Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Näytti Lappeenrannan kirkollisissa ilmotuksissa olevan 24v nuorimies joka oli kuollut Ukrainassa... Mikä lienee tarina tämän takana. :confused:
Liittyisiköhän tähän? Osui vain silmiin ja tuli mieleen tuo sinun viestisi. Venäjähän ottaa heti propagandana irti jos jotain tämmöistä tulee julki.
 
Liittyisiköhän tähän? Osui vain silmiin ja tuli mieleen tuo sinun viestisi. Venäjähän ottaa heti propagandana irti jos jotain tämmöistä tulee julki.
Tuossa mainitaan, että olisi kyse 2004 henkirikostuomion saaneesta henkilöstä. Eli hyvin mahdollisesti eri tapaukset.
 
Thorkill vahvistaa Pokrovskin tarun olevan loppua vaille valmis. Pitkään tuolla on sinnitelty ja valtavat tappiot tuotettu mutta kuten Kurskissakin, Rubicon-yksiköllä suuri vaikutus yleistilanteeseen.
Situation in the Pokrovsk area, Part III.

Information arriving yesterday and today from the Pokrovsk area indicates that the Ukrainian command of the 7th Corps, initiated approximately a week ago, attempted to stabilize the city's defenses based on the railway line, has failed. Russian assault groups are penetrating further north, both in the area of the road to Pavlohrad (48.293887, 37.126165) and the adjacent industrial district, as well as north of the railway station within the 8th district (48.295010, 37.186230).

The railway line was the last natural defensive line from which Ukrainian troops could still defend themselves in the city. Since deploying larger reserve forces into the very narrow isthmus currently separating the Pokrov Agglomeration from the rest of Ukraine is impossible – due to the Russian air superiority of the Rubicon drone group – the Ukrainian General Staff "East" command has practically run out of options to improve the operational situation. Thus, everything indicates that the battle for the Pokrov Agglomeration is entering its final stage.

In recent days, the Special Operations Command (DS) has finally awakened from its slumber and begun updating the map in the Pokrov area, slowly making up for weeks of delays. Suddenly, it turned out that "the Zverovo area is a weak point in the Ukrainian defense," which the enemy exploited to penetrate deeper into the city. In fact, the Russians breached the defense lines of the 32nd Air Base there around the end of September, and they had been penetrating even earlier, since mid-September. A similar situation occurred in the area of Chervony Lyman and the Rodyńskie-Pokrovsk intersection with the road to Hryshine (48.32307, 37.20346). Fierce fighting for the area has been ongoing since early September 2025. During these battles, the Ukrainians lost more than a dozen combat vehicles and MRAPs, as well as several dozen soldiers, in counterattacks, only to be able to halt the advance of the 9th Rifle Brigade (Zmot), which was attacking there. The Soviet Defense Forces (DS) began gradually marking the advance of Russian troops in the Chervonograd Lyman area on their map only in the last few days.

This can be continued in the deconstruction of the Soviet Defense Forces (DS) and profiles like Osman, Officer, etc., which, a few days ago – just after the publication of an article in Ukrainska Pravda presenting the actual situation in Pokrovsk – suddenly discovered that the situation there was critical. "Worst of all, the enemy has managed to disrupt logistics towards Myrhorod and the entire urban area. In addition to infantry ambushes, enemy drones are actively operating, monitoring and striking movements towards positions, supplies, etc.," the Soviet Defense Forces (DS) wrote today.

Except that the exact same thing could be heard in a front-line report by Slidstvo on Tube from September 18th, which I wrote about at the time. The soldiers of the 68th Yager Brigade, who spoke there, were already saying that Rubicon controlled the skies over Pokrovsk and all roads leading to it from the Shevchenko-Hryshine direction – which were at the Ukrainian disposal – using FPV drones and larger Molnya-type attack drones. Access to the city by car was already practically impossible. The report went unnoticed because Bankova was in the middle of creating a media spin called "big Russian cauldrons near Dobropol" so that Zelensky could boast about allegedly encircling 1,000 Russian soldiers during a conversation with Trump, and this could not be interrupted.

In summary, the "advice" published today in a long DS post entitled "What needs to be done to save Pokrovsk" is obviously at least a month late, and the people in this analytical group are well aware of this. They only serve to maintain credibility in the "we warned you" style.
/SPOILER]
 
"Näytti Lappeenrannan kirkollisissa ilmotuksissa olevan 24v nuorimies joka oli kuollut Ukrainassa... Mikä lienee tarina tämän takana."

Vuonna 2024 kuollut, mutta ikää 28v. 😓
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Miten mulle tuli mieleen se erikoismies joka esitteli itsensä kouluttajaksi mutta ei sitten ollutkaan, hieman vanhempi mies ja nimi oli Ruotsalaista alkuperää joku Kenneth tjsp... Muistaako kukaan?

 
Mitä kummaa tänne on rakennettu ?

Kaasulaitoksen vieressä toista sataa betonilaattaa, missä maavallit ympärillä. Rakennettu kesällä -25.




Katso liite: 125935
Copilotilla tulkasin kuvaa ja saatavilla olevaa OSINT tietoa:

Here’s what OSINT reveals about the location and the southern cluster:

Coordinates & Main Facility

  • The coordinates (52°50'00.9"N, 55°45'17.5"E) point to Karagali, near Orenburg Oblast, Russia.
  • This area is associated with Russian military-industrial infrastructure, not civilian industry. It is part of a network of clusters supporting defense production and logistics. Russia’s military industry relies on hundreds of such clusters, integrating manufacturing, storage, and testing facilities[1].

South Cluster (Dispersed Small Units)

  • The dispersed layout of 20–30 small structures (10–20 m each) along winding roads is consistent with ammunition or explosives storage depots.
  • International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) recommend such spacing to prevent sympathetic detonations and minimize blast effects. The pattern matches these standards: isolated storage cells, connected by controlled-access roads, often with earthen berms or natural cover[2][3].
  • These facilities typically store:
    • Artillery shells, rockets, and small arms ammunition
    • Possibly explosive ordnance or propellants
  • The design is not typical for housing or light industry; it strongly suggests military ordnance storage.

Strategic Context

  • Russia consolidates non-strategic nuclear and conventional munitions in centralized storage sites, often near major military-industrial hubs. While there is no direct evidence of nuclear material here, the layout aligns with conventional ammunition depots supporting nearby production or training units[4].
  • Such clusters are often linked to testing ranges or training grounds, which could explain the extensive road network south of the main complex.

Assessment

The southern cluster is almost certainly an ammunition storage area designed for safety and security:

  • Purpose: Stockpiling conventional munitions for nearby military facilities.
  • Indicators: Dispersed pattern, small isolated buildings, controlled road network, proximity to a major defense complex.

Tarkemmin kaiveltuna Copilot muutti vastausta, liian vähän lähtötietoja saa LLM:n hallusinoimaan.. toki tämäkin pitäisi tarkistaa jostain ;)

Here’s what OSINT reveals about Kanchurinskoye UPKhG (Канчуринское УПХГ) and its implications for the south cluster:




What is Kanchurinskoye UPKhG?


  • UPKhG stands for Управление Подземного Хранения Газа = Underground Gas Storage Management.
  • Kanchurinskoye UPKhG is a Gazprom-operated underground gas storage facility located in Bashkortostan.
  • Purpose:
    • Inject, store, and withdraw natural gas from porous geological formations.
    • Regulate seasonal and peak demand fluctuations and ensure uninterrupted operation of the regional gas transmission system.
  • Scale & Infrastructure:
    • One of the largest underground gas storage sites in Russia.
    • Active capacity: ~4.7 billion cubic meters of gas.
    • Includes compressor stations, gas treatment units, gas collection points, and 167 wells.
    • Operates at pressures up to 14.7 MPa. [uglevodorody.ru], [eng.bashinform.ru], [linkedin.com]



Relation to the South Cluster


  • The main facility at the pin is clearly tied to gas storage and processing, not ammunition.
  • The dispersed southern cluster could be:
    • Well pads or auxiliary installations for injection/withdrawal operations.
    • Monitoring stations or methanol injection points (methanol is used to prevent hydrate formation in gas pipelines).
    • Possibly gas collection manifolds or pressure regulation nodes.
  • The winding road network and spacing align with well distribution patterns in underground gas storage fields, where each pad accesses a different part of the reservoir.



Is Ammunition Storage Still Likely?


  • Unlikely, given:
    • Direct association with Gazprom and gas infrastructure.
    • No OSINT evidence of military ordnance activity in this area.
  • The layout mimics gas field well clusters, not explosive storage depots (which usually have visible blast berms and security fencing).
  • The presence of 167 wells in official descriptions strongly supports the interpretation that these small units are wellheads or related gas infrastructure, not ammunition bunkers. [eng.bashinform.ru]



Operational Role of South Cluster


  • Most probable purpose:
    • Distributed gas injection/withdrawal wells connected to the underground storage reservoir.
    • Supporting infrastructure for pressure control, pipeline interconnects, and chemical treatment.
  • Strategic importance:
    • Critical for Russia’s energy security and seasonal gas supply management.
    • Part of the Unified Gas Supply System (UGSS).
 
Viimeksi muokattu:

Ukrainassa sotinut suomalainen: "Kai se sotarikos oli tai jotain – naurettiin ja elämä jatkui"​

00:00 Miksi et paljasta henkilöllisyyttäsi?
03:55 Elämä ennen sotaa – sekoilua ja maleksimista
06:43 Päätös lähteä sotaan
09:52 Lähtö Ukrainaan
16:17 Kuvaile sotaan joutumista
19:07 Ensimmäinen ruumis tulee vastaan
23:49 Suomalainen kaveri saa osuman
36:04 Joukkuekaverit Rory ja Steve kuolevat
48:45 Päätös lähteä pois sodasta
58:04 Vapaaehtoisten motiivit lähteä sotaan
1:03:23 Miten käsitys sodasta muuttui
1:10:15 Vihasitko vihollista?
1:11:52 Supo kiinnostui
1:15:07 "Ukrainassa natsit osa järjestelmää"
1:19:21 "Kai se sotarikos oli tai jotain..."
1:32:09 Lähtisitkö sotaan uudestaan?
1:37:01 Sodassa kuolleiden Roryn ja Stevenin taustat
1:38:25 "Elliksen" huono lapsuus
 
Turvatakuista Ukrainan tapauksessa, ei ihme jos heillä on hieman skeptinen muisto, kertoo tekoäly:


Neuvostoliitto ei tarjonnut turvatakuita Ukrainalle, vaan tilanne liittyy Budapestin muistioon vuodelta 1994, jolloin Neuvostoliitto oli jo hajonnut. Tässä sopimuksessa Ukraina luopui ydinaseistaan vastineeksi turvatakuista, jotka antoivat Yhdysvallat, Britannia ja Venäjä. Ukrainan alueellinen koskemattomuus taattiin sopimuksessa, mutta tämä lupaus rikottiin Venäjän Krimin valtauksessa vuonna 2014.

  • Neuvostoliiton perintö:
    Ukraina oli Neuvostoliiton hajottua vuonna 1991 maailman kolmanneksi suurin ydinasevalta, ja sen maaperällä oli yli 1 900 ydinkärkeä.
    • Ukraina luovutti ydinaseensa Venäjälle hävitettäväksi.
    • Vastineeksi Yhdysvallat, Britannia ja Venäjä takasivat Ukrainalle sen alueellisen koskemattomuuden.
  • Lupauksen rikkominen:
    Venäjä valtasi Krimin niemimaan vuonna 2014, mikä osoitti, että Budapestin muistioon liittyvät turvatakuut eivät olleet riittäviä.
  • Seuraukset:
    Tämä kokemus johti siihen, että ukrainalaiset eivät luota Venäjän kanssa tehtyihin sopimuksiin, ja sopimusten noudattaminen on osoittautunut epäluotettavaksi, Yle toteaa.
 
Turvatakuista Ukrainan tapauksessa, ei ihme jos heillä on hieman skeptinen muisto, kertoo tekoäly:


Neuvostoliitto ei tarjonnut turvatakuita Ukrainalle, vaan tilanne liittyy Budapestin muistioon vuodelta 1994, jolloin Neuvostoliitto oli jo hajonnut. Tässä sopimuksessa Ukraina luopui ydinaseistaan vastineeksi turvatakuista, jotka antoivat Yhdysvallat, Britannia ja Venäjä. Ukrainan alueellinen koskemattomuus taattiin sopimuksessa, mutta tämä lupaus rikottiin Venäjän Krimin valtauksessa vuonna 2014.

  • Neuvostoliiton perintö:
    Ukraina oli Neuvostoliiton hajottua vuonna 1991 maailman kolmanneksi suurin ydinasevalta, ja sen maaperällä oli yli 1 900 ydinkärkeä.
    • Ukraina luovutti ydinaseensa Venäjälle hävitettäväksi.
    • Vastineeksi Yhdysvallat, Britannia ja Venäjä takasivat Ukrainalle sen alueellisen koskemattomuuden.
  • Lupauksen rikkominen:
    Venäjä valtasi Krimin niemimaan vuonna 2014, mikä osoitti, että Budapestin muistioon liittyvät turvatakuut eivät olleet riittäviä.
  • Seuraukset:
    Tämä kokemus johti siihen, että ukrainalaiset eivät luota Venäjän kanssa tehtyihin sopimuksiin, ja sopimusten noudattaminen on osoittautunut epäluotettavaksi, Yle toteaa.

Kaiken huipuksi Ukraina antoi myös tuhansia tonneja rakettipolttoaineita hävitettäväksi, mutta ryssä on kierrättänyt ne ja ladannut uudelleen ohjuksiin jonka jälkeen on ampunut ne Ukrainaan. Luottamus on varmasti ihan nolla ja se ainoa toimiva turvallisuustakuu on oma vahva armeija.
 
Thorkill vahvistaa Pokrovskin tarun olevan loppua vaille valmis. Pitkään tuolla on sinnitelty ja valtavat tappiot tuotettu mutta kuten Kurskissakin, Rubicon-yksiköllä suuri vaikutus yleistilanteeseen.
Situation in the Pokrovsk area, Part III.

Information arriving yesterday and today from the Pokrovsk area indicates that the Ukrainian command of the 7th Corps, initiated approximately a week ago, attempted to stabilize the city's defenses based on the railway line, has failed. Russian assault groups are penetrating further north, both in the area of the road to Pavlohrad (48.293887, 37.126165) and the adjacent industrial district, as well as north of the railway station within the 8th district (48.295010, 37.186230).

The railway line was the last natural defensive line from which Ukrainian troops could still defend themselves in the city. Since deploying larger reserve forces into the very narrow isthmus currently separating the Pokrov Agglomeration from the rest of Ukraine is impossible – due to the Russian air superiority of the Rubicon drone group – the Ukrainian General Staff "East" command has practically run out of options to improve the operational situation. Thus, everything indicates that the battle for the Pokrov Agglomeration is entering its final stage.

In recent days, the Special Operations Command (DS) has finally awakened from its slumber and begun updating the map in the Pokrov area, slowly making up for weeks of delays. Suddenly, it turned out that "the Zverovo area is a weak point in the Ukrainian defense," which the enemy exploited to penetrate deeper into the city. In fact, the Russians breached the defense lines of the 32nd Air Base there around the end of September, and they had been penetrating even earlier, since mid-September. A similar situation occurred in the area of Chervony Lyman and the Rodyńskie-Pokrovsk intersection with the road to Hryshine (48.32307, 37.20346). Fierce fighting for the area has been ongoing since early September 2025. During these battles, the Ukrainians lost more than a dozen combat vehicles and MRAPs, as well as several dozen soldiers, in counterattacks, only to be able to halt the advance of the 9th Rifle Brigade (Zmot), which was attacking there. The Soviet Defense Forces (DS) began gradually marking the advance of Russian troops in the Chervonograd Lyman area on their map only in the last few days.

This can be continued in the deconstruction of the Soviet Defense Forces (DS) and profiles like Osman, Officer, etc., which, a few days ago – just after the publication of an article in Ukrainska Pravda presenting the actual situation in Pokrovsk – suddenly discovered that the situation there was critical. "Worst of all, the enemy has managed to disrupt logistics towards Myrhorod and the entire urban area. In addition to infantry ambushes, enemy drones are actively operating, monitoring and striking movements towards positions, supplies, etc.," the Soviet Defense Forces (DS) wrote today.

Except that the exact same thing could be heard in a front-line report by Slidstvo on Tube from September 18th, which I wrote about at the time. The soldiers of the 68th Yager Brigade, who spoke there, were already saying that Rubicon controlled the skies over Pokrovsk and all roads leading to it from the Shevchenko-Hryshine direction – which were at the Ukrainian disposal – using FPV drones and larger Molnya-type attack drones. Access to the city by car was already practically impossible. The report went unnoticed because Bankova was in the middle of creating a media spin called "big Russian cauldrons near Dobropol" so that Zelensky could boast about allegedly encircling 1,000 Russian soldiers during a conversation with Trump, and this could not be interrupted.

In summary, the "advice" published today in a long DS post entitled "What needs to be done to save Pokrovsk" is obviously at least a month late, and the people in this analytical group are well aware of this. They only serve to maintain credibility in the "we warned you" style.
/SPOILER]

Muistelen että syyskuussa oli palstallakin juttua, että logistiikka on mahdotonta Pokrovskiin. Siihen nähden on pitkään pidetty. Kuinka nopeasti alueesta luovutaan jää nähtäväksi.

Näissä Thorkillin kommenteissa on viime kuukausina häirinnyt lisääntyvä vinoilu eri suuntiin. Omissa silmissäni syönyt uskottavuutta.
 
Hoksaako kukaan muu samaa asiayhteyttä, mutta kun ryssä ottaa joka yö vastaan Ukrainan drooniaallon ja jalostamoja sekä tehtaita palaa solkenaan niin Putler testaa ja puhuu ydinaseista. Se kortti otetaan pöydälle kun mitään muuta ei ole. Ukaasit pajareille on jo annettu eikä mikään muutu, uusi käryävä laitos tai useampia joka ainoa yö.

Sitten tullaan höpisemään Tsirkonista, Sarmatista, Poseidonista tai Burevestnikista, ai niin ja Oreshnikista. Mistä tahansa muusta kuin siitä, että Venäjää kairataan kakkoseen aika huolella.
 
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