Konflikti Kiinan merellä

Toisaalta ns. länsimaiden kanssa nuo ugandastanit ja vastaavat ovat oppineet, että lopulta kuitenkin artisti maksaa itse ja lakkaa perimästä velkoja. Sitten alkaa uusi kierros.

Viime kädessä ugandastan tms. voi julistaa kansallistavansa vaikkapa Kiinan rakentamat lentokentät EU:n ja USA:n hiljaisella tuella ja mitäpä Kiina siihen tekee - jos ugandastanilla on tuotteita jotka menevät myös muualle maailmaan kaupaksi...
 
Tuskinpa. Taitaa olla ammoinen neukkuaikainen alfa päässyt lähimmäs.
 

JTn mukaan Connecticut törmäsi pohjamuotoihin, mutta tuolla alueella 1000 metriä tulee helposti täyteen. Pystyykö SeaWolf menemään niin syvälle?

Etelä-Kiinan merellä näyttäisi olevan syvyydet jonnekin 4500 m asti. Siellä on myös hyvin matalaakin, siksi siellä niitä tekosaariakin väsätään. Jos ei tarkemmin tiedetä missä alus on törmännyt niin on turha puhua mistään sukellusveneiden maksimi sukellussyvyyksistä.
 
No mut eivät ole sentään rasistei ku heidän pihallaan näkyi olevan BLM kyltti eräässä kuvassa mikä oli otettu vissii päivää sen jälkeen ku FBI kävi kylässä. Eiköhän sillä alennusta saa ainakii jos tuomio tulee
 
No mut eivät ole sentään rasistei ku heidän pihallaan näkyi olevan BLM kyltti eräässä kuvassa mikä oli otettu vissii päivää sen jälkeen ku FBI kävi kylässä. Eiköhän sillä alennusta saa ainakii jos tuomio tulee

Aikaisemmin näin maininnan tuosta tapauksesta, niin heti tuli mieleen joku paskansyöjä joka haluaa sabotoida omaa maataan "woke" aatteen nimissä.
 
Sieltä toiselta Kiinan mereltä.
A simple bowl of curry is at the centre of the latest row in a long-running territorial dispute between Japan and the Koreas.

Media in North and South Korea reacted angrily after an online media report about a seafood curry sold in Japan that includes mounds of rice shaped to resemble the Takeshima islands, which Koreans refer to as Dokdo.

The rocky islets, which lie roughly equidistant between the two countries in the Japan Sea – or the East Sea according to Koreans – are administered by South Korea, but Japan insists they are an integral part of its territory.
 
On September 1, China’s Maritime Traffic Safety Law (MTSL) came into force, requiring all foreign vessels entering Chinese territorial waters to notify maritime authorities, carry required permits, and submit to Chinese command and supervision. This comes after China’s passage of a new law in February which authorizes the China Coast Guard (CCG) to use force on foreign vessels infringing on Chinese sovereignty. Both laws have serious implications for the international order. In addition, they infringe upon provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which grant states the right of innocent passage without requiring permission from the coastal state’s government.

This is not the first time China has passed legislation that goes against international norms and infringes on the sovereignty of other states. China’s codification of disputed waters has been building up to its current expansive stage for around three decades. The 1992 Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone also caused angst among other states, especially those whose interests are compromised by the legislation’s Article 6: “to enter the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China, foreign military ships must obtain permission from the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”

This same law also violated UNCLOS provisions on defining the baselines from which the territorial sea and other maritime zones are measured. China applied the straight baseline method, connecting basepoints between several islands far from the Chinese coast. By defining baselines far beyond those allowed by the terms of UNCLOS, China inflated its resulting territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), infringing upon the rights of other nations to use those waters as allowed by international law.

Chinese domestic legislation that goes beyond what is allowed by international law creates opportunities for it to advance its territorial goals through coercive means—at the expense of the territory and sovereignty of regional states. Specifically, Article 12 of February’s Coast Guard Law allows the CCG to act to protect Chinese sovereignty, maritime interests, artificial islands, and facilities and construction in waters claimed by China. The CCG can also demolish foreign buildings, structures, floating devices constructed on the seas, islands, and reefs under its jurisdiction according to Article 20 of the law.

Vice-President Kamala Harris’s maiden visit to Southeast Asia this month couldn’t have come at a more critical juncture. The Biden administration’s “hard and messy” exit from Afghanistan has not only sapped the prestige of American power, at least for the moment, but also enabled rivals and their proxies to gloatingly question the United States’ commitment to allies across the world.

In a strongly-worded editorial, China’s Global Times declared, “From what happened in Afghanistan, those in Taiwan should perceive that once a war breaks out in the [Taiwan] Straits, the island’s defense will collapse in hours and U.S. military won’t come to help.” A prominent Chinese scholar went so far as to quickly portray the debacle in Afghanistan as a “forecast” of what will happen to major U.S. allies in Asia.

In Southeast Asia, the ultimate theatre of great power competition, pro-Beijing proxies have also tried to exploit the situation by sowing doubts vis-à-vis American reliability as well as rehashing the age-old line of the supposed inevitability of Chinese primacy in the region.

Officially, however, key regional states have emphasized their continued confidence in the United States’ commitment to a free and open order in the region. After all, recent history shows us that America’s ignominious withdrawals from “forever” wars, from South Vietnam to post-Saddam Iraq, haven’t necessarily undermined its commitments elsewhere.

If anything, the Biden administration can and should redouble its efforts at strengthening alliances and strategic partnership across the Indo-Pacific. This is especially important in the context of the South China Sea disputes, where there is still much to be desired in terms of the United States’ defense cooperation with frontline states such as the Philippines, a treaty ally, and Vietnam, a vital strategic partner, against a resurgent China.
 
entinen-pentagon-pomo: -kiina-on-jo-voittanut-taistelun-tekoälystä. -povaa-suurvallan-nousevan-maailmanmahdiksi
Lännessä ei vielä missään ole aloitteita Kiinasta osamisen vähentämiseksi. Kiinalla menee hyvin niin kauan kuin me siltä ostetaan.
Aika jännää kuinka olemmekin "riippuvaisia" Kiinasta jo nyt.
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mushroom-cloud-1.jpg
 
Nuorempana ymmärsin tuota ajatusmaailmaa, mutta en enää.

Prahan kommunismin uhrien muistomerkki.



Jos puolustautuminen vaatii ydinaseiden käyttöä, niin sitten on puolustauduttava, vaikka ydinasein.

Olen samaa mieltä mutta tuntuu olevan osin tabu julkisessa keskustelussa vaikka ammattilaiset näyttävät puhuvan ydinaseista taas enemmän. Sotatieteiden päivilläkin on ydinaseteemaa.

 
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