Amerikkalainen sotataito

@SJ, tuli mieleen, että oven voi rikkoa vaikka kranaattipistoolin harjoituskranaatilla tai sitä varten voi tehdä (ellei ole jo) oman ammuksensa.
Eikös jenkeillä ollut välillä irakissa käytössä jotain räjähdepanoksia joilla mentiin seinästä sisään.( tai sitten katosta sisään ). Irakissa ehkä baghdadissa tai fallujassa on toki erilainen rakennuskanta.

Näin pystyy taktisessa kaupunkitaistelussa välttämään oven käytön (eikös nuo ovet ole sellaisia tappopaikkoja yleensä)
Eikös jenkeillä ollut välillä irakissa käytössä jotain räjähdepanoksia joilla mentiin seinästä sisään.( tai sitten katosta sisään ). Irakissa ehkä baghdadissa tai fallujassa on toki erilainen rakennuskanta.

Näin pystyy taktisessa kaupunkitaistelussa välttämään oven käytön (eikös nuo ovet ole sellaisia tappopaikkoja yleensä)
Saattaa ollakin, mutta siinä tapauksessa tarvitsee olla sen verran kaukana suojassa, että yllätysmomentti menetetään. Lopputulos +/- 0.
No, jenkit vissiin ajattelee, että se harjoituskranaatti läpäisee liikaa ja meillä noita kranaattipistooleita ei ole kaikille joukoille.
Ja haulikon täyteinen ei? Puhe oli jenkeistä, ei meistä. Siitä myös langan nimi vaikkei ovien ampuminen aivan ole sitä tasoa mitä "sotataito" antaa ymmärtää.


Ja haulikon täyteinen ei? Puhe oli jenkeistä, ei meistä. Siitä myös langan nimi vaikkei ovien ampuminen aivan ole sitä tasoa mitä "sotataito" antaa ymmärtää.
Haulikkoon on saatavilla ammuksia jotka ovat nimenomaan ovien rikkomiseen tarkoitettuja. Joten jos haulikot on varattu ovien rikkomiseen, niin kai siellä on sille ammuksia saatavilla.
USA:n armeija ja merijalkaväki kehittävät monialuetaistelutapaa, (oho, tulipa pitkä yhdyssana!).

White paper, new task force bring multi-domain concept closer to reality

TWICKENHAM, England (Army News Service) -- The Army's new concept of multi-domain battle gained momentum last week after senior leaders joined Marine Corps leadership to produce a white paper and set up a joint task force to start rolling with ideas that'll change how Soldiers fight.

"At the very beginning, we're trying to make this a very much joint concept," said Gen. David Perkins, head of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, which is developing the concept.

Signifying the next step in building up the concept, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley and Marine Gen. Robert Neller signed the white paper, which provides an overview of the concept to be reviewed by Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In October, the Army officially announced the multi-domain concept to broaden how the service fights on land, and sometimes with air assets, to also incorporating capabilities in the maritime and cyber domains into its doctrine.

One day, Soldiers may fire land-based missiles to sink ships or use cyber and electromagnetic tactics to help units maneuver inside enemy territory. Many other warfighting ideas can be inspired by the new concept, so the Army has planned multi-domain exercises to test and discover them, starting in the Pacific theater this spring, according to Perkins.

"A concept is an idea and now we have to operationalize it and get feedback from the folks that [will] actually use it," he said Wednesday, following his keynote speech at the International Armored Vehicles conference.

U.S. Army Pacific is working closely with the joint Pacific Command to finalize these exercises, Perkins said, and start leveraging capacity and capability already found in their domains. TRADOC personnel are helping design the exercises and will plan to interact with exercise participants to find ways to fight in multiple domains.

Soldiers in Europe are expected to do similar exercises next year, the general said.

"Let's take what we have now and use it better," he said. "Where are our shortcomings? Can we highlight them through exercises and help inform our requirements for the future?"

Since the concept is not tailored to a certain theater, he said crosstalk between the services and TRADOC will hopefully shore up unique characteristics in how Soldiers deploy multi-domain tactics in various locations around the world.

"The principles could be the same but the actual characteristics of the solution could be quite different," he said of the concept. "In a macro sense, it is theater non-specific."

Besides large exercises, he said, TRADOC is also trying to get units to use the concept in their day-to-day activities and training so the command can get continuous feedback rather than just one chunk of it after an exercise.

It's still too early to know when the multi-domain concept will be completed. Perkins previously said that the air/land concept that the Army had used before took eight years to be implemented after it first was introduced in 1973. While he doesn't expect multi-domain to take that long, he does expect that getting all of the services on board will be a long process.

Bureaucracy, not the mindset of individuals, is perhaps the biggest challenge facing the concept's rollout, he said.

As Congress typically appropriates money for tangible items, like equipment and vehicles, a change in thinking may be needed to get funds for future capabilities.

"We're trying to take those resources and spread them out to capabilities, and the system is not set up to deliver resources like that," he said. "It delivers resources for things, not capabilities. How do you start changing the bureaucracy and processes to align with producing what we actually need?"

But a portion of future funding will likely be needed to upgrade combat vehicles so they can keep an edge in full-spectrum warfare.

"I think what you're going to have is no more one-trick ponies," the general said. "You can't just have a vehicle that does this, and that's all it does."

He said he'd prefer to have "optionally manned" vehicles that can be driven with or without a human crew, depending on the situation.

So, if one of these vehicles had to be part of a breaching operation, the Soldiers could dismount and later hop back on after the danger has passed. Or, in a firefight, Soldiers could get out and engage the enemy while the autonomous vehicle provides cover fire to them, he noted.

"I think what you're absolutely going to find are combat vehicles that have multiple purposes and can operate in multiple modes," he said.

There's also more work in figuring out how to use the emerging domain of cyber in combat.

"Cyber has become a good forcing function for us," he said. "It's new and people know it's new so they don't necessarily have a preconceived notion on how to do it."

Soldiers should start thinking more holistically about how all of the domains intersect, Perkins said. During an exercise, for example, he said he once maneuvered an infantry company to fix a cyber issue emanating from a building.

"That was a multi-domain battle solution," he said. "It wasn't a bunch of computer scientists busting down the door and taking care of this problem; it was a bunch of infantrymen."


USA:n armeija ja merijalkaväki kehittävät monialuetaistelutapaa, (oho, tulipa pitkä yhdyssana!).

White paper, new task force bring multi-domain concept closer to reality
Olli Ainola ja kumpp. harmissaan. Miksi, oi miksi, tämä uutinen ei ollut Venäjältä. Silloin olisi voinut otsikoida:
"Venäjän uusi SUPERtaistelutapa tekee lännen armeijat kerralla vanhanaikaiseksi".
Kriittinen artikkeli USA:n strategiasta Afganistanissa. Kirjoittaja on Eversti evp, joka palveli kaksi kertaa maassa.

How to Lose the War in Afghanistan
The Pentagon is still under the delusion it can find a military answer to a 16-year-old war

It is now official beyond question. The senior ranks of the U.S. military and foreign policy leadership have now fully succumbed to the belief that all problems in the Middle East and South Asia must include, at their core, the application of lethal military power.

No other alternative is considered. Worse, the military solutions they advocate have literally no chance of accomplishing the national objectives sought.

The latest damning evidence — the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan testified before the Senate in February 2017 that he believes thousands of additional U.S. troops should be sent back to Afghanistan.

It is difficult to overstate the utter bankruptcy of a strategy designed to bring peace to Afghanistan based on sending large numbers of U.S. service members back into harm’s way. The Washington Post reported in early February that Army Gen. John W. Nicholson, Jr. said he “believes the new president may be open to a more robust military effort that is ‘objectives-based.’”

Questioned by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R.-S.C.), the general said he can definitely carry out his mission with less than 50,000 coalition troops, but hesitated a bit when asked if he could do so with less than 30,000.

The results of 16 years conducting counterinsurgency, foreign military training and counter-terrorism operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan should argue persuasively against repeating such a strategy. The results have been utter and complete failures on the strategic level.

Supporters of using COIN and CT cite the Iraq “surge” of 2007 as an example of how a properly run operation can succeed. Such endorsements expose a significant lack of understanding of what actually happened in 2007 and, of greater importance, that those individuals have a marked inability to see beyond tactical outcomes.

A Black Hawk helicopter gunner over Jalalabad. U.S. Army photo
The fundamental point that must be understood is that the surge of U.S. troops into Baghdad was not the causal factor in the dramatic reduction of violence. It was a contributing factor and did play a positive role, but without question was not the decisive one.

In late 2006 the Sunni insurgency was beginning to buckle under the cumulative weight of attacks by the United States, coalition forces, Shia militias and the Iraqi security forces. The pressure turned into an existential threat, however, when Al Qaeda in Iraq — an organization that should have been a natural Sunni ally — turned against them.

As was documented in great detail in Gian Gentile’s Wrong Turn, Sunni sheikhs recognized that their only chance for survival was to join with U.S. forces against their common AQI enemy.

Beginning even before the surge was authorized by president George W. Bush, Sunni sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha from Anbar Province approached U.S. soldiers and offered to join with them in ridding Ramadi of AQI. The resulting “Awakening” began a process that was well under way when Gen. David Petraeus arrived the next year.

To his credit, when Petraeus saw how effective the program was, he successfully expanded it to other areas of Iraq. But it cannot be overstated that Petraeus’s efforts were successful primarily because other Sunni leaders saw the effectiveness of Sheikh Sattar’s efforts and wanted to replicate them.

This point cannot be missed — the Sunnis never cooperated with U.S. forces because they “believed their future lay with the Coalition,” as one general famously said in 2008. They rationally saw that without a tactical union with America, they would be annihilated.

Sterling Jensen, one of the world’s leading experts on the Iraq surge, and Iraqi Gen. Najim Al Jabouri — currently commanding Iraqi forces assaulting Mosul — wrote of this period that “in fact, U.S. troops in general were not seen as useful even before the surge. When announcing the Anbar Awakening, Sheikh Sattar told the Americans that as long as the U.S. brigade helped locals become card-carrying security forces and be permitted to work in their areas, the U.S. forces could stay on their bases while the Anbaris fought.”

No such conditions exist in Afghanistan today, nor did they in 2010 when the United States surged 30,000 troops — and that explains why the Afghan surge did not knock out the insurgency.

An American paratrooper in Afghanistan’s Laghman province in 2015. U.S. Army photo
Second, there remains a troubling lack of understanding at the most senior levels of U.S. government of the interaction between tactical operations and strategic outcomes.

At the time of the Iraq surge, the most oft-cited justification for the operation was that the reduced level of violence provided “breathing space” to the Iraqi authorities to affect political reconciliation that would ultimately bring stability.

But once cleared of the existential threat the insurgency posed to the Shia government, Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki took advantage of the breathing space to eliminate most of his Sunni opponents. These oppressive tactics, in fact, helped facilitate the rise of ISIS three years after U.S. withdrawal from the area.

A similar scenario played out during the Afghan surge of 2010.

In mid-2009, then commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal sent a classified memo to the president stating that if he didn’t get more troops, the United States might lose the Afghan war. In December of that year, president Barack Obama approved the deployment of 30,000 U.S. troops — on top of the 17,000 he had deployed earlier that year — bringing the number of troops by 2010 to nearly 100,000.

I was on the ground in Afghanistan during that surge, and can authoritatively confirm that the only thing the surge accomplished tactically was the protection of the Afghan government in Kabul and the security of select lines of communication elsewhere in the country. But it did nothing to quell the insurgency.

In fact, it contributed to the insurgency. The level of violence that McChrystal warned could lose the war in 2009 was radically increased in 2010. When the U.S. forces ended their combat mission in 2014, the violence increased yet again.

According to the United Nations, the casualty rate of the Afghan National Security Forces and civilian population were at — or near — record highs in 2016. Sending in another 30,000 troops to train and advise Afghan soldiers might help to again secure Kabul and some lines of communication, but it will also cause a spike in U.S. casualties and a predictable increase in insurgent violence throughout the country.

What it will not do is defeat the insurgency and end the war. If the United States expands the mission into Afghanistan at this present time, we may well end up committing our armed forces to a permanent state of war.

An F-16C takes off from Bagram Airfield in 2016. U.S. Air Force photo
Lastly, as important as the above points are, the military strategy used by the United States is based on deeply flawed assumptions.

Gen. Nicholson said in his Senate testimony that “our primary mission remains to protect the homeland by preventing Afghanistan from being used again as a safe haven for terrorists to attack the United States or our allies.”

Yet there is not now, nor has there ever been, anything special about territory in Afghanistan in representing a threat to the United States. Most of the 9/11 terrorists did their training in Germany, Florida and on the East Coast, not in the caves of Tora Bora. Terrorism has spread like wildfire across the globe, expanding into Southeast Asia, Central Asia other parts of the Middle East and over millions of square miles in Africa.

There is no more danger to the United States from terrorists that live in Kunar Province than there is from terrorists living in ungoverned territory of Syria, Somalia, Tajikistan, Libya, Yemen or a dozen other countries.

Truly, it defies logic to suggest that the United States must permanently remain militarily active in the one spot of Afghanistan while countries around the globe burn with terrorist presence against which we do nothing.

There are other strategies that have a chance to work. They are not easy and none would guarantee success. But one can virtually guarantee that by repeating the military strategies we’ve used since 9/11, our efforts will fail.

Until senior policymakers discover the resolve necessary to admit these preferred strategies are bankrupt, we can expect — regardless of how many troops the president deploys — the fires of terrorism in Afghanistan to burn, American service members to suffer the loss of lives and limbs, and U.S. interests to deteriorate.

Daniel L. Davis is a retired U.S. Army colonel who served multiple tours in Afghanistan. He is a senior fellow with Defense Priorities. This article originally appeared at The National Interest.
se kestää tappioita ja se on kestänyt niitä pitkään.
En ole samaa mieltä. Jenkit nimenomaan ovat kärsineet hyvin minimaaliset tappiot. Jenkkien tappioiden kesto ei ole vielä ollut koetuksella ikinä. Yhdysvallat eivät ole ikinä edes taistelleet tasavahvaa vastustajaa vastaan. Yhdysvaltojen kokoiselle maalle ei Vietnamin sodassa kärsityt jenkkitappiot ole mitään. Koreassa tappiot ovat pieniä. Irakissa ja Afghanistanissa ei tappioita käytännössä ollut.
Ei toki yksinkertaisesti voi sanoa onko valtio kärsinyt isot tappiot vai eikö. Toisessa maailmansodassa sanoisin että Suomi on selvästi tappiot hyvin kestänyt. Samoin Saksa, Neuvostoliitto, ja Japani (esimerkkeinä). Yhdysvallat kärsivät hyvin pienet tappiot. Nolla perään (5 000 000) ja sitten voidaan sanoa että Jenkit pystyvät tappioita kestämään. Mutta Jenkit eivät ikinä ole tasavahvaa vastustajaa vastaan taistelleet joten ei ole ollut tilaisuuttakaan kestää tappioita. Se on kovin hankala sanoa mitkä ovat isot tappiot kun vihollinen on niin paljon heikompi.

Kesti muuten tunti tuo viesti kirjoittaa. (mutta samalla olen myös katsonut videoita)Tappioista puhuminen kun ei ole yksinkertaista. Ei siinä mitään hävettävää ole että Jenkit vietnamista halusivat lähteä tappioiden takia. Mutta ei myöskään voida sanoa että Yhdysvallat tappioita pystyvät kestämään. Yhdysvaltoja ei siinä ole viellä kunnolla koeteltu.
Ettehän siis liian kirjaimellisesti ota tätä viestiä - kun ei ole selvää mikä on iso tappio. Se riippuu aina niin monesta asiasta, myös mielipiteistä ja siitä mitä on saavutettu, ettei voi yksinkertaistesti sanoa.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tappioiden sietokyky on suoraan verrannollinen siihen, kuinka tärkeänä kansa näkee sodan oman olemassaolonsa kannalta.
On vähän eri tilanne yrittää perustella jonkun siirtomaasodassa kuolleen pojan vanhemmille, että poika puolusti vapautta ja demokratiaa kuolemalla jossain huitsinhelvetissä, kuin jos vihulainen pudottelee pommeja takapihalle.
Viimeksi muokattu:


Niin eikö silloin nimenomaan ole kysymys siitä, ettei se siedä enää että sen resursseja käytetään sotimiseen.
Kyllä vietnam on nimenomaan sota jossa tappioidensietokyky ei amerikkalaisilla riitänyt.
Hyvää pohdintaa. Ja tässä voidaan tietysti linkittää -tappioidensietokyky- otsikon alle sisä- ja ulkopoliittiset tappiot ja niiden kestäminen. Kenraalien tappioidensietokykyhän on ihmeellinen, kun sitä tarkastelee siviilin näkökulmasta. "mevoitettiinsiiskaikkitaistelut" - kilvenkirkastuskirjallisuusgenre amerikoissa onkin katsottava juuri tästä -kenraalienihmeellinentappioidensietokyky- vinkkelistä.

Yleisen asevelvollisuuden loppulauseet Usassa luettiin juuri Vietnamin sodan aikoihin. Yhteiskunnassa törmättiin de facto ja de jure siihen, etteivät ns. paremmat ihmiset suinkaan halunneet panna poikiaan kuolemaan minkään hikisen -kommunismin patoamisen agendan- tähden. Paremman väen pojat käytännössä pakoilivat palvelustaan kuka milläkin keinoin, keinoja löytyi, kun oli fyffee ja paalua isäkullalla. Tämä kehitys muuten tapahtui Britanniassa ekan ms:n jälkihajuissa. Paremman väen poikia kaatui "ihan liikaa" ja loppu on historiaa. Yleisen asevelvollisuuden ikävin saundi onkin siinä, että pahimmassa tapauksessa lihamyllyn läpi kulkee niin rikas, rakas kuin köyhä varaskin. Ei hyvä. Pitää olla siis systeemi, joka "valikoi" isänmaalle uhrattavat. :cool: Meillä ei ole vielä nähty olevan tälle suuntaukselle varaa....mutta ehkä liittouduttaemme voimme lopultakin luopua tästä kiusallisesta liian tasa-arvoisesta mahdollisuudesta menettää raajoja, terveys ja henkikin kunnian kentillä.....:p

Anteeksi kaunistelematon, brutaali mielipide maanantaiaamun ratoksi, mutta en hevin luovu käsityksistäni muutaman mustatuntuu- kommentin takia....saapa framille taluttaa erilaisen graafisten esitysten rynnäkönkin, eikä käsitykseni vielä ota osumaa.
Amerikan sisällissota.
"Roughly 2% of the population, an estimated 620,000 men, lost their lives in the line of duty. Taken as a percentage of today's population, the toll would have risen as high as 6 million souls."
Eli tappiot 2% populaatiosta, nykyväestöön suhteutettuna vastais n. kuutta miljoonaa kaatunutta. Kyllä tuossa jo koetellaan tappionsietokykyä. Varsinkin sodan alussa osapuolet olivat suhteellisen tasapäisiä, mutta etelä-valtioiden sietokyky hiipui konfliktin pitkittyessä. Kaikenkaikkiaan noin neljäsosa kaikista sotaan lähteneistä jäi sille tielle. Huikea luku.


Kaikenkaikkiaan noin neljäsosa kaikista sotaan lähteneistä jäi sille tielle. Huikea luku.
Taudit ja onnettomuudet tappoivat kaksi kertaa niin paljon kuin taistelut.

United States

110,000+ killed in action/died of wounds
230,000+ accident/disease deaths
25,000–30,000 died in Confederate prisons

365,000+ total dead

282,000+ wounded
181,193 captured

Total: 828,000+ casualties