Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Antares
- Aloitus PVM
Antares
Respected Leader
Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain ennen toista maailmansotaa.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. ХХ век. 1905-1941 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2002
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905-1941 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2002
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 17.
Huomaa, että tämän taulukon vuoden 1941 osuus on puolen vuoden osuus, ei koko vuosi. Käytännössä siis Saksan Neuvostoliittoon hyökkäämistä edeltäneen ajan tuotanto, päätepiste on 22.6.1941.
Supply of armored weapons and equipment by industrial plants in the Red Army
Note: * - Data are given for all serial tanks, including T-38M2;
** - Data are given for all serial flamethrower (chemical) tanks created on the basis of the T-26
Taulukon ensimmäisen datarivin nimen käännös: "Renault Russian". T-26 vaunun osalta on kaksi riviä, ylempi on "T-26 twin turret" ja sen alapuolella seuraava rivi on "T-26 single turret". Näiden alapuolella on rivi, jonka käännös on "T-26 from the mouth. P-40"
-
Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain tehtaiden mukaan eriteltynä.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 14.
Production of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945
Note: Table 3 does not list 201 SU-76I and 21 SG-122 units manufactured in 1942-1943. Plants No. 37 and 592, respectively, based on captured tanks and self-propelled
guns, as well as 101 ZIS-30 installations manufactured in 1941 by Plant No. 92 on the basis of the domestic semi-armored tractor T-20 "Komsomolets".
-
Yllä olevan taulukon data, tässä se on kirjattu vaunutyypeittäin (pari kategoriaa sisältää useita vaunuja, koska niitä ei ole eritelty alkuperäisessä taulukossa tarkemmin enkä halunnut alkaa spekuloimaan). Huomaa, että aikaväli ei ole vuosien 1941-1945 tuotanto alusta loppuun vaan "from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945" - täten tästä taulukosta puuttuu 1941 vuoden tuotanto ennen Saksan hyökkäystä, mikä on puolen vuoden tuotanto ja sodan päättymistä seurannut 1945 vuoden tuotanto, joka on sekin käytännössä puolen vuoden tuotanto.
-
Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain toisen maailmansodan jälkeen, aikaväli 1946-1965 sekä vuoden 1945 neljä viimeistä kuukautta.
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 20.
Huomaa, että taulukkoon merkitty vuoden 1945 määrä edustaa toisen maailmansodan jälkeistä tuotantoa, tässä se on merkitty syyskuusta joulukuuhun (IX-XII = 9-12). Täten tästä taulukosta puuttuu 1945 vuoden sodan aikana tehty tuotanto.
Production of tanks for the Soviet Army in the first post-war period (1946-1965)
* Of these, 96 are combat training.
** Tanks equipped for the installation of PST watercraft (tämän selitys: https://en.topwar.ru/8128-neobychnye-tanki-roscii-i-sssr-tanki-na-podvodnyh-krylyah.html)
-
Valitettavasti tämän erinomaisen kirjasarjan kolmas osa jäänee sen viimeiseksi, tietojeni mukaan kirjoittajaporukka hajosi sen jälkeen kuka minnekin eikä ole tarkoitusta kirjoittaa vuotta 1965 seuranneista kehityksistä. He ehtivät jo nimetä viimeisen kirjan:
"Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 4. 1966-2000" eli "Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 4. 1966-2000"
Heidän hyvin tarkka tyyli olisi varmasti tuonut lisävaloa kylmän sodan viimeisille vuosikymmenille sekä 90-luvun kaaokseen, harmi ettei tätä kirjaa tulla näkemään.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. ХХ век. 1905-1941 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2002
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905-1941 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2002
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 17.
Huomaa, että tämän taulukon vuoden 1941 osuus on puolen vuoden osuus, ei koko vuosi. Käytännössä siis Saksan Neuvostoliittoon hyökkäämistä edeltäneen ajan tuotanto, päätepiste on 22.6.1941.
Supply of armored weapons and equipment by industrial plants in the Red Army
Note: * - Data are given for all serial tanks, including T-38M2;
** - Data are given for all serial flamethrower (chemical) tanks created on the basis of the T-26
Taulukon ensimmäisen datarivin nimen käännös: "Renault Russian". T-26 vaunun osalta on kaksi riviä, ylempi on "T-26 twin turret" ja sen alapuolella seuraava rivi on "T-26 single turret". Näiden alapuolella on rivi, jonka käännös on "T-26 from the mouth. P-40"
-
Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain tehtaiden mukaan eriteltynä.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 14.
Production of Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945
Note: Table 3 does not list 201 SU-76I and 21 SG-122 units manufactured in 1942-1943. Plants No. 37 and 592, respectively, based on captured tanks and self-propelled
guns, as well as 101 ZIS-30 installations manufactured in 1941 by Plant No. 92 on the basis of the domestic semi-armored tractor T-20 "Komsomolets".
-
Yllä olevan taulukon data, tässä se on kirjattu vaunutyypeittäin (pari kategoriaa sisältää useita vaunuja, koska niitä ei ole eritelty alkuperäisessä taulukossa tarkemmin enkä halunnut alkaa spekuloimaan). Huomaa, että aikaväli ei ole vuosien 1941-1945 tuotanto alusta loppuun vaan "from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945" - täten tästä taulukosta puuttuu 1941 vuoden tuotanto ennen Saksan hyökkäystä, mikä on puolen vuoden tuotanto ja sodan päättymistä seurannut 1945 vuoden tuotanto, joka on sekin käytännössä puolen vuoden tuotanto.
-
Neuvostoliiton eri vaunutyyppien valmistusmäärät vuosittain toisen maailmansodan jälkeen, aikaväli 1946-1965 sekä vuoden 1945 neljä viimeistä kuukautta.
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 20.
Huomaa, että taulukkoon merkitty vuoden 1945 määrä edustaa toisen maailmansodan jälkeistä tuotantoa, tässä se on merkitty syyskuusta joulukuuhun (IX-XII = 9-12). Täten tästä taulukosta puuttuu 1945 vuoden sodan aikana tehty tuotanto.
Production of tanks for the Soviet Army in the first post-war period (1946-1965)
* Of these, 96 are combat training.
** Tanks equipped for the installation of PST watercraft (tämän selitys: https://en.topwar.ru/8128-neobychnye-tanki-roscii-i-sssr-tanki-na-podvodnyh-krylyah.html)
-
Valitettavasti tämän erinomaisen kirjasarjan kolmas osa jäänee sen viimeiseksi, tietojeni mukaan kirjoittajaporukka hajosi sen jälkeen kuka minnekin eikä ole tarkoitusta kirjoittaa vuotta 1965 seuranneista kehityksistä. He ehtivät jo nimetä viimeisen kirjan:
"Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 4. 1966-2000" eli "Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 4. 1966-2000"
Heidän hyvin tarkka tyyli olisi varmasti tuonut lisävaloa kylmän sodan viimeisille vuosikymmenille sekä 90-luvun kaaokseen, harmi ettei tätä kirjaa tulla näkemään.
Viimeksi muokattu:
SatSotHist
Kapteeni
Käsittämättömiä numeroita. T-44 joka oli "vain" ylimenokauden tankki valmistettiin yli 1200 kpl.
Antares
Respected Leader
Edellisen viestin taulukko toisen maailmansodan aikaisesta tuotannosta on aika selvä, mutta laitan sen uudestaan käännöstyökalun kautta ajettuna. Tämä sumentaa numeroita, mutta tekee tehtaiden nimet selväksi joten ei ole hyödytöntä vaikka samat kuvat tuleekin toistamiseen:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
T-64 vaunujen eri varianttien määristä, tämä lainaus on S. Suvorovin kirjasta "Танк Т-64 первенец танков второго поколения" (julkaistu vuonna 2001) sivut 56 ja 57. Otin sen käännöstyökalun läpi jotta testi on luettavissa (kirjasta löytyy myös skannattu versio täältä):
Huvittavasti hän moittii 90-luvun alkupuolen läntisiä kirjoituksia ja niiden virheitä, kun taas hänen kirjasta tunnistettuja virheitä on listattu mm. täällä: LINKKI
Yksi ikävimpiä on ettei kirja tarjoa luetteloa käytetyille lähteille, sikäli kun niitä on. Tämä on silti hyödyllinen, kirjoittaa mm. alkuperäisten T-64 vaunujen kohtalosta sekä antaa numeroita muutaman variantin tuotantomääristä:
T-64 = 600 - 1 700
T-64A = noin 4 600
T-64B = noin 4 200
T-64B1 = noin 1 200
T-64BK = 57
Näiden summa = 10 057 jos jätetään T-64 vaunut laskuista.
En sano että nämä Suvorovin kirjan määrät ovat välttämättä oikeat, mutta tarjoavat yhden datapisteen kokonaismääristä ja toisaalta jos törmäät internetissä näihin numeroihin, niin tiedät mistä ne tulevat.
Ukrainan wikipedian T-64 vaunua käsittelevä sivu sanoo että T-64AK valmistusmäärä olisi noin 780 kpl ja T-64BV osalta kirjoitetaan että niitä olisi Ukrainan armeijalla käytössä "more than 600". LÄHDE
Steve Zalogan mukaan: "In general, about 5 percent of Russian tanks were built in the command tank configuration". Jos näin on, niin T-64 vaunujen osalta 13 108 x 0,05 = 655 komentovaunua. En ole tarkastellut komentovaunujen määriä joten en osaa sanoa kuinka lähellä totuutta tuo on.
Alkuperäisten T-64 mallien eli Obyekt 432 valmistusmäärä on useamman lähteen mukaan 1 192 kpl
Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa kirjassaan "T-64 battle tank - the cold war's most secret tank" näiden vaunujen kohtalosta:
From 1977 to 1981, the T-64 tanks remaining in service underwent a capital rebuilding program that modernized their radio sets to current standards, added the Brod deep-wading system, and added a number of stowage features from the T-64A. These rebuilt T-64 tanks were designated as T-64R (R = remontniy; rebuilt).
Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan taulukon mukaan T-64A ja T-64B (sekä muut variantit) = 13 108 kpl
Zalogan kirja ei ota kantaa tuotantomääriin, tosin toteaa seuraavasti:
According to recent Russian accounts, total production of the T-64 was about 12,000 tanks, though details are lacking. The T-64A was frst deployed in the western military districts of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The intention was to gradually deploy the T-64A with the frst-line units facing NATO in the GSFG in Germany and neighboring Warsaw Pact states. The frst unit given this task was the 14th Guards Mechanized Division in Juterborg in 1976, reorganized in 1982 as the 32nd Guards Tank Division. NATO frst spotted the arrival of the T-64A tank in East Germany in 1976. At frst, it was misidentifed as the T-72. The T-64A was deployed primarily with the Soviet tank units in the northern regions of East Germany with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, 3rd Shock Army, and 20th Guards Army. Its primacy in the GSFG was short-lived.
The new T-80A tank began arriving in Germany in April 1983, initially re-equipping the feld armies in the southern sectors of East Germany. However, before the withdrawal of the GSFG, the T-80 had begun to replace the T-64A and T-64B in the three northern feld armies as well. The T-64 remained in two divisions and one separate brigade in Germany at the time of the Soviet withdrawal. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were 3,982 T-64 tanks in service west of the Urals, with 2,091 in Ukraine.The new Russian Army decided to standardize on the T-72 and T-80, and so the T-64 force was gradually put in reserve or scrapped. In 2014, the Russian force was estimated to number about 2,000 T-64 tanks in storage and there were additional tanks in the zone east of the Urals.
A number of other republics also ended up with modest numbers of T-64 tanks, including Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.
Kirja tarjoaa seuraavan taulukon eri varianttien määristä, mutta nämä ovat ainoastaan Neuvostoliiton ilmoittamat Uralin länsipuolelle sijoitetut vaunut vuonna 1990. Ei siis kerro mitään muuta tuon lisäksi, vaunuja oli sijoitettuna Uralin itäpuolelle eri varastoihin. Neuvostoliitto ei ollut hajonnut vuonna 1990 joten tässä on Venäjän ja Ukrainan määrät yhdessä.
Yhden lähteen mukaan Ukrainalle jääneet vaunut olivat, tosin CFE ilmoitusten perusteella T-80 vaunuja olisi ollut 350 kpl vuonna 1992. Tämän lisäksi alla olevasta taulukosta puuttuvat T-54 ja/tai T-55 vaunut, joita heillä oli myös "jokin määrä", arvatenkin useita satoja ellei jopa yli tuhat. Military Balancen mukaan heillä olisi ollut jo pitkään 112 kpl T-55 vaunuja, vanhin julkaisu jossa tämä mainitaan on vuodelta 2004 (vanhin julkaisu, johon minulla on pääsy):
Huvittavasti hän moittii 90-luvun alkupuolen läntisiä kirjoituksia ja niiden virheitä, kun taas hänen kirjasta tunnistettuja virheitä on listattu mm. täällä: LINKKI
Yksi ikävimpiä on ettei kirja tarjoa luetteloa käytetyille lähteille, sikäli kun niitä on. Tämä on silti hyödyllinen, kirjoittaa mm. alkuperäisten T-64 vaunujen kohtalosta sekä antaa numeroita muutaman variantin tuotantomääristä:
T-64 = 600 - 1 700
T-64A = noin 4 600
T-64B = noin 4 200
T-64B1 = noin 1 200
T-64BK = 57
Näiden summa = 10 057 jos jätetään T-64 vaunut laskuista.
En sano että nämä Suvorovin kirjan määrät ovat välttämättä oikeat, mutta tarjoavat yhden datapisteen kokonaismääristä ja toisaalta jos törmäät internetissä näihin numeroihin, niin tiedät mistä ne tulevat.
Ukrainan wikipedian T-64 vaunua käsittelevä sivu sanoo että T-64AK valmistusmäärä olisi noin 780 kpl ja T-64BV osalta kirjoitetaan että niitä olisi Ukrainan armeijalla käytössä "more than 600". LÄHDE
Steve Zalogan mukaan: "In general, about 5 percent of Russian tanks were built in the command tank configuration". Jos näin on, niin T-64 vaunujen osalta 13 108 x 0,05 = 655 komentovaunua. En ole tarkastellut komentovaunujen määriä joten en osaa sanoa kuinka lähellä totuutta tuo on.
Alkuperäisten T-64 mallien eli Obyekt 432 valmistusmäärä on useamman lähteen mukaan 1 192 kpl
Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa kirjassaan "T-64 battle tank - the cold war's most secret tank" näiden vaunujen kohtalosta:
From 1977 to 1981, the T-64 tanks remaining in service underwent a capital rebuilding program that modernized their radio sets to current standards, added the Brod deep-wading system, and added a number of stowage features from the T-64A. These rebuilt T-64 tanks were designated as T-64R (R = remontniy; rebuilt).
Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan taulukon mukaan T-64A ja T-64B (sekä muut variantit) = 13 108 kpl
Zalogan kirja ei ota kantaa tuotantomääriin, tosin toteaa seuraavasti:
According to recent Russian accounts, total production of the T-64 was about 12,000 tanks, though details are lacking. The T-64A was frst deployed in the western military districts of the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The intention was to gradually deploy the T-64A with the frst-line units facing NATO in the GSFG in Germany and neighboring Warsaw Pact states. The frst unit given this task was the 14th Guards Mechanized Division in Juterborg in 1976, reorganized in 1982 as the 32nd Guards Tank Division. NATO frst spotted the arrival of the T-64A tank in East Germany in 1976. At frst, it was misidentifed as the T-72. The T-64A was deployed primarily with the Soviet tank units in the northern regions of East Germany with the 2nd Guards Tank Army, 3rd Shock Army, and 20th Guards Army. Its primacy in the GSFG was short-lived.
The new T-80A tank began arriving in Germany in April 1983, initially re-equipping the feld armies in the southern sectors of East Germany. However, before the withdrawal of the GSFG, the T-80 had begun to replace the T-64A and T-64B in the three northern feld armies as well. The T-64 remained in two divisions and one separate brigade in Germany at the time of the Soviet withdrawal. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were 3,982 T-64 tanks in service west of the Urals, with 2,091 in Ukraine.The new Russian Army decided to standardize on the T-72 and T-80, and so the T-64 force was gradually put in reserve or scrapped. In 2014, the Russian force was estimated to number about 2,000 T-64 tanks in storage and there were additional tanks in the zone east of the Urals.
A number of other republics also ended up with modest numbers of T-64 tanks, including Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.
Kirja tarjoaa seuraavan taulukon eri varianttien määristä, mutta nämä ovat ainoastaan Neuvostoliiton ilmoittamat Uralin länsipuolelle sijoitetut vaunut vuonna 1990. Ei siis kerro mitään muuta tuon lisäksi, vaunuja oli sijoitettuna Uralin itäpuolelle eri varastoihin. Neuvostoliitto ei ollut hajonnut vuonna 1990 joten tässä on Venäjän ja Ukrainan määrät yhdessä.
Yhden lähteen mukaan Ukrainalle jääneet vaunut olivat, tosin CFE ilmoitusten perusteella T-80 vaunuja olisi ollut 350 kpl vuonna 1992. Tämän lisäksi alla olevasta taulukosta puuttuvat T-54 ja/tai T-55 vaunut, joita heillä oli myös "jokin määrä", arvatenkin useita satoja ellei jopa yli tuhat. Military Balancen mukaan heillä olisi ollut jo pitkään 112 kpl T-55 vaunuja, vanhin julkaisu jossa tämä mainitaan on vuodelta 2004 (vanhin julkaisu, johon minulla on pääsy):
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Yllä olevan viestin Neuvostoliiton toisen maailmansodan (from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945) sodanajan panssarivaunutuotanto pilkottuna vaunujen luokittelun mukaisesti:
Kevyet panssarivaunut (light tanks):
Keskiraskaat panssarivaunut (medium tanks):
Raskaat panssarivaunut (heavy tanks)
Rynnäkkötykit (self-propelled guns):
-
Alla koko taulukko yhdessä, tosin jos vertaa Solyankin et. al. kirjan taulukkoon niin rivien järjestys on hieman eri (sisältö on tietysti sama).
Tässä minun taulukossa tehtaat on järjestetty länsi-itä -suunnassa karkeasti, näkee helpommin tehtaiden tuotannon hiipumisen Saksan hyökkäyksen edetessä ja toisaalta tuotantolinjojen uudelleenkäynnistämisen kun hyökkäys pysähtyi ja vaihtoi suuntaa:
Kevyet panssarivaunut (light tanks):
Keskiraskaat panssarivaunut (medium tanks):
Raskaat panssarivaunut (heavy tanks)
Rynnäkkötykit (self-propelled guns):
-
Alla koko taulukko yhdessä, tosin jos vertaa Solyankin et. al. kirjan taulukkoon niin rivien järjestys on hieman eri (sisältö on tietysti sama).
Tässä minun taulukossa tehtaat on järjestetty länsi-itä -suunnassa karkeasti, näkee helpommin tehtaiden tuotannon hiipumisen Saksan hyökkäyksen edetessä ja toisaalta tuotantolinjojen uudelleenkäynnistämisen kun hyökkäys pysähtyi ja vaihtoi suuntaa:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tuumailua T-80 vaunujen valmistusmääristä sekä tuotannon eri vaiheista, seuraavat lainaukset ovat Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009):
-
In its original configuration, the long-delayed T-80 was essentially identical to the older T-64A in firepower, as it used exactly the same type of turret with an optical rangefinder. But it was hideously expensive: R480,000 versus R143,000 for the T-64A. In respect to its turret and fire controls, it was already behind the Kharkov T-64, which had evolved by 1976 into the T-64B with a new fire-control system incorporating a laser rangefinder and the capability to fire the Kobra tube-launched guided missile. As a result, production of the T-80 was very short-lived, running from only 1976 to 1978 at LKZ. Data released under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty from November 1990, indicated that there were only 112 T-80s west of the Urals, which suggests that overall T-80 production was probably well under 200 tanks.
-
The Obiekt 219R was accepted for Soviet service in 1978 as the T-80B and entered production at LKZ that year, replacing the earlier T-80. It entered production at the Omsk plant in 1979, belatedly replacing the T-55A that was still in production there for export. The Omsk plant was also assigned to develop the Obiekt 630 command version of the T-80B, designated T-80BK. The command version added a land navigation system and an additional command radio.
The T-80B became the most common production version of the T-80, and the first version to be forward deployed with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) starting in 1981. The T-80B was first seen by NATO moving into Germany in April 1983 near Halle, beginning with the 29th Tank Regiment, 9th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA), and with units of the 8th GTA in 1984. By 1985, each division in the 1st GTA and 8th GTA had received some T-80B tanks. According to data released under the CFE Treaty, there were 3,518 T-80B and 217 T-80BK command tanks in service west of the Urals in November 1990, plus a further 617 upgraded T-80BV, for a grand-total of 4,352, amounting to 90 percent of overall T-80 strength. There were very few T-80 tanks stationed east of the Urals, except for those still in the Omsk plant and in a handful of depots and schools.
-
Kontakt began to be fitted to Soviet tanks in 1983 and was first deployed with the GSFG in 1984. In 1985, the LKZ began to manufacture the T-80B with Kontakt as T-80BV (Obiekt 219RV); the corresponding command tank version was T-80BVK. The "V" suffix added to the designations indicated "explosive" (vyzryvnoi). During periodic rebuilding, older tanks were retrofitted with the Kontakt package. According to CFE Treaty documents, in November 1990 there were 594 T-80BV and 23 T-80BVK command tanks in Soviet service west of the Urals, amounting to about 13 percent of T-80 tank strength.
-
With the retirement of Aleksandr Morozov, the chief designer at the Kharkov plant in May 1976, defense minister Ustinov attempted to impose a greater degree of standardization on Soviet tank designs. Kharkov had been developing an improved T-64B with substantially improved fire controls and new turret armor as the Obiekt 476 or Izdeliye 9A. Rather than waste time transferring the features to a new T-80 turret, Moscow decided to merge the new Kharkov turret with the T-80B hull the Obiekt 219A Olkha, and then to shift Kharkov's production from the T-64B to the T-80. Under this scheme, Popov's design bureau at LKZ was responsible for the overall program while Kharkov's new chief designer, Nikolai Shomin, was responsible for the turret and armament. The Obiekt 476 turret included a new generation of laminate armor and the improved lA45 fire-control system with the new IG46 sight.
At the time, two different types of advanced composite turret armor were being examined by NIl Stali, and their reflecting-plate armor (bronya s otrazhayushchimi listami) was adopted on the new T-72B. The cavity in the front of the cast steel turret was filled with a laminate of alternating metal and non-metallic plates. The Obeikt 476 used a more expensive, semi-active filledcell armor (bronya s yachestim napolnitelem) in the cavity consisting of two rows of polymer-filled cells backed by a steel plate and another layer of resin. When the cells were penetrated by the shaped-charge jet, shock waves reverberated in the semi-liquid filler in the cells, degrading the penetrator. Although the Obiekt 219A was ready for production at Kharkov in the 1982 time-frame, production was limited to a relatively small number of tanks for trials purposes due to the other ongoing technology initiatives, including tubefired missiles and reactive armor.
-
As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Army pushed Kontakt-1 into service almost immediately. Kontakt was not entirely popular with the Soviet tank designers as it added 1.2 metric tons to the weight of the tank and was only able to protect against shaped charge warheads. By the mid-1980s, NATO was shifting its tactics towards the use of armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot (APFSDS) projectiles for tank guns, which were not affected by Kontakt. The Soviet Army acquired some examples of Israeli MIll APFSDS 105mm ammunition from the Syrians that had been captured in the 1982 Lebanon war. Tests of this ammunition in the Soviet Union in 1982-83 indicated it could penetrate the existing glacis ~rmor of tanks such as the T-72 and T-80. As a short-term fix, 20mm steel armor applique was applied to T-80B glacis plates. In addition, NIl Stali accelerated research on a secondgeneration "universal" ERA called Kontakt-5, which was intended to have some capability to degrade APFSDS projectiles as well as shaped-charge warheads. Kontakt-5 relied on a much more substantial steel plate on the outside of the panel and this material was sufficient both to increase the degradation of shaped-charge jets, and also degrade APFSDS penetration by about 20-35 percent. This plate required a more energetic explosive insert, with a TNT equivalent of 0.28kg in the 4S20 panels of Kontakt-1 versus 0.33kg in the 4S22 panels of the Kontakt-5. The Kontakt-5 panels had to be properly angled for maximum effect and in combination with their size and weight, they could not be bolted on, as had been the case with Kontakt1. Kontakt-5 had to be incorporated as a comprehensively designed armor package that would have to be undertaken during original manufacture or during capital rebuilding. As a result, Kontakt-1 and Kontakt-5 were distinguished from one another as applique ERA (navesnoy DZ) versus integrated ERA (vstroenniy DZ).
The new Obiekt 219AS merged the features of Obiekt 219A and Obiekt 219V along with the Kontakt-5 protective package. A pre-production batch of 20 Obiekt 219AS was completed in late 1983, with eight immediately sent for troop trials and the remainder for state trials and factory testing. The Obiekt 219AS was accepted for Soviet Army service in 1985 as the T-80U (U = usovershenstvovanniy: improved) and went into series production at Omsk in 1987. According to documents released under the CFE Treaty, there were 410 T-80U tanks in operational service west of the Urals in November 1990, or about 8 percent of T-80 strength; this figure presumably included some of the later T-80UD (see below).
-
The shortcomings of the turbine engine in the T-80 led to a continuing string of experimental alternatives using diesel propulsion. An initial diesel-powered version was developed by LKZ beginning in 1975-1976, powered by the 2V16 (A-53-2) 1,000hp diesel designed by the Transdizel Special Design Bureau at the Chelyabinsk Motor Plant. This was mounted on a modified T-80B chassis as the Obiekt 219RD, but was not ready until 1983. Another diesel test-bed was developed at Omsk as the Obiekt 644, using the V-46-6 of the T-72 tank. Neither of these reached the production stage due to Ustinov's "turbinization" program. Nevertheless, there was continuing interest in the Soviet Army to replace the turbine on the T-80 due to its high procurement and operating costs. For example, in the 1980s the V-46 diesel engine on the T-72 cost only R9,600 while the GTD-1 000 turbine was more than ten times more expensive at R104,000. Furthermore, the turbine had a shorter running life, consumed more fuel, and was complicated and expensive to maintain and repair.
Even if Ustinov insisted that Kharkov shift from T-64 to T-80 production, the Kharkov plant wanted to build their T-80s with a diesel. So the Obiekt 478, a third effort to develop a diesel-powered T-80, started in 1976 at Kharkov. It used the new 6TD 1,000 hp diesel developed at Kharkov for the improved T-64 (Obiekt 476) and the next-generation T-74. Another option was also explored, the Obiekt 478M, which was a much more elaborate configuration with the new Sistema fire-control system, Shater active protection system, and a Chelyabinsk Transdizel X-layout 1,500hp 124Ch diesel. The Obiekt 478M was recognized as being a case of the" best being the enemy of the good" - it was simply too expensive and complicated. The Obiekt 478, on the other hand, was falling behind the contemporary Obiekt 476 upgrade in terms of fire controls and armament features; for example, it relied on the older Kobra missile instead of the newer Refleks being considered for Obiekt 476. Nevertheless, Ustinov was still insistent on the "turbinization" of the army, and so production of the T-64B at Kharkov ended and the facility began to re-tool to manufacture the T-80U.
Ustinov's views were not universally shared within the Soviet Army and a Defense Ministry study in 1984 concluded that for the next five-year plan, the Soviet Army could purchase 2,500 tanks and 6,000 6TD diesel engines, or 1,500 tanks and 2,000 GTD-1250 turbine engines. Ustinov's death in December 1984, followed by that of Leningrad party-boss Romanov in July 1985, removed the two most prominent supporters of the Leningrad turbine tank and cleared the way for a return to diesel tanks. Production of the T-80U at Kharkov had been painfully slow anyway, and in the event only 45 were built there. Government approval for a diesel powered T-80U was speedily granted on September 2, 1985.
The Obiekt 478 diesel program was restarted as Obiekt 478B Bereza (Birch tree) with the 6TD engine in the T-80U. A total of five prototypes were quickly completed by year's end for trials purposes, but a parallel set of prototypes based on the less elaborate Obiekt 219A with the diesel were also built for comparison. Due to the earlier studies, test and evaluation work was very quickly completed and as a result, Obiekt 478B Bereza was demonstrated at the Kharkov tank school to Mikhail Gorbachev and other senior government and army officials. Government approval for production was quickly granted in 1986 but the production program was far from trouble-free, and the Soviet Army demanded improvements before large-scale production began. The original plan had been to designate the diesel-powered T-80U as the T-84, following the Kharkov tradition of the T-34, T-44, T-54, T-64 and T-74. This proposal led to a bitter "fight under the carpet" between the industry and army, with some detractors noting that the T-84 designation would draw attention to the fact that the Soviet Army was operating four different "standard" tanks - T-64, T-72, T-80, and T-84 - all with essentially the same characteristics except for four different powerplants. The issue was so contentious that it went to the top - Gorbachev's Central Committee of the Communist Party - for a final decision. In the end, the less conspicuous designation T-80UD was selected, indicating "Improved Diesel" (Usovershenstvovanniy Dieselniy). Soviet tank production continued to decline in the late 1980s due to Gorbachev's attempts to rein in defense spending. The original 1989 plan had been for 3,739 T-80 and T-72 tanks, but this was cut back to 1,530 tanks, and the 1990 plan cut to 1,445 tanks.
Total production of the T-80UD prior to the Soviet collapse was rather modest at about 500 tanks, of which about 350 were still located at the Kharkov plant when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (huom. Neuvostoliitto hajosi virallisesti 26 joulukuuta 1991 joten sinänsä oletan että tuon vuoden tuotanto valmistui kokonaisuudessaan, paitsi jos oli jotain aikataulusta myöhäisiä vaunuja sekä tuotantolinjalla tietysti keskeneräisiä eri vaiheissa kokoonpanoa). The T-80UD was first deployed with the two "Kremlin court divisions": the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division (4th GTD) and the 2nd Guards Taman Motor Rifle Division (MRD) in the Moscow area. The T-80UD was first publicly shown at the May 9, 1990 Victory Day parade in Red Square in Moscow. They were seen on the Moscow streets again during the attempted putsch in August 1991.
-
At the time of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the T-80 was the premium tank of the Soviet ground forces, deployed with the most combat-ready Soviet units. According to documents from the CFE Treaty, T-80 strength in November 1990 west of the Urals was 4,874. Of this strength, the vast majority was deployed against NATO, with some 3,020 T-80Bs and T-80BVs with six tank divisions and six motor rifle divisions in the GSFG and about 600 in a tank and motor rifle division in the Northern Group of Forces in Poland. A modest 705 were deployed with units in Russia, notably with the 4th GTD and 2nd Taman Guards MRD in the Moscow area, and in smaller numbers in five motor rifle divisions in the Leningrad Military District. The remaining T-80s were located in various schools, training units, and depots. Additional T-80s were located east of the Urals, such as at the Omsk plant and in depots and training schools, but these were relatively few in number. Total T-80 production was probably more than the 4,874 tanks reported under the CFE Treaty, as none were listed in the Ukraine, even though about 320 were at the Kharkov plant, and there were probably some T-80s at the Omsk tank plant as well.
As a result of the Soviet collapse, nearly all of the T-80 tanks were in Russian control except for about 350 tanks, mainly T-80UD, located in Ukraine at the Kharkov plant and less than a hundred in Belarus. The tanks stationed in German and Poland were gradually repatriated back to Russia through the mid-1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union threw the Soviet tank industry into crisis. At the time, only three of the five assembly plants were still active. Nizhni-Tagil was manufacturing the T-72B, Kharkov was manufacturing the T-80UD, and Omsk was manufacturing the T-80U; Leningrad and Chelyabinsk were no longer very active in tank assembly. Kharkov is located in Ukraine, and so was split off from the other Soviet plants in Russia. The political turmoil was accompanied by a precipitous decline in defense funding and virtually no new tanks were funded in Russia from 1991 to about 2005, although some production continued based on existing contracts and parts.
-
Once again, the fate of the Russian tank program was determined by politics more than technology. Having been the past victim of Kremlin politics, the Uralvagon plant proved to have learned its lesson. To avoid the taint of the Chechen war, the new T-72BU version of the T-72 tank was renamed the "T-90." Eduard Rossel, the governor of the Sverdlovsk region where the Nizhni-Tagil plant was located, vigorously campaigned for the T-90 as the future Russian tank. In 1996, the Russian Army announced that the T-90 would be the preferred tank for the immediate future. The decision made little difference in the short run, as there was no procurement funding for either the T-80U or T-90 for almost a decade. In the event, the T-90 prospered, as the Uralvagon plant at Nizhni-Tagil had an extensive commercial business in railroad equipment that kept the factory alive until state orders for tanks resumed in 2005. In addition, Nizhni-Tagil had better success in the export market, winning some large T-72 and T-90 sales to India and several other countries. In contrast, Omsk had a very difficult time winning export orders. The T-80U was significantly more expensive to purchase and operate than the T-72, and the Russian Army decision in favor of the T-90 did not help the T-80's export prospects. In addition, it faced competition from the Ukrainian Kharkov tank plant, which was offering the T-80UD/T-84 on the export market. Whether the T-90 was favored or not, by the late 1990s the T-80 was the backbone of Russian tank forces. Older tanks had been retired due to a lack of funds and of the 5,546 tanks still in service west of the Urals in 1997, 3,210 were T-80 tanks, almost 60 percent.
-
A handful of export orders for the T-80U did materialize, though they were fulfilled mostly by using undelivered inventory from the Omsk plant. Morocco acquired about five T-80 tanks in the late 1980s, ostensibly for testing for a future tank requirement; it is widely believed that they ended up in the hands of US, British, and German intelligence agencies. Russia sold Britain one T-80U in 1992 as a goodwill gesture connected with President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Britain in 1992. Sweden evaluated the T-80U for its tank competition starting in 1993, but finally settled on the Leopard 2. The Russian government owed South Korea a substantial amount of money from the Soviet period, and partly paid these debts through the sale of military equipment. The Republic of Korea Army received about 80 T-80U tanks from 1996 to 2005. These are used primarily by "opposing forces" units for training. Cyprus acquired 41 T-80U tanks, including 14 of the new T-80UK command tanks in 1996-97.
Omsk attempted to reinvigorate international interest in the T-80 by more elaborate improvements, including active protection systems as detailed below. Export sales were too small to keep the Omsk tank plant busy, and in spite of a few small state orders for tank rebuilding, the plant went bankrupt in 2006. At the time of writing (huom. kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009 joten "kirjoitushetki" on jotain tuota ennen, ehkä vuoden 2008 loppu), the Russian government planned to consolidate the tank business around Uralvagon in Nizhni-Tagil, with Omsk assigned tank rebuilding efforts as well as some design work. The Russian Army began to fund upgrades for its aging T-80 fleet in the 2007 defense budget.
-
The Kharkov plant in newly independent Ukraine attempted to keep T-80 production alive there, but suffered from some unique problems. About 70 percent of the T-80UD came from plants outside Ukraine, mainly Russia. Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up. Since the Ukrainian state budget was too small to support any extensive production, the plant turned to the export market. In 1993, the Malyshev plant demonstrated the T-80UD to Pakistan and in the summer of 1995, two T-80UD underwent extensive testing there. In August 1996, Pakistan announced plans to purchase 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine. One critical component was the cast turret - this came from the Azvostal foundry in Mariupol, which had already ceased production; the other casting facility was at the Omsk plant in Russia. So the Malyshev plant's design bureau developed a new welded turret that resulted in the Obiekt 478BK (BK = Bereza-Katanaya: Rolled-armor birch tree), with the first completed in 1993. Ukraine began manufacturing its own version of the D-81 125mm gun at the KBA-3. Of the 320 tanks delivered to Pakistan in 1997-1999, 145 used the original cast turret, including 52 tanks completed under Soviet contracts but never delivered, plus new tanks built with remaining Soviet-era turrets, and some tanks from Ukrainian army stocks. Ukrainian Army T-80 strength fell from about 350 tanks prior to the sale to 271 afterwards. The remaining 175 tanks were the new production Obiekt 478BE with the welded turret.
-
Although the Ukrainian government made repeated promises to begin purchasing the T-84 tank for the Ukrainian Army, the budget was too small to do so. A total of ten T-84M were ordered and delivered in 2002-2003. However, the government had problems paying for all the tanks, and four were sold off to the United States in 2003. A lack of orders from the Ukrainian government or from export clients left the Kharkov plant in grave economic straits and restricted their development efforts after 2005.
-
Tämä lainaus on Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivuilta 4-6 ja tarjoaa lisätietoa panssarivaunujen tuotantomäärille 90-luvun alussa:
-
The imposition of the “defense sufficiency” doctrine in the Gorbachev years led to substantial reductions in Soviet tank production. The Soviet Union had five tank plants in 1980 but only three remained active by 1991. After the Soviet collapse, only two remained inside the Russian Federation. Annual tank production plummeted from 3,254 in 1987 to 1,000 in 1991 and fell rapidly after that. The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991. Since it was located in Ukraine, the Kharkov plant was cut off from the Russian Federation. T-80U production in St Petersburg at the Leningrad Kirov Plant ceased in 1990 prior to the Soviet collapse. T-72 production at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) had ceased in 1989 after 1,522 had been built there. This left only two functioning tank plants in Russia, the Uralvagonzavod (UVZ: Ural Rail-Car Plant) in Nizhni-Tagil and the Transmash plant in Omsk in Siberia. Of these two, the UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil was the more significant. It included both a substantial design bureau, nicknamed the “Vagonka,” as well as a large manufacturing facility. It had been responsible for the design of several Soviet tanks during the Cold War years including the T-55, T-62 and T-72. The Omsk plant had a very small design staff and was regarded as a subsidiary plant, usually manufacturing tanks developed at other locations. At the time of the Soviet collapse, the T-80U was still in production at the Transmash Plant in Omsk while T-72 was in production at UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil.
In 1992, the Russian defense ministry made it clear that it could no longer afford to simultaneously buy two main battle tanks. Russian officials stated that they wished to cut production down to a single type, either the T-72 or the T-80. However, selecting one or the other tank meant that economic catastrophe would befall the losing city. Therefore, Russian officials continued to order both types in small amounts. In 1992, the Russian Army ordered only 20 tanks: 5 T-80U tanks from Omsk and 15 tanks from Nizhni-Tagil. Tank production at Omsk and Nizhni-Tagil in 1992–93 was well beyond the puny state orders due to some export orders, but only a pale shadow of the 1980s. This additional production was not ordered by the Russian Army, but undertaken simply to keep the plants from closing. There was the hope that large export orders would emerge to save the plants and sop up this surplus. However the anticipated export orders did not materialize. The UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil had about 350 T-72S and T-90 tanks in its factory yards, and Omsk had 150−200 T-80U tanks. Some of these T-80U tanks were exported to Cyprus and South Korea in 1996; UVZ gradually exported the T-72 tanks. Lack of pay at the Nizhni-Tagil plant led to strikes in July 1995 during which the workers seized several of the idle tanks and drove them through the city in protest.
-
Taulukko Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009) sivulta 34:
Tämä taulukko on Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank - the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivulta 10. Huomaa, että vuoden 1991 numerot koskevat Neuvostoliittoa, mutta 1992 on pelkästään Venäjä. Siitä puuttuu siis Ukrainan ja Valko-Venäjän omistukseen siirtyneet vaunut, ehkä myös osa on siirretty Uralin itäpuolelle:
Tässä ovat T-80 vuosittaiset valmistusmäärät kuten ne on kerrottu siinä Nizhny Tagilin taulukossa (johon Zaloga viittaa omassa taulukossaan kirjassa "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivulla 5):
Zalogan kirjoittaman perusteella jako vaunutyypeittäin:
-
In its original configuration, the long-delayed T-80 was essentially identical to the older T-64A in firepower, as it used exactly the same type of turret with an optical rangefinder. But it was hideously expensive: R480,000 versus R143,000 for the T-64A. In respect to its turret and fire controls, it was already behind the Kharkov T-64, which had evolved by 1976 into the T-64B with a new fire-control system incorporating a laser rangefinder and the capability to fire the Kobra tube-launched guided missile. As a result, production of the T-80 was very short-lived, running from only 1976 to 1978 at LKZ. Data released under the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty from November 1990, indicated that there were only 112 T-80s west of the Urals, which suggests that overall T-80 production was probably well under 200 tanks.
-
The Obiekt 219R was accepted for Soviet service in 1978 as the T-80B and entered production at LKZ that year, replacing the earlier T-80. It entered production at the Omsk plant in 1979, belatedly replacing the T-55A that was still in production there for export. The Omsk plant was also assigned to develop the Obiekt 630 command version of the T-80B, designated T-80BK. The command version added a land navigation system and an additional command radio.
The T-80B became the most common production version of the T-80, and the first version to be forward deployed with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) starting in 1981. The T-80B was first seen by NATO moving into Germany in April 1983 near Halle, beginning with the 29th Tank Regiment, 9th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army (GTA), and with units of the 8th GTA in 1984. By 1985, each division in the 1st GTA and 8th GTA had received some T-80B tanks. According to data released under the CFE Treaty, there were 3,518 T-80B and 217 T-80BK command tanks in service west of the Urals in November 1990, plus a further 617 upgraded T-80BV, for a grand-total of 4,352, amounting to 90 percent of overall T-80 strength. There were very few T-80 tanks stationed east of the Urals, except for those still in the Omsk plant and in a handful of depots and schools.
-
Kontakt began to be fitted to Soviet tanks in 1983 and was first deployed with the GSFG in 1984. In 1985, the LKZ began to manufacture the T-80B with Kontakt as T-80BV (Obiekt 219RV); the corresponding command tank version was T-80BVK. The "V" suffix added to the designations indicated "explosive" (vyzryvnoi). During periodic rebuilding, older tanks were retrofitted with the Kontakt package. According to CFE Treaty documents, in November 1990 there were 594 T-80BV and 23 T-80BVK command tanks in Soviet service west of the Urals, amounting to about 13 percent of T-80 tank strength.
-
With the retirement of Aleksandr Morozov, the chief designer at the Kharkov plant in May 1976, defense minister Ustinov attempted to impose a greater degree of standardization on Soviet tank designs. Kharkov had been developing an improved T-64B with substantially improved fire controls and new turret armor as the Obiekt 476 or Izdeliye 9A. Rather than waste time transferring the features to a new T-80 turret, Moscow decided to merge the new Kharkov turret with the T-80B hull the Obiekt 219A Olkha, and then to shift Kharkov's production from the T-64B to the T-80. Under this scheme, Popov's design bureau at LKZ was responsible for the overall program while Kharkov's new chief designer, Nikolai Shomin, was responsible for the turret and armament. The Obiekt 476 turret included a new generation of laminate armor and the improved lA45 fire-control system with the new IG46 sight.
At the time, two different types of advanced composite turret armor were being examined by NIl Stali, and their reflecting-plate armor (bronya s otrazhayushchimi listami) was adopted on the new T-72B. The cavity in the front of the cast steel turret was filled with a laminate of alternating metal and non-metallic plates. The Obeikt 476 used a more expensive, semi-active filledcell armor (bronya s yachestim napolnitelem) in the cavity consisting of two rows of polymer-filled cells backed by a steel plate and another layer of resin. When the cells were penetrated by the shaped-charge jet, shock waves reverberated in the semi-liquid filler in the cells, degrading the penetrator. Although the Obiekt 219A was ready for production at Kharkov in the 1982 time-frame, production was limited to a relatively small number of tanks for trials purposes due to the other ongoing technology initiatives, including tubefired missiles and reactive armor.
-
As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Army pushed Kontakt-1 into service almost immediately. Kontakt was not entirely popular with the Soviet tank designers as it added 1.2 metric tons to the weight of the tank and was only able to protect against shaped charge warheads. By the mid-1980s, NATO was shifting its tactics towards the use of armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding-sabot (APFSDS) projectiles for tank guns, which were not affected by Kontakt. The Soviet Army acquired some examples of Israeli MIll APFSDS 105mm ammunition from the Syrians that had been captured in the 1982 Lebanon war. Tests of this ammunition in the Soviet Union in 1982-83 indicated it could penetrate the existing glacis ~rmor of tanks such as the T-72 and T-80. As a short-term fix, 20mm steel armor applique was applied to T-80B glacis plates. In addition, NIl Stali accelerated research on a secondgeneration "universal" ERA called Kontakt-5, which was intended to have some capability to degrade APFSDS projectiles as well as shaped-charge warheads. Kontakt-5 relied on a much more substantial steel plate on the outside of the panel and this material was sufficient both to increase the degradation of shaped-charge jets, and also degrade APFSDS penetration by about 20-35 percent. This plate required a more energetic explosive insert, with a TNT equivalent of 0.28kg in the 4S20 panels of Kontakt-1 versus 0.33kg in the 4S22 panels of the Kontakt-5. The Kontakt-5 panels had to be properly angled for maximum effect and in combination with their size and weight, they could not be bolted on, as had been the case with Kontakt1. Kontakt-5 had to be incorporated as a comprehensively designed armor package that would have to be undertaken during original manufacture or during capital rebuilding. As a result, Kontakt-1 and Kontakt-5 were distinguished from one another as applique ERA (navesnoy DZ) versus integrated ERA (vstroenniy DZ).
The new Obiekt 219AS merged the features of Obiekt 219A and Obiekt 219V along with the Kontakt-5 protective package. A pre-production batch of 20 Obiekt 219AS was completed in late 1983, with eight immediately sent for troop trials and the remainder for state trials and factory testing. The Obiekt 219AS was accepted for Soviet Army service in 1985 as the T-80U (U = usovershenstvovanniy: improved) and went into series production at Omsk in 1987. According to documents released under the CFE Treaty, there were 410 T-80U tanks in operational service west of the Urals in November 1990, or about 8 percent of T-80 strength; this figure presumably included some of the later T-80UD (see below).
-
The shortcomings of the turbine engine in the T-80 led to a continuing string of experimental alternatives using diesel propulsion. An initial diesel-powered version was developed by LKZ beginning in 1975-1976, powered by the 2V16 (A-53-2) 1,000hp diesel designed by the Transdizel Special Design Bureau at the Chelyabinsk Motor Plant. This was mounted on a modified T-80B chassis as the Obiekt 219RD, but was not ready until 1983. Another diesel test-bed was developed at Omsk as the Obiekt 644, using the V-46-6 of the T-72 tank. Neither of these reached the production stage due to Ustinov's "turbinization" program. Nevertheless, there was continuing interest in the Soviet Army to replace the turbine on the T-80 due to its high procurement and operating costs. For example, in the 1980s the V-46 diesel engine on the T-72 cost only R9,600 while the GTD-1 000 turbine was more than ten times more expensive at R104,000. Furthermore, the turbine had a shorter running life, consumed more fuel, and was complicated and expensive to maintain and repair.
Even if Ustinov insisted that Kharkov shift from T-64 to T-80 production, the Kharkov plant wanted to build their T-80s with a diesel. So the Obiekt 478, a third effort to develop a diesel-powered T-80, started in 1976 at Kharkov. It used the new 6TD 1,000 hp diesel developed at Kharkov for the improved T-64 (Obiekt 476) and the next-generation T-74. Another option was also explored, the Obiekt 478M, which was a much more elaborate configuration with the new Sistema fire-control system, Shater active protection system, and a Chelyabinsk Transdizel X-layout 1,500hp 124Ch diesel. The Obiekt 478M was recognized as being a case of the" best being the enemy of the good" - it was simply too expensive and complicated. The Obiekt 478, on the other hand, was falling behind the contemporary Obiekt 476 upgrade in terms of fire controls and armament features; for example, it relied on the older Kobra missile instead of the newer Refleks being considered for Obiekt 476. Nevertheless, Ustinov was still insistent on the "turbinization" of the army, and so production of the T-64B at Kharkov ended and the facility began to re-tool to manufacture the T-80U.
Ustinov's views were not universally shared within the Soviet Army and a Defense Ministry study in 1984 concluded that for the next five-year plan, the Soviet Army could purchase 2,500 tanks and 6,000 6TD diesel engines, or 1,500 tanks and 2,000 GTD-1250 turbine engines. Ustinov's death in December 1984, followed by that of Leningrad party-boss Romanov in July 1985, removed the two most prominent supporters of the Leningrad turbine tank and cleared the way for a return to diesel tanks. Production of the T-80U at Kharkov had been painfully slow anyway, and in the event only 45 were built there. Government approval for a diesel powered T-80U was speedily granted on September 2, 1985.
The Obiekt 478 diesel program was restarted as Obiekt 478B Bereza (Birch tree) with the 6TD engine in the T-80U. A total of five prototypes were quickly completed by year's end for trials purposes, but a parallel set of prototypes based on the less elaborate Obiekt 219A with the diesel were also built for comparison. Due to the earlier studies, test and evaluation work was very quickly completed and as a result, Obiekt 478B Bereza was demonstrated at the Kharkov tank school to Mikhail Gorbachev and other senior government and army officials. Government approval for production was quickly granted in 1986 but the production program was far from trouble-free, and the Soviet Army demanded improvements before large-scale production began. The original plan had been to designate the diesel-powered T-80U as the T-84, following the Kharkov tradition of the T-34, T-44, T-54, T-64 and T-74. This proposal led to a bitter "fight under the carpet" between the industry and army, with some detractors noting that the T-84 designation would draw attention to the fact that the Soviet Army was operating four different "standard" tanks - T-64, T-72, T-80, and T-84 - all with essentially the same characteristics except for four different powerplants. The issue was so contentious that it went to the top - Gorbachev's Central Committee of the Communist Party - for a final decision. In the end, the less conspicuous designation T-80UD was selected, indicating "Improved Diesel" (Usovershenstvovanniy Dieselniy). Soviet tank production continued to decline in the late 1980s due to Gorbachev's attempts to rein in defense spending. The original 1989 plan had been for 3,739 T-80 and T-72 tanks, but this was cut back to 1,530 tanks, and the 1990 plan cut to 1,445 tanks.
Total production of the T-80UD prior to the Soviet collapse was rather modest at about 500 tanks, of which about 350 were still located at the Kharkov plant when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (huom. Neuvostoliitto hajosi virallisesti 26 joulukuuta 1991 joten sinänsä oletan että tuon vuoden tuotanto valmistui kokonaisuudessaan, paitsi jos oli jotain aikataulusta myöhäisiä vaunuja sekä tuotantolinjalla tietysti keskeneräisiä eri vaiheissa kokoonpanoa). The T-80UD was first deployed with the two "Kremlin court divisions": the 4th Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division (4th GTD) and the 2nd Guards Taman Motor Rifle Division (MRD) in the Moscow area. The T-80UD was first publicly shown at the May 9, 1990 Victory Day parade in Red Square in Moscow. They were seen on the Moscow streets again during the attempted putsch in August 1991.
-
At the time of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the T-80 was the premium tank of the Soviet ground forces, deployed with the most combat-ready Soviet units. According to documents from the CFE Treaty, T-80 strength in November 1990 west of the Urals was 4,874. Of this strength, the vast majority was deployed against NATO, with some 3,020 T-80Bs and T-80BVs with six tank divisions and six motor rifle divisions in the GSFG and about 600 in a tank and motor rifle division in the Northern Group of Forces in Poland. A modest 705 were deployed with units in Russia, notably with the 4th GTD and 2nd Taman Guards MRD in the Moscow area, and in smaller numbers in five motor rifle divisions in the Leningrad Military District. The remaining T-80s were located in various schools, training units, and depots. Additional T-80s were located east of the Urals, such as at the Omsk plant and in depots and training schools, but these were relatively few in number. Total T-80 production was probably more than the 4,874 tanks reported under the CFE Treaty, as none were listed in the Ukraine, even though about 320 were at the Kharkov plant, and there were probably some T-80s at the Omsk tank plant as well.
As a result of the Soviet collapse, nearly all of the T-80 tanks were in Russian control except for about 350 tanks, mainly T-80UD, located in Ukraine at the Kharkov plant and less than a hundred in Belarus. The tanks stationed in German and Poland were gradually repatriated back to Russia through the mid-1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union threw the Soviet tank industry into crisis. At the time, only three of the five assembly plants were still active. Nizhni-Tagil was manufacturing the T-72B, Kharkov was manufacturing the T-80UD, and Omsk was manufacturing the T-80U; Leningrad and Chelyabinsk were no longer very active in tank assembly. Kharkov is located in Ukraine, and so was split off from the other Soviet plants in Russia. The political turmoil was accompanied by a precipitous decline in defense funding and virtually no new tanks were funded in Russia from 1991 to about 2005, although some production continued based on existing contracts and parts.
-
Once again, the fate of the Russian tank program was determined by politics more than technology. Having been the past victim of Kremlin politics, the Uralvagon plant proved to have learned its lesson. To avoid the taint of the Chechen war, the new T-72BU version of the T-72 tank was renamed the "T-90." Eduard Rossel, the governor of the Sverdlovsk region where the Nizhni-Tagil plant was located, vigorously campaigned for the T-90 as the future Russian tank. In 1996, the Russian Army announced that the T-90 would be the preferred tank for the immediate future. The decision made little difference in the short run, as there was no procurement funding for either the T-80U or T-90 for almost a decade. In the event, the T-90 prospered, as the Uralvagon plant at Nizhni-Tagil had an extensive commercial business in railroad equipment that kept the factory alive until state orders for tanks resumed in 2005. In addition, Nizhni-Tagil had better success in the export market, winning some large T-72 and T-90 sales to India and several other countries. In contrast, Omsk had a very difficult time winning export orders. The T-80U was significantly more expensive to purchase and operate than the T-72, and the Russian Army decision in favor of the T-90 did not help the T-80's export prospects. In addition, it faced competition from the Ukrainian Kharkov tank plant, which was offering the T-80UD/T-84 on the export market. Whether the T-90 was favored or not, by the late 1990s the T-80 was the backbone of Russian tank forces. Older tanks had been retired due to a lack of funds and of the 5,546 tanks still in service west of the Urals in 1997, 3,210 were T-80 tanks, almost 60 percent.
-
A handful of export orders for the T-80U did materialize, though they were fulfilled mostly by using undelivered inventory from the Omsk plant. Morocco acquired about five T-80 tanks in the late 1980s, ostensibly for testing for a future tank requirement; it is widely believed that they ended up in the hands of US, British, and German intelligence agencies. Russia sold Britain one T-80U in 1992 as a goodwill gesture connected with President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Britain in 1992. Sweden evaluated the T-80U for its tank competition starting in 1993, but finally settled on the Leopard 2. The Russian government owed South Korea a substantial amount of money from the Soviet period, and partly paid these debts through the sale of military equipment. The Republic of Korea Army received about 80 T-80U tanks from 1996 to 2005. These are used primarily by "opposing forces" units for training. Cyprus acquired 41 T-80U tanks, including 14 of the new T-80UK command tanks in 1996-97.
Omsk attempted to reinvigorate international interest in the T-80 by more elaborate improvements, including active protection systems as detailed below. Export sales were too small to keep the Omsk tank plant busy, and in spite of a few small state orders for tank rebuilding, the plant went bankrupt in 2006. At the time of writing (huom. kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009 joten "kirjoitushetki" on jotain tuota ennen, ehkä vuoden 2008 loppu), the Russian government planned to consolidate the tank business around Uralvagon in Nizhni-Tagil, with Omsk assigned tank rebuilding efforts as well as some design work. The Russian Army began to fund upgrades for its aging T-80 fleet in the 2007 defense budget.
-
The Kharkov plant in newly independent Ukraine attempted to keep T-80 production alive there, but suffered from some unique problems. About 70 percent of the T-80UD came from plants outside Ukraine, mainly Russia. Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up. Since the Ukrainian state budget was too small to support any extensive production, the plant turned to the export market. In 1993, the Malyshev plant demonstrated the T-80UD to Pakistan and in the summer of 1995, two T-80UD underwent extensive testing there. In August 1996, Pakistan announced plans to purchase 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine. One critical component was the cast turret - this came from the Azvostal foundry in Mariupol, which had already ceased production; the other casting facility was at the Omsk plant in Russia. So the Malyshev plant's design bureau developed a new welded turret that resulted in the Obiekt 478BK (BK = Bereza-Katanaya: Rolled-armor birch tree), with the first completed in 1993. Ukraine began manufacturing its own version of the D-81 125mm gun at the KBA-3. Of the 320 tanks delivered to Pakistan in 1997-1999, 145 used the original cast turret, including 52 tanks completed under Soviet contracts but never delivered, plus new tanks built with remaining Soviet-era turrets, and some tanks from Ukrainian army stocks. Ukrainian Army T-80 strength fell from about 350 tanks prior to the sale to 271 afterwards. The remaining 175 tanks were the new production Obiekt 478BE with the welded turret.
-
Although the Ukrainian government made repeated promises to begin purchasing the T-84 tank for the Ukrainian Army, the budget was too small to do so. A total of ten T-84M were ordered and delivered in 2002-2003. However, the government had problems paying for all the tanks, and four were sold off to the United States in 2003. A lack of orders from the Ukrainian government or from export clients left the Kharkov plant in grave economic straits and restricted their development efforts after 2005.
-
Tämä lainaus on Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivuilta 4-6 ja tarjoaa lisätietoa panssarivaunujen tuotantomäärille 90-luvun alussa:
-
The imposition of the “defense sufficiency” doctrine in the Gorbachev years led to substantial reductions in Soviet tank production. The Soviet Union had five tank plants in 1980 but only three remained active by 1991. After the Soviet collapse, only two remained inside the Russian Federation. Annual tank production plummeted from 3,254 in 1987 to 1,000 in 1991 and fell rapidly after that. The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991. Since it was located in Ukraine, the Kharkov plant was cut off from the Russian Federation. T-80U production in St Petersburg at the Leningrad Kirov Plant ceased in 1990 prior to the Soviet collapse. T-72 production at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) had ceased in 1989 after 1,522 had been built there. This left only two functioning tank plants in Russia, the Uralvagonzavod (UVZ: Ural Rail-Car Plant) in Nizhni-Tagil and the Transmash plant in Omsk in Siberia. Of these two, the UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil was the more significant. It included both a substantial design bureau, nicknamed the “Vagonka,” as well as a large manufacturing facility. It had been responsible for the design of several Soviet tanks during the Cold War years including the T-55, T-62 and T-72. The Omsk plant had a very small design staff and was regarded as a subsidiary plant, usually manufacturing tanks developed at other locations. At the time of the Soviet collapse, the T-80U was still in production at the Transmash Plant in Omsk while T-72 was in production at UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil.
In 1992, the Russian defense ministry made it clear that it could no longer afford to simultaneously buy two main battle tanks. Russian officials stated that they wished to cut production down to a single type, either the T-72 or the T-80. However, selecting one or the other tank meant that economic catastrophe would befall the losing city. Therefore, Russian officials continued to order both types in small amounts. In 1992, the Russian Army ordered only 20 tanks: 5 T-80U tanks from Omsk and 15 tanks from Nizhni-Tagil. Tank production at Omsk and Nizhni-Tagil in 1992–93 was well beyond the puny state orders due to some export orders, but only a pale shadow of the 1980s. This additional production was not ordered by the Russian Army, but undertaken simply to keep the plants from closing. There was the hope that large export orders would emerge to save the plants and sop up this surplus. However the anticipated export orders did not materialize. The UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil had about 350 T-72S and T-90 tanks in its factory yards, and Omsk had 150−200 T-80U tanks. Some of these T-80U tanks were exported to Cyprus and South Korea in 1996; UVZ gradually exported the T-72 tanks. Lack of pay at the Nizhni-Tagil plant led to strikes in July 1995 during which the workers seized several of the idle tanks and drove them through the city in protest.
-
Taulukko Steve Zalogan kirjasta "T-80 standard tank - Soviet armys last champion" (kirja julkaistu 17.2.2009) sivulta 34:
Tämä taulukko on Zalogan kirjasta "T-90 standard tank - the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivulta 10. Huomaa, että vuoden 1991 numerot koskevat Neuvostoliittoa, mutta 1992 on pelkästään Venäjä. Siitä puuttuu siis Ukrainan ja Valko-Venäjän omistukseen siirtyneet vaunut, ehkä myös osa on siirretty Uralin itäpuolelle:
Tässä ovat T-80 vuosittaiset valmistusmäärät kuten ne on kerrottu siinä Nizhny Tagilin taulukossa (johon Zaloga viittaa omassa taulukossaan kirjassa "T-90 standard tank: the first tank of the new Russia" (kirja julkaistu 20.2.2018) sivulla 5):
Zalogan kirjoittaman perusteella jako vaunutyypeittäin:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
T-62 vaunujen valmistusmääristä sekä vientimääristä.
Alla olevan taulukon lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivulta 75
Kuten kirjan nimestä nähdään, se käsittelee Uralvagonzavodia. Siellä kirjoitetaan että kukaan muu ei valmistanut T-62 vaunuja, joten ylläoleva on heidän tuotantomääränsä per vuosi - ja samalla koko T-62 tuotanto Neuvostoliitossa.
Kun vertaa tätä taulukkoa tästä ketjusta löytyvään Solyankin et. al. vuosia 1946-1965 käsittelevästä kirjasta otettuun taulukkoon niin havaitaan että numerot täsmäävät kokonaismäärien kanssa, mutta tässä taulukossa on laskettu kaikki T-62 mallit yhteen. Täten esim. T-62 ja T-62K ei ole eritelty. Taulukkoja vertaamalla nähdään:
1963 - 1 069 kpl T-62 + 31 kpl T-62K = 1 100
1964 - 1 521 kpl T-62 + 79 kpl T-62K = 1 600
1965 - 1 450 kpl T-62 + 50 kpl T-62K = 1 500
Harmillisesti Solyankin et. al. taulukko päättyy vuoteen 1965, joten tämän jälkeen on pelkästään yllä olevan taulukon kokonaismäärät ilman tarkempaa jaottelua malleihin. Toki se on parempi kuin ei mitään.
Tuossa yllä olevassa T-62 vaunuja käsittelevässä taulukossa on kolme saraketta:
1) näistä ensimmäinen vasemmalta kertoo T-62 vuotuiset valmistusmäärät (Uralvagonzavod oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja),
2) tuosta seuraava sarake oikealle on Neuvostoliiton käyttöön tulleiden T-62 vaunujen määrä ja
3) siitä seuraava oikealle on kyseisenä vuonna Neuvostoliiton käyttöön tulleiden "medium, heavy and main battle tanks" määrä - eli kertoo määrän sekä luovutettujen vaunujen tyypin ilman tarkempaa jakoa. Listassa mainitaan vaunutyypit T-10M, T-55, T-55A, T-55/55A, T-62, T-64, T-64A ja ihan viimeisellä rivillä T-72.
Täten T-62 vaunujen ulkomaanviennin saa laskettua kun vähentää sarakkeen 1 numeroista sarakkeen 2 numeron. Tuosta voidaan siis laskea näin:
Vuoden 1969 kohdalla Neuvostoliiton käyttöön olisi tullut suurempi määrä vaunuja kuin mitä on valmistettu. Oletan että tuossa on lipsahtanut numerot väärille sarakkeille, pitäisi olla toisinpäin.
Jos oletetaan tuo virheeksi, niin T-62 viennin kokonaismääräksi saataisiin 387 vaunua, mutta tämän tiedetään olevan liian pieni määrä. Olen aina tulkinnut tätä siten että tuo määrä oli uustuotannon vientiä ja kaikki muu oli Neuvostoliiton omista varastoista tehtyä vientiä sitä mukaa kun saivat T-64A, T-64B, T-72 ja T-80 vaunuja lisää riviin. Uralvagonzavod aloitti T-72 valmistuksen vuonna 1973 joten T-62 tuotanto päättyi samalla.
Seuraava lainaus koskee T-62 vientiä.
Lähde:
T-62 main battle tank 1965-2005 - Steve Zaloga - 18.8.2009
Kirjan sivuilta 30 ja 31:
EXPORT BONANZA
Unlike the T-54 and T-55, the T-62 was never license manufactured outside the Soviet Union. Polish and Czech sources suggest that the reasons were in part due to cost. The sale price of the T-62 was R250,000, which was about 50 per cent greater than the cost of the T-55 at the time. Furthermore, senior Warsaw Pact officials were aware that the Soviet Army was adopting the new T-64A as their "universal tank," so a short-term transition to the T-62 hardly seemed worth the effort. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 also delayed modernization of the Martin tank plant, and political turmoil and economic liberalization in Poland also put a cap on defense modernization there. US intelligence believed that Czechoslovakia manufactured about 1,500 T-62 tanks, but this appears to have been a mistake judging from recent Czech and Slovak accounts. The only Warsaw Pact army to adopt the T-62 was Bulgaria, which acquired about 80, selling these off in 1993-94 to Angola and Yemen. There have been reports that North Korea has manufactured copies of the T-62 as the Chonma tank, but it is not clear whether this is true or whether they are locally improved versions of Soviet manufactured tanks. Although the T-62 never played a major role in Warsaw Pact modernization, it became a trademark of the expanding Soviet arms trade in the 1970s, especially in the Middle East and Africa. Of the more than 19,000 T-62 tanks manufactured, over 5,000 were exported in the 1970s and 1980s and more in later years. The figures below are from a variety of sources and many are estimates, as no official data has been released.
Sales of new tanks largely ended by the early 1980s, but the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a second wave of sales as former Soviet republics such as Belarus and Ukraine dumped their older tanks on the market. As a result, T-62s have shown up in additional locations beyond the formal sales programs detailed above, with more recent sales to Sudan, the Congo, and other hot spots.
-
Tuon taulukon numeroiden summa on 4 960, toki kuten hän kirjoittaa, osa näistä on parempia ja varmempia kuin toiset: virallisia vientinumeroita ei ole tiedossa, ainoastaan tällaista eri lähteistä parsittua dataa. Toki pitää muistaa että hänen kirja on julkaistu 18.8.2009, joten sen jälkeen on voitu saada parempaa tietoa. Sama taulukko mutta aikajärjestyksessä:
HUOM: Olen nähnyt kirjoituksia, joiden mukaan T-62 kokonaistuotanto olisi hieman yli 22 700 vaunua, joista noin 20 000 olisi valmistettu Nizhny Tagilissa (1961-1973) ja loput Omskissa (1961-1975) - tosin Omskin osalta määrät ja aikavälit eivät ole selviä. Ustyantsev S. V kirjassa "Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет" joka on eräänlainen Uralvagonzavodin virallinen historiikki, kirjoitetaan että he olivat ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja (tuo yllä oleva taulukko on otettu ko. kirjasta). Olen aina olettanut tämän pitävän paikkansa, mutta paras silti mainita että internetissä näkee myös väitteitä, joiden mukaan Omsk olisi valmistanut T-62 vaunuja.
Omsk valmisti valtaosan T-55 vaunuista, usein näkee numeroa 13 032 ja kokonaismäärän ollessa jotain 20 000 tienoilla. Aikaväli mahdollisesti 1958-1979. Erityisesti tuotannon häntäpäästä valtaosa meni vientiin. Kharkovan tehdas valmisti T-55 vaunuja lyhyen aikaa 1959-1963 ennen kuin aloittivat Obyekt 432 eli alkuperäisen T-64 tuotannon. Nizhny Tagil valmisti loput T-55 määrästä, tosin heidän T-62 tuotanto alkoi 1961 ja oletan että korvasi kokonaan T-55 tuotannon tuon vuoden jälkeen. Neuvostoliiton ulkopuolisissa maissa valmistettiin (väitetysti) seuraavat määrät T-55 vaunuja seuraavina aikaväleinä (Puolan ja Tsekkoslovakian vaunuista osa meni vientiin):
- Bumar-Labedy tehdas Puolan Gliwicessä - 1 500 vaunua (1964-1978),
- Tsekkoslovakian ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) tehdas sijaitsee Martin-nimisessä kaupungissa (nykyään Slovakia alueella) - 1 700 vaunua (1964-1973)
- Romanian Bucharestissa sijaitseva Fabrica de Mașini Grele Speciale - 400 vaunua (1979-1985).
Omskin T-55 vaunujen tuotanto jatkui Nizhny Tagilin T-62 vaunuja pidempään koska T-72 Uralin tuotannon alkaminen vuonna 1973 korvasi T-62 tuotannon. Käytännössä Omskin T-55 tuotanto jatkui T-80 vaunujen valmistuksen alkuun eli vuoteen 1979 asti. On tietysti mahdollista että he olisivat pystyttäneet hetkeksi T-62 tuotantolinjan, jolla olisi valmistettu tuo huhuttu hieman yli 2 270 vaunua. Teoriassa olisi myös mahdollista että Omsk olisi tehnyt pelkästään kokoonpanoa Nizhny Tagilin toimittamien kittien osalta, mutta hieman epäilyttää tämäkin: Uralvagonzavod on helvetin iso tehdas, heillä tuskin olisi ongelmia kokoonpanon osalta. Omsk puolestaan oli kiireinen T-55 vaunujen kanssa, ei käy järkeen että sitä mentäisiin sotkemaan "pienellä erällä vieraita vaunuja". Hyvä myös muistaa että suuresta valmistusmäärästä huolimatta T-62 vaunua pidettiin jopa Varsovan liiton sisällä kalliina ja väliaikaisena ratkaisuna, kaikki tiesivät jo 60-luvulla että parempaa oli tiedossa T-64 vaunujen muodossa ja kun niitä ei tarjottu vientiin, niin T-72 oli seuraava vaihtoehto 1973 jälkeen (tosin vienti alkoi myöhemmin). T-55 vientikauppa kävi hyvin sen halvan hinnan, helpon käytettävyyden sekä vaunun hyvän kestokyvyn takia.
Ehkä jossain vaiheessa törmään tiedonmuruseen joka selventää asian, mutta toistaiseksi olen nojannut pelkästään Nizhny Tagilin taulukkoon ja pitänyt sitä virallisena totuutena valmistusmäärien osalta. Olen myös pitänyt selvänä että Nizhny Tagil oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, tosin joskus muisti pettää ja saatan toistaa vahingossa tuota juoruilua Omskin T-62 tuotannosta.
-
Pari knoppitietoa T-62 osalta, koskien vaunujen menetyksiä Afganistanin sodassa 1979-1989.
Lähde:
T-62 main battle tank 1965-2005 - Steve Zaloga - 18.8.2009
Teksti kirjan sivuilta 39 ja 40, taulukko on sivulta 42:
The T-62 also saw its first extensive use in Soviet hands during the savage conflict in Afghanistan in 1979-1988. The Afghan Army had been partly equipped with T-62 tanks in the early 1970s prior to the eruption of the civil war. The Communist coups in Afghanistan in 1978-1979 and the continued disintegration of government control prompted a Soviet intervention that began on December 24, 1979. The main Soviet Ground Force element sent into Afghanistan was the Fortieth Army, and since it was located in areas far removed from the main confrontation zones facing NATO, its equipment was
older.
The predominant tank type was the T-62, since there was little point in deploying more modern types such as the T-64 or T-72 when the opposition was a guerrilla force without tanks. Some Soviet T-62 tanks were dug in and used to form the core of firebases; others were employed for patrols and convoy protection, and others were used for infantry support during the Soviet attacks on mujahedeen positions. RPG-7 anti-tank rockets and mines were the main threats to the T-62.
The T-62M upgrade program was partly a response to these threats, with the anti-mine package being largely motivated by the Afghan experience. In Afghanistan, the uparmored T-62M1 was locally called T-62D (dopolitelnoy zashchita: extra protection). By 1987, the Soviet tank force in Afghanistan included 625 T-62 tanks. Total tank combat losses in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989 was around 385, almost all T-62s. However, 1,340 T-62 tanks were written off by Soviet units in Afghanistan, which includes combat losses, worn-out tanks, and tanks not worth recovering.
Alla olevan taulukon lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivulta 75
Kuten kirjan nimestä nähdään, se käsittelee Uralvagonzavodia. Siellä kirjoitetaan että kukaan muu ei valmistanut T-62 vaunuja, joten ylläoleva on heidän tuotantomääränsä per vuosi - ja samalla koko T-62 tuotanto Neuvostoliitossa.
Kun vertaa tätä taulukkoa tästä ketjusta löytyvään Solyankin et. al. vuosia 1946-1965 käsittelevästä kirjasta otettuun taulukkoon niin havaitaan että numerot täsmäävät kokonaismäärien kanssa, mutta tässä taulukossa on laskettu kaikki T-62 mallit yhteen. Täten esim. T-62 ja T-62K ei ole eritelty. Taulukkoja vertaamalla nähdään:
1963 - 1 069 kpl T-62 + 31 kpl T-62K = 1 100
1964 - 1 521 kpl T-62 + 79 kpl T-62K = 1 600
1965 - 1 450 kpl T-62 + 50 kpl T-62K = 1 500
Harmillisesti Solyankin et. al. taulukko päättyy vuoteen 1965, joten tämän jälkeen on pelkästään yllä olevan taulukon kokonaismäärät ilman tarkempaa jaottelua malleihin. Toki se on parempi kuin ei mitään.
Tuossa yllä olevassa T-62 vaunuja käsittelevässä taulukossa on kolme saraketta:
1) näistä ensimmäinen vasemmalta kertoo T-62 vuotuiset valmistusmäärät (Uralvagonzavod oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja),
2) tuosta seuraava sarake oikealle on Neuvostoliiton käyttöön tulleiden T-62 vaunujen määrä ja
3) siitä seuraava oikealle on kyseisenä vuonna Neuvostoliiton käyttöön tulleiden "medium, heavy and main battle tanks" määrä - eli kertoo määrän sekä luovutettujen vaunujen tyypin ilman tarkempaa jakoa. Listassa mainitaan vaunutyypit T-10M, T-55, T-55A, T-55/55A, T-62, T-64, T-64A ja ihan viimeisellä rivillä T-72.
Täten T-62 vaunujen ulkomaanviennin saa laskettua kun vähentää sarakkeen 1 numeroista sarakkeen 2 numeron. Tuosta voidaan siis laskea näin:
Vuoden 1969 kohdalla Neuvostoliiton käyttöön olisi tullut suurempi määrä vaunuja kuin mitä on valmistettu. Oletan että tuossa on lipsahtanut numerot väärille sarakkeille, pitäisi olla toisinpäin.
Jos oletetaan tuo virheeksi, niin T-62 viennin kokonaismääräksi saataisiin 387 vaunua, mutta tämän tiedetään olevan liian pieni määrä. Olen aina tulkinnut tätä siten että tuo määrä oli uustuotannon vientiä ja kaikki muu oli Neuvostoliiton omista varastoista tehtyä vientiä sitä mukaa kun saivat T-64A, T-64B, T-72 ja T-80 vaunuja lisää riviin. Uralvagonzavod aloitti T-72 valmistuksen vuonna 1973 joten T-62 tuotanto päättyi samalla.
Seuraava lainaus koskee T-62 vientiä.
Lähde:
T-62 main battle tank 1965-2005 - Steve Zaloga - 18.8.2009
Kirjan sivuilta 30 ja 31:
EXPORT BONANZA
Unlike the T-54 and T-55, the T-62 was never license manufactured outside the Soviet Union. Polish and Czech sources suggest that the reasons were in part due to cost. The sale price of the T-62 was R250,000, which was about 50 per cent greater than the cost of the T-55 at the time. Furthermore, senior Warsaw Pact officials were aware that the Soviet Army was adopting the new T-64A as their "universal tank," so a short-term transition to the T-62 hardly seemed worth the effort. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 also delayed modernization of the Martin tank plant, and political turmoil and economic liberalization in Poland also put a cap on defense modernization there. US intelligence believed that Czechoslovakia manufactured about 1,500 T-62 tanks, but this appears to have been a mistake judging from recent Czech and Slovak accounts. The only Warsaw Pact army to adopt the T-62 was Bulgaria, which acquired about 80, selling these off in 1993-94 to Angola and Yemen. There have been reports that North Korea has manufactured copies of the T-62 as the Chonma tank, but it is not clear whether this is true or whether they are locally improved versions of Soviet manufactured tanks. Although the T-62 never played a major role in Warsaw Pact modernization, it became a trademark of the expanding Soviet arms trade in the 1970s, especially in the Middle East and Africa. Of the more than 19,000 T-62 tanks manufactured, over 5,000 were exported in the 1970s and 1980s and more in later years. The figures below are from a variety of sources and many are estimates, as no official data has been released.
Sales of new tanks largely ended by the early 1980s, but the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a second wave of sales as former Soviet republics such as Belarus and Ukraine dumped their older tanks on the market. As a result, T-62s have shown up in additional locations beyond the formal sales programs detailed above, with more recent sales to Sudan, the Congo, and other hot spots.
-
Tuon taulukon numeroiden summa on 4 960, toki kuten hän kirjoittaa, osa näistä on parempia ja varmempia kuin toiset: virallisia vientinumeroita ei ole tiedossa, ainoastaan tällaista eri lähteistä parsittua dataa. Toki pitää muistaa että hänen kirja on julkaistu 18.8.2009, joten sen jälkeen on voitu saada parempaa tietoa. Sama taulukko mutta aikajärjestyksessä:
HUOM: Olen nähnyt kirjoituksia, joiden mukaan T-62 kokonaistuotanto olisi hieman yli 22 700 vaunua, joista noin 20 000 olisi valmistettu Nizhny Tagilissa (1961-1973) ja loput Omskissa (1961-1975) - tosin Omskin osalta määrät ja aikavälit eivät ole selviä. Ustyantsev S. V kirjassa "Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет" joka on eräänlainen Uralvagonzavodin virallinen historiikki, kirjoitetaan että he olivat ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja (tuo yllä oleva taulukko on otettu ko. kirjasta). Olen aina olettanut tämän pitävän paikkansa, mutta paras silti mainita että internetissä näkee myös väitteitä, joiden mukaan Omsk olisi valmistanut T-62 vaunuja.
Omsk valmisti valtaosan T-55 vaunuista, usein näkee numeroa 13 032 ja kokonaismäärän ollessa jotain 20 000 tienoilla. Aikaväli mahdollisesti 1958-1979. Erityisesti tuotannon häntäpäästä valtaosa meni vientiin. Kharkovan tehdas valmisti T-55 vaunuja lyhyen aikaa 1959-1963 ennen kuin aloittivat Obyekt 432 eli alkuperäisen T-64 tuotannon. Nizhny Tagil valmisti loput T-55 määrästä, tosin heidän T-62 tuotanto alkoi 1961 ja oletan että korvasi kokonaan T-55 tuotannon tuon vuoden jälkeen. Neuvostoliiton ulkopuolisissa maissa valmistettiin (väitetysti) seuraavat määrät T-55 vaunuja seuraavina aikaväleinä (Puolan ja Tsekkoslovakian vaunuista osa meni vientiin):
- Bumar-Labedy tehdas Puolan Gliwicessä - 1 500 vaunua (1964-1978),
- Tsekkoslovakian ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) tehdas sijaitsee Martin-nimisessä kaupungissa (nykyään Slovakia alueella) - 1 700 vaunua (1964-1973)
- Romanian Bucharestissa sijaitseva Fabrica de Mașini Grele Speciale - 400 vaunua (1979-1985).
Omskin T-55 vaunujen tuotanto jatkui Nizhny Tagilin T-62 vaunuja pidempään koska T-72 Uralin tuotannon alkaminen vuonna 1973 korvasi T-62 tuotannon. Käytännössä Omskin T-55 tuotanto jatkui T-80 vaunujen valmistuksen alkuun eli vuoteen 1979 asti. On tietysti mahdollista että he olisivat pystyttäneet hetkeksi T-62 tuotantolinjan, jolla olisi valmistettu tuo huhuttu hieman yli 2 270 vaunua. Teoriassa olisi myös mahdollista että Omsk olisi tehnyt pelkästään kokoonpanoa Nizhny Tagilin toimittamien kittien osalta, mutta hieman epäilyttää tämäkin: Uralvagonzavod on helvetin iso tehdas, heillä tuskin olisi ongelmia kokoonpanon osalta. Omsk puolestaan oli kiireinen T-55 vaunujen kanssa, ei käy järkeen että sitä mentäisiin sotkemaan "pienellä erällä vieraita vaunuja". Hyvä myös muistaa että suuresta valmistusmäärästä huolimatta T-62 vaunua pidettiin jopa Varsovan liiton sisällä kalliina ja väliaikaisena ratkaisuna, kaikki tiesivät jo 60-luvulla että parempaa oli tiedossa T-64 vaunujen muodossa ja kun niitä ei tarjottu vientiin, niin T-72 oli seuraava vaihtoehto 1973 jälkeen (tosin vienti alkoi myöhemmin). T-55 vientikauppa kävi hyvin sen halvan hinnan, helpon käytettävyyden sekä vaunun hyvän kestokyvyn takia.
Ehkä jossain vaiheessa törmään tiedonmuruseen joka selventää asian, mutta toistaiseksi olen nojannut pelkästään Nizhny Tagilin taulukkoon ja pitänyt sitä virallisena totuutena valmistusmäärien osalta. Olen myös pitänyt selvänä että Nizhny Tagil oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, tosin joskus muisti pettää ja saatan toistaa vahingossa tuota juoruilua Omskin T-62 tuotannosta.
-
Pari knoppitietoa T-62 osalta, koskien vaunujen menetyksiä Afganistanin sodassa 1979-1989.
Lähde:
T-62 main battle tank 1965-2005 - Steve Zaloga - 18.8.2009
Teksti kirjan sivuilta 39 ja 40, taulukko on sivulta 42:
The T-62 also saw its first extensive use in Soviet hands during the savage conflict in Afghanistan in 1979-1988. The Afghan Army had been partly equipped with T-62 tanks in the early 1970s prior to the eruption of the civil war. The Communist coups in Afghanistan in 1978-1979 and the continued disintegration of government control prompted a Soviet intervention that began on December 24, 1979. The main Soviet Ground Force element sent into Afghanistan was the Fortieth Army, and since it was located in areas far removed from the main confrontation zones facing NATO, its equipment was
older.
The predominant tank type was the T-62, since there was little point in deploying more modern types such as the T-64 or T-72 when the opposition was a guerrilla force without tanks. Some Soviet T-62 tanks were dug in and used to form the core of firebases; others were employed for patrols and convoy protection, and others were used for infantry support during the Soviet attacks on mujahedeen positions. RPG-7 anti-tank rockets and mines were the main threats to the T-62.
The T-62M upgrade program was partly a response to these threats, with the anti-mine package being largely motivated by the Afghan experience. In Afghanistan, the uparmored T-62M1 was locally called T-62D (dopolitelnoy zashchita: extra protection). By 1987, the Soviet tank force in Afghanistan included 625 T-62 tanks. Total tank combat losses in Afghanistan from 1980 to 1989 was around 385, almost all T-62s. However, 1,340 T-62 tanks were written off by Soviet units in Afghanistan, which includes combat losses, worn-out tanks, and tanks not worth recovering.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tässä on mielenkiintoinen taulukko eri vaunumallien hankintahinnasta sekä käytön hinnoista:
Taulukon Google Lens -käännös:
Olen poiminut tuon talteen erinomaiselta Tankograd-sivustolta, tosin hän ei kerro taulukon alkuperäistä lähdettä. Hän kirjoittaa sivulla näin: LÄHDE
From 1973 to 1990, a total of 18,373 T-72 tanks and T-72 derivatives were manufactured at the UVZ factory floor and another 1,600 tanks were manufactured from 1991 to 1996. The Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory also took part in the manufacture of the T-72 tank, producing 1,894 units themselves between 1978 and 1990. In total, 20,267 T-72 tanks were produced in Soviet Russia, making it the second most numerous tank ever produced in both the USSR and the world, outstripping the T-62 for that title by a slim margin. Of that total, 5,264 T-72A tanks were delivered to the Soviet Army. But how did it come about? The 2010 book "T-72 Ural armor versus NATO" by noted military historian Mikhail Baryatinsky details the history of the development of the tank, and is the source for many of the diagrams and pictures shared below.
Firstly, it should be clear that the T-72 is indeed a "mobilization model" of a sort with slightly inferior performance compared to the later models of the T-64 series. The main factor that relegates the T-72 to this category during its service career in the Soviet Army was its role as the primary tank model for motorized infantry units and other mainline Army units whereas the T-64 and T-80 series were supplied to Guards units. The T-72 was also widely exported during the Cold War, and as such, the T-72 could be rightfully considered the backbone of the Soviet Army and that of many other nations together with the T-55 and the T-62. With that said, some Internet sleuths found this chart of procurement prices showing that the T-72A (1979) was significantly more expensive than the T-64A. The more expensive pricing of the T-72 does not change the fact that it was a less sophisticated product compared to the later models of the T-64 such as the T-64B, although it was not originally intended to be such by the chief designer of the UKBTM design bureau, Leonid Kartsev. In fact, the original T-72 outpaced the T-64A in some technical areas due to the implementation of certain technologies.
-
HUOM: alkuperäinen linkki on kuollut mutta löytyy Wayback Machinen kautta: LINKKI
-
Taulukossa on alleviivattu T-64A ja T-72A hankintahinta, millä on haluttu korostaa sitä että T-72 ei ollut varsinainen "mobilisaatiomalli" ainakaan hinnan perusteella. En ole pitänyt tätä taulukkoa muuna kuin yhtenä datapisteenä: toisinaan eri kirjoissa törmää hinta-arvioihin eri vaunujen osalta joten on hauska verrata niitä kirjoituksia keskenään. Vaunun hinta on toki kokoajan vaihtuva asia, yhden vuoden yksikköhinta ei ole välttämättä sama kuin seuraavana vuotena. Varsinkin jos massatuotanto saadaan rullaamaan.
On tuossa taulukossa ainakin yleinen trendi oikein: mitä monimutkaisemmiksi vaunut muuttuivat, sitä kalliimpia ne olivat. Automaattilaturi, elektroniikan ja radioiden määrän kasvu, tykistä ammuttava ohjus ja sen ohjauselektroniikka, parempi optiikka, pimeänäkölaitteet ja lämpötähtäimet yms. yms. Varsinkin T-80 sarjan vaunujen on aina tiedetty olleen kalliita: turbiinimoottori oli kallis ostaa, kallis käyttää ja kallis ylläpitää. T-80U / T-80UD puolestaan edusti Neuvostoliiton parasta tekniikkaa ihan kylmän sodan viimeisinä vuosina joten se on tietysti selvästi kalliimpi kuin muut.
Ehkä suurin yllätys taulukossa on se että T-62 olisi hankintahinnaltaan halvempi kuin T-55. Tätä minun on vaikea ymmärtää, tosin valmistusmäärät olivat "samalla sektorilla" - T-62 valmistusmäärä oli 19 651 kpl vs. T-55 valmistusmäärä Neuvostoliitossa 20 032 (toki tällekin numerolle on tietty vaihteluväli, riippuu keneltä kysyy).
T-55 vaunuja on valmistettu selvästi suurempi määrä jos lukuun lasketaan T-54 vaunut, niitä valmistettiin 16 775 kpl. Tämä tiedetään varmasti, sen voi laskea Solyankin et. al. vuosia 1946-1965 käsittelevästä kirjasta otetusta taulukosta. Olen nähnyt T-54 valmistusmäärälle myös numeroa 17 345 joka on 570 enemmän kuin Solyankin et. al. kirjan taulukosta laskettu määrä. Ilman tarkkaa lähdettä on vaikea sanoa mistä tuo numero tulee.
Taulukon Google Lens -käännös:
Olen poiminut tuon talteen erinomaiselta Tankograd-sivustolta, tosin hän ei kerro taulukon alkuperäistä lähdettä. Hän kirjoittaa sivulla näin: LÄHDE
From 1973 to 1990, a total of 18,373 T-72 tanks and T-72 derivatives were manufactured at the UVZ factory floor and another 1,600 tanks were manufactured from 1991 to 1996. The Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory also took part in the manufacture of the T-72 tank, producing 1,894 units themselves between 1978 and 1990. In total, 20,267 T-72 tanks were produced in Soviet Russia, making it the second most numerous tank ever produced in both the USSR and the world, outstripping the T-62 for that title by a slim margin. Of that total, 5,264 T-72A tanks were delivered to the Soviet Army. But how did it come about? The 2010 book "T-72 Ural armor versus NATO" by noted military historian Mikhail Baryatinsky details the history of the development of the tank, and is the source for many of the diagrams and pictures shared below.
Firstly, it should be clear that the T-72 is indeed a "mobilization model" of a sort with slightly inferior performance compared to the later models of the T-64 series. The main factor that relegates the T-72 to this category during its service career in the Soviet Army was its role as the primary tank model for motorized infantry units and other mainline Army units whereas the T-64 and T-80 series were supplied to Guards units. The T-72 was also widely exported during the Cold War, and as such, the T-72 could be rightfully considered the backbone of the Soviet Army and that of many other nations together with the T-55 and the T-62. With that said, some Internet sleuths found this chart of procurement prices showing that the T-72A (1979) was significantly more expensive than the T-64A. The more expensive pricing of the T-72 does not change the fact that it was a less sophisticated product compared to the later models of the T-64 such as the T-64B, although it was not originally intended to be such by the chief designer of the UKBTM design bureau, Leonid Kartsev. In fact, the original T-72 outpaced the T-64A in some technical areas due to the implementation of certain technologies.
-
HUOM: alkuperäinen linkki on kuollut mutta löytyy Wayback Machinen kautta: LINKKI
-
Taulukossa on alleviivattu T-64A ja T-72A hankintahinta, millä on haluttu korostaa sitä että T-72 ei ollut varsinainen "mobilisaatiomalli" ainakaan hinnan perusteella. En ole pitänyt tätä taulukkoa muuna kuin yhtenä datapisteenä: toisinaan eri kirjoissa törmää hinta-arvioihin eri vaunujen osalta joten on hauska verrata niitä kirjoituksia keskenään. Vaunun hinta on toki kokoajan vaihtuva asia, yhden vuoden yksikköhinta ei ole välttämättä sama kuin seuraavana vuotena. Varsinkin jos massatuotanto saadaan rullaamaan.
On tuossa taulukossa ainakin yleinen trendi oikein: mitä monimutkaisemmiksi vaunut muuttuivat, sitä kalliimpia ne olivat. Automaattilaturi, elektroniikan ja radioiden määrän kasvu, tykistä ammuttava ohjus ja sen ohjauselektroniikka, parempi optiikka, pimeänäkölaitteet ja lämpötähtäimet yms. yms. Varsinkin T-80 sarjan vaunujen on aina tiedetty olleen kalliita: turbiinimoottori oli kallis ostaa, kallis käyttää ja kallis ylläpitää. T-80U / T-80UD puolestaan edusti Neuvostoliiton parasta tekniikkaa ihan kylmän sodan viimeisinä vuosina joten se on tietysti selvästi kalliimpi kuin muut.
Ehkä suurin yllätys taulukossa on se että T-62 olisi hankintahinnaltaan halvempi kuin T-55. Tätä minun on vaikea ymmärtää, tosin valmistusmäärät olivat "samalla sektorilla" - T-62 valmistusmäärä oli 19 651 kpl vs. T-55 valmistusmäärä Neuvostoliitossa 20 032 (toki tällekin numerolle on tietty vaihteluväli, riippuu keneltä kysyy).
T-55 vaunuja on valmistettu selvästi suurempi määrä jos lukuun lasketaan T-54 vaunut, niitä valmistettiin 16 775 kpl. Tämä tiedetään varmasti, sen voi laskea Solyankin et. al. vuosia 1946-1965 käsittelevästä kirjasta otetusta taulukosta. Olen nähnyt T-54 valmistusmäärälle myös numeroa 17 345 joka on 570 enemmän kuin Solyankin et. al. kirjan taulukosta laskettu määrä. Ilman tarkkaa lähdettä on vaikea sanoa mistä tuo numero tulee.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
80-luvulle tultaessa oli selvää että NATO siirtyi käyttämään APFSDS-nuolia entistä enemmän, he olivat niiden kehityksessä Neuvostoliittoa hitaampia, joilla oli ensimmäiset nuolet käytössä T-62 vaunuissa jo 60-luvulla. Jokainen toki teki niiden tutkimus- ja kehitystyötä 70-luvun läpi ja otti niitä hiljalleen osaksi vaunujen aseistusta.
1982 sota Lähi-idässä säikäytti Neuvostoliiton ja yhden kaapatun vaunun tutkiminen johti paitsi vanhojen vaunujen panssaroinnin paikkaamiseen keulaan hitsatun panssariteräslevyn muodossa niin myös uusien vaunumallien kehitystyön aloittamiseen. Tämä kehitystyö johti lopulta T-72B ja T-72B obr 1989 sekä T-80U malleihin. T-64 vaunuperhe jäi pois tuotannosta, tosin vasta 1987 ja niidenkin viimeisissä versioissa T-64BV oli otettu paremmin huomioon raskaat nuoliammukset.
1982 vuoden säikäytys sekä Neuvostoliiton sota Afganistanissa johti tarpeeseen päivittää tietty määrä T-55A ja T-62 vaunuja. Kuten taulukosta nähdään, tietyn määrän varastossa olevia T-55A ja T-62 vaunuja koettiin olevan päivtyksen tarpeessa jo ennen 1982 mutta sodan tulosten arvioinnin jälkeen määrä kasvoi, on kirjoitettu että tämä olisi suora seuraus sodasta ja kaapatun Israelin vaunun tutkimuksista. Alla on aikataulu sekä päivitettyjen vaunujen määrä. Lähde numeroille ja vuosille.
Tankogradin artikkeli selventää tehtyjä muutoksia ja niiden toimintaperiaatetta: T-62M
Tankogradin T-54 / T-55 vaunuja käsittelevä artikkeli kirjoittaa näistä jonkin verran, löytyy kun hakee sivulta sanaa "T-55M": LINKKI
Lisää kuvia saman tyylisestä T-55A vaunujen lisäpanssaroinnsta, tosin nämä ovat Tsekkoslovakian tuotoksia. Andrei Tarasenkon blogin kirjoitus vuodelta 2019: T-55AM2
-
Linkitetyssä artikkelissa Tarasenko kirjoittaa lyhyestä Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotantomääristä:
Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture tanks in 1964. First, the T-55 was produced at the ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in the Slovak city of Martin, and from 1967 to 1982, the T-55A, a total of 3820 units were built.
Tuo aikataulu on linjassa aikaisemmassa viestissäni laittamani taulukon kanssa, jonka mukaan Tsekkoslovakian T-72 tuotanto alkoi pienimääräisesti vuosina 1981 ja 1982 mutta lähti kunnolla käyntiin vuonna 1983. Tsekkoslovakian T-72 vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1981-1991:
18-50-130-212-251-277-290-284-62-107-101
Pienen tehtaan osalta on järkevää tehdä tällainen sujuva vaihto, missä vanha poisjäävä tuote ja uusi sen korvaava vaihtavat paikkaa tähän tyyliin. Suuren tehtaan osalta on loogisempaa tehdä rajumpi leikkaus ja panostaa täysillä uuden tuotteen tuotantoon saattamiseen, vaikka se tekisikin pienen loven vuosituotantoon. Toki riippuu tuotteesta, jos vanhan voi korvata uudella tuotannossa ilman merkittäviä tuotantolinjojen muutoksia ja häiriöitä niin silloin tietysti toimitaan niin. Panssarivaunujen osalta vaatinee että kaikki jigit ja valmistus- sekä kokoonpano vaativat niin suuria muutoksia, ettei "helppo vaihto" ole niin helppoa ja sujuvaa.
Toisaalta on myös mahdollista että Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotannon jatkuminen vuoteen 1982 asti johtui viennistä: heiltä meni tämä aika viimeisten tilausten täyttämiseen, samalla kun tehdas käynnisti T-72 tuotantoa.
Minulla on hyllyssä kirja Slovakian sotavälineiden tuotannosta (käsittelee tietysti Tsekkoslovakian aikaa), eräänlainen historiikki vaan en ole selannut sitä vuosikausiin. Pitänee ehkä vilkaista mitä sieltä löytyy.
1982 sota Lähi-idässä säikäytti Neuvostoliiton ja yhden kaapatun vaunun tutkiminen johti paitsi vanhojen vaunujen panssaroinnin paikkaamiseen keulaan hitsatun panssariteräslevyn muodossa niin myös uusien vaunumallien kehitystyön aloittamiseen. Tämä kehitystyö johti lopulta T-72B ja T-72B obr 1989 sekä T-80U malleihin. T-64 vaunuperhe jäi pois tuotannosta, tosin vasta 1987 ja niidenkin viimeisissä versioissa T-64BV oli otettu paremmin huomioon raskaat nuoliammukset.
1982 vuoden säikäytys sekä Neuvostoliiton sota Afganistanissa johti tarpeeseen päivittää tietty määrä T-55A ja T-62 vaunuja. Kuten taulukosta nähdään, tietyn määrän varastossa olevia T-55A ja T-62 vaunuja koettiin olevan päivtyksen tarpeessa jo ennen 1982 mutta sodan tulosten arvioinnin jälkeen määrä kasvoi, on kirjoitettu että tämä olisi suora seuraus sodasta ja kaapatun Israelin vaunun tutkimuksista. Alla on aikataulu sekä päivitettyjen vaunujen määrä. Lähde numeroille ja vuosille.
Tankogradin artikkeli selventää tehtyjä muutoksia ja niiden toimintaperiaatetta: T-62M
Tankogradin T-54 / T-55 vaunuja käsittelevä artikkeli kirjoittaa näistä jonkin verran, löytyy kun hakee sivulta sanaa "T-55M": LINKKI
Lisää kuvia saman tyylisestä T-55A vaunujen lisäpanssaroinnsta, tosin nämä ovat Tsekkoslovakian tuotoksia. Andrei Tarasenkon blogin kirjoitus vuodelta 2019: T-55AM2
-
Linkitetyssä artikkelissa Tarasenko kirjoittaa lyhyestä Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotantomääristä:
Czechoslovakia received a license to manufacture tanks in 1964. First, the T-55 was produced at the ZTS (Zavod Trucanske Strojarne) plant in the Slovak city of Martin, and from 1967 to 1982, the T-55A, a total of 3820 units were built.
Tuo aikataulu on linjassa aikaisemmassa viestissäni laittamani taulukon kanssa, jonka mukaan Tsekkoslovakian T-72 tuotanto alkoi pienimääräisesti vuosina 1981 ja 1982 mutta lähti kunnolla käyntiin vuonna 1983. Tsekkoslovakian T-72 vuosituotantomäärät aikavälillä 1981-1991:
18-50-130-212-251-277-290-284-62-107-101
Pienen tehtaan osalta on järkevää tehdä tällainen sujuva vaihto, missä vanha poisjäävä tuote ja uusi sen korvaava vaihtavat paikkaa tähän tyyliin. Suuren tehtaan osalta on loogisempaa tehdä rajumpi leikkaus ja panostaa täysillä uuden tuotteen tuotantoon saattamiseen, vaikka se tekisikin pienen loven vuosituotantoon. Toki riippuu tuotteesta, jos vanhan voi korvata uudella tuotannossa ilman merkittäviä tuotantolinjojen muutoksia ja häiriöitä niin silloin tietysti toimitaan niin. Panssarivaunujen osalta vaatinee että kaikki jigit ja valmistus- sekä kokoonpano vaativat niin suuria muutoksia, ettei "helppo vaihto" ole niin helppoa ja sujuvaa.
Toisaalta on myös mahdollista että Tsekkoslovakian T-55 tuotannon jatkuminen vuoteen 1982 asti johtui viennistä: heiltä meni tämä aika viimeisten tilausten täyttämiseen, samalla kun tehdas käynnisti T-72 tuotantoa.
Minulla on hyllyssä kirja Slovakian sotavälineiden tuotannosta (käsittelee tietysti Tsekkoslovakian aikaa), eräänlainen historiikki vaan en ole selannut sitä vuosikausiin. Pitänee ehkä vilkaista mitä sieltä löytyy.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Google Translate käännös T-34 -tuotantoa käsittelevästä kappaleesta. Tässä kirjoitetaan yleisesti vaunun massatuotannosta, tosin päähuomio on Nizhny Tagilissa koska he valmistivat selvästi suurimman määrän näitä vaunuja. Lainaan tekstin kokonaisuudessaan, joten pahoittelut pitkästä tekstistä. Käännöksessä voi myös olla joitakin virheitä, joten älä ihmettele jos jossain kohdassa on outoja sanamuotoja tai epäloogisuuksia.
Lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivut 49-58
-
Chapter 2 - T-34
Thus, in four positions, A. S. Pushkin formulated the origins of the victory of the Russian state in the Patriotic War of 1812. A similar formula for the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was found by the translator of the headquarters of the 3rd shock army E. Rzhevskaya. As part of her service, she interrogated captured German soldiers and officers. And in the list of our strengths, I most often heard from them the words: “T-34 tank, endurance of soldiers, Zhukov.”
The first place for the "thirty-four" was ensured not only by tactical and technical characteristics, but also by the fact that they can experience unforgettable the impressions of communication with her were shared by everyone who had the misfortune to get to the Eastern Front as part of the troops of the Third Reich and its allies. There were many T-34 tanks. Lots of.
In six years, from the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1945, six Soviet factories produced 58,681 vehicles. This is an absolute record that has never been broken by anyone in the world tank building. Moreover, more than half, 28,952 tanks, were given to the Soviet army by the Nizhny Tagil tank plant No. 183, formerly known as Uralvagonzavod. The assembly of tanks began here in November 1941, one vehicle was ready on December 18, by the end of the year the military representatives managed to hand over 25 tanks. And further, during 1942-1944, the Tagil giant surpassed the entire industry of the Third Reich in the number of tanks built.
There is no reason to doubt the power of German tank building, which subordinated the industry of all continental Western Europe to its needs. But there is no magic in what happened either. In the Urals, technologies were created and implemented that ensured minimal labor and equipment costs per unit of output. For example, a tank "Panther" had a labor intensity 8.5 times higher than the T-34. At the same time, in the military-technical level, the German machine surpassed the T-34-85 by only one and a half times (two "Panthers" were equal to three "thirty-fours"). As you can see, the price did not pay off with the quality of TBOM.
However, the high manufacturability of the Soviet medium tank is not an innate property, but acquired in wartime, paid for by the labor of many engineers and scientists.
MERGING FORCES
On September 11, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted Decree No. 2059 on the transfer to the newly formed People's Commissariat of the tank industry of many enterprises - both those already engaged in the production of tanks, and civilian ones - car building, shipbuilding and machine tool building. Among them was the Ural Carriage Works named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky.
Why was Uralvagonzavod chosen as the base for the production of the most massive medium tanks? There were three main reasons: huge assembly shops, originally designed for in-line conveyor production, powerful metallurgy, and the presence of our own energy facilities. Of course, the disadvantages were initially known in the form of a lack of space, ideas for machining and armor shops, a simplified nomenclature of steel castings and the complete insufficiency of a non-ferrous casting shop, but they could be overcome relatively easily. To organize a tank plant, 13 enterprises were evacuated to the UVZ site - in whole or in part. The combination of all these factories and people, or rather, their merging, alloying on the Ural land was the basis for the formation of the largest tank factory in the world.
The tank builders of the Kharkov Plant No. 183 and, later, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and its armored supplier, Plant No. 264, brought experience and technologies for assembling tanks to the Urals. It is no coincidence that Kharkov Yu. E. Maksarev, and chief engineer energy L.I. Corduner evacuated from Stalingrad
A few words about the prehistory of plant No. 183 (aka the Kharkov Steam Locomotive Plant). It arose even before the revolution and quickly turned into a general engineering enterprise, producing, among other things, products unique for those times: powerful stationary and marine diesel engines. In Soviet times, KhPZ mastered the production of caterpillar tractors; the first of these was presented to the public on May 1, 1924. Following the tractors, the assembly of caterpillar artillery tractors began. In the first half of the 1930s, the plant was completely reconstructed for tank production and began to produce first the T-24, and then the BT-2, BT-5, BT-7 and BT-7M, and in large series for those times. To this should be added the piece assembly of heavy five-turreted T-35 tanks. And, finally, the main thing: it was at the turn of the 1930-1940s that the T-34 tanks and diesel engines for them, V-2, were created and mastered in serial production at the KhPZ. At the beginning of 1939, the Kharkov Locomotive Plant was divided into two independent enterprises: tank plant No. 183 and diesel plant No. 75.
The contribution of Uralvagonzavodtsev to the tank plant was not only factory buildings and equipment, but also the experience of managing a large association consisting of various industries. That is why the production and dispatching department during almost the entire war was led by the former chief dispatcher of UVZ L.L. Shtarkman. The armor business in Nizhny Tagil was established by specialists from the Mariupol Ilyich Metallurgical Plant. The latter was formed in 1922 by merging the enterprises of two joint-stock companies that appeared at the end of the 19th century - Nikopol and Providence. In 1928-1930, a complete reconstruction was carried out and the profile of production was changed: commercial metal and rolled metal for shipbuilding replaced the armor plate and parts from it for warships, tanks and combat aircraft. For this purpose, the largest rolling mills, metal-cutting machines and presses were installed and put into operation. After evacuation to the Urals, the chief engineer of Mariupol plant V. S. Nitsenko headed the armor department of plant No. 183. M. E. Kats, former chief engineer of the Moscow Ordzhonikidze Machine Tool Plant, became the chief technologist of the Ural Tank Plant. This enterprise was put into operation in 1930-1932 and was distinguished by a high technological culture. The plant's output consisted of various types of the latest machine tools, automatic machines, semi-automatic machines, etc., with which the entire main industry of the country was equipped, and chiefly aviation and munitions. It is no coincidence that it was M. E. Katz who became the main ideologist in the Urals for the introduction of production lines in the machining of tank parts and the assembly of combat vehicle components.
And so it was with each of the evacuated enterprises - they all brought their developments and pre-war achievements to the common basket. But the benefits of evacuation were not exhausted by this: for the first time, albeit forcibly, it united industry and science in solving common problems. The Ural Tank Plant No. 183 not only fell into the scope of powerful "tank" scientific institutions - the State Allied Design Institute No. 8 and the Central Research Institute No. 48, but also became the place of deployment and application of the forces of several evacuated scientific institutions.
Thus, by order of the director of the plant No. 183 dated December 8, 1941, a central plant laboratory (TsZL, or department 34) was created with the responsibilities to carry out: “... along with the performance of work to provide production with chemical analyzes of metals and materials, results mechanical, metallographic and other tests:
1. Carrying out research work on foundry, forging and pressing, thermal production, melting and heating devices aimed at improving quality, reducing labor intensity, saving expensive ferroalloys, metals and materials.
2. Development of instructions for smelting, pouring and hot working of metals.
3. Selection of grades of steels and other metals. Research and implementation in the production of substitutes.
4. Establishment of concepts and modes of heat treatment of metals.
5. Introduction of new methods for testing metals and monitoring metallurgical and thermal processes.
It is only necessary to add that the main part of the staff of the CPL was made up of employees of the Kharkov Institute of Metals, evacuated together with the plant. In September 1941, P. M. Krivich, a representative of the Kharkov Tank Plant No. 183, who had just appeared in Nizhny Tagil, entrusted all experimental and research work in the field of armor welding to the Electric Welding Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, to which the property of both UVZ welding laboratory and and 183rd plant. Arrived in Nizhny Tagil at the end of 1941, the State Allied Scientific Research Laboratory. Ignatier Va (LARIG) dealt with the design, manufacture and repair of cutting tools. Soon after, by the order of the UTZ director, the employees of LARIG were thanked for their success in training working toolmakers and creating new types of tools. And the list of scientific subdivisions is far from exhausted.
VICTORY TECHNOLOGIES
The confluence of forces made it possible to create a number of "breakthrough" technologies that ensured victory in the competition with a powerful adversary - German industry. Having barely settled in the Urals, the technologists and the design bureau of plant No. 183 began a huge amount of work that continued throughout the war and took place in the following areas.
1. THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF DETAILS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE IN THE TANK, THE EXCLUSION OF WHICH SHOULD NOT DOWN THE TECHNICAL AND FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE MACHINE.
2. REDUCTION OF THE NORMAL PARTS USED ON THE TANK, BOTH IN QUANTITY AND IN DIMENSIONS.
3. REDUCTION ON THE PARTS OF PLACES TO BE MACHINED WITH A SIMULTANEOUS REVIEW OF THE DEGREE OF PURITY OF THE PARTS TO BE MACHINED.
4. TRANSITION TO THE MANUFACTURE OF PARTS BY COLD FORGING AND CASTING INSTEAD OF THE APPLIED HOT FORGING AND FORGING.
5. REDUCTION OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF PARTS REQUIRING HEAT TREATMENT, DIFFERENT TYPES OF ANTI-CORROSION AND DECORATIVE COATINGS OR SPECIAL SURFACE TREATMENT.
6. REDUCTION OF KNOTS AND PARTS OBTAINED IN THE ORDER OF COOPERATION FROM THE SIDE.
7. REDUCTION OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF GRADES AND PROFILES OF MATERIALS USED FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF THE TANK.
8. TRANSFER OF PARTS PRODUCED FROM DEFICIENT MATERIALS TO MANUFACTURE OF SUBSTITUTE MATERIALS.
9. EXPANSION WHERE PERMITTED BY CONDITIONS OF WORK, PERMISSIBLE DEVIATIONS FROM TECHNICAL CONDITIONS.
QUOTE FROM THE HISTORY OF TANK BUILDING AT THE URAL TANK PLANT No. 183.
By January 1942, changes were made to the drawings of 770 items of parts, and 1265 items of parts were simply removed from the design. At the same time, despite the short time and the lack of experimental verification of the modified and new designs, no errors were found in the future!
By the end of 1942, the number of abolished parts reached 6237, and the range of fasteners decreased by 21%. Such Details and assemblies as the driver's hatch, final drive housing, tracks, instrument panel, shoulder straps were simplified according to the configuration and places of processing. During 1943, another 638 changes were made to the design of the T-34, with the aim of reducing labor intensity.
CAST ARMOR
A special role in reducing the labor intensity of T-34 tanks in Nizhny Tagil was played by the development of mass production of cast armor parts - from the mask of a hull machine gun to entire towers.
This technology was not something fundamentally new - a cast turret was installed on French tanks Renault FT. During the Second World War, armor casting was not neglected by our Anglo-American allies - on tanks Mk II "Matilda", Mk III Wallentine, medium MZ and M4.
The reasons for this are obvious: although cast armor has less resistance than katana, large cast parts are ultimately more reliable under projectile fire due to the absence of weakened zones in the form of welds. In addition, armor casting made it possible to release for other needs the pressing, welding and other equipment necessary for processing armored parts from rolled steel. At the same time, casting technology had many of its subtleties. It was considered relatively easy to cast parts with subsequent processing to low and medium hardness - as was the case on American and British tanks. Hardening of the casting to high hardness was more difficult. As already mentioned in the
first chapter, in the USSR and Germany, armor of high hardness was chosen to protect medium tanks in the late 1930s. The German metallurgists chose not to tempt fate and until 1945 used castings only for small details such as cannon masks or commander's cupolas. Soviet tank builders took a conscious risk and, even before the war, they began to master armor casting with subsequent hardening to high hardness. In 1939-1940, armor casting experiments were headed by NII-48, which made it possible by June 1941 to organize serial production for T-34 tanks - towers, nose beams, driver's hatch covers, DT machine gun protection, crankcase protection and observation device bases .
True, a rather complicated and lengthy manual molding technology was used for this, so the process of CASTING ONE tower took seven days. Already during the Great Patriotic War, in the production of cast turrets at the Ural Tank Plant (since August 15, 1942), casting of turrets into raw molds made by machine molding was introduced. The technology made it possible to increase the production of Vox turret to 5-6 per day at the end of 1941 to 40 units at the end of 1942.
-
Jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä.
Lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivut 49-58
-
Chapter 2 - T-34
Thus, in four positions, A. S. Pushkin formulated the origins of the victory of the Russian state in the Patriotic War of 1812. A similar formula for the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was found by the translator of the headquarters of the 3rd shock army E. Rzhevskaya. As part of her service, she interrogated captured German soldiers and officers. And in the list of our strengths, I most often heard from them the words: “T-34 tank, endurance of soldiers, Zhukov.”
The first place for the "thirty-four" was ensured not only by tactical and technical characteristics, but also by the fact that they can experience unforgettable the impressions of communication with her were shared by everyone who had the misfortune to get to the Eastern Front as part of the troops of the Third Reich and its allies. There were many T-34 tanks. Lots of.
In six years, from the beginning of 1940 to the end of 1945, six Soviet factories produced 58,681 vehicles. This is an absolute record that has never been broken by anyone in the world tank building. Moreover, more than half, 28,952 tanks, were given to the Soviet army by the Nizhny Tagil tank plant No. 183, formerly known as Uralvagonzavod. The assembly of tanks began here in November 1941, one vehicle was ready on December 18, by the end of the year the military representatives managed to hand over 25 tanks. And further, during 1942-1944, the Tagil giant surpassed the entire industry of the Third Reich in the number of tanks built.
There is no reason to doubt the power of German tank building, which subordinated the industry of all continental Western Europe to its needs. But there is no magic in what happened either. In the Urals, technologies were created and implemented that ensured minimal labor and equipment costs per unit of output. For example, a tank "Panther" had a labor intensity 8.5 times higher than the T-34. At the same time, in the military-technical level, the German machine surpassed the T-34-85 by only one and a half times (two "Panthers" were equal to three "thirty-fours"). As you can see, the price did not pay off with the quality of TBOM.
However, the high manufacturability of the Soviet medium tank is not an innate property, but acquired in wartime, paid for by the labor of many engineers and scientists.
MERGING FORCES
On September 11, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted Decree No. 2059 on the transfer to the newly formed People's Commissariat of the tank industry of many enterprises - both those already engaged in the production of tanks, and civilian ones - car building, shipbuilding and machine tool building. Among them was the Ural Carriage Works named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky.
Why was Uralvagonzavod chosen as the base for the production of the most massive medium tanks? There were three main reasons: huge assembly shops, originally designed for in-line conveyor production, powerful metallurgy, and the presence of our own energy facilities. Of course, the disadvantages were initially known in the form of a lack of space, ideas for machining and armor shops, a simplified nomenclature of steel castings and the complete insufficiency of a non-ferrous casting shop, but they could be overcome relatively easily. To organize a tank plant, 13 enterprises were evacuated to the UVZ site - in whole or in part. The combination of all these factories and people, or rather, their merging, alloying on the Ural land was the basis for the formation of the largest tank factory in the world.
The tank builders of the Kharkov Plant No. 183 and, later, the Stalingrad Tractor Plant and its armored supplier, Plant No. 264, brought experience and technologies for assembling tanks to the Urals. It is no coincidence that Kharkov Yu. E. Maksarev, and chief engineer energy L.I. Corduner evacuated from Stalingrad
A few words about the prehistory of plant No. 183 (aka the Kharkov Steam Locomotive Plant). It arose even before the revolution and quickly turned into a general engineering enterprise, producing, among other things, products unique for those times: powerful stationary and marine diesel engines. In Soviet times, KhPZ mastered the production of caterpillar tractors; the first of these was presented to the public on May 1, 1924. Following the tractors, the assembly of caterpillar artillery tractors began. In the first half of the 1930s, the plant was completely reconstructed for tank production and began to produce first the T-24, and then the BT-2, BT-5, BT-7 and BT-7M, and in large series for those times. To this should be added the piece assembly of heavy five-turreted T-35 tanks. And, finally, the main thing: it was at the turn of the 1930-1940s that the T-34 tanks and diesel engines for them, V-2, were created and mastered in serial production at the KhPZ. At the beginning of 1939, the Kharkov Locomotive Plant was divided into two independent enterprises: tank plant No. 183 and diesel plant No. 75.
The contribution of Uralvagonzavodtsev to the tank plant was not only factory buildings and equipment, but also the experience of managing a large association consisting of various industries. That is why the production and dispatching department during almost the entire war was led by the former chief dispatcher of UVZ L.L. Shtarkman. The armor business in Nizhny Tagil was established by specialists from the Mariupol Ilyich Metallurgical Plant. The latter was formed in 1922 by merging the enterprises of two joint-stock companies that appeared at the end of the 19th century - Nikopol and Providence. In 1928-1930, a complete reconstruction was carried out and the profile of production was changed: commercial metal and rolled metal for shipbuilding replaced the armor plate and parts from it for warships, tanks and combat aircraft. For this purpose, the largest rolling mills, metal-cutting machines and presses were installed and put into operation. After evacuation to the Urals, the chief engineer of Mariupol plant V. S. Nitsenko headed the armor department of plant No. 183. M. E. Kats, former chief engineer of the Moscow Ordzhonikidze Machine Tool Plant, became the chief technologist of the Ural Tank Plant. This enterprise was put into operation in 1930-1932 and was distinguished by a high technological culture. The plant's output consisted of various types of the latest machine tools, automatic machines, semi-automatic machines, etc., with which the entire main industry of the country was equipped, and chiefly aviation and munitions. It is no coincidence that it was M. E. Katz who became the main ideologist in the Urals for the introduction of production lines in the machining of tank parts and the assembly of combat vehicle components.
And so it was with each of the evacuated enterprises - they all brought their developments and pre-war achievements to the common basket. But the benefits of evacuation were not exhausted by this: for the first time, albeit forcibly, it united industry and science in solving common problems. The Ural Tank Plant No. 183 not only fell into the scope of powerful "tank" scientific institutions - the State Allied Design Institute No. 8 and the Central Research Institute No. 48, but also became the place of deployment and application of the forces of several evacuated scientific institutions.
Thus, by order of the director of the plant No. 183 dated December 8, 1941, a central plant laboratory (TsZL, or department 34) was created with the responsibilities to carry out: “... along with the performance of work to provide production with chemical analyzes of metals and materials, results mechanical, metallographic and other tests:
1. Carrying out research work on foundry, forging and pressing, thermal production, melting and heating devices aimed at improving quality, reducing labor intensity, saving expensive ferroalloys, metals and materials.
2. Development of instructions for smelting, pouring and hot working of metals.
3. Selection of grades of steels and other metals. Research and implementation in the production of substitutes.
4. Establishment of concepts and modes of heat treatment of metals.
5. Introduction of new methods for testing metals and monitoring metallurgical and thermal processes.
It is only necessary to add that the main part of the staff of the CPL was made up of employees of the Kharkov Institute of Metals, evacuated together with the plant. In September 1941, P. M. Krivich, a representative of the Kharkov Tank Plant No. 183, who had just appeared in Nizhny Tagil, entrusted all experimental and research work in the field of armor welding to the Electric Welding Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, to which the property of both UVZ welding laboratory and and 183rd plant. Arrived in Nizhny Tagil at the end of 1941, the State Allied Scientific Research Laboratory. Ignatier Va (LARIG) dealt with the design, manufacture and repair of cutting tools. Soon after, by the order of the UTZ director, the employees of LARIG were thanked for their success in training working toolmakers and creating new types of tools. And the list of scientific subdivisions is far from exhausted.
VICTORY TECHNOLOGIES
The confluence of forces made it possible to create a number of "breakthrough" technologies that ensured victory in the competition with a powerful adversary - German industry. Having barely settled in the Urals, the technologists and the design bureau of plant No. 183 began a huge amount of work that continued throughout the war and took place in the following areas.
1. THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF DETAILS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE IN THE TANK, THE EXCLUSION OF WHICH SHOULD NOT DOWN THE TECHNICAL AND FIGHTING QUALITIES OF THE MACHINE.
2. REDUCTION OF THE NORMAL PARTS USED ON THE TANK, BOTH IN QUANTITY AND IN DIMENSIONS.
3. REDUCTION ON THE PARTS OF PLACES TO BE MACHINED WITH A SIMULTANEOUS REVIEW OF THE DEGREE OF PURITY OF THE PARTS TO BE MACHINED.
4. TRANSITION TO THE MANUFACTURE OF PARTS BY COLD FORGING AND CASTING INSTEAD OF THE APPLIED HOT FORGING AND FORGING.
5. REDUCTION OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF PARTS REQUIRING HEAT TREATMENT, DIFFERENT TYPES OF ANTI-CORROSION AND DECORATIVE COATINGS OR SPECIAL SURFACE TREATMENT.
6. REDUCTION OF KNOTS AND PARTS OBTAINED IN THE ORDER OF COOPERATION FROM THE SIDE.
7. REDUCTION OF THE NOMENCLATURE OF GRADES AND PROFILES OF MATERIALS USED FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF THE TANK.
8. TRANSFER OF PARTS PRODUCED FROM DEFICIENT MATERIALS TO MANUFACTURE OF SUBSTITUTE MATERIALS.
9. EXPANSION WHERE PERMITTED BY CONDITIONS OF WORK, PERMISSIBLE DEVIATIONS FROM TECHNICAL CONDITIONS.
QUOTE FROM THE HISTORY OF TANK BUILDING AT THE URAL TANK PLANT No. 183.
By January 1942, changes were made to the drawings of 770 items of parts, and 1265 items of parts were simply removed from the design. At the same time, despite the short time and the lack of experimental verification of the modified and new designs, no errors were found in the future!
By the end of 1942, the number of abolished parts reached 6237, and the range of fasteners decreased by 21%. Such Details and assemblies as the driver's hatch, final drive housing, tracks, instrument panel, shoulder straps were simplified according to the configuration and places of processing. During 1943, another 638 changes were made to the design of the T-34, with the aim of reducing labor intensity.
CAST ARMOR
A special role in reducing the labor intensity of T-34 tanks in Nizhny Tagil was played by the development of mass production of cast armor parts - from the mask of a hull machine gun to entire towers.
This technology was not something fundamentally new - a cast turret was installed on French tanks Renault FT. During the Second World War, armor casting was not neglected by our Anglo-American allies - on tanks Mk II "Matilda", Mk III Wallentine, medium MZ and M4.
The reasons for this are obvious: although cast armor has less resistance than katana, large cast parts are ultimately more reliable under projectile fire due to the absence of weakened zones in the form of welds. In addition, armor casting made it possible to release for other needs the pressing, welding and other equipment necessary for processing armored parts from rolled steel. At the same time, casting technology had many of its subtleties. It was considered relatively easy to cast parts with subsequent processing to low and medium hardness - as was the case on American and British tanks. Hardening of the casting to high hardness was more difficult. As already mentioned in the
first chapter, in the USSR and Germany, armor of high hardness was chosen to protect medium tanks in the late 1930s. The German metallurgists chose not to tempt fate and until 1945 used castings only for small details such as cannon masks or commander's cupolas. Soviet tank builders took a conscious risk and, even before the war, they began to master armor casting with subsequent hardening to high hardness. In 1939-1940, armor casting experiments were headed by NII-48, which made it possible by June 1941 to organize serial production for T-34 tanks - towers, nose beams, driver's hatch covers, DT machine gun protection, crankcase protection and observation device bases .
True, a rather complicated and lengthy manual molding technology was used for this, so the process of CASTING ONE tower took seven days. Already during the Great Patriotic War, in the production of cast turrets at the Ural Tank Plant (since August 15, 1942), casting of turrets into raw molds made by machine molding was introduced. The technology made it possible to increase the production of Vox turret to 5-6 per day at the end of 1941 to 40 units at the end of 1942.
-
Jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Edellisen viestin artikkeli jatkuu.
Lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivut 59-70
-
MEASURING BANDS
In the prewar period, rolled armor metal was cut according to a template into the corresponding parts and then welded. In the production of the thirty-four, two parts of the hull were especially troublesome: the fender liner (the inclined part of the side) and the vertical side plate. Both of them were long, even-width strips with slanted cuts along the edges. Accordingly, a proposal arose to roll a measuring strip equal in width to the finished parts. This idea was first proposed by the armored cars of the Mariupol plant in the summer of 1941. The slab of the Zaporizhstal plant was intended for experimental rolling, where two echelons of armored ingots were sent. But then they did not have time to get down to business: the advancing German troops captured both the echelons and Zaporozhye itself.
At the turn of 1941-1942, during the development of the production of armor at new factories, there was not up to the measured strip. However, in May 1942, the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy again received an order to rent it. The task turned out to be a difficult one: the width tolerances had to be no more than -2/+5 mm, crescent (i.e. bending) for the total length of the part .5 mm. Cracks, sunsets and delaminations were not allowed on the edges - in order to weld without machining or fire cutting.
Experimental work began simultaneously in the rolling shops of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, at first without any special achievements. They soon abandoned the rental of parts for heavy tanks, but in the end they managed to achieve success for thirty-four. The team of authors consisting of G. A. Vinogradov, head of the metallurgical department of NII-48, L. E. Vaisberg, chief engineer of the KMK, and S. E. Lieberman, engineer of the same plant, during November 1942 - January 1943 we obtained a high-quality strip by applying a completely new method of rolling on the ribs on the swaging stand 900 of the rail and beam mill. In January 1943, 280 strips were issued, in February - 486, in March - 1636. In April, after all the required tests, the development of the gross production of measured strips for T-34 tank wing liners began. Initially, they were supplied to the Ural Tank Plant and UZTM, and then to other T-34 tank manufacturers. A complete and accurate assessment of the new technology is given by the corresponding report of NII-48 dated December 25, 1943: ”A fundamentally new method of rolling a wide armor strip on edge".
Obtaining a calibrated (measured) strip with a width according to the dimensions of the finished part of the armored hull of the T-34 tank made it possible for the NKTP plants to adopt a NEW high-performance technology for manufacturing armored parts without trimming the longitudinal edges. Thanks to the application of the new method to one of the main armored parts of the T-34 tank (fender liner), a very significant time saving was achieved (about 36%) when cutting them out. Up to 15% savings in armor steel 8C and oxygen savings of 15,000 kb/m per 1,000 hulls have been achieved. It remains only to add that by the end of 1943, the rolling of a measuring strip for another part of the T-34 hull - the vertical of the New Board was mastered.
Rollers to the best of their ability facilitated the work of not only armored hulls, but also machining shops. Turret shoulder straps for T-34 tanks, which were manufactured in 1942-1945 at the banding mill of the Novo-Tagil Metallurgical Plant, had minimal launches. The People's Commissar for the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev, in his order of September 28, 1943, considered it necessary to express special gratitude to the Tagil metallurgists.
AUTOMATIC WELDING
Manual welding required the highest qualifications of workers and careful preparation of parts - in particular, the machining of edges. However, at the end of 1941, enterprises that produced T-34 tanks, one after another, began to abandon the machining of welded edges due to lack of equipment. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant and Gorky Plant No. 112 were the first to do this, followed by Plant No. 183. As a result, the labor intensity of manufacturing one set of armored parts decreased from 280 machine hours at the Mariupol Plant to 62 at the Ural Tank Plant, the number of finishing jobs decreased by four times, and straight rolls by two times. In addition, after studying the fluctuations in the dimensions of parts during hardening, the workpieces were slightly changed in such a way that hardened parts are obtained within drawing requirements.
But there has always been a price to pay for simplifying technology. Having abandoned milling and gouging of welded edges, Soviet specialists had to sharply increase the strength of the weld itself, since there was a necessary backlog. Back in 1940, employees of the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Academician E. O. Paton, managed to independently recreate the method of automatic submerged arc welding, patented in 1936 by the American company Linde. The technology of the new process at the institute was handled by V. I. Dyatlov, and the equipment was developed by P. I. Sevbo. However, both the Americans and the staff of the Paton Institute used submerged arc welding to join ordinary steel parts; for armor welding, the method needed serious improvement. This is exactly what the scientists of NII-48, together with the workers of the Izhora plant, did at the beginning of 1941. By the summer, it was possible to achieve, thanks to the introduction of ferrotitanium and ferrosilicon into the flux, a consistently high quality of the welded seam of armor structures.
In parallel with the Izhora plant, automatic welding of armor under a layer of flux was introduced at the Kharkov tank plant No. 183. We do not know for sure whether employees of NII-48 or the Institute of Electric Welding took a direct part in this. It is only known for certain that the Kharkiv residents received the drawings of the machine from the Institute of Electric Welding and independently manufactured three installations of the R-72 type. One of them was launched and used to weld the sides of the T-34 tank with the bottom of the wing liner; two others were not installed before the plant was moved to Nizhny Tagil. According to the director of the plant Yu. E. Maksarev, Academician E. O. Paton was present at the test of the first Kharkov automatic machine. The new method demonstrated excellent quality: when testing the welded projectile structure with in-line shelling, it was not the seam that was broken, but the armor plate.
At Uralvagonzavod, the first automatic welding installations appeared in the spring of 1941 and were intended for welding long car seams. After the start of the war, the employees of the Institute of Electric Welding did not waste their time and by October 1941 they managed to reconfigure the R-70 installations of the carriage production for welding the sides of tanks. On November 6, 1941, V.A. Malyshev, People’s Commissar for the Tank Industry, while in Nizhny Tagil, signed Order No. the time to significantly increase the production of hulls for tanks and the lack of qualified welders at hull and tank factories, the only reliable means for ensuring the implementation of programs for hulls is the use of automatic submerged arc welding according to the method of Academician Paton, which has already proven itself and has been tested at a number of factories . I consider it necessary in the near future for all directors of hull and tank factories to seriously engage in the introduction of automatic welding for the manufacture of tank hulls.
During 1942-1943, the Electric Welding Institute, together with the armor workers of the corps department of the Ural Tank Plant Da, created a whole complex of automatic machines of various types and purposes. In 1945, UTZ used the following auto-welding machines:
- universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
- universal self-propelled carts:
- simplified specialized carts;
- installations for welding of circular seams at a motionless product;
- installations with a carousel for product rotation when welding circular seams;
- self-propelled units with a common drive for feeding the electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.
In 1945, machine guns accounted for 23% of welding work (by weight of deposited metal) on the hull and 30% on tank turrets. The use of automatic machines made it possible already in 1942 to release 60 qualified welders at only one plant No. 183, and in 1945 - 140. A very important circumstance: the high quality of the seam in automatic welding eliminated the negative consequences of refusing mechanical processing of the edges of armor parts .
It only remains to add that in the United States, automatic submerged arc welding was used in armor production in 1944. In Germany, automatic welding machines appeared only at the very end of the war, before that only manual welding was used.
MACHINING OF PARTS
Post-war surveys of German tank factories showed not only the vastness, but also the high technical perfection of their machine park. The Germans managed to achieve a special art in the creation of special machine tools. Soviet enterprises could not boast of such wealth: the most critical equipment was not produced in the country, and back in the early 1930s it was purchased abroad, in particular, in Germany. Almost the only way out for our factories was to increase the productivity of available universal machines by introducing new tools and special adjustments. In the report cheers The Polish Tank Plant for 1942 reads: “For the manufacture of many parts, a completely new original technology and new techniques were used that were not previously used in tank building: the widespread use of multi-cut cutting, in-line milling, the widespread use of broach .... the introduction of high-performance adjustments on revolving machines and automatic machines.
At the end of 1942, the leadership of the NKTP turned to the government with a request to involve specialists from the cutting department of the Moscow State Technical University named after V.I. Bauman. They have already distinguished themselves at the factories of the People's Commissariat for Armaments by proposing a different sharpening of cutting tools. The mechanical workshops of the Ural Tank Plant were chosen as an experimental base for mastering the tool with a rational geometry of the cutting edges.
For this purpose, a team of researchers was created from local technologists, employees of the branch institute 8GSPI and, of course, representatives of the Moscow Higher Technical School. The very first months of joint work in the winter - summer of 1943 demonstrated complete success: cutters, drills and cutters had 1.6-5 times greater durability and made it possible to increase the productivity of machine tools by 25-30%. The “Guidelines on the Geometry of the Cutting Tool” developed by the scientists of the Moscow Higher Technical School and the workers of the plant were approved as mandatory telny for use at all plants of NKTP.
The Ural Tank Plant's own innovators also had a creative approach to business. In 1943 alone, the Head of the Breeze, V. A. Nauchitel, invented and for the first time in the USSR introduced a modular milling cutter with plug-in knives, engineer P. P. Yunkin created a progressive cutting broach. The use of quick-clamping and multi-point fixtures has become commonplace in the plant. Application of construct tor Nickelberg of single-pass modular broaches for the manufacture of gears increased productivity several times. Multi-spindle drilling heads have reduced the labor intensity of the drilling operation on the ≪fan>> unit by 55%. In Nizhny Tagil, technologists of the Moscow Machine Tool Plant named after V.I. Ordzhonikidze.
In 1941-1942 alone, they carried out 325 adjustments, which made it possible to launch a stable production of very important transmission and chassis parts for the T-34. In 1943, the work was continued by the tank builders on their own: the annual report states: “The simple and easy-to-maintain designs of the devices made it possible to details, to differentiate and simplify operations as much as possible. In 1943, the production received tooling of higher productivity. It has become a common requirement for technologists and manufacturers to design multi-cutting adjustments, combined dies, quick-clamping and multi-place fixtures. In total, during 1942-1943, Renault introduced 6046 tooling units and 1909 cold dies at UTZ.
Gradually, the assistance of the allies had an effect: during the years 1942-1943, high-performance machine tools became more and more widespread: special aggregate, multi-cutter and multi-spindle. Their total number by the end of 1943 increased to 227 units - against 51 in Kharkov.
FLOW AND CONVEYOR
The main advantage of the Soviet tank-building enterprises, and above all the Ural Tank Plant, was the transfer of machining and machine-assembly shops to the flow-conveyor method of work. Already in 1942, painstaking work was carried out in them to break down production operations into the simplest components accessible to almost untrained workers. Following this, the “alignment” of equipment began in the order of a sequence of operations, that is, the form of production lines. They first appeared in workshop number 184, then in workshops 119 and 110. Following the first three PRODUCTION LINES, another 64 were created in 1943, 67 in 1944, and 17 in 1945. As of January 1, 1946, 151 production lines were operating at UTZ.
About efficiency:
Production lines are illustrated by the following example: for the manufacture of the final drive gear in 1942, before the introduction of the production line, 39 machines and 70 workers were required, and in 1945, on a streamlined flow, 19 machines and 27 workers. For some particularly complex units, automatic production lines were developed. So, for processing the rear axle after welding it into the body in 1943, an automatic line of 14 units was developed and installed. With outward simplicity, this work required enormous efforts and incredible accuracy of calculations from the technologists. The UTZ report for 1943 states: ”The transition to a streamline organization of the production process required the following maximum preparation of production:
a) revision of blanks, possible rationalization and simplification of it, reduction of start-ups;
b) revision of processing technology, possible differentiation of operations in relation to the required rhythm and their simplification, designed for the use of unskilled workers;
c) standardization of technical processes and selection of the required equipment, specialized in operations and equipping it with as simple a tool as possible;
d) the layout of the equipment along the flow, ensuring the processing of the part without "loop";
e) resolving issues of technical control of the product and its location;
f) providing the production line with the minimum necessary vehicles, choosing these vehicles, organizing jobs, providing them with inventory and small-scale mechanization (tool boxes, carts, etc.).
The first stage on the way to the transition to the in-line organization of production sections and lines at our plant was the organization of machine assembly shops according to the principle of finished production. These workshops supply finished units to the main assembly conveyor. The next step was the rejection of the group arrangement of machines. With the group arrangement of equipment, the “face of the part” was lost, the beginning and end of processing was not visible, it was extremely difficult to plan the release of parts and control the schedule.
At the same time, the details made large “loops”, the cargo flow as a whole was confused, a large number of transport workers and means were required. It was not enough to arrange the machines in the order of operations. In all cases, the success of the in-line method of production was inextricably linked with the rise to a new, higher level of technology for processing parts and organizing the production site. Convey ep reigned in the assembly shops. The invention of American car builders has been used at tank factories in the USSR since the early 1930s. In particular, the first assembly line in Kharkov was created in 1932 - for the production of tanks BT-2.
In Nizhny Tagil, the T-34 tank assembly line went into operation on January 7, the second on April 1, 1942. Later, at the beginning of 1944, a reduction in the assembly cycle of machines made it possible to abandon the second conveyor and concentrate all forces on one. What was an assembly line? It was a system with discontinuous movement similar to the wagon conveyor that previously operated at UVZ with two preparation sections. At the first stage, the tank hull was mounted on stands where electrical equipment, tanks, suspension, tubes and brackets for the engine were mounted. In the second section, the hull was raised on the goats for the convenience of installing road wheels with balancers, guide wheels and front suspensions.
Further, the body on its wheels moved to the conveyor belt and was included in the moving production line. As the car moved forward, Dacha final drives, control drives, gearboxes, motor, fuel, oil and air systems, prepared outside the conveyor line, were installed on it. The entire assembly process included 8 preparatory work units carried out before the conveyor at two preparatory sections, and 35 assembly positions for work directly on the conveyor. The work of workers was facilitated by the use of electric wrenches, pneumatic machines and other means of mechanization. On the assembly line, the cars were refueled with fuel, oil and water. After adjustment, the tanks were transferred to stands for stationary testing. The closing of the machine and installation on the tracks were carried out on a separate delivery conveyor.
I must say that the conveyor assembly of tanks was known in Germany. But the conveyor in armored hull production was a purely Soviet invention and was first implemented in Nizhny Tagil - on the initiative of the plant director Yu. E. Maksarev. The order to create a conveyor for welding armored hulls was signed on December 10, 1941, but its implementation was delayed for a number of reasons. Construction was completed in early May 1942, and after a number of experiments since June 1, the conveyor has entered commercial operation.
In January 1943, the same one began to operate for assembling and welding the nose of the tank hull. In the manuscript of the book "History of tank building at the Ural Tank Plant No. 183" we find an exhaustive description of these systems: "The conveyor for welding the hulls is a normal gauge railway track with a length of 98 m. On this track there are 26 Diamond wagon bogies, having a spring coupling between them...All trolleys have the same profile for mounting the bodies in all four positions in which welding is performed. A tractor winch is installed in front of the conveyor, moving all carts simultaneously to one workplace. The front trolley, released from the body, is transferred by crane to the beginning of the conveyor and coupled with the rest of the trolleys. Conveyor rhythm 44 minutes.
The organization of work is regulated by the technological process, which provides for 4 positions of the body on the conveyor:
- Normal position
- Position on the right side.
- Position "upside down".
-Position on the left side.
Several bogies are occupied in each of the indicated positions, depending on the amount of welding work and the number of simultaneously working welders... Special places are allocated for tilting the body to the next position... The body is removed from its place, turned over on the floor by an overhead crane and placed on the next cart in the new position...
The conveyor for assembly and welding of the T-34 hull nose unit is a lattice-type metal structure carrying horizontally reinforced squares along the entire conveyor. The horizontal shelves of these squares serve as a support for rolling the KOB role, on which the infinite Gall chain rests with a step of 200 mm. The conveyor moves periodically every 44 minutes. Support channels are welded to the chain links with a pitch equal to the width of the nose, on which the nose assembly is laid. They protect the supporting structure from touching protruding parts. The technological process of assembly and welding provides for 15 operations equal in labor intensity.
RECOGNITION OF THE ALLIES
The history of the Ural Tank Plant No. 183 of the war years indisputably proves the fact that the lack of material resources is by no means an insurmountable obstacle in competition with a more powerful enemy. True, on the obligatory condition that intellectual resources are available. We will not go into excessive pathos and will give the right to a conclusion to a person who, in this respect, to the unbiased, namely the American historian Steven Zaloga:
“The Soviet philosophy of tank design was obviously focused on the creation of an inexpensive and reliable design, devoid of any embellishment. This pragmatic approach meant that the Soviet Union throughout the war was able to significantly outnumber Germany in the number of tanks built, despite a much weaker production base due to the huge losses of 1941. It was the success of industry that ensured the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II.”
Lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivut 59-70
-
MEASURING BANDS
In the prewar period, rolled armor metal was cut according to a template into the corresponding parts and then welded. In the production of the thirty-four, two parts of the hull were especially troublesome: the fender liner (the inclined part of the side) and the vertical side plate. Both of them were long, even-width strips with slanted cuts along the edges. Accordingly, a proposal arose to roll a measuring strip equal in width to the finished parts. This idea was first proposed by the armored cars of the Mariupol plant in the summer of 1941. The slab of the Zaporizhstal plant was intended for experimental rolling, where two echelons of armored ingots were sent. But then they did not have time to get down to business: the advancing German troops captured both the echelons and Zaporozhye itself.
At the turn of 1941-1942, during the development of the production of armor at new factories, there was not up to the measured strip. However, in May 1942, the People's Commissariat of Ferrous Metallurgy again received an order to rent it. The task turned out to be a difficult one: the width tolerances had to be no more than -2/+5 mm, crescent (i.e. bending) for the total length of the part .5 mm. Cracks, sunsets and delaminations were not allowed on the edges - in order to weld without machining or fire cutting.
Experimental work began simultaneously in the rolling shops of the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical plants, at first without any special achievements. They soon abandoned the rental of parts for heavy tanks, but in the end they managed to achieve success for thirty-four. The team of authors consisting of G. A. Vinogradov, head of the metallurgical department of NII-48, L. E. Vaisberg, chief engineer of the KMK, and S. E. Lieberman, engineer of the same plant, during November 1942 - January 1943 we obtained a high-quality strip by applying a completely new method of rolling on the ribs on the swaging stand 900 of the rail and beam mill. In January 1943, 280 strips were issued, in February - 486, in March - 1636. In April, after all the required tests, the development of the gross production of measured strips for T-34 tank wing liners began. Initially, they were supplied to the Ural Tank Plant and UZTM, and then to other T-34 tank manufacturers. A complete and accurate assessment of the new technology is given by the corresponding report of NII-48 dated December 25, 1943: ”A fundamentally new method of rolling a wide armor strip on edge".
Obtaining a calibrated (measured) strip with a width according to the dimensions of the finished part of the armored hull of the T-34 tank made it possible for the NKTP plants to adopt a NEW high-performance technology for manufacturing armored parts without trimming the longitudinal edges. Thanks to the application of the new method to one of the main armored parts of the T-34 tank (fender liner), a very significant time saving was achieved (about 36%) when cutting them out. Up to 15% savings in armor steel 8C and oxygen savings of 15,000 kb/m per 1,000 hulls have been achieved. It remains only to add that by the end of 1943, the rolling of a measuring strip for another part of the T-34 hull - the vertical of the New Board was mastered.
Rollers to the best of their ability facilitated the work of not only armored hulls, but also machining shops. Turret shoulder straps for T-34 tanks, which were manufactured in 1942-1945 at the banding mill of the Novo-Tagil Metallurgical Plant, had minimal launches. The People's Commissar for the Tank Industry V. A. Malyshev, in his order of September 28, 1943, considered it necessary to express special gratitude to the Tagil metallurgists.
AUTOMATIC WELDING
Manual welding required the highest qualifications of workers and careful preparation of parts - in particular, the machining of edges. However, at the end of 1941, enterprises that produced T-34 tanks, one after another, began to abandon the machining of welded edges due to lack of equipment. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant and Gorky Plant No. 112 were the first to do this, followed by Plant No. 183. As a result, the labor intensity of manufacturing one set of armored parts decreased from 280 machine hours at the Mariupol Plant to 62 at the Ural Tank Plant, the number of finishing jobs decreased by four times, and straight rolls by two times. In addition, after studying the fluctuations in the dimensions of parts during hardening, the workpieces were slightly changed in such a way that hardened parts are obtained within drawing requirements.
But there has always been a price to pay for simplifying technology. Having abandoned milling and gouging of welded edges, Soviet specialists had to sharply increase the strength of the weld itself, since there was a necessary backlog. Back in 1940, employees of the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Academician E. O. Paton, managed to independently recreate the method of automatic submerged arc welding, patented in 1936 by the American company Linde. The technology of the new process at the institute was handled by V. I. Dyatlov, and the equipment was developed by P. I. Sevbo. However, both the Americans and the staff of the Paton Institute used submerged arc welding to join ordinary steel parts; for armor welding, the method needed serious improvement. This is exactly what the scientists of NII-48, together with the workers of the Izhora plant, did at the beginning of 1941. By the summer, it was possible to achieve, thanks to the introduction of ferrotitanium and ferrosilicon into the flux, a consistently high quality of the welded seam of armor structures.
In parallel with the Izhora plant, automatic welding of armor under a layer of flux was introduced at the Kharkov tank plant No. 183. We do not know for sure whether employees of NII-48 or the Institute of Electric Welding took a direct part in this. It is only known for certain that the Kharkiv residents received the drawings of the machine from the Institute of Electric Welding and independently manufactured three installations of the R-72 type. One of them was launched and used to weld the sides of the T-34 tank with the bottom of the wing liner; two others were not installed before the plant was moved to Nizhny Tagil. According to the director of the plant Yu. E. Maksarev, Academician E. O. Paton was present at the test of the first Kharkov automatic machine. The new method demonstrated excellent quality: when testing the welded projectile structure with in-line shelling, it was not the seam that was broken, but the armor plate.
At Uralvagonzavod, the first automatic welding installations appeared in the spring of 1941 and were intended for welding long car seams. After the start of the war, the employees of the Institute of Electric Welding did not waste their time and by October 1941 they managed to reconfigure the R-70 installations of the carriage production for welding the sides of tanks. On November 6, 1941, V.A. Malyshev, People’s Commissar for the Tank Industry, while in Nizhny Tagil, signed Order No. the time to significantly increase the production of hulls for tanks and the lack of qualified welders at hull and tank factories, the only reliable means for ensuring the implementation of programs for hulls is the use of automatic submerged arc welding according to the method of Academician Paton, which has already proven itself and has been tested at a number of factories . I consider it necessary in the near future for all directors of hull and tank factories to seriously engage in the introduction of automatic welding for the manufacture of tank hulls.
During 1942-1943, the Electric Welding Institute, together with the armor workers of the corps department of the Ural Tank Plant Da, created a whole complex of automatic machines of various types and purposes. In 1945, UTZ used the following auto-welding machines:
- universal type for welding straight longitudinal seams;
- universal self-propelled carts:
- simplified specialized carts;
- installations for welding of circular seams at a motionless product;
- installations with a carousel for product rotation when welding circular seams;
- self-propelled units with a common drive for feeding the electrode wire and moving the head for welding seams on bulky structures.
In 1945, machine guns accounted for 23% of welding work (by weight of deposited metal) on the hull and 30% on tank turrets. The use of automatic machines made it possible already in 1942 to release 60 qualified welders at only one plant No. 183, and in 1945 - 140. A very important circumstance: the high quality of the seam in automatic welding eliminated the negative consequences of refusing mechanical processing of the edges of armor parts .
It only remains to add that in the United States, automatic submerged arc welding was used in armor production in 1944. In Germany, automatic welding machines appeared only at the very end of the war, before that only manual welding was used.
MACHINING OF PARTS
Post-war surveys of German tank factories showed not only the vastness, but also the high technical perfection of their machine park. The Germans managed to achieve a special art in the creation of special machine tools. Soviet enterprises could not boast of such wealth: the most critical equipment was not produced in the country, and back in the early 1930s it was purchased abroad, in particular, in Germany. Almost the only way out for our factories was to increase the productivity of available universal machines by introducing new tools and special adjustments. In the report cheers The Polish Tank Plant for 1942 reads: “For the manufacture of many parts, a completely new original technology and new techniques were used that were not previously used in tank building: the widespread use of multi-cut cutting, in-line milling, the widespread use of broach .... the introduction of high-performance adjustments on revolving machines and automatic machines.
At the end of 1942, the leadership of the NKTP turned to the government with a request to involve specialists from the cutting department of the Moscow State Technical University named after V.I. Bauman. They have already distinguished themselves at the factories of the People's Commissariat for Armaments by proposing a different sharpening of cutting tools. The mechanical workshops of the Ural Tank Plant were chosen as an experimental base for mastering the tool with a rational geometry of the cutting edges.
For this purpose, a team of researchers was created from local technologists, employees of the branch institute 8GSPI and, of course, representatives of the Moscow Higher Technical School. The very first months of joint work in the winter - summer of 1943 demonstrated complete success: cutters, drills and cutters had 1.6-5 times greater durability and made it possible to increase the productivity of machine tools by 25-30%. The “Guidelines on the Geometry of the Cutting Tool” developed by the scientists of the Moscow Higher Technical School and the workers of the plant were approved as mandatory telny for use at all plants of NKTP.
The Ural Tank Plant's own innovators also had a creative approach to business. In 1943 alone, the Head of the Breeze, V. A. Nauchitel, invented and for the first time in the USSR introduced a modular milling cutter with plug-in knives, engineer P. P. Yunkin created a progressive cutting broach. The use of quick-clamping and multi-point fixtures has become commonplace in the plant. Application of construct tor Nickelberg of single-pass modular broaches for the manufacture of gears increased productivity several times. Multi-spindle drilling heads have reduced the labor intensity of the drilling operation on the ≪fan>> unit by 55%. In Nizhny Tagil, technologists of the Moscow Machine Tool Plant named after V.I. Ordzhonikidze.
In 1941-1942 alone, they carried out 325 adjustments, which made it possible to launch a stable production of very important transmission and chassis parts for the T-34. In 1943, the work was continued by the tank builders on their own: the annual report states: “The simple and easy-to-maintain designs of the devices made it possible to details, to differentiate and simplify operations as much as possible. In 1943, the production received tooling of higher productivity. It has become a common requirement for technologists and manufacturers to design multi-cutting adjustments, combined dies, quick-clamping and multi-place fixtures. In total, during 1942-1943, Renault introduced 6046 tooling units and 1909 cold dies at UTZ.
Gradually, the assistance of the allies had an effect: during the years 1942-1943, high-performance machine tools became more and more widespread: special aggregate, multi-cutter and multi-spindle. Their total number by the end of 1943 increased to 227 units - against 51 in Kharkov.
FLOW AND CONVEYOR
The main advantage of the Soviet tank-building enterprises, and above all the Ural Tank Plant, was the transfer of machining and machine-assembly shops to the flow-conveyor method of work. Already in 1942, painstaking work was carried out in them to break down production operations into the simplest components accessible to almost untrained workers. Following this, the “alignment” of equipment began in the order of a sequence of operations, that is, the form of production lines. They first appeared in workshop number 184, then in workshops 119 and 110. Following the first three PRODUCTION LINES, another 64 were created in 1943, 67 in 1944, and 17 in 1945. As of January 1, 1946, 151 production lines were operating at UTZ.
About efficiency:
Production lines are illustrated by the following example: for the manufacture of the final drive gear in 1942, before the introduction of the production line, 39 machines and 70 workers were required, and in 1945, on a streamlined flow, 19 machines and 27 workers. For some particularly complex units, automatic production lines were developed. So, for processing the rear axle after welding it into the body in 1943, an automatic line of 14 units was developed and installed. With outward simplicity, this work required enormous efforts and incredible accuracy of calculations from the technologists. The UTZ report for 1943 states: ”The transition to a streamline organization of the production process required the following maximum preparation of production:
a) revision of blanks, possible rationalization and simplification of it, reduction of start-ups;
b) revision of processing technology, possible differentiation of operations in relation to the required rhythm and their simplification, designed for the use of unskilled workers;
c) standardization of technical processes and selection of the required equipment, specialized in operations and equipping it with as simple a tool as possible;
d) the layout of the equipment along the flow, ensuring the processing of the part without "loop";
e) resolving issues of technical control of the product and its location;
f) providing the production line with the minimum necessary vehicles, choosing these vehicles, organizing jobs, providing them with inventory and small-scale mechanization (tool boxes, carts, etc.).
The first stage on the way to the transition to the in-line organization of production sections and lines at our plant was the organization of machine assembly shops according to the principle of finished production. These workshops supply finished units to the main assembly conveyor. The next step was the rejection of the group arrangement of machines. With the group arrangement of equipment, the “face of the part” was lost, the beginning and end of processing was not visible, it was extremely difficult to plan the release of parts and control the schedule.
At the same time, the details made large “loops”, the cargo flow as a whole was confused, a large number of transport workers and means were required. It was not enough to arrange the machines in the order of operations. In all cases, the success of the in-line method of production was inextricably linked with the rise to a new, higher level of technology for processing parts and organizing the production site. Convey ep reigned in the assembly shops. The invention of American car builders has been used at tank factories in the USSR since the early 1930s. In particular, the first assembly line in Kharkov was created in 1932 - for the production of tanks BT-2.
In Nizhny Tagil, the T-34 tank assembly line went into operation on January 7, the second on April 1, 1942. Later, at the beginning of 1944, a reduction in the assembly cycle of machines made it possible to abandon the second conveyor and concentrate all forces on one. What was an assembly line? It was a system with discontinuous movement similar to the wagon conveyor that previously operated at UVZ with two preparation sections. At the first stage, the tank hull was mounted on stands where electrical equipment, tanks, suspension, tubes and brackets for the engine were mounted. In the second section, the hull was raised on the goats for the convenience of installing road wheels with balancers, guide wheels and front suspensions.
Further, the body on its wheels moved to the conveyor belt and was included in the moving production line. As the car moved forward, Dacha final drives, control drives, gearboxes, motor, fuel, oil and air systems, prepared outside the conveyor line, were installed on it. The entire assembly process included 8 preparatory work units carried out before the conveyor at two preparatory sections, and 35 assembly positions for work directly on the conveyor. The work of workers was facilitated by the use of electric wrenches, pneumatic machines and other means of mechanization. On the assembly line, the cars were refueled with fuel, oil and water. After adjustment, the tanks were transferred to stands for stationary testing. The closing of the machine and installation on the tracks were carried out on a separate delivery conveyor.
I must say that the conveyor assembly of tanks was known in Germany. But the conveyor in armored hull production was a purely Soviet invention and was first implemented in Nizhny Tagil - on the initiative of the plant director Yu. E. Maksarev. The order to create a conveyor for welding armored hulls was signed on December 10, 1941, but its implementation was delayed for a number of reasons. Construction was completed in early May 1942, and after a number of experiments since June 1, the conveyor has entered commercial operation.
In January 1943, the same one began to operate for assembling and welding the nose of the tank hull. In the manuscript of the book "History of tank building at the Ural Tank Plant No. 183" we find an exhaustive description of these systems: "The conveyor for welding the hulls is a normal gauge railway track with a length of 98 m. On this track there are 26 Diamond wagon bogies, having a spring coupling between them...All trolleys have the same profile for mounting the bodies in all four positions in which welding is performed. A tractor winch is installed in front of the conveyor, moving all carts simultaneously to one workplace. The front trolley, released from the body, is transferred by crane to the beginning of the conveyor and coupled with the rest of the trolleys. Conveyor rhythm 44 minutes.
The organization of work is regulated by the technological process, which provides for 4 positions of the body on the conveyor:
- Normal position
- Position on the right side.
- Position "upside down".
-Position on the left side.
Several bogies are occupied in each of the indicated positions, depending on the amount of welding work and the number of simultaneously working welders... Special places are allocated for tilting the body to the next position... The body is removed from its place, turned over on the floor by an overhead crane and placed on the next cart in the new position...
The conveyor for assembly and welding of the T-34 hull nose unit is a lattice-type metal structure carrying horizontally reinforced squares along the entire conveyor. The horizontal shelves of these squares serve as a support for rolling the KOB role, on which the infinite Gall chain rests with a step of 200 mm. The conveyor moves periodically every 44 minutes. Support channels are welded to the chain links with a pitch equal to the width of the nose, on which the nose assembly is laid. They protect the supporting structure from touching protruding parts. The technological process of assembly and welding provides for 15 operations equal in labor intensity.
RECOGNITION OF THE ALLIES
The history of the Ural Tank Plant No. 183 of the war years indisputably proves the fact that the lack of material resources is by no means an insurmountable obstacle in competition with a more powerful enemy. True, on the obligatory condition that intellectual resources are available. We will not go into excessive pathos and will give the right to a conclusion to a person who, in this respect, to the unbiased, namely the American historian Steven Zaloga:
“The Soviet philosophy of tank design was obviously focused on the creation of an inexpensive and reliable design, devoid of any embellishment. This pragmatic approach meant that the Soviet Union throughout the war was able to significantly outnumber Germany in the number of tanks built, despite a much weaker production base due to the huge losses of 1941. It was the success of industry that ensured the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II.”
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Nizhny Tagilin vuosituotanto 1946-1990.
Lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivut 72-77
-
URAL SCALE: PRODUCTION STATISTICS
The main striking force of the Soviet army was medium and then main battle tanks, supplemented until the mid-1960s by a small number of heavy class vehicles. The information below takes into account only serial armored vehicles suitable for immediate participation in hostilities, and ruthlessly discarded experimental products (the number of which sometimes exceeded hundreds of units per year), as well as engineering vehicles, rocket fighters and other products not related to to the tanks themselves.
The first table was compiled on the basis of archival data from the Ministry of Transport Engineering, which after the war included all manufacturers of medium and heavy tanks. Comparison with those published in the journal “Technology and Armament. Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow” (2008, No. 6) with materials on the number of tanks that entered service with the Soviet Army (or for army trials) for 1945-1965 shows that almost all the armored equipment built at that time was sent to the Armed Forces of the country and then from their composition to other - law enforcement agencies or abroad.
(Nizhny Tagilin sarakkeen summa on 8 254 ja oikeanpuoleisen sarakkeen summa on 18 590)
As we can see, in the re-equipment of the Armed Forces in 1946-1947 with models that were put into service and mass production back in wartime, the participation of Uralvagonzavod is not very significant. But on the other hand, in the production of machines of the first post-war generation, the role of UVZ is more than great.
If we discard 200 T-44 tanks made in 1947, it turns out that out of 14 371 T-54, IS-4 and T-10 tanks built in 1947-1956, the Nizhny Tagil plant produced 7 804 vehicles, or 54.3% of the total. It should be recalled that, in addition to UVZ, the Kharkov Plant No. 75 and the Omsk Plant No. 174 were engaged in new medium tanks, and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant worked on heavy vehicles.
What follows in our statistics is an offensive gap from 1957 to 1961. At that time, the enterprises of the industry were dismantled according to the regional councils of the national economy, so there is no ministerial statistics. Unfortunately, the plant could not be found either.
Russian documentation on defense topics: it is no longer in the UVZ archive, and it is not known to which external departments it was sent. It can only be assumed with certain certainty that the share of Uralvagonzavod in equipping the Soviet army with tanks remained at the same level as in previous years.
The following table covers the period from 1962 to 1973. Uralvagonzavod produced T-62 tanks, essentially a transitional model from a medium to main battle tank, with reinforced armor protection of a solid-cast turret and a smooth-bore gun firing powerful feathered sub-caliber projectiles. There were no other T-62 manufacturers in the country. The first small batch of 25 serial T-62s was built back in 1961.
(Huom. taulukon oikeanpuolimmaisen sarakkeen summassa on virhe: pitäisi lukea 31 616 eli kuvassa puuttuu yksi vaunu summasta)
Since factory and army accounting methods differed significantly, three columns had to be made in the table: the production of tanks at UVZ (according to factory data), the receipt of T-62 in the Soviet army and the total number of tanks received by our army (according to the Office of the Chief of Armaments (UNV) and GBTU, available at the disposal of the UVZ Museum). The discrepancies were exacerbated by the fact that equipment directly from the factory could go not only to the Ground Forces, but also to the KGB and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
So, from 1962 to 1973, Uralvagonzavod provided the Soviet army with 61.6% of all new tanks registered by UNV. The actual contribution of UVZ was even higher: a considerable number of T-55 tanks built in Omsk, although they were on the UNV lists, were intended to arm the armies of the Warsaw Pact and other allies of the USSR. In 1966-1970 alone, 2 685 vehicles were listed as such. Deliveries of T-55s abroad continued in the 1970s, until the complete cessation of production of tanks of this type at the Omsk Transport Engineering Plant in 1979.
It should be noted that in 1966 and 1969 more advanced Kharkov tanks were put into service - respectively T-64 and T-64A, the latter being considered the first main battle tank in the world. However, these were still very raw and technically unreliable machines, brought to mind just in time for the end of 1973. Therefore, in the event of a war in these years, its entire burden would fall on Tagil products.
In the first half of the 1970s, the T 64A tank managed to get rid of numerous childhood diseases, not only in relation to newly built, but also to previously produced vehicles. In 1973, Uralvagonzavod also began mass production their MBT type T-72. On them, the shortcomings of the T-64A were taken into account from the moment of design, therefore, in terms of the military-technical level, the T-72 initially surpassed their predecessors.
In 1976, the T-80 tank was adopted. According to its performance characteristics, T-80 was somewhat ahead of Tagil and Kharkov products, but it was very expensive both in production and in operation. Two factories were engaged in the production of T-80 tanks at once - the Leningrad Kirov Plant and, since 1980, the Omsk Transport Machine Building Plant. A little later, the Kharkiv plant V. A. Malysheva. The well-known and described in many books competition of three MBTs began. We propose to leave aside the improvement of designs and pay attention to the little-known figures for the production of combat vehicles.
(HUOM: T-64A / T-64B ja T-80 summat on laskettu väärin, pitäisi lukea 13 108 kpl T-64A / T-64B osalta ja 7 066 kpl T-80 osalta. Rivien tiedot on oikein mutta summat merkitty väärin näille kahdelle.)
A few clarifications to the table below of release in the USSR MBT. The first column - the production of T-72 tanks at Uralvagonzavod - is compiled on the basis of factory data and includes both vehicles for the Soviet army and those intended for export. From of all Soviet MBTs, only Tagil products were supplied abroad. The rest of the columns use UNV data. We note that ChTZ produced only modifications of the T-72 for the Soviet army, and tanks of the T-80 and T-64A and T-64B type were never delivered to other paramilitary departments in the USSR and abroad.
To summarize, Uralvagozavod produced almost half of all domestic MBTs by the end of the Soviet era - 20,574 tanks out of 41,610 units. The second half was provided by four powerful and well-known factories. Let's call them again: Leningrad Kirovsky, Kharkov plant V. A. Malysheva, Chelyabinsk Tractor and Omsk Transport Engineering Plant. But in equipping the Soviet army, the contribution of UVZ is somewhat less: 16,309 vehicles (17,831 - 1,522 Chelyabinsk vehicles = 16,309). Accordingly, out of the total number of 37,345 MBTs (17831 + 12508 + 7006) that entered service with the Soviet Army, about 43.7% fall to the share of UVZ. It's still a lot.
Along with the quantity, the pace of production is also striking. From 1978 to 1988, UVZ produced 100-125 T-72 tanks every month. The Americans, with all their efforts to re-equip their army as soon as possible on the Abrams MBT, produced an average of 70 tanks per month and only once, in October 1986, built 103 vehicles.
The principles of flow-conveyor production, fine-tuned during the years of the Great Patriotic War, enriched with more and more new technologies, once again proved their superiority. It is impossible to describe all this in a short chapter; the topic requires an extensive monograph. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to just a few examples.
-
Mitä tuosta on hyvä nähdä jos mietitään kylmän sodan aikaista vaunutuotantoa? Muutama asia numeroiden lisäksi osuu silmään:
- Nizhny Tagil oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, joten tuo yllä tarjottu lista on täydellinen niiden osalta - ei ole muita mysteereitä mitä pitää lisätä kokonaismäärään. Samoin kaikki vientiin menneet vaunut ovat pois tästä kokonaismäärästä, ei ole tehty mitään "jälkituotantoa" vientiä varten jossain muualla
- T-64 ja T-80 perheiden vaunuja ei tarjottu vientiin kylmän sodan aikana. Tämä on toki ollut kaikilla tiedossa mutta hyvä sanoa se ääneen varmuuden vuoksi.
- Chelyabinskin T-72 tuotanto oli tekstin mukaan pelkästään "modifikaatioita". Tarkka lainaus: "We note that ChTZ produced only modifications of the T-72 for the Soviet army". Tämä vaatii lisäselvityksiä mutta voisiko tuo tarkoittaa komentovaunuja eli T-72K malleja? Nizhny Tagil teki K-mallien suunnittelun T-54K, T-54AK, T-54BK ja T-55K mallien osalta, mutta se ei tarkoittanut että he tekisivät vaunuja prototyyppien jälkeen. Ainoastaan T-54BK ja T-55K ovat kaikki heidän tekoa kun taas T-55AK vaunun suunnittelun ja valmistuksen hoiti Omsk. Ei ole siis mahdoton ajatus että T-72 perheen K-vaunujen suunnittelu olisi tehty Nizhny Tagilissa mutta valmistus olisi tapahtunut Chelyabinskissä. Toisaalta ehkä he tekivät jotain muuta "modifikaatiota" - hyvä pitää mielessä, jos törmää kirjoituksiin Chelyabinskin T-72 vaunuista. Toisaalta Nizhny Tagil suunnitteli ja valmisti kaikki T-62K vaunut ja oli samalla ainoa T-62 vaunuja valmistanut tehdas. He valmistivat valtaosan T-72 vaunuista joten ehkä tämän vaunuperheen K-vaunut kuuluivat myös heille? Jos tämä pitää paikkansa niin Chelyabinskin T-72 "modifikaatiot" 80-luvulla ovat olleet jotain muuta.
- tekstissä mainittu "an offensive gap from 1957 to 1961" on harmillinen jos haluaa arvioida tehdaskohtaisia vuosituotantomääriä, mutta ei ole iso murhe jos mietitään pelkästään kokonaismääriä. Tuohon viiden vuoden aikaväliin osuus T-54A ja T-54B vaunujen tuotannon päättyminen ja T-55 vaunujen tuotannon ensimmäiset vuodet. Ei sinänsä iso asia kokonaisuuden kannalta, mutta jos tosiaan pyrkii arvioimaan tehdaskohtaisia tuotantomääriä niin tuo hieman sotkee. Puhutaan siis tähän taulukkoon punaisella merkitystä osuudesta, taulukkoon on merkitty Solyankin et. al. kirjan taulukon mukaiset vuosituotantomäärä vaunutyypeittäin:
Toisaalta se ei ole täysi mysteeri: Nizhny Tagil valmisti ensin T-54 vaunuja, sen jälkeen T-54A vaunuja, T-54B vaunuja, T-55 vaunuja ja näiden jälkeen aloittivat T-62 tuotannon. Ensimmäiset T-62 vaunut valmistettiin vuonna 1961. He olivat ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, joten T-62A ja T-62K olivat myös heidän tuotantoa. Lisäksi tiedetään että Nizhny Tagil oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-54AK, T-54BK ja T-55K komentovaunuja. Täten tuon heidän tuotannon "mustan aukon" osalta tiedetään ainakin tämä:
Tiedetään myös että he valmistivat 52 kpl T-54A vaunujen prototyyppia vuosina 1952 ja 1954 joten olisi loogista että vaunu tulisi heidän tuotantoon ensimmäisenä. Tuosta huolimatta T-54A tuli Nizhny Tagilin, Kharkovan ja Omskin tehtaiden tuotantoon samana vuonna, 1955.
Samoin tiedetään että he valmistivat 2 kpl T-55 vaunujen prototyyppiä vuonna 1957 ja että ko. vaunun tuotanto alkoi heillä 1958, kun taas Omskin ja Kharkovan tehtailla se alkoi 1959. Täten 1958 vuoden koko tuotannon pitäisi olla Nizhny Tagilin heiniä. Sen jälkeen eri tehtaiden osuuksia voi vain arvailla. Eri vaunutyypit tulivat tuotantoon eri aikoina vuotta, eivät veitsellä leikaten kalenterivuoden vaihtuessa.
Toisaalta kun katsoo heidän tuotantomäärää T-54 vaunujen osalta ja muistaa ettei T-55 ole kovin paljon monimutkaisempi, niin helppo uskoa että heidän osuus vaunujen tuotannosta oli merkittävä variantin vaihdon jälkeenkin. Nizhny Tagilin osuus T-54 tuotannosta sen loppuaikoina oli:
1952 - 57,94 %
1953 - 58,06 %
1954 - 57,32 %
Helppo siis uskoa että heidän osuus T-54A, T-54B ja T-55 tuotannosta olisi jotain tuota luokkaa - ainakin siinä vaiheessa kun tuotantolinja on saatu rullaamaan kunnolla. Heillä oli selvästi kapasiteettia tuollaiseen 1 200 - 1 500 vaunun vuosituotantoon, tosin aina uuden version myötä alku on vaikeampi ja tuotantomäärät hetken aikaa "normaalia" pienempiä.
Lähde:
Уральский вагоностроительный завод. 80 лет - С. В. Устьянцев - 2016
Ural Carriage Works: 80 years - Ustyantsev S. V. - 2016
Sivut 72-77
-
URAL SCALE: PRODUCTION STATISTICS
The main striking force of the Soviet army was medium and then main battle tanks, supplemented until the mid-1960s by a small number of heavy class vehicles. The information below takes into account only serial armored vehicles suitable for immediate participation in hostilities, and ruthlessly discarded experimental products (the number of which sometimes exceeded hundreds of units per year), as well as engineering vehicles, rocket fighters and other products not related to to the tanks themselves.
The first table was compiled on the basis of archival data from the Ministry of Transport Engineering, which after the war included all manufacturers of medium and heavy tanks. Comparison with those published in the journal “Technology and Armament. Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow” (2008, No. 6) with materials on the number of tanks that entered service with the Soviet Army (or for army trials) for 1945-1965 shows that almost all the armored equipment built at that time was sent to the Armed Forces of the country and then from their composition to other - law enforcement agencies or abroad.
(Nizhny Tagilin sarakkeen summa on 8 254 ja oikeanpuoleisen sarakkeen summa on 18 590)
As we can see, in the re-equipment of the Armed Forces in 1946-1947 with models that were put into service and mass production back in wartime, the participation of Uralvagonzavod is not very significant. But on the other hand, in the production of machines of the first post-war generation, the role of UVZ is more than great.
If we discard 200 T-44 tanks made in 1947, it turns out that out of 14 371 T-54, IS-4 and T-10 tanks built in 1947-1956, the Nizhny Tagil plant produced 7 804 vehicles, or 54.3% of the total. It should be recalled that, in addition to UVZ, the Kharkov Plant No. 75 and the Omsk Plant No. 174 were engaged in new medium tanks, and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant worked on heavy vehicles.
What follows in our statistics is an offensive gap from 1957 to 1961. At that time, the enterprises of the industry were dismantled according to the regional councils of the national economy, so there is no ministerial statistics. Unfortunately, the plant could not be found either.
Russian documentation on defense topics: it is no longer in the UVZ archive, and it is not known to which external departments it was sent. It can only be assumed with certain certainty that the share of Uralvagonzavod in equipping the Soviet army with tanks remained at the same level as in previous years.
The following table covers the period from 1962 to 1973. Uralvagonzavod produced T-62 tanks, essentially a transitional model from a medium to main battle tank, with reinforced armor protection of a solid-cast turret and a smooth-bore gun firing powerful feathered sub-caliber projectiles. There were no other T-62 manufacturers in the country. The first small batch of 25 serial T-62s was built back in 1961.
(Huom. taulukon oikeanpuolimmaisen sarakkeen summassa on virhe: pitäisi lukea 31 616 eli kuvassa puuttuu yksi vaunu summasta)
Since factory and army accounting methods differed significantly, three columns had to be made in the table: the production of tanks at UVZ (according to factory data), the receipt of T-62 in the Soviet army and the total number of tanks received by our army (according to the Office of the Chief of Armaments (UNV) and GBTU, available at the disposal of the UVZ Museum). The discrepancies were exacerbated by the fact that equipment directly from the factory could go not only to the Ground Forces, but also to the KGB and internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
So, from 1962 to 1973, Uralvagonzavod provided the Soviet army with 61.6% of all new tanks registered by UNV. The actual contribution of UVZ was even higher: a considerable number of T-55 tanks built in Omsk, although they were on the UNV lists, were intended to arm the armies of the Warsaw Pact and other allies of the USSR. In 1966-1970 alone, 2 685 vehicles were listed as such. Deliveries of T-55s abroad continued in the 1970s, until the complete cessation of production of tanks of this type at the Omsk Transport Engineering Plant in 1979.
It should be noted that in 1966 and 1969 more advanced Kharkov tanks were put into service - respectively T-64 and T-64A, the latter being considered the first main battle tank in the world. However, these were still very raw and technically unreliable machines, brought to mind just in time for the end of 1973. Therefore, in the event of a war in these years, its entire burden would fall on Tagil products.
In the first half of the 1970s, the T 64A tank managed to get rid of numerous childhood diseases, not only in relation to newly built, but also to previously produced vehicles. In 1973, Uralvagonzavod also began mass production their MBT type T-72. On them, the shortcomings of the T-64A were taken into account from the moment of design, therefore, in terms of the military-technical level, the T-72 initially surpassed their predecessors.
In 1976, the T-80 tank was adopted. According to its performance characteristics, T-80 was somewhat ahead of Tagil and Kharkov products, but it was very expensive both in production and in operation. Two factories were engaged in the production of T-80 tanks at once - the Leningrad Kirov Plant and, since 1980, the Omsk Transport Machine Building Plant. A little later, the Kharkiv plant V. A. Malysheva. The well-known and described in many books competition of three MBTs began. We propose to leave aside the improvement of designs and pay attention to the little-known figures for the production of combat vehicles.
(HUOM: T-64A / T-64B ja T-80 summat on laskettu väärin, pitäisi lukea 13 108 kpl T-64A / T-64B osalta ja 7 066 kpl T-80 osalta. Rivien tiedot on oikein mutta summat merkitty väärin näille kahdelle.)
A few clarifications to the table below of release in the USSR MBT. The first column - the production of T-72 tanks at Uralvagonzavod - is compiled on the basis of factory data and includes both vehicles for the Soviet army and those intended for export. From of all Soviet MBTs, only Tagil products were supplied abroad. The rest of the columns use UNV data. We note that ChTZ produced only modifications of the T-72 for the Soviet army, and tanks of the T-80 and T-64A and T-64B type were never delivered to other paramilitary departments in the USSR and abroad.
To summarize, Uralvagozavod produced almost half of all domestic MBTs by the end of the Soviet era - 20,574 tanks out of 41,610 units. The second half was provided by four powerful and well-known factories. Let's call them again: Leningrad Kirovsky, Kharkov plant V. A. Malysheva, Chelyabinsk Tractor and Omsk Transport Engineering Plant. But in equipping the Soviet army, the contribution of UVZ is somewhat less: 16,309 vehicles (17,831 - 1,522 Chelyabinsk vehicles = 16,309). Accordingly, out of the total number of 37,345 MBTs (17831 + 12508 + 7006) that entered service with the Soviet Army, about 43.7% fall to the share of UVZ. It's still a lot.
Along with the quantity, the pace of production is also striking. From 1978 to 1988, UVZ produced 100-125 T-72 tanks every month. The Americans, with all their efforts to re-equip their army as soon as possible on the Abrams MBT, produced an average of 70 tanks per month and only once, in October 1986, built 103 vehicles.
The principles of flow-conveyor production, fine-tuned during the years of the Great Patriotic War, enriched with more and more new technologies, once again proved their superiority. It is impossible to describe all this in a short chapter; the topic requires an extensive monograph. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to just a few examples.
-
Mitä tuosta on hyvä nähdä jos mietitään kylmän sodan aikaista vaunutuotantoa? Muutama asia numeroiden lisäksi osuu silmään:
- Nizhny Tagil oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, joten tuo yllä tarjottu lista on täydellinen niiden osalta - ei ole muita mysteereitä mitä pitää lisätä kokonaismäärään. Samoin kaikki vientiin menneet vaunut ovat pois tästä kokonaismäärästä, ei ole tehty mitään "jälkituotantoa" vientiä varten jossain muualla
- T-64 ja T-80 perheiden vaunuja ei tarjottu vientiin kylmän sodan aikana. Tämä on toki ollut kaikilla tiedossa mutta hyvä sanoa se ääneen varmuuden vuoksi.
- Chelyabinskin T-72 tuotanto oli tekstin mukaan pelkästään "modifikaatioita". Tarkka lainaus: "We note that ChTZ produced only modifications of the T-72 for the Soviet army". Tämä vaatii lisäselvityksiä mutta voisiko tuo tarkoittaa komentovaunuja eli T-72K malleja? Nizhny Tagil teki K-mallien suunnittelun T-54K, T-54AK, T-54BK ja T-55K mallien osalta, mutta se ei tarkoittanut että he tekisivät vaunuja prototyyppien jälkeen. Ainoastaan T-54BK ja T-55K ovat kaikki heidän tekoa kun taas T-55AK vaunun suunnittelun ja valmistuksen hoiti Omsk. Ei ole siis mahdoton ajatus että T-72 perheen K-vaunujen suunnittelu olisi tehty Nizhny Tagilissa mutta valmistus olisi tapahtunut Chelyabinskissä. Toisaalta ehkä he tekivät jotain muuta "modifikaatiota" - hyvä pitää mielessä, jos törmää kirjoituksiin Chelyabinskin T-72 vaunuista. Toisaalta Nizhny Tagil suunnitteli ja valmisti kaikki T-62K vaunut ja oli samalla ainoa T-62 vaunuja valmistanut tehdas. He valmistivat valtaosan T-72 vaunuista joten ehkä tämän vaunuperheen K-vaunut kuuluivat myös heille? Jos tämä pitää paikkansa niin Chelyabinskin T-72 "modifikaatiot" 80-luvulla ovat olleet jotain muuta.
- tekstissä mainittu "an offensive gap from 1957 to 1961" on harmillinen jos haluaa arvioida tehdaskohtaisia vuosituotantomääriä, mutta ei ole iso murhe jos mietitään pelkästään kokonaismääriä. Tuohon viiden vuoden aikaväliin osuus T-54A ja T-54B vaunujen tuotannon päättyminen ja T-55 vaunujen tuotannon ensimmäiset vuodet. Ei sinänsä iso asia kokonaisuuden kannalta, mutta jos tosiaan pyrkii arvioimaan tehdaskohtaisia tuotantomääriä niin tuo hieman sotkee. Puhutaan siis tähän taulukkoon punaisella merkitystä osuudesta, taulukkoon on merkitty Solyankin et. al. kirjan taulukon mukaiset vuosituotantomäärä vaunutyypeittäin:
Toisaalta se ei ole täysi mysteeri: Nizhny Tagil valmisti ensin T-54 vaunuja, sen jälkeen T-54A vaunuja, T-54B vaunuja, T-55 vaunuja ja näiden jälkeen aloittivat T-62 tuotannon. Ensimmäiset T-62 vaunut valmistettiin vuonna 1961. He olivat ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-62 vaunuja, joten T-62A ja T-62K olivat myös heidän tuotantoa. Lisäksi tiedetään että Nizhny Tagil oli ainoa tehdas joka valmisti T-54AK, T-54BK ja T-55K komentovaunuja. Täten tuon heidän tuotannon "mustan aukon" osalta tiedetään ainakin tämä:
Tiedetään myös että he valmistivat 52 kpl T-54A vaunujen prototyyppia vuosina 1952 ja 1954 joten olisi loogista että vaunu tulisi heidän tuotantoon ensimmäisenä. Tuosta huolimatta T-54A tuli Nizhny Tagilin, Kharkovan ja Omskin tehtaiden tuotantoon samana vuonna, 1955.
Samoin tiedetään että he valmistivat 2 kpl T-55 vaunujen prototyyppiä vuonna 1957 ja että ko. vaunun tuotanto alkoi heillä 1958, kun taas Omskin ja Kharkovan tehtailla se alkoi 1959. Täten 1958 vuoden koko tuotannon pitäisi olla Nizhny Tagilin heiniä. Sen jälkeen eri tehtaiden osuuksia voi vain arvailla. Eri vaunutyypit tulivat tuotantoon eri aikoina vuotta, eivät veitsellä leikaten kalenterivuoden vaihtuessa.
Toisaalta kun katsoo heidän tuotantomäärää T-54 vaunujen osalta ja muistaa ettei T-55 ole kovin paljon monimutkaisempi, niin helppo uskoa että heidän osuus vaunujen tuotannosta oli merkittävä variantin vaihdon jälkeenkin. Nizhny Tagilin osuus T-54 tuotannosta sen loppuaikoina oli:
1952 - 57,94 %
1953 - 58,06 %
1954 - 57,32 %
Helppo siis uskoa että heidän osuus T-54A, T-54B ja T-55 tuotannosta olisi jotain tuota luokkaa - ainakin siinä vaiheessa kun tuotantolinja on saatu rullaamaan kunnolla. Heillä oli selvästi kapasiteettia tuollaiseen 1 200 - 1 500 vaunun vuosituotantoon, tosin aina uuden version myötä alku on vaikeampi ja tuotantomäärät hetken aikaa "normaalia" pienempiä.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Eri vaunutyyppien määrät Neuvostoliiton asevoimilla eri sotilaspiirien (military districts) osalta 1.4.1941.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. ХХ век. 1905-1941 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2002
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905-1941 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2002
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 18.
-
The presence of armored weapons and equipment in the Red Army (as of April 1, 1941) - Table 2
-
Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunutuotannon alkuvaiheista lyhyesti, lainaus samasta Solyankin et. al. kirjasta kuin yllä oleva taulukko, tämä on sivulta 17:
For the manufacture of experimental machines in 1933, on the basis of OKMO in Leningrad, a plant named after. S.M. Kirov (since 1936 - plant No. 185). In May-June 1940, Plant No. 185 merged with Plant No. 174, and part of the designers who worked on the creation of heavy tanks were transferred to permanent work at the Kirov Plant. Of great importance for the development of the above tanks was the creation of factory tank design bureaus, which in different years were headed by such well-known chief designers as M.I. Koshkin, A.A. Morozov, Zh.Ya. Kotin, A.O. Firsov. N.N. Kozyrev, N.A. Astrov, S.A. Ginzburg, O.M. Ivanov.
In the early 30s. in the USSR were built and put into operation the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) named after. Dzerzhinsky (1930). Kharkov Tractor Plant (XT3) im. Ordzhonikidze (1931). Gorky Automobile Plant (GAZ) (1932), Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) im. Lenin (1933). Ural plant of heavy engineering Ordzhonikidze (Uralmash) in Sverdlovsk (1933). In October 1936, the Ural Carriage Works in Nizhny Tagil went into operation and was destined to play a major role during the war in the production of T-34 tanks. In addition to it, most of the plants mentioned above will also be involved in the production of tanks and self-propelled guns.
-
Taulukko Neuvostoliiton armeijalle toimitetuista panssarivaunuista toisen maailmansodan aikaan.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 30.
Huomaa että tästä puuttuvat rynnäkkötykit (self-propelled guns) ja jos vertaat tätä aikaisemman viestini taulukkoon, niin tämän takaraja on eri ja siitä syystä vuoden 1945 valmistusmäärät ovat hieman suuremmat. Edellisen viestini taulukossa takaraja oli heinäkuun 1. päivä 1945 kun taas tässä taulukossa se on syyskuun 1. päivä 1945. Tässä on siis sodan päättymistä seuranneiden kahden kuukauden tuotanto mukana.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. ХХ век. 1905-1941 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2002
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. 1905-1941 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2002
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 18.
-
The presence of armored weapons and equipment in the Red Army (as of April 1, 1941) - Table 2
-
Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunutuotannon alkuvaiheista lyhyesti, lainaus samasta Solyankin et. al. kirjasta kuin yllä oleva taulukko, tämä on sivulta 17:
For the manufacture of experimental machines in 1933, on the basis of OKMO in Leningrad, a plant named after. S.M. Kirov (since 1936 - plant No. 185). In May-June 1940, Plant No. 185 merged with Plant No. 174, and part of the designers who worked on the creation of heavy tanks were transferred to permanent work at the Kirov Plant. Of great importance for the development of the above tanks was the creation of factory tank design bureaus, which in different years were headed by such well-known chief designers as M.I. Koshkin, A.A. Morozov, Zh.Ya. Kotin, A.O. Firsov. N.N. Kozyrev, N.A. Astrov, S.A. Ginzburg, O.M. Ivanov.
In the early 30s. in the USSR were built and put into operation the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (STZ) named after. Dzerzhinsky (1930). Kharkov Tractor Plant (XT3) im. Ordzhonikidze (1931). Gorky Automobile Plant (GAZ) (1932), Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) im. Lenin (1933). Ural plant of heavy engineering Ordzhonikidze (Uralmash) in Sverdlovsk (1933). In October 1936, the Ural Carriage Works in Nizhny Tagil went into operation and was destined to play a major role during the war in the production of T-34 tanks. In addition to it, most of the plants mentioned above will also be involved in the production of tanks and self-propelled guns.
-
Taulukko Neuvostoliiton armeijalle toimitetuista panssarivaunuista toisen maailmansodan aikaan.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 30.
Huomaa että tästä puuttuvat rynnäkkötykit (self-propelled guns) ja jos vertaat tätä aikaisemman viestini taulukkoon, niin tämän takaraja on eri ja siitä syystä vuoden 1945 valmistusmäärät ovat hieman suuremmat. Edellisen viestini taulukossa takaraja oli heinäkuun 1. päivä 1945 kun taas tässä taulukossa se on syyskuun 1. päivä 1945. Tässä on siis sodan päättymistä seuranneiden kahden kuukauden tuotanto mukana.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Saksan panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 34.
Tank production in Germany from 1 July 1941 to 1 March 1945
tank brands are indicated in accordance with the B. Muller-Gillebrand reference
book Note: Production of type III tanks with a 75-mm gun begins in January 1942 (January - 64 vehicles, February - 156). since March, the production of tanks with
a 50-mm cannon has ceased; production of type IV tanks with a long-barreled gun (L43/48) begins in April 1942.
-
Iso-Britannian panssarivaunutuotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana, aikaväli 1940-1944.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 36.
Production of British infantry and cruiser tanks in 1940 - 1944
Google Lens -käännös selventää rivien tekstiä:
.
Yhdysvaltain vaunutuotanto, kokonaismäärät aikavälillä 1.7.1941 - 31.7.1945.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 38.
US tank production from 1 July 1941 to 31 July 1945
Google Lens -käännös selventää rivien merkitystä:
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 34.
Tank production in Germany from 1 July 1941 to 1 March 1945
tank brands are indicated in accordance with the B. Muller-Gillebrand reference
book Note: Production of type III tanks with a 75-mm gun begins in January 1942 (January - 64 vehicles, February - 156). since March, the production of tanks with
a 50-mm cannon has ceased; production of type IV tanks with a long-barreled gun (L43/48) begins in April 1942.
-
Iso-Britannian panssarivaunutuotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana, aikaväli 1940-1944.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 36.
Production of British infantry and cruiser tanks in 1940 - 1944
Google Lens -käännös selventää rivien tekstiä:
.
Yhdysvaltain vaunutuotanto, kokonaismäärät aikavälillä 1.7.1941 - 31.7.1945.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 38.
US tank production from 1 July 1941 to 31 July 1945
Google Lens -käännös selventää rivien merkitystä:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
T-34-76, T-34-85 ja T-44 panssarivaunujen kuukausituotanto eri tehtaiden mukaan jaettuna aikavälillä 1.7.1941 - 1.6.1945.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 140-141.
Release of medium tanks during the Great Patriotic War from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945
* - the denominator indicates the number of flamethrower tanks fired in excess of the number of linear tanks indicated in
** - the numerator: no data
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 140-141.
Release of medium tanks during the Great Patriotic War from July 1, 1941 to June 1, 1945
* - the denominator indicates the number of flamethrower tanks fired in excess of the number of linear tanks indicated in
** - the numerator: no data
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Raskaiden KV vaunujen kuukausituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko on kirjan sivulta 210.
Huomaa että vuoden 1941 aikana valmistavia tehtaita olisi kaksi, tästä syystä rivejä on kaksi. Hyvä myös muistaa että KV-1 vaunuja valmistettiin 141 kpl vuonna 1940 ja 1 121 kpl vuonna 1941. KV-2 vaunuja valmistettiin 102 kpl vuonna 1940 ja 232 kpl vuonna 1941.
Production of serial KV tanks during the Great Patriotic War
* - in the denominator of the issued flamethrower tanks are indicated:
** - with turrets from the KV-1 tank mod. 1941
-
Raskaiden IS-1, IS-2 ja IS-3 vaunujen kuukausituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana aikavälillä 1.10.1943 - 1.9.1945 (huom. IS-3 tuotanto jatkui sodan jälkeen 1945-1946 ajan).
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 216.
The number of serial IS tanks produced from 1.10.1943 to 1.9.1945
-
Rynnäkkötykkien vuosituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 291.
Release of self-propelled artillery mounts 1.07.1941 - 01.06.1945
* - one installation with a 45-mm anti-tank gun, taking into
** - account the manufacture of a pilot installation
Tehtaiden nimien selitys Google Lens käännöksellä:
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko on kirjan sivulta 210.
Huomaa että vuoden 1941 aikana valmistavia tehtaita olisi kaksi, tästä syystä rivejä on kaksi. Hyvä myös muistaa että KV-1 vaunuja valmistettiin 141 kpl vuonna 1940 ja 1 121 kpl vuonna 1941. KV-2 vaunuja valmistettiin 102 kpl vuonna 1940 ja 232 kpl vuonna 1941.
Production of serial KV tanks during the Great Patriotic War
* - in the denominator of the issued flamethrower tanks are indicated:
** - with turrets from the KV-1 tank mod. 1941
-
Raskaiden IS-1, IS-2 ja IS-3 vaunujen kuukausituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana aikavälillä 1.10.1943 - 1.9.1945 (huom. IS-3 tuotanto jatkui sodan jälkeen 1945-1946 ajan).
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 216.
The number of serial IS tanks produced from 1.10.1943 to 1.9.1945
-
Rynnäkkötykkien vuosituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 291.
Release of self-propelled artillery mounts 1.07.1941 - 01.06.1945
* - one installation with a 45-mm anti-tank gun, taking into
** - account the manufacture of a pilot installation
Tehtaiden nimien selitys Google Lens käännöksellä:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Neuvostoliiton liekinheitinpanssarivaunujen vuosituotanto toisen maailmansodan aikana, jaettu valmistaville tehtaille sekä vaunutyypittäin.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 379.
Production of flamethrower tanks during the Great Patriotic War
1 - of which 77 tanks with a radio station:
2 - all tanks with a radio station;
3 - one tank with an ATO-41 flamethrower, the rest with ATO-42, of which 71 tanks with a radio station; without
* - taking into account several dozen OT-130 (OT-133) flamethrower tanks, produced by plant No. 174 from the available stock in September-October 1941.
Tehtaiden nimien selitykset Google Lens käännöksellä:
-
T-34-85 tehdaskohtaiset tuotantomäärät vuonna 1946, vuoden tuotanto esitetty vuosineljännesten osalta.
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 207.
Vuosi 1946 oli viimeinen vuosi jolloin T-34-85 oli tuotannossa Neuvostoliitossa, T-44 tuotanto päättyi vuonna 1947 mutta sama vuotena Nizhny Tagil valmisti ensimmäiset 22 kpl T-54 vaunuja ja niiden massatuotanto alkoi sitä seuraavana vuotena 1948 kolmen tehtaan voimin: Nizhny Tagil, Kharkova ja Omsk.
Production of T-34-85 tanks in 1946
-
Keskiraskaiden panssarivaunujen tuotantomäärät aikavälillä 1945-1965.
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 207.
Huomaa valmistaneiden tehtaiden sarake joka selventää mikä tehdas teki mitäkin variantteja, tosin T-54A, T-54B ja T-55 vuosituotantomäärien osalta ei ole jakoa Kharkovan, Nizhny Tagilin ja Omskin osuuksiin. Paremman tiedon puutteessa näitä voi vain arvailla. Tosin T-54 variantin osalta kunkin tehtaan vuosituotantomäärät on merkitty, joten siitä saanee ainakin oikeansuuntaista skaalaa - toki vaihtelua on aina, vuodet eivät ole identtisiä.
Production of medium tanks in 1945-1965
* - Of these, 96 combat training.
Lähde:
Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век. Том 2. 1941-1945 - А.Г. Солянкин, М.В. Павлов, И.В. Павлов, И.Г. Желтов - 2005
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 2. 1941-1945 - Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. - 2005
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 379.
Production of flamethrower tanks during the Great Patriotic War
1 - of which 77 tanks with a radio station:
2 - all tanks with a radio station;
3 - one tank with an ATO-41 flamethrower, the rest with ATO-42, of which 71 tanks with a radio station; without
* - taking into account several dozen OT-130 (OT-133) flamethrower tanks, produced by plant No. 174 from the available stock in September-October 1941.
Tehtaiden nimien selitykset Google Lens käännöksellä:
-
T-34-85 tehdaskohtaiset tuotantomäärät vuonna 1946, vuoden tuotanto esitetty vuosineljännesten osalta.
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 207.
Vuosi 1946 oli viimeinen vuosi jolloin T-34-85 oli tuotannossa Neuvostoliitossa, T-44 tuotanto päättyi vuonna 1947 mutta sama vuotena Nizhny Tagil valmisti ensimmäiset 22 kpl T-54 vaunuja ja niiden massatuotanto alkoi sitä seuraavana vuotena 1948 kolmen tehtaan voimin: Nizhny Tagil, Kharkova ja Omsk.
Production of T-34-85 tanks in 1946
-
Keskiraskaiden panssarivaunujen tuotantomäärät aikavälillä 1945-1965.
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 207.
Huomaa valmistaneiden tehtaiden sarake joka selventää mikä tehdas teki mitäkin variantteja, tosin T-54A, T-54B ja T-55 vuosituotantomäärien osalta ei ole jakoa Kharkovan, Nizhny Tagilin ja Omskin osuuksiin. Paremman tiedon puutteessa näitä voi vain arvailla. Tosin T-54 variantin osalta kunkin tehtaan vuosituotantomäärät on merkitty, joten siitä saanee ainakin oikeansuuntaista skaalaa - toki vaihtelua on aina, vuodet eivät ole identtisiä.
Production of medium tanks in 1945-1965
* - Of these, 96 combat training.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Raskaiden IS-4 ja IS-4M vaunujen tuotantomäärät heti toisen maailmansodan jälkeen, merkitty vuosineljännesten tuotannon mukaan (taulukossa esitetty tämän vaunutyypin tuotannon koko elinkaari).
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 360.
Production of IS-4 tanks at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant
Google Lens -käännös selventää rivien tekstiä:
-
Raskaiden T-10 vaunujen vuosituotanto kylmän sodan alkupuolella (taulukossa esitetty tämän vaunutyypin tuotannon koko elinkaari).
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 391.
Production of heavy tanks of the T-10 series
* - Experienced and control tanks "Object 730" and IS-8.
Huomaa tuotannon jaottelu tehtaiden osalta, Google Lens -käännös:
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 360.
Production of IS-4 tanks at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant
Google Lens -käännös selventää rivien tekstiä:
-
Raskaiden T-10 vaunujen vuosituotanto kylmän sodan alkupuolella (taulukossa esitetty tämän vaunutyypin tuotannon koko elinkaari).
Lähde:
Отечественные Бронированные Машины ХХ век Том 3: 1946-1965 - А.Г. Солянкин, И.Г. Желтов, К.Н. Кудряшов - 2010
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century. Volume 3. 1946-1965 - Solyankin A.G., Zheltov I.G., Kudryashov K.N. - 2010
Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 391.
Production of heavy tanks of the T-10 series
* - Experienced and control tanks "Object 730" and IS-8.
Huomaa tuotannon jaottelu tehtaiden osalta, Google Lens -käännös:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Pohdintaa Neuvostoliiton romahtamista seuranneesta tuotantomäärien rajusta laskusta ja 90-luvun tuotannosta.
Tässä on taulukko jossa viitataan CFE-sopimuksen ilmoituksiin. Vuoden 1991 tiedot ovat Neuvostoliiton mutta 1992 alkaen Venäjän vaunumääriä Uralin länsipuolella. Näiden vuosien erotus, siitä osa on mahdollisesti siirretty Uralin itäpuolelle (massiiviset siirrot ennen CFE sopimuksen allekirjoittamista vuosina 1989 ja 1990) mutta iso määrä jäi myös Ukrainalle, Valko-Venäjälle yms. maille Neuvostoliiton hajottua. Neuvostoliitto siirsi suuren määrän kalustoa Uralin itäpuolelle ennen sopimuksen allekirjoittamista, mikä vääristää ilmoituksista saatavan tiedon arvoa. Huom. Neuvostoliitto hajosi virallisesti 26 joulukuuta 1991 joten vuoden uusien panssarivaunujen tuotanto valmistui kokonaisuudessaan, mutta vuodesta 1992 alkaen meni nopeasti hyvin vaikeaksi.
Steve Zaloga on kirjoittanut Ukrainan Kharkovan tehtaan tilanteesta näin:
Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up.
Tässä hän kirjoittaa Venäjän tilanteesta vuonna 1992:
In 1992, the Russian Army ordered only 20 tanks: 5 T-80U tanks from Omsk and 15 tanks from Nizhni-Tagil. Tank production at Omsk and Nizhni-Tagil in 1992–93 was well beyond the puny state orders due to some export orders, but only a pale shadow of the 1980s. This additional production was not ordered by the Russian Army, but undertaken simply to keep the plants from closing. There was the hope that large export orders would emerge to save the plants and sop up this surplus. However the anticipated export orders did not materialize.
Tankograd blogi on kirjoittanut Nizhny Tagilin 90-luvun alun tuotannosta näin (tosin hän ei tarjoa numerolle lähdettä):
From 1973 to 1990, a total of 18,373 T-72 tanks and T-72 derivatives were manufactured at the UVZ factory floor and another 1,600 tanks were manufactured from 1991 to 1996. LÄHDE
Zaloga kirjoittaa 80-luvun lopun rajusta alamäestä näin:
The Soviet Union had five tank plants in 1980 but only three remained active by 1991. After the Soviet collapse, only two remained inside the Russian Federation. Annual tank production plummeted from 3,254 in 1987 to 1,000 in 1991 and fell rapidly after that. The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991.
Olen hieman kahden vaiheilla T-80UD osalta. Zalogan muista kirjoituksista voi tulkita että Kharkovan tehdas valmisti 800 T-80UD panssarivaunua vuoteen 1991 mennessä. Toisaalta lainaamassani tekstissä sanotaan aika selvästi että he olisivat valmistaneet 800 kpl T-80UD vaunuja vuonna 1991. Toisaalta tuo sopisi aika huonosti yhteen sen tiedon kanssa että vuoden 1991 kokonaistuotanto olisi ollut 1 000 vaunua, en usko että Kharkovan osuus olisi ollut 80%. Nizhny Tagil on vuosi toisensa jälkeen valmistanut noin 55% vuosituotannosta. Muistan lukeneeni jossain että Omsk ei olisi valmistanut yhtäkään T-80 vaunua vuonna 1991, joten tuo 1 000 vaunun osuus sisältäisi vain Kharkovan T-80UD ja Nizhny Tagilin T-72B, T-72B1 ja T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja, nämä jossakin suhteessa. Ehkä muistan väärin, saattoi olla niinkin että Kirovin tehdas ei valmistanut T-80 vaunuja vuonna 1991 mutta Omsk teki jonkin määrän.
Tankogradin väite siitä että Nizhny Tagil valmisti 1 600 panssarivaunua aikavälillä 1991 - 1996 kuulostaa hurjan suurelta, kun huomioidaan että Venäjän valtio ei tilannut uusia vaunuja juuri ollenkaan koko 90-luvun aikana. Toisaalta kirjoitukset siitä että tehdas valmisti vaunuja pihalle odottamaan potentiaalisia ulkomaan tilauksia ovat loogisia, se oli ainoa keino pitää tehtaalla valot päällä ja ihmiset töissä. Omsk teki samaa. Kharkovan tehdas ei siihen kyennyt, koska oli riippuvainen tiettyjen komponenttien tuomisesta Venäjältä ja nämä materiaalivirrat kuivuivat nopeasti.
Nizhny Tagil valmisti 1 600 vaunua kuudessa vuodessa 90-luvun alun kaaoksessa? Keskiarvo olisi 267 vaunua per vuosi, tosin veikkaan että todellisuudessa valtaosa olisi näiden vuosien alkupään tuotantoa ja sitä seuraisi raju lasku.
Nizhny Tagilin vuosituotanto 80-luvun lopussa:
1985 - 1 559
1986 - 1 530
1987 - 1 534
1988 - 1 503
1989 - 933
1990 - 776
Zaloga on kirjoittanut 80-luvun lopusta näin:
Soviet tank production continued to decline in the late 1980s due to Gorbachev's attempts to rein in defense spending. The original 1989 plan had been for 3,739 T-80 and T-72 tanks, but this was cut back to 1,530 tanks, and the 1990 plan cut to 1,445 tanks.
Tilastoista tiedetään että vuonna 1989 Neuvostoarmeijalle toimitettiin 1 600 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja, joista 890 kpl T-72 vaunuja (55,625%) ja 710 kpl T-80 vaunuja (44,375%). Vuonna 1990 toimitettiin 1 404 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja, joista 774 kp T-72 vaunuja (55,13%) ja 630 kpl T-80 vaunuja (44,82%).
Tuon perusteella voisi arvata että vuoden 1991 osalta, jos tuo Zalogan tieto 1 000 kpl uudesta vaunusta pitäisi paikkansa, niin niistä 55% voisi olla T-72 vaunuja ja 45% voisi olla T-80 vaunuja. Tämä tarkoittaisi 550 kpl T-72 vaunuja ja 450 kpl T-80 vaunuja.
Jos katsoo Tankogradin väitettä tässä valossa, niin se tarkoittaisi että Nizhny Tagil valmisti 1 050 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja aikavälillä 1992-1996. Keskiarvo olisi 210 vaunua per vuosi.
Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoittaa kirjassa "Уральский вагоностроительный завод 80 лет" sivulla 124 näin (julkaistu vuonna 2016):
According to the open press, the production of tanks for the Russian army in 1992 amounted to 600 vehicles, in 1993 - 150, 1994 - 60 and in 1995 - 50 units. Then the orders stopped.
Voi toki kysyä, ovatko tämän "open press" lähteen tiedot oikeat. Oma arvaus: tuo voi pitää paikkansa, ainakin tuollainen raju lasku vuosien 1992 ja 1993 aikana sekä huomattavan pienet määrät sen jälkeen. Tuossa puhutaan Venäjän armeijalle tulleista vaunuista, joten hyvä muistaa että Nizhny Tagil ja Omsk molemmat valmistivat vaunuja pihoille odottamaan tilauksia. Toisten lähteiden mukaan Venäjän armeijan tilaukset kutistuivat hyvin pieniksi jo vuonna 1992 joten tuo "open press" numero voi kertoa myös todellisista valmistusmääristä vaikkei niitä kaikkia olisikaan luovutettu Venäjän armeijalle - tai armeija ei ottanut vastaan. Vuoden 1991 jälkeen Venäjällä oli kaksi panssarivaunuja valmistavaa tehdasta: Nizhny Tagil ja Omsk, oletan että nuo määrät olisivat näiden kahden tehtaan tuotanto yhteensä.
Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoittaa kirjassa "Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72" sivulla 122 näin (julkaistu vuonna 2004):
The crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a severe impact on Uralvagonzavod, as, indeed, on all major enterprises in the country. The main consumer of wagons and tanks, which came off the factory conveyors in a continuous stream, disappeared. The factory managers did not master the art of selling their products on the free market.
The forthcoming reduction in the production of tanks was known in advance, but no one could guess its size: the state order for combat vehicles in 1990 was 51% of the 1988 level and continued to fall in subsequent years. In 1992, the volume of production of military equipment at the plant amounted to approximately 25%, and in 1994 only 2.15% of the stable level of 1986. During the 1990s there were periods when the state did not order a single tank at all. At the same time, the system of foreign arms supplies in the late 1980s also broke up, in connection with which, by 1991, a significant pair of unsold tanks accumulated in the warehouses of UVZ.
Ustyantsev S.V. ja Komalkov D. (Uralvagonzavodin pääsuunnittelija) antavat taulukon Nizhny Tagilin tuotannosta kirjassa "Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков" sivulla 172 (julkaistu vuonna 2013):
Aikaisemman lainauksen perusteella "the volume of production of military equipment at the plant (Nizhny Tagil)" voitaisiin laskea tämän taulukon avulla:
Vuoden 1992 määrä:
1 530 + 19 + 70 + 11 + 105 + 76 = 1 811
1 811 x 0,25 = 453
Vuoden 1994 määrä:
1 530 + 19 + 70 + 11 + 105 + 76 = 1 811
1 811 x 0,0215 = 39
Tietyt lähteet kirjoittavat että tehtaat tekivät valmiiksi Neuvostoliiton aikaiset tilaukset ja sitten kun uusia ei kuulunut, tekivät jonkin verran "omaan laskuun" eli tehtaan pihalle odottamaan. Ustyantsevin kirjoituksista voisi päätellä että "pihalle jääneet vaunut" olisi valmistettu pääasiassa vuosien 1992 ja 1993 aikana ja että tuotanto olisi jatkunut hyvin pienimuotoisena sen jälkeen.
On mahdollista nähdä tuo 90-luvun alun tuotanto vanhojen tilausten valmiiksi tekemisenä, mikä voi selittää väitteet siitä että tuotanto olisi jatkunut 1995 asti ja vaunut menneet "Venäjän armeijalle" vaikka samalla tiedetään ettei uusia tilauksia juurikaan tullut 1992 jälkeen.
Zaloga kirjoittaa 90-luvun alun tilanteesta näin:
The UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil had about 350 T-72S and T-90 tanks in its factory yards, and Omsk had 150−200 T-80U tanks.
Tuossakin Nizhny Tagilin osuus on 63,6-70% "pihalle jääneistä vaunuista" eli selvästi yli puolet, tämäkin olisi linjassa kylmän sodan aikaisten vuosituotannon osuuksien kanssa, vaikka onkin "tyypillistä suurempi osuus" (heidän osuus oli yleensä 55% tienoilla), tosin Kharkovan tehdas jäi pois joten Nizhny Tagilin osuus on suurempi jo pelkästään sen takia.
Osa Venäjän 90-luvulla tehdystä panssarivaunujen vientikaupasta oli uusia vaunuja, osa "armeijan varastoista". Sama koski Ukrainaa, Valko-Venäjää, Puolaa ja muita entisiä Varsovan liiton maita: monet niistä dumppasivat varastovaunuja markkinoille, osalle löytyi ostaja ja osalle ei, osa päätyi sulatukseen, osa "jonnekin varastoon", todennäköisesti pihalle seisomaan tuuleen ja sateeseen.
Virallisten numeroiden puuttuessa menee arvailuksi, mutta arvaan silti että vuodet 1992 ja 1993 ovat todennäköisesti olleet Nizhny Tagilin osalta "viimeiset normaalit vuodet" jolloin on tehty useampi sata vaunua, jos ei muuten niin tuotantolinja tyhjäksi ja yritetty pitää tehdas hengissä. Arvaan että tämän jälkeen tehdas on ollut käytänössä kiinni, varmasti valmistettu joitakin vaunuja per vuosi muttei mitään merkittävää määrää. Zaloga kirjoittaa että tehtaan henkilöstö osoitti mieltä maksamattomien palkkojen takia heinäkuussa 1995.
Jos spekuloidaan edellisten numeroiden avulla, niin on mahdollista että Neuvostoliiton ja Venäjän panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto aikavälillä 1985 - 1995 on voinut mennä näin (tai tässä skaalassa - vuosi 1990 on viimeinen jolta olen nähnyt virallisen tilaston):
1985 - 3 162
1986 - 3 245
1987 - 3 254
1988 - 2 815
1989 - 1 858
1990 - 1 406
1991 - 1 000
1992 - 600
1993 - 150
1994 - 10-60 ?
1995 - 10-50 ?
Pitää muistaa että Venäjän armeijalle hankittiin alkuperäiset T-90 obr 1992 vaunut 90-luvulla. Zalogan arvion mukaan näitä olisi hankittu 120kpl, Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoittaa kirjassa "Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72" (julkaistu vuonna 2004):
We we do not have exact data on how many of these machines were built and delivered to the Russian armed forces, but it is obvious that, by Soviet standards, very few. It is reported in the open press that by 2000 the ground forces had less than 200 T-90 tanks concentrated in two Siberian divisions.
Olen taipuvainen uskomaan Zalogan arvion vaunujen määrästä, hänen kirjasta "T-90 Standard Tank The First Tank of the New Russia" sivulta 8 lainaten:
The first tank of an initial low-rate production batch was ready on September 30, 1992, and by the end of the year 13 T-90 tanks had been assembled. Supply of the Agava-2 thermal imaging sight was a problem due to the low output of the device as well as its extremely high cost. In the event, only two of the original batch of tanks received this sight, the remainder receiving the cheaper Buran-PA night sight. The basic T-90 was followed on the assembly floor in March 1994 by the T-90K command tank. This version had additional radio equipment fitted including the R-163-50 transceiver, a special 4-meter antenna, a navigation aid, and an AB1-P28.5 auxiliary power unit. In general, about 5 percent of Russian tanks were built in the command tank configuration. Total T-90 production in 1992 to 1994 was about 105 tanks.
-
Tiedetään myös että samaan aikaan valmisteltiin vientiversio T-90S jossa oli alunperin valettu torni (kuten oli kaikissa Neuvostoliiton / Venäjän vaunuissa ennen T-90A vaunuja), mutta se ei löytänyt ostajaa 90-luvulla, vaan vasta 2000-luvun alussa kun Intia ja Algeria ostivat vaunuja. Valettujen tornien valmistaminen ei ollut enää mahdollista konkurssien takia, joten joutuivat suunnittelemaan uuden hitsatun tornin (kuten joutui myös Kharkovan tehdas Ukrainassa, heidän valutornit tulivat alunperin Mariupolin tehtaalta vaan sielläkin valaminen ei ollut enää mahdollista).
Edelleen samasta Ustyantsev S.V. kirjasta "Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72" lainaten, sivuilta 134-135:
By 1996, the welded tower had been worked out, as well as the technology for its production. However, the plant at that time had no orders for the Russian army. Therefore, the T-90S tanks, manufactured in 2000-2003, became the first serial modification of the "ninetieth" with a welded turret. under an Indian contract.
Welded turret No. 1, manufactured in September 1998, was installed on one of the three T-90Ss that were being prepared for run tests in India; at the end of December 2001, their mass production began.
-
Today there is no need to hide that the potential of tank production in Nizhny Tagil in the 1990s. was saved mainly through exports. Unfortunately, the main merit in this belongs to non-specialized state organizations, and to the manufacturers themselves Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM. Of course, state control over arms sales is quite understandable and natural, just like state regulation of relations between domestic arms manufacturers.
Government officials have two tasks: to prevent the supply of weapons to states and structures that pose a real or potential danger to the interests of the Russian Federation, and to create conditions for the sale of Russian-made weapons to neutral or allied countries. In reality, unfortunately, it sometimes turns out quite differently. If we turn to the book of one of the leaders of the state Noy company "Rosvooruzhenie" in the 1990s. BN Kuzyk "Behind the Scenes of a Breakthrough: Russia in the Arms Markets", one might think that Russia has only one T-80U tank. He is mentioned dozens of times, whole pages of descriptions are devoted to the "eighties". For comparison: the T-90 tank is assigned one line [24].
Moreover, Moscow officials actively prevented the T-90S from entering the world market. Uralvagonzavod was ready to exhibit its latest products at the 1993 international arms exhibition in the United Arab Emirates, but the Department of Defense Industry allowed only the T-72S to be displayed. It was not possible to bring the newest Tagil tank and the T-80U into open competition. And then for another five years, the export model of the T-90-T-90S tank, which was allowed for sale abroad, which was in service with the Russian army, was not allowed to participate in world arms exhibitions. And when Uralvagonzavod nevertheless managed in 1997 to obtain permission to demonstrate the T-90S at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi, then one of the bureaucrats "forgot" to provide information about the Tagil car to the organizers of the exhibition. As a result, the T-90 tank, which was actually shown at the IDEX'97 exhibition, was never included in its official program [25].
The first thought that comes to mind is that everything that happened is explained by the desire of the employees of Rosvooruzhenie to maintain the production of more promising, from their point of view, gas turbine tanks - even at the expense of Uralvagonzavod. One may disagree with such a position, but it is still a position. Moreover, the same B.N. Kuzyk writes that the main goal of "Rosvooruzhenie" was: "... not to let the military-industrial complex die, the center of the country's intellectual and industrial power, to keep the work of millions of highly qualified specialists, to raise from their knees the regions that are completely dependent on the state of affairs in the military-industrial complex" [26].
In words, Everything is logical, but in reality ... In the open press, in particular, M. Baryatinsky's brochure "Tank T-80" reports that the deliveries of "eighties" abroad were made from the Armed Forces [27] and, accordingly, they were not intended to preserve tank production at the Omsk transport engineering plant. There was a frank sale of the Soviet heritage, which had the sole purpose of making an immediate profit. In combination with the lack of orders for the Russian army, this led to the fact that tanks of the T-80 type have not been SERIALLY PRODUCED FOR 10 YEARS!
-
Kirja on julkaistu vuonna 2004 ja Ustyantsev S.V. on eräänlainen Uralvagonzavodin historioitsija, joten pienellä varauksella pitää suhtautua hänen kirjoituksiin. Lisäksi hyvä muistaa että T-80 vaunuperheestä tai Kirovin ja Omskin tehtaista ei ole kirjoitettu kunnon kattavaa historiikkia, joten tämä puoli tarinasta on (ainakin osaksi) kertomatta. Joka tapauksessa Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoituksen perusteella Omsk ei olisi valmistanut uusia T-80U vaunuja kymmeneen vuoteen eli viimeiset olisivat vuodelta 1993 tai 1994. Tuo on toisaalta helppo uskoa: minun aikaisemmasta viestistä löytyy Kommersantin julkaisema vientitaulukko LINKKI
Jos katsoo Kommersantin taulukkoa vuosien 1992-2012 viennistä niin T-80U on viety tasan kolmeen maahan: 1 kpl lahjoitettu Iso-Britannialle hyväntahdoneleenä vuonna 1992, 41 kpl Kyprokselle 1996-1997 ja 35 kpl Etelä-Korealle 1996 ja 2005. Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa kirjassaan "T-80 Standard Tank The Soviet Armys Last Armored Champion" että Etelä-Korealle olisi myyty 80 kpl, mutta oletan sen olevan virhe. Lainaus ko. kirjasta sivuilta 34-35:
A handful of export orders for the T-80U did materialize, though they were fulfilled mostly by using undelivered inventory from the Omsk plant. Morocco acquired about five T-80 tanks in the late 1980s, ostensibly for testing for a future tank requirement; it is widely believed that they ended up in the hands of US, British, and German intelligence agencies. Russia sold Britain one T-80U in 1992 as a goodwill gesture connected with President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Britain in 1992. Sweden evaluated the T-80U for its tank competition starting in 1993, but finally settled on the Leopard 2. The Russian government owed South Korea a substantial amount of money from the Soviet period, and partly paid these debts through the sale of military equipment. The Republic of Korea Army received about 80 T-80U tanks
from 1996 to 2005. These are used primarily by "opposing forces" units for training. Cyprus acquired 41 T-80U tanks, including 14 of the new T-80UK command tanks in 1996-97.
Omsk attempted to reinvigorate international interest in the T-80 by more elaborate improvements, including active protection systems as detailed below. Export sales were too small to keep the Omsk tank plant busy, and in spite of a few small state orders for tank rebuilding, the plant went bankrupt in 2006. At the time of writing, the Russian government planned to consolidate the tank business around Uralvagon in Nizhni-Tagil, with Omsk assigned tank rebuilding efforts as well as some design work. The Russian Army began to fund upgrades for its aging T-80 fleet in the 2007 defense budget.
Toisen lähteen mukaan alunperin keskusteltiin 80 kpl T-80U vaunun antamisesta (velkojen kattamiseksi) mutta määrä supistui 35 kpl: LÄHDE
The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the impoverishment of the new Russian Federation made it impossible for Moscow to repay the loans in cash.
The Russian Federation began supplying tanks, combat vehicles, military helicopters, and other defense equipment to the South Korean armed forces as partial payment of the $2 billion debt to the ROK that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.
Under their terms, Russia provided the ROK armed forces with Soviet-era T-80U main battle tanks, METIS-M anti-tank missiles, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Kamov Ka-32 transport helicopters, and Murena-E hovercraft. Although South Korea had originally planned to purchase 80 tanks, the ROK ended up buying only 35 T-80U tanks. South Korea also received 70 BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles from Russia.
Zalogan mukaan Omskin pihalla oli 150−200 kpl T-80U vaunuja kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeisinä vuosina, joten vienti ei riittänyt edes tyhjentämään tehtaan pihaa. Ukrainan T-80UD pärjäsi vähän paremmin ja solmivat ison kaupan Pakistanin kanssa 90-luvun lopulla (tämä puolestaan sai Intian ostamaan suuren määrän T-90S ja myöhemmin T-90A vaunuja Nizhny Tagililta, mikä pelasti ko. tehtaan konkurssilta).
Nizhny Tagilin etu oli myös se että he valmistivat nimensä mukaisesti junaliikenteen erilaisia vaunuja. Näidenkin tilausmäärät kutistuivat rajusti 90-luvun aikana, mutta eivät kuolleet kokonaan (Venäjä riippuu rautateistä ja siten uusille vaunuille on aina kysyntää) ja siten kantoivat tehtaan osaltaan. He tekivät myös armeijan panssarivaunujen huoltoa, tosin se ei tuo rahaa läheskään samaa määrää kuin uusien valmistus tai vanhojen modernisointi.
-
Jos katsoo linkittämäni aikaisemman viestin Kommersantin taulukkoa Venäjän viennistä aikavälillä 1992-2012, niin se kertoo omaa tarinaansa Uralvagonzavodin tilanteesta samana aikana. HUOM: Kommersantin kuvassa kerrotaan viety vaunutyyppi, niiden kokonaismäärä ja aikaväli muttei vuosikohtaista toimitettua määrää, joten kuvasin tämän taulukkoon siten että ko. toimituksen aikavälin vuodet merkitty X-kirjaimilla ja viimeisen vuoden kohdalla toimitettu määrä. Kyseisen kaupan vuosikohtaiset toimitusmäärät voivat löytyä tarkemmalla kaivamisella, mutta en ole nähnyt sitä vaivaa.
Tässä minun arvio "uusista vaunuista" vs. "armeijan varastoista otetut", tämä perustuu Kommersantin infograafin tarjoamaan selitykseen:
Summat täsmäävät Kommersantin infograafin selityksen kanssa:
- viennin kokonaismäärä aikavälillä 1992-2012 "yli 2000 vaunua" joista
- Uralvagonzavodin osuus "yli 1300 vaunua" joista
- 709 kpl ready-to-assemble set supplied to India and Iran
Minun taulukossa oranssilla on merkitty nämä Iranin ja Intian kitit 709 kpl. Vihreällä Uralvagonzavodin uudet vaunut T-72S ja T-90S ja T-90SA, näiden summa on 1 309 vaunua. Taulukon kaikkien vientivaunujen summa on 2 018 kpl.
Jos en ole erehtynyt tai tulkinnut heidän kirjoitusta väärin, niin tuosta nähdään että Nizhny Tagilin uustuotannon vienti 90-luvulla oli 132 kpl T-72S vaunua. Tämä aikavälillä 1992-1998. Jos lasketaan Iranin kitit mukaan uustuotantoon, mikä tarkoittaa tietysti komponenttien valmistusta muttei vaunun kokoonpanoa (eli uustuotantoa, muttei silti ihan sama kuin uuden vaunun myynti), niin 90-luvun vienti olisi 432 kpl T-72S vaunua aikavälillä 1992-2000. Toisaalta voi miettiä, mikä määrä näistä vaunuista valmistettiin vuosien 1992-1994 aikana? Zaloga kirjoittaa että Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen heillä oli pihalla noin 350 kpl T-72S ja T-90 vaunuja.
Heidän oli tarkoitus myydä Iranille huomattavasti suurempi määrä T-72S vaunuja (muistaakseni ensimmäinen tilaus oli 1 000 vaunua) sekä oikeus vaunujen lisenssivalmistukseen Iranissa, mutta nämä kaupat peruuttiin mm. Yhdysvaltain suuren vastustuksen takia. 300 kpl T-72S kitin toimitus on ainoa mikä siitä kaupasta toteutui.
Näkee hyvin että Intian suurkauppa oli äärimmäisen tärkeä, tosin tie tarjouksesta ensimmäisiin toteutuneisiin ajoneuvoihin oli sotilashankintojen mittakaavassa melko nopea mutta pahoissa vaikeuksissa olevan tehtaan kannalta hidas: noin neljä vuotta. Intia mm. vaati tehokkaamman moottorin, minkä kehitys vei aikaa. Hitsatun tornin kehitys tehtiin 1996-1998, tosin varmasti ensimmäisten valmistuksen jälkeen prosessia on hiottu. Ustyantsev S.V. kirjasta Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72 sivulta 134:
Welded turret No. 1, manufactured in September 1998, was installed on one of the three T-90Ss that were being prepared for run tests in India; at the end of December 2001, their mass production began [21]. Today, only Uralvagonzavod in Russia has proven technologies for the production of welded tank turrets. The Omsk experimental tank "Cherny Orel" also has a welded turret, but this is an experimental model, and years of work and substantial expenses are needed to master their serial production. It remains to say a huge "thank you" to the Indian army, which provided funds for organizing the production of welded towers at Uralvagonzavod.
Intian lisenssivalmistus myöhästyi pahasti koska Venäjä alkoi pelaamaan heille tyypillisiä pelejään: teknologian siirtoon ja lisenssivalmistukseen Intiassa sisältyi paljon isovenäläistä protektionismia, sopimusten rikkomista yms. ja Intia on joutunut ostamaan lisää Venäjällä valmistettuja vaunuja oman tuotannon sijaan. Ilmeisesti kaikkia lisenssivalmistuksen ongelmia ei ole ratkaistu tähän päivään mennessäkään, vaikka alkuperäisten T-90S vaunujen toimituksesta on yli 20 vuotta aikaa.
Nizhny Tagil teki myös Venäjän armeijan vaunujen modernisointia aikavälillä 1998-2005 (ehkä jatkui 2010-2011 asti), tämä oli monivaiheinen prosessi ja eri aikaan valmistuneille vaunuille tehtiin eri määrä muutoksia. Näistä käytetään yleensä nimitystä T-72BA vaikka eivät olekaan keskenään samanlaisia. Virallisesti tuo nimi astui voimaan vasta 2005 Venäjän valtion päätöksellä. Nämä vaunut ovat pitkälti samanlaisia kuin T-72B obr 1989 tosin pienin parannuksin. Modattujen vaunujen määrästä näkee usein monenlaisia arvioita, minua eniten vakuuttanut numero on 150 kpl, mutta näillekin on vaikea löytää virallista numeroa. Puolan panssarivaunujen erikoismies Jaroslaw Wolski on arvioinut näiden määräksi 750 kpl.
Pari linkkiä jos kiinnostaa lukea tarkemmin T-72BA vaunuista:
https://en.topwar.ru/9099-kratko-o-tanke-modernizirovannyy-t-72ba.html
http://otvaga2004.ru/tanki/istoriya-sozdaniya/tank-t72ba/
Lainaus ensimmäisestä linkistä:
Let's start the story of the tank from the beginning. In 1991, the Uralvagonzavod plant produced a good pace with the T-72B tank and a modification of this tank for export of the T-72S. Together with UKBTM works on the design of improved models and modifications. T-72B produces another plant - a tractor plant in Chelyabinsk.
The collapse of the USSR into separate and independent states puts the plants on the verge of closure. Production of tanks at the factory is completely minimized. Chelyabinsk Plant never produced armored heavy military equipment.
Uralvagonzavod masters the repair of tanks and is engaged only in repairs up to 1998 of the year. Maybe the plant was helped by a change of director or was affected by another factor, but it was in 1998 that the plant began to upgrade several dozen tanks at its own peril and risk. But the first wave of upgrades was not affordable for the Russian military.
In 1999, the plant sends repaired and upgraded T-72Bs to a state test.
After successful tests, the 184A object is accepted into service under the name T-72BA.
-
Jos tämä on oikeassa, niin 90-luku olisi ollut pitkälti vanhojen vaunujen korjaamista kunnes saivat tilauksen T-72B modernisoinnista vuoden 2000 tienoilla. Huom: T-72BA on hyvin budjettivetoinen, köyhän miehen modernisointi. T-72B3 (2011-2015) puhutaan myös sellaisena, mutta se on huomattavasti parempi silti: siinä tulee jopa lämpötähtäin. Alunperin Nizhny Tagil tarjosi T-72BA vaunuja joihin olisi modifikaation aikana asennettu lämpötähtäimet, mutta vaunut olivat aivan liian kalliita Venäjälle 90-luvun puolivälissä. Olen aina nähnyt T-72 modernisaation seuraavanlaisena ketjuna: tarjottu T-72BA vuonna 1998 piti alunperin olla sellainen millaisena päätyivät ostamaan T-72B3 vuonna 2011. Kun vihdoin hankkivat vaunuja vuodesta 2011 alkaen, niin aika oli jo ajanut niistä ohi (vaikka toki uudessa vaunussa oli modernimpia komponentteja verrattuna 1998 tarjottuun). Muutama vuosi myöhemmin hankkivat vihdoin vaunuja "sellaisena kuin niiden piti olla alunperinkin" eli T-72B3 obr 2016. Tämä on lähempänä T-72B2 Rogatka versiota, jota Nizhny Tagil tarjosi vuoden 2006 tienoilla, mutta sekin hylättiin silloin liian kalliina.
Logiikka on selvä: Nizhny Tagil tarjoaa 1998 hyvää modernisaationa T-72BA vaunuksi, mutta Venäjä ostaa mieluummin karvalakkimallin. Vuonna 2006 Nizhny Tagil tarjoaa hyvää modernisaatioa T-72B2 Rogatka, mutta Venäjä ostaa mieluummin karvalakkimallin T-72B3 vuonna 2011. Vuonna 2016 ilmeisesti vihdoin tärppää ja hankkivat T-72B3 obr 2016 vaunuja. Tämän modernisaation valmistus on jatkunut ainakin vuoteen 2022 asti. T-80BVM modernisaation ensimmäiset vaunut luovutettiin vuonna 2017. Venäjä osti viimeiset T-90A vaunut lähteestä riippuen joko vuonna 2011 tai 2012. T-90MS vientiversio esiteltiin ensimmäisen kerran vuonna 2011 (arvaan että samaan aikaan on tarjottu Venäjälle T-90M vaunuja). Venäjä testasi T-90M vaunuja vuonna 2017 ja ensimmäiset luovutettiin vuona 2019. Mikään vaunu ei tietysti pysy samana läpi vuosien mutta tuossakin on nähtävissä melkein 10 vuoden pätkä T-90M osalta "tuumailusta tekoihin".
Tässä on taulukko jossa viitataan CFE-sopimuksen ilmoituksiin. Vuoden 1991 tiedot ovat Neuvostoliiton mutta 1992 alkaen Venäjän vaunumääriä Uralin länsipuolella. Näiden vuosien erotus, siitä osa on mahdollisesti siirretty Uralin itäpuolelle (massiiviset siirrot ennen CFE sopimuksen allekirjoittamista vuosina 1989 ja 1990) mutta iso määrä jäi myös Ukrainalle, Valko-Venäjälle yms. maille Neuvostoliiton hajottua. Neuvostoliitto siirsi suuren määrän kalustoa Uralin itäpuolelle ennen sopimuksen allekirjoittamista, mikä vääristää ilmoituksista saatavan tiedon arvoa. Huom. Neuvostoliitto hajosi virallisesti 26 joulukuuta 1991 joten vuoden uusien panssarivaunujen tuotanto valmistui kokonaisuudessaan, mutta vuodesta 1992 alkaen meni nopeasti hyvin vaikeaksi.
Steve Zaloga on kirjoittanut Ukrainan Kharkovan tehtaan tilanteesta näin:
Production was 800 combat vehicles in 1991, but only 43 in 1992 and none in 1993 as the supply of components dried up.
Tässä hän kirjoittaa Venäjän tilanteesta vuonna 1992:
In 1992, the Russian Army ordered only 20 tanks: 5 T-80U tanks from Omsk and 15 tanks from Nizhni-Tagil. Tank production at Omsk and Nizhni-Tagil in 1992–93 was well beyond the puny state orders due to some export orders, but only a pale shadow of the 1980s. This additional production was not ordered by the Russian Army, but undertaken simply to keep the plants from closing. There was the hope that large export orders would emerge to save the plants and sop up this surplus. However the anticipated export orders did not materialize.
Tankograd blogi on kirjoittanut Nizhny Tagilin 90-luvun alun tuotannosta näin (tosin hän ei tarjoa numerolle lähdettä):
From 1973 to 1990, a total of 18,373 T-72 tanks and T-72 derivatives were manufactured at the UVZ factory floor and another 1,600 tanks were manufactured from 1991 to 1996. LÄHDE
Zaloga kirjoittaa 80-luvun lopun rajusta alamäestä näin:
The Soviet Union had five tank plants in 1980 but only three remained active by 1991. After the Soviet collapse, only two remained inside the Russian Federation. Annual tank production plummeted from 3,254 in 1987 to 1,000 in 1991 and fell rapidly after that. The Kharkov tank plant, long considered the premier Soviet tank design and production center, had produced 800 T-80UD tanks in 1991.
Olen hieman kahden vaiheilla T-80UD osalta. Zalogan muista kirjoituksista voi tulkita että Kharkovan tehdas valmisti 800 T-80UD panssarivaunua vuoteen 1991 mennessä. Toisaalta lainaamassani tekstissä sanotaan aika selvästi että he olisivat valmistaneet 800 kpl T-80UD vaunuja vuonna 1991. Toisaalta tuo sopisi aika huonosti yhteen sen tiedon kanssa että vuoden 1991 kokonaistuotanto olisi ollut 1 000 vaunua, en usko että Kharkovan osuus olisi ollut 80%. Nizhny Tagil on vuosi toisensa jälkeen valmistanut noin 55% vuosituotannosta. Muistan lukeneeni jossain että Omsk ei olisi valmistanut yhtäkään T-80 vaunua vuonna 1991, joten tuo 1 000 vaunun osuus sisältäisi vain Kharkovan T-80UD ja Nizhny Tagilin T-72B, T-72B1 ja T-72B obr 1989 vaunuja, nämä jossakin suhteessa. Ehkä muistan väärin, saattoi olla niinkin että Kirovin tehdas ei valmistanut T-80 vaunuja vuonna 1991 mutta Omsk teki jonkin määrän.
Tankogradin väite siitä että Nizhny Tagil valmisti 1 600 panssarivaunua aikavälillä 1991 - 1996 kuulostaa hurjan suurelta, kun huomioidaan että Venäjän valtio ei tilannut uusia vaunuja juuri ollenkaan koko 90-luvun aikana. Toisaalta kirjoitukset siitä että tehdas valmisti vaunuja pihalle odottamaan potentiaalisia ulkomaan tilauksia ovat loogisia, se oli ainoa keino pitää tehtaalla valot päällä ja ihmiset töissä. Omsk teki samaa. Kharkovan tehdas ei siihen kyennyt, koska oli riippuvainen tiettyjen komponenttien tuomisesta Venäjältä ja nämä materiaalivirrat kuivuivat nopeasti.
Nizhny Tagil valmisti 1 600 vaunua kuudessa vuodessa 90-luvun alun kaaoksessa? Keskiarvo olisi 267 vaunua per vuosi, tosin veikkaan että todellisuudessa valtaosa olisi näiden vuosien alkupään tuotantoa ja sitä seuraisi raju lasku.
Nizhny Tagilin vuosituotanto 80-luvun lopussa:
1985 - 1 559
1986 - 1 530
1987 - 1 534
1988 - 1 503
1989 - 933
1990 - 776
Zaloga on kirjoittanut 80-luvun lopusta näin:
Soviet tank production continued to decline in the late 1980s due to Gorbachev's attempts to rein in defense spending. The original 1989 plan had been for 3,739 T-80 and T-72 tanks, but this was cut back to 1,530 tanks, and the 1990 plan cut to 1,445 tanks.
Tilastoista tiedetään että vuonna 1989 Neuvostoarmeijalle toimitettiin 1 600 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja, joista 890 kpl T-72 vaunuja (55,625%) ja 710 kpl T-80 vaunuja (44,375%). Vuonna 1990 toimitettiin 1 404 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja, joista 774 kp T-72 vaunuja (55,13%) ja 630 kpl T-80 vaunuja (44,82%).
Tuon perusteella voisi arvata että vuoden 1991 osalta, jos tuo Zalogan tieto 1 000 kpl uudesta vaunusta pitäisi paikkansa, niin niistä 55% voisi olla T-72 vaunuja ja 45% voisi olla T-80 vaunuja. Tämä tarkoittaisi 550 kpl T-72 vaunuja ja 450 kpl T-80 vaunuja.
Jos katsoo Tankogradin väitettä tässä valossa, niin se tarkoittaisi että Nizhny Tagil valmisti 1 050 kpl uusia panssarivaunuja aikavälillä 1992-1996. Keskiarvo olisi 210 vaunua per vuosi.
Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoittaa kirjassa "Уральский вагоностроительный завод 80 лет" sivulla 124 näin (julkaistu vuonna 2016):
According to the open press, the production of tanks for the Russian army in 1992 amounted to 600 vehicles, in 1993 - 150, 1994 - 60 and in 1995 - 50 units. Then the orders stopped.
Voi toki kysyä, ovatko tämän "open press" lähteen tiedot oikeat. Oma arvaus: tuo voi pitää paikkansa, ainakin tuollainen raju lasku vuosien 1992 ja 1993 aikana sekä huomattavan pienet määrät sen jälkeen. Tuossa puhutaan Venäjän armeijalle tulleista vaunuista, joten hyvä muistaa että Nizhny Tagil ja Omsk molemmat valmistivat vaunuja pihoille odottamaan tilauksia. Toisten lähteiden mukaan Venäjän armeijan tilaukset kutistuivat hyvin pieniksi jo vuonna 1992 joten tuo "open press" numero voi kertoa myös todellisista valmistusmääristä vaikkei niitä kaikkia olisikaan luovutettu Venäjän armeijalle - tai armeija ei ottanut vastaan. Vuoden 1991 jälkeen Venäjällä oli kaksi panssarivaunuja valmistavaa tehdasta: Nizhny Tagil ja Omsk, oletan että nuo määrät olisivat näiden kahden tehtaan tuotanto yhteensä.
Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoittaa kirjassa "Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72" sivulla 122 näin (julkaistu vuonna 2004):
The crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a severe impact on Uralvagonzavod, as, indeed, on all major enterprises in the country. The main consumer of wagons and tanks, which came off the factory conveyors in a continuous stream, disappeared. The factory managers did not master the art of selling their products on the free market.
The forthcoming reduction in the production of tanks was known in advance, but no one could guess its size: the state order for combat vehicles in 1990 was 51% of the 1988 level and continued to fall in subsequent years. In 1992, the volume of production of military equipment at the plant amounted to approximately 25%, and in 1994 only 2.15% of the stable level of 1986. During the 1990s there were periods when the state did not order a single tank at all. At the same time, the system of foreign arms supplies in the late 1980s also broke up, in connection with which, by 1991, a significant pair of unsold tanks accumulated in the warehouses of UVZ.
Ustyantsev S.V. ja Komalkov D. (Uralvagonzavodin pääsuunnittelija) antavat taulukon Nizhny Tagilin tuotannosta kirjassa "Т72-Т90.Опыт создания отечественных основных боевых танков" sivulla 172 (julkaistu vuonna 2013):
Aikaisemman lainauksen perusteella "the volume of production of military equipment at the plant (Nizhny Tagil)" voitaisiin laskea tämän taulukon avulla:
Vuoden 1992 määrä:
1 530 + 19 + 70 + 11 + 105 + 76 = 1 811
1 811 x 0,25 = 453
Vuoden 1994 määrä:
1 530 + 19 + 70 + 11 + 105 + 76 = 1 811
1 811 x 0,0215 = 39
Tietyt lähteet kirjoittavat että tehtaat tekivät valmiiksi Neuvostoliiton aikaiset tilaukset ja sitten kun uusia ei kuulunut, tekivät jonkin verran "omaan laskuun" eli tehtaan pihalle odottamaan. Ustyantsevin kirjoituksista voisi päätellä että "pihalle jääneet vaunut" olisi valmistettu pääasiassa vuosien 1992 ja 1993 aikana ja että tuotanto olisi jatkunut hyvin pienimuotoisena sen jälkeen.
On mahdollista nähdä tuo 90-luvun alun tuotanto vanhojen tilausten valmiiksi tekemisenä, mikä voi selittää väitteet siitä että tuotanto olisi jatkunut 1995 asti ja vaunut menneet "Venäjän armeijalle" vaikka samalla tiedetään ettei uusia tilauksia juurikaan tullut 1992 jälkeen.
Zaloga kirjoittaa 90-luvun alun tilanteesta näin:
The UVZ in Nizhni-Tagil had about 350 T-72S and T-90 tanks in its factory yards, and Omsk had 150−200 T-80U tanks.
Tuossakin Nizhny Tagilin osuus on 63,6-70% "pihalle jääneistä vaunuista" eli selvästi yli puolet, tämäkin olisi linjassa kylmän sodan aikaisten vuosituotannon osuuksien kanssa, vaikka onkin "tyypillistä suurempi osuus" (heidän osuus oli yleensä 55% tienoilla), tosin Kharkovan tehdas jäi pois joten Nizhny Tagilin osuus on suurempi jo pelkästään sen takia.
Osa Venäjän 90-luvulla tehdystä panssarivaunujen vientikaupasta oli uusia vaunuja, osa "armeijan varastoista". Sama koski Ukrainaa, Valko-Venäjää, Puolaa ja muita entisiä Varsovan liiton maita: monet niistä dumppasivat varastovaunuja markkinoille, osalle löytyi ostaja ja osalle ei, osa päätyi sulatukseen, osa "jonnekin varastoon", todennäköisesti pihalle seisomaan tuuleen ja sateeseen.
Virallisten numeroiden puuttuessa menee arvailuksi, mutta arvaan silti että vuodet 1992 ja 1993 ovat todennäköisesti olleet Nizhny Tagilin osalta "viimeiset normaalit vuodet" jolloin on tehty useampi sata vaunua, jos ei muuten niin tuotantolinja tyhjäksi ja yritetty pitää tehdas hengissä. Arvaan että tämän jälkeen tehdas on ollut käytänössä kiinni, varmasti valmistettu joitakin vaunuja per vuosi muttei mitään merkittävää määrää. Zaloga kirjoittaa että tehtaan henkilöstö osoitti mieltä maksamattomien palkkojen takia heinäkuussa 1995.
Jos spekuloidaan edellisten numeroiden avulla, niin on mahdollista että Neuvostoliiton ja Venäjän panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto aikavälillä 1985 - 1995 on voinut mennä näin (tai tässä skaalassa - vuosi 1990 on viimeinen jolta olen nähnyt virallisen tilaston):
1985 - 3 162
1986 - 3 245
1987 - 3 254
1988 - 2 815
1989 - 1 858
1990 - 1 406
1991 - 1 000
1992 - 600
1993 - 150
1994 - 10-60 ?
1995 - 10-50 ?
Pitää muistaa että Venäjän armeijalle hankittiin alkuperäiset T-90 obr 1992 vaunut 90-luvulla. Zalogan arvion mukaan näitä olisi hankittu 120kpl, Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoittaa kirjassa "Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72" (julkaistu vuonna 2004):
We we do not have exact data on how many of these machines were built and delivered to the Russian armed forces, but it is obvious that, by Soviet standards, very few. It is reported in the open press that by 2000 the ground forces had less than 200 T-90 tanks concentrated in two Siberian divisions.
Olen taipuvainen uskomaan Zalogan arvion vaunujen määrästä, hänen kirjasta "T-90 Standard Tank The First Tank of the New Russia" sivulta 8 lainaten:
The first tank of an initial low-rate production batch was ready on September 30, 1992, and by the end of the year 13 T-90 tanks had been assembled. Supply of the Agava-2 thermal imaging sight was a problem due to the low output of the device as well as its extremely high cost. In the event, only two of the original batch of tanks received this sight, the remainder receiving the cheaper Buran-PA night sight. The basic T-90 was followed on the assembly floor in March 1994 by the T-90K command tank. This version had additional radio equipment fitted including the R-163-50 transceiver, a special 4-meter antenna, a navigation aid, and an AB1-P28.5 auxiliary power unit. In general, about 5 percent of Russian tanks were built in the command tank configuration. Total T-90 production in 1992 to 1994 was about 105 tanks.
-
Tiedetään myös että samaan aikaan valmisteltiin vientiversio T-90S jossa oli alunperin valettu torni (kuten oli kaikissa Neuvostoliiton / Venäjän vaunuissa ennen T-90A vaunuja), mutta se ei löytänyt ostajaa 90-luvulla, vaan vasta 2000-luvun alussa kun Intia ja Algeria ostivat vaunuja. Valettujen tornien valmistaminen ei ollut enää mahdollista konkurssien takia, joten joutuivat suunnittelemaan uuden hitsatun tornin (kuten joutui myös Kharkovan tehdas Ukrainassa, heidän valutornit tulivat alunperin Mariupolin tehtaalta vaan sielläkin valaminen ei ollut enää mahdollista).
Edelleen samasta Ustyantsev S.V. kirjasta "Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72" lainaten, sivuilta 134-135:
By 1996, the welded tower had been worked out, as well as the technology for its production. However, the plant at that time had no orders for the Russian army. Therefore, the T-90S tanks, manufactured in 2000-2003, became the first serial modification of the "ninetieth" with a welded turret. under an Indian contract.
Welded turret No. 1, manufactured in September 1998, was installed on one of the three T-90Ss that were being prepared for run tests in India; at the end of December 2001, their mass production began.
-
Today there is no need to hide that the potential of tank production in Nizhny Tagil in the 1990s. was saved mainly through exports. Unfortunately, the main merit in this belongs to non-specialized state organizations, and to the manufacturers themselves Uralvagonzavod and UKBTM. Of course, state control over arms sales is quite understandable and natural, just like state regulation of relations between domestic arms manufacturers.
Government officials have two tasks: to prevent the supply of weapons to states and structures that pose a real or potential danger to the interests of the Russian Federation, and to create conditions for the sale of Russian-made weapons to neutral or allied countries. In reality, unfortunately, it sometimes turns out quite differently. If we turn to the book of one of the leaders of the state Noy company "Rosvooruzhenie" in the 1990s. BN Kuzyk "Behind the Scenes of a Breakthrough: Russia in the Arms Markets", one might think that Russia has only one T-80U tank. He is mentioned dozens of times, whole pages of descriptions are devoted to the "eighties". For comparison: the T-90 tank is assigned one line [24].
Moreover, Moscow officials actively prevented the T-90S from entering the world market. Uralvagonzavod was ready to exhibit its latest products at the 1993 international arms exhibition in the United Arab Emirates, but the Department of Defense Industry allowed only the T-72S to be displayed. It was not possible to bring the newest Tagil tank and the T-80U into open competition. And then for another five years, the export model of the T-90-T-90S tank, which was allowed for sale abroad, which was in service with the Russian army, was not allowed to participate in world arms exhibitions. And when Uralvagonzavod nevertheless managed in 1997 to obtain permission to demonstrate the T-90S at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi, then one of the bureaucrats "forgot" to provide information about the Tagil car to the organizers of the exhibition. As a result, the T-90 tank, which was actually shown at the IDEX'97 exhibition, was never included in its official program [25].
The first thought that comes to mind is that everything that happened is explained by the desire of the employees of Rosvooruzhenie to maintain the production of more promising, from their point of view, gas turbine tanks - even at the expense of Uralvagonzavod. One may disagree with such a position, but it is still a position. Moreover, the same B.N. Kuzyk writes that the main goal of "Rosvooruzhenie" was: "... not to let the military-industrial complex die, the center of the country's intellectual and industrial power, to keep the work of millions of highly qualified specialists, to raise from their knees the regions that are completely dependent on the state of affairs in the military-industrial complex" [26].
In words, Everything is logical, but in reality ... In the open press, in particular, M. Baryatinsky's brochure "Tank T-80" reports that the deliveries of "eighties" abroad were made from the Armed Forces [27] and, accordingly, they were not intended to preserve tank production at the Omsk transport engineering plant. There was a frank sale of the Soviet heritage, which had the sole purpose of making an immediate profit. In combination with the lack of orders for the Russian army, this led to the fact that tanks of the T-80 type have not been SERIALLY PRODUCED FOR 10 YEARS!
-
Kirja on julkaistu vuonna 2004 ja Ustyantsev S.V. on eräänlainen Uralvagonzavodin historioitsija, joten pienellä varauksella pitää suhtautua hänen kirjoituksiin. Lisäksi hyvä muistaa että T-80 vaunuperheestä tai Kirovin ja Omskin tehtaista ei ole kirjoitettu kunnon kattavaa historiikkia, joten tämä puoli tarinasta on (ainakin osaksi) kertomatta. Joka tapauksessa Ustyantsev S.V. kirjoituksen perusteella Omsk ei olisi valmistanut uusia T-80U vaunuja kymmeneen vuoteen eli viimeiset olisivat vuodelta 1993 tai 1994. Tuo on toisaalta helppo uskoa: minun aikaisemmasta viestistä löytyy Kommersantin julkaisema vientitaulukko LINKKI
Jos katsoo Kommersantin taulukkoa vuosien 1992-2012 viennistä niin T-80U on viety tasan kolmeen maahan: 1 kpl lahjoitettu Iso-Britannialle hyväntahdoneleenä vuonna 1992, 41 kpl Kyprokselle 1996-1997 ja 35 kpl Etelä-Korealle 1996 ja 2005. Steve Zaloga kirjoittaa kirjassaan "T-80 Standard Tank The Soviet Armys Last Armored Champion" että Etelä-Korealle olisi myyty 80 kpl, mutta oletan sen olevan virhe. Lainaus ko. kirjasta sivuilta 34-35:
A handful of export orders for the T-80U did materialize, though they were fulfilled mostly by using undelivered inventory from the Omsk plant. Morocco acquired about five T-80 tanks in the late 1980s, ostensibly for testing for a future tank requirement; it is widely believed that they ended up in the hands of US, British, and German intelligence agencies. Russia sold Britain one T-80U in 1992 as a goodwill gesture connected with President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Britain in 1992. Sweden evaluated the T-80U for its tank competition starting in 1993, but finally settled on the Leopard 2. The Russian government owed South Korea a substantial amount of money from the Soviet period, and partly paid these debts through the sale of military equipment. The Republic of Korea Army received about 80 T-80U tanks
from 1996 to 2005. These are used primarily by "opposing forces" units for training. Cyprus acquired 41 T-80U tanks, including 14 of the new T-80UK command tanks in 1996-97.
Omsk attempted to reinvigorate international interest in the T-80 by more elaborate improvements, including active protection systems as detailed below. Export sales were too small to keep the Omsk tank plant busy, and in spite of a few small state orders for tank rebuilding, the plant went bankrupt in 2006. At the time of writing, the Russian government planned to consolidate the tank business around Uralvagon in Nizhni-Tagil, with Omsk assigned tank rebuilding efforts as well as some design work. The Russian Army began to fund upgrades for its aging T-80 fleet in the 2007 defense budget.
Toisen lähteen mukaan alunperin keskusteltiin 80 kpl T-80U vaunun antamisesta (velkojen kattamiseksi) mutta määrä supistui 35 kpl: LÄHDE
The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union and the impoverishment of the new Russian Federation made it impossible for Moscow to repay the loans in cash.
The Russian Federation began supplying tanks, combat vehicles, military helicopters, and other defense equipment to the South Korean armed forces as partial payment of the $2 billion debt to the ROK that Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union.
Under their terms, Russia provided the ROK armed forces with Soviet-era T-80U main battle tanks, METIS-M anti-tank missiles, BMP infantry fighting vehicles, Kamov Ka-32 transport helicopters, and Murena-E hovercraft. Although South Korea had originally planned to purchase 80 tanks, the ROK ended up buying only 35 T-80U tanks. South Korea also received 70 BMP-3 Infantry Fighting Vehicles from Russia.
Zalogan mukaan Omskin pihalla oli 150−200 kpl T-80U vaunuja kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeisinä vuosina, joten vienti ei riittänyt edes tyhjentämään tehtaan pihaa. Ukrainan T-80UD pärjäsi vähän paremmin ja solmivat ison kaupan Pakistanin kanssa 90-luvun lopulla (tämä puolestaan sai Intian ostamaan suuren määrän T-90S ja myöhemmin T-90A vaunuja Nizhny Tagililta, mikä pelasti ko. tehtaan konkurssilta).
Nizhny Tagilin etu oli myös se että he valmistivat nimensä mukaisesti junaliikenteen erilaisia vaunuja. Näidenkin tilausmäärät kutistuivat rajusti 90-luvun aikana, mutta eivät kuolleet kokonaan (Venäjä riippuu rautateistä ja siten uusille vaunuille on aina kysyntää) ja siten kantoivat tehtaan osaltaan. He tekivät myös armeijan panssarivaunujen huoltoa, tosin se ei tuo rahaa läheskään samaa määrää kuin uusien valmistus tai vanhojen modernisointi.
-
Jos katsoo linkittämäni aikaisemman viestin Kommersantin taulukkoa Venäjän viennistä aikavälillä 1992-2012, niin se kertoo omaa tarinaansa Uralvagonzavodin tilanteesta samana aikana. HUOM: Kommersantin kuvassa kerrotaan viety vaunutyyppi, niiden kokonaismäärä ja aikaväli muttei vuosikohtaista toimitettua määrää, joten kuvasin tämän taulukkoon siten että ko. toimituksen aikavälin vuodet merkitty X-kirjaimilla ja viimeisen vuoden kohdalla toimitettu määrä. Kyseisen kaupan vuosikohtaiset toimitusmäärät voivat löytyä tarkemmalla kaivamisella, mutta en ole nähnyt sitä vaivaa.
Tässä minun arvio "uusista vaunuista" vs. "armeijan varastoista otetut", tämä perustuu Kommersantin infograafin tarjoamaan selitykseen:
Summat täsmäävät Kommersantin infograafin selityksen kanssa:
- viennin kokonaismäärä aikavälillä 1992-2012 "yli 2000 vaunua" joista
- Uralvagonzavodin osuus "yli 1300 vaunua" joista
- 709 kpl ready-to-assemble set supplied to India and Iran
Minun taulukossa oranssilla on merkitty nämä Iranin ja Intian kitit 709 kpl. Vihreällä Uralvagonzavodin uudet vaunut T-72S ja T-90S ja T-90SA, näiden summa on 1 309 vaunua. Taulukon kaikkien vientivaunujen summa on 2 018 kpl.
Jos en ole erehtynyt tai tulkinnut heidän kirjoitusta väärin, niin tuosta nähdään että Nizhny Tagilin uustuotannon vienti 90-luvulla oli 132 kpl T-72S vaunua. Tämä aikavälillä 1992-1998. Jos lasketaan Iranin kitit mukaan uustuotantoon, mikä tarkoittaa tietysti komponenttien valmistusta muttei vaunun kokoonpanoa (eli uustuotantoa, muttei silti ihan sama kuin uuden vaunun myynti), niin 90-luvun vienti olisi 432 kpl T-72S vaunua aikavälillä 1992-2000. Toisaalta voi miettiä, mikä määrä näistä vaunuista valmistettiin vuosien 1992-1994 aikana? Zaloga kirjoittaa että Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen heillä oli pihalla noin 350 kpl T-72S ja T-90 vaunuja.
Heidän oli tarkoitus myydä Iranille huomattavasti suurempi määrä T-72S vaunuja (muistaakseni ensimmäinen tilaus oli 1 000 vaunua) sekä oikeus vaunujen lisenssivalmistukseen Iranissa, mutta nämä kaupat peruuttiin mm. Yhdysvaltain suuren vastustuksen takia. 300 kpl T-72S kitin toimitus on ainoa mikä siitä kaupasta toteutui.
Näkee hyvin että Intian suurkauppa oli äärimmäisen tärkeä, tosin tie tarjouksesta ensimmäisiin toteutuneisiin ajoneuvoihin oli sotilashankintojen mittakaavassa melko nopea mutta pahoissa vaikeuksissa olevan tehtaan kannalta hidas: noin neljä vuotta. Intia mm. vaati tehokkaamman moottorin, minkä kehitys vei aikaa. Hitsatun tornin kehitys tehtiin 1996-1998, tosin varmasti ensimmäisten valmistuksen jälkeen prosessia on hiottu. Ustyantsev S.V. kirjasta Боевые машины Уралвагонзавода. Танк Т-72 sivulta 134:
Welded turret No. 1, manufactured in September 1998, was installed on one of the three T-90Ss that were being prepared for run tests in India; at the end of December 2001, their mass production began [21]. Today, only Uralvagonzavod in Russia has proven technologies for the production of welded tank turrets. The Omsk experimental tank "Cherny Orel" also has a welded turret, but this is an experimental model, and years of work and substantial expenses are needed to master their serial production. It remains to say a huge "thank you" to the Indian army, which provided funds for organizing the production of welded towers at Uralvagonzavod.
Intian lisenssivalmistus myöhästyi pahasti koska Venäjä alkoi pelaamaan heille tyypillisiä pelejään: teknologian siirtoon ja lisenssivalmistukseen Intiassa sisältyi paljon isovenäläistä protektionismia, sopimusten rikkomista yms. ja Intia on joutunut ostamaan lisää Venäjällä valmistettuja vaunuja oman tuotannon sijaan. Ilmeisesti kaikkia lisenssivalmistuksen ongelmia ei ole ratkaistu tähän päivään mennessäkään, vaikka alkuperäisten T-90S vaunujen toimituksesta on yli 20 vuotta aikaa.
Nizhny Tagil teki myös Venäjän armeijan vaunujen modernisointia aikavälillä 1998-2005 (ehkä jatkui 2010-2011 asti), tämä oli monivaiheinen prosessi ja eri aikaan valmistuneille vaunuille tehtiin eri määrä muutoksia. Näistä käytetään yleensä nimitystä T-72BA vaikka eivät olekaan keskenään samanlaisia. Virallisesti tuo nimi astui voimaan vasta 2005 Venäjän valtion päätöksellä. Nämä vaunut ovat pitkälti samanlaisia kuin T-72B obr 1989 tosin pienin parannuksin. Modattujen vaunujen määrästä näkee usein monenlaisia arvioita, minua eniten vakuuttanut numero on 150 kpl, mutta näillekin on vaikea löytää virallista numeroa. Puolan panssarivaunujen erikoismies Jaroslaw Wolski on arvioinut näiden määräksi 750 kpl.
Pari linkkiä jos kiinnostaa lukea tarkemmin T-72BA vaunuista:
https://en.topwar.ru/9099-kratko-o-tanke-modernizirovannyy-t-72ba.html
http://otvaga2004.ru/tanki/istoriya-sozdaniya/tank-t72ba/
Lainaus ensimmäisestä linkistä:
Let's start the story of the tank from the beginning. In 1991, the Uralvagonzavod plant produced a good pace with the T-72B tank and a modification of this tank for export of the T-72S. Together with UKBTM works on the design of improved models and modifications. T-72B produces another plant - a tractor plant in Chelyabinsk.
The collapse of the USSR into separate and independent states puts the plants on the verge of closure. Production of tanks at the factory is completely minimized. Chelyabinsk Plant never produced armored heavy military equipment.
Uralvagonzavod masters the repair of tanks and is engaged only in repairs up to 1998 of the year. Maybe the plant was helped by a change of director or was affected by another factor, but it was in 1998 that the plant began to upgrade several dozen tanks at its own peril and risk. But the first wave of upgrades was not affordable for the Russian military.
In 1999, the plant sends repaired and upgraded T-72Bs to a state test.
After successful tests, the 184A object is accepted into service under the name T-72BA.
-
Jos tämä on oikeassa, niin 90-luku olisi ollut pitkälti vanhojen vaunujen korjaamista kunnes saivat tilauksen T-72B modernisoinnista vuoden 2000 tienoilla. Huom: T-72BA on hyvin budjettivetoinen, köyhän miehen modernisointi. T-72B3 (2011-2015) puhutaan myös sellaisena, mutta se on huomattavasti parempi silti: siinä tulee jopa lämpötähtäin. Alunperin Nizhny Tagil tarjosi T-72BA vaunuja joihin olisi modifikaation aikana asennettu lämpötähtäimet, mutta vaunut olivat aivan liian kalliita Venäjälle 90-luvun puolivälissä. Olen aina nähnyt T-72 modernisaation seuraavanlaisena ketjuna: tarjottu T-72BA vuonna 1998 piti alunperin olla sellainen millaisena päätyivät ostamaan T-72B3 vuonna 2011. Kun vihdoin hankkivat vaunuja vuodesta 2011 alkaen, niin aika oli jo ajanut niistä ohi (vaikka toki uudessa vaunussa oli modernimpia komponentteja verrattuna 1998 tarjottuun). Muutama vuosi myöhemmin hankkivat vihdoin vaunuja "sellaisena kuin niiden piti olla alunperinkin" eli T-72B3 obr 2016. Tämä on lähempänä T-72B2 Rogatka versiota, jota Nizhny Tagil tarjosi vuoden 2006 tienoilla, mutta sekin hylättiin silloin liian kalliina.
Logiikka on selvä: Nizhny Tagil tarjoaa 1998 hyvää modernisaationa T-72BA vaunuksi, mutta Venäjä ostaa mieluummin karvalakkimallin. Vuonna 2006 Nizhny Tagil tarjoaa hyvää modernisaatioa T-72B2 Rogatka, mutta Venäjä ostaa mieluummin karvalakkimallin T-72B3 vuonna 2011. Vuonna 2016 ilmeisesti vihdoin tärppää ja hankkivat T-72B3 obr 2016 vaunuja. Tämän modernisaation valmistus on jatkunut ainakin vuoteen 2022 asti. T-80BVM modernisaation ensimmäiset vaunut luovutettiin vuonna 2017. Venäjä osti viimeiset T-90A vaunut lähteestä riippuen joko vuonna 2011 tai 2012. T-90MS vientiversio esiteltiin ensimmäisen kerran vuonna 2011 (arvaan että samaan aikaan on tarjottu Venäjälle T-90M vaunuja). Venäjä testasi T-90M vaunuja vuonna 2017 ja ensimmäiset luovutettiin vuona 2019. Mikään vaunu ei tietysti pysy samana läpi vuosien mutta tuossakin on nähtävissä melkein 10 vuoden pätkä T-90M osalta "tuumailusta tekoihin".
Viimeksi muokattu: