What this third test does lay bare, however, is a fundamental flaw in the Trump administration’s approach to Pyongyang. Since the early days of his presidency, the president has sought the
total and complete disarmament of North Korea. At the very least, he and his advisers have resolved that North Korea should not gain the ability to
strike the United States with a nuclear weapon. But because few expect North Korea to denuclearize, Trump’s objective strikes many as impossible.
Alongside these maximalist goals, top administration officials have also routinely threatened the first-use of American force, presuming this would stop North Korea from completing its nuclear and missile programs. Trump’s “
fire and fury” comments, for example, suggested that the United States might strike North Korea in retaliation for mere threats.
He and
his advisors have also repeated their belief that the North Korean leader is
irrational, undeterrable, and suicidal—a logic which, if sincerely believed, would seem to make U.S. military action inevitable. Importantly, this case for preventive action is premised on the idea that the United States and the world are
“running out of time” to halt North Korea from acquiring these gravest of capabilities. According to this narrative, it would be better to strike North Korea now rather than face its most sophisticated capabilities later.