F-35 Lightning II

https://ekstrabladet.dk/nyheder/sam...sa-amerikanerne-ejer-f-35-reservedele/6957749

"Denmark pays 962 million kroner to gain access to a global spare parts stock shared by all countries using F-35.
Half a billion a year
After that, the Danish Treasury must continue to pay to maintain access to spare parts storage. When the planes are fully phased in, the Ministry of Defense expects that the annual cost will be around NOK 440 million.
But even though Denmark is paying billions of dollars for both equipment and the spare parts that will eventually become more and more in the Danish aircraft, it's formally Americans who own both spare parts and equipment."

Miten Tanska ja norjan kruunu liittyvät toisiinsa???
 
F-35 saa rakkautta kanukki-kentsulta, gripukka pyyhkeitä (jopa liian kanssa):

The F-35 is Canada's best fighter plane and will meet Canada's defense needs for the next 50 years. The Canadian government has no other choice, and the acquisition of some 20 F-18s from the Australian fleet is a way for him to save time and avoid losing face before the next election.
Retired General Yvan Blondin, former Commander of the Bagotville Base and now defense systems consultant, was in the front row when Canada conducted studies to determine which would be the best fighter to replace the aging fleet. CF-18.

"To avoid military bias, the work was done by Public Works Canada and the three studies were clear: the F-35, if it fulfilled its promise of performance and cost, was the best device and the best value for money. -price ", explains the retired general.

"Of course, the plane was still developing; problems occurred and the price was high. It was perfectly normal. But since then, the hunter has proven that he is able to fulfill his promises and the costs have gone from $ 120 million to $ 90 million each (estimated delivery price starting in 2022). "

That said, Yvan Blondin is convinced that the F-35 will still be in the lead if we redo the studies and that it will win the tenders that will be launched by the government by 2019. "The Eurofighter (Typhoon) which one Talk a lot is $ 120 million. So much more expensive than the F-35 and it's a fourth-and-a-half, not a fifth generation, aircraft. He is a half-generation late. The French Rafale oscillates around $ 110 million and can not reach the height of the F-35, and the Swedish Gripen is a fourth-generation aircraft. "

stealthy

The CF-18 is also a fourth generation aircraft. So buying an equivalent device like the Gripen is not a strategic gain. The electronic equipment of the Eurofighter or the Rafale makes them fourth and a half generation planes, but they are not stealthy like those of the fifth generation like the F-35 and the F-22 that we saw in Bagotville last summer.

Although it is cheaper to buy, the Gripen would be the worst choice, according to former General Blondin, because it does not have the technological platform to be upgraded in 20 or 25 years. "It's like your iPad. If it's too old, you can not do the updates anymore. That's what will happen with the Gripen and it will not help anymore. "

The Super Hornet (the most serious competitor of the F-35 according to Mr. Blondin, who is 20 years behind the technology) could support this upgrade, but in 35 years, it will be obsolete too, while the F-35 may have a career of 50 years.

American problem

If Canada had to go for a European plane anyway, it would meet another obstacle, according to Yvan Blondin.

"Our planes absolutely need compatible communications systems with the United States. These systems are ultra secret. And if Canada were to say no to the Americans by refusing the Boeing Super Hornets or the Lockheed Martin F-35s, there is no guarantee that they will agree to provide the systems for its new aircraft. They could make life hard for us. "

The Royal Canadian Air Force and the US Air Force must work together for the defense of North American airspace and for NATO missions. Their systems must be compatible.

Retired Lieutenant-General Yvan Blondin spent most of his career as a pilot in Bagotville and was a commander.

https://translate.googleusercontent...1e50f2&usg=ALkJrhi7wunbHZDKTGbdaBWeQsFd22M2cQ

Ihmeellistä tosiaan, miten eläkeläis-kenu voi olla noin pihalla.
 
file.php
 
Olisi hienoa jos noista google-konekäännöksistä olisi aina aluksi joku varoitus, ettei tarvitsisi ihmetellä miksi teksti on lukukelvotonta silppua jossa edes valuuttakurssit eivät pysy karsinoissaan. #metoo.
 
Joo, ei tuota voi ottaa todesta kun väittää Gripukkaa 4 gen koneeksi, mutta sitten kohta sanoo 4.5 syntyvän käytetystä avioniikasta. Aha, no sopii katsoa mitä löytyy... kappas sehän on sekin 4.5g sitten.
Ihmeellistä tosiaan, miten eläkeläis-kenu voi olla noin pihalla.
#Turpo taitaa Gripukan kuolemaksi olla tuolla(kin), jos olisi amerikkalainen kone, voisi Boeingin olla semi-mahdoton myydä superhönöjä mihinkään.
 
Jos on tuo parissa muussakin yhteydessä mainittu operatiivinen vaatimus, että vain amerikkalainen tiedustelu- ja viestintäelektroniikka kelpaa Norad-valvontalinkkien vuoksi, on turhaa spekuloida muiden koneiden ominaisuuksilla. F-35 tulee eikä vaihtoehtoja Kanadalle ole (kun SH pelattu syystä tai toisesta ulos), vaikka haluaisi.

Alkuperäinen irtautuminen on voinut olla ihan todellinen, ei ehkä haluttu näitä ensimmäisten sarjojen koneita, mutta taustalla koko ajan tiedetty että uskolliselle pohjoiselle sopimuskumppanille vaihtoehtoina ovat vain ne koneet, joita eteläinen isoveli päättää tarjota. Eläkeläiskenraali on ystävällisesti tarjoutunut pehmittämään maata omilla lausunnoillaan, joista hän ei ole enää virkavastuussa.

E: Heh, jutun mukaan eläkeläisen nykyinen ammatti on puolustusjärjestelmäkonsultti. Kenen leipää mahtaa syödä ; )
 
Mitä tuo tarkoittaa?

Koetin löytää uudestaan vanhat linkit, en tähän hätään löytänyt kunnollisia. Pahoittelut. Mutta siis Kanadan ilmavoimien kaksi tärkeintä tehtävää on Kanadan ilmatilan puolustaminen ja Pohjois-Amerikan puolustaminen. Molemmat hoidetaan ensisijaisesti Norad-yhteistyön kautta. Tämä edellyttää avioniikkaa, joka juttelee suoraan Noradin kanssa ja siihen käytetään NSA:n tuottamaa kryptoa. Em. kenraali viittaa edellä siihen, että sitä saa vain Jenkeistä, nyten löydä linkkiä juttuun jossa joku valtiollisempikin edustaja sanoi samaa kandidaateista; että NSA:n laitteistoa pitää koneesta löytyä Pohjois-Amerikka-missiota varten.

Käsittääkseni Norad-tehtävällä oleva kone välittää dataa suoraan Noradiin koko ajan ja saa sieltä luultavasti informaatiota takaisinpäin. Mitä, sitä emme tietty tiedä.

Tämmöisen viittauksen nyt löysin vain tähän hätään. Mun käsittääkseni tässä puhutaan juuri Norad-datasta, ei siitä mitä muiden liittolaisten kanssa vaihdetaan muissa datalinkeissä.
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs/next-gen-fighter-cf18-estimated-life-expectancy.page
However, beyond 2020, some core CF-18 avionics systems will need to be upgraded. These requirements are driven by the US National Security Agency (NSA) modernization of their cryptographic architecture which enables secure (encrypted) communications. These hardware upgrades will also require OFP upgrades, which will also drive hardware and firmware upgrades to the CF-18 mission computers which run them.
-> En tiedä onko tätä kryptoa tarjolla muuhun kuin amerikkalaiseen rautaan. Yhteistyötä on muidenkin kanssa, mutta vain ulkomaista Kanadan koneet lienee Noradin tietovuossa suoraan mukana.

Kanadan päämissiot:
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/air/snac-nfps/questevalfin-finquesteval-eng.html
The CFDS provides the Canadian Armed Forces with clear direction concerning their three roles:

  1. First and foremost, to defend Canada;
  2. Defending North America; and
  3. Contributing to international peace and security.
Through the CFDS, the Government has accordingly established a level of ambition that will see the Canadian Armed Forces carry out the following missions, potentially all at the same time:

  1. Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD);
 
...ja siis tämä kohta tuossa ranskankielisessä em jutussa tarkalleen innoitti spekulointiin ja muisteluun: (kai tuonkin voi lähteeksi lukea)

"Our planes absolutely need compatible communications systems with the United States. These systems are ultra secret. And if Canada were to say no to the Americans by refusing the Boeing Super Hornets or the Lockheed Martin F-35s, there is no guarantee that they will agree to provide the systems for its new aircraft. They could make life hard for us. "

Ja en nyt malta auskoa, että tässä puhuttaisiin vain NATO-liittolaisten kilpailijakoneiden kanssa (jo muutenkin) jaettavista salausavaimista Link16-tyyppisiin yhteisverkkoiohin.
 
Koetin löytää uudestaan vanhat linkit, en tähän hätään löytänyt kunnollisia. Pahoittelut. Mutta siis Kanadan ilmavoimien kaksi tärkeintä tehtävää on Kanadan ilmatilan puolustaminen ja Pohjois-Amerikan puolustaminen. Molemmat hoidetaan ensisijaisesti Norad-yhteistyön kautta. Tämä edellyttää avioniikkaa, joka juttelee suoraan Noradin kanssa ja siihen käytetään NSA:n tuottamaa kryptoa. Em. kenraali viittaa edellä siihen, että sitä saa vain Jenkeistä, nyten löydä linkkiä juttuun jossa joku valtiollisempikin edustaja sanoi samaa kandidaateista; että NSA:n laitteistoa pitää koneesta löytyä Pohjois-Amerikka-missiota varten.

Käsittääkseni Norad-tehtävällä oleva kone välittää dataa suoraan Noradiin koko ajan ja saa sieltä luultavasti informaatiota takaisinpäin. Mitä, sitä emme tietty tiedä.

Tämmöisen viittauksen nyt löysin vain tähän hätään. Mun käsittääkseni tässä puhutaan juuri Norad-datasta, ei siitä mitä muiden liittolaisten kanssa vaihdetaan muissa datalinkeissä.
http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs/next-gen-fighter-cf18-estimated-life-expectancy.page

-> En tiedä onko tätä kryptoa tarjolla muuhun kuin amerikkalaiseen rautaan. Yhteistyötä on muidenkin kanssa, mutta vain ulkomaista Kanadan koneet lienee Noradin tietovuossa suoraan mukana.

Kanadan päämissiot:
https://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/air/snac-nfps/questevalfin-finquesteval-eng.html

Aivan.

Laitetaan linkki kirjoittamaani tätä asiaa käsittelevään tekstiin Kanada-ketjussa: https://maanpuolustus.net/threads/uutisia-kanadasta.2108/post-562021

Tuossa lainaamassasi linkissä on käsittääkseni kyse ihan yksinkertaisesti Link-16 salauksen päivityksestä. Siitä löytyy teknisiä pdf:iä esim. haulla: "link 16 cryptography".

Tässä texti-artikkeli aiheesta.

https://archive.org/stream/Link-16-Joint-Key-Management-Plan-28-April-2015/Link 16 Joint Key Management Plan, 28 April 2015_djvu.txt

This manual outlines procedures for production, distribution,
and use of Link 16 COMSEC keying material (KEYMAT) for legacy and crypto
modernized Link 16 systems

Transition to Modernized Crypto

(1) CJCSI 6510. 02D directs DoD to perform Link 16 Crypto
Modernization for all DoD users and must also be extended to Allied and
Coalition partners. This modernization project is a major production and
deployment project across all of DoD and will take several years to accomplish.
Link 1 6 terminals that have been modernized will be backwards compatible
with legacy terminals. Crypto modernization for Link 16 was carefully
structured to support operational employment of Link 1 6 equipment while
maintaining compatibility with legacy Link 16 equipment.


...ja siis tämä kohta tuossa ranskankielisessä em jutussa tarkalleen innoitti spekulointiin ja muisteluun: (kai tuonkin voi lähteeksi lukea)

Ja en nyt malta auskoa, että tässä puhuttaisiin vain NATO-liittolaisten kilpailijakoneiden kanssa (jo muutenkin) jaettavista salausavaimista Link16-tyyppisiin yhteisverkkoiohin.

Uskoisin, että nimenomaan siitä on kyse.

Asiassa on mm. ollut nimittäin jo tähän mennessä vähän hämminkiä.

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-wonders-of-link-16-for-less-midslvts-updated-02471/

Members of EuroMIDS are also collaborating in these efforts, and will probably produce MIDS JTRS in the future. Thales and Data Link Solutions, for example, already have a June 2006 agreement
external.png
to that effect. On the other hand, the US National Security Agency had not approved the programmable cryptographic keys for foreign users, as of April 2012. Until that approval is forthcoming, it will force buyers outside America to either continue buying MIDS-LVTs, or take the problematic route of incorporating their own cryptography into MIDS JTRS.
 
Automation has been very beneficial, particularly for the B (STOVL) and the C (Carrier) models, because without it you probably couldn’t justify capital investments for building those variants as they are required in much smaller numbers.”
https://www.aero-mag.com/lockheed-martin-f-35-lightning-ii-fighter-aircraft/

The F-35 ITF then capped off WDA tests by completing testing on the F-35’s GAU-22 25mm gun at the beginning of December 2017. The WDA gun tests included the Air Force’s A variant where the gun is internal carried and on the Marine Corps’ and Navy’s B and C variants, which employ a gun pod beneath the jet. Each weapon test required multiple missions including software development, “dry runs” and then the actual weapon release. Not including the gun, Hamilton said the F-35 ITF delivered 55 weapons during WDA testing, which was mainly done over the military sea range off the California coast and at Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake in California.
http://www.edwards.af.mil/News/Article/1400349/f-35-testers-wrap-up-weapons-delivery-accuracy-tests/

Lockheed Martin Meets 2017 F-35 Delivery Target

To date, more than 265 F-35 aircraft have been delivered to U.S. and international customers. More than 530 pilots and nearly 5,000 maintainers have been trained, and the F-35 fleet has surpassed more than 115,000 cumulative flight hours

66 F-35 deliveries in 2017 represents more than a 40 percent increase from 2016, and the F-35 enterprise is prepared to increase production volume year-over-year to hit full rate of approximately 160 aircraft in 2023.

• The price of an F-35A has come down more than 60 percent from the first contract.
• Touch labor has been reduced by about 75 percent over the last five years.
• Production span time has decreased by about 20 percent since 2015.
https://www.f35.com/news/detail/lockheed-martin-meets-2017-f-35-delivery-target

 
Accompanying briefing from MoD to Conservative Mps F35–Claims and Reality

Claim: The F-35 is unable to share data.
This is incorrect. Data exchange was examined during a recent Red Flag exercise with the US where the F-35 acquitted itself exceptionally well. To describe the data link as insecure is incorrect. MOD, alongside our NATO partners, has allocated funding to continue the upgrade of secure communications via this data link.

Claim: There are hidden costs within the F-35 programme.
We simply do not recognise the costs quoted in the article. The UK’s F-35 programme remains within its cost approval, details of which are in the Defence Equipment Plan 2016, published on 27 January 2017. MOD is working hard with the suppliers to ensure delivery to budget and programme cost effectiveness. Defence expert Howard Wheeldon has described The Times’ figures as ‘back of a fag packet’ cost guestimates that also fail to mention cost reductions that will come from a low rate initial production (LRIP) As recently announced, the Department has invested in RAF Marham to ensure availability and support to the UK F-35. This investment ensures that cutting edge maintenance facilities are available to the aircraft on arrival in the UK next year.

Claim: The broadband capacity of Queen Elizabeth is insufficient to support F-35.
This is incorrect. The planned bandwidth of the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers will be sufficient to carry out the scope of carrier strike operations, over the life of the programme. As with all programmes, requirements and opportunities are kept under constant review and will be developed through the life of the programme. The aircraft, the carrier and our communication networks are all designed with the capacity to grow, and are not constrained by design or bandwidth limitations.

Claim: The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) software system is [a] vulnerability in the F-35 system
This is incorrect. ALIS is part of the ground based information system and is not fitted on board the F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft. We don’t comment on the specifics of Cyber operations, but we take encryption and protection of our information very seriously and these measures remain classified. All classified data transmissions to and from the F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft are fully encrypted.

Claim: The F-35 has a number of on-going technical issues:
All issues raised have been reported in the past and are under active management by the Joint Strike Fighter Joint Programme Office and the MOD. The F-35 Programme is still within the Development Test phase. As issues are found, solutions are developed; the UK is part of that testing.

Claim: The F-35 is too heavy to land on the aircraft carrier.
This is nonsense. We have specifically developed a UK technique for recovering the aircraft to the carriers to ensure that a heavy aircraft can land on the deck. Ship-borne Rolling Vertical Landing (SRVL) will be tested during Flight Trials of HMS Queen Elizabeth over the next couple of years.

Claim: Helmet not fit for purpose.
We are holding the supplier to account to deliver a helmet that delivers the full operational requirement and we are confident that issue will be resolved satisfactorily.

Claim: The F-35 has less memory than the average iPhone.
The figure of 10 GB is not recognised by the MoD and comparison of F-35 memory with an iPhone is neither credible, nor sensible. The F-35 software architecture is partitioned with memory distributed around the aircraft to achieve specific functions in a rigorous security architecture, and the memory is of many, many orders of magnitude higher than 10GB. (luokkaa teratavuja ALISiin tehtävän jälkeen)

Claim: The F-35 programme is not subject to proper public scrutiny.
This is incorrect. The F-35 programme is publicly held to account by:
• In March 2017, the NAO report ‘Delivering Carrier Strike’, for example, analysed the carrier programme and conducted a deep dive in the F-35.
• The annual Project Performance Summary Table (formerly the Major Projects Report), which forms part of the Equipment Plan, scrutinised by both the HCDC and PAC.
• The Major Projects Authority, which provides independent assurance as part of its Government Major Projects Portfolio.
• The Director of Operational Test & Evaluation report, as part of the global F-35 programme.

All of these reviews can be found online.
The programme is also held to account internally by:
• The Defence Portfolio Approvals Secretariat
• Integrated Assurance Reviews
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/326/32610.htm (tiivistelmä), https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/326/326.pdf (koko)

DRVWsa8XUAEgsMk[1].webp
 
F-35 testers wrap up Weapons Delivery Accuracy tests

http://www.edwards.af.mil/News/Article/1400349/f-35-testers-wrap-up-weapons-delivery-accuracy-tests/

esters from the 461st Flight Test Squadron and F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF) completed a major test milestone bringing the F-35 Lightning II’s full combat capabilities closer to the battlefield.

Weapons Delivery Accuracy (WDA) flight tests began in July 2013 and testing wrapped up earlier this month. The WDA portion of the F-35 developmental test and evaluation mission ensures the fifth-generation fighter’s weapons system can deliver lethal ordnance both air-to-air and air-to-ground using the jet’s warfighting Block 3F software.

The ITF used all three F-35 variants and delivered air-to-air missiles including AIM-120s, the AIM-9X and the United Kingdom’s Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile. The WDA tests also confirmed air-to-ground delivery of the Paveway IV laser-guided bomb, GBU-39 small diameter bomb, GBU-12, GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munition and the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon.
 
Kovaa pelia F-35 hintatavoitteiden (-lupausten) saavuttamiseksi/ pitamiseksi:

Laitetaan monta Lot'tia, ml. monta tulevaa, samaan kasaan ja kerataan tilauksia (koska muutenhan "incentive" olisi odottaa, ja sellaisia asiakkaita kertyisi enemman ja enemman:

"the grouping of purchases into lots is designed to achieve economies
of scale that should, as production increases, see costs per unit decline. Mr Babione told
us that, at the request of the JPO, Lockheed Martin will be aggregating Lots 12, 13 and
14 into what they called a “block buy and an economic order quantity opportunity” of
approximately 445 airplanes. He also explained that Lockheed Martin’s cost target was
for the price of the B model to be $105 million by the end of that block buy ($80 million
for the A model).

Tony Douglas, the Chief Executive of [UK] Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), told
us that, ahead of the block buy opportunity, the Government’s target cost per aircraft
was around $105 million.
- When asked what would happen if that target could not be
met, Mr Douglas claimed that they would “not sign the contract unless we can back it off
against that price”.
- Eli hinta oli jo mennyt yli, ja pienella matemaattisella jippoilulla se saatiin taas esitettavaan kuntoon (kunhan kokonaismaara saadaan asiakaskunnasta kasaan, vrt. odottaminen).
 
Meidan Puolustusvaliokuntaa vastaavalle elimelle
House of Commons Defence Committee, Session 2017–19 (jasenet kun voivat vaihtua vaalien myota)
kerrottiin vastauksena kysymyksiin, etta
"arrived at by taking £7.3
billion from the £9.1 billion (this £7.3 billion figure covers the production, sustainment
and follow-on phase of the programme to 2026) "
- joka tekee 48 konetta, joka on riittavasti tukialusten pitamiseksi toimintakykyisina

Komitea hiukka ihmetteli, kuinka tuo viipale kustannuksista (kattaa tukikohtien sisalla tapahtuvan huollon jarjestamisen, alkuinvestointina... ei mitaan telttailua, niinkuin Norjassa 1. vuoden ajan) tukee sen jalkeen tapahtuvien hankintojen arviota (ja sita, etta arvio olisi kattava, vrt 138 kaikkiaan ja niista 48 alkajaisiksi), kun

"an open-ended financial commitment which can be quantified only in retrospect?

We understand that the Lot-by-Lot procurement process for the aircraft, allied
with the separate processes for procuring parts and spares and logistical support, make
it difficult to calculate the total cost whether on a per-aircraft or on a programme-
as-a-whole basis. However, it is simply not acceptable for the Ministry of Defence to
refuse to disclose to Parliament and the public its estimates for the total cost of the
programme, and to suggest instead that we must wait until the mid-2030s (when **** all
138 **** F-35 have been procured) to be able to work out a full unit cost for each aircraft,
once spares and upgrades are included."
 
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