Antares
Respected Leader
Pari mielipidettä, miksi salamurha ei ole Putinin vahvuuden vaan heikkouden merkki:
Kysymys: Is it possible that Putin comes out of this episode stronger? He identified multiple Generals who are not loyal to him and he assassinated a formidable rival. He reinforced fear to any potential individuals who may want to challenge his regime!
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Garry Kasparovin vastaus: No. When a dictator is reduced to murdering members of his inner circle and fighting with and replacing his own generals, the situation is very dangerous. There is no trust among those who remain, and therefore no loyalty. The knives are out and must taste blood.
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Venäjän-tutkija Mark Galeottin kirjoitus, toki edustaa alustavia näkemyksiä koska tapaus on niin tuore eikä tiedetä kaikkia yksityiskohtia (mikäli ne saadaan koskaan tietoon): LÄHDE
#Prigozhin’s death has exposed #Putin’s weakness
Quick first thoughts on the latest episode in the murderous Russian soap opera/Shakespearean drama for @SpecCoffeeHouse
Kysymys: Is it possible that Putin comes out of this episode stronger? He identified multiple Generals who are not loyal to him and he assassinated a formidable rival. He reinforced fear to any potential individuals who may want to challenge his regime!
-
Garry Kasparovin vastaus: No. When a dictator is reduced to murdering members of his inner circle and fighting with and replacing his own generals, the situation is very dangerous. There is no trust among those who remain, and therefore no loyalty. The knives are out and must taste blood.
-
Venäjän-tutkija Mark Galeottin kirjoitus, toki edustaa alustavia näkemyksiä koska tapaus on niin tuore eikä tiedetä kaikkia yksityiskohtia (mikäli ne saadaan koskaan tietoon): LÄHDE
#Prigozhin’s death has exposed #Putin’s weakness
Quick first thoughts on the latest episode in the murderous Russian soap opera/Shakespearean drama for @SpecCoffeeHouse
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/prigozhins-death-has-exposed-putins-weakness/
Yevgeny Prigozhin (Credit: Getty images)
So much is still unclear about the fate of Wagner group head Yevgeny Prigozhin, from whether he really did die in the private jet that plummeted to the ground in Russia’s Tver region to what caused the crash. In today’s Russia, after all, ‘mechanical problems’ could be anything from maintenance issues to the difficulty in flying when a bomb has blown a hole in your fuselage. The odds are, though, that he is indeed dead, and three things would follow from this.
First of all, that Wagner’s fate is sealed. Even its operations in Africa are unlikely to survive long term, given the degree to which they were bound in personal deals, illicit financial flows and corrupt understandings brokered by Prigozhin himself. Other Russian mercenary companies such as Redut, run by Prigozhin’s arch-rival Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, may try to muscle in on Wagner’s business, but it is unlikely they will simply be able to replace it.
Secondly, that the Kremlin had decided it could close the book on its investigations of Wagner’s recent mutiny, and that it had identified those who supported and sympathised with it. Suspected of being Prigozhin’s highest-placed military backer, General Sergei Surovikin had disappeared into custody and interrogation after the coup. Is it just a coincidence that on the same day as the plane crash Surovikin was formally dismissed from his position as commander of the Aerospace Forces?
Thirdly, that Putin – who would have had to have at the very least approved any decision to kill Prigozhin – has moved into a new and even more blatant era of assassination. This was vengeance not just on a grander style than in the past but also after Putin had apparently given his erstwhile lieutenant an at least temporary stay of execution. The increasingly dictatorial Russian leader may hope that this strengthens his position, but arguably the opposite may be true.
The Russian elites are likely to see this as evidence not that Putin is strong but that he is increasingly and murderously erratic. That he flip-flopped so quickly from lambasting Prigozhin as a traitor to inviting him to his recent Africa summit to murdering him will do nothing to calm nerves about Putin’s state of mind and grip on the system.
The mutiny itself was a mark of his failure to successfully manage the horizontal disputes; since the beginning, this management has been central to Putin’s style of governing. Of course, by mutinying – even if with the intent of persuading the boss to back him against Shoigu rather than to topple him – Prigozhin sealed his own fate.
However, the mark of a well-organised authoritarianism is that the regime does not need so openly to kill insiders, because they are deterred from breaking the rules of the system in the first place. Putin’s greatest threats are likely to come not from the streets, let alone the remnants of the liberal opposition, but from a pragmatic elite that is constantly weighing the dangers of living under him him against those of not doing so. The so-called ‘turbo-patriots’ who think his regime is too incompetent to win the war with Ukraine also pose a threat.
Assuming he did have Prigozhin killed – and that must be our working assumption for now – then Putin may have hoped to cow both groups with such a naked display of power and violence. But he may find he has done the opposite.
The ultra-nationalists are furious, some already vowing revenge, as they saw in the thuggish Prigozhin the kind of man who, in their eyes, would do whatever it took to win the war. The wider elite are much more circumspect, but they may well be getting closer to the point at which they consider themselves his hostages rather than his supporters. That does not mean they will turn against him any time soon, as matters will have to get much worse before the dangers in that course of action will be outweighed, but that potential tipping point is getting closer.
Mark Galeotti heads the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and is honorary professor at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies and the author of over 25 books on Russia. His latest, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, is out now.
Prigozhin’s death has exposed Putin’s weakness
- 24 August 2023, 6:51am
Yevgeny Prigozhin (Credit: Getty images)
So much is still unclear about the fate of Wagner group head Yevgeny Prigozhin, from whether he really did die in the private jet that plummeted to the ground in Russia’s Tver region to what caused the crash. In today’s Russia, after all, ‘mechanical problems’ could be anything from maintenance issues to the difficulty in flying when a bomb has blown a hole in your fuselage. The odds are, though, that he is indeed dead, and three things would follow from this.
First of all, that Wagner’s fate is sealed. Even its operations in Africa are unlikely to survive long term, given the degree to which they were bound in personal deals, illicit financial flows and corrupt understandings brokered by Prigozhin himself. Other Russian mercenary companies such as Redut, run by Prigozhin’s arch-rival Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, may try to muscle in on Wagner’s business, but it is unlikely they will simply be able to replace it.
Secondly, that the Kremlin had decided it could close the book on its investigations of Wagner’s recent mutiny, and that it had identified those who supported and sympathised with it. Suspected of being Prigozhin’s highest-placed military backer, General Sergei Surovikin had disappeared into custody and interrogation after the coup. Is it just a coincidence that on the same day as the plane crash Surovikin was formally dismissed from his position as commander of the Aerospace Forces?
Thirdly, that Putin – who would have had to have at the very least approved any decision to kill Prigozhin – has moved into a new and even more blatant era of assassination. This was vengeance not just on a grander style than in the past but also after Putin had apparently given his erstwhile lieutenant an at least temporary stay of execution. The increasingly dictatorial Russian leader may hope that this strengthens his position, but arguably the opposite may be true.
The Russian elites are likely to see this as evidence not that Putin is strong but that he is increasingly and murderously erratic. That he flip-flopped so quickly from lambasting Prigozhin as a traitor to inviting him to his recent Africa summit to murdering him will do nothing to calm nerves about Putin’s state of mind and grip on the system.
The mutiny itself was a mark of his failure to successfully manage the horizontal disputes; since the beginning, this management has been central to Putin’s style of governing. Of course, by mutinying – even if with the intent of persuading the boss to back him against Shoigu rather than to topple him – Prigozhin sealed his own fate.
However, the mark of a well-organised authoritarianism is that the regime does not need so openly to kill insiders, because they are deterred from breaking the rules of the system in the first place. Putin’s greatest threats are likely to come not from the streets, let alone the remnants of the liberal opposition, but from a pragmatic elite that is constantly weighing the dangers of living under him him against those of not doing so. The so-called ‘turbo-patriots’ who think his regime is too incompetent to win the war with Ukraine also pose a threat.
Assuming he did have Prigozhin killed – and that must be our working assumption for now – then Putin may have hoped to cow both groups with such a naked display of power and violence. But he may find he has done the opposite.
The ultra-nationalists are furious, some already vowing revenge, as they saw in the thuggish Prigozhin the kind of man who, in their eyes, would do whatever it took to win the war. The wider elite are much more circumspect, but they may well be getting closer to the point at which they consider themselves his hostages rather than his supporters. That does not mean they will turn against him any time soon, as matters will have to get much worse before the dangers in that course of action will be outweighed, but that potential tipping point is getting closer.
WRITTEN BY
Mark GaleottiMark Galeotti heads the consultancy Mayak Intelligence and is honorary professor at the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies and the author of over 25 books on Russia. His latest, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, is out now.
