Ennen Trumpin virkaanastujaisia oli yleinen uskomus, että vaalit voitettuaan rauhoittuu ja voi olla ihan hyväkin presidentti. Loppujen lopuksihan se sekoilu ennemminkin paheni ja tuhoja rajasi lähinnä presidenttikauden lyhyys ja jatkuva henkilöiden vaihtuminen Trumpin ympärillä. Tässä valossa pelko Ukrainan tuen loppumisesta Trumpin voittaessa nämä vaalit on täysin aiheellinen. Ei varmaa, mutta hyvin todennäköistä.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
PekoniSoturi
Kapteeni
Hevosten käytössä on tiettyjä etuja:
- hevoselle ei tarvitse kuljettaa syötävää, se löytää kesällä itse ruokansa.
- jos hevonen kävelee miinaan, siitä saadaan miehistölle ruokaa.
Eiköhän hevosten käyttäminen lopu talvella, kun pitäisi huolehtia niistä.
Meillähän sota-aikaan paljon hevosia käytettiin... Rehupulan aikoihin niille syötettiin selluloosaa, sillon piti sukaa käyttää kevyesti, ettei hangannu pahvia näkyville... Ykskin hevosmies epäili, että nyt on lavantautia liikkeellä, ku kärryistä aisa katkes... Toisella taasen oli hevosella ähky ja kysäs toiselta hevosmieheltä neuvoa että mitäs nyt pitäs tehdä... Tää toinen neuvo "juota hevoselle pullo tärpättiä"... No tää juotti, mut hepo kuoli...Seuraavalla kerralla ku tän neuvojan tapas, ni sano että hepo kuoli.... Neuvoja vastas "niin munkin hepo kuoli."
Antares
Respected Leader
Nyt kun Gazpromin menestys nousi taas hetkellisesti puheenaiheeksi niin tässä pari kuukautta vanha artikkeli jossa on analysoitu yhtiön tulevaisuuden näkymiä.
Lainaan sen spoilerin taakse niitä varten joita aihe kiinnostaa (artikkeli julkaistu 15.5.2024 - ei siis ihan tuore julkaisu): LÄHDE
Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom recorded a US$6.8bn loss in 2023, the first since 1999 - in my latest for @ForeignPolicy
I unpack what this means for the Kremlin's war economy and why Moscow has no good option to revive flagging gas sales
Lainaan sen spoilerin taakse niitä varten joita aihe kiinnostaa (artikkeli julkaistu 15.5.2024 - ei siis ihan tuore julkaisu): LÄHDE
Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom recorded a US$6.8bn loss in 2023, the first since 1999 - in my latest for @ForeignPolicy
I unpack what this means for the Kremlin's war economy and why Moscow has no good option to revive flagging gas sales
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/1...budget-war-economy-russia-putin-europe-china/
ANALYSIS
By Agathe Demarais, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
A small crowd is silhouetted against a giant blue screen with global gridlines that displays the Gasprom logo. People mill about under the Gazprom logo at the the International Gas Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on Oct. 7, 2021. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
MAY 15, 2024, 5:24 AM
At the end of 2022, Dmitry Medvedev—Russia’s former prime minister and the current deputy chairman of its Security Council—offered his predictions for the coming year. He warned that Europeans would suffer badly from Russia’s decision to curb natural gas exports to the European Union, suggesting that gas prices would jump to $5,000 per thousand cubic meters in 2023—around 50 times their prewar average. He probably assumed that that sky-high prices would translate into a windfall for Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, which was still supplying several European countries via pipeline, ramping up exports of liquefied natural gas, and eyeing new deals with China. Perhaps Medvedev also hoped that Europeans would beg the Kremlin to send the gas flowing again.
It turns out that Medvedev might want to polish his crystal ball: Last year, European gas prices averaged a mere one-tenth of his number. And just this month, Gazprom posted a massive $6.8 billion loss for 2023, the first since 1999.
Gazprom’s losses demonstrate the extent to which the Kremlin’s decision to turn off the gas tap to Europe in 2022 has backfired. In 2023, European Union imports of Russian gas were at their lowest level since the early 1970s, with Russian supplies making up only 8 percent of EU gas imports, down from 40 percent in 2021. This has translated into vertiginous losses for Gazprom, with the firm’s revenues from foreign sales plunging by two-thirds in 2023.
Gazprom’s woes are very likely setting off alarm bells in Moscow: With no good options for the company to revive flagging gas sales, its losses could weigh on Russia’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine. This is especially ironic given the fact that EU sanctions do not target Russian gas exports; the damage to the Kremlin and its war effort is entirely self-inflicted.
The most immediate impact of Gazprom’s losses will be on Russian government revenues, a crucial metric to gauge Moscow’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. Poring over Gazprom’s latest financials paints a striking picture. Excluding dividends, Gazprom transferred at least $40 billion into Russian state coffers in 2022, either to the general government budget or the National Welfare Fund (NWF), Moscow’s sovereign wealth fund.
This is no small feat. Until last year, Gazprom alone provided about 10 percent of Russian federal budget revenues through customs and excise duties as well as profit taxes. (Oil receipts usually account for an additional 30 percent of budget revenues.) This flood of money now looks like distant history. In 2023, the company’s contribution to state coffers through customs and excise duties was slashed by four-fifths, and like many money-losing firms, it is due a tax refund from the Russian treasury.
For Moscow, this is bad news on several fronts. Because of rising military expenses, the country’s fiscal balance swung into deficit when Moscow invaded Ukraine. To help plug the gap, the Kremlin ordered Gazprom to pay a $500 million monthly levy to the state until 2025. Now that the company is posting losses, it is unclear how it will be able to afford this transfer. In addition, Gazprom’s contribution to the NWF will probably have to shrink. For the Kremlin, this could not come at a worst time: The NWF’s liquid holdings have already dropped by nearly $60 billion, around half of its prewar total, as Moscow drains its rainy-day fund to finance the war. Finally, Gazprom’s woes could prompt the firm to shrink its planned investments in gas fields and pipelines—a decision that would, in turn, hit Russian GDP growth.
As if this was not enough, a closer look at Gazprom’s newly released financials suggests that the worst may be yet to come, with three telltale signs that 2024 could be even more difficult than 2023.
First, Gazprom’s accounts receivable—a measure of money due to be paid by customers—are in free fall, suggesting that the firm’s revenue inflow is drying up. Second, accounts payable shot up by around 50 percent in 2023, hinting that Gazprom is struggling to pay its own bills to various suppliers. Finally, short-term borrowing nearly doubled last year as Russian state-owned banks were enlisted to support the former gas giant.
Whereas these figures come from Gazprom’s English-language financials, the company’s latest Russian-language update yields two additional surprises—both of which show that the firm’s situation has worsened even further since the beginning of the year.
First, short-term borrowing during the first three months of 2024 roughly doubled compared to the previous quarter. If Russian state-owned banks continue to cover Gazprom’s losses, the Russian financial sector could soon find itself in trouble. This begs a tricky question: With the NWF’s reserves dwindling and Moscow’s access to international capital markets shut down, who would pay a bailout bill? Second, Gazprom’s losses were almost five times greater in the first quarter of 2024 than in the same period of 2023, hinting that the firm may post an even bigger loss this year than it did in 2023.
Looking ahead, 2025 will be an especially tough year for Gazprom. The transit deal for gas shipments through Ukraine via pipeline to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia will probably expire at the end of this year, further curbing what’s left of Gazprom’s exports to Europe. A quick glance at a map makes it clear that China is now the only remaining option for Russian pipeline gas.
Yet Beijing is not that interested: Last year, it bought just 23 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, a mere fraction of the 180 billion cubic meters that Moscow used to ship to Europe. Negotiations to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would boost gas shipments to China, have stalled. And in truth, China is not a like-for-like replacement for Gazprom’s lost European consumers. Beijing pays 20 percent less for Russian gas than the remaining EU customers, and the gap is predicted to widen to 28 percent through 2027.
Without pipelines, raising exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is the only remaining option for Moscow. However, Western policies make this easier said than done. Western export controls curb Russia’s access to the complex machinery needed to develop LNG terminals, such as equipment to chill the gas to negative 160 degrees Celsius so that it can be shipped on specialized vessels. In addition, Washington has recently imposed sanctions on a Singapore-based firm and two ships working on a Russian LNG project, signaling that it will similarly designate any entity willing to work in the sector. Finally, U.S. sanctions make it much harder for Russian firms to finance the development of new liquefaction facilities and the gas field designed to supply them. In December, Japanese firm Mitsui announced that it was pulling staff and reviewing options for its participation to Russia’s flagship Arctic LNG 2 project. As a result, the Russian operator announced last month that it was suspending operations of the project, which was originally slated to launch LNG shipments early this year.
Gazprom’s cheesy corporate slogan—“Dreams come true!”—does not ring so true anymore as Moscow’s former cash cow becomes a loss-making drain. Data from the International Energy Agency confirms the extent of the Kremlin’s miscalculation when it turned off the gas tap to Europe: The agency predicts that Russia’s share of global gas exports will fall to 15 percent by 2030—down from 30 percent before Moscow’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine.
This was probably predictable. It is hard to imagine how a gas exporter configured to serve European customers and reliant on Western technology could thrive after refusing to serve its main client—signaling to every other potential customer, including China, that it is an unreliable supplier. Corporate empires tend to rise and fall, and it looks like Gazprom will be no exception to the rule.
-
Agathe Demarais is a columnist at Foreign Policy, a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. Twitter: @AgatheDemarais
ANALYSIS
Gazprom’s Declining Fortunes Spell Trouble for Moscow
The gas giant’s record loss should worry the Kremlin on several fronts.
By Agathe Demarais, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
A small crowd is silhouetted against a giant blue screen with global gridlines that displays the Gasprom logo. People mill about under the Gazprom logo at the the International Gas Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on Oct. 7, 2021. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
MAY 15, 2024, 5:24 AM
At the end of 2022, Dmitry Medvedev—Russia’s former prime minister and the current deputy chairman of its Security Council—offered his predictions for the coming year. He warned that Europeans would suffer badly from Russia’s decision to curb natural gas exports to the European Union, suggesting that gas prices would jump to $5,000 per thousand cubic meters in 2023—around 50 times their prewar average. He probably assumed that that sky-high prices would translate into a windfall for Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, which was still supplying several European countries via pipeline, ramping up exports of liquefied natural gas, and eyeing new deals with China. Perhaps Medvedev also hoped that Europeans would beg the Kremlin to send the gas flowing again.
It turns out that Medvedev might want to polish his crystal ball: Last year, European gas prices averaged a mere one-tenth of his number. And just this month, Gazprom posted a massive $6.8 billion loss for 2023, the first since 1999.
Gazprom’s losses demonstrate the extent to which the Kremlin’s decision to turn off the gas tap to Europe in 2022 has backfired. In 2023, European Union imports of Russian gas were at their lowest level since the early 1970s, with Russian supplies making up only 8 percent of EU gas imports, down from 40 percent in 2021. This has translated into vertiginous losses for Gazprom, with the firm’s revenues from foreign sales plunging by two-thirds in 2023.
Gazprom’s woes are very likely setting off alarm bells in Moscow: With no good options for the company to revive flagging gas sales, its losses could weigh on Russia’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine. This is especially ironic given the fact that EU sanctions do not target Russian gas exports; the damage to the Kremlin and its war effort is entirely self-inflicted.
The most immediate impact of Gazprom’s losses will be on Russian government revenues, a crucial metric to gauge Moscow’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. Poring over Gazprom’s latest financials paints a striking picture. Excluding dividends, Gazprom transferred at least $40 billion into Russian state coffers in 2022, either to the general government budget or the National Welfare Fund (NWF), Moscow’s sovereign wealth fund.
This is no small feat. Until last year, Gazprom alone provided about 10 percent of Russian federal budget revenues through customs and excise duties as well as profit taxes. (Oil receipts usually account for an additional 30 percent of budget revenues.) This flood of money now looks like distant history. In 2023, the company’s contribution to state coffers through customs and excise duties was slashed by four-fifths, and like many money-losing firms, it is due a tax refund from the Russian treasury.
For Moscow, this is bad news on several fronts. Because of rising military expenses, the country’s fiscal balance swung into deficit when Moscow invaded Ukraine. To help plug the gap, the Kremlin ordered Gazprom to pay a $500 million monthly levy to the state until 2025. Now that the company is posting losses, it is unclear how it will be able to afford this transfer. In addition, Gazprom’s contribution to the NWF will probably have to shrink. For the Kremlin, this could not come at a worst time: The NWF’s liquid holdings have already dropped by nearly $60 billion, around half of its prewar total, as Moscow drains its rainy-day fund to finance the war. Finally, Gazprom’s woes could prompt the firm to shrink its planned investments in gas fields and pipelines—a decision that would, in turn, hit Russian GDP growth.
As if this was not enough, a closer look at Gazprom’s newly released financials suggests that the worst may be yet to come, with three telltale signs that 2024 could be even more difficult than 2023.
First, Gazprom’s accounts receivable—a measure of money due to be paid by customers—are in free fall, suggesting that the firm’s revenue inflow is drying up. Second, accounts payable shot up by around 50 percent in 2023, hinting that Gazprom is struggling to pay its own bills to various suppliers. Finally, short-term borrowing nearly doubled last year as Russian state-owned banks were enlisted to support the former gas giant.
Whereas these figures come from Gazprom’s English-language financials, the company’s latest Russian-language update yields two additional surprises—both of which show that the firm’s situation has worsened even further since the beginning of the year.
First, short-term borrowing during the first three months of 2024 roughly doubled compared to the previous quarter. If Russian state-owned banks continue to cover Gazprom’s losses, the Russian financial sector could soon find itself in trouble. This begs a tricky question: With the NWF’s reserves dwindling and Moscow’s access to international capital markets shut down, who would pay a bailout bill? Second, Gazprom’s losses were almost five times greater in the first quarter of 2024 than in the same period of 2023, hinting that the firm may post an even bigger loss this year than it did in 2023.
Looking ahead, 2025 will be an especially tough year for Gazprom. The transit deal for gas shipments through Ukraine via pipeline to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia will probably expire at the end of this year, further curbing what’s left of Gazprom’s exports to Europe. A quick glance at a map makes it clear that China is now the only remaining option for Russian pipeline gas.
Yet Beijing is not that interested: Last year, it bought just 23 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, a mere fraction of the 180 billion cubic meters that Moscow used to ship to Europe. Negotiations to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would boost gas shipments to China, have stalled. And in truth, China is not a like-for-like replacement for Gazprom’s lost European consumers. Beijing pays 20 percent less for Russian gas than the remaining EU customers, and the gap is predicted to widen to 28 percent through 2027.
Without pipelines, raising exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is the only remaining option for Moscow. However, Western policies make this easier said than done. Western export controls curb Russia’s access to the complex machinery needed to develop LNG terminals, such as equipment to chill the gas to negative 160 degrees Celsius so that it can be shipped on specialized vessels. In addition, Washington has recently imposed sanctions on a Singapore-based firm and two ships working on a Russian LNG project, signaling that it will similarly designate any entity willing to work in the sector. Finally, U.S. sanctions make it much harder for Russian firms to finance the development of new liquefaction facilities and the gas field designed to supply them. In December, Japanese firm Mitsui announced that it was pulling staff and reviewing options for its participation to Russia’s flagship Arctic LNG 2 project. As a result, the Russian operator announced last month that it was suspending operations of the project, which was originally slated to launch LNG shipments early this year.
Gazprom’s cheesy corporate slogan—“Dreams come true!”—does not ring so true anymore as Moscow’s former cash cow becomes a loss-making drain. Data from the International Energy Agency confirms the extent of the Kremlin’s miscalculation when it turned off the gas tap to Europe: The agency predicts that Russia’s share of global gas exports will fall to 15 percent by 2030—down from 30 percent before Moscow’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine.
This was probably predictable. It is hard to imagine how a gas exporter configured to serve European customers and reliant on Western technology could thrive after refusing to serve its main client—signaling to every other potential customer, including China, that it is an unreliable supplier. Corporate empires tend to rise and fall, and it looks like Gazprom will be no exception to the rule.
-
Agathe Demarais is a columnist at Foreign Policy, a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. Twitter: @AgatheDemarais
Miksi ne toimituskieltoa laittaisi? Eiköhän ne ala vaan pyytämään rahaa niistä ja ei heitä voi siitä syyttää. Siellä on Ukrainassa luonnonvaroja joita vastaan varmasti löytyy rahaa markkinalta ja sitä myöten aseita. Jos me ei kehdata pyytää sotaa käyvältä maalta luonnonvaroja rahaa/aseita vastaan niin kyllä ameriiikan poika kehtoo. Noin jos toimivat niin se on sitten loputon tuki jenkeiltä Ukrainaan, ne puolustaa siellä sitten jo omia intressejä.
taantumu
Ylipäällikkö
40-vuotias Saratovilainen mobilisoitiin sotaan jossa polven nivelsiteet repesivät. Mies korjautti polven omilla rahoillaan ja pyysi sotilassairaalalta lähetettä kuntoututukseen. Sairaala ei antanut lähetettä ja kehotti miestä häipymään kiroilun säestämänä.
Keppien kanssa kulkevan miehen mukaan sairaalan hissi ei ole toiminut kymmeneen vuoteen ja osasto on neljännessä kerroksessa, jalat menettääneet eivät pääse kuukausiin ulos. Lehden soittaessa sairaalan ylilääkärille tämä kuunteli kysymyksen ja katkaisi puhelun vastaamatta mitään.
Keppien kanssa kulkevan miehen mukaan sairaalan hissi ei ole toiminut kymmeneen vuoteen ja osasto on neljännessä kerroksessa, jalat menettääneet eivät pääse kuukausiin ulos. Lehden soittaessa sairaalan ylilääkärille tämä kuunteli kysymyksen ja katkaisi puhelun vastaamatta mitään.
https://www.4vsar.ru/news/ychastnik-svo-o-reabilitacii-v-190473/
Tää on vähän ku "Karpolla on asiaa"... Siinä yhessä jaksossa kaveri oli menettäny jalkansa... Se oli siis amputoitu... Mutta vakuutusfirman mielestä ei kyseessä ollut pysyvä haitta... Vissiin ne oletti että jalka kasvaa takas
pitkäpyssy
Luutnantti
Tuo toimittaja on unohtanut putket Turkkiin, eli 45mrd kuutiota menee vielä jatkossakin. Päättyvä soppari 2025 lopussa Ukrainan läpi on 40mrd kuutiota. Mutta Kiina tuskin lisää ostoja, koska investoi tällä hetkellä pää märkänä aurinko- ja tuulivoimaan.Nyt kun Gazpromin menestys nousi taas hetkellisesti puheenaiheeksi niin tässä pari kuukautta vanha artikkeli jossa on analysoitu yhtiön tulevaisuuden näkymiä.
Lainaan sen spoilerin taakse niitä varten joita aihe kiinnostaa (artikkeli julkaistu 15.5.2024 - ei siis ihan tuore julkaisu): LÄHDE
Russia's state-owned energy giant Gazprom recorded a US$6.8bn loss in 2023, the first since 1999 - in my latest for @ForeignPolicy
I unpack what this means for the Kremlin's war economy and why Moscow has no good option to revive flagging gas sales
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/05/1...budget-war-economy-russia-putin-europe-china/
ANALYSIS
Gazprom’s Declining Fortunes Spell Trouble for Moscow
The gas giant’s record loss should worry the Kremlin on several fronts.
By Agathe Demarais, a columnist at Foreign Policy and a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
A small crowd is silhouetted against a giant blue screen with global gridlines that displays the Gasprom logo. People mill about under the Gazprom logo at the the International Gas Forum in Saint Petersburg, Russia, on Oct. 7, 2021. OLGA MALTSEVA/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
MAY 15, 2024, 5:24 AM
At the end of 2022, Dmitry Medvedev—Russia’s former prime minister and the current deputy chairman of its Security Council—offered his predictions for the coming year. He warned that Europeans would suffer badly from Russia’s decision to curb natural gas exports to the European Union, suggesting that gas prices would jump to $5,000 per thousand cubic meters in 2023—around 50 times their prewar average. He probably assumed that that sky-high prices would translate into a windfall for Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, which was still supplying several European countries via pipeline, ramping up exports of liquefied natural gas, and eyeing new deals with China. Perhaps Medvedev also hoped that Europeans would beg the Kremlin to send the gas flowing again.
It turns out that Medvedev might want to polish his crystal ball: Last year, European gas prices averaged a mere one-tenth of his number. And just this month, Gazprom posted a massive $6.8 billion loss for 2023, the first since 1999.
Gazprom’s losses demonstrate the extent to which the Kremlin’s decision to turn off the gas tap to Europe in 2022 has backfired. In 2023, European Union imports of Russian gas were at their lowest level since the early 1970s, with Russian supplies making up only 8 percent of EU gas imports, down from 40 percent in 2021. This has translated into vertiginous losses for Gazprom, with the firm’s revenues from foreign sales plunging by two-thirds in 2023.
Gazprom’s woes are very likely setting off alarm bells in Moscow: With no good options for the company to revive flagging gas sales, its losses could weigh on Russia’s ability to finance the war in Ukraine. This is especially ironic given the fact that EU sanctions do not target Russian gas exports; the damage to the Kremlin and its war effort is entirely self-inflicted.
The most immediate impact of Gazprom’s losses will be on Russian government revenues, a crucial metric to gauge Moscow’s ability to sustain its war against Ukraine. Poring over Gazprom’s latest financials paints a striking picture. Excluding dividends, Gazprom transferred at least $40 billion into Russian state coffers in 2022, either to the general government budget or the National Welfare Fund (NWF), Moscow’s sovereign wealth fund.
This is no small feat. Until last year, Gazprom alone provided about 10 percent of Russian federal budget revenues through customs and excise duties as well as profit taxes. (Oil receipts usually account for an additional 30 percent of budget revenues.) This flood of money now looks like distant history. In 2023, the company’s contribution to state coffers through customs and excise duties was slashed by four-fifths, and like many money-losing firms, it is due a tax refund from the Russian treasury.
For Moscow, this is bad news on several fronts. Because of rising military expenses, the country’s fiscal balance swung into deficit when Moscow invaded Ukraine. To help plug the gap, the Kremlin ordered Gazprom to pay a $500 million monthly levy to the state until 2025. Now that the company is posting losses, it is unclear how it will be able to afford this transfer. In addition, Gazprom’s contribution to the NWF will probably have to shrink. For the Kremlin, this could not come at a worst time: The NWF’s liquid holdings have already dropped by nearly $60 billion, around half of its prewar total, as Moscow drains its rainy-day fund to finance the war. Finally, Gazprom’s woes could prompt the firm to shrink its planned investments in gas fields and pipelines—a decision that would, in turn, hit Russian GDP growth.
As if this was not enough, a closer look at Gazprom’s newly released financials suggests that the worst may be yet to come, with three telltale signs that 2024 could be even more difficult than 2023.
First, Gazprom’s accounts receivable—a measure of money due to be paid by customers—are in free fall, suggesting that the firm’s revenue inflow is drying up. Second, accounts payable shot up by around 50 percent in 2023, hinting that Gazprom is struggling to pay its own bills to various suppliers. Finally, short-term borrowing nearly doubled last year as Russian state-owned banks were enlisted to support the former gas giant.
Whereas these figures come from Gazprom’s English-language financials, the company’s latest Russian-language update yields two additional surprises—both of which show that the firm’s situation has worsened even further since the beginning of the year.
First, short-term borrowing during the first three months of 2024 roughly doubled compared to the previous quarter. If Russian state-owned banks continue to cover Gazprom’s losses, the Russian financial sector could soon find itself in trouble. This begs a tricky question: With the NWF’s reserves dwindling and Moscow’s access to international capital markets shut down, who would pay a bailout bill? Second, Gazprom’s losses were almost five times greater in the first quarter of 2024 than in the same period of 2023, hinting that the firm may post an even bigger loss this year than it did in 2023.
Looking ahead, 2025 will be an especially tough year for Gazprom. The transit deal for gas shipments through Ukraine via pipeline to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia will probably expire at the end of this year, further curbing what’s left of Gazprom’s exports to Europe. A quick glance at a map makes it clear that China is now the only remaining option for Russian pipeline gas.
Yet Beijing is not that interested: Last year, it bought just 23 billion cubic meters of Russian gas, a mere fraction of the 180 billion cubic meters that Moscow used to ship to Europe. Negotiations to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would boost gas shipments to China, have stalled. And in truth, China is not a like-for-like replacement for Gazprom’s lost European consumers. Beijing pays 20 percent less for Russian gas than the remaining EU customers, and the gap is predicted to widen to 28 percent through 2027.
Without pipelines, raising exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is the only remaining option for Moscow. However, Western policies make this easier said than done. Western export controls curb Russia’s access to the complex machinery needed to develop LNG terminals, such as equipment to chill the gas to negative 160 degrees Celsius so that it can be shipped on specialized vessels. In addition, Washington has recently imposed sanctions on a Singapore-based firm and two ships working on a Russian LNG project, signaling that it will similarly designate any entity willing to work in the sector. Finally, U.S. sanctions make it much harder for Russian firms to finance the development of new liquefaction facilities and the gas field designed to supply them. In December, Japanese firm Mitsui announced that it was pulling staff and reviewing options for its participation to Russia’s flagship Arctic LNG 2 project. As a result, the Russian operator announced last month that it was suspending operations of the project, which was originally slated to launch LNG shipments early this year.
Gazprom’s cheesy corporate slogan—“Dreams come true!”—does not ring so true anymore as Moscow’s former cash cow becomes a loss-making drain. Data from the International Energy Agency confirms the extent of the Kremlin’s miscalculation when it turned off the gas tap to Europe: The agency predicts that Russia’s share of global gas exports will fall to 15 percent by 2030—down from 30 percent before Moscow’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine.
This was probably predictable. It is hard to imagine how a gas exporter configured to serve European customers and reliant on Western technology could thrive after refusing to serve its main client—signaling to every other potential customer, including China, that it is an unreliable supplier. Corporate empires tend to rise and fall, and it looks like Gazprom will be no exception to the rule.
-
Agathe Demarais is a columnist at Foreign Policy, a senior policy fellow on geoeconomics at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and the author of Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. Twitter: @AgatheDemarais
Siksi en sitä suurimpana vaikuttajana pidäkään. USA:n vaikutus on epäsuora: jos halukkuus Ukrainan tukemiseen hiipuu, heikkenee Kiovassa odotukset sotamenestykselle joka puolestaan lisää motivaatiota solmia kehnompikin rauhansopimus.
Venäjällä taas alkaa käydä vähiin koulutetut miehet, kalusto ja rahat. Eikä välttämättä tässä järjestyksessä.
Venäjän tukemisesta kritisoidulta Kiinalta yllättävä ilmoitus
Kiina ilmoittaa kieltävänsä kaikkien sotilaallisiin tarkoituksiin soveltuvien siviilidroonien viennin, uutistoimisto Associated Press (AP) kertoo.
www.ksml.fi
Että tällaista lupaillaan, nähtäväksi jää miten toteutuu. Kuitenkin vaikuttaa siltä, että pikkuhiljaa varoituksen sanat ymmärretään Kiinassakin ja sieltäkin on jo tehty näyttäviä irtiottoja ryssän tukemisesta
. Kyllä siellä jonkin pöydän äärellä jo pelataan niitä Ukrainan sodan jälkeisiä pelejä ja näissäkin Kiinakin puolensa valinnut. Tosin siinä pelissä ei näyttäisi olevan mukana enää nykymuotoista venäjää
Tuo kielto koskettaisi myös Ukrainaa hyvin paljon koska sieltä taitaa kaikki DJI -dronet tulla joka tapauksessa. Tuo APn uutinen on vähän outo. Aluksi mainitaan että kielletään kaikki ns. kaksoiskäyttödronet mutta sitten myöhemmässä kappaleessa rajoitukset siviilidroneilta lopetetaan.Venäjän tukemisesta kritisoidulta Kiinalta yllättävä ilmoitus
Kiina ilmoittaa kieltävänsä kaikkien sotilaallisiin tarkoituksiin soveltuvien siviilidroonien viennin, uutistoimisto Associated Press (AP) kertoo.
Että tällaista lupaillaan, nähtäväksi jää miten toteutuu. Kuitenkin vaikuttaa siltä, että pikkuhiljaa varoituksen sanat ymmärretään Kiinassakin ja sieltäkin on jo tehty näyttäviä irtiottoja ryssän tukemisesta
BANGKOK (AP) — China says it will prohibit the export of all unregulated civilian drones that can be used for military purposes or in terrorist activities and that certain drone features will be restricted as the East Asian country faces repeated Western criticism for its stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the ministry announced it was also removing temporary restrictions placed on civilian drones. It didn’t specify which type, but last year Beijing restricted the exports of long-range drones while citing Russia’s war in Ukraine.
TeVu
Kapteeni
Jokos nyt olisi F-16 Ukrainassa. Useampaan kertaan jo väitetty että on, mutta tähän mennessä uutisankkoja Venäjän kiusaksi. Edit: Bloombergin mukaan näin on.
www.bloomberg.com
Ukraine Gets First Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets After Long Wait
Ukraine Gets First Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets After Long Wait
The first delivery of F-16 fighter jets from NATO allies has arrived in Ukraine, in a long-awaited move that may boost the war-torn nation’s ability to repel Russian attacks.
www.bloomberg.com
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Ehkä unohtanut, ehkä ei - ainakaan hän ei niitä mainitse artikkelissa. Tietysti artikkelin pointti ei ole siinä etteikö ryssä kykenisi myymään kaasua jonnekin jatkossa, vaan siinä että määrät ovat murto-osa sotaa edeltäviin verrattuna ja kaasusta saatava hinta on myös jotain muuta kuin mitä Eurooppa maksoi.
Määrien osalta hän sanoo Kiinan ostaneen 23mrd kuutiota kun taas Eurooppa osti 180mrd kuutiota.
Turkki + Kiina yhdessä tarkoittaisivat 68mrd kuutiota.
Eikä ongelma ole pelkästään siinä että mistä löytää korvaavat markkinat vaan siinä, miten kaasu saadaan toimitettua niille markkinoille: putket ovat paras tapa siirron näkökulmasta vaan valtaosa kapasiteetista on keskitetty Eurooppaa varten, näkeehän tuon viedyn kaasun määristäkin.
Vaikeita vuosia näköpiirissä Gazpromille jos asiat eivät muutu nopeasti.
Kyllä kinkkilässä seurataan mitä on tapahtumassa.... ryssän tuki saattaa olla hyvin äkkiä katkolla jos aletaan kauppasotaa käymään kinkkejä vastaan ryssän tukemisen takia....Venäjän tukemisesta kritisoidulta Kiinalta yllättävä ilmoitus
Kiina ilmoittaa kieltävänsä kaikkien sotilaallisiin tarkoituksiin soveltuvien siviilidroonien viennin, uutistoimisto Associated Press (AP) kertoo.
Että tällaista lupaillaan, nähtäväksi jää miten toteutuu. Kuitenkin vaikuttaa siltä, että pikkuhiljaa varoituksen sanat ymmärretään Kiinassakin ja sieltäkin on jo tehty näyttäviä irtiottoja ryssän tukemisesta
Russian forces have reportedly deployed a North Korean long-range anti-tank missile system, the Bulsae-4, also known as the M-2018, against Ukrainian troops.
eiköhän nimenä parempi bullshit 4 kun tulee pohjoiskoreasta.
eiköhän nimenä parempi bullshit 4 kun tulee pohjoiskoreasta.
lsoviha
Majuri
Jokos nyt olisi F-16 Ukrainassa. Useampaan kertaan jo väitetty että on, mutta tähän mennessä uutisankkoja Venäjän kiusaksi. Edit: Bloombergin mukaan näin on.
Ukraine Gets First Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets After Long Wait
Ukraine Gets First Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets After Long Wait
The first delivery of F-16 fighter jets from NATO allies has arrived in Ukraine, in a long-awaited move that may boost the war-torn nation’s ability to repel Russian attacks.
Tiistaina postaamani video aiheesta on aito, eli koneita on ja niillä lennetään.
Bloombergin artikkelista: "The deadline for the transfer of the US-made warplanes was the end of this month and it has been respected"
Lahtinen
Kapteeni
Oma veikkaus venäjän tilanteesta on se, että kohta on joko rahat, sotilaat tai kalusto lopussa. Tämän takia venäjä pyrkii puskemaan nyt niin pitkälle kuin vaan onnistuu ja kaivautumaan asemiin, jonka jälkeen alkaa armoton painostus nopeaan ja venäjän kannalta edulliseen rauhaan.
Mutta, mitä tekee Ukraina? Jos Ukrainalla on varma tieto siitä, että tuo on venäjän suunnitelma, niin silloinhan Ukrainan kannattaa nyt keskittyä toki puolustamaan, mutta myös samalla keräämään ja kouluttaman uusia joukkoja. Ja ”jos” kaikki menee hyvin, niin silloin kun venäjällä ovat niin kalusto kuin sotilaan lopussa, niin silloin suoritetaan tuo vastahyökkäys.
Tärkeintä tässä vastahyökkäyksessä on se, että niin venäjän panssarit kuin tykistö on paikallisesti neutralisoitu ja ns. liike on pysäytetty. Tällöin riittää hyvin kapea hyökkäys, johon keskitetään todella paljon voimia, koska venäjän joukot ovat jumissa asemissa ympäri rintamalinjaa ja vastahyökkäystä ei tarvitse enää pelätä. Ja jos tällainen kapea läpimurto saadaan aikaiseksi, niin sen jälkeen voidaan olettaa, että rintaman takana oleva vastarinta on hyvin vähäistä ja suurin vastarinta kohdataan nimenomaan etulinjassa.
Ja jos tämä hyökkäys onnistuu ja se saadaan puskettua Azovonmerelle asti, lähellä venäjän rajaa, niin se sota onkin sitten aika pitkälle. Tämän jälkeen suurin osa venäjän armeijasta on käytännössä motissa, jolloin ei tarvita enää muuta, kuin odottaa että sotilailta loppuu ruoka. Joten varaudutaan vaan suuriin joukkoantautumisiin.
Toki tämä on aikamoista optimismia, mutta ei mitenkään mahdoton ajatus. Ja tämä perustuu myös siihen olettamukseen, että Ukrainalla on edelleen sitä kalustoa reservissä ja tappiot ovat viime aikoina olleet vain murto-osa venäjän vastaavista.
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Kuvan kone on hollantilaisten vanhin. Värit on vielä laittamatta.Jokos nyt olisi F-16 Ukrainassa. Useampaan kertaan jo väitetty että on, mutta tähän mennessä uutisankkoja Venäjän kiusaksi. Edit: Bloombergin mukaan näin on.
Ukraine Gets First Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets After Long Wait
Ukraine Gets First Delivery of F-16 Fighter Jets After Long Wait
The first delivery of F-16 fighter jets from NATO allies has arrived in Ukraine, in a long-awaited move that may boost the war-torn nation’s ability to repel Russian attacks.
Harvapartio
Eversti
On näissä venäjän hommissa kyllä erikoisia piirteitä. Mitä seuraavaksi, palovammapotilaat pannuhuoneen vieressä?
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Ei tuossa ollutkaan tarkoitus päästää jalattomia näkösälle. Ukrainasta alkoi tulla jalattomia tasan kymmenen vuotta sitten. Nyt ne jalattomat örkit ostaan jo jättää kuolemaan niin eivät tule pilaamaan ryssän kaupunkien ilmapiiriä tämän voitokkaan kolmepäiväisen osalta.