Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Riskillä että saan paskaa niskaan kysyn: Miksi postaatte jatkuvasti Ukrainan ilmoittamia aiheutettuja tappioita? Onko niistä saatu suora yhteys todistettua osint tilien päivä/viikko/kuukausi ilmoittamiin tappio lukuihin?
OSINT tilit joissa vahvistetut, on asia erikseen niistä respect kaikille jotka jaksaa seurata niitä ja laittaa tänne.

100%:sesti paikkansapitävää tietoa sodan etenemisestä pian tapahtumien jälkeen on melko mahdotonta saada. Monia syitä tähän, mm. ettei haluta vihollisen tietävän tarkalleen mitä on tapahtunut. Todennäköisesti silti Ukrainan julkaisemat luvut ovat lähempänä todellisia kuin Venäjän ilmoittamat.
 
GUR:n mukaan ryssän vähimmäisvarasto ohjusiskuissa on 900 kpl pitkän matkan (>350 km) suristinta.
Ylimenevä osa voidaan käyttää.


GUR:n mukaan siis ryssällä olisi tällä hetkellä eli 2.4.2024 yli 950km ohjuksia joiden kantomatka on yli 350km.

https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/rosiyani-pid-chas-nichnoyi-ataki-vdarili-1712037687.html

How many missiles are there in Russia and how long can the shelling of the energy sector continue: the answer of the State Government​

UKRAINE RUSSIA, TUESDAY, APRIL 02, 2024 09:08
UAENRU

How many missiles are there in Russia and how long can the shelling of the energy sector continue: the answer of the State Government

Photo: representative of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major General Vadym Skibitskyi (Vitaly Nosach RBC-Ukraine)


AUTHOR: YAROSLAVA BORZOVA , ULYANA BEZPALKO

Russia plans to carry out several more massive strikes on Ukrainian energy this spring. However, its stockpile of missiles is depleting, so the aggressor country will again need a pause for stockpiling.

This is stated in the RBC-Ukraine article "The Kremlin is gathering forces. Where can Russia launch a new offensive and how many missiles does it have left?"

"Currently, according to our estimation, Russia has about 950 high-precision missiles of the operational-strategic and strategic level with a range of more than 350 kilometers. We observe a tendency that they, as a rule, try to keep their stocks at the level of at least 900 missiles," - Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, a representative of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, told the publication.

He noted that the Russians begin a series of strikes when they manage to accumulate more than 900 missiles. When stocks approach 900 units, there is a pause in massive strikes.

Now, according to Skibitskyi, the Russians are approaching this limit.

"According to our data, Russia plans to produce about 40 Kh-101 missiles in April. We predict that the Russians will be able to carry out several more massive attacks (2-3 - precisely massive ones), and then they will be forced to take a pause again to accumulate missiles and "Shahedov". However, individual local shelling may continue at the same time," explained the representative of the GUR.

Strikes on energy infrastructure​


We will remind you that in recent weeks, the Russian army resumed attacks on the energy infrastructure. Only on the night of March 22, the Russians attacked Ukraine with 151 means of air attack. At the same time, energy facilities were shelled, as a result of which emergency shutdowns were introduced in a number of cities.

In addition, on March 29, the enemy launched 60 kamikaze drones and 39 missiles, which were also aimed at the energy sector of Ukraine. The Russians attacked three TPPs, as a result of which the equipment was seriously damaged.

As the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated, the Russians are now trying to cause as much destruction as possible to the country's energy sector with their combined airstrikes on the territory of Ukraine.

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Read urgent and important messages about Russia's war against Ukraine on the RBC-Ukraine Telegram channel .

Minun karkea laskelmani sanoo että tällaisia ohjuksia oliis 836 kpl eli tämä on yli 100 kpl pielessä:

1712072272334.png

Helppo nähdä että Kh-101 risteilyohjuksien osalta ainakin tämä on pielessä, koska tulokseksi saadaan -47 kpl.

Liekö sitten juuri Kh-101 on se johon voisi huoletta laskea +100 kpl?

Toisaalta yllä lainatun tuoreen artikkelin mukaan, ryssän sanotaan pyrkivän valmistamaan 40 kpl Kh-101 risteilyohjuksia huhtikuussa 2024 - eli sama määrä jonka minun laskelmani olettaa heidän valmistavan joka kuukausi 6.11.2023 jälkeen.

Joten miten on mahdollista että yhtäkkiä ollaan -47 kpl pakkasen puolella ja kokonaismääränkin pitäisi olla yli 950 kpl?

Ohjusten uustuotannon vaihtelu kuukaudesta toiseen selittäisi tätä osittain, mutta silläkin on rajansa.

GUR:n Vadim Skibatsky kertoi Kalibr-ohjusten määräksi yli 260 kpl (LÄHDE), joten sen osalta minun laskelmani on kohtuu lähellä samaa. Tosin Skibatsky kommentoi että ryssän tavoitteena olisi valmistaa 30 kpl Kalibreita huhtikuussa 2024. Minun laskelmani laskee että 20 kpl per kuukausi tosin GUR arvioi aikaisemmin että tuotantomäärä voi vaihdella välillä 20-35 kpl per kuukausi. JOS viimeisten kuukausien aikana uustuotanto olisi kyennyt esim. 25 kpl per kuukausi, niin silloin lopputulos olisi "yli 260 kpl".

https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/gur-rozpovili-kiy-zapas-raket-kalibr-rosiyi-1712038394.html

The GUR has told how many Kalibr missiles are in stock in Russia​

UKRAINE, TUESDAY, APRIL 02, 2024 09:22
UAENRU

The GUR has told how many Kalibr missiles are in stock in Russia

Photo: Vadym Skibitskyi (Vitaly Nosach, RBC-Ukraine)

AUTHOR: ULYANA BEZPALKO , OLEKSANDR BILOUS

Since the end of September last year, Russia has almost never launched Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles over Ukraine. During this time, a significant stock was created.

This is stated in the RBC-Ukraine article " The Kremlin is gathering forces. Where can Russia launch a new offensive and how many missiles does it have left ".

"The aggressor is stockpiling 3M-14 "Caliber" cruise missiles and has at least 260 units at its disposal. Moreover, they plan to produce 30 such missiles in April this year," Major General Vadym Skibitskyi, a representative of the Ministry of Defense of the Ministry of Defense, told the publication.

Danger from Russian ships​

Earlier, the head of the GUR of the Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov, said that the Russian fleet was stockpiling Kalibr cruise missiles and that the enemy could probably use them to attack Ukraine.

"Calibers have been accumulating throughout this period. They are absolutely ready for use," said the head of the GUR.

According to him, a decision was made in Russia to use Kh-101 cruise missiles instead of Calibers, as they are more effective.

"In the near future, I think we will see the Caliber again, because the number of X-101s has decreased significantly," he added.

As the spokeswoman of the Southern Defense Forces of Ukraine Nataliya Gumenyuk said, Russian ships are stuck in the southeastern part of the Black Sea and are not active. However, the general readiness of missile carriers is high, so the danger from the sea remains.

Last year, the Russians actively used sea-based Kalibr cruise missiles to strike Ukraine's energy sector. This year, the enemy almost did not use this type of missiles.
 
Ryssän strategisten ohjusiskujen jälkeen on nähty usein yhden telegram-kanavan karttoja, joihin on merkitty eri ohjusten ja dronejen lentoreittejä. Vaikka ne lienevätkin suuntaa-antavia, kertovat silti siitä että Ukrainan kokoisessa maassa ei ole mahdollista rakentaa kaiken kattavaa maalavetteihin perustuvaa ilmatorjuntaa.

Sama toisesta kulmasta katsoen: tuollaisen rakentaminen on vielä vaikeampaa Venäjän kokoisessa maassa.

Täten on ennakoitavissa että maahan sijoitettu ilmatorjunta tullaan kiertämään jatkossakin ja toisaalta sitä tuskin riittää jokaisen strategisen kohteen suojaksi.

Budanov kommentoi aikaisemmin yhden haastattelun yhteydessä että Ukrainan kauas yltävistä droneista noin 70% menetetään joko vian tai onnistuneen torjunnan takia (olipa ohjus-it, ammus-it tai EW) mutta noin 30% lentää onnistuneesti perille asti.

Ei ole syytä epäillä, etteikö näin tapahtuisi jatkossakin.
Hinta / hyöty suhde lienee hyvin kohdillaan vaikka vain 1 / 10 osuisi. Tänään tutuksi tulleen Taneco jalostamon ensimmäinen vaihe maksoi $5,8 Mrd. Äkkiseltään en löytänyt mitä vaiheet 2 ja 3 maksoivat, mutta putkiakin rakennettiin näiden lisäksi satoja kilometrejä.
 
Kummasti alkaa löytyä. Ehkä tässä on käynyt niin että joku on ottanut puhelimen käteen ja alkanut soitella. Ne on varmasti ollut saatavilla jo viime vuonna mutta kukaan ei ole tajunnut kysellä perään.

Tuolla Saksan arviolla tulee 3200 € / ammus hinnaksi ( 576 m€ / 180000).

Joka ei kuulosta pahalta kun puhuttiin jopa 8000 € / ammus ennenkö Tsekkiläiset alkoivat soitella.

Tsekkien "löytämiä" kerrottiin olleen 800 000 + 700 000 ja hinnaksi sanottiin 3 miljardia euroa eli 3,3 miljardia dollaria.

Eli yhden laukauksen hinnaksi tulisi 2 000 euroa eli 2 200 dollaria.

3 200 euroa per laukaus on selvästi kalliimpi, mutta ei mitenkään sietämättömän paljon kalliimpi.

Varsinkin kun ei voida tietää, miten nämä eri tilauserät vertautuvat toisiinsa.

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MUOKKAUS: aikaisemmassa viestissä (LINKKI) oli puhetta Viron "löytämistä" 1,2 miljoonasta laukauksesta joiden hinnaksi arvioitiin 2-3 miljardia euroa.

Tuosta voidaan laskea yhden laukauksen hinnaksi (sen vaihteluväliksi):

3 000 000 000 / 1 200 000 = 2 500 euroa
2 000 000 000 / 1 200 000 = 1 666,67 euroa

Ylläolevan sanotaan olevan kattaus monenlaista ampumatarviketta: LÄHDE

Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur tells newspaper Postimees that deliveries could begin in 2 months if funding is secured.

The available ammunition includes 122mm Grad rockets, and 122mm, 152mm & 155mm shells.


Tämän perusteella näitä on siis "löydettävissä" halvemmallakin kuin 3 200 euroa per laukaus, tosin ei voida tietää, puhutaanko esim. 105mm, 122mm, 152mm vai 155mm laukauksista vai eri kaliiperien yhdistelmistä, joten ei voida vertailla erilaisia "löydöksiä" näin suoraviivaisesti.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Pitäiskö sit postata ryssien ilmoittamat tappiot?
Sanoinko niin tuossa? Vai pitikö muuten vaan alkaa olkinukkeilemaan?

100%:sesti paikkansapitävää tietoa sodan etenemisestä pian tapahtumien jälkeen on melko mahdotonta saada. Monia syitä tähän, mm. ettei haluta vihollisen tietävän tarkalleen mitä on tapahtunut. Todennäköisesti silti Ukrainan julkaisemat luvut ovat lähempänä todellisia kuin Venäjän ilmoittamat.
Tottakai ne on lähempänä kuin Venäjän, mutta ihmetykseni koskeekin sitä että saako joku jotain niistä ilmoitetuista luvuista vs vahvistetuista tappiosta. Ellei sitten ole jo todistettu aikaisemmin että ne pitävät paikkansa ja osint tulee vaan jälkijunassa.
 
Riskillä että saan paskaa niskaan kysyn: Miksi postaatte jatkuvasti Ukrainan ilmoittamia aiheutettuja tappioita? Onko niistä saatu suora yhteys todistettua osint tilien päivä/viikko/kuukausi ilmoittamiin tappio lukuihin?
OSINT tilit joissa vahvistetut, on asia erikseen niistä respect kaikille jotka jaksaa seurata niitä ja laittaa tänne.
Käsittääkseni sodan alun "moraali-ilmavoittojen" jälkeen ilmoitetun ryssän tappiot seuraavat hyvin osint-tilien ja tiedustelupalvelujen julkaisemia lukuja. Mitä kauempana ryssän selustassa tappiot tapahtuvat (tykistö, ilmatorjunta, huolto, lentotukikohdat), sen huonommin osint-tilit saavat niistä kiinni. Eli pelkästään osint-tilien lukuja seuraamalla saa liian pessimistisen kuvan tilanteesta.

Itse pidän Ukrainan ilmoittamia lukuja suhteellisen oikeina (poislukien em. moraali-ilmavoitot). Näistä luvuista voidaan tehdä johtopäätöksiä ryssän varastojen riittävyydestä ja miten reaktivoinnit ja uudistuotanto pysyy tappioiden mukana. Lisäksi tuntuu mukavalta kun kuolleet ryssät ja tuhoutunut ryssäkalusto saavuttaa uusia tasalukuja.

Vaikka ei ilmoitusten lukuja uskoisikaan, trendit kertovat itsessään jotain taistelujen kiivaudesta.

En ryhdy spekuloimaan miksi halutaan käyttää pessimistisimpiä mahdollisia ryssän tappiolukuja tilanteessa, jossa uutisia hallitsevat Ukrainan ammuspula ja ryssän eteneminen ja tuleva keväthyökkäys.
 
Tottakai ne on lähempänä kuin Venäjän, mutta ihmetykseni koskeekin sitä että saako joku jotain niistä ilmoitetuista luvuista vs vahvistetuista tappiosta. Ellei sitten ole jo todistettu aikaisemmin että ne pitävät paikkansa ja osint tulee vaan jälkijunassa.
Niin kuin Lihapakaste kirjoitti niistä voi saada käsitystä esim onko meneillään normaalia hiljaisempi tai aktiivisempi vaihe sodasta. Minkätyyppistä kalustoa tuhotaan paljon, mitä vähän yms. Itse en niin tärkeänä pidä montako vaikka tankkia tuhottiin jonain päivänä koska kaikkea ei tiedetä ja osa vaurioituneista voidaan korjata ja ne palaavat käyttöön myöhemmin. Jos luet kuvauksia aikaisemmista sodista sielläkin saadaan hyvin erilaisia kuvauksia tapahtumista riippuen siitä keneltä kysytään.

Eilen maanantaina TV:stä tuli dokumenttielokuva Mariupolin taisteluista.
Sen lopussa kerrottiin että kaupungissa olisi kuollut arvioiden mukaan 25 000 ihmistä, mutta todellinen luku lienee suurempi.

kukaan ei tiedä tarkkaa määrää.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tässä pidempi artikkeli, jossa mainitaan tiettyjen ohjusten määriä ja uustuotantoa sekä ryssän mobilisaatiopotentiaalia:

https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/analytics/kremlin-accumulates-forces-russia-s-potential-1712039745.html

Kremlin accumulates forces: Russia's potential offensive and amount of missiles it has​

UKRAINE, TUE, APRIL 02, 2024 - 09:38

Kremlin accumulates forces: Russia's potential offensive and amount of missiles it has​

UKRAINE, TUE, APRIL 02, 2024 - 09:38
UAENRU

Kremlin accumulates forces: Russia's potential offensive and amount of missiles it has

Russia is preparing a new offensive in August or September (GettyImages)

AUTHOR: ULIANA BEZPALKO, MARIA KHOLINA

Russia has resumed its attacks on ГUkraine's energy infrastructure and is preparing for a new offensive on the front lines this summer. Details of Moscow's plans are outlined in the RBC-Ukraine report.

Sources used during the preparation of the article: Defense Express, The Times, The Economist, Russian media, comments from the representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Vadym Skibitskyi, military experts Oleksandr Kovalenko, Ivan Kyrychevskyi, as well as conversations with representatives of the Defense Forces on condition of anonymity.


Russia continues its offensive operation in the east, despite the end of the prolonged and exhausting battles for Avdiivka. Moscow seeks to maximize the "window of opportunity" caused by the slowdown in assistance to Ukraine from the United States.

Foreign observers and Ukrainian government representatives warn that the enemy may strike with renewed force as early as this summer. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has specifically said that himself. Several leading Western media outlets have described rather pessimistic scenarios for Ukraine's future, including the possibility of occupation forces advancing on Kyiv or Kharkiv.

Such bleak forecasts may appear more as an attempt to align Western policymakers. However, Moscow does indeed have plans regarding Ukrainian energy and the occupation of new territories this year.

Russia's actions in the spring: Attacks on energy infrastructure, destabilization, and preparation

The pace of the offensive operation, which Moscow initiated back in September, has somewhat slowed down. Currently, the adversary is essentially trying to prepare the initial conditions for a new strike after managing to regroup and gather additional forces.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has made another move and decided to target energy infrastructure, attacking Ukrainian thermal power plants, combined heat and power plants, hydroelectric power stations, and gas storage facilities. Ukraine's Ukrenergo company has been forced to periodically implement emergency electricity shutdowns in some regions. The situation is mitigated by warm weather, as the heating season is already ending in some areas, significantly reducing the load on the power grid.

There were concerns and forecasts that Russia would begin attacks on Ukrainian energy earlier, when temperatures reached below zero. However, it became clear as early as December that Moscow decided to postpone this plan. According to reports, all the massive shelling conducted by the enemy in December, January, and February was mostly aimed at Ukrainian defense industry objects.

Such calculations by the Kremlin may be related to the presidential elections held in March. Perhaps Putin feared that if our energy facilities were systematically destroyed in winter, the same fate would befall those Russian regions reached by Ukrainian means of attack. Power outages and blackouts in Russian settlements would have created a negative background during the campaign, which Putin was not interested in. The end of the elections essentially gave him more freedom, and Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil bases and refineries were just a formal pretext for starting their air campaign.

Кремль збирає сили. Де Росія може почати новий наступ і скільки в неї залишилось ракет

Russia has begun attacking the energy sector, using new tactics to bypass Ukraine's air defense (photo: RBC-Ukraine, Vitaliш Nosach)


Russia's goal is not only to cut off electricity but also to destroy thermal power generation facilities to leave part of the Ukrainian population without heating for the next autumn-winter season. An additional task is to disrupt the functioning of our defense industry through damage to the power grid.

Unlike last fall and winter, Moscow has now begun to plan attacks more meticulously and inventively. Last year, these were mostly missile strikes with Kalibr and Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from Tu-95 bombers, which usually occurred during peak working hours once every 7 days, then once every 10 days, and then once every 14 days. And between them, nighttime strikes were carried out using Shahed drones.

Now the Russians have reduced the interval between strikes and are combining various means of attack in volleys. First comes a swarm of Shahed drones, followed by Kh-101 missiles, S-300 missiles, and a significant portion of ballistic and supersonic missiles – Iskanders-M, Kh-22, and Kinzhals. The attacks are conducted at night, which, on the one hand, complicates the detection of aerial targets for Ukraine's air defense units, and on the other hand, creates psychological and physical exhaustion among the civilian population.

Another characteristic feature is that during the recent strikes, the Russians have been actively using Kh-55 missiles. These missiles are also fired from Tu-95s to overload and distract our air defense system. According to RBC-Ukraine, during a series of recent shelling, Kh-55 missiles accounted for approximately 25% of the total barrage. And during one of the recent strikes on Kyiv, the enemy exclusively used this type of missile.

Situation with Russian missiles

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia is planning several more massive strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities this spring. However, their missile reserves are dwindling, so they will need another pause to replenish.

"Currently in Russia, according to our estimates, there are about 950 high-precision missiles of operational-strategic and strategic levels with a range of over 350 kilometers. We observe a tendency that they usually try to keep their reserves at a level of no less than 900 missiles," said General Major Vadym Skibitskyi, a representative of the General Staff.

When Russians manage to accumulate over 900 missiles, they begin a series of strikes. Conversely, when reserves approach 900 units, there is a pause in mass strikes. According to Skibitskyi, the Russians are already approaching this limit.

"In April, according to our data, Russia plans to produce about 40 Kh-101 missiles. We predict that the Russians may conduct several more mass attacks (2-3, specifically mass ones), and then they will have to take another pause to accumulate missiles and drones. However, separate local shelling may continue during this time," Skibitskyi explained.

It is also noteworthy that since late September, the adversary has almost not launched other sea-based cruise missiles Kalibr. According to military sources, this type of missile is easier to counter by Ukraine's air defense system than the Kh-101. Additionally, the adversary is compelled to limit their use due to wear and tear and damage to their carriers. Military-political observer of the Information Resistance group, Oleksandr Kovalenko, asserts that infrastructure for servicing and storing the Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles has not yet been arranged in Novorossiysk, where the Black Sea Fleet was relocated after fleeing from occupied Sevastopol.

"The aggressor is accumulating reserves of 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles and has at least 260 units at their disposal. Moreover, they plan to produce 30 such missiles in April of this year," Skibitskyi said.

Considering the reserves of these missiles against the reduction of Kh-101, intelligence suggests that the adversary will resume their more active use soon. Meanwhile, the Russians have begun to employ another type of ballistic missiles launched from the territory of occupied Crimea. Interlocutors in various sectors of the Armed Forces still doubt whether the adversary has indeed acquired the Zircon missile, which until recently was considered only a prospective missile, or upgraded the Onyx-M.

Кремль збирає сили. Де Росія може почати новий наступ і скільки в неї залишилось ракет

Onyx missile launch (photo: defence.ua.com)


Nevertheless, the limited use of these means of attack can be interpreted as a demonstration by the Kremlin that they have finally acquired something resembling hypersonic missiles. However, the Kyiv air defense system has shown that it is still capable of intercepting them. The exact number of these new ballistic missiles in the enemy's possession is unknown.

"As for the fast missiles flying from the southern direction, it is currently difficult to determine whether they are Zircon missiles or modernized Onyx missiles. However, speaking of ordinary Onyxes, according to our data, the Russians have 440 units in stock. Currently, they have managed to resume their production at a rate of 6-8 missiles per month," Skibitskyi said.

Another element to expect from Russia this spring is an attempt to destabilize the situation inside Ukraine. This threat has recently been reported, particularly by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. According to sources within military circles, Moscow's destabilization will primarily take the form of information-psychological operations. For example, the number of unconfirmed reports (about alleged shelling threats, terrorist acts, etc.) in anonymous publics will increase, aiming to sow panic, fatigue, and disappointment among the population. At the same time, experts do not rule out that Russia may increase attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian territory with sabotage-reconnaissance groups.

Russia's summer plans: Troop buildup and potential new offensive


As early as this summer, the Russians may organize a new offensive operation. Given the pace of forming new units and troop recruitment, Moscow's military activities could intensify in August or September.

"They will need some time to compensate for the losses they suffered during the previous year and since the beginning of this year during the Avdiivka offensive campaign. Currently, they are not advancing as intensively along the front line as before, but they still try to do so. During the summer, they will form new units, complete those that are not yet formed, and around the second half of this year, they may indeed begin offensive operations," believes Kovalenko.

Speaking of Russia's new offensive, it should be noted that their objectives on the front remain the same – complete capture of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The next priority, in case of advancement in Donbas, is the expansion of the occupation to Zaporizhzhia region, located on the left bank of the Dnipro River.

Therefore, their new operations, according to one scenario, could unfold towards the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. For this, the occupiers may intensify activities both in the Lyman and Siverskyi directions to encircle this area. Another variant of their actions involves another attempt to capture Kurakhove and Vuhledar.

"It is quite possible that the adversary may also consider the Vuhledar area for an offensive. It is crucial for them to take control of Road 0532 – a logistical artery from Maryinka to Vuhledar. The enemy is currently trying to create conditions for cutting this logistical artery in the Novomykhailivka area. They are also pushing towards Pobeda and Vodiane from Solodke. In fact, they are creating conditions to push towards Vuhledar not only from the south but also from the north," says Kovalenko. He also believes that the Russians may attempt to reinvigorate their offensive actions in the Kupiansk area in the second half of the year.

Regarding the possibility of an offensive on Kyiv, which some Western media predict, it currently seems highly unlikely. For Moscow to organize such an operation, they would need to accumulate no less than 100,000 troops alongside the Kyiv region, particularly from the North, on the territory of Belarus. To deploy such a force, conduct its deployment, combat coordination, and so forth, it would take at least 3-4 months, and this cannot go unnoticed by Ukraine's special services. Currently, according to RBC-Ukraine, no such activity is observed in the North.

Кремль збирає сили. Де Росія може почати новий наступ і скільки в неї залишилось ракет

Russia may launch a new offensive in Donbas this summer (photo: GettyImages)


The question remains open: will Putin decide to announce a new wave of mobilization in Russia similar to the one conducted in the fall of 2022? Sources within the Ukrainian Armed Forces believe that the Kremlin does not urgently need this. For 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense and the General Staff have planned to recruit approximately 500,000 personnel into the military without declaring an open mobilization - both to replenish losses and to form new units. And they are likely to succeed, considering that at least 30,000 individuals are already joining the Russian army each month.

Moreover, Putin has signed a decree to conduct a spring draft starting from April 1, which will last until mid-July. 150,000 Russians will be conscripted, and an estimated 30% of them are expected to agree to switch to contract service, according to one of the informed RBC-Ukraine sources. Thus, they could effectively be deployed to the front lines. At least a similar percentage of conscripts - 30-40% - decided to sign contracts for further service during the last fall draft.

The task of the Ukrainian army this year is to maximally restrain the enemy's advances, effectively conduct defensive operations, and continue to destroy enemy targets and depots, particularly in the occupied Crimea. However, Ukraine's capabilities will objectively depend on the volumes of military aid from Western partners. None of the interlocutors within military circles doubts that it will continue in 2024. The main question is in what volumes.

Ivan Kyrychevskyi, an expert from the information and consulting agency Defense Express, said that currently Ukrainian units on the front line are somewhat recovering from the ammunition shortage that existed back in January.

"This could have happened thanks to our defense budget, and also thanks to the EU, which, despite widespread discourse, somehow fulfills its promise regarding ammunition. According to the Czech initiative, ammunition will likely arrive closer to summer. But in reality, there are sources worldwide where ammunition can be obtained. The main thing is the speed in resolving this issue. Even Serbians are ready to sell ammunition to Ukraine, as well as South Africa, which is a country that is a major source of 155 mm caliber ammunition. Türkiye could also be one of the sources," the interlocutor said.

In order to seize the initiative on the front lines in 2024, the Ukrainian army needs all types of weapons and equipment. And even if Ukraine suddenly loses such an important partner as the USA, Europe, in the foreseeable future, is capable of taking over this "baton."

"I think we should take into account all geopolitical factors and the fact that Europe has all the capabilities to become no less powerful than the United States. Because the United States themselves are relinquishing the role of security guarantor in confrontation with Russia. We need to prepare for the reality where Europe will indeed replace the United States in terms of security for Ukraine," Kyrychevskyi believes.

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Tässä pari lainausta ohjuksista:

Now the Russians have reduced the interval between strikes and are combining various means of attack in volleys. First comes a swarm of Shahed drones, followed by Kh-101 missiles, S-300 missiles, and a significant portion of ballistic and supersonic missiles – Iskanders-M, Kh-22, and Kinzhals. The attacks are conducted at night, which, on the one hand, complicates the detection of aerial targets for Ukraine's air defense units, and on the other hand, creates psychological and physical exhaustion among the civilian population.

Another characteristic feature is that during the recent strikes, the Russians have been actively using Kh-55 missiles. These missiles are also fired from Tu-95s to overload and distract our air defense system. According to RBC-Ukraine, during a series of recent shelling, Kh-55 missiles accounted for approximately 25% of the total barrage. And during one of the recent strikes on Kyiv, the enemy exclusively used this type of missile.

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However, speaking of ordinary Onyxes, according to our data, the Russians have 440 units in stock. Currently, they have managed to resume their production at a rate of 6-8 missiles per month," Skibitskyi said.


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Onyx-ohjuksia käytettiin Reznikovin mukaan 144 kpl aikavälillä 23.2.2022 - 3.1.2023, jolloin hyökkäystä edeltänyt määrä 470 kpl kutistui määräksi 326 kpl. Reznikovin mukaan ohjuksia ei olisi valmistettu yhtäkään ko. aikavälillä.

GUR:n Skibistkyn mukaan näitä ohjuksia olisi kyetty valmistamaan 6-8 kpl per kuukausi ja määrä olisi tällä hetkellä 440 kpl.

Näitä kahta vertaamalla voidaan todeta että määrä olisi kasvanut aikavälillä 4.1.2023 - 2.4.2024 (454 päivää eli 15,13333 kuukautta jos lasketaan 30 päivää per kuukausi):

440 - 326 = 114

Yhden kuukauden keskiarvoinen uustuotanto olisi siis:

114 / 15,13333 = 7,53304

Tämä vertautuu hyvin Skibitskyn vaihteluvälin 6-8 kpl kanssa, joskin se on vaihteluvälin suuremmasta päästä.

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Kh-55 ohjusten käyttö, joiden osuus voinut olla 25% "viimeaikaisista iskuista" ja yhdessä iskussa kaikki ohjukset olivat Kh-55 - tämä voisi selittää sen, miksi minun laskelmani "Kh-101 numero" on lipsahtanut pakkasen puolelle.

Laskelmani perustuu Kh-101 ohjuksia määrään 6.11.2023 ja uustuotantoon, jonka koko on 40 kpl per kuukausi - MUTTA oletetaan myös että joka kerta kun Ukraina kertoo käytetyn "Kh-101/555/55 risteilyohjuksia", lasken nämä Kh-101 ohjuksiksi.

Kh-55 ei ole uustuotannossa joten niiden käyttö tarkoittaa olemassaolevien varastojen tyhjentämistä. Tietääkseni Kh-555 on edelleen tuotannossa, vaikka onkin vanhempi kuin Kh-101 - molemmat ovat kuitenkin 2000-luvun uustuotantoa. Toisaalta, joka kerta kun olen kuullut näitä tuoreita arvioita ohjusten määristä niin niissä puhutaan aina "Kh-101 määrä ja uustuotanto" mutta ei koskaan "Kh-555 määrä ja uustuotanto". Kenties nämä mielletään samaksi? Tai kenties toisesta on tietoa ja toisesta ei?
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tuo lentää hitaammin kuin känninen fasaani tervattuna. Onkohan Venäjän tutkat vieläkään korjattu havaitsemaan todella hitaita kohteita.
Näillä hitailla lentohärveleillä on tuulen suunta ja nopeus olleelinen matkan pituuteen. 10 m/s sekunnissa myötätuleen tekee 10 tunnin lennolla 360 km lisää toimintamatkaan ja vastatuuleen tulee miinusta enemmän.
Räyskälässä kerran purjekone "peruutti" maahan nähden vastatuulen lentäessä. Suihkukoneella tulee pienemmät muutokset.
 
Ja lisäksi lentäjän massa (laskennallisesti 75 kg) jää pois. Ja jos lentäjää ei ole, miksi olisi penkki ja turvavyö? Korikaan ei tarvitse mitään turvakaarta tms. eli ei mitään lentoturvallisuuteen liittyvää tarvita. Sisustus voidaan riisua minimiin jne. Voidaan käyttää ohutta muovia jos 10 lentotuntia riittää. Kummasti saadaan polttoaine + räjähdelastia lisää mahtumaan.

On muuten mielenkiintoinen ja jännittävä kesäkausi edessä ryssän cesna harrastajilla.
Mahdollisen pelastusvarjon voi myös jättää pois kyydistä n.15kg. Sähköisen bensapumpun, mittarit sekä akun kokonaan pois jättäminenkin saattaisi keventää, sillä Rotaxin sytkät toimii magneetoilla, kaapeleilla käyntiin vaan.

Renkaat telineineen pitäisi myös olla pois tiputettavaa mallia ilmanvastuksen ja painon takia.
 
Mahdollisen pelastusvarjon voi myös jättää pois kyydistä n.15kg. Sähköisen bensapumpun, mittarit sekä akun kokonaan pois jättäminenkin saattaisi keventää, sillä Rotaxin sytkät toimii magneetoilla, kaapeleilla käyntiin vaan.

Renkaat telineineen pitäisi myös olla pois tiputettavaa mallia ilmanvastuksen ja painon takia.
Pelastusvarjo siviilikoneessa?
 
Ukrainassa on lentokone osaamista, saattaahan siellä kynät jo kovasti sauhuta ko. tarkoitukseen "liukkaampaa" runkoa varten.
Ultrallahan pystyy ajelemaan hyvin matalalla ja tutka havaisee silloin sen huonosti sekä ultra ei mölyä kovasti.
Huono on havaita jos 160kmh ajaa matalalla.
 
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