Neuvostoliiton ja Varsovan liiton (sekä muiden) tuotantomääristä

[Antares]

Viittasin edellisessä viestissä Neuvostoliiton tekemiin massiivisiin varusteiden siirtoihin Uralin itäpuolelle ennen CFE-sopimuksen allekirjoittamista. Seuraavassa kuvaus CFE-sopimuksesta (Conventional Forces in Europe) ja siihen liittyvistä vaikeuksista kylmän sodan päättymisen hetkellä. On hyvä tietää sopimuksen ja siihen liittyvien ilmoitusten tausta kun arvioi niiden numeroita ja luotettavuutta: LÄHDE

Chapter 3 - RATIFICATION DELAYED, EUROPE IN TURMOIL, SOVIET UNION IN REVOLUTION​

As Europe entered the 1990s, it was in turmoil. From 1989 to 1992-coinciding with the years of the CFE Treaty's negotiation, ratification, and entry into force-nations on the European continent were experiencing their greatest changes since the end of World War II. There was the unification of Germany; the "velvet" political revolutions casting out Communist systems in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; the bloody revolution in Romania; the continuous integration of the European Union; the recurrent economic and political crises in the Soviet Union presaging its collapse; the national independence movements in the former Soviet republics; and, running throughout, the large-scale military withdrawals from Central and Western Europe by the Soviet Union and the United States. Politically, diplomatically, and militarily, the European continent was in the midst of revolutionary changes. It was in this context that ratification and implementation of the CFE Treaty proceeded.

FROM TREATY SIGNATURE TO RATIFICATION​

In constitutional governments, treaties require two acts for legitimacy: executive signature and legislative ratification. For the United States, President Bush signed the CFE Treaty in Paris on November 19, 1990. That same day, the leaders of 21 other NATO and Warsaw Pact nations signed the treaty. Ratification, however, took nearly two years. On October 30, 1992, just 20 days short of two full years, the final two states, Belarus and Kazakstan, ratified the treaty and deposited their instruments of ratification at The Hague in the Netherlands. Why did it take so long?

One CFE Treaty signatory state, the Soviet Union, was in such turmoil in 1991 and 1992 that its very existence was in question.1 When the USSR collapsed in late December 1991, its successor states had to form new governments, and those governments had to work out military and security relationships with Russia, the largest and most powerful of the former republics.

So great were the repercussions from the Soviet Union's internal difficulties that the CFE Treaty signatory states had to convene four separate extraordinary meetings to approve, authorize, and incorporate new statements, understandings, declarations, and agreements into the treaty regarding entitlements and obligations. In June 1991, the signatory states met at The Hague; in October 1991 they convened in Vienna; in June 1992 they met in Oslo; and, finally, in July 1992, they assembled just before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Helsinki. At each of these meetings, the diplomats took up specific treaty issues for the group to resolve before the individual states would proceed with ratification and implementation. Every issue was a consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse as an empire. Throughout these extraordinary meetings across Europe, the commitment of the European and North Atlantic states to the CFE Treaty as the "cornerstone of European security" proved to be remarkably strong and durable.

THE FIRST CRISIS: SURPRISES AT THE DATA EXCHANGE​

The first, and most serious, issue arose at the time of the CSCE/CFE Treaty summit in November 1990. On November 18, one day before treaty signing, representatives from each of the signatory states placed stacks of treaty-mandated data books on long rows of tables in the Hofburg Palace in Vienna. The books listed detailed information on force structure, force size, military units and organizations, and military weapons in the five treaty categories of armaments: tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and combat aircraft. Shortly thereafter, state delegates moved from table to table scooping up copies of these invaluable military force data. U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator Lynn M. Hansen, who was in the Hofburg Palace that morning, characterized the exchange as having the "aura of a bazaar." He remembered military officers and specialists excited and buzzing at the opportunity to compare treaty declarations against current estimates.2 Within days, however, the atmosphere changed for the worse as serious questions arose about the Soviet Union's force data (see table 3-1).3

It appeared to many of the state delegates in Vienna that the Soviet Union had underrepresented its treaty holdings by a significant degree. In July 1988, when all the states had presented their force data to the negotiating teams, the Soviet Union had given out one set of data. Now in November 1990, at treaty signature, it had presented a much different set of data. When compared, there were major discrepancies. U.S. officials reported to President Bush that the Soviet discrepancy was between 20,000 and 40,000 items: 6,000 to 11,000 tanks, 12,000 armored fighting vehicles, 12,000 artillery pieces, and 3,000 combat aircraft.4 This was a serious discrepancy, one that clearly threatened ratification. Was there a Soviet explanation?

In Vienna, Soviet diplomats explained that during the two years of treaty negotiations, 1989-90, the Soviet High Command had conducted a large-scale operation that withdrew thousands of military personnel, weapons, and units from Central and Eastern Europe. It was this military equipment, they asserted, that accounted for the difference.5 They explained that in one category alone, tanks, the Soviet Army had destroyed, exported, or converted more than 4,000 items since 1989. The Soviet military had sent another 8,000 tanks to motor rifle and other divisions stationed in Asia, or to military storage depots located beyond the Ural Mountains. In addition, they pointed out that the Soviet military had sent thousands of items from other treaty-limited equipment (TLE) categories--artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), and helicopters--to military depots and active units stationed beyond the Urals.6 The Ural Mountains were the CFE Treaty's easternmost boundary; military equipment located east of the Urals was not subject to any of the treaty's requirements. There would be no requirement for its inclusion in the initial data, for on-site inspection teams to count it, or for it to be reduced within a set period of time. Finally, the Soviet diplomats explained that since much of this equipment had been transferred from specialized combat support units, those units no longer held any TLE.7 Those units, by the treaty's inspection protocols, would not be objects of verification (OOVs). As a result, the Soviet Union's OOVs dropped from approximately 1,500 to fewer than 1,000.



Further, the Soviet diplomats asserted that this information should not have come as a surprise. In early October, Soviet General Mikhail A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, had announced the specific details of many of these force movements at a Pentagon press conference in Washington, D.C.8 Just four weeks before the Vienna meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze had sent a detailed letter on October 13, 1990, to U.S. Secretary of State James Baker listing the number and category of equipment removed from Central Europe to the east.9 But some Soviet officials had made statements that indicated a far different situation. In early October, Soviet Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky spoke informally with the other CFE Treaty diplomats in Vienna, stating that the USSR would have 1,600 OOVs at treaty signature, and approximately 1,500 OOVs at the end of the 40-month reduction phase.10 Therefore, when the Soviet Union revealed in Vienna, just one day before the official signing of the treaty in Paris, the scope of its unilateral military equipment relocation and the decrease in its inspectable sites, it surprised and disturbed many diplomats from the other CFE nations. At the very least, it raised serious questions of credibility.

Within a few weeks, diplomats linked these questions to other unilateral treaty-related actions by the Soviet Union. The Soviet High Command, according to the USSR's data books, had resubordinated three motor rifle divisions to naval infantry forces. In terms of CFE Treaty equipment, this meant they had transferred to the naval forces 120 tanks, 753 armored personnel vehicles, and 234 artillery pieces. The Soviet High Command also had established a new kind of naval unit, the coastal defense forces, and assigned to it 813 tanks, 972 ACVs, and 846 artillery pieces. In addition, the Strategic Rocket Forces received 1,791 ACVs.11 During treaty negotiations, delegates considered all this equipment to be a part of the USSR's CFE Treaty TLE ceilings, subject to reduction quotas and inspection protocols. In Vienna, Soviet diplomats argued that since the Soviet High Command had reassigned this equipment to naval units, which they asserted were not included in the treaty, the equipment would not be subject to treaty inspections or ceilings. Further, they asserted that the Strategic Rocket Forces' 1,791 ACVs should be classified as internal security equipment, again outside the treaty's quantitative provisions. Finally, the Soviet data omitted 18 PT-76 armored combat vehicles, which had belonged to the civil defense forces, from the TLE category of heavy armament combat vehicles. Neither in their data submission nor in subsequent discussions did the Soviets give any explanation for this omission.12

Despite these discrepancies, the treaty was signed on November 19, 1990. Nonetheless, four states--the United States, Germany, Canada, and Great Britain--raised specific questions about the Soviet data. The forum they used was the newly established CFE Treaty Joint Consultative Group (JCG).13 One of this group's responsibilities was to seek resolutions of ambiguities in data or differences of interpretation resulting from treaty implementation. Clearly, the dispute with the Soviet Union, a major signatory party, over its initial data submission fell within the scope of the JCG. Article V of the treaty, and a separate protocol, authorized and set forth the responsibilities and procedural rules governing this important joint treaty group. Consisting of representatives from every signatory state, the JCG was to meet in Vienna twice a year, with each session lasting four weeks. In fact, the initial issues were so contentious that the JCG met in nearly continuous monthly sessions beginning in late November 1990.

The state parties had 90 days--until February 15, 1991--to correct any discrepancies in their initial data and to respond to ambiguities. The United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Canada urged the Soviet Union to reconsider its initial submission. During this 90-day period, diplomats from the United States and several other NATO nations sought to use bilateral diplomacy to resolve the issue. Early in December, Ambassador R. James Woolsey, U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator, Brigadier General Daniel W. Christman, USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative, and a small team flew to Moscow to meet with Defense Minister Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, General Moiseyev, and other members of the Soviet Supreme High Command.14 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was not present. Defense Minister Yazov refused categorically to consider any changes to the Soviet position on the former TLE equipment assigned to naval and civil defense units. That equipment, he asserted, might become part of a possible future treaty on conventional naval forces, but the Soviet military did not have to count it with the Soviet Union's TLE for the CFE Treaty. Ambassador Woolsey rejected Yazov's assertion out of hand. He regarded the Soviet defense minister's position as directly contravening the negotiated and signed treaty. An angry confrontation ensued. Woolsey told Yazov that the United States would accept the Soviet position "over my dead body!"15

This exchange hardened the impasse. At subsequent U.S.-USSR diplomatic meetings in Houston, Texas, and Brussels, Belgium, in December 1990 and January 1991, Soviet military leaders remained obdurate. Then, on February 14, 1991, the Soviet Union presented its updated treaty data to the JCG in Vienna. It retained every essential element under dispute--the exempted TLE reassigned to the coastal defense forces, naval infantry forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, and civil defense units. Given this fact, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker declared on the same day that President Bush would not submit the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate for ratification.16

It is interesting that in the midst of this frosty atmosphere, the diplomats resolved one issue: the 20,000-40,000 discrepancy in the Soviets' data. Analysis of two key documents supported the Soviet position. First, Soviet Minister Shevardnadze's letter to Secretary of State Baker, dated October 13, 1990, had contained specific figures on the Soviet forces and equipment in the treaty's zones as well as details on the TLE transfers from 1988 to 1990. Excerpted, the data revealed the following information:



Secretary Baker and General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received these Soviet figures in late October. Then, three weeks later, the Soviets had presented these same figures in Vienna at the initial data exchange. Consequently, continued U.S. objections in the winter of 1990-91 stood on thin ice. The ice got even thinner in January 1991 when U.S. intelligence estimates confirmed that the Soviet Union's data discrepancy was not in the 20,000-40,000 range, but probably entailed 2,000-3,000 items.17 With this new estimate, the issue melted away, losing its power to influence treaty ratification.

What did not disappear, however, was the Soviet High Command's insistence on the legitimacy of resubordinating the three motorized rifle divisions to the naval infantry and the coastal defense forces. This position alone meant that on February 14, 1991, the date when the Soviet Union submitted its updated data, the CFE Treaty was at an impasse. Some believed that the Soviet High Command wanted to stop the CFE Treaty ratification process cold and substitute for the treaty a "status-quo" military relationship of the Soviet Union with Central and Western European nations.18 If this were true, the Soviet military's vision proved to be shortsighted in view of subsequent events.

In the spring and summer months of 1991, the Soviet Union's internal and external policies were subject to larger and more powerful events. In late February, a United Nations coalition, led by the United States, won a decisive victory in the Gulf War over Iraq, a former Soviet ally. Simultaneously, in late January and February, the people of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania rebelled against Soviet imperialism.19 Following a brief, violent confrontation, they won recognition of their sovereignty from Moscow. Then, throughout April, May, and June, President Gorbachev and the Communist central government gradually lost power to Boris Yeltsin, Russian reformers, and nationalistic leaders in the republics. The Soviet High Command's desire to establish a Soviet-dominated imperial security system based on the military status quo became untenable as the Soviet Union unraveled both as an empire and a nation.

While the old system was untenable, it would take many months for the new reality to emerge. The Soviet Union remained a great military power and a major CFE Treaty state party. Following the Gulf War, President Bush began a series of arms control initiatives.20 He directed Secretary of State Baker to initiate diplomatic discussions with Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander A. Bessmertnykh. Baker focused on resolving both the CFE Treaty impasse and the outstanding issues of the still-unsigned Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). In the White House, President Bush set up a small, high-level experts group on arms control to draft presidential letters and new treaty positions and to formulate immediate responses. Led by Arnold Kanter of the National Security Council, this four-person group worked closely with Secretary Baker, Ambassador Woolsey, CFE Treaty Negotiator Hansen, and the START Treaty negotiators. Initially there was little change. In March, Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met with Secretary Baker in Moscow. He asked Baker to reconsider the United States' opposition to the Soviet High Command's resubordination of CFE TLE to naval and coastal defense units. Baker replied: "I don't know what there is to talk about. Twenty-two countries have signed this treaty, and only one has changed the rules."21

Next, President Bush wrote directly to President Gorbachev asking him to resolve the dispute on the reassignment of the military equipment. Secretary Baker made a direct appeal to Bessmertnykh in Russia in late April. Neither Bush's letter nor Baker's personal diplomacy had much effect. Then in late May a breakthrough occurred. President Gorbachev sent General Moiseyev to Washington for a two-day meeting with the president, senior military leaders, and treaty negotiators.22 He brought with him new proposals. General Moiseyev stated the Soviet Union's final position: all equipment in the Soviet naval infantry and coastal defense forces would remain in their units, but they would be counted against the USSR's overall CFE Treaty ceilings. The number of armored personnel vehicles assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) would be limited to 1,701, but they would not be counted against the Soviet Union's aggregate number of treaty ACVs. The naval forces would not be counted as OOVs, limiting the number of inspections the Soviets would be liable for, but these units would still be vulnerable to inspection under the challenge inspection provisions. More important, the naval forces equipment would be counted in Soviet TLE totals. The issue of armored personnel vehicles in the SRF was countered somewhat by the U.S. concern for the security of Soviet nuclear materials if the Soviet Union became less stable. After consideration, U.S. experts accepted the Soviet position. The next day General Moiseyev met with President Bush in the White House. According to a recent account, President Bush was insistent and very firm on the United States' commitment to the treaty and the consequences of any nation trying to back out at this late stage.23 General Moiseyev agreed, stating his support for President Gorbachev, perestroika, and arms control.

The CFE Treaty was multilateral, with 22 signatory nations; no one could deny, however, that bilateral negotiations had resolved this treaty impasse. The United States and the Soviet Union acted decisively, but bilaterally, in reaching these settlements. At times allies were informed; other times they were not. Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany complained that the United States and the USSR were settling multilateral treaty issues among themselves.24 Yet during months of turmoil and real uncertainty, U.S. and Soviet political leaders focused again and again on the CFE Treaty; their persistence produced results.

It was only a matter of weeks from the time of General Moiseyev's Washington visit in May 1991 to the USSR's formal declaration to all other treaty states in Vienna. In early June, Secretary Baker and Ambassador Woolsey flew to Moscow and met with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Soviet CFE Treaty Negotiator Grinevsky. The result was a complex, three-part solution.25 First, France, as a CFE Treaty signatory state, would request that the Netherlands convene an extraordinary conference of state parties to the treaty at The Hague. Next, the Soviet Union, at that conference, would issue a legally binding statement explaining the obligations it would undertake "outside of the framework of the treaty" to account for its TLE holdings within the treaty's area of application. The Soviet Union would declare its willingness to limit the equipment in its naval infantry forces, coastal defense forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces to the exact number previously announced in Vienna. Then, they would declare that 40 months after entry into force, the USSR's maximum TLE holdings would include the total TLE assigned to the naval infantry forces, coastal defense forces, and Strategic Rocket Forces. This meant that the Soviet Union would reduce an equivalent number of TLE elsewhere to meet its maximum holdings. Specifically, the Soviets pledged to destroy or convert 933 tanks, 1,725 ACVs, and 1,080 artillery pieces. They would reduce one-half of the 933 tanks and 1,080 artillery pieces from forces within the ATTU and the other half from forces east of the Urals. The Soviets also stated that they would modify 753 of the 1,725 ACVs to become MTLB-AT types. These were "look-alikes" and thus, not limited by the treaty.26

The Soviets were adamant in their position that the coastal defense forces and naval infantry units were not OOVs and therefore not subject to declared site inspections. They agreed, however, that this equipment would be subject to challenge inspections. They also declared that they would limit the number of armored combat vehicles of the SRF, but that these limits would not count against the total number of ACVs allocated under the CFE Treaty to the Soviet Union. In response to the Soviet Union's statement, each of the other 21 states at the extraordinary conference would issue a statement accepting the Soviet Union's declaration as legally binding and the basis for proceeding toward ratification and implementation. When the extraordinary conference convened at The Hague on June 18, 1991, the respective ambassadors read their carefully crafted, legally binding statements into the record and, with no objections, the chairman accepted them as official treaty documents.27
On the issue of the Soviet military equipment positioned east of the Ural Mountains, the Soviet government presented a politically binding statement to the state delegates attending the CFE's Joint Consultative Group in Vienna. The Soviet Union pledged to destroy or convert to civilian use no fewer than 6,000 tanks, 1,500 ACVs, and 7,000 artillery pieces located beyond the Ural Mountains. They would reduce these items by November 1995 in such a way as to provide "sufficient visible evidence" of their destruction or their having been rendered militarily unsuitable. Essentially, the pledge meant that the Soviet Union would display this equipment so that treaty states could use satellite reconnaissance to monitor and confirm its reduction.28

Once these Soviet legal and political statements had been accepted as official treaty documents, most of the CFE Treaty signatory states turned to ratification. President Bush submitted the CFE Treaty to the U.S. Senate on July 9, 1991, stating, "The CFE Treaty is the most ambitious arms control agreement ever concluded."29 He declared that the treaty was in the "best interests of the United States" and that it was an important step in "defining the new security regime in Europe." Other states went through the ratification process as well. Czechoslovakia was the first nation to ratify the treaty and deposit the instruments of ratification in the treaty depository at The Hague. Other nations followed and by the end of 1991, 14 nations, including Hungary, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, United Kingdom, Poland, Germany, and the United States, had ratified the treaty. Before all the original 22 treaty signatories could complete the ratification process, however, three new developments influenced the treaty.

(jatkuu seuraavassa viestissä)

 

[Antares]

CFE-sopimuksen lyhyt historia jatkuu: LÄHDE

THE SECOND CRISIS: THE BALTIC STATES​

This issue dealt with the legal status of the Soviet Union's TLE in the three Baltic nations--Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia.30 Resolution came expeditiously. None of the Baltic states wanted to become parties to the CFE Treaty. None wanted the Soviet military forces, which they considered to be armies of occupation, to be stationed permanently on their national territory. They were concerned that any treaty participation by a Baltic state would lend legitimacy to a Soviet presence in the Baltics. All desired, however, that the Soviet Union's conventional military equipment and units subject to the treaty still count against the Soviet Union's TLE ceilings and, if possible, be reduced in accordance with the protocols of the treaty.

Recognizing the Baltic nations' demands, and sensing that the Soviet Foreign Ministry was willing to discuss a diplomatic solution, U.S. diplomats in Moscow informally raised the possibility of another "agreed statement" regarding the Soviet Union's CFE Treaty obligations. As a direct consequence of this bilateral diplomacy, the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group convened another extraordinary meeting in Vienna on October 18, 1991.31 The chairman read statements from the Soviet Union and other state parties that stipulated that the three Baltic nations were not parties to the CFE Treaty and that all Soviet TLE on the territory of those states would count against the USSR's treaty ceilings. Read aloud to the assembled state delegates, the statements were accepted without comment. Following procedure, the statements were sent to the treaty depository at The Hague for deposit with the official treaty.32

By this time the Soviet Union as a nation was in a tenuous state. Its government had barely survived a failed coup d'état in mid-August, its ruling Communist party had been outlawed, and its national leadership appeared incapable of stemming the twin forces of a collapsing empire and rising nationalism. By December 1991, the creation of an independent Ukraine and Belarus, and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States, sealed the fate of the USSR. On December 25, 1991, the USSR formally dissolved as a nation and was replaced by 15 newly independent states.33 Eight of these new states--Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine--had former Soviet military forces and units stationed on their territory that were subject to the CFE Treaty. What would be their fate? Would these new nations simply nationalize the military forces stationed on their territory? Or would they seek to join the all-European CFE Treaty and commit themselves to destroying conventional military equipment that could be used by their new armies and air forces? And under what aegis would they discuss joining the CFE Treaty states? They were not members of any international forum such as the CSCE, Warsaw Pact, or NATO.34

THE THIRD CRISIS: NEW STATE PARTIES​

On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus gathered in Minsk, Belarus, to place their signatures on the document creating the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Within a week, the leaders of five other republics--Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan--had met in Ashkhabad, Turkmenistan, and pledged to join the new commonwealth. All the military forces of the collapsing Soviet Union would be placed under the control of this commonwealth. These events signaled not only the end of the Soviet Union as a nation but also its end as a state party to the CFE Treaty. In Vienna, the CFE state delegates sought some mechanism to bring the new republics into the CFE Treaty orbit.35

In the late fall of 1991, a new pan-European organization, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was set up with U.S. and German leadership. By December, its membership consisted of the 16 NATO nations, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and the 15 newly independent states from the former Soviet Union. Shortly after the creation of the CIS in December, the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council invited all member states to meet in Brussels at NATO headquarters on January 10, 1992. The objective was to convene a high level working group to discuss the future of the CFE Treaty. Every state accepted and attended, with the exception of Kazakstan. This was the first time the new CIS nations, represented by their foreign and defense ministers, had been at NATO headquarters. At this historic meeting, they participated as sovereign independent nations, sitting beside the leaders of the former Warsaw Pact nations and, of course, the foreign and defense ministers of the NATO nations.36

In their opening statements, the foreign ministers of the newly independent states declared that the CFE Treaty was "the cornerstone of European security." In his statement, Vladimir Petrovskiy, the Russian representative, asserted that only Russia needed to ratify the CFE Treaty.37 He said that Russia would subsequently negotiate the "necessary adjustments" with the other republics. All other NACC states rejected this Russian interpretation. Instead, they proposed that each of the newly independent states be considered a successor state. Furthermore, following signature and ratification, each would become an original state party to the treaty. This concept carried the day, and after lengthy discussion, the delegates agreed on the following points:38

• The CFE Treaty should enter into force without renegotiation and should be fully implemented as soon as possible.
• Treaty obligations of the former USSR should be wholly accounted for by all the newly independent states and apportioned among them in a manner acceptable to all parties to the treaty.
• All newly independent states in the area of application of the CFE Treaty should ratify the treaty.
• Some updating of the treaty would be necessary, but it would be done after its entry into force.
• The deadline for entry into force should be as soon as possible, preferably by the time of the Helsinki Review Conference (March-July 1992).
• Further work by the high level working group was warranted.

The NACC high level working group met again in February, March, April, and May of 1992. These were extraordinary months for the newly independent states. First, as new nations, they had to define their relationships with the nations of Central and Western Europe. The CFE Treaty lay at the center of the military dimension of this relationship. Second, they had to define their relationship with Russia, the largest and most powerful of the former Soviet republics. Here the CFE Treaty was also a focal point, since it mandated reductions in the former Soviet Union's vast arsenal of conventional weapons. The question of how the USSR's arsenal would be partitioned among the sucessor states, and then how these national portions would be subject to the treaty, had to be decided. The two issues were related, and the working group resolved them in the first six months of 1992.

On January 16, 1992, Russia proposed at a CIS meeting in Minsk that it should receive two-thirds of the ground weapons of the former Soviet Union. At that meeting, Valery Shustov, Russia's CFE Treaty Negotiator, declared that Russia would coordinate the inspection, escort, and reduction activities of all the CIS states implementing the CFE Treaty.39 The other CIS states, especially Ukraine, rejected this assertion. Two weeks later, on January 30, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) admitted 10 CIS states as members. The new states signed letters pledging to "move forward promptly with the ratification of the CFE Treaty and to assume ... all CFE obligations of the former Soviet Union."40 With this important international diplomatic and political act completed, the CIS nations turned to the tough negotiations on partitioning the former Soviet Union's conventional armed forces. They set up a group of experts, largely consisting of senior military officers, who examined force structure, treaty ceilings, and treaty reduction requirements. Throughout February, March, and April of 1992, this group labored to devise a distribution formula acceptable to all states.

It was not easy. At one point, Leonid Kravchuk, then Ukrainian foreign minister, complained about the CIS nations' failure to resolve the CFE Treaty TLE problem: "Not one major military question has been resolved ... within the framework of the Commonwealth."41 Then, in early April, the Russian Parliament voted not to ratify the CFE Treaty, even though the USSR Supreme Soviet had ratified it in 1991. At that point, President Yeltsin intervened, stating that Russia would accept all treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union.42 In separate actions, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan complained that they should be allocated more tanks than proposed by the group of experts. These two nations were locked in an intense ethnic war over separatist Nagorno-Karabakh; consequently, they sought more conventional armaments.

Amidst these internal CIS negotiations, the monthly NACC meetings of the foreign ministers at NATO headquarters continued. These meetings put pressure on Russia and the other successor states to divide the Soviet Union's entitlements and obligations in an equitable manner. In April 1992, Ambassador Lynn M. Hansen, the U.S. CFE Treaty Negotiator who had replaced Ambassador R. James Woolsey in June 1991, led a small delegation to Minsk, Kiev, Chisinau, and Moscow to discuss treaty ratification and implementation.43 On this same trip, Ambassador Hansen's delegation met in Moscow with representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakstan. Over the course of 10 days, Hansen learned that all the newly independent states had the political will to achieve an agreement on the CFE Treaty TLE. He also discovered that the smaller states distrusted Russia's tactics and attitudes. Characteristically, Hansen went directly to see the Russian first deputy foreign minister; they discussed ratification of the treaty. Hansen told him "an agreement was there for the taking, if they would just modify the way they negotiated."44 The Russian minister listened, but action would not come until mid-May.

Finally, following further CIS negotiating sessions in Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, and other capitals, the leaders of the successor states met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on May 15, 1992. There they signed an agreement on the division of the former Soviet Union's CFE Treaty obligations and entitlements.45 The Russian military was instrumental in devising this agreement; without their detailed work it would not have happened. The division at Tashkent is detailed in table 3-3.



With the Tashkent accords signed on May 15, 1992, attention turned to Vienna where the CFE Treaty's Joint Consultative Group was meeting in preparation for a third Extraordinary Conference. In Vienna, the state delegates drafted a document, to be signed on June 5, 1992, at an Extraordinary Conference in Oslo. This document made legal both the entry of the new state parties and their acceptance of all the obligations and entitlements of the former USSR. In short order, the JCG delegates and technical specialists drafted new treaty annexes containing treaty understandings, notifications, confirmations, and commitments. They incorporated the new annexes into the "Final Document," which changed the wording in the treaty to reflect the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the inclusion of eight new state parties. The Final Document set a deadline of July 1, 1992, for each signatory state to provide to all other states information concerning inspections and verification. In addition, it stated that the TLE reduction liabilities of the new state parties collectively would be no different from those of the former Soviet Union. It also reaffirmed the two previous JCG statements: the Soviet Union's June 15, 1991, statement regarding the TLE reassigned to the naval infantry and coastal defense forces, and the October 18, 1991, Soviet statement on the status of TLE stationed on the territory of the three Baltic nations. Finally, it addressed the problem of stationing armored infantry fighting vehicles (AIFVs) on the flanks; but it left resolution to the JCG forum following entry into force.

All of these changes and new annexes were incorporated into the treaty, translated into the six treaty languages, and presented at the Oslo Extraordinary Conference. There, delegates from the now 29 signatory states signed the new documents on June 5, 1992. The CFE Treaty stipulated that from that moment the eight new states were "original state parties" and that each assumed the same rights and obligations that every other state party had under the treaty.46

THE LAST CRISIS: FINAL RATIFICATION​

Following the Oslo conference, attention turned to completing ratification and exchanging final treaty documents at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on July 9-10, 1992. Of the 29 states that were party to the treaty, 11 had not ratified and deposited their instruments of ratification at The Hague as of mid-June. As stipulated by the treaty, entry into force would occur 10 days after all the states had deposited their ratification articles. Turkey ratified on June 18, Moldova on July 1, and Russia on July 8. Five other nations deposited their ratification articles on July 6, 8, and 9. That left three nations--Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakstan--that would not, or could not, act in time for the CSCE summit in Helsinki, slated for July 9-10. Treaty diplomats in Vienna viewed this inaction as disastrous; the 26 states that had completed ratification held more than 90 percent of the treaty's TLE, units, territory, and zones. Further delay might dissipate the momentum created in the past seven months.

When Ambassador Hansen returned to Vienna from Oslo in mid-June, he realized that the Helsinki summit might be held without a ratified CFE Treaty and no entry into force. "Near panic struck," he recalled. "One night, in the middle of the night, I concluded what we had to do. I said: `We have to provisionally implement the whole treaty.'"47 For a multinational, 29-nation treaty, this was a radical idea. The next day when Hansen called Washington and discussed the idea with U.S. international treaty lawyers, "They rejected it totally." Then, he recalled, "We had a bit of a screaming match."48 Hansen won; but the president and key U.S. senators had to approve the concept before U.S. officials could discuss it with the NATO allies and the other signatory nations. When the secretary of state, the president, and the senators approved, events moved swiftly.

Over the next 10 days, Ambassador Hansen and the other state negotiators in Vienna explained, cajoled, and succeeded in persuading their colleagues to accept the concept of provisional implementation of the CFE Treaty. Meanwhile, new documents were prepared in six languages for the 29 states to approve and sign in Helsinki. On July 10, 1992, representatives of all state parties met in Helsinki for the fourth extraordinary conference on the CFE Treaty. They signed three documents. In the first, the individual states agreed to provisionally implement the CFE Treaty. In the second, the individual states affirmed the relationship between the CFE Treaty and the CFE 1A agreement, officially titled: The Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Essentially, CFE 1A was a "political" statement by each of the treaty states declaring that they would not exceed self-imposed limits on military manpower strength. The limits were, in fact, quite high. Consequently, the treaty's national manpower figures were not as significant as the fact that they were declared in a politically binding treaty. These figures were subject to monitoring and questioning, and if exceeded, the guilty states would be subject to international censure. This was the first time in the twentieth century that the European nations, acting collectively, had agreed to limits on their national military forces. In the third document, each signatory state declared it would provisionally implement the CFE 1A Concluding Act. Then, and only then, could treaty implementation begin.49

These actions set the clock running on entry into force, but they did not complete the formal ratification process. Armenia deposited its ratified CFE Treaty instruments at The Hague on October 12, 1992. Belarus and Kazakstan completed the group of original states by depositing their instruments of ratification on October 30. Ten days later, on November 9, the CFE Treaty and the CFE 1A Concluding Act officially entered into force.50

SUMMING UP​

It had taken 24 months--November 1990 to November 1992--to move from treaty signature through the national ratifications to official entry into force. Along the way a series of treaty-related crises had been resolved: TLE relocations, resubordinations, reclassifications, new state parties, redistribution of the former USSR's entitlements and obligations, and new national manpower ceilings. But the larger, more serious crisis of the Soviet Union's collapse struck at the existence of the CFE Treaty. In the face of turmoil and revolution, German, French, American, Russian, British, and Central European leaders and diplomats had fought hard to retain the treaty. Throughout these difficulties, the CFE Treaty retained its importance for the future of Europe. With treaty operations about to start, attention turned to the national inspection agencies and their inspectors who would monitor the treaty, and the military services that would reduce and account for thousands of items of treaty-limited equipment.

For the United States, the On-Site Inspection Agency had the mission of conducting the CFE Treaty inspections and escorts. During the long and arduous two-year ratification process, OSIA's European Operations Command underwent what Colonel Lawrence Kelley, Chief of Operations, called "Standing Up the Unit."



CFE-sopimuksen valmistelusta sekä käytännön toteutuksesta allekirjoittamisen jälkeen voi lukea paljon lisää täältä:

https://nuke.fas.org/control/cfe/cfebook/tabcon.html

Kuvat ovat hävinneet eetteriin mutta teksti on edelleen tallessa. Lainaamani teksti on kappale 3 kokonaisuudessaan.

 

[Antares]

T-72BA vaunuista, osa sanoo tämän modernisointiprojektin kestäneen 1998-2005, toisten mukaan jatkui tuota pidempään, mahdollisesti jopa T-72B3 modernisoinnin alkamiseen asti eli vuoteen 2011.

Alexey Khlopotovin (tunnetaan myös nimimerkin Gur Khan kirjoituksista) mukaan T-72BA modernisointi olisi jatkunut vuoteen 2011 asti, tosin ei jatkuvana vaan erissä. Hän kirjoitti vuonna 2009 että näitä vaunuja olisi luovutettu asevoimille "yli sata" ja olen nähnyt usein numeron 150 kpl.

Khlopotovilla on hyvin tiiviit välit Nizhny Tagilin tehtaan kanssa, ymmärtääkseni hän on ollut viime vuosina (ellei jo kauemmin) tehtaan palkkalistoilla jossakin roolissa. Täten hänellä pitäisi olla pääsy hyviin lähteisiin kaiken T-72 ja T-90 liittyvän osalta - toki se mitä valitsee julkaistavaksi on asia erikseen, tuskin julkaisee kaikkea mitä tietää.

Ensimmäisiä armeijalle luovutettavia T-72B3 vaunuja käsittelevässä artikkelissa 6.12.2011 Khlopotov kirjoittaa näin: LÄHDE

The modernized T-72BA tank (kutsui vaunuja tällä nimellä ennen kuin virallinen T-72B3 nimi julkistettiin), which has been produced at Uralvagonzavod with interruptions and minor changes since 1998 (for more details, see the article “T-72BA Tank” on the Courage website and Khlopotov A. Tank T-72BA: mediocre modernization or modernization within the means ? // Equipment and armament. - 2009, No. 10) by the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century is not distinguished by the technical perfection of the design - the reluctance of the Russian Defense Ministry to carry out a full-fledged "expensive" modernization is to blame. However, starting in 2011, one fundamental change was made to its design, which dramatically increased the combat capabilities of the vehicle. This innovation was the installation of a new, modern level, the Sosna-U fire control system.

The Sosna-U control system of the modernized T-72BA tank is in many ways similar to the Kalina control system of the modernized T-90MS tank and differs from it only in the absence of the commander's panoramic sight and the preservation of the 1A40-1 sighting system as a backup sight, i.e. more than 3/4 in composition is unified with the Kalina OMS. In general, it must be said that the scientific and technical groundwork created during the development and modernization of the T-90 tank is being successfully implemented in the modernization of the T-72 series tanks. The new version of the modernization of the T-72BA tank is a good example. The modernized T-72BA tank is gradually introducing the proven basic technical solutions from the T-90MS tank: armament (2A46M5 cannon, automatic loader for a promising BPS), a motor-transmission unit with a V-92S2 engine (1000hp), chassis. At the same time, for economic reasons, the cast turret of tanks is preserved.

The next step is the introduction of the design of an improved universal dynamic protection, worked out as part of the Relict R&D. However, for now, one has to be content with the remote sensing of the previous generation - "Contact - V ". "Relic" is apparently too expensive for our Russian Ministry of Defense - as if this "savings" then did not turn back to him, if the tanks "go to war." In other respects, “saving” on protection seems to have its own trend - for example, the priority in the modernization of the T-72 tanks for Algeria is also, first of all, bringing the SLA to the level of the T-90S, and improving mobility due to the unification of the chassis and logistics, all with the same T-90S.

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Tuossa kuvaillaan tosiaan T-72B3 vaunuja joihin asennettiin Sosna-U lämpötähtäin, toisin kuin sitä edeltäneisiin T-72BA vaunuihin. Khlopotovin kirjoituksen perusteella T-72BA olisi ollut vaiheittain tuotannossa 2011 vuoteen asti - "with interruptions and minor changes".

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Tämän artikkelin ovat kirjoittaneet Alexey Khlopotov (tunnetaan myös nimimerkin Gur Khan kirjoituksista), Vladislav Belogrud, Vyacheslav Vovnov - 09/01/2012 LÄHDE

Paljon samaa sisältävä artikkeli on julkaistu pidemmässä ja yksityiskohtaisemmassa muodossa jo vuonna 2009, erityisesti kerrotaan tarkemmin Uralvagonzavodin alunperin 90-luvulla tarjoamasta versiosta (joka hylättiin liian kalliina). ТЕХНИКА И ВООРУЖЕНИЕ № 10/2009, стр. 17-31 - ТАНК Т-72БА: ПОСРЕДСТВЕННАЯ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ ИЛИ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ ПО СРЕДСТВАМ?
LÄHDE

Tämä on Google Translate -käännös, minkä takia jotkin termit yms. on hieman outoja. Lihavoinnit ovat alkuperäisestä tekstistä, jätin ne ennalleen.

HUOM: artikkelia lukiessa on hyvä muistaa kokoajan että se on kirjoitettu vuonna 2009. Venäjä osti uusia T-90A vaunuja 2004-2011 (tai 2012, lähteestä riippuen). Kuten tekstistä nähdään, Khlopotov vastustaa vanhojen vaunujen modernisointia kalliina jos vertaa kokonaan uusien vaunujen tekemiseen:

TANK T-72BA - DESCRIPTION, PHOTO REPORT AND PHOTO DETAILING​

The history of the appearance in the Russian armed forces of the modernized T-72BA tank dates back to the beginning of the 90s of the twentieth century. In 1991, the Nizhny Tagil "Uralvagonzavod" continued to produce the T-72B tank , its export modification T-72S , together with UKBTM carried out work to modernize and improve the "object 184" , was preparing for mass production of the "object 188" , in parallel, work was carried out on even more promising cars. At the same time, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant was also engaged in the production of "Beshki". However, the collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to production plans. The abrupt cessation of funding for defense programs has put enterprises on the brink of survival.

Mass production of T-72B was phased out at both factories. Moreover, the production of tanks at ChTZ was curtailed completely and forever. UVZ for some time continued to produce export products, engineering vehicles and cherished hopes for the deployment of a large series of T-90 ("object 188") . However, the landslide conversion of 1992 forced Uralvagonzavod to take up a new business for itself - to master the repair of T-72B tanks , as well as the repair of T-72A with modernization to the level of T-72B. This, it would seem, is not a difficult task that required considerable study. It was necessary, first of all, to determine the workshop where the actual disassembly of the machines. Work out the fault detection technology, develop measures for organizing and sending units and assemblies to workshops and third-party repair plants. Organize the drain of fuel and oils and much more.

In 1992, for the purpose of the experiment, UVZ repaired 10 vehicles for the Moscow Region in the T-72B and B1 versions . At the same time, the cost of repairing the T-72A with refinement to the T-72B level amounted to 8,400,000 rubles, and to the T-72B1 level - 6,850,000-6,400,000 rubles, respectively. At the same time, for reference, the cost of the T-72S manufactured in the same period was 14,500,000 rubles.* [ internal prices are indicated at the time of the events described ]. Thus, the modernization was 44-58% of the cost of a new tank. The quality of the repair directly at the manufacturing plant was recognized as higher than the repair carried out by the TRZ MO, however, its high cost compared to the same TRZ was frightening. However, the management of UVZ, represented by the general director Seryakov V.S. arrived in good hopes planning to carry out in 1993 the repair of up to 40 cars per month. Together with UKBTM, 3 options for deep modernization were developed:

1st option "B" with the installation of VDZ, "Curtains" and KUV "Svir" ;

2nd option "B1" with the installation of VDZ and "Curtains" ;

3rd option “so-called. ideal "with the installation of the SUO 1A45 , closed memory, VDZ, " Shtoroy " and KUV " Reflex " .

Only these good intentions were not destined to come true, because. the deep modernization program was not continued due to the lack of funds from the Ministry of Defense. Instead, in 1993, UVZ carried out simple repairs in small batches with minimal product modifications. From 1994 to 1997, inclusive, no work was carried out to modernize and repair the T-72 .

With the change of the general director (in July 1997, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Malykh took over this position), work in the field of repair / modernization of the T-72s also revived. In 1998, in order to practice modernization skills, it was decided to take 20-30 products from the Moscow Region for overhaul. In March 1998, the ideology of improvements was determined. For the “object 172M”, it consisted mainly in replacing the V-46 engine with the V-84 , installing an automated control system, a thermal imager and VDZ “Kontakt-5”.

By the end of the year (huom. 1998 vuoden loppuun mennessä), the first machine, upgraded according to this scheme, went on the run, and the second was completed by mounting the turret on the hull. Both cars were supposed to be shown at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi. However, this option again turned out to be expensive for the native MO. In addition to these machines, which became prototypes for further development of export options for modernization, 15 machines "object 184" and "object 172M" were overhauled .

The volume of improvements, as well as 5 years ago, they were small. In the next 1999 MSZ UVZ already repaired 30 T-72B and B1 machines. It is time to "legitimize" the improvements carried out during the repair, and therefore, in the period from 15.10. on November 26, 2000, state tests of the upgraded tank were carried out. After their successful completion, the tank was adopted by the Russian Army under the designation "T-72BA" ( "object 184A" and "object 184A1" according to in-plant documentation).

The first series of vehicles upgraded in this way (1998-2000) were equipped with the Kontakt hinged dynamic protection complex (part of the Contact-5 ), modified to the level of T-72B of the latest production series (1991) SUO 1A40-1 . Externally, the machine with a modified SLA is distinguished by the presence of an atmospheric conditions sensor DVE-BS in the aft part of the turret . Transcription "DVE-BS" stands for "capacitive wind sensor with interface unit". It is the interface unit that is responsible for integrating this sensor into the SLA 1A40-1 . The MSA provides fully automatic operation, but the input of the total correction remained manual. Later on T-72BA began to install the modernized Krasnogorsk "Zenith" SUO 1A40-1M . Distinctive features of the modernized complex are:

• the presence of a tank ballistic computer (TBV) on the microprocessor;

• taking into account the crosswind, roll, angular velocity of the target, individual takeoff angles and deviations of the initial velocity of the projectiles;

• automatic input of aiming angles and lateral lead when firing from a cannon and coaxial machine gun;

• semi-automatic tracking of a moving target;

• calculation of aiming angles and lateral lead for the commander's sight.

The SLA 1A40-1 and 1A40-1M includes the Svir KUV with 9M119 and 9M119M missiles . The guided projectile guidance device is built into the 1K13-49 periscopic passive-active night sight .

In 2005, after the next modifications, it was put into service and the 1A40-M2 sighting system began to be installed .

The standard weapon stabilizers 2E28M and 2E42-2 were replaced with the new 2E42-4 . Armament stabilizer 2E42-4 "Jasmine" two-plane with electric machine drive in horizontal and electro-hydraulic in vertical planes. Provides a median value of stabilization accuracy in the main mode vertically 0.4 td, horizontally 0.6 td.

Instead of diesel engines V-84-1 and V-84M of the T-72B tank , which have a problem in the form of overheating and burnout of the exhaust manifold, an improved engine of this family is installed on the T-72BA - diesel V-84MS . On the exhaust manifolds of this engine, bellows are installed that mix the exhaust gases with atmospheric air, which improved the temperature regime of the manifold and reduced the thermal visibility of the tank. Such engines were first installed on the export version of the T-72B - the T-72S "Shilden" tank . Similar to the T-90 tank mod. In 1993, the transmission was finalized. Since 1999 on modernized T-72BA a new undercarriage with a caterpillar with a parallel RMSH (drawing 172.55.010sb1) and with the possibility of installing asphalt shoes (drawing 188.91.009sp) was installed, respectively, new sloth and sprocket of the drive wheel were used.

In the area where the driver's seat was located, the PMZ of the bottom was reinforced. Under the driver's seat, a transverse piller was installed and two additional stiffening ribs under the bottom. A spacer stand is installed next to the seat, and the driver's seat itself is suspended from the roof of the hull. Overhead armor plates are installed between the stiffening ribs (option).

During repairs, the fenders are modified to comply with drawing 185.40.005sb adopted on the T-72B since 1989, while the front metal mudguards are replaced with “soft” rubber-metal ones without fail.

The next series of machines (1999-2002) was generally similar to the first, but already had the VDZ complex "Contact-5" . "Contact-5" was also equipped with several cars modernized in 1999, and in 2000 there were cars with NDZ, so the division into series adopted by the author is somewhat arbitrary.

Since 2003, a unified MTO with a 1000-horsepower V-92S2 diesel engine, worked out on the T-90S of the Indian order, was introduced on the T-72BA , similar to the MTO installations on the T-90A . In addition to the engine, this includes a reinforced transmission, aluminum radiators with increased heat dissipation, a modified air cleaning system with a long confuser pipe. Introduced IR camouflage similar to the T-90A . The undercarriage has been improved - the dynamic course of the rollers has been increased. Installed PPO with control system 3ETs13-1 . Communications complex "Passage" , which includes the UKB radio station R-173 , radio receiver R-173P, a block of antenna filters and AVSK R-174 . The radio station operates in the frequency range of 30-76 MHz and has a memory device that allows you to prepare ten communication frequencies in advance. It provides a communication range of at least 20 km both on the spot and on the move over medium rough terrain. An automatic sludge drain valve was installed, a night device for the driver TVN-5 .

All tanks leaving the factory after modernization are painted with standard protective paint. Camouflage, if necessary, is applied in combat units. At the same time, the schemes of deforming staining are variations of the schemes prescribed by the 1978 instruction.

Modern schemes of deforming coloring, developed by the Research Institute of Steel together with UKBTM, are not used for unknown reasons.

It should be noted that T-72B tanks of various production series and submodifications are being sent for overhaul and modernization . At the same time, in the process of repair, depersonalization and bringing to a single standard takes place. So, for example, in 2006, 2 T-72B tanks , produced by UVZ in the spring of 1991 according to the specification "Object 184 with TSHU", were received for repairs . During the inspection of the machines, it was decided not to restore the TSHU complex, the repair should be carried out according to standard repair documentation. The only differences that remain with machines that have undergone repair and modernization work relate to the level of protection. So during the serial production of the T-72B from 1985 to 1991, the design of the combined filling of the VLD of the hull and chines in the tower was repeatedly changed. Repair documentation for the "Object 184A" and "Object 184A1" does not provide for interference with the existing design of the reservation. In the presence of combat damage to the hull and turret, they are repaired in accordance with the "Instructions for the repair of the BP", in extreme cases, the turret can be replaced with a similar one taken from an early disposed tank. For the purposes of such repairs, as well as for the modernization of vehicles of very early releases, the GABTU creates a reserve of tank turrets, and only turrets of drawing 172.10.100sb and production no earlier than 1989 go to the reserve. Cases of repairing machines with combat damage are not so rare.

As a clear illustration, we can recall the repair of 5 machines with "holes" in the hull and turrets that came to the plant in 2005. Among them was found "seventy-two" who took part in the battles of 1996 for the city of Grozny. During the battle, at the moment when the gun was already loaded, the tank "caught" an RPG grenade in the side projection of the tower. The crew in the turret were killed. After removing the remains of the bodies of the dead tankers, the car was sent first to the collection and evacuation point, and then to storage. There, on one of the armored personnel carriers, the car stood for almost 9 years with the OFS in the barrel. In the spring of 2005, as part of a batch of about 30 cars, she entered Uralvagonzavod for repairs. Upon examination, traces of blood and half-decomposed remains of human tissues were found. Immediately, a kind of "gift" was found in the chamber of the gun. The car was evacuated to the artillery and ammunition range of the Institute for Metal Testing, where it was discharged with the necessary precautions. In general, the condition of the machines coming to the plant from the troops is beyond any criticism. Often, everything that can be looted, broken, dismantled. Moss, herbs, and even... birch trees grow on the armor and on the shelves!

The scheme of repair work with modernization is approximately as follows:

1. Delivery of a batch of machines to the plant with BH or military unit

2. Unloading

3. Draining fuel, oils and other liquids

4. Complete dismantling

5. Detection of components and assemblies

6. Shot blasting

7. Modification of the body for the installation of the engine, transmission, control drives and engine systems

8. Finalization of the tower for the installation of the FCS, guns, modified automatic loader

9. Coloring

10. Repair of components and assemblies

11. Manufacture and purchase of new components and assemblies

12. Installation of systems, components and assemblies (both new and overhauled) in the building:

• completion and installation of upgraded final drives and internal gearboxes;

• installation of a new or overhauled engine;

• installation of a new transmission;

• installation of new engine systems;

• installation of new control drives;

• installation of a new running gear;

• installation of new wiring and electrical equipment;

• installation of the PPO system;

• installation of new means of communication;

• installation of a new automatic loader, etc. etc.

13. Installation of systems, components and assemblies (both new and overhauled) in the tower and on the tower:

• installation of lining and lining;

• installation of weapons;

• installation of LMS elements;

• installation of new means of communication, etc. etc.

14. Mounting the tower on the hull

15. Installation of the DZ complex

16. Adjustment and inspection work

17. Coloring

18. Acceptance tests

19. Shipment

This scheme explains the high cost of modernization relative to the release of a new machine. Technologically, modernization, in fact, turns out to be identical to the creation of a new machine. The difference in costs lies only in the fact that in the case of modernization, there are costs for disassembling the machine and preparing the hull with the turret for subsequent installation work, and with new production, there are costs for the procurement of materials and the actual manufacture of the hull and turret. It may seem that manufacturing from scratch is a more time-consuming and costly process.

However, it is not. The design of Soviet generation machines provides for conveyor mass production with a high level of automation and mechanization of work. This leads to a significant reduction in the cost of hull work and, as a result, the machine as a whole. In addition, the State, through the institution of military acceptance, very tightly controls the cost of the work performed and the level of their profitability, even in our modern completely market capitalist conditions. Work on the dismantling and disassembly of the machine that came for overhaul is mostly manual and labor-intensive. Also, manual hull work during the ongoing modernization is very labor-intensive - cutting and welding.

All this makes a simple overhaul completely unprofitable for the manufacturer, and repair with modernization - unprofitable for the customer. It is no coincidence that for the purposes of overhaul in the USSR, a whole network of tank repair plants of central subordination was created in the structure of the Ministry of Defense. The lower cost of repairs on them was due to the lack of commercial costs of the enterprise and the almost zero level of planned profitability. Spare parts and equipment needed for repairs were supplied either from storage and the State Reserve or through mass serial orders. In addition, BTRZ, as a rule, did not perform complex hull work.

Approximately similar scheme for major repairs and upgrades exists abroad. Particularly in the USA. In addition to the fact that all work related to the repair and modernization of BTTs is carried out at state arsenals, their profitability is also determined by the higher commercial value of the new machine. In addition, BTRZ, as a rule, did not perform complex hull work.

The paradox of the situation is that in the USSR and Russia, by saving on the purchase of new equipment, strictly controlling its cost, we make further improvement of the machine and its modernization during overhauls economically inexpedient with our own hands. Although the modernization of the same T-72, but exported, say to India or Algeria, is quite a profitable event for both the contractor and the customer, and precisely because the cars were originally sold at a higher, “commercial” cost.

The first appearance of the T-72BA in public took place in July 2000 during the exhibition of weapons "Ural Expo Arms - 2000" at the Nizhny Tagil artillery range "Staratel". To demonstrate the capabilities of the Rusich Kurgan tractors , Uralvagonzavod, as a hospitable host, provided a car for the "load" of the conveyor. This machine turned out to be T-72BA preparing to surrender to the troops. By that time, the NDZ complex had not yet been mounted on it, there were no side screens. So that the “seventy-two” with its somewhat “unfinished” appearance would not embarrass the public and distinguished guests, the car was carefully wrapped in a tarpaulin, so much so that it was somehow possible to distinguish only part of the trunk. It was not without a curiosity: the video from this demonstration, shown in one of the Strike Force programs of Channel 1, flavored with comments about the imminent appearance of a new promising tank in Russia, gave rise to a wave of rumors that a fundamentally new Russian combat vehicle was hiding under the tarpaulin ( see .video tank_T-72AB.avi ). The reality was much simpler and more banal...

At present, most of the upgraded T-72BAs are located in the PUrVO units. At the moment, the T-72BA tanks "lit up" in the 276th infantry regiment, 239th infantry regiment of the 34th infantry division, as well as in 81 infantry division and 152 infantry regiment of the 27th infantry division. Almost every year they can be seen at demonstrations of military equipment dedicated to the Victory Day holiday in the cities of Yekaterinburg and Samara. T-72BAs regularly participate in the Air Defense exercises, including such large-scale exercises as the Southern Shield-2006, the summer 2008 exercises in Ashuluk, and the Center-2008 autumn maneuvers . Moreover, the following fact was noticed during the exercises: T-72BA tanks, as a rule, are vehicles of platoon commanders.

Further deliveries of the T-72BA , judging by some reports, are planned for parts of the North Caucasus Military District (Vladikavkaz).

At the behest of the time , a computerized training complex in a container version was developed for training the crews of T-72BA tanks, which received the designation "MKT-184A" . At the time of publication, it is known about the supply of at least two sets of this complex to military units stationed respectively in the cities of Yekaterinburg and Vladikavkaz.

It is rather difficult to evaluate this modernization option. According to its ideology, it is outdated by 15 years, but it is fully consistent with the modern technical level, adjusted for operating conditions in the modern Russian Army. Particularly strong criticism, apparently, needs to be subjected to the SLA for the lack of a thermal imager in its composition. However, this variant of the SLA was implemented by UKBTM in several more expensive upgrade options for the T-72 . In 1998-99 the selling price of the plant for these machines was lower than their cost by 13-34%. UVZ did the modernization of tanks for our Army at a loss. Today, the Defense Ministry is also in no hurry to become generous - deliveries are on the verge of profitability. Thus, T-72BA can be called "modernization for the money" - what you paid for, you got! UVZ and UKBTM should not be blamed for conservative approaches and technical backwardness. At the moment, they only fulfill the requirements of the customer with very scarce funding.


Kuvateksti: The T-72B underwent a major overhaul with modifications at UVZ in 1998. In appearance, such vehicles can be easily confused with the T-72S tanks that entered the Russian army in 1993 after the failure of a number of export deliveries. The only external difference between the T-72S and the repair T-72B of 1998 is the absence of an anti-neutron knockout on the tower. The second distinguishing feature: a smaller number of NDZ containers on the side screens is not indicative - the troops may well hang regular screens from the T-72B, or even do without them


Kuvateksti: One of the early T-72BAs. On this tank, the head of the atmospheric parameter sensor was dismantled - apparently the troops did not know how to work with it and took it out of harm's way - it's more reliable in the old fashioned way!


Kuvateksti: T-72BA late series at UVZ are preparing to be sent to the troops

Alkuperäisen artikkelin yhteydessä on monta sivua kuvia, tässä linkki ensimmäiselle kuvasivulle. Huomaa että pitää kelata ihan sivun alareunaan asti, sieltä löytyy seuraavien sivujen linkit: LINKKI

 

[Antares]

Jatkoa T-72BA modernisaation osalta, lainaan Khlopotov vuonna 2009 julkaistusta artikkelista. ТЕХНИКА И ВООРУЖЕНИЕ № 10/2009, стр. 17-31 - ТАНК Т-72БА: ПОСРЕДСТВЕННАЯ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ ИЛИ МОДЕРНИЗАЦИЯ ПО СРЕДСТВАМ? LÄHDE

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The history of the appearance in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of the modernized T-72BA tank dates back to the beginning of the 1990s. In 1991, the production of the T-72B tank ("object 184") and its export modification T-72S continued at the Nizhny Tagil Uralvagonzavod (UVZ); together with UKBTM, work was underway to modernize and improve the T-72B, and mass production of the T-90 (“object 188”) was being prepared. In parallel, work was underway on more promising machines. At the same time, the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ) was also engaged in the manufacture of "Bash-ki".

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union crossed out these plans. The abrupt cessation of funding for defense programs has put enterprises on the brink of survival. Serial production of the T-72B was curtailed at both plants. Moreover, the production of tanks at ChTZ ended forever. For some time, UVZ continued to assemble export products, engineering vehicles and cherished hopes for the deployment of a large series of T-90s. But the landslide conversion in 1992 forced Uralvagonzavod to take up a new business for itself - to master the repair of T-72B tanks, as well as T-72A (with modernization to the level of T-72B).

This seemingly simple task required considerable study. It was necessary, first of all, to determine the workshop where the machines were to be dismantled. To work out the defect detection technology, develop measures for organizing and sending units and assemblies to workshops and third-party repair plants, organize the draining of fuel, oils, and much more. After all, UVZ is, first of all, a manufacturing plant. In the USSR, special tank repair plants (TRZ) of the Ministry of Defense were engaged in tank repair, for which technologies, equipment, equipment, tools were created and mastered for a long time, there were specially trained personnel.

In 1992 UVZ repaired 10 vehicles in the T-72B and B11 versions for the purpose of the experiment. At the same time, the cost of repairing the T-72A with refinement to the level of T-72B or B1, according to various estimates, was 44-58% of the cost of a new tank.

The quality of repair directly at the manufacturing plant was recognized as higher than the repair carried out by the TRZ MO, however, its high cost compared to the same TRZ was frightening. This was explained simply: UVZ is a gigantic enterprise, with a huge level of overhead costs and all kinds of costs. With the mass production of tanks, these costs were proportionally “smeared” over the entire series, but in this case, with a sharp reduction in the serial production of tanks, all costs had to be written off for the meager number of vehicles that went through repairs. In addition, the so-called "purchased" products contributed to the growth in cost. Uralvagonzavod had to fight with component suppliers for every penny. And this despite that in the conditions of the collapsed public procurement system, many counterparties simply began to curtail production. Nevertheless, the leadership of Uralvagonzavod, represented by General Director BC Seryakov, was in good hopes, planning to carry out repairs in 1993 of up to 40 cars per month. Together with UKBTM, three options for deep modernization were developed:

- option "B" - with the installation of built-in dynamic protection (VDZ) and KOEP "Shtora";

- option "B1" - with the installation of VDZ, KOEP "Shtora" and KUV "Svir";

- the so-called "ideal" option - with the installation of the SUO 1A45, a closed storage device, VDZ, KOEP "Shtora" and KUV "Reflex"2.

Only these good intentions were not destined to come true, since the program of deep modernization was not continued due to the complete lack of funds from the customer. Instead, in 1993, simple repairs were carried out in small batches with minimal modifications to the products. From 1994 to 1997 inclusive, the modernization and repair of the T-72 was not carried out. It must be emphasized that the actions of VS Seryakov during this period brought the association to the brink of existence. With the change of the General Director (in July 1997, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Malykh assumed this position), work in the field of repair and modernization of the T-72 resumed.

In 1998, in order to practice modernization skills, it was decided to take 20-30 tanks for overhaul. In March 1998, the ideology of improvements was determined. For the "172M object", it consisted mainly in replacing the V-46 engine with the V-84, installing an automated control system, a thermal imager and the Kontakt-V VDZ3. By the end of the year, the first machine, upgraded according to this scheme, went on the run, and the second was completed by mounting the turret on the hull. Both cars were supposed to be shown at an exhibition in Abu Dhabi4. However, this option was again recognized as too expensive. In addition to this machine, which became a prototype for further development of export options for modernization, 15 "objects 184" and "172M" were overhauled. The volume of improvements on them, as well as 5 years ago, was small.

The vehicles that underwent a major overhaul with modifications at UVZ in 1998 can be easily confused in appearance with the T-72S tanks that entered our army in 1993 after a number of export deliveries were disrupted. The only external difference between the "eSka" and the repair T-72B of 1998 is the absence of an anti-neutron knockout on the tower. The second distinguishing feature - a smaller number of NDZ containers on the side screens - is not indicative: the troops may well hang standard screens from the T-72B, or even do without them. The “head” of the DVE sensor on these machines in the troops was most often dismantled (probably the crews had no idea how to work with it, and they removed it out of harm’s way, preferring to act in the old fashioned way).

In 1999, 30 T-72B and T-72B1 tanks were already repaired at Uralvagonzavod, which had a number of differences from the repair vehicles of 1998. These tanks received an updated undercarriage with a track with a parallel RMSh, and some vehicles were equipped with the Kontakt-V VDZ complex . As part of the development work carried out by UKBTM, the tasks of strengthening firepower, improving the security and mobility of serial vehicles were solved. Given the wide range of tasks set, the large number of co-executors involved and the difficulties with financing, the topic dragged on for many years, representing, in the end, an endless series of separate stages.

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Tuota seuraa pitkä kuvaus Nizhny Tagilin esittämästä T-72 vaunujen modernisaatiosta, jota en ala toistamaan tässä. Sen voi lukea linkin takaa (siinä on myös reilusti mustavalko kuvia jotka havainnollistavat mistä puhutaan), jos on kiinnostunut yksityiskohdista: lyhyesti sanottuna se on yhdistelmä T-72B obr 1989 ja T-90 obr 1992 vaunujen eri piirteitä, joilla vanhat varastovaunut tuotaisiin lähellä tai vastaavaksi T-90 vaunujen kanssa. Tämä esitys hylättiin liian kalliina, mutta johti monivaiheiseen T-72BA:na tunnettuun modernisointiprosessiin.

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The above measures are undoubtedly progressive in nature and significantly increase the capabilities of the modernized T-72B tank, but do not forget that most of them are just the embodiment of developments and backlogs of ten, or even 20-25 years ago! Moreover, the realities of life in modern Russia have made significant adjustments to this specification.

Thus, the first series of tanks that underwent repairs in 1998-2000 were mostly equipped with the Kontakt mounted dynamic protection system, and only a part of them had a built-in Kontakt-V remote sensing system. All vehicles that underwent repairs from 1998 to 2002 were equipped with MTOs with a V-84MS engine with a power of 840 hp, and not a V-92S2. Such engines were first installed on the export version of the T-72B - the T-72S "Shilden" tank in 1991.

The undercarriage unified with the T-90S with a track with a parallel RMSh and the possibility of installing asphalt shoes on the T-72BA was introduced during repairs only in 1999 (the most interesting thing is that the troops have at least one vehicle that was repaired in the mid-2000s gg., which has MTO with B-92S2, but with an old chassis!).

A unified MTO with a 1000-horsepower V-92S2 diesel engine, worked out on the T-90S of the Indian order, appeared on the T-72BA only in 2003 (this is due to the actual absence of these engines in stock - 100% of their production then went to secure an export contract) .

In 2005, after the next modifications, it was put into service and the 1A40-M218 sighting system began to be installed.

Unfortunately, in the course of modernization repairs in full on the T-72BA, it was possible to introduce only unified MTO with the B-92S2 and the chassis, as well as the modernized FCS, which, however, by the end of the first decade of the 21st century is already obsolete. Measures related to strengthening firepower and increasing the level of security and survivability remained unrealized.

All tanks leaving the factory after modernization are painted with standard protective paint. Camouflage, if necessary, is applied in combat units. At the same time, the schemes of deforming coloring are variations of the schemes prescribed by the instructions back in 1978. Modern schemes of deforming coloring, developed by the Research Institute of Steel together with UKBTM, are not used for unknown reasons (exceptions are events associated with large ceremonial events - only in these cases camouflage).

The best developments in the direction of improving the T-72B tanks were subsequently implemented during the creation of the modernized T-72B tank (ROGATKA-1) under the designation "Object 184M"19. This unique machine during the state tests, which ended in 2006, clearly demonstrated the highest level and compliance with the best world standards in the field of tank building20. However, there are still no orders for this modern and fully-fledged modernization option from the Ministry of Defense.

The customer's trimming of the initial design specification predetermined the appearance in the production documentation of the designation of these submodifications as "Object 184A1" (military name "T-72BA1").

It should be noted that the T-72B tanks of various production series and submodifications are being received for overhaul and modernization. At the same time, in the process of repair, they are “depersonalized” and brought to a single standard. So, for example, in 2006, two tanks, produced in the spring of 1991 according to the specification "Object 184 with TSHU", were received for repairs. During the inspection of the machines, it was decided not to restore the TSHU complex, but to carry out repairs according to standard repair documentation.

The only differences that remain with machines that have undergone repair and modernization work relate to the level of protection. So, during the serial production of the T-72B from 1985 to 1991, the design of the combined barrier of the VLD of the hull and turret was repeatedly changed. Repair documentation for the "Object 184A" and "Object 184A1" does not provide for interference with the existing design of the reservation. In the presence of combat damage to the hull and turret, they are repaired; in extreme cases, the turret can be replaced with a similar one taken from a previously disposed tank.

Not so rare cases of repairing machines with combat damage. As a clear illustration, we can recall the repair of five vehicles with "holes" in the hull and turrets, which came to Uralvagonzavod in 2005. Among them was the "seventy-two", which took part in the battles of 1996 for the city of Grozny. During the battle, at the moment when the gun was already loaded, the tank "caught" an RPG grenade in the side projection of the tower. The crew in the tower died. The car was sent first to the collection and evacuation point, and then to storage. There, at one of the repair plants, the car stood for almost 9 years with the OFS in the barrel. In the spring of 2005, she, as part of a batch of approximately 30 vehicles, entered Uralvagonzavod for repairs. Immediately, a kind of "gift" was found in the chamber of the gun. The car was evacuated to the artillery and ammunition range of the FKP "Institute for Metal Testing",

Unfortunately, the modernization and repair scheme that exists today leads to higher costs in relation to the production of a new car. Technologically, modernization, in fact, turns out to be identical to the creation of a new machine. The difference in costs lies only in the fact that in the case of modernization, there are costs for disassembling the machine and preparing the hull with the turret for subsequent installation work, and in the case of new production, for the procurement of materials and the manufacture of the hull and turret. It may seem that manufacturing from scratch is a more time-consuming and costly process. However, it is not. The design of Soviet generation machines provides for conveyor mass production with a high level of automation and mechanization of work. This leads to a significant reduction in the cost of hull work and, as a result, the entire machine. Besides, the state, through the institute of military acceptance, very tightly controls the cost of the work performed and the level of their profitability, even in our modern completely market conditions. The dismantling and dismantling of the machine that came in for overhaul is mostly manual and labor-intensive. Very labor costs and manual hull work during the ongoing modernization - cutting and welding. All this makes a simple overhaul completely unprofitable for the manufacturer, and repair with modernization unprofitable for the customer. It is no coincidence that for the purposes of overhaul in the USSR, a whole network of tank repair plants of central subordination was created in the structure of the Ministry of Defense. The lower cost of repairs on them was due to the absence of commercial costs of the enterprise and the minimum level of planned profitability. Spare parts and equipment, necessary for repairs were supplied either from storage and the State Reserve, or through mass serial orders. In addition, these TRZ, as a rule, did not perform complex hull work.

Approximately similar scheme for major overhauls and upgrades exists abroad, in particular, in the United States. There, in addition to the fact that all work related to the repair and modernization of armored vehicles is carried out at state arsenals, their profitability is also determined by the higher commercial value of the new machine. The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that in the USSR and Russia, saving on the purchase of new equipment, strictly controlling its cost, we make further improvement of machines and their modernization during overhauls economically inexpedient with our own hands. Although the modernization of the same “seventy-two”, but exported (say, to India or Algeria), is quite a profitable event for both the contractor and the customer. But only because the cars were originally sold at a higher, "commercial" price.

Another very paradoxical and alarming situation is the withdrawal of existing tank repair plants from the system of the Ministry of Defense, their corporatization and transfer to a commercial basis, which is being carried out this year. The consequences of this step are obvious: in the very near future, the cost of repairing armored vehicles at these enterprises will rise significantly, and the volume of work in the face of an ever-shrinking fleet of combat vehicles at these plants will drop to a critical point. The Russian Army is simply losing its tank repair base!

However, back to the upgraded T-72BA. His first public appearance took place in July 2000 during the exhibition of weapons "Ural Expo Arms-2000" at the Nizhny Tagil artillery range "Staratel". To demonstrate the capabilities of the Rusich Kurgan tractors, Uralvagonzavod, as a hospitable host, provided a car for the "load" of the conveyor. This machine turned out to be the T-72BA, which was preparing to be handed over to the troops. By that time, the NDZ complex had not yet been mounted on it, there were no side screens. So that the “seventy-two” with its somewhat “unfinished” appearance would not embarrass the public and distinguished guests, the car was carefully wrapped in a tarpaulin, so much so that only part of the trunk could be distinguished. Therefore, there was a curiosity: the video from this demonstration, shown in one of the TV programs of the Shock Force cycle of Channel 1, accompanied by comments about the imminent appearance of a new promising tank in Russia, gave rise to a wave of rumors that a fundamentally new combat vehicle was hiding under the tarpaulin. The reality was much simpler and more banal...

From 2000 to 2009, more than a hundred tanks were modernized in Nizhny Tagil according to the T-72BA / T-72BA1 variants. At present, most of the upgraded T-72BAs are located in PUrVO22 units. At the moment, the T-72BA tanks "lit up" in the 276th MRR, 239th TP of the 34th MSD, as well as in the 81st MRR and 152nd TP of the 27th MSD. Almost every year they can be seen at military equipment demonstrations dedicated to the Victory Day holiday in Yekaterinburg and Samara. T-72BA regularly participate in the exercises of the Air Defense Forces, including such large-scale ones as the "Southern Shield- 2006",summer 2008 exercises in Ashuluk, autumn maneuvers "Center-2008". Moreover, the following fact was noticed during the exercises: T-72BA, as a rule, are the vehicles of platoon commanders. In accordance with the new structure and staffing of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, T-72BA tanks are equipped with the PURVO23 Omsbr. Further deliveries of the T-72BA, judging by some reports, are planned in part of the North Caucasus Military District (Vladikavkaz, Buynaksk and Maikop24).

To train the crews of the T-72BA tanks, a computerized training complex in a container version was developed, which received the designation "MKT-184A"25. At the time of publication, it is known about the supply of at least two sets of this complex to military units stationed, respectively, in Yekaterinburg and Vladikavkaz. Training complexes TTV-172K for driving the T-72BA tank in 2008 were to be delivered to Vladikavkaz (1 unit), Buynaksk (1 unit), Maykop (1 unit), Totskoye village (3 units) - total 6 units26.

It is quite difficult to assess the T-72BA modernization option. According to its ideology, it is outdated by 15 years, but it is fully consistent with the modern technical level, adjusted for operating conditions in the modern Russian Army. Particularly strong criticism, apparently, needs to be subjected to the SLA for the lack of a thermal imager in its composition. However, this version of the SLA was implemented by UKBTM in several more advanced versions of the T-72 modernization. But UVZ and UKBTM should not be blamed for conservative approaches and technical backwardness. At the moment, they only fulfill the requirements of the customer with very scarce funding.

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Aikaisemmin lainaamani ensimmäisen T-72B3 luovutusta käsittelevän yhteydessä hän kirjoittaa että T-72BA on ollut tuotannosta vaihtelevasti siihen asti. Tässä artikkelissa joka on kirjoitettu vuonna 2009 hän kirjoittaa "From 2000 to 2009, more than a hundred tanks were modernized in Nizhny Tagil according to the T-72BA / T-72BA1 variants."

Olen kuullut arvioita että kaikkinensa näitä erilaisia T-72BA vaunuja olisi modernisoitu 150 kpl. Tuo määrä kuulostaa hyvin realistiselta, mikäli Khlopotovin kirjoittama pitää paikkansa. T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 osalta modernisointimäärät olivat selvästi suurempia, mutta Venäjän taloustilanne oli myös selvästi parempi 2010-luvulla.

 

[Antares]

Artikkeli vuodelta 2011, tässä kirjoitetaan T-90A tilausten lopettamisesta ja T-72 modernisaatiosta (jotka tullaan nimeämään T-72B3:ksi myöhemmin):

The army chooses the modernization of the T-72 instead of purchasing the T-90​

September 28, 2011

One of the main decisions of the Army Armaments Exhibition held in Nizhny Tagil was that the Russian government is ready to finance the renewal of the production capacities of the domestic tank-building giant Uralvagonzavod at the expense of budgetary funds. It is expected that in the coming years the state will spend more than 64 billion rubles on the development program of the enterprise, in particular, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced this, speaking at a festival dedicated to the 75th anniversary of the enterprise. On the example of Uralvagonzavod, we see a serious attempt by the authorities to inject budgetary funds into the modernization of a military industry enterprise. Where will these 64 billion go?

It should be noted that in recent years, the military has accumulated a fair amount of claims to the products manufactured at the enterprise. At the exhibition held in early September, among other models, the T-90 tank was once again demonstrated. In the spring of 2011, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Alexander Postnikov, already criticized this tank, saying that the Russian Defense Ministry sees no point in buying the "17th modernization of the T -72 tank" for 118 million rubles. Perhaps that is why the structure of orders of the defense department for tank technology is changing with great difficulty. For many years, the Ministry of Defense has been purchasing 63 T-90 tanks each, supplementing the order with services for the overhaul and modernization of the T-72 tanks in service to the T-72BA level.

The statements of General Alexander Postnikov did not come out of nowhere, apparently, the military really does not see the point in buying a large number of new T-90s (which did originally have the T-72BU index) at a price of 118 million rubles apiece. Last year, the defense department purchased these tanks for 70 million rubles. Leaving behind the scenes the reasons for such a sharp increase in the price of this tank, it is worth noting that the fact remains: the Russian Ministry of Defense considers the mass purchase of the T-90 to be too expensive an idea.

Instead of buying new "old" tanks, the Ministry of Defense decided to increase the pace of modernization of the T-72 tanks in service. According to the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, in 2010 the military ordered the modernization of 198 T-72B tanks to the level of T-72BA. It is also reported that in March 2011, a contract was signed to upgrade 300 tanks to the level of T-72BA for 3 years, that is, 100 tanks per year. However, given the total number of T-72 tanks in the army (according to information from open sources, their number exceeds 9 thousand units) and even taking into account their inevitable reduction during the transition to the “new look” brigades, such rates of modernization should be recognized as not the highest .

The desire to move on to the modernization of existing tanks instead of acquiring the T-90 is also confirmed by the concept of 3 types of “new look” combined-arms brigades, which was published by the General Staff back in 2010. According to this concept, brigades of 3 classes should be created in Russia - heavy (on caterpillar tracks), medium (on wheeled armored personnel carriers) and light (on armored vehicles). At the same time, the military put forward the requirement for the maximum unification of vehicles within one compound. In practice, this means that in the case of a heavy brigade, if possible, the entire fleet of its equipment should be based on one chassis: from tanks, self-propelled guns and infantry fighting vehicles to engineering vehicles and tractors. The tanks and infantry fighting vehicles currently in service, as well as the hypothetical T-95, do not satisfy this requirement.

That is why the project appeared under the code name "Armata" (there is an opinion that somewhere on the way to the media a mistake crept into the name of the project, and it is still called "Armada"). This development in the language of the military is referred to only as a "promising unified heavy platform", it is on it that the entire complex of combat and auxiliary tracked vehicles of Russian heavy brigades should be deployed. It is assumed that when developing the "Armata", the engineers of "Uralvagonzavod" will use all the successful solutions that have been used on the T-90 and the "object-195".

It is assumed that "Armata" will leave the plant's workshops in 2015. Before this deadline, the military decided to use an economical recipe with the modernization of the T-72 tanks already in service. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, it will be more practical and cheaper.



Modernization T-72

The appearance of the T-72BA tank in the armed forces of Russia goes back to the very beginning of the 1990s. At that time, the production of tanks was carried out at two factories, the Chelyabinsk Tractor and Uralvagonzavod in Nizhny Tagil. However, the collapse of the USSR put an end to the production plans of both plants, the serial production of T-72B tanks was practically stopped, and at ChTZ, the production of tanks, as it turned out, was stopped forever. "Uralvagonzavod" for some time pinned hopes on the deployment of a large order for the T-90 tank ("object 188") and was engaged in the supply of products for export. However, the landslide conversion of 1992 forced the plant to turn its attention to a new type of activity for itself - the repair and modernization of vehicles in service to a more advanced level. However, the Ministry of Defense did not have the necessary financial resources for this either. Instead, the plant during 1993 was engaged in simple repairs and minimal refinement of products in small batches. From 1994 to 1997, the company did not carry out work on the modernization of the T-72 tank at all.

The situation revived in 1997, with the change of director at the enterprise and the revival of the Russian economy. In 1998, the enterprise took 20-30 tanks from the Ministry of Defense for overhaul to develop skills for the modernization of vehicles. In March 1998, the plant completely decided on the ideology of improvements. For the T-72 tank, it included the replacement of the V-46 engine with the V-84, the installation of a modern automated control system, a thermal imager and VDZ (built-in dynamic protection) "Contact-5". By the end of the year, the first vehicle upgraded according to this scheme was prepared at the plant, and the installation of the turret on the hull was being completed on the second tank. Both tanks were planned to be shown at an arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi. However, this upgrade option again turned out to be expensive for domestic aircraft. Two tanks remained prototypes for further modernization of the export versions of the tank, while the remaining ones underwent major repairs and, in general, minor modifications. In 1999, another 30 T-72B tanks were repaired at the enterprise;

The first vehicles upgraded under this project (1998-2000) received the Kontakt mounted dynamic protection complex, some received the Kontakt-5 and SLA 1A40-1. Externally, these tanks could be identified by the presence of an atmospheric conditions sensor DVE-BS (stands for capacitive wind sensor with an interface unit) in the aft part of the turret. It is the interface unit that is responsible for integrating the sensor with this FCS. SUO 1A40-1 provides fully automatic operation, however, the input of total corrections still remained manual. Later, the upgraded SLA 1A40-1M was installed on the tanks. Its distinguishing features are:



- the presence of TBV (tank ballistic computer) on the processor;
- automatic input of lateral lead and aiming angles when firing from a cannon and a machine gun coaxial with it;
- calculation of aiming angles and lateral lead for the commander's sight;
- semi-automatic tracking of a moving target.

Both of these SLAs include the Svir guided weapon system, which allows firing 9M119 and 9M119M missiles. The guidance device KUV "Svir" is mounted in a periscopic passive-active night sight 1K13-49. In 2005, after the implementation of the next improvements on the tank, a new SLA 1A40-M2 appeared. The standard armament stabilizers were replaced with a new two-plane stabilizer 2E42-4 "Jasmine" with an electric machine drive for horizontal guidance and an electro-hydraulic drive for vertical guidance.

Instead of the old diesel engines V-84-1 and V-84M, which were installed on the T-72B, which had the disadvantages of burnout of the exhaust manifold and overheating, an improved diesel engine, the V-84MS, was installed on the tank. Bellows were mounted on the exhaust manifolds of this diesel engine, mixing the exhaust gases of the engine with atmospheric air, which had a positive effect on the temperature regime of the manifold and reduced the thermal visibility of the T-72. Similarly to the T-90 tank of the 1993 model, the transmission was finalized. The undercarriage received tracks with parallel RMSH and with the possibility of mounting asphalt shoes. In accordance with this, a new drive wheel sprocket and idler were applied.

The tank received enhanced anti-mine bottom protection under the driver's seat. Here, 2 additional stiffeners under the bottom and transverse pillers were mounted. A spacer post was located directly next to the seat, and the seat itself was suspended from the roof of the tank hull. Between the installed stiffeners, overhead armor plates can be installed (as an option).

Machines upgraded after 2002 were equipped only with the built-in dynamic protection "Contact-5", and since 2003 they began to receive a new unified MTO with a V-92S2 diesel engine with a power of 1000 hp. This MTO was worked out on the T-90S tanks of the Indian order. In addition to the engine, the tank received a new reinforced transmission, a modified air cleaning system, aluminum radiators with increased heat dissipation, as well as implemented IR masking tools. The tank received a new set of communications "Passage", providing a confident communication range at a distance of at least 20 km. both on the spot and on the move over moderately rugged terrain and a new TVN-5 night vision device for the driver.



Unfortunately, even this small upgrade was carried out in a fairly small batch. At the end of 2009, the troops had no more than 219 tanks upgraded under this program. Presumably in 2010, their number increased by another 198 units, and in the period up to 2014 the number of such tanks in the armed forces could reach 700. ” involves the modernization of over 300 tanks within 3 years.

Currently, this modernization is rightly criticized by experts for its inferiority, but the Ministry of Defense is still unwilling to spend significant funds to bring the T-72B tanks to the level of the T-72B2, which was developed during the R&D under the Slingshot-1 project. Most likely, a compromise solution will be born, according to which the T-72BA tanks will be finalized in terms of installing a new FCS, including a gunner's thermal imaging sight, since such developments at Uralvagonzavod have been ready for a long time. According to preliminary information, the Sosna-U thermal imaging sight developed by Peleng OJSC (Belarus) and equipped with a 2nd generation thermal imaging camera manufactured by the French company CATHERINE can be installed on the tanks.

Despite the fact that this modernization of the tank is already 15 years outdated in its ideology, it is fully consistent with the modern technical level, adjusted for operation in the Russian Army. It is worth noting that this modernization is a modernization in terms of money - what you paid for, you got. It is also possible to stretch until the new generation tanks under development enter the troops with a modification of the T-72BA (especially if the tanks receive thermal imagers).

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Tuossa on muutama mielenkiintoinen yksityiskohta: ensinnäkin kirjoitetaan että vuoden 2009 lopussa joukoilla olisi 219 kpl T-72BA vaunua ja vuonna 2010 olisi allekirjoitettu sopimus 198 kpl modernisoinnista ja maaliskuussa 2011 uusi sopimus 300 vaunun modernisoinnista. Puolalainen panssarivaunujen asiantuntija Jaroslaw Wolski on arvioinut T-72BA vaunujen määräksi 750 kpl. Nähdään, mistä tuo luku on peräisin: 219 + 198 + 300 = 717 kpl.

Toisaalta tiedetään että ensimmäiset T-72B3 vaunut luovutettiin asevoimille vuoden 2011 lopussa. Tässä on pari vaihtoehtoa: joko 2010 ja 2011 allekirjoitetut sopimukset on tehty valmiiksi ja T-72BA vaunuja on todella valmistettu reilut 700 kpl tai sitten toinen tai molemmat näistä sopimuksista johtivat T-72B3 vaunujen tekemiseen ja T-72BA vaunuja olisi ehkä tuo reilut 200 kpl.

Venäjän armeijan kalustoa tarkasti seuraava Altyn73 kirjoitti viime vuonna blogissaan Kazakstanin T-72BA vaunuista: LÄHDE

Tanks T-72BA of the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan

• Sep. Wednesday, 28th, 2021 at 8:11 PM

Modernization of T-72B tanks to the level T-72BA was carried out at the Uralvagonzavod enterprise in 1998-2005. Among other things, the updated tanks received a new track with a parallel rubber-metal hinge (RMSH) from the T-90 tank, which is seriously different from the previous one.

according to known data, by 2005, the 81st motorized rifle and 152nd tank regiments of the 27th motorized rifle division, the 276th motorized rifle and 239th tank regiments of the 34th motorized rifle division were armed with T-72BA tanks - a total of eight tank battalions . After repeated reorganization and rearmament measures, in 2021 T-72BA tanks remained in only two battalions - in the 488th motorized rifle regiment of the 144th motorized rifle division (heir to the 276th motorized rifle regiment) and in the 21st motorized rifle brigade (heir to 152nd Tank Regiment). There are several single examples in the tank battalions of the 90th Panzer Division, 35th and 60th motorized rifle brigades. Where did six more battalions of updated T-72BA tanks disappear to?

On May 7, 2015, at the parade in the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana (now Nur-Sultan), the T-72BA tanks were shown for the first time, but what is remarkable - with OLD-style caterpillars. in all the pictures known to me (some of them below) of the Kazakh T-72BA tanks, the caterpillars of the OLD model. Judging by the numbering, now in Kazakhstan six tank battalions, out of thirteen available, are armed with T-72BA tanks. Just six "missing" battalions from the Russian troops. New tracks, most likely, were replaced with old ones before being shipped to Kazakhstan in 2015-2016. And the removed tracks were already going to equip the newly modernized T-72B3 tanks. Here is my version. By the way, the 35th motorized rifle brigade also has a T-72BA tank on old tracks.



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Hän spekuloi että Venäjä olisi myynyt valtaosan T-72BA vaunuista Kazakstanille aikavälillä joskus vuoden 2015 jälkeen. Military Balance 2021 julkaisun mukaan Kazakstanilla olisi 300 kpl T-72BA vaunuja. Kazakstan on ainoa maa jonka kohdalla T-72BA mainitaan, sen lisäksi vaunut mainitaan Donetsk Peoples Repuclic ja Luhansk Peoples Repuclic kohdalla - ryssä siis toimittanut heille näitä vaunuja. Olisiko Kazakstan ostanut nämä vaunut Venäjältä ja ehkä tilannut tietylle määrälle omia vaunuja modernisaation Nizhny Tagililla? Toinen vaihtoehto on että ovat tehneet Venäjän kanssa vaihtokaupan ja toimittaneet omista varastoista aihioita Venäjälle, joka puolestaan on modernisoinut niistä T-72B3 vaunuja tai purkanut varaosiksi.

Jos katsotaan Ukrainan sodan 2022 tappioita niin T-72BA on hyvin vähän edustettuna siellä, tosin nämä on helppo sekoittaa T-72B obr 1989 kanssa. Altyn73 mukaan Venäjällä olisi ollut vuonna 2005 kahdeksan pataljoonaa T-72BA vaunuja. Yhden pataljoonan koko on 31 vaunua joten 31 x 8 = 248 vaunua. Hänen mukaansa vuonna 2021 "T-72BA remained in only two battallions". Tuon voi lukea kahdella tapaa: vaunuja oli kaksi pataljoonaa eli 62 kpl tai vaunuja oli kahdessa pataljoonassa, mutta pataljoona voi olla vaunutyypeiltään sekalainen. Täten Venäjällä olisi aktiivijoukoilla huomattavan pieni määrä T-72BA vaunuja ja näistäkin osa on tuhottu Ukrainassa. Oryxin mukaan näitä olisi menetetty 5 kpl tähän päivään mennessä: 1 damaged, 4 captured (14.8.2022).

 

[Antares]

Kahden venäläisen kommentoijan kirjoituksia vuodelta 2011 (Gur Khan blogin kommenteista): LÄHDE

Nomad September 16, 2011, 03:02 am

Nezalegnii, wake up! Tank production in Omsk has not been carried out since 1992! In St. Petersburg even earlier! The Omsk plant went bankrupt long before UVZ came to it. UVZ is now actually reanimating production in order to give working people at least something to eat! In addition, as you can see, you don’t understand at all who and what produces in Russia - the Kirov Plant is not and never was part of the UVZ Corporation - there is a completely different owner. The production of tanks on it was stopped back in Gorbachev's "perestroika"! The St. Petersburg design bureau "Spetsmash" became part of the Uralvagonzavod Corporation - yes, but given the fact that tanks with gas turbine engines are a dead end branch of development, the design bureau was redesigned for drilling equipment. People immediately began to receive decent salaries. All this is a consequence of mistakes in tank building since the days of the USSR.

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Uv.classicist2001 September 16, 2011, 05:29 AM

Alex, I strongly disagree with you. During July of this year. passed UVZ, Transmash, Rubtsovsky branch and Omsk Design Bureau. Yes, UVZ lives on wagons, Trasmash on trams, Rubtsovsk on tractors, while having developments that are not in demand in the country. But Omsk continues to deal with tanks and engineering equipment, including the modernization of the T-55, T-62 and T-80U. Unfortunately, at present, UVZ Corporation is not interested in promoting the products of other enterprises that are part of it. Therefore, Pisk bridgelayers and self-propelled floating pontoons from the Duplo complex are necessary for the Ministry of Emergency Situations, however, as well as drilling machines of KB Spetsmash (essentially very expensive cranes up to 160 tons with a lifting capacity) exist in 2 copies for the exhibition in Tagil. By the way, the same Spetsmash has developed and is testing, though for a year now, a new 45K fire control system for the T-80U.

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Uv.classicist2001 September 16, 2011, 05:30

Actually, in the 1990s, Omsktransmash went bankrupt and spread rot just Uralvagonzavod. Taking advantage of the fact that EBN was from the Urals, he was convinced that the T-72 is a "super-duper" tank and that its advanced modification called the T-90 should be purchased. At the same time, the T-80 is superior in all respects to the T-72, especially in terms of FCS and turret armor. The T-90 was developed by Tagil as an attempt to bring the T-72B up to the level of the T-80. The most combat-ready units of the Soviet Army (GSVG) were equipped with T-64 and T-80. Nobody argues that it is necessary to produce one MBT, and not three. Doubts are raised by spells that the T-90 is "our everything." By the way, the Americans are putting gas turbine engines on the Abrams and are not going to switch back to diesel. In the same way as they switched from steam engines to internal combustion engines, the future belongs to gas turbine engines.

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Nomad September 16, 2011, 06:41 AM

Uv.classicist2001, if you mean Uraltransmash, then he lives as a rocking chair for Gazprom and oilmen and just the defense industry. He now has big contracts with Almaz-Antey, Burevestnik, and a contract with Venezuela was recently implemented. As for Omsk - please name the numbers - how many engineering vehicles were produced, release dates, development dates. Unfortunately, except for 4 (four) BREM-80U shipped this year to Cyprus, everything else was developed a long time ago and is in prototypes. There are small purchases of BMO and TOS, but this is the conversion of old T-72s, and their volumes are not decisive for the survival of the enterprise. Moreover, in the field of BTT, KBTM deals with cases that are akin to fraud. An example is the history of the ROC "Burlak" - about a billion rubles were thrown into the wind! As for modernization - no need to sing about the T-55 and T-62 - not a single machine was modernized in Omsk, except for demonstration samples, which are constantly and equally "successfully" shown at each of your exhibitions. For the modernization of the T-80U - a little more than 40 vehicles for Cyprus and nothing more. There are no new orders for modernization and are not expected. Yes, single ones are possible, but for this you do not need to have the entire plant at hand. In Omsk, no one is going to completely and completely abandon tanks, but the plant must feed itself, and for this UVZ lends a helping hand to it. As for the so-called. "45K systems" at "Spetsmash" - this is work that has been going on for them since the mid-90s and is a slightly shamanized "Irtysh" - no comparison with the Kalina FCS of the T-90MS tank! which are constantly and equally "successfully" shown at each of your exhibitions.

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Uv.classicist2001 September 19, 2011, 01:57 AM

Let's start with the fact that the T-80UD was chosen as the single tank of the USSR, and not the T-72B. After the collapse of the Union, initiated by the EBN clique, in 1992, EBN, the former 1st secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee, decided to give UVZ an order for the production of T-90s (120 units), which allowed UVZ to maintain tank production and saved the plant from bankruptcy. Then, in 1995, Yeltsin ordered Grachev to abandon purchases of the T-80U in favor of the T-90. In a conversation with Popov, the designer of the T-80, Grachev admitted that the tank chosen was far from the best. As a result of Tagil's intrigues, the production of the T-80U at Omsktransmash was stopped, which eventually led to its bankruptcy, because who will buy tanks from Russia that their own army refused. So, nepotism led to the fact that they began to produce and modernize the obviously worst tank - the T-72B / T-90 / T-90A / T-90SM.

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Nomad September 19, 2011, 02:28 am

Uv.classicist2001, let's not eat fairy tales and leave EBN alone. In the end, he is not responsible for the collapse of the USSR, but the CIA bitch Gorby. Regarding the purchases of the T-80U - if you caught 1990-93, then you probably remember what the financial situation in the country was then. Who needed a tank with a gas turbine engine at the price of three diesel tanks. The 120 T-90s you mentioned did not do any good for UVZ, if they helped to survive the plant, then only one, 1994. Now give an answer: what tanks did UVZ live on from 1995 to 2001? And before licking the asses of our retired generals, such as Pasha-Mercedes, I advise you to read at least a fresh issue of the Army and Navy Review (No. 4 2011) - there is a good article by Sergei Suvorov about the Leclerc tank, where, in particular, he reveals a little about why and how the T-80Us were not exported and stopped being produced: "The Leclerc tank owes its fate to serve in the UAE army to the Russian T-80U, or rather, the unwillingness of the then Russian officials to sell modern military equipment abroad In the early 90s of the last century, the Arab military had a great desire to buy a batch of T-80Us, which were then considered the best tank in the world, but Russian generals flatly refused to do this.When a couple of years later, Russia presented the T-80U at the first international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi with a hint of the possibility of selling such cars in the UAE - it was too late." As you can see, there is not a word about EBN, but here are the "generals" so "cheerful" for the T-80 are present ... The Leclerc tank owes its fate to serve in the UAE army to the Russian T-80U, or rather the reluctance of the then Russian officials to sell modern military equipment abroad. In the early 90s of the last century, the Arab military had a great desire to buy a batch of T-80Us, which were then considered the best tank in the world, but the Russian generals flatly refused to do so. When, a couple of years later, Russia presented the T-80U at the first international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi with a hint of the possibility of selling such vehicles in the UAE, it was already too late. for the T-80 there are ... The Leclerc tank owes its fate to serve in the UAE army to the Russian T-80U, or rather the reluctance of the then Russian officials to sell modern military equipment abroad. In the early 90s of the last century, the Arab military had a great desire to buy a batch of T-80Us, which were then considered the best tank in the world, but the Russian generals flatly refused to do so. When, a couple of years later, Russia presented the T-80U at the first international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi with a hint of the possibility of selling such vehicles in the UAE, it was already too late. for the T-80 there are ... In the early 90s of the last century, the Arab military had a great desire to buy a batch of T-80Us, which were then considered the best tank in the world, but the Russian generals flatly refused to do so. When, a couple of years later, Russia presented the T-80U at the first international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi with a hint of the possibility of selling such vehicles in the UAE, it was already too late. for the T-80 there are ... In the early 90s of the last century, the Arab military had a great desire to buy a batch of T-80Us, which were then considered the best tank in the world, but the Russian generals flatly refused to do so. When, a couple of years later, Russia presented the T-80U at the first international arms exhibition in Abu Dhabi with a hint of the possibility of selling such vehicles in the UAE, it was already too late. for the T-80 there are ...

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EBN = Ельцин, Борис Николаевич = ЕБН = Yeltsin, Boris Nikolaevich (eli Venäjän ensimmäinen presidentti Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen)

Mikäli tässä keskustelussa on totuuden jyvä niin hän voisi olla alkuperäisten T-90 obr 1992 vaunujen tilauksen takana ja määrä olisi tosiaan paljon toisteltu 120 kpl. Tämä on silti varmaa: LÄHDE

October 5, 1992, by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 759-58, the T-90 tank was adopted by the Russian armored forces.

Käyttäjän Nomad kirjoitus T-80U vaunujen viennistä ja erityisesti siitä että armeijan päälliköt eivät olleet halukkaita tarjoamaan sitä myyntiin, vaikka kiinnostuneita ostajia olikin, olen lukenut samasta muistakin lähteistä. Toisaalta T-80U kävi Ruotsissa testattavana 1993/1994 (täältä voi lukea ko. testeista, kirjoittajana Rickard O. Lindström joka oli itse testeissä mukana LINKKI ja erityisesti tämä LINKKI, testiraportti luettavissa LINKKI, Youtube-video testeistä, tuore artikkeli testeistä LINKKI) ja Boris Jeltsin antoi yhden vaunun Iso-Britannialle hyväntahdoneleenä vuonna 1992, joten ehkä tiettyjen "asiakkaiden" osalta tehtiin poikkeus ja toisille olisi myyty mieluummin jotain muuta? Aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa lainaamani kirjoitukset T-90S vaunujen myynnin vaikeuksista 90-luvulla ovat osaltaan linjassa tämän kanssa: eivät olleet halukkaita myymään parasta tai lähes parasta teknologiaa 90-luvulla.

HUOM: pitää muistaa kun lukee näitä venäläisten kirjoituksia että panssarivaunujen osalta vallitsee syvät jakolinjat vaunuperheiden välillä: toiset fanittavat T-64, toiset T-72 ja osa T-80 vaunuja. Usein "keskustelut" taantuvat fanipoikien huutamiseksi vailla mitään hyödyllistä, tosin välillä näiden keskustelujen sivulauseissa tulevat kertoneeksi hyödyllisiä tiedonmurusia. Ukrainalaiset kirjoittajat puolestaan fanittavat suuresti T-64 ja T-80UD vaunuja, venäläisten vihatessa niitä. Tämä ei ole mitään uutta, kylmän sodan vuosina oli hyvin veristä kamppailua Neuvostoliiton sisällä. He pitivät kolme melkein samanlaisen suorituskyvyn vaunua aktiivijoukkojen käytössä kaikkine variantteineen ja näiden lisäksi suuren määrän vanhempia T-54, T-55 ja T-62 vaunuja. Jakolinjat ovat siis monen kirjoittajan osalta vuosikymmeniä vanhoja eikä vanha koira pääse tavoistaan eroon.

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90-luvulla kun Uralvagonzavod ja Omsk olivat molemmat löysässä hirressä talouden osalta (Omsk selvästi huonommassa tilassa) niin molemmilla oli erilaisia tutkimusprojekteja joita yrittivät myydä pääasiassa ulkomaisille ostajille. Uralvagonzavod teki T-72 modernisointeja joten heillä ei ollut ihan niin suurta hätää ja erityisesti Intian isot tilaukset 2000-luvun alussa pelastivat firman uhkaavalta konkurssilta. T-90A syntyi niiden kauppojen myötä, kuulemma yksi vaikuttava tekijä tornin hitsaamiselle oli se että olivat menettäneet kyvyn valmistaa noin isoja valettuja teräsosia. Valssatusta panssariteräksestä valmistettu torni on suojausarvoltaan valettua parempi, joten siinä voi olla myös selitys uudelle tornille (tosin osuman jälkeen hitsaussaumat voivat revetä, kun taas valettu torni pitää muotonsa).

Omskin yksi tuote oli vuonna 1996 esitelty object 640 eli se kuuluisa "Black Eagle" josta valmistettiin pari demonstraattoria, käytännössä T-80 rungon päälle tehty puinen mock-up -torni. Siinä oli tornia jatkettu taaksepäin ja kaavailtu sinne ainakin nuoliammusten säilytystä. Ilmeisesti HEAT olisi ollut edelleen rungossa normaalissa automaattilaturissa.

Venäjän valtio tuki tuon jatkokehitystä, mikä piti Omskin suunnittelukonttorissa valot päällä vielä hetken aikaa ja johti Burlak-torniprojektiin, suunnittelivat sitä ainakin 2005-2009. Tarkoitus oli tuottaa ns. universaali torni jonka olisi voinut asentaa T-64, T-72, T-80 ja T-90 vaunuihin "helpohkosti". Tästä löytyy 3D-malleja ja muistaakseni on valmistettu muutama oikea prototyyppi teräksestä, tosin en ole varma onko siellä kaikki sisuskalut toimivia. Pian tuon jälkeen Omskin suunnittelutoimisto yhdistettiin Uralvagonzavodin kanssa ja arvaisin että tuosta on otettu jotain linjoja T-90M vaunujen torniin, siinäkin on selvä ero kun vertaa perinteisiin Neuvostoliiton torneihin tai jopa T-90A hitsattuun torniin.

Iso syy tornin jatkolle oli tarve ottaa käyttöön pidempiä nuoliammuksia. Muistaakseni - varoitus, tämä tulee ulkomuistista - heidän perinteiset automaattilaturit rajoittivat nuoliammuksen maksimipituudeksi 600-650 mm ihan pelkästään fyysisten mittojen takia. Tämä siitä huolimatta että ammus on laturissa kahdessa osassa: varsinainen nuoli ja sen ajopanos sitten omana pakettina. Nuoliammuksella käytännössä läpäisykyky on suoraan verrannollinen nuolen pituuteen, tosin sen rakenne vaikuttaa siihen miten reagoi esim. raskaaseen ERA:n tai kerrospanssariin tms. Tornin takaosaan tuleva ammusvarasto ja sille oma automaattilaturi mahdollistaisi siis pidempien nuoliammusten käytön. Muistaakseni T-90A vaunuissa olisi tehty jotain muutoksia automaattilaturiin jonka ansiosta voisivat käyttää aavistuksen perinteistä pidempi nuolia, mutta en ole varma. Samat muutokset on tehty sen jälkeen ainakin T-72B3 ja T-72B3 obr 2016 vaunuihin, oletan että myös T-80BVM ja T-90M. Vaatisi tarkempaa selvitystä, mutta on mahdollista että nämä muutokset olisi myös tehty jo T-72B obr 1989 ja T-90 obr 1992 vaunujen automaattilatureihin, ja täten ehkä myös myöhäisemmän vaiheen T-72BA modernisoituihin (ainakin Uralvagonzavod tarjosi tätä 90-luvulla osana esitettyä modernisaatiota, joka hylättiin liian kalliina).

Tuon jälkeenkin siis tietty osa ammuksista (pääasiassa HEAT mutta myös muita) varastoitaisiin normaalilla paikallaan tornin alapuolella rungossa, koska tornin takaosaan ei mahdu suurta määrää ammuksia. Jos mentäisiin miehistön turvallisuus edellä, niin olisi mahdollista poistaa kokonaan se rungon ammusvarasto ja käyttää vain tornin takaosaa, jolloin ne olisi omassa osastossaan ja miehistön suojana panssarilevy sekä blow-out paneelit vaikka tornin katossa. Ammuskuorma jää tällöin pienemmäksi, joten valintojen maailma. Näihin torneihin on haettu ideaa mm. M1 Abrams ja Leclerc vaunuista, tosin olen melko varma että kylmän sodan aikana Neuvostoliitolla olisi ollut joku prototyyppi tai edes hahmotelma tällaisesta vaunun tornista. Heillä oli yleensä ainakin kynällä paperille hahmoteltu kaikki mahdolliset ja mahdottomat layoutit, joten en olisi yllättynyt vaikka Omskin suunnittelu 90-luvulla olisi perustunut johonkin vanhempaan ideaan.

HUOM: muistaakseni tätä Burlak-tornia tarjottiin tuossa 2005-2009 aikavälin tienoilla Venäjälle vaan hylkäsivät sen liian kalliina. Uralvagonzavod puolestaan esitti T-72B2 Rogatka versiota vanhojen T-72B vaunujen uudeksi modernisoinniksi vuoden 2006 tienoilla eli heti T-72BA modernisointiohjelman päättymisen jälkeen (1998-2005, vai jatkuiko modernisointi vuoteen 2011 asti?) mutta sekin hylättiin liian kalliina. Jatkojalostivat siitä karvalakkimallin T-72B3 joka tuli tuotantoon 2011. Jopa venäläiset kommentaattorit ovat moittineet sitä hyvin laiskaksi modernisoinniksi ja vasta 2016 tuli vakavampi, parempi ja kalliimpi versio T-72B3 vaunusta.

Tuosta saa aika näppärän aikajanan Uralvagonzavodin toiminnalle, kun mietitään Venäjän modernisointeja sekä vaunujen uustuotantoa kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeen (nämä siis vaunut mitkä tuli heidän omalle armeijalle, ei ulkomaan myyntiä tässä):

1992-1998: T-90 obr 1992, yhteensä 120 kpl
1998-2005 (vai 2011?): T-72B modernisoinnit, tulos T-72BA joissa on eroja riippuen missä valmistuserässä on tehty.
2004-2006: ensimmäiset T-90A vaunut, yhteensä 32 kpl
2006-2012: parempi versio T-90A vaunuista mm. ranskalaiset ESSA lämpötähtäimet, 337 kpl
2011-2015: T-72B modernisointi, tulos T-72B3 joissa jonkin verran eroja taas riippuen milloin on valmistunut. Jaroslaw Wolskin mukaan 1st series: 220 kpl, sen jälkeen 600 kpl
2016 --> T-72B modernisointi, tulos T-72B3 obr 2016, edelleen Wolskin arvio 382 kpl
2019 --> T-90 ja T-90A modernisointi, tulos T-90M joita valmistettu toistaiseksi 65 kpl (yhden lähteen mukaan näistä 55 kpl vanhojen modernisointia ja 10 kpl uustuotantoa, kuka tietää....)

MUOKKAUS: linkki viestiin jossa kerrotaan paremmin Neuvostoliiton ja Venäjän panssarivaunujen nuoliammusten pituudesta:

https://maanpuolustus.net/threads/panssarivaunut.122/page-732#post-1188763

 

[Antares]

Kuvaus T-90 vaunujen historiasta.

Lähde:

Броня СССР. Все советские танки - Mikhail Baryatinsky - 2014

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The main disadvantage of the T-72 tanks of all modifications compared to other vehicles of Soviet and foreign production those years there was a lack of an automated fire control system (FCS). In connection with this, a decision was made to carry out a major modernization "seventy-two". This work took place within the framework of topic "Improvement of the T-72B", set by the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 19, 1986.

Initially, the design took place under the leadership of V.N. Venediktov, and after he left for 1987 retired - under the leadership of the new chief designer V.I. Potkin.

When developing a new machine, which received the designation "object 188", the main emphasis was placed on increasing combat effectiveness in order to bring it to the level of the T-80U tank. Borrowed from the latter weapon control complex 1A45 "Irtysh", which, after being finalized to interact with the automatic loader of the Nizhny Tagil design, received the designation 1A45T. In January 1989, four prototypes of the "object 188" were submitted for state tests, during which the car was run in for a year and a half in Moscow, Kemerovo and Dzhambul regions, as well as polygon Uralvagonzavod.

The tank was tested in extreme conditions, passed 14 thousand km, that is, full overhaul cycle to overhaul with virtually no breakdowns and failures. From June to September 1990 more two samples of the machine passed the final tests. At the end of which one of them was shot at the firing range. March 27, 1991 by joint decision of the ministries of defense and defense industry, the tank was recommended for adoption into service under the symbol T-72BU.

It was listed in the documents as “advanced T-72B tank”. However, to accept it into service with the Soviet armies did not have time: both the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army ceased to exist. Meanwhile, given the experience of Operation Desert Storm, the UKBTM decided to increase the security of the tank by installing a complex of optoelectronic suppression TShU-1 "Curtain". As a result, the tests began again.

However, on September 30, 1992, the factory floors left the first "object 188" of the installation batch, and on October 5, 1992, by a government decree Russian Federation, the tank was adopted by the Russian Army under the symbol T-90. A month later, its mass production began.

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On the basis of the order of the State Military-Industrial Commission of the USSR dated April 4, 1991, Uralvagonzavod Design Bureau began designing a commander's version of the T-90 tank, which received the designation "object 188K".

This tank was equipped with an additional R-163-50K radio station, TNA-4-3 tank navigation equipment and an autonomous power unit AB-1-P28.

After the completion of the tests on the basis of the order of the Minister of Defense of June 3, 1994, "the object 188K" was adopted by the Russian Army under the symbol T-90K.

The first serial T-90 tanks entered various training centers. The first tank regiment (94 cars) was armed with them in the 21st Taganrog Red Banner Order of Suvorov Motorized Rifle Division (Siberian Military District). In the middle In the 1990s, the T-90 was also received by the 5th Guards Don tank division stationed in Buryatia. AT 1996, the Russian Army officially stopped your choice on the T-90 as a promising tank for equipping tank troops. At the same time, however, the number of T-90s produced was small: towards the middle in 1998, there were about 120 units in their troops. As for production, by this time for the Russian Army, it completely stopped. Almost simultaneously with the creation of the tank T-90 in UKBTM was developing its export option - T-90S. In accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of December 24, 1992 was allowed to supply T-90S for export.

Beginning since March 1997, various modifications of this combat vehicle have become constant participants in numerous military exhibitions, both in Russia and abroad. In 1998, negotiations began on the supply of T-90S tanks to India and the acquisition of the latest license for their production. But acceptance and the decision to purchase Russian tanks by the Indian government was preceded by extensive tests conducted by Indian specialists.

On May 17, 1999, three prototypes of the T-90S were sent to India. These tanks were different from each other other complete set depending on the wishes customer. In particular, they were equipped with various versions of the SLA with thermal imaging sights "Nocturne" and "Essa". They were distinguished by the presence or the absence of the Shtora system. Finally, two the machines had cast towers, and the third had a welded one. The dispatch of tanks to India was overshadowed by a tragic event - on May 13, 1999, the chief designer of UKBTM V.I. Potkin died at his workplace.

Minister of Defense of India in memory proposed to name the tested tanks about him T-90S named "Vladimir". The tests took place in the Thar Desert - an area heavily crossed by dunes 20 - 30 m high. The daytime temperature reached 54 ° C. In such conditions, each tank passed about 2 thousand km without serious problems. During live firing conducted in India, the T-90S hit 80% of the targets, and the shooting was carried out at ranges up to 3 thousand km. m. After completion of the tests, all three machines were returned to UVZ, where they went through a bulkhead and defect. The final line under the tests was summed up in August 1999 in the armored artillery range NTIIM, when Indian experts evaluated the armor protection of the tank. After that, the negotiation process began agreement on the terms of the contract.

On February 15, 2001, a contract was signed for the supply of T-90S tanks to India and the transfer of a license for their production. We are talking about 310 tanks, 124 of which should be manufactured in Russia, and 186 - in India from Russian assembly kits. In accordance with the contract, the technology for the production of tanks was also transferred to the Indian side (without re-export rights issued machines to third countries) with the relevant design documentation, ammunition, training aids and the training of specialists from the manufacturer in the city of Avadi was carried out. Total contract value exceeded 800 million dollars.

T-90S tanks of the Indian contract are equipped with multi-fuel diesel engines V-92S2 with a capacity of 1000 HP In addition, they do not have a complex optoelectronic suppression "Shtora". Instead of illuminators "Curtains" additional elements of dynamic protection are installed, and grenade launchers of the "Tucha" system are installed at an angle of 45 °, but not 15 °, as in the presence of the Shtora complex. To use the PNK-4S commander's sighting and observation system in active mode instead of missing illuminators OTSHU-1-7 of the complex "Shtora" on the commander's cupola installed Ikosvitel OU-3GKU. A characteristic feature of the T-90S of the Indian army is enhanced anti-nuclear protection: the anti-neutron knockout layer is approximately twice as thick as on Russian samples.

In India, the T-90S tank was named "Bishma". So far 2001 contract fully completed. All machines that must were made in Russia, sent to the customer. At the plant in Avadi, a licensed production. On November 30, 2007, a new contract was signed, which provided for the supply of 347 tanks T-90S. Of these, 124 should be sent fully assembled, and 223 as machine kits for subsequent assembly at the plant in Avadi. The shipment of the first 24 tanks under the new contract took place in 2008. Indian ground forces development plans to 2020 provides for equipping with tanks T-90S "Bishma" 21 regiment. A total of 1,657 T-90S tanks are planned to be put into service.

After testing in India in 1999, a sample T-90S with a welded turret has undergone some refinement. In particular, instead of the left spare parts box on The tower was air conditioned. In this form, the tank sent to the DCA-2000 exhibition in Malaysia, and then he took part in the tender for the purchase of tanks for the armed forces of this country. During the tender, the T-90S participated in trials in the summer of 2000.

However, during the preliminary negotiations it became clear that the acquisition of T-90S tanks by Malaysia is unlikely. To not depend on the area weapons from one state, the Malaysian government chose to purchase MiG-29 fighters from Russia, and give the contract for the supply of tanks Poland.

Again T-90 tanks were ordered for the Russian Army only for 2004 - 14 units! Before "Uralvagonzavod" the question arose: what kind of tanks, in fact, the customer needs. Tank model 1992 clearly outdated, and it was physically impossible to release it possible due to the lack of entire industries. At the same time, after 1992, the army did not accept anything else into service. As a result of clarification tactical and technical task began to take shape appearance of the upgraded tank. It was based on laid the design of an export tank for India. Work on the "object 188A1" was carried out at UKBTM under the direction of the new chief designer V.B. Domnina. The fire control system of the modernized tank was built around the French-Belarusian Essa gunner's thermal imaging sight. production and upgraded sighting and observation complex commander TO1-KO4 "Agat-MR".

The improved ballistic computer 1V216M was also used in the LMS. fire the power of the tank has also increased due to the installation of an improved 2A46M-5 gun with improved characteristics of internal and external ballistics. On the the modernized Shtora optoelectronic countermeasures complex was installed on the machine, and already proven in India diesel V-92S2 with a capacity of 1000 HP. Despite the difficulties in mastering the mass production of the modernized tank, the entire batch of 14 units ordered by the army was delivered to early 2005.

In the same year, "object 188A1" was adopted by the Russian Army under the designation T-90A. In 2005, Uralvagonzavod produced 18 more vehicles. By this time, the plant had succeeded complete the debugging of technological processes and restore cooperative ties. It allowed in 2006 to fulfill the State Defense Order in the amount of battalion set of vehicles - 31 units. In total, 369 tanks were produced from 2004 to 2011.

T-90A, including over 50 T-90AK tanks. From the end 2011, the purchase of T-90A tanks for the Russian Army was discontinued.

As part of the parade crew of the 2nd Guards Taman Motorized Rifle Division, and then the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, T-90A tanks took part in military parades on Red Square in Moscow 9 May 2008 - 2013.

The next countries whose military drew attention to the T-90S were Algeria and Libya. 28 January 2004 the capabilities of Russian technology were shown to the representatives of Libya, and March 24 - 25 of the same year - the delegation of Algeria. Taking based on the T-90S tank of the 1999 model, UKBTM carried out its revision to the requirements of the new customer.

The original version of the machine was chosen with the installation of an air conditioning system, as well as with a modified laser irradiation detection system. This option received the factory index "object 188SA ”(“ A ”for Algeria) and army designation T-90SA. A prototype was made in May 2005 year, and at the end of the same year he successfully passed the tests in Algeria.

Signed in January 2006 contract for the supply of armored vehicles to Algeria. In accordance with it, the Russian side was supposed to supply 185 T-90SA tanks to Algeria, which was completed by 2008. Additionally in 2011 120 more T-90SA units ordered.

It should be noted that the Libyan military refused to purchase the T-90S due to its higher cost than the upgraded T-72. For a similar reason, Peru and Venezuela refused to purchase the T-90S. In August 2009, 10 T-90S tanks were delivered to Turkmenistan. In 2011, a contract was signed to supply another 30 tanks to this country. Simultaneously with Algeria and Libya, interest in T-90S showed Saudi Arabia. Comparative tests involving a Russian tank were carried out in the Arabian Desert in 2006.

Information of varying degrees of certainty is available about negotiations, statements of intent or expressed interest in the acquisition of T-90S tanks with sides of Iran, Yemen, South Korea, Lebanon, Morocco and Syria.

As part of a package agreement signed in 2010, 44 T-90SA tanks in 2011 were delivered to Uganda. In 2011, between the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan and the company "Rosoboronexport" was an agreement was signed for the purchase of 94 T-90S (3 battalions). The delivery of tanks began in the spring of 2013. There is also an option for another 94 T-90S tanks. By the desire of the Azerbaijani side on the tanks were complexes of optoelectronic suppression "Shtora-1" were installed.

As part of the VIII international arms exhibition REA-2011, held in September 2011 at the Staratel training ground in Nizhny Tagil, a new export modification of the T-90SM was presented. The main features of the modernization of the tank was the replacement of the old tower with a new combat module, which is equipped with an improved SLA "Kalina" with an integrated combat information and control system of the tactical level, new automatic loader and upgraded gun 2A46M-5, as well as a remotely controlled anti-aircraft gun UDP T05BV-1.

Installed dynamic protection "Relic" instead of "Contact V". Particular attention was paid to improving the commander's ability to search for targets and control weapon fire equally effectively day and night. For the first time in the Russian main the tank uses helm-based control and automatic gearshift system with the option to switch to manual. Ammunition placed in 2 stacking groups: 1 inside the tank and 1 outside, 22 shots are in the AZ, at the bottom parts of the hull, other shots and charges to them located in an armored box located at the rear of the tower.

To improve mobility and maneuverability on a modernized tank a new combined night vision device for the driver and a rear-view camera was installed. The mass of the new version, compared to the base model, has increased by one and a half tons and is 48 t. A monoblock power plant is installed on the tank installation V-93 with a capacity of 1130 hp, developed based on V-92S2F2. Removed anti-neutron knockout and replaced with a fire-resistant anti-shatter material such as Kevlar, as well as an improved fire extinguishing system.


Intian T-90S Bishma vuodelta 2002: The presented photographs depict the T-90S from the main batch, which was demonstrated shortly before being sent to the duty station at the REA-2002 arms and military equipment exhibition in Nizhny Tagil. LÄHDE

 

[Antares]

T-55 vaunujen tuotannosta eri tehtaiden osalta.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 32-33.

The new tank design successfully passed all of its state tests with flying colours, and in the middle of 1957 it was accepted for service as the T-55, with formal adoption taking place in May 1958, full production actually having already begun on 1 January 1958. One of the reasons for this delay was purely bureaucratic: all of the ministries were required to comply with the Councils of National Economy (Sovnarkhozov), and local manufacturing plants had to work through and with those organizations, which was always a slow bureaucratic process that ran behind the actual design and production process.

Series production of the new T-55 tank took place at Nizhny Tagil (Uralvagonzavod – UVZ), Kharkov (Plant No. 75) and Omsk (Plant No. 174, formally Leningrad Voroshilov Plant or LVZ). Production continued at UVZ from 1958 until about 1972, when it was replaced in production there by the T-72; Kharkov appears to have produced the T-55 series from 1958 to about 1969, when the T-64A entered full series production, and only Omsk produced the T-55 continuously from 1958 to 1979, when the plant switched over to T-80 tank production. *

There were inevitably some teething problems in initial production. For instance, as the first production T-55 tanks were being assembled, it was found that the fuel filler cap and the fuel filler pipe throat for the central fuel tank were not aligned. One of the designers, A. S. Serikov, was responsible for the mistake. When the factory director called for him, they found he was at a chess tournament in Sverdlovsk. He was recalled and the technical issue was quickly sorted out.

* One of the authors encountered one of the last Omsk-built T-55s at Camp Grayling, Michigan, in August 1984. It bore 1979 production markings and stamped dates on all of the key components requiring them, but in actuality was probably a Model 1969 tank that had undergone capital rebuilding in that year. There was no information available as to where it came from, but the supposition was that it had been captured in Lebanon by the IDF and sent to the US for evaluation. Most of the ancillary items such as the radio set and machine guns had been removed from the tank and it had all crew hatches and access hatches fixed open to include the engine, radiator and air cleaner sections. The tank was undamaged. It has since been removed.

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T-55 vaunujen tuotantomääristä.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Lainaus kirjan sivulta 99.

HOW MANY T-55 TANKS WERE ACTUALLY BUILT?

At the present time, the answer to this seemingly straightforward question is that there are no good records outside of Soviet (now Russian) state archives that completely answer that question.

Accurate totals are available through 1965 and show that the three Soviet production plants had built a total of 8,925 T-55s of all types and 1,505 T-55A type tanks by the end of that year. Between 1962 and 1979, 4,435 T-55A tanks and 150 T-55AK tanks were built by Kharkov and Omsk combined. Varying sources give the final Soviet-built totals as over 20,000; over 23,000; over 33,000; or, including the Polish- and Czechoslovakian-built tanks, over 68,000.

The Czechoslovakian Republic (CSSR) built 8,300 T-55 tanks, and Poland built another 7,000 T-55s on its own. While some sources also include Chinese Type 69 series tanks as well, these tanks, while having most of the same combat capabilities as the T-55, are not really T-55-based tanks and should not be included.

A large number of T-55-based chassis were also built, mostly by Omsk or at the STZ Martin plant in the Czechoslovakian SSR. That also adds another 7,705 known chassis to the mix.

Based on the 1979 Kraznaya Zvedza article indicating 23,000 plus T-55s of all types were built in the USSR, this would give a total of all T-55s including the Czech and Polish models of around 38,000. Today more than 32,000 T-54s and T-55s remain in service with some 40 user nations, which is testimony to the strength and endurance of the original design.

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T-55/T-55A vaunujen tuotantomäärät per vuosi (ne mitkä tiedetään arkistolähteistä).

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 152.



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T-54 ja T-55 vaunumäärät tyypeittäin Uralin länsipuolella 1990 (Neuvostoliiton ilmoituksen mukaan, CFE-sopimus).

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 153.




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T-54 ja T-55 peruskorjattujen vaunujen määrä per vuosi aikavälillä 1985-1990.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 154.


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T-55 vaunujen "obiekt" numeroiden selitykset.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 154.

 

[Antares]

T-54 ja T-55 panssarivaunujen käyttäjät sekä arviot määristä.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivuilta 160-161.

 

[Antares]

Kuvaus Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunujen tyypillisestä elinkaaresta (koskee myös muita panssaroituja ajoneuvoja).

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 165-168.

SOVIET STANDARDIZED LIFE CYCLE FOR ARMOURED VEHICLES

All Soviet tank designs began with a recognized need for a certain class of combat vehicle. This would be assigned as a project, often with a codename.

1.) All new projects started with a request from the Council of Ministers of the USSR (SM SSSR) and the Central Committee (TsK). These were given to the relevant design and production facilities who then decided if they could meet the project requirements. If they could, they were tasked with carrying out scientific research work on a project to determine its viability.

2.) Scientific Design Work (Nauchno-Issledivatal’naya Rabota or NIR).

This was, and remains today, the scientific work that would determine the feasibility of a project and lay out possible solutions to the tasking. At this stage the project was either given a project name (e.g. ‘Liven’<th>’, ‘Oka’, ‘Akatsiya’, etc.) or a manufacturing plant internal designator. Once the NIR work was approved by the Scientific Committee for the Council of Ministers, the manufacturing plant was then authorized to carry out prototype design work.

3.) Prototype Design Work (Opytno-Konstruktorskaya Rabota or OKR).

At this stage, the project was given an article designator or Obiekt number (e.g. Obiekt-137G2, Obiekt-482). This stage required at least one running prototype of the vehicle for assessment. Depending upon the problem at hand, as many as six prototypes might have been built, including one for destructive firing testing of its armour protection.

4.) Factory Testing. Once the prototype was ready, it underwent factory testing by the designers and engineers in concert with the ‘Zakhacik’ or customer representative (the Ministry of Defence representative to the plant). Once the major bugs had been ironed out and approval granted by the Scientific Committee, the vehicle was then sent for State Polygon (range) Testing at Kubinka.

5.) State Polygon Testing. The military and members of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Production authorities tested all major qualities of the new vehicle in a series of planned tests at the Kubinka Test Polygon. ‘Findings’ were made, which required the plant to repair or correct them as soon as possible. Once all corrections were made, permission was granted for troop testing.

6.) Troop Testing. This usually required an establishment lot (ustavlennaya partiya) of vehicles to be built – usually a batch of 3, 5, 10 or 25 tanks, depending on the viability of the product and requirements for thorough testing. Vehicles might then be sent to various parts of the Soviet Union for testing – the north for winter conditions, the Southern Republics such as Kazakhstan for desert conditions, the Urals for mountainous conditions, etc. Once the vehicle passed its troop testing phase, the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Production would recommend it for acceptance and full production.

7.) State Resolution. A joint resolution of the Central Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the USSR (many members holding positions in both) named the item (i.e. T-10, T-10A, T-10M, etc.) and announced it was accepted for service with the Soviet Army. Full production might then be ordered by the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Production (occasionally the project was tabled at this point due to extenuating circumstances, as for example the 100mm D-54TS armed T-62A tank), followed by the factory preparing to put the vehicle into full production. This might take place nearly immediately if it was only a modification of a vehicle in series production, or there might be as much as a year and a half delay while the plant remodelled and retooled to produce the new machine.

All this could take up to ten years of elapsed time from project to first production model rollout.

Once the vehicles were in service, there were set times and levels of repairs needed called TO-1, TO-2 and Capital Rebuilding. They were rebuilt under the capital rebuilding programme of the Soviet Army. Given the years listed and numbers, it is probable these tanks were all given major upgrades. The T-54s would be upgraded to T-54AM standards and the T-55s to any of the T-55M, T-55AM, T-55MV or T-55AMV standards. While some were to be retained for either reserve status, or for use with Soviet Naval Infantry in the case of the T-55AMV tanks, others would be sold abroad after the 1991 downfall of the Soviet Union.

Tanks were maintained as per four levels of maintenance that determined when they would be rebuilt.

The first level was daily technical inspection (EhTO) and covered routine tank operations on a daily basis. The checks included lubrication as defined in the maintenance manual, checking fluid levels for hydraulics, coolant and lubricants, track tension, air cleaner and in line filters, and any missing or damaged parts. This was crew level maintenance.

Technical Inspection 1 (TO-1) was carried out at set points of operation (either by mileage, time on the engine or usage period) and was more detailed, covering adjustments to the sights, equipment, brakes, track tension and condition of track shoes, hoses, lines, and most critical components. This was company level maintenance.

Technical Inspection 2 (TO-2) was more detailed than TO-1 and called for co ordinated work by higher level technical personnel with specialized equipment to adjust, align and service most key components of the tank. It could include bore-sighting the gun, aligning the IR equipment, checking radio and intercom operation, and replacing any worn out or service limited items. This was regimental or division level maintenance.

Capital rebuilding took place after the tank had covered 5,000 to 10,000 kilometres (based on tank model) or completed ten years of service. The tank would be shipped back to a specialized rebuilding plant where it would be stripped down and completely examined from the ground up. Worn out or obsolete components would be replaced, rebuilt engine and transmission installed, lines and hoses replaced, and any new upgraded components introduced at that time. These could include RMSh tracks in place of OMSh tracks, new road wheels, upgraded radio systems (R-123/R-173 for the older R-113, R-134 for the older R-112 in command tanks), new sights, thermal sleeves for the gun, smoke grenade launchers, demand fuel feed systems for the 200 litre auxiliary tanks, an NVST machine gun in place of the DShKM, and PKTs in place of the SGMs. Most tanks would have been limited to one capital rebuilding in their lifetime, but T-55s seem to have had two – especially if they were going to be sold to a foreign client.

While in service, there were four categories of serviceability for the tanks:

• Category 1: vehicle is new, fully combat capable, all systems are fully operational, all spare parts and tools are in place, and the vehicle is ready to go.

• Category 2: vehicle is used, mostly combat capable, needs some minor repairs to some systems, may be missing some spare parts and tools, but could stand in a combat formation.

• Category 3: vehicle is in need of major repairs; some combat systems are inoperable or no longer present in the vehicle, it is missing most of its spare parts and tools, and would not be sufficiently capable of conducting combat.

• Category 4: vehicle is nearly inoperable, suffers from major failures of key systems (engine, driveline, gun, operating mechanisms) and needs capital repair or rebuilding.

There is a Category 5, which signifies the vehicle has been written off (peacetime) or is a ‘non-returning combat loss’ (wartime). In some cases, vehicles in this condition were stripped of most running gear, supporting systems, and electronics, and then dug in as pillboxes or firing points in fortified regions such as along the mainland Chinese border or on Soviet Sakhalin Island in the Pacific Ocean.

 

[Antares]

T-55 vaunujen pienemmistä tuotannonaikaisista muutoksista.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 71-75

INTERIM CHANGES AND IMPROVEMENTS

Unlike many other Soviet tanks, the T-55 and T-55A received incremental upgrades over the course of their production life in addition to capital rebuild improvements. The US Army would call these ‘modification work orders’ or MWOs, but the Soviet Army had no comparable plan, simply introducing improvements as they materialized. Morozov had seen exactly this problem during the war, hence his demand that he be given full control of the production of the T-34 to standardize improvements and to prevent this sort of variation in specific items on the tanks.

From the beginning the tank was designed to be fitted with the five-spoke cast ‘starfish’ wheels, but due to available supplies of the older ‘spider’ wheels some early production T-55s were fitted with those road wheels. Later on, a scalloped rim idler was introduced to provide more bearing surface for the tracks and prevent thrown tracks while traversing rough terrain.

In 1960 the dynamic travel of the torsion bar suspension was increased from 142mm to 162mm to improve the ability to cross uneven terrain. This also required resetting the maximum angle for flex of the bars from 48 to 53˚. The torsion bars were given additional heat treatment.

About this time, work was also undertaken on the suspension components. The outcome was an increase in the diameter of the hub of the road wheels on Station 1, with a visually similar but larger design. Apparently too much wear was taking place on that wheel station during cross-country driving and a larger hub meant a longer life.

In 1962, meanwhile, the KB at Plant No. 174 developed and tested RMSh tracks for the T-55. The new design featured track pins encased in rubber so that track life was extended to 5,000–6,000 kilometres, while noise and vibration levels were reduced. The RMSh tracks were introduced on new build tanks from 1966, with older tanks being retrofitted as they underwent ‘Capremont’ or capital repair if needed.

In 1964 the FG-102 and FG-100 headlights were replaced by the FG-125 infrared light and the FG-127 blackout-shielded light for the driver-mechanic. The driver-mechanic could now use the FG-125 with his TVN-2 driver-mechanic’s night periscope for night driving conditions; normally the FG-100 was in place and only replaced by the FG-125 when the infrared system was in use.

In 1966 the tanks began to be retrofitted or issued with the new R-123 VHF FM radio in place of the older R-113. The R-123 had a frequency range of 20–51.5MHz and offered a great deal more flexibility to the tank units, including the ability to contact infantry and artillery units in combat situations.

A number of the tanks were fitted with 12 mounts on the upper and lower glacis (four on the upper and eight on the lower) and two brackets for mounting either the BTU-55 bulldozer blade or a KMT-4 or KMT-5 wheeled mine trawl. All 12 of the rectangular mounts were secured with four large bolts in each one; the brackets were shaped something like an open soup pan and had more bolts along their perimeter. Depending on the device needed, they could be attached either by doubtless enthusiastic manual labour or with the help of engineers and a crane.

Most important and visible of all of the changes made to the tank was the reintroduction of the 12.7mm DShKM machine gun over the loader’s hatch. By 1969 it was apparent that the new threat to Soviet armoured vehicles would be attack helicopters such as the AH-1 Huey Cobra and others in Western Europe. These were highly manoeuvrable but relatively slow targets (less than 320km/h top speed) and had to hover to fire ATGMs at tanks, so could be successfully engaged by anti-aircraft machine guns at ranges of 2,000 metres or less. There were also a lot of softer targets such as light armoured vehicles appearing on the battlefield that could be successfully engaged by a 12.7mm weapon with armour-piercing ammunition. The cupola was nearly identical to the older T-54 ones but had a new hatch design and some other changes, with only 300 rounds being provided for the weapon, all carried on the right rear outside of the turret. The T-55 (T-55A) with 12.7mm DShKM was formally introduced in 1972.

From 1974, some T-55 (T-55A) tanks were fitted with the KTD-1 laser rangefinder above the barrel. The KTD-1 was so fitted to T-55 (T-55A) tanks from 1975 to 1977. During the same time period, side skirts were added to some tanks.

Note that these incremental changes were applied to all T-55 models (T-55, T-55A, T-55K and T-55AK).

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Kuvaus T-55 panssarivaunujen elinkaaren jatkamisesta (sivuaa osaltaan samaa mistä kirjoitettiin edellisessä viestissä).

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 39-44

EXTENDING THE LIFESPAN OF THE T-55

The Soviet Army had a rather well thought-through standard for tanks and how to keep them operational. There were three standards for evaluation: technical inspection one (TO-1), technical inspection two (TO-2), and capital rebuilding. This was used for all tanks, with TO-1 taking place after about 2,500 kilometres or three years of operation, TO-2 at 5,000 kilometres or five years of operation, and capital rebuilding at 10,000 kilometres or ten years. Specific items such as tracks, clutches, fuel and water pumps, radiators, electronics, engines and transmissions were to be inspected and replaced at each of these intervals. Special ‘Remontny Zavod’ or ‘Remzavod’ rebuilding plants were set up to handle most of these operations, but on occasion the tanks would also be sent back to the production plants.

The potential battlefield environment also began to change during the first ten years of service life of the T-55 tank, by the end of which there were two new elements on the battlefield that had not been present when the tank was being designed. One of them was the introduction in large numbers of light armoured vehicles and personnel carriers such as the US M113, British FV432 and of course the Soviet BMP-1 and BTR-60. These lightly armoured vehicles included variants now being armed with first generation anti-tank guided missiles, making them a direct threat to tanks such as the T-55. But all of these lightly armoured vehicles were vulnerable to some degree to heavy machine guns such as the 12.7mm DShKM, which was still fitted to the T-54 series. The B-32 round could nominally penetrate 25mm of armour at close range, and later rounds like the BS with a tungsten carbide core could go even further. The 12.7mm DShKM turret weapon, deleted on the original T-55 design, now had a new role.

Also now entering the battlefield scenario and more relevant from a threat perspective was the advent of the attack helicopter armed with machine guns, cannon, rockets and ATGMs (anti-tank guided missiles). Slow flying compared to ground attack fighter-bombers, with speeds not faster than 320km/h, but carrying weapons deadly against tanks, these attack helicopters were, however, vulnerable to the 12.7mm AAMG fitted on the older Soviet tanks. Starting from 1969, the Soviets began to take measures to reinstall the AAMG mounts and weapons on T-55 and T-55A tanks, with 300 rounds in external stowage for the guns, while also fitting the same mount to the T-62 tank and other armoured vehicles such as the SU-85 (ASU-85) airborne self-propelled gun. All tank installations were generally referred to as the ‘Model 1972’ versions of these tanks. At least one Soviet rebuild plant appears to have also created a retrofit kit for the AAMG cupola and mount, as these were subsequently seen on tanks in Iraq and in service with other foreign customers.

In 1977 a programme was undertaken to bring some of the T-54 tanks up to the standard of the T-55, and as such a major programme was carried out under the designator T-54M. This designator had also been used for an earlier proposed but stillborn upgrade to the T-54 in the mid 1950s and should not be confused with that programme. Full modernization called for the following:

• Replacement of the D-10T gun with a D-10T2S and the ‘Tsiklon’ twin-axis gun stabilizer;

• Replacement of the SGMT machine guns with new PKT models;

• Installation of the TSh-32PM gunner’s telescopic sight;

• Installation of the complete IR night fighting suite;

• Replacement of the V-54 engine with the V-55V of 580hp;

• Installation of the T-55 PAZ, PPO and TDA systems;

• Fitting of at least an R-123 radio set.

There were also T-54MK tanks built using the R-112 HF AM radio and antenna suite as well as a TNA-4 navigation system and independent generator set to provide power for the additional electrical load.

By the 1980s the T-55, which had entered service in 1958, was past its prime in its current configuration and was not tenable on modern battlefields as it stood. Combat evaluation from various battlefields where customers had used the tank showed several serious problems, of which the major ones were these:

• Vulnerability to RPG (rocket-propelled grenade), ATGM and HEAT (high-explosive anti-tank) ammunition. All of these could easily penetrate even the glacis and turret front of the tank, knocking it out and killing the crew.

• Vulnerability to mine damage. Not only would an anti-tank mine blow off a track or penetrate the hull, but just the shockwave of its detonation would invariably kill or cripple the driver-mechanic. This was due to his seat being firmly attached to the hull floor of the tank, so the shockwave was directly transmitted to his body.

• Limited effective gunnery range. The determined effective range of a T-55 armed with the 100mm D-10T2S gun was around 1,550–1,650 metres: that was the point where the tank had a 50 per cent chance of hitting its target and three tanks had a 50 per cent chance of destroying the target. But modern Western tanks had effective ranges out to 2,500–3,000 metres with laser rangefinders and fire control computers, and given suitable open ground could pick off the T-55 before they were within firing range. The same applied to anti-tank missile teams, who could outrange the tanks.

A suitable package was designed and developed to fit to both the T-55 and T-62 series tanks. The new equipment and fittings for the T-55, developed as the Obiekt-639 (production T-55M) and Obiekt-639AM (production T-55AM), included the following:

• An upgraded engine, first to the V-55U (developing 640hp) and later the V-46-5M (developing 690hp);

• The new ‘Volna’ fire control system with the 1K13 gunner’s sight, KTD-2 laser rangefinder, BV-55 fire control computer, TShSM-32PV gunner’s sight, ‘Tsiklon-M1’ stabilizer, missile laser guidance system, 9K116 ‘Bastion’ bore-launched ATGM, a 9S831 power converter, and new controls and electronics;

• A spaced armour plate on the tank hull floor to protect against mine detonations under the forward part of the hull;

• Passive armour arrays consisting of stacked, thin spaced armour plates with surrounding resin filler on the glacis and frontal sides of the turret (these were colloquially nicknamed ‘Il’yich’s Eyebrows’ in service after those features of Premier Leonid Brezhnev);

• Steel-reinforced rubber side skirts, providing a degree of protection against cumulative rounds;

• A suspended driver-mechanic’s seat attached to the inside of the hull roof to protect the driver-mechanic from mine shockwave injuries;

• A set of eight Type 902B smoke grenade launchers from the ‘Tucha’ family;

• Increased dynamic travel to the suspension;

• Replacement of the older OMSh steel tracks with RMSh rubber-bushed steel tracks;

• Replacement of the R-113 or R-123 radio sets with the R-173 semi-solid state VHF FM transceiver.

The new tanks were accepted for service in April 1983 under the following designators: T-55M (V-55U engine); T-55M-1 (V-46-5M engine); T-55M1 (without the 9K116 system); T-55M1-1 (without the 9K115 but with the V-46-5M engine); T-55AM (V-55U engine); T-55AM-1 (V-46-5M engine); T-55AM1 (without the 9K116 system); T-55AM1-1 (without the 9K116 system but with the V-46-5M engine).

Two years later, some of the tanks had their passive armour arrays on the glacis and turret removed and replaced with Dynamicheskaya Zaschita (DZ) or dynamic protection, known in the West as explosive reactive armour (ERA) for protection from enhanced HEAT projectiles. Typically, 44 boxes were placed on the upper glacis, 12 on the lower glacis, around 40 on the turret, and up to 84 on the side skirts. These tanks were designated either T-55MV or T-55AMV in service depending on the T-55 base model.

The upgrade permitted the Soviets to consider the improved T-55s to be ‘main battle tanks’ that could now fight against similar Western tanks (M60A3, Leopard 1Ax, AMX-30, Chieftain) on a relatively even level. The ‘Bastion’ bore-launched ATGM had a range of 4,000 metres and now provided the tank with the ability to effectively engage most threats as far as the crew had visibility.

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T-54 ja T-55 vaunujen viimeisistä vuosista Neuvostoliiton ja Venäjän asevoimien käytössä.

Lähde:

Soviet T-55 Main Battle Tank - James Kinnear, Stephen L. Sewell - 2019

Lainaus kirjan sivuilta 50-51.

THE TWILIGHT YEARS IN SOVIET AND RUSSIAN SERVICE

As more and more new generation tanks appeared on the horizon, such as the American Abrams, the British Challenger 1 and 2, the German Leopard 2, and the French Le Clerc, the day of the T-55 was drawing to a close with the Soviet Army. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it was noted by General-Lieutenant Dmitry Vologonov that the USSR had a total of 77,000 combat tanks still on the books. He did admit that this figure included T-34-85, T-44M, IS-2M and IS-3M, and T-10 tanks in ‘war reserve inventory’ and located in depots throughout the country. But a good number of those tanks were T-54 and T-55 types in various stages of upgrading or deterioration based on where and when they had been last serviced.

Many of the tanks were distributed between the 15 new republics created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For example, in 1994 the Ukraine offered as many as 1,200 T-54 and T-55 tanks as scrap to Western countries, with Germany among other countries taking them for their very high-grade steels.

All of the upgrades and various changes over the protracted service life of the T-55 did come with a penalty, however. After the debacle of the Chechen invasion in December 1994, General-Lieutenant Sergey Maev (then head of GABTU, Gosudarstvennoye Avtomotivnoye Bronetankirovannoye Upravleniye – Main Automotive and Armoured Vehicle Directorate) noted that the Russian Army had dozens of different models of tanks in inventory, and many of them did not take the same parts or ammunition, which made operational maintenance difficult.

The Russian Federation sold off large numbers of these obsolescent tanks to client states, but the end finally came in 1997, when President Boris Yeltsin wrote off all surviving T-54 and T-55 tanks with the exception of a number of T-55AMV models. These latter tanks belonged to the Russian Naval Infantry and were kept for one basic reason: the load capacity of the ‘Aist’ class Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) assault landing vessels. An ‘Aist’ could carry either one T-55AMV tank or 200 Naval Infantry troops; all of the other tanks in service with the post-Soviet Russian Army were at least six metric tonnes too heavy for deployment on the air cushion vessel.

A 1979 article in the Soviet military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda stated that some 38,000 T-54 and T-55 tanks had been built when production ceased. Since there were 15,522 T-54 tanks of all models, it follows that from 1958 to 1979 around 23,000 T-55s of all types were built. Today the T-55 and T-55A still serve in the armies of many former Soviet and current Russian client states. Upgrades for these tanks are still offered by the Russian Federation and Western countries. Upgrades available include modification to the firepower, fire control, power plants, electronics and armour protection elements of the tank. With or without upgrades, T-55 tanks will continue to serve for many more years with many nations.

 

[Antares]

Saksan panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto vaunutyypeittäin ennen toista maailmansotaa ja sen aikana.

Lähde:

Танки III Рейха. Самая полная энциклопедия - Михаил Барятинский - 2011

Tanks III Reich. The most complete encyclopedia - Mikhail Baryatinsky - 2011

Taulukot löytyvät kirjan sivuilta 29 ja 30, käännös on otettu Google Lensin kautta.





Tämä taulukko on saman kirjan sivulta 35.


Tämä taulukko on saman kirjan sivulta 82.


Tämä taulukko on saman kirjan sivulta 135.

 

[Antares]

Saksan panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto vaunutyypeittäin ennen toista maailmansotaa ja sen aikana.

Lähde:

Танки III Рейха. Самая полная энциклопедия - Михаил Барятинский - 2011

Tanks III Reich. The most complete encyclopedia - Mikhail Baryatinsky - 2011

Panzer IV vuosituotantomäärät. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 249.


Tiger / Panzer VI panssarivaunujen kuukausituotantomäärät. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 359.


Tiger II / Tiger B / Panzer VI B / King Tiger / Königstiger panssarivaunun kuukausituotantomäärät. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 434.

 

[Antares]

Saksan panssarijoukkojen kokoonpano vaunutyypeittäin toisen maailmansodan eri aikoihin.

Lähde:

Танки III Рейха. Самая полная энциклопедия - Михаил Барятинский - 2011

Tanks III Reich. The most complete encyclopedia - Mikhail Baryatinsky - 2011

The combat composition of the German tank divisions, armed with tanks Pz.38 (t), on June 22, 1941. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 150.


Combat composition of tank formations armed with Pz.38 (t) (at the end of June - beginning of July 1942). Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 157.


The presence of Pz.III tanks in German tank and motorized divisions on the eve Operation "Citadel". Operaatio Citadel oli Saksan hyökkäysoperaatio heinäkuussa 1943 Neuvostoliiton joukkoja vastaan Kurskin "taskun" alueella. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 221. Huomaa että oikean reunan sarake kertoo Panzer III vaunujen prosenttiosuuden kyseisen joukon panssarivaunujen kokonaismäärästä.


The precence of tanks in the German tank and motorized divisions on the eve of Operation "Citadel". Operaatio Citadel oli Saksan hyökkäysoperaatio heinäkuussa 1943 Neuvostoliiton joukkoja vastaan Kurskin "taskun" alueella. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 267. HUOM: jos vertaa tämän taulukon Panzer III määriä ylläolevaan taulukkoon, niin huomaa että tässä taulukossa ei ole laskettu mukaan "Pz. Bef. Wg. III" sekä "Pz. III (Fl)" vaunuja.

Kommentti: erikoista että taulukosta puuttuvat "Pz. V" eli Panther-vaunut. Lainaan wikipediasta: LÄHDE

The Panther tank was seen as a necessary component of Operation Citadel, and the attack was delayed several times because of their mechanical problems and to receive more Panthers, with the eventual start date of the battle only six days after the last Panthers had been delivered to the front. This resulted in major problems in Panther units during the Battle of Kursk, as tactical training at the unit level, coordination by radio, and driver training were all seriously deficient.[93]

It was not until 23–29 June 1943 that a total of 200 rebuilt Panthers were finally issued to Panther Regiment von Lauchert, of the XLVIII Panzer Corps (4 Panzer Army). Two were immediately lost due to motor fires on disembarking from the trains.[93] By 5 July, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to 40.[93] On 17 July 1943 Hitler had ordered a stop to the German offensive.

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A later report on 20 July 1943 showed 41 Panthers as operational, 85 as repairable, 16 severely damaged and needing repair in Germany, 56 burnt out because of enemy action, and two destroyed by motor fires.[97]

Before the Germans ended their offensive at Kursk, the Soviets began their counteroffensive, and succeeded in pushing the Germans back into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on 11 August 1943 showed that the number of total write-offs in Panthers swelled to 156, with only nine operational. The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat, and increasingly lost Panthers in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles.[97]

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Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 273.

 

[Antares]

Saksan panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto vaunutyypeittäin ennen toista maailmansotaa ja sen aikana.

Tiger I panssarivaunujen kuukausituotantomäärät toisen maailmansodan aikana.

Lähde:

Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942-45 - Tom Jentz, Hilary Doyle, Peter Sarson - 1993

HUOM: "Monthly goal" kertoo tietysti tavoitteen mutta "Accepted by inspector" kertoo toteutuneen vaunumäärän per kuukausi. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 13.


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Tiger I panssarivaunujen määrät itärintamalla toisen maailmansodan aikana.

Lähde:

Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942-45 - Tom Jentz, Hilary Doyle, Peter Sarson - 1993

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 41.


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Tiger II panssarivaunujen kuukausituotantomäärät toisen maailmansodan aikana.

Lähde:

Kingtiger Heavy Tank 1942-45 - Tom Jentz, Hilary Doyle, Peter Sarson - 1993

HUOM: "Monthly goal" kertoo tietysti tavoitteen mutta "Accepted by inspector" kertoo toteutuneen vaunumäärän per kuukausi. Liittoutuneiden raskas pommituskampanja pysäytti vaunujen tuotannon maaliskuussa 1945 ja Henschel ehti valmistaa kaikkinensa kolme prototyyppiä ja 489 kpl ns. tuotantomalleja. Tämän lisäksi kirjassa sanotaan että pommituskampanja esti ainakin 657 kpl Tiger II vaunujen valmistamisen aikavälillä syyskuu 1944 - maalisku 1945. Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 17.


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Saksan panssarijoukkojen vahvuus 10. toukokuuta 1940 eli ennen hyökkäystä Alankomaihin ja Ranskaan.

Lähde:

German Light Panzers 1932-42 - Bryan Perrett - 1998

Lainaus ja taulukko löytyvät kirjan sivuilta 40 ja 41.

On 10 May 1940 the long-awaited offensive against France and the Low Countries began. An appendix to Guderian's memoirs contains a memorandum despatched by Army Headquarters (the OKH) to the Fuhrer's military adjutant on 7 November 1944, and this quotes the German tank strenght on the eve of the invasion as being as follows:



These figures, prepared four and a half years after the event, were as accurate as possible, although there is good reason to believe that they slightly understate the case as far as the Czech vehicles are concerned. Excluding command vehicles, they give a total of 2 439 gun tanks, of which the 1 478 machine-gun-armed PzKpfw Is and IIs still represented a substantial majority. In contrast, the French Army alone could deploy over 3 000 tanks, many of which were better armed and better protected than the best German machines.

 

[Antares]

Japanin panssarivaunujen vuosituotanto aikavälillä 1931-1945.

Lähde:

Japanese Tanks 1939-45 - Steven J. Zaloga - 2007

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 10.

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Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 17

 

[Antares]

Tsekkien Panzer 38(t) / PzKpfw 38(t) tuotantomäärät toisen maailmansodan aikana.

Lähde:

Panzer 38(t) - Steven J. Zaloga - 2014

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 16.


Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 26.


Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 29.

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The table below indicates the disposition of the turrets based on a March 1945 report. The turrets listed for the Atlantikwall in fact went to the Südwall on the French Mediterranean coast, mainly to Marseilles and Toulon. It seems likely that some of the turrets allotted elsewhere on the Mediterranean coast in fact ended up in France, since tallies of the fortifications on the Südwall show that there were at least 30 assigned to the French Mediterranean coast and eight more to the Pyrenees. Many of the turrets emplaced on the Greek islands remained in Greek service through much of the Cold War.

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 37.


When the Bulgarian People’s Army retired its handful of PzKpfw 38(t) in the 1950s, they were converted into bunkers on the southern border with Greece. In the early 1960s when Sweden’s obsolete Stridsvagen m/41 were converted into turretless armored personnel carriers, the spare turrets were used to create defensive positions around important military facilities such as airbases. These emplaced turret bunkers remained in service well into the 1980s.

 

[Antares]

Tsekkien Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer tuotantomääristä ja tavoitteista aikavälillä 1944-1945.

Lähde:

Jagdpanzer 38 'Hetzer' 1944-45 - Hilary Doyle, Tom Jentz, Mike Badrocke - 2001

Tuotantohistorian kuvaus ja taulukot löytyvät kirjan sivulta 6-9.

On 28 January 1944 Hitler stressed the importance of quickly starting and increasing production of the 'leichte Sturmgeschütz auf 38(t)' as the most urgent task for the army in 1944. By 18 January 1944 the decision had already been made to produce 1,000 leichte Panzerjäger 38(t)s' before the ink was dry on the conceptual drawings. A very aggressive production schedule was set, calling for a rapid increase in the monthly production rate to reach a final goal of 1,000 per month by March 1945 as follows:


These were quite considerable targets since no single factory had produced over 300 heavy armoured vehicles per month by then. BMM had only achieved a maximum monthly output of 151 and Škoda had not produced a single fully tracked armoured vehicle other than a few prototypes for Germany.

BMM's contract was increased to 2,000 in Fgst.Nr.Serie 321001-323000. Bergepanzerwagen 38 and Jagdpanzer 38 starr were also included in this Fgst.Nr.Serie. Škoda was awarded contracts for 2,000 to be identified with Fgst.Nr.Serie 323001-325000. After completion of their first 2,000, those completed by BMM were identified by the Fgst.Nr.Serie starting with 325001.

As requested, the first three leichte Panzerjäger 38 vehicles were completed on schedule at BMM in March 1944 and accepted by the Heeres Waffenamt inspector in April. These were followed by 20 in April that were demonstrated for Hitler on 20 April 1944. After the demonstration they were sent directly back to the factory since they were not yet completely serviceable. Some armoured components were still missing. BMM continued to meet their production goals of 50 in May and 100 in June but fell short in July, blaming delayed delivery of gun mounts. Even though the factory was claiming that these Jagdpanzer were complete and the Waffenamt inspectors were accepting them, there were numerous minor deficiencies, including: leaking gaskets, air filtration, carburation, the type of spark plugs, the governor and the layout of the connecting lines between the two fuel tanks.

The Waffenamt reduced production goals for August to December to allow the factories more time to get the job done right and deliver operational vehicles. Škoda completed their first ten as scheduled in July. After that they had a tough time rapidly increasing production because of their inexperienced workforce.

Four firms had been given contracts to deliver armoured components for the Jagdpanzer 38, including Škoda in Pilsen, BMM, Linke Hoffman in Breslau and Poldihutte in Komatou. Two air raids on the Škoda plant in October in which a total of 417 tons of bombs were dropped, was the excuse given by the Waffenamt for not meeting the October production goal. Over 400 Jagdpanzer 38 were produced in November but production dropped again in December, partly as a result of three air raids on the Škoda plant in which 375 tons of high-explosive bombs were delivered.

Monthly production peaked at 434 in January 1945, and Škoda was never able to reach the magic figure of 500 per month requested by the Waffenamt. After 1 February 1945 only 2,100 additional Jagdpanzer 38(t)s were ordered to be completed. In June 1945 production was shifted over to the Jagdpanzer 38D - an even simpler design with a diesel engine.

Production declined slightly in February, partly due to an air raid on Prague, and continued decline in March and April was caused by electrical power cuts and shortages in parts as well as the first heavy air raid on BMM, in which 378 tons of high-explosive bombs were dropped on 25 March.

To counter the effects of bombing, assembly was shifted to additional facilities. As reported from Milowitz on 17 April 1945:

'After the bombing raid final assembly of a total of 48 Jagdpanzer 38 was shifted to Milowitz from the BMM Werk Prag/Lyben. Of these only 9 Jagdpanzer 38 and 2 Bergepanzer 38 have been completed and accepted by the inspectors. Causes for the poor performance were relocating the machinery for machining steel castings and secondly getting the 85 Czech workers transferred and established in Milowitz. Once they get started on 18 April, by working 12 to 14 hour shifts, the remaining 39 vehicles should be completed by 24 April. Work at BMM Werk Prag/Lyben has slowed to where only 10 vehicles are expected by 24 April. In addition, about 15 Jagdpanzer 38 should be completed at another dispersion assembly plant in Schlan for a total of 62 from the Prag area. About 50 or 60 are expected from Škoda in Pilsen by 24 April which only delivered 24 by 14 April 1945. The largest threat to continued production is the lack of 7.5cm Pak 39 [which were assembled at plants in Germany].'

A further report dated 29 April 1945 revealed that since 15 April 1945 a total of 103 Jagdpanzer 38 had been issued to units and a further 20 were expected by the end of the month. Plans for May were not certain because there were only 15 Pak 39 available, some without sights or traversing gear. Permission was requested to remove the sights and traversing gear from eight Jagdpanzer 38 starr located at the school in Milowitz in order to complete additional Jagdpanzer 38. BMM was to attempt to install a 7.5cm StuK 40 in a Jagdpanzer 38. This trial was to be completed by about mid-May, and since 75 Stuk 40 were available (assembled by Škoda in Pilsen), it could result in a total of 90 Jagdpanzer 38 being completed in May.

Škoda had also been heavily hit, when over 500 tons of bombs were delivered in an air raid on 24 April 1945. A few additional Jagdpanzer 38 were completed in the first days of May, but records have not survived to reveal the actual numbers. Still. it was a remarkable record that over 2,800 Jagdpanzer 38 were produced during the last year of the war.

 

[Antares]

Sturmgeschutz III Ausf. A - Ausf. E kuukausituotantomäärät aikavälillä tammikuu 1940 - maaliskuu 1942.

Lähde:

Sturmgeschutz III Assault Gun 1940-42 - Hilary Doyle, Tom Jentz - 1996

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 13.

Taulukon kokonaismäärät: "number produced monthly" summa on 834 kpl, "number delivered for issue" summa on 811 kpl.

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Sturmgeschutz III Ausf. G ja Ausf. H sekä Sturmgeschutz IV kuukausituotantomäärät aikavälillä maaliskuu 1942 - huhtikuu 1945.

Lähde:

Sturmgeschutz III and IV 1942-45 - Hilary Doyle, Tom Jentz, Mike Fuller, Peter Sarson - 2001

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 16.

Taulukon kokonaismäärät: "Stu.G" summa on 8 416 kpl, "Stu.H" summa on 1 299 kpl, "Stu.G IV" summa on 1 141 kpl.

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Sturmpanzer "Brummbär" / Sturmpanzer 43 kuukausituotantomäärät.

Lähde:

Sturmtiger and Sturmpanzer in Combat - Waldemar Trojca, Markus Jaugitz - 2008

Lainaus on kirjan sivuilta 23-24.


(yllä lainatun summa = 299 kpl)

 

[Antares]

Panzer IV vuosituotantomääristä.

Lähde:

Panzer IV and Its Variants - The Spielberger German Armor and Military Vehicles Series vol. IV - Walter J. Spielberger - 1993

Taulukko löytyy kirjan sivulta 86.


Sivuilta 115 ja 116.


The transition to the "Kugelblitz" was not achieved, what with starting difficulties and energy shortages. Because of delays in the start of "Ostwind" production, an additional 25 Möbelwagen were contracted. The resulting production and delivery was as follows: