Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Kattelin karttaa https://www.google.com/maps/place/N...try=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI1MTExMi4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw== , eihän tuo lahti oo leveimmältä kohdaltakaan infran täyttämänä kuin 2-3km maks. Ryssän tietäen ja noita videoita katellen, ei siellä ole etukäteen mitään turvallisia tai edes järkeviä ampumasektoreita kateltu. Ruumiita ja vahinkoa tulee torjunnasta yhtä paljon kuin hyökkääjän toimesta
Ilman räjähteitäkin ilmaan laitettu drone voi tuottaa kivaa vahinkoa, ryssien ampuessa toisensa 
missileman
Kenraali
Pieni videonpätkä kauko-ohjatun kulkijan toiminnasta ja venäläisryhmän räjäyttämisestä. Tuollaiset autonomiset maalaiteet toimisivat varmaan hyvin tilanteissa, joissa pitäisi vihollisajoneuvoja saada toimintakyvyttömäksi tai pysäytettyä.
Paitsi että muut seuraajat saattavat olla väärässä esmes Ukrainan puolustuksen romahtamisesta tai ryssien hyökkäyksen aiheuttamasta läpimurrosta... Kastekelmi on aina oikeassa jos ryssä menestyy ja väärässä jos Ukraina menestyy. Siinä se ero on
Antares
Respected Leader
Huolestuttava arvio.
Tatarigami_UA kommentoi viestiä näin:
Famous Ukrainian volunteer and head of the Sternenko Community Foundation, which supplies drones to the front lines, gives the following assessment: “We are heading toward a strategic-scale catastrophe that could cost us our statehood. And that’s a very diplomatic assessment.”
If you want to support his efforts, you can always check the ongoing fundraisers on his fund’s community webpage or on the X. (@sternenko ) and (@sternenkofund )
https://www.sternenkofund.org/en/donate
I don’t agree that we’re on the verge of a strategic catastrophe, but I do think we’re gambling with one, and the risk is growing over time. He is right to call for changes, which you can read in his original statement.
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Andrew Perpetua vastasi tähän näin: LÄHDE
The priorities are simply bizarre. Getting your ass handed to you in Kupyansk while clinging to meaningless land around Pokrovsk and completely sacrificing the entire southern line. The leadership in charge of this are not making rational decisions by any stretch.
The leadership clung to severodonetsk and bakhmut while sacrificing the south, and now they are doing it again. Over and over again they make the same mistake. One could see this trap developing a year in advance.
I think even unobservant people saw this coming even last autumn if not last summer. That Russia was going to load up on an attack on Pokrovsk to force Ukraine to put all their forces there and then sneak through the south to push toward Pavlohrad.
Kastehelmi katsoo rintama linjaa ja sen jälkeen uudestaan rintamalinjaa. Sitä vaan pohtii että missä se linja oikein todella merkitsevästi kulkee ? Jake Broe arvioi viimeisimmällä videollaan sivulausessa että moskovan vienti harmaisiin tankkereihin Mustanmeren kautta OLI 100 miljoonaa dollaria per päivä mutta nyt on totaali pysähtynyt. Tuohon ei ollu valitettavasti lähdettä, mutta varmaan menetettyjen öljy tappioiden koko luokka oli oikea ?Paitsi että muut seuraajat saattavat olla väärässä esmes Ukrainan puolustuksen romahtamisesta tai ryssien hyökkäyksen aiheuttamasta läpimurrosta... Kastekelmi on aina oikeassa jos ryssä menestyy ja väärässä jos Ukraina menestyy. Siinä se ero on
Jos näin on - niin - Mun insinöörin aivot sanoo öljysataman nollaukset on sama kuin periaatteessa muutaman päivän välein olisi upottanut Moskvan tästä eteenpäin kunnes putket on korjattu - mutta - muistakaa, että sehän moskva oli jo investoinniltaan kuoletettu sijoitus ja vanhaa rautaa. Nyt jos moskovasta katoaa luokkaa 100 miljoonaa per päivä valuuttaa se sattuu kovaa koska se menetys koskee sitä hinta-laatu suhteen tavaraa jota ryssä tänään ja nyt eniten kaipaa seuraavaan vunderwaffe hyökkäykseen mutta johon ei olekkaan varaa. Tärkeät dronet ja lentopommit jää ostamatta kun karkkirahoja ei ole. Näitä asioita se Kastehelmi ei katso vaan se katsoo vain rintamaa.
Tietysti myös rintama on hyvin perustavanlaatuinen tekijä. Jos kävisi niin, että Venäjän eteneminen muuttuisi olennaisesti nopeammaksi niin se muuttaa koko vallitsevan perusasetelman.
Esimerkiksi 100 miljoonan lisäeuron puuttuminen Venäjän taloudesta per päivä on tietysti merkittävä ongelma, mutta jos ja kun Putin on päättänyt, että tätä sotaa ei ole varaa hävitä (koska häviö tietäisi hänelle vallan menetystä), niin kyllä se puuttuva raha tiristettäneen jostain osasta kansantaloutta vielä pitkään. Kestämättömin seurauksin toki, mutta se on tulevaisuuden murhe.
Esimerkiksi 100 miljoonan lisäeuron puuttuminen Venäjän taloudesta per päivä on tietysti merkittävä ongelma, mutta jos ja kun Putin on päättänyt, että tätä sotaa ei ole varaa hävitä (koska häviö tietäisi hänelle vallan menetystä), niin kyllä se puuttuva raha tiristettäneen jostain osasta kansantaloutta vielä pitkään. Kestämättömin seurauksin toki, mutta se on tulevaisuuden murhe.
John Hilly
Respected Leader
Venäjän uudistunut droonistrategia heikentää Ukrainan puolustusta...
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Venäjä on ottanut valtavan harppauksen lennokkisodassa | Verkkouutiset
Venäjä on ottanut valtavan harppauksen lennokkisodassa | Verkkouutiset
www.verkkouutiset.fi
viimeinen mohikaani
Eversti
Varomatonta tupakointia Novokuibysevskin öljynjalostamolla Samaran oblastissa noin 1000 kilometriä Ukrainasta:
Cyka, blyat, mikä tulipallo!
Cyka, blyat, mikä tulipallo!
missileman
Kenraali
Hieman menee ohi Ukrainan sodasta. Fico luennoimassa lukiolaisille, jotka alkavat haastamaan häntä liittyen Ukrainaan. Käskee alaikäisiä oppilaita menemään taistelemaan Ukrainaan. Porukka poistuu tilaisuudesta avaimia heiluttaen mikä viittaa tsekkoslovakian -89 tienoilla kommunistihallinnon kukistamiseen. Säälittävä kaveri ja miten fiksua nuorisoa Slovakiassakin 
Thorkilin analyysi Zaporizhian tilanteesta. Hänen mukaansa kartalla näytti selvältä mihin Ukrainan pitää keskittyä puolustuksessa, mutta tilanteeseen herättiin ns. paskat housussa ja paikalle saatiin puolikuntoinen kivääriprikaati ilman raskasta kalustoa Lviv:stä syyskuun lopussa. Sen jälkeen tämän prikaatin vierekkäiset pataljoonat alistettiin vielä eri komentoketjuuun syystä tai toisesta. Yksi pataljoona menetti 40% vahvuudesta.
Tämä kirjoittaja näyttäisi kahlaavan läpi paljon prikaatien telegram-kanavia, alueellisia someja yms. josta imee tietoja
Tämä kirjoittaja näyttäisi kahlaavan läpi paljon prikaatien telegram-kanavia, alueellisia someja yms. josta imee tietoja
A Recipe for Disaster. How General Syrski and the Ukrainian General Staff Defended the Yanchurian River Line in the Hulyaipolsky Direction.
When, in early September 2025, units of the Russian General Staff "Vostok" began approaching Hulyaipolsky from the east, I reassured everyone in my posts about this direction and in the comments below. I wrote at the time that the Ukrainian XX Corps was withdrawing because it was only conducting delaying operations ahead of its main defense line, based on the western bank of the Yanchurian River along the Danylivka-Uspenivka-Poltavka-Malynivka section.
"No one will commit large forces to defensive operations with the river behind them. On its western side, the Ukrainians already have a prepared defense line," I wrote at the time. As it turned out, I was completely wrong. I overestimated General Syrski and the Ukrainian General Staff. Nothing was prepared or organized on the Yanchurian River line in early September. Instead of fresh Ukrainian troops standing and waiting for the approaching Russians in previously constructed field fortifications, only the wind howled across the empty steppe.
The Yanchurian River may not be a particularly favorable natural frontier. For a long stretch, it flows in a relatively narrow, shallow valley—though in a bed with rather steep banks—acting as a natural moat and anti-vehicle ditch. Its valley widens gently, "dissolving" into the surrounding steppe, in two places: near the villages of Poltavka and Uspenivka. It was therefore obvious that the Russian command of the Vostok General Staff would seek favorable locations there to cross the river and establish a bridgehead on the western bank. The Ukrainian Border Guard and the Supreme Command should pay special attention to these defensive sectors: prepare the fortifications and man them well in advance with fresh, valuable units, so that their soldiers and commanders could thoroughly familiarize themselves with the surrounding area. In military terminology, this is called "establishing a unit in the field." Centuries ago, it was discovered that this positively impacts defense stability.
What did the Ukrainian Border Guard and Supreme Command prepare to defend the line of the Janczur River near Poltavka look like in practice? When, in the first half of September, the Russian 127th Rifle Division, the first unit of the "Vostok" Army, reached the river near this village, the Ukrainian Border Guard and Supreme Command suddenly awoke from their slumber and began preparations, already delayed by then, to secure Poltavka from the Steppe-Levadne direction, which appeared to be improvisational. On September 10, at their command, elements of the 125th "Heavy" Infantry Brigade were dispatched to the area. It is unclear why this particular unit was chosen. It appears to have been simply because they were readily available, although many indications suggest they lacked sufficient combat readiness to undertake the task outlined in their orders.
In the first half of September 2025, units of the 125th Heavy Mech Brigade were stationed in the Lviv region, where, from the beginning of August, they had been conducting a largely feigned reorganization. According to the description, the goal was supposedly to transform the former 125th OT Brigade into a heavy mech brigade with two tank battalions, two mech battalions, and a rifle battalion. In reality, throughout August, only a change in organizational structure occurred: the former 215th and 216th OT Battalions were merged into the 1st Mech Battalion, the 217th and 219th Battalions were merged into the 2nd Mech Battalion, and the 218th Battalion became the 1st Rifle Battalion. This concealed the fact that individual OT battalions actually had the strength of company battle groups, while the entire former OT brigade had the strength of a half-brigade. By September, the 125th Brigade had received neither recruits to supplement its personnel nor any heavy combat equipment (infantry vehicles or tanks). It remained a light infantry unit equipped only with wheeled vehicles: pickup trucks and Hummers. Ultimately, the 2nd Mech Battalion (formerly the 217th/219th Infantry Battalion) and the 1st Rifle Battalion (formerly the 218th Infantry Battalion) were dispatched to Zaporizhzhia.
When the transfer of the 125th Brigade units to the Poltavka area was completed on September 15th, it turned out that their commanders and soldiers had only one day to familiarize themselves with the terrain for future combat operations and the situation on this section of the front, as the 114th Rifle Regiment (ZMOT) of the 127th Division was already approaching the village from the east. At the same time, in a completely incomprehensible decision, the Ukrainian Supreme Command—instead of creating the "Poltavka" tactical group from these battalions under joint command, subordinated to a single higher tactical unit—decided that the battalions of the same brigade, defending the same area, would be placed under the control of two different commands: the 1st Rifle Battalion was subordinated to the 110th Rifle Brigade, and the 2nd Mech Battalion to the 102nd Tactical Brigade. The reason for such an irrational decision will remain one of Syrski's mysteries. However, I am convinced that such foolishness was not taught at the Higher Military Command School in Moscow, from which Syrski graduated in 1986.
The effects of creating this completely illogical, thoughtless organization for the defense of the Poltava region were not long in coming. I described this in more detail in a post two days ago. You can find it at this link: x.com/Thorkill65/sta…
Briefly, on September 19-20, the 1st Rifle Battalion was defeated after receiving no support from the 110th Infantry Brigade command, leaving a gap in the Ukrainian defense lines. The second battalion of the 125th Brigade, isolated, heroically defended Poltavka for the next three weeks, from September 20 to October 15, sending appeals for help. These appeals went unanswered. On the evening of October 15, the 2nd Mech Battalion—after losing approximately 40 percent of its initial personnel and finally obtaining permission from the XX Corps command to retreat—withdrew from the Poltavka area. The next day, elements of the 127th Rifle Division (Zmot) entered the empty village, and the breakthrough of the Ukrainian perimeter along the Janczur River became a fact. Two weeks later, after a series of errors resulting from a lack of coordination between hastily transferred Ukrainian units from various brigades and the resulting improvised defense organization, the Ukrainian defense line on the Janczur River in the Uspenivka region was quickly and almost without significant fighting. As a result, the last good defense line east of Hulyaipol was breached by the Russians along almost its entire length in just six weeks of fighting.
When, in early September 2025, units of the Russian General Staff "Vostok" began approaching Hulyaipolsky from the east, I reassured everyone in my posts about this direction and in the comments below. I wrote at the time that the Ukrainian XX Corps was withdrawing because it was only conducting delaying operations ahead of its main defense line, based on the western bank of the Yanchurian River along the Danylivka-Uspenivka-Poltavka-Malynivka section.
"No one will commit large forces to defensive operations with the river behind them. On its western side, the Ukrainians already have a prepared defense line," I wrote at the time. As it turned out, I was completely wrong. I overestimated General Syrski and the Ukrainian General Staff. Nothing was prepared or organized on the Yanchurian River line in early September. Instead of fresh Ukrainian troops standing and waiting for the approaching Russians in previously constructed field fortifications, only the wind howled across the empty steppe.
The Yanchurian River may not be a particularly favorable natural frontier. For a long stretch, it flows in a relatively narrow, shallow valley—though in a bed with rather steep banks—acting as a natural moat and anti-vehicle ditch. Its valley widens gently, "dissolving" into the surrounding steppe, in two places: near the villages of Poltavka and Uspenivka. It was therefore obvious that the Russian command of the Vostok General Staff would seek favorable locations there to cross the river and establish a bridgehead on the western bank. The Ukrainian Border Guard and the Supreme Command should pay special attention to these defensive sectors: prepare the fortifications and man them well in advance with fresh, valuable units, so that their soldiers and commanders could thoroughly familiarize themselves with the surrounding area. In military terminology, this is called "establishing a unit in the field." Centuries ago, it was discovered that this positively impacts defense stability.
What did the Ukrainian Border Guard and Supreme Command prepare to defend the line of the Janczur River near Poltavka look like in practice? When, in the first half of September, the Russian 127th Rifle Division, the first unit of the "Vostok" Army, reached the river near this village, the Ukrainian Border Guard and Supreme Command suddenly awoke from their slumber and began preparations, already delayed by then, to secure Poltavka from the Steppe-Levadne direction, which appeared to be improvisational. On September 10, at their command, elements of the 125th "Heavy" Infantry Brigade were dispatched to the area. It is unclear why this particular unit was chosen. It appears to have been simply because they were readily available, although many indications suggest they lacked sufficient combat readiness to undertake the task outlined in their orders.
In the first half of September 2025, units of the 125th Heavy Mech Brigade were stationed in the Lviv region, where, from the beginning of August, they had been conducting a largely feigned reorganization. According to the description, the goal was supposedly to transform the former 125th OT Brigade into a heavy mech brigade with two tank battalions, two mech battalions, and a rifle battalion. In reality, throughout August, only a change in organizational structure occurred: the former 215th and 216th OT Battalions were merged into the 1st Mech Battalion, the 217th and 219th Battalions were merged into the 2nd Mech Battalion, and the 218th Battalion became the 1st Rifle Battalion. This concealed the fact that individual OT battalions actually had the strength of company battle groups, while the entire former OT brigade had the strength of a half-brigade. By September, the 125th Brigade had received neither recruits to supplement its personnel nor any heavy combat equipment (infantry vehicles or tanks). It remained a light infantry unit equipped only with wheeled vehicles: pickup trucks and Hummers. Ultimately, the 2nd Mech Battalion (formerly the 217th/219th Infantry Battalion) and the 1st Rifle Battalion (formerly the 218th Infantry Battalion) were dispatched to Zaporizhzhia.
When the transfer of the 125th Brigade units to the Poltavka area was completed on September 15th, it turned out that their commanders and soldiers had only one day to familiarize themselves with the terrain for future combat operations and the situation on this section of the front, as the 114th Rifle Regiment (ZMOT) of the 127th Division was already approaching the village from the east. At the same time, in a completely incomprehensible decision, the Ukrainian Supreme Command—instead of creating the "Poltavka" tactical group from these battalions under joint command, subordinated to a single higher tactical unit—decided that the battalions of the same brigade, defending the same area, would be placed under the control of two different commands: the 1st Rifle Battalion was subordinated to the 110th Rifle Brigade, and the 2nd Mech Battalion to the 102nd Tactical Brigade. The reason for such an irrational decision will remain one of Syrski's mysteries. However, I am convinced that such foolishness was not taught at the Higher Military Command School in Moscow, from which Syrski graduated in 1986.
The effects of creating this completely illogical, thoughtless organization for the defense of the Poltava region were not long in coming. I described this in more detail in a post two days ago. You can find it at this link: x.com/Thorkill65/sta…
Briefly, on September 19-20, the 1st Rifle Battalion was defeated after receiving no support from the 110th Infantry Brigade command, leaving a gap in the Ukrainian defense lines. The second battalion of the 125th Brigade, isolated, heroically defended Poltavka for the next three weeks, from September 20 to October 15, sending appeals for help. These appeals went unanswered. On the evening of October 15, the 2nd Mech Battalion—after losing approximately 40 percent of its initial personnel and finally obtaining permission from the XX Corps command to retreat—withdrew from the Poltavka area. The next day, elements of the 127th Rifle Division (Zmot) entered the empty village, and the breakthrough of the Ukrainian perimeter along the Janczur River became a fact. Two weeks later, after a series of errors resulting from a lack of coordination between hastily transferred Ukrainian units from various brigades and the resulting improvised defense organization, the Ukrainian defense line on the Janczur River in the Uspenivka region was quickly and almost without significant fighting. As a result, the last good defense line east of Hulyaipol was breached by the Russians along almost its entire length in just six weeks of fighting.
Viimeksi muokattu:
J0h1F
Respected Leader
Ensimmäisen maailmansodan taktiikkaa tuosta vastuussa olevilta, eli että oma suurin voima laitetaan vihollisen suurinta voimaa vastaan.
Onkohan sitä täällä kauan sitten peräänkuuluttamaani kantalinnoitettua ketjua tehty drooninkantaman päähän nykyisistä asemista?
Tämä tosin ei aseta kovin häävejä odotuksia.