Ilmatorjunta

Valistakaa jos muistan väärin mutta käsittääkseni avaruuteen eli siis ilmakehän ulkopuolelle ei saa nykyisten sopimusten valossa viedä aseita esim. lasereita. Sehän olisi helppo vaihtoehto kun varustaisi satelliitin reaktorilla ja laser aseella.

Oliko sopimus voimassa jo silloin kun Neukkula aseisti ainakin yhden Saljut-avaruusasemistaan konetykillä? Ei sillä että tuo olisi ollut jonkun laserin veroinen uhka yhtään kenellekään mutta mielenkiintoinen detalji.
 
Oliko sopimus voimassa jo silloin kun Neukkula aseisti ainakin yhden Saljut-avaruusasemistaan konetykillä? Ei sillä että tuo olisi ollut jonkun laserin veroinen uhka yhtään kenellekään mutta mielenkiintoinen detalji.

Koskee vain joukkotuhoaseita.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Outer_Space_Treaty

The Outer Space Treaty represents the basic legal framework of international space law. Among its principles, it bars states party to the treaty from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit of Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing them in outer space. It exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and expressly prohibits their use for testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and fortifications (Article IV). However, the Treaty does not prohibit the placement of conventional weapons in orbit and thus some highly destructive attack strategies such as kinetic bombardment are still potentially allowable. The treaty also states that the exploration of outer space shall be done to benefit all countries and that space shall be free for exploration and use by all the States.
 
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Pantsir-SM, vanha alusta, uusi ohjustin

The Russian army may get a new Pantsir-SM air defense missile/gun (ADMG) system with an extended range missile in 2018, Russia’s Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov said.

"There are plans to double the engagement range. I think we’ll complete these works in 2018. This will be an upgraded system with an extended range missile," he said. The deputy minister also clarified that the in-service Pantsir ADMG systems, too, will be equipped with the new missile. Borisov also told what contracts will be awarded to KBP Instrument Design Bureau under the new state armament program. "All of KBP’s final products, which, in addition to the Pantsir ADMG system, include the Kornet ATGM system, various small arms and cannons, guided artillery projectiles, will be contracted," he said.

The Pantsir-SM is expected to significantly outperform the current version. In particular, it should get a new high-speed missile, while the target detection and destruction range will approximately double. It is expected that the Pantsir-SM will be able to detect a target at 75 km and destroy it 40 km. For the Pantsir-S1, these indicators are 40 and 20 km, respectively. The Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound NATO code name) is an air defense missile-gun system designed to protect vital small-size and big military areas, industrial targets and land forces units and reinforced the air defense units responsible for the protection of troops and military installations against precision-guided air attack from low and extreme low altitudes.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/oct...opment_of_pantsir-sm_air_defense_in_2018.html
 
Venäjän ilmatorjunnalla vaikeuksia Syyriassa?

Russia’s Air Defenses In Syria Have Some Big Problems
Terrain limits the radars' effectiveness
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S-400’s 92N2 pulse-Doppler radar

WIB front October 6, 2017 Tom Cooper

In late September 2017, satellite photographs indicated that Russia had deployed a second Russian SA-21 surface-to-air missile system in Syria.

Purportedly, the system in question is deployed high in the mountains near Masyaf, fewer than 40 kilometers southeast of Lattakia, and right next to a battery of Bastion-P systems equipped with Oniks cruise missiles.

For many of foreign observers, this is an indication of the Russians bolstering their presence in Syria, perhaps even directly threatening operations of U.S. and allied aircraft against Islamic State extremists.

Actually, a closer look at the satellite photographs in question – to say nothing of the history of Russian SAM deployments in Syria since 2015 – reveals multiple shortcomings of the equipment in question, and mistakes by the Russians in the course of their military intervention in the country.

Initially during the Russian intervention in Syria, the primary Russian air base in the country – Hmemmem air base – was protected by the Slava-class guided missile cruiser Moskva.

Equipped with S-300F SAMs — a.k.a., SA-N-6 Grumble, a navalized variant of the S-300/SA-10 Grumble — this ship positioned off the Syrian coast of the Mediterranean Sea.

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At top — the S-400’s 92N2 pulse-Doppler radar. Vitaly Kuzmin/Wikipedia photo. Above — satellite photograph of the new Russian S-400 SAM site in the Alawite Mountains near Masyaf. Airbus DS photo


Obviously, this was hardly satisfactory. The Russian navy couldn’t keep Moskva on station off Syria indefinitely.

Furthermore, repeated attacks on Hmemmem air base by BM-21 multiple rocket launcher systems operated by Syrian insurgents have shown that Moskva’s SA-N-6s were providing no protection at all. Correspondingly, the Russians deployed at least one battery of Pantsyr-S1 — SA-22 Greyhound — SAMs at Hmemmem air base, too.

In November 2015, after the shoot-down of a Russian Su-24 by Turkish F-16s, Moscow publicly ordered the deployment of a ground-based S-400/SA-21 Growler to Hmemmem.

But the system evident in photos actually appears to be the S-350 – an advanced variant of the S-300/SA-10 Grumble that’s custom-tailored for short- and medium-range engagements of cruise missiles, combat aircraft and ballistic rockets.

In theory, this combination of SA-10s and SA-21s – or SA-22s and SA-21s – should have sealed the skies not only over Hmemmem, but indeed over the entire Syrian coast of the Mediterranean Sea. However, operational experience has shown that this is not the case.

The primary problem of the S-350 or S-400 SAM-site deployed at Hmemmem is the local terrain. This air base is on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, fewer than 10 kilometers west of the Alawite Mountains, and only 40 kilometers south of the Turkmen Mountains.


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P-14 radar. Photo via Wikipedia


Propaganda notwithstanding, physical laws still apply to Russian military technology. Fact is, even the most advanced radars cannot see through mountains. Therefore, the mountain chains in question are limiting the radar horizon of the Russian SAMs protecting Hmemmem.

Due to the local topography, the S-400’s 91N6E Grave Stone radar couldn’t see aircraft operating at low and medium altitudes just 40 kilometers north or 15 kilometers east of Hmemmem, even if installed atop a 40-meter mast.

On its own, this might not appear to be a major issue. After all, the SAM sites in question were foremost responsible for the air defense of Hmemmem, and not much more was necessary.

However, during late 2015 and early 2016, the battlefield in northern Syria began moving ever farther away from the base. At least periodically, there were tensions with Turkey and the United States and its allies operating over northern Syria.

This became even more important when Russian ground troops got involved in combat operations in the Aleppo area. Obviously, the troops in question required protection from possible air attack.

In December 2015, the regime of Syrian president Bashar Al Assad deployed one site each of S-75M/SA-2 Guideline and Buk/SA-17 SAMs at Kweres air base east of Aleppo. By March 2015, it became clear that the Russians had positioned S-300/350/400 in the As Safira area around 30 kilometers southeast of Aleppo. With this, the Russians have filled the gap in their radar coverage caused by the Alawite Mountains.

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Russia’s high-tech 55Zh6ME Nebo radar has not yet deployed to Syria. Rossoboronexport photo


However, on April 6, 2017, in retaliation for a chemical weapons attack on Khan Sheykhoun that killed nearly 100 Syrian civilians, two U.S. Navy destroyers fired 59 BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles at Shayrat air base.

On their way to the target, most of the missiles in question passed over the Tartous area and then through the so-called “Homs Gap” – a depression between the mountains of western Syria and those in Lebanon – only 50 kilometers south of Hmemmem. Nevertheless, the Russian radars completely failed to detect them.

As reported in May this year, the Russian reaction to this experience was to deploy first one, then two, Myasichev A-50 Airborne Early Warning System to Hmemmem, with intention of expanding and improving their radar coverage.

However, the Russian air force has only 17 of these precious aircraft in operational condition. These are already overburdened with the task of controlling the extensive air space over the Russian Federation.

Finally, the deployment of Bastion-P ground-based cruise missiles in Syria demanded improved protection of these systems, too. This is the reason why the Russians eventually deployed their second SA-21 SAM near Masyaf. Its position high in the mountains significantly improved its low-altitude coverage.

One problem remained, though — the detection of stealth aircraft and cruise missiles. Certainly enough, the Russian defense sector claims that systems such as the SA-10, SA-17, SA-21 and SA-22 are able to detect and track low-observable targets.

However, one detail from satellite photographs indicates this is not the case. The photos depict a P-14/Tall King long-range radar.

This 1950s-vintage system is no longer in service with the Russian military. It’s so old that the Russian defense industry is unable to provide spare parts. The P-14 in question is operated by the Syrian air force, and kept operational thanks to upgrades from Belarus in the late 2000s.

In contrast to the radars associated with the SA-21, the P-14 operates at a wavelength that gives it some ability to detect stealth aircraft.

http://warisboring.com/russias-air-...problems/?mc_cid=f7f2931e0b&mc_eid=45a4b1a714
 
Saudit päätti ostaa S-400:a. Mitähän tähän nyt sanoisi... Hinnan on ainakin täytynyt olla kohdallaan. Ei se nyt välttämättä huono asia ole, että ryssät myy parasta kalustoaan lännen "liittolaisille". Saattaa noista Turkin tai Saudien puikoista päätyä jokunen soveltuvaan testiin.
 
Luulenpa, etta Saudien tapauksessa on pelko siita, etta Iranin IT ulottuu lahden yli heille ja nyt sitten vaan symmetristetaan tilanne.

Tuolle seudullehan on tilattu paljon (toisesta ilmansuunnasta) myos ballistiseen torjuntaan kykenenvia jarjestelmia.
 
Ei ilmatorjuntaa hankita siksi että naapurilla on ilmatorjuntaa.
Et taida olla ihan jyvalla access denial - kasitteesta? Ja sen kaytosta voimaepatasapainon korjaamisen ja mahdollisen taistelukentan muokkaamiseen (nama asymmetric jutut, joista on toki keskusteltu seka konventionaalisen, epakonventionaalisen kuin myos hybridisodankaynnin otsakkeiden alla). Vaikka Saudeilla on koneita enemman kuin lentajia, niin tuskin he niita syottavat yli lahden ulottuvalle ilmatorjunnalle. Mitas niilla sitten tehdaan?
- oletko miettinyt, miksi Ukrainassa ei paljon lennella (millaan muulla kuin droneilla)? Ilmatorjuntahan tuli testattua jo heti alkupaivina - tosin venalaiset testasivat ukrainalaisten ohjusviritykset jo Gruusiassa ja niin vaan tuli Tu-22M (moderni tiedustelukone) taivaalta kuin tiiliskivi:)
 
Ei ilmatorjuntaa hankita siksi että naapurilla on ilmatorjuntaa.

Eikä lentoyhtiöitä kasvateta siksi, että oma olisi isompi ja ylellisempi kuin naapurimaalla.

Eikä pilvenpiirtäjiä rakenneta vielä korkeammiksi siksi että oma tolppa olisi pidempi kuin naapurilla.

Eikä loisto- ja urheiluautoja osteta kymmenittäin siksi, että omistaisi kaiken mitä naapuri ja muutaman harvinaisen enemmän.

Eikä kukaan jätä uuden auton muovisia penkinsuojuksia moneksi viikoksi pyörimään repaleisina ja hiostavina riesoina ihan vain elvistelläkseen sillä että auto on uusi. Ei etenkään kuumassa ilmastossa. Eikä etenkään ajele ikkunat auki jotta repaleiset suojat lepattaisivat näkyvästi tuulessa.

Eikä... Arabimaissa käytetään usein laadullisesti erilaisia logiikan ja motiivien tyyppejä kuin täällä kylmässä pohjolassa.
 
Arabimaissa käytetään usein laadullisesti erilaisia logiikan ja motiivien tyyppejä
Nokia hoksi taman, ja teki ko. markkinalle oman brandin: Vertu
- saa kultakuorrutuksella (olihan Saddamin "throne" sekin sellainen; ei tosin valtaistuimensa, vaan yksityinen vessanpontto. Ja pojan autotallista loytyi 500 urheiluautoa, harvinaisimpia myoten)
- lisamaksusta saa/ sai myos upotettuja timantteja (tai, jos niita oli ennestaan, timanttien upotuksen)
 
Saddamista kun paasin vauhtiin, niin laitetaanpa OT:

Kaikki varmaan tietaa, etta Suomessa rakennettiin tykkiveneita viela kolmaskin, mutta kolmanteen ei tullut 120 mm Bofors'is keulakannelle. Se kun oli tilattu Saddamin huvijahdiksi. Silla, mika oli merelle, han ei uskaltanut ajella Eufrat/ Tigrisilla. koska isollakin joella ollaan joskus niin lahella rantaa, etta joku singolla paasee posauttamaan. Seinat siis kaksinnettiin ontelopanoksia vastaan ja huippunopeus sailyi entisellaan, eli hyvana, ja "haneen" paasee lahtemaan vikkelasti, jos sellainen paikka tulisi.
- pakotteet kuitenkin iskivat, ennenkuin paatti ehdittiin toimittaa
- wiki ei, taaskaan:), kerro mihin se paatyi
 
Saddamista kun paasin vauhtiin, niin laitetaanpa OT:

Kaikki varmaan tietaa, etta Suomessa rakennettiin tykkiveneita viela kolmaskin, mutta kolmanteen ei tullut 120 mm Bofors'is keulakannelle. Se kun oli tilattu Saddamin huvijahdiksi. Silla, mika oli merelle, han ei uskaltanut ajella Eufrat/ Tigrisilla. koska isollakin joella ollaan joskus niin lahella rantaa, etta joku singolla paasee posauttamaan. Seinat siis kaksinnettiin ontelopanoksia vastaan ja huippunopeus sailyi entisellaan, eli hyvana, ja "haneen" paasee lahtemaan vikkelasti, jos sellainen paikka tulisi.
- pakotteet kuitenkin iskivat, ennenkuin paatti ehdittiin toimittaa
- wiki ei, taaskaan:), kerro mihin se paatyi

Ehkä olen se poikkeus joka vahvistaa säännön mutta enpä ole moisesta ikinä kuullut. Laita ihmeessä lisäinformaatiota.

Sen tiesin että Suomessa tehtiin Saddamille jahti joka tuhoutui 2003. Sillä paatilla ei kyllä ollut mitään tekemistä tykkiveneiden kanssa.
 
Suomessa tehtiin Saddamille jahti joka tuhoutui 2003
Niin tuo, yksi monista:
"

Ironically, Saddam Hussein had christened it al-Mansur, which means in Arabic, The Victor.
When it was launched in 1982, it was one of the largest and most impressive private yachts in the world.




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It looked more like a smart cross-Channel ferry than a private yacht
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Built by a Finnish firm, the eight-deck-tall yacht was for a long time the largest vessel in the Iraqi Navy despite having no military use.

It was designed to Saddam's personal specifications and sumptuously decorated all over in marble, exotic woods, and with silver and gold fittings.


Punavuoresta, kun tuosta "joki"paatista paivakavelylla ollessani aikanaan siella kyselin, loytyi tietoa. Se oli kuulemma salaisuus, mika oli tyon alla, vaikka oli siina nakyvilla...Olikohan vain varusteltavana: Hietalahden telakkahan on/oli kova tekija niissa hommissa. Yksiin ristiaisiin minutkin kutsuttiin, paasin nakemaan tyon jaljen ensi kadelta, kahdessakin mielessa:)

Tama http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/01/160104-saddam-hussein-boat-research-iraq/ on se meriversio, joka ei ole tuhoutunut (Tanskassa rakennettu Qadissiyat Saddam = reference to a 7th century battle in which Arabs triumphed over Persia)
- Saddamhan oli kova sotimaan, vahan niinkuin monet muutkin, jotka joutuvat rystyset valkoisena pitamaan vallan syrjasta kiinni, ja tarvitsevat ulkoisia viholisia
 
Öö mikä siis oli se Saddamille tehty suomalainen versio tykkiveneestä?
 
. Vaikka Saudeilla on koneita enemman kuin lentajia, niin tuskin he niita syottavat yli lahden ulottuvalle ilmatorjunnalle. Mitas niilla sitten tehdaan?
- oletko miettinyt, miksi Ukrainassa ei paljon lennella (millaan muulla kuin droneilla)?
Uskoisin että syy miksi Ukrainassa ei lennellä on vieläkin se, että edes venäläinen ei kehtaa valehdella tarpeeksi.

Virallisesti kun siellä ei ole joukkoja, vaan ovat joko lomalla tai muuten vaan vapaaehtoisia. On astetta hankalampaa väittää että nämä joukot olisivat lomailemassa siellä henkilökohtaisten maataistelukoneiden kanssa. Lomalle lähtiessä jäi lomakassiin tälläinen Hind?
 
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