https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/09/03/starlinki-dlia-svo
"Starlinks" for "SVO"
Musk Says He's Not Selling Putin Satellite Terminals. New Europe Experiment Shows That's Not Quite True
09:41, 3 September 2024
Investigation Department of Novaya Gazeta Evropa
Illustration: "Novaya Gazeta Evropa"
Elon Musk's SpaceX sells Starlinks through official suppliers. Novaya Gazeta Evropa found out that some of them are ready to trade with anonymous companies from Kazakhstan, despite all the recommendations on export control. Only one dealer refused us on the grounds that the terminals could go to the Russian army. We tell you how the "black market" that Musk does not control works.
In May 2024, John Hill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile Defense, was forced to answer awkward questions from senators about the actions of his major supplier, Elon Musk’s SpaceX. Since 2015, the company has been developing the Starlink satellite internet network, which has proven to be in demand in the war zone in Ukraine. “When Russia attacked Ukraine and disrupted phone service and the internet, one of the Defense Department’s suppliers, SpaceX, sent Starlink terminals to Ukraine to help Ukrainians get back in touch,” Senator Elizabeth Warren began her speech.
To access satellite internet, the customer must buy a special terminal the size of a pizza box. The next steps, as described on the official website, are simple: connect the terminal and point it to the sky.
In the winter of 2024, two years after the start of military operations in Ukraine, the first reports began to appear in
the foreign and
Russian press that the Russian army also had Starlinks.
"Russia's outdated communications systems were a major factor in the initial failure of the Russian military in Ukraine," Warren continued. "There is no doubt that the Starlinks would be an incredible asset to the Russians, providing the secure communications links they so desperately need. Such links would offset Ukraine's advantage on the battlefield.
Obviously, we can't disclose classified information here, but I think there's a lot of public interest in how the Defense Department is dealing with leaks."
When asked how dual-use equipment made in the US (meaning it could be used in a war zone in addition to peaceful purposes) could end up in the hands of Russian soldiers, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense spoke of how Russian citizens had become adept at using the “black market.” In his only public response to the allegations, Elon Musk
said that “No Starlinks were sold to Russia, directly or indirectly.”
An experiment conducted by Novaya Gazeta Evropa shows that Musk actually does not have reliable information on this issue: his own official dealers do not take the necessary precautions to avoid participating in the very same “black market” that the Russians supposedly mastered so well.
Several official Starlink resellers, who receive terminals directly from the manufacturer, have agreed to supply equipment to countries bordering Russia without asking any questions about the customer's ultimate owner or the purposes for which these large deliveries are needed.
Starlink antenna of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kharkiv region, September 25, 2022. Photo: Yasuyoshi Chiba / AFP / Scanpix / LETA
"Red Flags"
Immediately after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, dozens of Western countries imposed unprecedented sanctions against Russia. They can be divided into two types: personal sanctions against Russian officials and big businesses with the freezing of personal assets, and a ban on the export of certain goods to Russia: luxury goods (in a broad interpretation, which includes, for example, smartphones costing more than $300) and military and dual-use goods that can be used for military action. By some estimates, Russia currently has more sanctions imposed against it than
North Korea and Iran.
Exports of many goods directly from the US and Europe have indeed ceased or sharply decreased. But neither iPhones nor washing machines have disappeared from Russian stores, and foreign components continue to be found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine. The main flow of sanctioned goods enters Russia through third countries that have not joined the sanctions: for example, China, the UAE, Kazakhstan and Turkey.
When answering journalists’ questions, large international companies most often say that they cannot control the fate of the goods they produce after they have entered the secondary market. However, experts say that manufacturers have effective ways to control supply chains. “The key problem is that large companies do not yet see the big risks for themselves and do not take the necessary measures to stop questionable supplies,” says Maximilian Hess, a specialist at the Institute for Foreign Policy Studies.
In RuNet, you can find
dozens of sites that sell Starlink terminals for the SVO, in z-channels in Telegram they often collect money for the purchase of terminals and report on their delivery to active Russian units. Russian and foreign media wrote that the equipment comes to Russia from the UAE. Novaya Gazeta Evropa decided to check how compliance works at the first stages of this chain - in Elon Musk's company itself.
The experiment showed that even at the first link in the supply chain, companies do not follow the simplest recommendations that should make it more difficult for dual-use goods to enter Russia.
Experiment
A Novaya Gazeta Evropa correspondent called official Starlink resellers under the guise of a potential buyer from Kazakhstan. The journalist introduced himself as an agent of an online store that trades with clients in various countries of the former Soviet Union. He answered evasively to questions about the end users of the terminals. He wanted to buy terminals in large quantities - about a hundred; but without a subscription and technical support from the seller. He corresponded with resellers from an email address on the Russian domain @mail.ru.
“This legend should have raised a whole series of questions for any ethically responsible seller,” says Ella Skibenko, senior researcher for Central and Eastern Europe at the Resource Center for Human Rights in Business.
The legend contains a number of “red flags” that human rights groups and government agencies have raised, and Space X executives have been reminded of them during legislative proceedings. In May 2024, two members of Congress
wrote a letter to Space X CEO Gwynne Shotwell emphasizing the importance of taking precautions and citing recent
guidance from the U.S. Department of Commerce. The guidance calls on those who manufacture and sell dual-use goods to pay special attention to buyers who:
- Registered in countries outside the export control coalition (i.e., they have not joined the sanctions against Russia);
- Were not customers before February 2022 and did not purchase similar products;
- They were clients until February 2022, but after the start of military actions in Ukraine they increased their orders several times;
- Not interested in the usual related services for installation and maintenance of goods;
- Refuse to provide information about the end users of the product or are deliberately evasive about them;
- The product is delivered to a country where its use is not possible (for example, in our case, Starlink is not licensed for use in Kazakhstan);
- Almost nothing is known about the activities of the purchasing company.
A Novaya Gazeta Evropa correspondent called dozens of official suppliers. Some refused to continue cooperation for various reasons: for example, they said that they only sell Starlinks for marine use, or do not work in Europe and Asia. But with three official resellers, communication reached the point of discussing specific delivery conditions.
Boxes with Starlink terminals bought by Russian volunteers for the military. Photo: Alexey Rogozin /
VK
Bentley Telecom
Literally the first company contacted by Novaya Gazeta Evropa journalists, registered in the UK, showed interest in deliveries to Kazakhstan. The sales manager warned from the very beginning that the terminals were not licensed for use in Kazakhstan. “But I know that customers find a way to get around these restrictions,” he said in the very first conversation. Soon he sent a presentation by email with prices and terms of delivery of Starlinks.
After some time, he sent another letter. "As official Starlink dealers, we must coordinate deliveries with the parent company, and deliveries to unlicensed territories are currently impossible." However, the manager agreed to look for workarounds and conclude a contract. For example, he confirmed that an order could be placed if a "friendly legal entity" was found in Georgia: Starlinks are licensed there. Moreover, the order should come from a legal entity, because it would be "easier to explain why such a large order is needed: the company may have many offices, employees in remote locations." The manager asked to send a purchase order with the company's details. At this point, the editors interrupted their experiment.
Company response:
In response to an official request from Novaya Evropa, a company representative said that “Starlink does not impose any specific requirements on terminal customers.” Therefore, the company is open to discussing an order from any supplier and, in fact, the only requirement is that the buyer be registered in a country where the use of terminals is permitted.
Hansael
The official Starlink dealer in Latvia said in the first phone conversation that he had about a hundred terminals in stock and was ready to ship them anywhere in the world. “Send us your details, we’ll issue an invoice, send them to the airport — you handle the customs procedures yourself. And also: at customs they’ll ask you to sign a form — on compliance with these sanctions, as is now fashionable. Well, that’s all.” When asked for clarification, the company representative said that this form was more of a formality. “You take responsibility for not violating the sanctions, but we don’t,” the seller said.
Soon he sent an estimate for the cost of 80 terminals, including delivery, to the email address registered on the @mail.ru domain.
Company response:
The company did not respond to Novaya Gazeta Evropa's request for comment.
KVH Industries
A representative of the official Starlink supplier in Asia was happy to help with an order from Kazakhstan. However, he, like other official suppliers, said that the company would not be approved for delivery to Kazakhstan, but any legal entity in a licensed country could place an order. “Do you have anything in Mongolia? I need to follow all the rules of Starlink and my company, the question is how we play with these rules. Find a legal entity in Mongolia and I think we can have a business,” the sales agent told a Novaya Gazeta Evropa correspondent.
When asked about the company’s requirements for partners in Mongolia, the sales manager said that it doesn’t matter to him whether the company has a website, staff, or an office – he will figure out how to make the deal look legitimate.
Company response:
The company did not respond to Novaya Gazeta Evropa's request for comment.
Russian soldier with Starlink. Photo:
Telegram
Blurred responsibility
According to Maximilian Hess, the experiment conducted by Novaya Gazeta Evropa shows that companies are prepared to violate export controls, but the issue of legal liability remains complex. “The supply chains to Russia are now very long, so lawyers can argue about which link should be considered legally responsible for the supply. Some will say that responsibility should lie with those who are at the last stage of this route, that is, transporting the goods to Russia. In my opinion, the only way to stop the supply of dual-use goods is, on the contrary, to start with the main link. Responsibility should lie with the largest corporations that own the trademark and technology. They have the resources and the ability to introduce the necessary checks, they have the ability to control their official suppliers. And if they do not do this now, it is because they can shift the blame to someone else.”
Of all the official Starlink suppliers that Novaya Gazeta Evropa called under the guise of a potential buyer from Kazakhstan, there was only one who directly stated that he would not deal with the company for ethical reasons. “What company do you say you represent? I can’t find any mention of your company on the Internet. What is the largest marketplace in Kazakhstan?” After a short pause, he added: “Kazakhstan is close to Russia, there is no customs control between the countries.
I can't say anything for sure, but I'm sure you want to buy terminals for Russia. I think it's illegal, I have no interest in doing business with such partners."
When Novaya Gazeta Evropa revealed his identity, the supplier said he often receives similar requests from people in Russia or border areas. “You have to be stupid not to understand that an anonymous buyer from Kazakhstan can simply cross the border and sell these terminals further into Russia.” The supplier said Starlink is very strict about not selling or supplying terminals directly to unlicensed territories. But he did not mention any specific guidelines or rules that the parent company asks its suppliers to follow to prevent indirect deliveries to Russia.
Representatives of Space X did not respond to Novaya Gazeta Evropa's request for comment.