➤ 00:00 Arty Green: Do the UAF perceive a change in strategy? UAF commanders don't have full picture of enemy resources;
➤ 07:40 Green: Technology and innovation at war. FPV-drones are a revolutionary weapon. The war of 2022 is very different from the war of 2023. Russians are better financed, less tech savvy. I am more optimistic than Arestovytch, but the trend is worsening for us. Innovations have a great influence on the war, they are more important than the quantity of ammunition;
➤ 13:40 Arty Green: UAF have a good chance to hold on current positions. In the current positional war the enemy has no chance for significant successes in the coming six months;
➤ 15:55 Arestovytch: Hypothesis — Gen. Zaluzhniy quickly evaluated the perspective of the southern summer offensive and limited the action to conservative goals and set achievable goals for the army. Positional warfare is not good for Ukraine, it turns into a competition of potentials against a larger enemy. Are Ukrainian politicians capable of listening the military and let the troops retreat from disadvantageous positions to better ones? Kutuzov's dilemma — save one's army or cling on to territory. The enemy's intention in the run-up to the US presidential elections of 2024;
➤ 26:35 Аrestovytch: What are Ukraine's options to counter the enemy's actions;
➤ 30:36 Arty Green: Optimal strategy for 2024. Territorial defence: troops aren't being prepared, they are unable to oppose the enemy as of now, corruption. If major changes aren't implemented in government policy and governance during wartime, the country is in mortal danger. The skill level of Ukraine's artillery forces is exaggerated;
➤ 39:55 Arty Green: Proposal for cognitive "IQ" testing of ukrainian generals. Fire those that have below 150. Necessary to optimize command and control, then our army's effectiveness will increase significantly;
➤ 47:10 Romanenko: It is time to recognize, that fighting to reach the internationally recognized borders of 1991 is unrealistic. Preliminary conclusions;
➤ 49:15 Аrestovytch: The root cause of the problems are in the management of the Armed Forces. The nomination of a general or operational direction commander — is a political decision. The army is commanded by combat directives, not combat orders. Why the soviet minded caste of old school officers is behaving like that;
➤ 58:15 Аrestovytch: Quality military training — Systemic problem. Political optimisation of the most effective senior army commander's nomination process;
➤ 01:03:23 Arty Green: Double high command problem in the army — Generals Zaluzhniy and Syrskiy. Problem of incompetent commanders nominated by high command;
➤ 01:12:35 Аrestovytch: Objective testing system for future senior commanders not implemented;
➤ 01:16:40 Arty Green: Some senior commanders have a feudal army command mode. Much fewer people join the Armed Forces voluntarily. Sorting out the mobilization process problems is a task of the utmost urgency;
➤ 01:24:39 Аrestovytch: Implement the American Armed Forces approach, when not recognizing one's mistake is the worst type of dereliction of duty. Proposals for modernizing the Army that would significantly boost the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. Improving the personnel management policy is key. Who could implement it;
➤ 01:32:10 Arty Green: There is end of war vision. Possibility of frank discussion between the ukrainian political leadership and the western partners is yet to be seen;
➤ 01:35:20 Аrestovytch: There are no positive end goals of the war — this is the main strategic weakness of Ukraine. The western partners currently aren't up to the challenge.