Ydinaseet

DF-31AG miehistö poseeraa ennen paraatia.
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Pari riippumatonta tutkijaa saivat aikaan tosi kiinnostavan keskustelun Ranskassa.
Päätyivät ison aineiston pohjalta johtopäätökseen, että ainakaan 1974 asti Ranskalla ei ollut uskottavaa ydinasedoktriinia. Eli silloin olisi saavutettu tarvittava kahden ydinsukellusveneen saatavuus jatkuvasti merellä. Triadi tai ainakin SLBM on näköjään uskottavuuden edellytys eikä sitä vähemmällä kannata lähteä röyhentelemään rintaa.

Tällä on meidän kannalta merkitystä mm. HX-Rafalen kautta, joka on triadin taktinen eli kevyin osa. Mutta silti kyseinen kyky on heille tärkeä ja ohjaa sekä Rafalen että SCAF/NGF vaatimuksia jossain määrin. Sekä ylläpitoa/eläköittämistä aikanaan. ASMP modernisoitiin vasta ASMP-A:ksi, mutta sekin on pian menossa vaihtoon.

Sinällään minusta myös Ruotsin ydinaseohjelma kertoo tästä samasta, että ydinaseet kehitetään ensin ja vasta sitten doktriini. Vaikka arkijärki sanoisi toista. Siellähän ajettiin homma alas kun ei löytynyt lopulta oikeutusta.

"For a long time, French nuclear deterrence was not credible"​

Jean-Dominique Merchet
February 23, 2021 at 12:45 p.m.

Benoît Pélopidas and Sébastien Philippe: “We assume that the construction of nuclear arsenals responds to a well-defined strategy. Under De Gaulle, this was not the case ”​


Two French researchers, Benoît Pelopidas and Sébastien Philippe, question the generally accepted account of the beginnings of nuclear deterrence in France. In an academic article published in the journal Cold War History, devoted to the period 1956-1974, they assert that the atomic bomb was, contrary to today's discourse, "unfit for purpose" - unfit for its purpose - at least. until 1974.

What new elements are you basing your demonstration on, which seems to agree with those who spoke of the “bombinette” at the time?

Critics of the credibility of the strike force, and in particular of the performance of the Mirage IV bomber, were indeed right. We can now assess their judgment with elements that they did not have at the time. To do this, we rely on unpublished primary sources and a new technical analysis of the performance of deployed weapon systems. In terms of archives, there are 1,300 pages of interviews conducted by Admiral Marcel Duval with participants in the French nuclear program, unpublished archives in the United States and the United Kingdom on the evaluation of the French program by the Allies. and interviews with soldiers.

What happened in 1974 to make things change?

We are not saying that everything changed on that date. In 1974, the third nuclear missile submarine (SSBN) entered service, which opened the possibility of a permanence at sea for the French nuclear arsenal. That same year, Pluto surface-to-surface missiles replaced American-made Honest Johns and NATO recognized the contribution of the French arsenal to the alliance's deterrence capacity. However, we have found in the archives of Admiral Duval a clue suggesting that permanence at sea has not yet been achieved. A high-ranking official told him that until August 1976, there were 1.9 submarines available at all times, not yet the two necessary for permanence at sea. Finally, the performance of the first SSBNs of the Class Redoutable equipped with M1, M2 then M20 missiles, to our knowledge, have not yet been the subject of in-depth studies.
“The triumphalist account according to which the strike force corresponded from the start to a coherent, credible and effective strategy is false. Therefore, the recent announcement of the construction of new nuclear submarines launching devices, whose crews have not yet been born and the cost is secret, leaves one wondering "

You insist on the fact that major military programs were launched without a lot of strategic thinking, and that only then was it concerned with designing a doctrine! How did it go ?

It is generally assumed that the construction and deployment of nuclear arsenals responds to a strategy that is communicated to the potential enemy in the form of doctrine. This would mean that 1) objectives are set before the means which serve them, 2) these means, weapon systems, effectively correspond to these objectives and 3) doctrine communicates this link between the ends and the means. However, we show that French nuclear history does not correspond to any of these three criteria. At the time the contracts were signed, there was no doctrine. This is not, moreover, specific to France, because this mismatch between the arsenal deployed and nuclear doctrines has also been established in the case of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The doctrines are affixed a posteriori. The arsenal corresponding to the "all-out" was not there in 1974 and it is not known from when it became a reality. Let's take an example: the inertial guidance system of the S2 missiles on the Albion plateau could not be aligned beyond +/- 60 ° from the primary target. In other words, only the Soviet Union could be the target.

Does this gap between means and discourses still exist today?

For 2021, work remains to be done, but it is important to observe that the triumphalist account according to which the strike force corresponded from the start to a coherent, credible and effective strategy since the entry into service of the first Mirage IV squadrons. in 1964 is quite simply false, at least until 1974. Consequently, the recent announcement of the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, on the construction of new 3 rd generation SSBNs, “Nation life insurance” which could sail until 2090, whose crews have not yet been born and whose cost is secret , leaves one wondering. We would be curious about the strategic predictions of the Ministry for the XXI th century, how they are formulated and who takes responsibility for them.

What American and British aid has France benefited from to create its "strike force"?

Throughout the French military nuclear program, cooperation with the United States has been important in almost all aspects, less with Great Britain. In our article, we focused on helping to build or implement the first vectors, but the list is much longer! For the Mirage IV, there was the sale of a Boeing C-135 refueling aircraft to increase its range, but also assistance in the development of electronic countermeasures to penetrate Soviet airspace, as well that the sharing of information on the position of anti-aircraft batteries. Basically everything that was needed to be able to complete the mission, at least on paper. For missiles,

You claim that the Soviets did not take the French threat very seriously. What damage could the strike force cause on Soviet territory?

The General de Gaulle had set as a criterion for securing the territory through deterrence the ability to kill as many Russians as French in the event of nuclear war, ie more than 30 million people. According to our analysis, the destruction capacity of the Mirage IV was 100 to 1000 times less! This, of course, depends on the conditions of the mission and how many planes might have reached their goal - according to British intelligence, one or two at most. For the S2 missiles from the Albion plateau, it depended on the conditions of use, first or second. At the time, these missiles were vulnerable to electromagnetic pulses and there was no warning system that allowed them to be launched before a Soviet strike. Our allies considered them very vulnerable, and unlikely to survive.
“It is frequently assumed that the French strike force has been independent from the start. This is incorrect. Thus, the original mission consisted of a joint attack with the American and British allies on twenty Soviet cities, two of which would have been targeted by the French ”

In your article, you talk about “catalytic posture” and “ trigger strategy” with regard to the deterrence desired by General de Gaulle. What is it about ?

Letters from the French Ambassador to the United States, Hervé Alphand, to the then Foreign Minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, as well as a secret note from De Gaulle from the 1962-1963 period show that the The expected effect of French nuclear deterrence was to trigger the use of American nuclear weapons without the Americans being consulted. We are therefore very far from the idea of nuclear autonomy and sovereignty and much closer to the “detonator theory” or a catalytic posture. Contrary to the idea according to which the sovereignist conceptions of nuclear armament of General Gallois would reflect French nuclear history, we can thus establish a greater dependence on the Allies. It is frequently assumed that the French strike force has been independent from the start. This is incorrect. Thus, the original mission which justified the choice of the Mirages IV (carriers of the "bomb") consisted of a joint attack with the American and British allies on twenty Soviet cities - of which we provide the list and of which two would have been targeted by the French forces.
In a note dated April 21, 1959, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force explained that it would take 40 strategic bombers to fulfill this mission and 316 to attack alone ... But we will not build, at the start , than 36 planes, with a range of action is much smaller than expected. From the flight plan and technical data, we show that they were unable to reach Moscow. the original mission which justified the choice of the Mirages IV (carriers of the "bomb") consisted of a joint attack with the American and British allies on twenty Soviet cities - of which we provide the list and of which two would have been targeted by the forces French.
In a note dated April 21, 1959, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force explained that it would take 40 strategic bombers to fulfill this mission and 316 to attack alone ... But we will not build, at the start, that 36 planes, with a range of action is much smaller than expected. From the flight plan and technical data, we show that they were unable to reach Moscow. the original mission which justified the choice of the Mirages IV (carriers of the "bomb") consisted of a joint attack with the American and British allies on twenty Soviet cities - of which we provide the list and of which two would have been targeted by the forces French.
In a note dated April 21, 1959, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force explained that it would take 40 strategic bombers to fulfill this mission and 316 to attack alone ... But we will not build, at the start , that 36 planes, with a range of action is much smaller than expected. From the flight plan and technical data, we show that they were unable to reach Moscow.

But in the end, was General de Gaulle wrong? On the contrary, didn't his "bluff" work well?

If by bluff we mean the ability to make believe in the credibility of the French strike force, the unpublished sources that we discovered in the United Kingdom and the United States show that the intelligence services and allied strategists did not believe it. . The elements that we have found with regard to the Soviet Union point in the same direction. No, the bluff didn't work, however you measure credibility. But the idea of General de Gaulle's bluff presupposes that he had a clear and coherent strategy and that his requests were followed to the letter.
If we combine the study of French archives and that of built arsenals, we quickly realize, as Raymond Aron and a few others have already said, that de Gaulle made vague and sometimes contradictory remarks, in particular on the criteria of the credibility of deterrence. The myth of the great nuclear strategist does not hold water. If one thinks of de Gaulle as the strategist of "all-out", the arsenal corresponding to this doctrine was not built over this period. That of the leader whom one obeys does not hold more.
Moreover, as he told his minister Alain Peyrefitte, his preferences on the arsenal are not always followed. If this bluff was not strategic or military, the problem to be taken seriously remains that of the effects in domestic politics. Why did you tell all this to the French? That of the chief to whom one obeys does not hold more. Moreover, as he told his minister Alain Peyrefitte, his preferences on the arsenal are not always followed. If this bluff was not strategic or military, the problem to be taken seriously remains that of the effects in domestic politics. Why did you tell all this to the French? That of the chief to whom one obeys does not hold more.
Moreover, as he told his minister Alain Peyrefitte, his preferences on the arsenal are not always followed. If this bluff was not strategic or military, the problem to be taken seriously remains that of the effects in domestic politics. Why did you tell all this to the French?
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«Pendant longtemps, la dissuasion nucléaire française n’a pas été crédible»

Benoît Pélopidas et Sébastien Philippe : « On suppose que la construction d’arsenaux nucléaires répond à une stratégie bien définie. Sous De Gaulle, cela n’a pas été le cas »
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Nuclear deterrence: “Against triumphalist narratives, with supporting evidence”, by Benoît Pélopidas and Sébastien Philippe​

Jean-Dominique Merchet, Benoit Pélopidas and Sébastien Philippe
March 05, 2021 at 12:45 p.m.

Severely criticized and questioned by other specialists, the two researchers questioned by the L'Opinion on credibility and the "triumphalist stories" on French deterrence react​

L'Opinion published on February 23 an interview with two researchers who question the dominant narrative on the beginnings of French nuclear deterrence. This article provoked many reactions in specialized circles. We have published two very critical responses and are doing the same today with the reaction of those concerned. Always with the desire to promote debate.
France's nuclear history deserves a precise assessment, with supporting evidence. The answers we have received, those from Maurice Vaïsse and Dominique Mongin then from François Géré and Philippe Wodka-Gallien , are sorely lacking, ignore those we provide, commit major methodological errors and obstruct the progress of the knowledge by resorting to the process of intention. In the article in Cold War History which constitutes the starting point of this exchange, we put forward two arguments and an implication which we specify here.

No strategic rationality until 1974​

We show that if strategic rationality means that: 1) we set objectives before the means that serve them; 2) these means, weapon systems, effectively correspond to these objectives; 3) this link between ends and means is communicated to the adversary, then there is no sign of strategic rationality linked to the strike force in the documents available between 1956 and 1974.
Our opponents want to be critical but the evidence they mobilize does not relate to our argument. Thus, MM. Mongin and Vaïsse affirm: “General de Gaulle had a real strategic vision. If his Minister of the Armed Forces had created the Center for Foresight and Assessment in 1964, it was precisely to enrich strategic thinking. »How are the General's intentions, assuming that they are coherent, precise and stable over time, sufficient to inform the policy followed? How does the creation of an a posteriori center of the first major technological decisions tell us anything about the adequacy between ends and means, which is an essential criterion in our definition of strategy?
"Contrary to what our opponents reproach us, we do not claim that our assessment is new, but that it is based on new sources and new technical analysis, which they never consider"

Likewise, our opponents claim all kinds of things about De Gaulle's strategic vision that do not detract from the evidence established in the article that De Gaulle's personal assessment of credibility requirements varies considerably over time, that he is lied to about important elements of the program (such as the need for highly enriched uranium to make thermonuclear weapons) and that his preferences are sometimes not followed, as in the case of the Albion Plateau. Let us add that, as his companion Olivier Guichard and his biographer Julian Jackson established, de Gaulle was often ambiguous or silent so that the interpretation of his desiderata was a complex art. From these silences and contradictions one infers too often and too easily a coherent grand strategy.

A strike force not credible until 1974​

We establish on reading the sources available on the Soviet Union, American and British primary sources of intelligence and the strategic community and an unprecedented technical analysis of the performance of the arsenal, that the French strike force is not credible until 1974.
Contrary to what our opponents reproach us, we do not claim that our assessment is new, but that it is based on new sources and new technical analysis, which they never consider. On this level, MM. Mongin and Vaïsse are so busy rigging us up with all the vices of the earth that their criticism does not affect the validity of our argument or prove to be contradictory. Thus, they present the Ottawa Declaration of 1974 as a refutation of our argument on the lack of credibility whereas our article is only valid until 1974. Likewise, they criticize us both for not citing the Admiral Duval's assessment that the strike force was not credible until the end of the 1970s, and to “use” its archives to achieve a similar result.
They commit a methodological fault which consists in treating the intentions of the French leaders as sufficient proof that they have been realized: “France would not have been able to lead without its American and British allies a really effective raid on Soviet territory. However, it was precisely to achieve this objective that France decided very early on (in 1962) to buy refueling planes from the United States. »Does this intention change anything from the problems detailed in our article regarding tanker performance, evaluation of strike plans or even taking into account the capacity of Soviet air defenses? Does it dispense with studying the technical performance of the arsenal and its perception among adversaries? In the eyes of our opponents, this would amount to forgetting that credibility is sought in the "dissuaded" and not in the "dissuader".
“The dream of the Mach 2 saturation raid of Messrs. Géré and Wodka-Gallien does not correspond to the flight plans, nor to the overhaul of the Mirage IVs with a view to switching to subsonic flight at low altitude, nor to the performance of the aircraft. , nor to the specifications of the alert "
Likewise, they add: “It is argued that the choice of the Mirage IV-A instead of the Mirage IV-B would have undermined the credibility of the Strike Force; Gold is good because the choice of 2 etype of aircraft would have resulted in a dependence on the United States (for the engine) that General de Gaulle refused this option. Supposing that this dependence is the reason for De Gaulle's decision, how does this affect the technical credibility problems established by the evidence gathered in our article? This point is highly debatable as other key pieces of Mirage IV equipment, such as its radar, flight computer or countermeasures, have been purchased or funded in the US and UK. Likewise, the pre-production specifications of the Mirage IV A planes even required the carrying capacity of the NATO Mark 7 nuclear bomb, which has exactly the same diameter as the AN11 nuclear bomb which will eventually equip the Mirage IV in 1964.
Second, our opponents seem to consider that the evidence we have mobilized - and which has been validated by an international academic journal - can simply be overlooked when it does not suit them. Thus, "to maintain that the United States would have doubted the credibility of the French strike force is also inaccurate". This assertion is not enough to suppress the communiqué of the United States Secretary of State Thomas Hughes of December 8, 1967, a CIA report, the evaluation of Robert Lieber, professor at Harvard, in the leading journal International Affairs, the writings of commentator Joseph Alsop and strategist Albert Wohlstetter, whose archives we were the first to consult. Maybe there are Americans we don't know about who disagree at the time, but our evidence cannot simply be dismissed as inaccurate. The diversity of sources suggests that the argument holds.
We also promote unpublished British archives. It is not enough to say "it is wrong to claim that the Mirages IV could not accomplish their mission" for this to be true. The criticisms of the engineer in charge of the Mirage IVA program, Jean Forestier, and of General Martin, in charge of the first generation of the strike force, with regard to the performance of the device, remain. The dream of the Mach 2 saturation raid of Messrs. Géré and Wodka-Gallien does not correspond to the flight plans, nor to the overhaul of the Mirage IVs with a view to switching to subsonic flight at low altitude, nor to the performance of the aircraft, nor to the specifications of the alert.
"The methodical criticism of the credibility and independence of the national nuclear arsenal takes place in the United Kingdom without the researchers being accused of this"

A triumphalist retrospective tale​

Over the past thirty years, a triumphalist retrospective narrative which supposes a strategic rationality and a credible strike force from the first years, is found in the ambient discourse in France, but also in the majority of the international literature in history and in relations. international. The few non-triumphalist pages of 1993 that MM. Mongin and Vaïsse indicate that it is not enough to reverse our argument. The response of MM. Géré and Wodka-Gallien constitutes further proof of the existence of this triumphalist tale.

Intention process and knowledge advance​

The trial of intention which is made against us is as serious as it is false. The evidence our opponents point out does not invalidate our argument. That an honest effort to advance knowledge seems so intolerable that it should immediately be called "negationist" or "ideological" and hastily accumulate inadequate or inconsistent evidence, questions. All the more so since this effort was financed on the basis of the recognition of academic excellence contrary to the endemic conflict of interest in the production of nuclear discourse in France, which it mobilizes primary sources in three countries and a new one. technical analysis.
To believe our opponents, to propose an assessment of the credibility of the strike force fifty years ago is "to undermine the foundations of French policy" and the primary objective of the research seems to be not to "put in doubts the strategy initiated by France ”. Methodical criticism of the credibility and independence of the national nuclear arsenal is taking place in the UK without the researchers being accused of it. Systematic use of the archives obtained on a regular basis, and cross-referencing them with others and a technical analysis, here becomes “instrumentalization”.
Finally, the unsurpassable criterion for evaluating historical reality is the word of French officials and loyalty to the intention of an actor and historian of the nuclear program, Admiral Duval, whose nos. opponents proclaim themselves the only legitimate interpreters. Faced with this sterile behavior, contrary to research ethics, independent research is proving to be more necessary than ever.

Benoît Pelopidas is the founder of the nuclear knowledge studies program at Sciences Po (Ceri). He is preparing a book on French deterrence.
Sébastien Philippe, engineer, is a teacher-researcher at Princeton University, and associate researcher at Ceri.
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Dissuasion nucléaire : «Contre les récits triomphalistes, preuves à l’appui», par Benoît Pélopidas et Sébastien Philippe

Sévèrement critiqués et mis en cause par d’autres spécialistes, les deux chercheurs interrogés par l’Opinion sur la crédibilité et les « récits triomphalistes » sur la dissuasion française réagissent
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Nuclear deterrence: "An ideological enterprise of deconstruction", by Maurice Vaïsse and Dominique Mongin​

Jean-Dominique Merchet, Maurice Vaïsse and Dominique Mongin
March 02, 2021 at 12:45 p.m.

Under the title "For a long time, French nuclear deterrence was not credible", the Opinion published on February 23 an interview with two researchers. This text provokes numerous and lively reactions in specialized circles. Anxious to open the debate, we publish a first response from two renowned historians​


The common thread of the article that the two researchers Benoît Pélopidas and Sébastien Philippe co-authored in the journal Cold War History - and which is at the origin of the recent interview in the Opinion - does not fail to question the scientific character of the proposed argument, especially since, if it focuses on the period which extends from 1956 to 1974, it does not hesitate to make an extrapolation to our time, with the idea of putting doubts the strategy initiated by France.
The problem is that this article suggests that it brings new elements - in particular through the use of the oral archives of Admiral Marcel Duval, former director of the Revue de Défense nationale - by maintaining that historiography “ classical ”would not have dealt with these difficult beginnings, which is rigorously inaccurate. This questions the ideological bias adopted in this article and the reality of historical research as it is invoked.
The article prides itself on being able to reveal an absence of second strike capability for the French nuclear forces - and therefore of their dissuasive function before 1974, with the arrival of the third nuclear missile submarine (SNLE). This assertion notably ignores the work of Admiral Duval, who wrote in 1993 that French strategic armaments only reached at the end of the 1970s a "rate of sufficiency", that is to say a capacity of destruction susceptible to destruction. to dissuade a potential aggressor on pain of paying an exorbitant price.
"Strategic triad". The article also minimizes the contribution of the "Strategic Triad" (planes, SSBNs and surface-to-surface missiles from the Albion plateau), fully operational at the turn of the years 1971-1972, allowing the Head of State to be able to act. diversify the possible response scenarios in the event of conflict.
“The debate about whether technology precedes strategy - as it often does, in a very pragmatic way - is not new; the problem here is that this debate is not even posed ”

In particular, he tries to discredit the role of the airborne component, arguing that a “reassessment” has been made of the credibility of the first generation of the strike force. This is how it is claimed that France would not have been able to conduct a truly effective raid on Soviet territory without its American and British allies. However, it was precisely to achieve this objective that France decided very early on (in 1962) to buy refueling planes from the United States. Likewise, it is argued that the choice of the Mirage IV-A instead of the Mirage IV-B would have damaged the credibility of the French Strike Force. However, it is because the choice of the second type of plane would have resulted in dependence on the United States (for the engine) that General de Gaulle refused this option.
Finally, the article points out the limits in terms of safety of the first AN-11 nuclear weapon, but this is already known and this is the reason why this weapon was only in service for a very short time, from 1964 to 1966.
Real strategic vision. In addition, according to the two researchers, there would have been an absence of strategic rationality in the field of French nuclear weapons, these having been deployed before the definition of a strategy by the political decision-makers. But, again, the debate as to whether technology precedes strategy - as it often does, in a very pragmatic way - is not new; the problem here is that this debate is not even posed. Instead, we are told that France would have had a strike force without knowing how to use it in the event of a conflict, for lack of an adequate strategy ...
It is to forget a little quickly that General de Gaulle had a real strategic vision and that, for him, what counted in the nuclear weapon, it was not to compete with the Americans and the Soviets, it was of have a political and strategic weapon, and this status symbol of great power. And if his Minister of the Armed Forces had created the Center for Foresight and Evaluation (CPE) in 1964, it was precisely to enrich strategic thinking.

“The most serious is the instrumentalisation that is made of the sources, in particular those gathered by Admiral Marcel Duval. For having helped and supported him in his approach, we can affirm that he would have been dismayed to discover the use which was made here of his works ”
Moreover, in the highly sensitive field of national defense, it is necessary to distinguish between what is discourse and what is defined and conceptualized in a secret manner in appropriate bodies (the Defense Councils in particular). In addition, to suggest that the all-out strategy defined by General Ailleret in 1967 was supposed to apply from that time is, again, exaggerated. An exegesis of this strategy clearly shows that it was a very prospective strategic reflection, as confirmed by Admiral Duval's own testimony. Today, the M-51 missiles which are on board the French SNLE-NG have this capability. It just goes to show that strategy can in some cases precede technology ...
“Proper dissuasive role”. To maintain, moreover, that the United States would have doubted the credibility of the French strike force, that they would have seen only a "detonator" (forcing them to engage alongside their ally if the latter took the initiative to use nuclear weapons) is again inaccurate, and indeed this debate, once again, is far from new. This is to ignore both the strategy of national independence led by General de Gaulle, especially in the face of the reluctance expressed by President Kennedy vis-à-vis a France that has become a nuclear power. Conversely, with the Ottawa declaration of 1974, NATO clearly recognized the “specific dissuasive role” of the French nuclear forces and its contribution to the overall strengthening of the Alliance's deterrence.
In the end, we are dealing here with an ideological enterprise of deconstructing history - judged to be a “triumphalist narrative” - with the objective of calling into question the technical, and therefore political, credibility of French nuclear deterrence. by claiming to develop historiography on the subject.
The most serious is the instrumentalisation that is made of the sources, in particular those gathered by Admiral Marcel Duval. For having helped and supported him in his approach, we can affirm that he would have been dismayed to discover the use which was made here of his work; the "bluff" and the lack of credibility that were mentioned by the two researchers are, in the end, not where they believe ...

Maurice Vaïsse is Professor Emeritus of Universities at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris. He headed the French study group for the history of nuclear armament (Grefhan) from 1986 to 1994. He is the executor of the archives of Admiral Marcel Duval.

Dominique Mongin has a doctorate in history. A former member of Grefhan, he had helped Admiral Duval in his collection of oral records. Today, he teaches at ENS-Ulm and Inalco.
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Dissuasion nucléaire: «Une entreprise idéologique de déconstruction», par Maurice Vaïsse et Dominique Mongin

Sous le titre « Pendant longtemps, la dissuasion nucléaire française n’a pas été crédible », l’Opinion a publié le 23 février un entretien avec deux chercheurs. Ce texte provoque de nombreuses et vives réactions dans les milieux spécialisés. Soucieux d’ouvrir le débat, nous publions une première…
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Nuclear deterrence: "Crude falsifications of history", by François Géré and Philippe Wodka-Gallien​

Jean-Dominique Merchet, François Géré and Philippe Wodka-Gallien
March 03, 2021 at 6:00 a.m.

Two specialists in strategy and nuclear weapons, François Géré and Philippe Wodka-Gallien in turn react to the words of the two researchers questioning the credibility of the French strike force at its inception​


Under the title "For a long time, French nuclear deterrence was not credible", the Opinion published on February 23 an interview with two researchers. This text provokes numerous and lively reactions in specialized circles. Anxious to open the debate, after a first response from two renowned historians Maurice Vaïsse and Dominique Mongin, we publish that, very controversial, two specialists in French deterrence, François Géré and Philippe Wodka-Gallien.
Regarding a recent article by Pélopidas and C ° , we would like to thank the authors for having searched the trash cans of history to unearth the tendentious and inept arguments which marked the beginnings of the construction of the French nuclear deterrence strategy in taking them back to their own account. We welcome an approach that demonstrates ignorance of the very principle of this strategy by accumulating involuntary or deliberate errors and unfounded assertions. There are so many that it would be tedious to take them all back. For the sake of brevity, we will only pay attention to the grossest forgeries.
It is wrong to assert that the doctrine has confined itself to monitoring the advancement of technical capacities. The foundations of the nuclear strategy were laid down in the early 1950s by Colonel Ailleret (responsible for atomic tests in the Sahara, who later became Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces). In January 1955, he published in National Defense - the review is a reference in academic work - an article entitled "The atomic weapon: a factor of peace" where he explains: "If cities, wealth, populations must in any case be destroyed , war no longer has any meaning. His articles and lectures were the subject of a summary, “Essay general of strategy”, written in 1959, before he took office, which contained the principles for France's use of nuclear weapons.
General de Gaulle kept himself constantly informed of developments in nuclear weapons. At the end of 1956, after Suez, he had received Colonel Gallois. The synthesis of his reflections was expressed in December 1959, in the so-called “Rotonde Gabriel” speech at the Military School, which gives the reasons and unambiguously presents the main lines of the nuclear deterrence strategy.


"Claiming to be innovative, the authors only take up Raymond Aron's controversial work“ The Great Debate ”"
Brainwashing. Claiming to be innovative, the authors only take up Raymond Aron's controversial work The Great Debate , 1963, directed against Gallois - which he nevertheless praised in the preface to his 1960 book Strategy of the Atomic Age . Following a stay in the United States where he had kindly been brainwashed by the "egg skulls" surrounding McNamara, Aron took up the latter's argument describing the small French nuclear force "ineffective. , useless and dangerous ”. Aron's approach was all the stranger since, at that time, he could not ignore the capability objectives set by the military planning law of 1960.
Technically, it is wrong to claim that the Mirages IV could not accomplish their mission. Despite air defense, even very efficient, 100% interception does not exist. With regard to conventional bombs, the phenomenon is obviously annoying but tolerable; with nuclear weapons, the fact that a few planes can pass is an exorbitant risk. What rational leader would take the risk of nuclear war in the face of the probability that a few planes could pass? Mach 2 is still the master asset of the Mirage IV to break through. No opponent can bet to stop an entire saturation raid, which also benefits from escort planes.
Attacking credibility amounts to undermining the foundations of French policy, based on decision-making autonomy. Credibility is based on a guaranteed response capacity towards high-value demographic targets, and therefore a small number. From the entry into service of the Mirage IV in October 1964, the first component of the strike force, credibility rests on two elements: the vector and the load. The 1960 military planning law provides for the creation of a diversified fleet of vectors over ten years to, more or less, cross the opposing defenses. The capability objective provides for more than 60 Mirage IV bombers (50 under a first contract, then 16, all delivered in five years!), The Plateau d'Albion missiles (this will be 18, May 1968 having been right budget), and five submarine launchers each equipped with 16 missiles (one to two are at sea).

As early as 1965, the ballistic potential was demonstrated with the successful launching of Asterix, the first French satellite. The Diamond rocket is used to develop the strike force missiles. The machine is 100% "made in Normandy". The process is ab initio. The new Directorate of Armaments launched the SSBN project without going through the intermediate stage of the attack submarine, unlike the Soviets, the Americans and the British. A single M1 or M2, equals 40 Hiroshima, one megaton with the M20.
“In Washington, McNamara, Secretary of State, opposes the constitution of independent nuclear forces within the Alliance. However, he must bow to John Kennedy who agrees to provide us with refueling planes ”

"Bombinette". Let's talk about "loads". This is the purpose of nuclear testing. The first, on February 13, 1960, in the Algerian desert, released 40 kilotons, three times the weapon that ravaged Hiroshima. In July 1966, the Tamouré test saw a Mirage IV drop an operational bomb, thus validating the combined Mirage IV-AN21 bomb, a “bomber” which produced 50 kilotons. The operation was repeated with a Mirage III in 1973 then a Jaguar in 1974. The first thermonuclear test, in August 1968, gave 2.6 megatons.
The relationship with the allies has its place in our nuclear story. General de Gaulle relies on the atom to assert himself vis-à-vis London and Washington. Cooperate between allies: nothing more normal. In Washington, McNamara, Secretary of State, opposes the constitution of independent nuclear forces within the Alliance. However, he must bow to John Kennedy who agrees to provide us with refueling planes, especially as this request receives the support of General Curtis Le May. The alternative solution would have called for Caravelles modified into flying tanks. Help from the allies is welcome by saving time and money.
It is false and ridiculous to take up the thesis, without a future, of the "detonator", according to which the French force had only one end to push the United States to a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.
It is wrong to mention that a figure was used to determine the losses of the USSR. We contented ourselves with mentioning “intolerable damage”, sometimes equivalent to the “France value”, but without ever setting a threshold.
“The reason for this negationist enterprise is revealed at the end of the process: to question the modernization programs of French nuclear weapons. Let's call it the beaver strategy: “Gnaw the roots to bring down the tree” ”

Virtual domain. Welsh aside, the authors ignore (or want to ignore) the theorists of nuclear deterrence strategy: Ailleret, Beaufre and Poirier. This explains a total lack of understanding of the unique characteristics of this deterrent mode. Beaufre remarked “the general understanding of the phenomenon is distorted each time we consider a nuclear problem from the point of view of its onset and not from that of deterrence - which is just the reverse. "One cannot confuse, adds Beaufre," the threat of triggering with the effective triggering. ”(Deterrence and Strategy, 1964).
This fundamental distinction is found in the writings of Lucien Poirier author of the “conceivable nuclear strategy model for France” (1966) founding the concept of “deterrence from the weak to the strong”, validated by the Minister of the Armed Forces, Pierre Messmer and approved by de Gaulle. Poirier explains that nuclear deterrence operates in the virtual realm. The nuclear weapon constitutes a threat for the potential aggressor candidate who sees himself in the obligation to integrate it upstream in his calculation of the expected gain with regard to the probable losses. If deterrence were to fail, it would not automatically lead to a nuclear response. Those responsible would have to determine the choice of a new strategy either autonomously or in consultation with their allies.
It is wrong to assert that the notion of "all azimuth" appeared in French doctrine. General Ailleret's article in the “Revue de Défense nationale” in December 1967 was conceived by de Gaulle as a “test balloon” which was quickly abandoned.
The reason for this negationist enterprise is revealed at the end of the process: to question the modernization programs of French nuclear weapons. Let's call it the beaver strategy: "Gnaw the roots to bring down the tree." But it is not by such crass artifices that this will be achieved.

François Géré is president of the Cercle Lucien Poirier and of the French Institute for Strategic Analysis (Ifas), author of the book “La Pitch Stratégique Française Contemporaine” (Economica).
Philippe Wodka-Gallien is a member of the French Institute for Strategic Analysis ( Ifas) and author of the book “French nuclear deterrence in action - Dictionary of a national narrative” (Ed. Decoopman).
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