I've previously discussed some calculations and adjustments to data on visually confirmed Russian losses in the Russo-Ukrainian war. As a follow-up, I'd like to look at more precise calculations on total losses + remaining stocks.
Let's first look at MBTs.
We work with imperfect data. Thus, a number of adjustments are required.
In general, the greater the required adjustment, the lower the confidence in the estimate. Many of the data points we have require significant adjustments, so the estimates below are low confidence.
That said, the required adjustments for MBTs are likely to be the smallest.
Due to their tactical and propaganda value, as well as due to their general proximity and visibility on the battlefield, MBT losses are probably one of the most complete sets of visually confirmed data.
First, about the methodology.
We assign an adjustment factor by type of equipment in two categories:
- adjustment for proximity/visibility
- adjustment for prestige/value
The adjustment by type for MBTs based on these factors is the lowest (0.95), making MBTs a good candidate for this first exercise.
Most MBTs will be visible on the battlefield, and as their value is high, photos/videos of their destruction will be shared generously.
In my previous thread, I mention the delay in confirmations and the substantial drop in visibility of reported losses after August 2023. I make an adjustment for Oryx data based on that delay. I use the GSUA:Oryx reported ratio up to that time (0.4935).
LINKKI
In this calculation, we treat GSUA (General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine) reports as "hits" rather than destructions.
Hit > damaged > destroyed.
Some definitions below.
"Damaged" refers to vehicles hit with sufficient enough force, or in a vulnerable enough spot, to likely require at least some repairs.
"Destroyed" refers to vehicles that are either totally destroyed or vehicles that require repairs that go beyond replacement cost.
I've also mentioned the higher rate of visible confirmations by
@AndrewPerpetua. The difference is mostly in the form of damaged vehicles as there are methodological differences in terms of what is accepted as a confirmation (Perpetua vs
@oryxspioenkop).
LINKKI
With the corresponding adjustments, we get 3,237 destroyed and 2,023 damaged MBTs by Jan 1, 2024.
Here we incorporate the adjustment by type factor explained above, and we get 3,407 destroyed and 2,130 damaged MBTs by January 1, 2024. GSUA have reported 5,983 hits by that date.
However, our goal is to understand the true number of economically lost MBTs. Thus, three additional adjustments are needed:
+ (add) 20% damaged, uneconomical to repair
- (subtract) 5% destroyed+damaged uneconomical to repair but useful for parts
- (subtract) 15% captured useful
After all the adjustments, we get 3,551 MBTs economically lost.
The calculations are visible in the attached screenshot.
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At the end of August 2023, Institut Action Resilience (IAR) published the most detailed estimate of MBTs in storage, lost, and remaining I have seen.
You can download the full paper here:
https://institutactionresilience.fr/publications.php
Using satellite imagery of the storage bases of the Russian army, they estimate that Russia had 2,987 MBTs in active duty in late 2021 and 5,639 MBTs in storage, of which 3,044 in a reactivatable/repairable state.
The IAR analysts make a note of an unknown number of MBTs in covered storage. However, they consider the number of such MBTs in good quality rather small, likely fewer than 500 units.
We will assume 500 units.
Based on that estimate of available MBTs pre-war (2,987+5,639+500) and based on my estimate of economically lost MBTs, we get 2,980 MBTs left.
GSUA have been reporting 10.5 hit RU MBTs per day since mid-2023. The estimated rate of economically lost to reported hit has been 60%.
Thus, we can assume 6.3 economically lost MBTs per day. RU is estimated to be able to produce ~200 brand-new tanks per year, or 0.55 per day.
At a constant rate of net loss of 5.75 tanks per day, the tank fleet will be totally depleted by June 2, 2025.
Any of the assumptions above can be adjusted to change the final outcome. This is just one example estimate and projection. It is more a methodological exercise of what should potentially go into a calculation of this sort.
Comments and notes are welcome.
An important note: the main chokepoint might not be MBTs but artillery units, in particular barrel shortage, i.e. the depletion there (barring external help) might come sooner. Very important in that estimation is the research
@HighMarsed is doing right now. More on this later.
Sources:
institutactionresilience.fr
oryxspioenkop.com
docs.google.com
docs.google.com
Casualties of the armed forces of the Russian Federation during the war in Ukraine.
index.minfin.com.ua
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Lisäksi linkitti vanhemman ketjunsa jossa pohditaan tappiodataa:
LINKKI
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Samaa dataa paljon pyörittävä whitherapathy kommentoi ketjua näin: A great method and there's nothing missing from the logical approach. Personally I would weaken the dependency on what the GSUa report as I think that is a source of a slight inflation in numbers but honestly it's all a matter of opinion. Great stuff!
www.twz.com
