Ai niitä, jonka valmistus loppui 1987? Vai uutta KC-46, josta vuotaa bensat ja tankkauksessa käytettävä kaukonäkö ei toimi?
Sama KC-10 jonka suorituskyky vastaa kahta KC-46, sama KC-10 jonka kuljetuskyky vastaa C-17, sama KC-10 jonka käyttöiästä on 60% jäljellä.
Why Keep the KC-10?
The KC-10, known as ‘Big Sexy’ by many aircrews, is a workhorse platform that brings several distinctive capabilities to the joint warfighter. Among these are:
High-Volume Refueling – The most unique contribution the KC-10 brings to the joint fight is volume. Launching a single KC-10 provides far more flexibility to any refueling mission because of its longer legs, ability to loiter, and capacity to offload fuel quantities that would require multiple KC-135s or KC-46s. As operations officers and commanders, we lost count of the number of times our KC-10s were supporting a large-scale exercise or senior leader movement where the tanker planners said that the “make or break” refueling was one supported by our units. This was because the offloads required at the critical point could not be accomplished by a KC-135.
A primary KC-10 and an additional airborne KC-10 as a backup could easily accomplish a mission which would require at least four KC-135s.
Reach and Deterrence – Perhaps the most concerning aspect of KC-10 retirement is the potential effect on strategic, long-range refueling missions. KC-10s provide huge offload capabilities over long distances, and this is particularly critical in the Pacific where there are relatively few long runways and lots of open ocean to traverse. The
Nuclear Posture Review cites the strategic importance of long-range bomber assurance and deterrence missions, “including nonstop, round-trip flights from the continental United States to the Korean peninsula,” for which aerial refueling is “crucial” to success. Those massive fuel offloads are the KC-10’s core asset.
Airframe Life –
KC-10s are still relatively young airframes. Compared with commercial DC-10s, the
Extender airframe is still at only about 40 percent of its expected lifespan. This is in stark contrast to KC-135s, some of which have been flying since the 1950s, and are scheduled to fly well beyond a normal lifespan.
Stress on the Force – Requiring multiple tankers to complete missions the KC-10 could accomplish by itself will invariably create employ-to-dwell increases and drive continued decreases in aircrew morale. As tanker squadron commanders, we saw firsthand how the demand for air refueling will always outpace our limited supply and how a high operations tempo has a palpable effect on aircrew morale. In a tanker force that is bleeding talent due to the operational stress and endless refueling requirements, more tanker sorties will have a negative impact on Air Force retention.
Parking – This may seem like an odd concern, but limited ramp space could be an operational constraint for large-scale Pacific missions. Any plan requiring KC-10 support could soon require double the number of KC-46s or KC-135s, and there is only so much room to park aircraft at a field. Double the tankers will quickly fill limited ramp space, which is a scarce resource between Hawaii and Japan. Ramp space is also stressing the current tanker bed-down in United States Central Command. Losing a tanker that can carry 356,000 pounds of gas will be a significant planning constraint.
Cargo – The Extender has
27 pallet positions and can carry
up to 170,000 pounds of cargo, which is
comparable to a C-17. Although it is not normally used in a pure cargo role, the KC-10 can carry its own deployment cargo, freeing up other Transportation Command assets to provide needed lift for the huge wartime logistical requirement.
Simplicity and Economy of Force – Smaller tankers require more tails airborne to do the same job. Missions requiring one KC-10 will now require two or even three smaller tankers. Adding tankers to a mission invariably increases complexity of both planning and mission execution. This increases the size and difficulty of both mobility and wartime support missions, thus contradicting two fundamental
principles of war.
The U.S. Air Force is about to execute a plan that could have irreversible consequences, and time is running out to change course. Before it retires the
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