Prof. Klaus Kultti veti aikoinaan ainakin peliteorian post-gradu -kurssia Stadin Lipastolla, jotain tähän malliin... kumpi on kumpi tässä nokka pokassa?!
Hyvä kurssi oli ainakin 1996...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signaling_game
One of the major uses of signaling games both in
economics and
biology has been to determine under what conditions honest signaling can be an equilibrium of the game. That is, under what conditions can we expect rational people or animals subject to natural selection to reveal information about their types?
If both parties have coinciding interest, that is they both prefer the same outcomes in all situations, then honesty is an equilibrium. (Although in most of these cases non-communicative equilbria exist as well.) However, if the parties' interests do not perfectly overlap, then the maintenance of informative signaling systems raises an important problem.
Consider a circumstance described by
John Maynard Smith regarding transfer between related individuals. Suppose a signaler can be either starving or just hungry, and they can signal that fact to another individual who has food. Suppose that they would like more food regardless of their state, but that the individual with food only wants to give them the food if they are starving. While both players have identical interests when the signaler is starving, they have opposing interests when the signaler is only hungry. When they are only hungry, they have an incentive to lie about their need in order to obtain the food. And if the signaler regularly lies, then the receiver should ignore the signal and do whatever they think is best.
Determining how signaling is stable in these situations has concerned both economists and biologists, and both have independently suggested that signal cost might play a role. If sending one signal is costly, it might only be worth the cost for the starving person to signal. The analysis of when costs are necessary to sustain honesty has been a significant area of research in both these fields.