The wave of full-scale regrouping of forces rolled from Far East through military districts of European part of USSR up to frontiers of Western districts. By mid-June it was extremely hard to hide from enemy’s intelligence such event as concentration of operative forces formation of First strategic echelon. In the period of June 12 till June 15 command of Western frontier districts received orders to advance divisions of district (front) reserve towards state's border. Directive of People's Commissar of Defense as of June 13, 1941, communicated to Kiev SMD, instructed:
“With the purpose of increasing district forces’ combat readiness by July 1 (underlined by me – M.S.)
all internal divisions with corps departments, as well as with corps parts are to be moved closer to state’s border into new camps…
All movements of forces are to be strictly confidential.
Marching to perform along with tactic trainings, at night time. All mobile supplies of ammunition and fuels and lubricants are to be taken out along with the forces. Families to leave behind. Execution to communicate to couriers by July 1, 1941” (6, page 359 )
Order was accepted for execution immediately. Marshal Bagramyan (at the time – Chief of operative department, Deputy Chief Staff of Kiev SMD) tells about these events in his memoirs:
“…On June 15 we received an order to start from June 17 advancement of all five rifle corps of the Second echelon towards border. We had already everything get prepared (underlined by me - M.S.) for this: already in the beginning of May we have performed substantial work, by order from Moscow, - drafted directives to corps, did reconnaissance of routes and districts of confinement. It was now just to give order to executors…Divisions were taking everything needed for combat actions. For secrecy purpose forces were to move at night time only. The plan was elaborated in details…In order Hitlerites wouldn’t notice our movements, districts of corps concentration were chosen not by the very border, but few daily marches away to East (45, page 75 )
Directive with similar content and with the same deadline for concentration – by July 1 – was delivered to Western SMD, as well. (6, page 423 ). By June 15 more than half of all divisions, making up the second echelon and reserve of Western military districts, were caused to move. On the eve of war, 32 divisions of Western districts secretly, by night marching through forests and swamps were going (creeping) towards to border. Colonel Novychkov who in the beginning of war was chief staff of 62nd rifle division of 5th Army of Kiev SMD, remembers: “Division’s parts advanced from camp in Kyvertsi (approximately 80 km from the border – M.S.) and by completing two night marching, approached line of defense by morning of June 19, though didn’t take the defensive position, just concentrated in forests (underlined by me – M.S.) not far from it.” (46)
On June 15 Chief commander of Baltic SMD, general-colonel F.I. Kuznetsov, issued an order № 0052, where he reminded his subordinates that
“just today, ever more, we have to be in full combat readiness…This should be fully understood by everybody, since at any minute we have to be ready to carry out any kind of military task”. (50, p. 8). Notwithstanding the fact, that order № 0052 didn’t contain any specific operative tasks, it received “Top secret. Particular importance” classification was brought to notice of senior officers only (from commanders of divisions and higher), and was concluded with the following instruction:
“With regard to this order no other written orders and instructions are to be given to anybody”. Concern about “secrecy purposes” led to such situation, when chief of politpropaganda department of Baltic SMD, comrade Ryabtchiy, in the evening of June 21, 1941, ordered that “
departments of corps and division politpropaganda are not to give directives to units; tasks of political work to raise orally through personal representatives…” ( 46 )
It’s very strange, very. Obviously, Soviet norms of confidentiality differed a lot from universal ones, but how come that it wasn’t be possible to put on paper such tasks as “be ready to protect peaceful work of Soviets” or “we don’t want any part of foreign land”?
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