Ja nyt kun lännen kortit on katsottu on helppo jatkaa vaikuttamista ukrainan sisällä ja viedä päätökseen ukrainan liittäminen sopivan tilaisuuden tullen. Ei ole oikeastaan mitään syytä miksi Venäjä ei näin toimisi. Jos Trump valitaan US presidentiksi on helppo nähdä esim Viron ja Latvian olevan seuraavalla listalla. Itse en ainakaan enää luota NATO:n turvatakuisiin. Ei niistä tietysti haittaakaan ole.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Saksallahan on toki vahvat perinteet sopia Venäjän kanssa toisten maiden rajoista...
VanhaPate
Respected Leader
Operatiivinen tieto 02.10.2024 klo 08.00 mennessä koskien Venäjän hyökkäystä
t.me
t.me
t.me
Kunnia Ukrainalle!
On alkanut Venäjän federaation laajamittaisen aseellisen hyökkäyksen 952. päivä Ukrainaa vastaan.
Tilanne rintamalla pysyy vaikeana. Vihollinen hyökkää jatkuvasti hyödyntäen ylivoimaansa miehistössä ja tekniikassa. Ukrainan puolustajat pitävät lujasti asemansa ja aiheuttavat viholliselle suuria tappioita.
Kaikkiaan edellisen vuorokauden aikana kirjattiin 155 taistelukohtaamista.
Tarkentuneiden tietojen mukaan vihollinen iski eilen kahdella ohjuksella Ukrainan joukkojen asemiin ja asutuskeskuksiin, teki 68 ilmaiskua ja pudotti 124 ohjattua pommia. Lisäksi se suoritti yli 3810 tykistöiskua asutuskeskuksiin ja joukkojemme asemiin, joista 124 moninkertaisilla raketinheittimillä.
Vihollinen teki ilmaiskuja muun muassa Bilopilljan, Vyshenkyn, Studenokin, Pavlivkan, Stepnen, Tokarivkan, Ulanoven, Lyptsin, Vovchanskin, Petropavlivkan, Krugljakivkan, Nadiyan, Markoven, Chasiv Jarin, Kostiantynivkan, Kleban Bykin, Romanivkan, Berestokin, Chunishynen, Vodyansken, Pokrovskin, Bohoyavlenkan, Novopavlivkan ja Zaporizhzhian alueilla.
Eilen puolustusvoimien ilmavoimat, ohjusjoukot ja tykistö iskivät kahdeksan kertaa vihollisen miehistön ja sotilaskaluston keskittymiin.
Harkovan suunnalla vihollinen jatkoi hyökkäyksiä, ja käytiin kuusi taistelukohtaamista. Taistelut keskittyivät erityisesti Starytsan ja Vovchanskin alueille.
Kupjanskin suunnalla vihollinen teki päivän aikana 25 hyökkäystä. Puolustusjoukot torjuivat vihollisen hyökkäykset Synkivkan, Novoosynoven, Kurelivkan, Novoselivkan, Vyshnevon, Kolisnykivkan, Hluskivkan ja Krugljakivkan alueilla.
Lymanin suunnalla vihollinen hyökkäsi 17 kertaa. Se pyrki etenemään lähellä Chasiv Jaria, Hryhorivkaa ja Stupochkin suuntaan.
Kramatorskin suunnalla miehittäjät hyökkäsivät kahdeksan kertaa lähellä Andriivkaa, Klishchiivkaa, Mayskea ja Markovea. Tilanne on puolustusvoimien hallinnassa.
Toretskin suunnalla vihollinen teki 16 hyökkäystä, joista osa ilmatukea hyödyntäen, Toretskin ja Shcherbynivkan alueilla.
Pokrovskin suunnalla puolustajamme torjuivat 25 vihollisen hyökkäystä Vozdvyzhenkan, Myroliubivkan, Krasnyi Yarin, Lysivkan, Novohrodivkan ja Selydoven lähettyvillä. Suurin hyökkäysten keskittymä oli Myroliubivkan, Yelizavetivkan ja Lysivkan läheisyydessä, missä vihollinen käytti aktiivisesti ilmatukea.
Kurakhiven suunnalla puolustusvoimat torjuivat 25 hyökkäystä Tsukuryneen, Hirnykiin, Heorhiivkaan, Kostiantynivkaan ja Katerynivkaan.
Vremivkan suunnalla, tarkentuneiden tietojen mukaan, vihollinen teki epäonnistuneen hyökkäyksen asemiamme kohti Bohoyavlenkan suuntaan.
Viime vuorokauden aikana vihollinen hyökkäsi seitsemän kertaa ukrainalaisasemiin Orikhivin suunnalla lähellä Novodanilivkaa, Malysh Sherbakia ja Kamjanskea.
Volynin ja Polissyan suunnilla vihollisen hyökkäysryhmien muodostumisen merkkejä ei havaittu.
Chernihivin ja Sumin alueiden rajalla vihollinen käyttää aktiivisesti tykistöä ja ilmatukea Venäjän alueelta ukrainalaiskyliä vastaan.
Ukrainan puolustusvoimat jatkavat operaatioitaan Kurskin alueella. Viime vuorokauden aikana vihollinen teki 15 ilmaiskua Kurskin alueelle käyttäen 20 ohjattua pommia.
Sotilaamme aiheuttavat aktiivisesti merkittäviä tappioita miehittäjäjoukoille niin miehistössä kuin kalustossa. Eilen venäläisten tappiot olivat 1130 henkeä. Lisäksi ukrainalaiset sotilaat tuhosivat neljä tankkia, 32 panssaroitua taisteluajoneuvoa, 14 tykistöjärjestelmää, 26 operatiivis-taktista UAV-laitetta, 71 ajoneuvoa ja neljä erikoisteknistä yksikköä miehittäjiltä.
Liity puolustusvoimiin! Yhdessä voitamme!
Генеральний штаб ЗСУ
Оперативна інформація станом на 08.00 02.10.2024 щодо російського вторгнення Слава Україні! Розпочалась дев’ятсот п’ятдесят друга доба широкомасштабної збройної агресії російської федерації проти України. Ситуація на фронті залишається складною. Противник, використовуючи свою перевагу в живій...
t.me
Офіцер ✙
З Вугледаром сталося те, що сталося, ще тиждень-півтора тому я писав, що точка неповернення пройдена і це справа часу. Для когось може це відбулось дуже швидко, хочу зауважити, що це невелике місто, в декілька разів менше, ніж окупована сусідня Павлівка, тому тримати його тривалий час, тим...
t.me
Офіцер ✙
За останні декілька тижнів нашим хлопцям на Курщині вдалося приземлити декілька БпЛА «Оріон», доволі небезпечна штука, яка вражала нашу техніку своїми ракетами, але і випадків збиття цих безпілотників набагато більше, ніж про це говорилося. Офіцер ✙ | Підписатись
t.me
Antares
Respected Leader
Hyvin mielenkiintoinen kommentti ja tämä lähde kertoo ainakin osaksi, mistä vaihtosuhteen muutos johtuu: LÄHDE
https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/10...rom-81-to-31-ukrainian-defense-official-says/
BYYURI ZORIA
01/10/2024
2 MINUTE READ
155 mm artillery rounds, illustrative image. Photo via Wikimedia.
Russian artillery superiority decreases from 8:1 to 3:1, Ukrainian defense official says
On 1 October, Ukraine’s first Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk reported a significant reduction in Russia’s artillery advantage on the frontline since the beginning of 2024. On the national telethon, he said the ratio of artillery ammunition usage between Russian and Ukrainian forces has decreased from 8:1 last winter to 3:1 now, as per Liga.
Last winter’s Russian artillery advantage was largely due to factors: the six-month delay of the Ukraine aid funding by the US Congress Republicans, and the EU’s failure to deliver promised 1,000,000 artillery shells. The situation improved after the arrival of US aid and as supplies under the Czech shell initiative began to arrive.
The official emphasized Ukraine’s challenges in competing with Russia in the production of weapons, equipment, and ammunition due to Russia’s larger industrial potential. He highlighted the crucial role of support from foreign partners and coordinated efforts of government structures in addressing this disparity.
Havryliuk stressed the importance of ongoing efforts to establish joint ventures with international partners.
Russian artillery superiority decreases from 8:1 to 3:1, Ukrainian defense official says
The official stressed the importance of foreign support and collaborative ventures to boost Ukraine’s military production capabilities, acknowledging the industrial capacity disparity with Russia.BYYURI ZORIA01/10/2024
2 MINUTE READ
Russian artillery superiority decreases from 8:1 to 3:1, Ukrainian defense official says
On 1 October, Ukraine’s first Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk reported a significant reduction in Russia’s artillery advantage on the frontline since the beginning of 2024. On the national telethon, he said the ratio of artillery ammunition usage between Russian and Ukrainian forces has decreased from 8:1 last winter to 3:1 now, as per Liga.
Last winter’s Russian artillery advantage was largely due to factors: the six-month delay of the Ukraine aid funding by the US Congress Republicans, and the EU’s failure to deliver promised 1,000,000 artillery shells. The situation improved after the arrival of US aid and as supplies under the Czech shell initiative began to arrive.
The official emphasized Ukraine’s challenges in competing with Russia in the production of weapons, equipment, and ammunition due to Russia’s larger industrial potential. He highlighted the crucial role of support from foreign partners and coordinated efforts of government structures in addressing this disparity.
Havryliuk stressed the importance of ongoing efforts to establish joint ventures with international partners.
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Eli lainaan tuosta oleellisen kohdan:
Last winter’s Russian artillery advantage was largely due to factors: the six-month delay of the Ukraine aid funding by the US Congress Republicans, and the EU’s failure to deliver promised 1,000,000 artillery shells. The situation improved after the arrival of US aid and as supplies under the Czech shell initiative began to arrive.
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Se mitä tuossa artikkelissa ei sanota: Ukrainan oman teollisuuden uustuotanto lienee kasvanut, ei välttämättä suuresti mutta vähän joka tapauksessa.
Lisäksi ei voi olla miettimättä, miten ryssän tykistön tilanne on kehittynyt mainittuna aikavälinä eli talvi 2023/2024 verrattuna syksyyn 2024. Tässä puhutaan kuitenkin 6-9 kuukauden aikavälistä. Kenties tykistön tila on saatu pidettyä (toistaiseksi) kohtuu samanlaisena eli tappiot ja kaluston kuluminen on kyetty korvaamaan varastoista ottamalla?
Toisaalta hyvä myös muistaa että ryssä on saanut nyt yli vuoden ajan tykistön laukauksia Pohjois-Koreasta, väitetysti keskiarvoisesti yli 1000 kpl kontteja per kuukausi. Näiden päälle tulevat sitten ryssän oma uustuotanto sekä toimitukset Iranista ja Valko-Venäjältä, tosin nämä kaksi viimeistä lienevät selvästi pienemmässä roolissa. SILTI, tästä huolimatta sanovat että laukausten suhde olisi kaventunut selvästi viime talven tilanteesta.
JOS oletetaan että ryssän osalta tilanne olisi pysynyt kohtuullisen vakiona, ehkä jopa aavistuksen parantunut jos oletetaan myös heidän uustuotantonsa kasvaneen tällä aikavälillä, niin silloin tuon suhteen muutoksen täytyy johtua valtaosaksi, ellei jopa täysin Ukrainan tykistön parantuneesta tilanteesta.
Sitä tukee myös se havainto, etten muista kuulleeni useampaan kuukauteen puhetta laukausten vähyydestä. Joitakin paikallisia tapauksia on ollut, mutta yleisesti ottaen korkeampi johto ei ole pitänyt asiaa yllä.
rty19
Greatest Leader
Tässä Zelensky kertoo että tykistön ja krh:n ammuksia tehty 2024 alkupuoliskon aikana 25 kertaa niin paljon kuin koko 2022 aikana.
Zelensky: Ukraine produced 25 times more ammunition in half a year than in entire year of 2022
In the face of full-scale war and constant Russian attacks, Ukrainians have managed to build a de-facto new defense industry. In the first half of this year alone, Ukraine produced 25 times more artillery and mortar ammunition than in the entire year of 2022. — Ukrinform.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tässä Zelensky kertoo että tykistön ja krh:n ammuksia tehty 2024 alkupuoliskon aikana 25 kertaa niin paljon kuin koko 2022 aikana.
Zelensky: Ukraine produced 25 times more ammunition in half a year than in entire year of 2022
In the face of full-scale war and constant Russian attacks, Ukrainians have managed to build a de-facto new defense industry. In the first half of this year alone, Ukraine produced 25 times more artillery and mortar ammunition than in the entire year of 2022. — Ukrinform.www.ukrinform.net
Jos oletetaan että numerot pitävät paikkansa ja jos oletetaan että tuotanto jatkuisi yhtä suurena vuoden 2024 toisen puoliskon ajan, niin silloin vuoden 2024 uustuotanto olisi 50 kertaa suurempi kuin vuoden 2022 uustuotanto.
Hyvin suuri muutos, tosin tuossa ei tietysti kerrota, miten suuri uustuotanto oli vuonna 2022.
Oletan että vuosien 2014-2021 taisteluista huolimatta todellinen uustuotanto ei ole ollut valtavan suurta, osaksi sen takia että Ukrainakin peri hyvin suuret varastot Neuvostoliiton hajoamisen jälkeen. Ryssä onnistui tuhoamaan niistä useita, olikohan kolme? Joka tapauksessa luulisi että uustuotannon ei ole tarvinnut olla kovin merkittävää, näiden varastojen takia - käytännössä niin suurta että se riittää "rauhanajan" kulutuksen korvaamiseen sekä kattamaan mahdolliset vientiin menevät tilaukset (sikäli kun sellaisia on).
Lisäksi vuoden 2022 uustuotantoa häiritsivät ryssän ohjushyökkäykset, joten arvatenkin ei kyetty täysipainoiseen uustuotantoon.
Toisaalta, JOS vuoden 2022 uustuotanto olisi ollut "kymmeniä tuhansia" niin tuo suhdeluku 50 tarkoittaa että nyt sen pitäisi olla "miljoonia". Tuossa on niputettu tykistön ja kranaatinheittimien laukaukset samaan numeroon, joten mikä lie realistinen numero. Lisäksi numerossa ovat kaikki tuotannossa olevat kaliiperit mukana.
Niin tai näin, huomattava muutos kyseessä ja varmasti selittää omalta osaltaan sitä, miksi ryssän etu tykistön ja kranaatinheittimien käytössä on kutistunut 1:3 kokoiseksi.
Vot Iivana
Korpraali
Aika nopeasti on tuo suhdeluku muuttunut. Mistähän tästä löytäisi tarkempaa erittelyä, lienee todennäköistä että ryssä tykistö on saanut ammuttua aiempaa vähemmän ja Ukraina on saanut sekä oman kranaattituotantonsa että muualta tulevat toimitukset kasvamaan merkittävästi.
Samoin olisi kiinnostava ymmärtää mitä käsite "artillery shell use" tarkalleen kattaa; kentälle toimitetut laukaukset? ammutut laukaukset? myös suutarit, vai ei? miten kaliiperi .. ja kuuluuko lukuihin mukaan myös korohoro (ja miltä osin) ja esim psv epäsuora jos sellaista on yleisemmin käytetty. Noin ensimmäisenä ajatuksenahan tuosta artikkelistahan tulee mieleen 122mm-155mm vedettävä ja itseliikkuva epäsuora.. mutta vaikutus saattaa muuttua suuntaan jos toiseen, riippuen siitä miten tuo on laskettu.
.. eikös tuossa taannoin ollut juttua että ryssän ampuma tusina P-K:n valmistamia kranuja mötkähteli maalialuelle ja yksi niistä räjähti.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Ukrainalla oli tosiaan neukkulan perintönä aivan helvetinmoinen määrä 152 ampumatarvikkeita. Ryssien sabotöörit onnistuivat mossauttamaan osan noista taivaan tuuliin 2014 jälkeen. Ukrainalla ei vielä 2022 ollut kykyä valmistaa 152 amettia juuri lainkaan, 2023 rupesivat tekemään noita isommissa määrin itse ja 155 valmistus pääsi vauhtiin vasta tämän vuoden puolella.
Viimeksi muokattu:
VanhaPate
Respected Leader
️
2. lokakuuta 2024 räjähti auto Ukrainskih Partizan -kadun (ennen dekomunisaatiota - “Punapartisaanit”) kuudennen talon lähellä Liskyn alueella, sataman läheisyydessä tilapäisesti miehitetyssä Berdjanskissa. Autossa oli petturi Vitali Lomeiko.
Lomeiko oli Zaporižžjan alueen Tšernihivin piirituomari, joka jäi miehitettyyn Berdjanskiin, rikkoi sodan aikana valansa ja tietoisesti sekä vapaaehtoisesti ryhtyi yhteistyöhön Venäjän miehittäjien kanssa.
Vitali Lomeikon kohtalo, joka oli osallisena ukrainalaisten repressioihin miehityksen aikana ja sotarikoksiin, on muistutus kaikille pettureille, että ukrainalaista kansaa sortavien palvelijoiden tie on vaarallinen terveydelle ja elämälle.
Kunnia Ukrainalle!
Головне управління розвідки МО України
❗️❗️У Бердянську знайшли мертвим суддю-зрадника Віталія Ломейка 🔥2 жовтня 2024 року біля шостого будинку на вулиці Українських Партизан (до декомунізації ― «красних партізан») у мікрорайоні Лиски неподалік порту в тимчасово окупованому Бердянську вибухнув автомобіль, в якому перебував зрадник...
t.me
Ukrainan vahvistaminen ja hyökkääjävaltion Venäjän maksimaalinen heikentäminen – Ukrainan sotilastiedustelupalvelun (GUR) edustaja Andrii Tšernjak kertoi “Me olemme Ukraina” -kanavalle antamassaan haastattelussa sotilastiedustelijoiden työn strategisesta tavoitteesta ja erityispiirteistä täysimittaisen sodan olosuhteissa.
“Emme toimi vain rintamalla. Operaatiomme tapahtuvat aivan kaikkialla. Joka puolella toimivat omat ihmisemme, jotka joka päivä, ja erityisesti juuri tällä hetkellä, tekevät kaikkensa vihollisen maksimaalisen heikentämiseksi”, korosti Andrii Tšernjak.
Hän kiinnitti erityistä huomiota Ukrainan vastarintaliikkeen toimintaan.
“Ukrainan vastarinta toimii aktiivisesti – ihmiset odottavat Ukrainan paluuta. Ihmiset ryhtyvät yhteistyöhön, huolimatta vihollisen erittäin tehokkaasta vastavakoilutoiminnasta: pienimmästäkin epäilystä voi joutua pidätetyksi ja vangituksi ilman oikeudenkäyntiä. Siitä huolimatta ihmiset ottavat meihin yhteyttä, työskentelevät kanssamme ja auttavat erittäin aktiivisesti”, Tšernjak sanoi ja kiitti kaikkia, jotka toimivat tilapäisesti miehitetyillä alueilla.
“Ukrainan sotilastiedustelupalvelun aktiivisten toimintojen yksiköt ovat kuin veitsi, joka tekee viillon oikeaan aikaan ja oikeaan paikkaan”, hän totesi.
Katso haastattelusta lisää tietoa tiedustelijoiden toiminnasta maalla, ilmassa, merellä ja kyberavaruudessa sekä GUR:n onnistuneiden operaatioiden suunnittelusta ja toteutuksesta, myös Venäjällä.
Головне управління розвідки МО України
🔥 Підрозділи активних дій ГУР МОУ, як хірургічний скальпель ― ріжуть там, де треба, ― Андрій Черняк 💪 Зміцнення України та максимальне знесилення держави-агресора росії ― представник ГУР МО України Андрій Черняк розповів про стратегічну мету та особливості роботи воєнних розвідників в умовах...
t.me
Edit:
Оperaatioita GUR:lta, joista ei ole vielä PUHUTTU! Venäläisen upseerin LIKVIDOINTI ja venäläisten PAKO Mustaltamereltä. CHERNJAK
Viimeksi muokattu:
hyvis
Eversti
Tuohon vielä yksi taistelulaiva (mustanmeren lippulaivakin kelpuutetaan), jonkun verran vaunuja lisää ja mielellään pari maihinnousuvenettä, niin aletaan olla Rudelin lukemissa. Toivottavasti kaverin henkinen kantti kestää, täytyy olla karmeaa hommaa.
Antares
Respected Leader
Eipä noin tarkkaa erittely taida ollakaan, ei ainakaan julkista.
Perinteisesti kun tällaisia numeroita on nähty tämän sodan aikana, ne ovat olleet "laukausta per kuukausi / viikko / päivä" eli sinänsä todellisia ampumamääriä, tosin niiden vaihtelu voi johtua myös operatiivisesta tai strategisesta tilanteen muutoksesta eikä esim. tuotannon vaikeuksista (toki voivat olla myös niitä).
Usein julkisuuteen kerrotut numerot ovat olleet suuntaa-antavia ja tilanteiden muuttuessa tosiaan nämäkin numerot muuttuvat.
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Unohtui mainita aikaisemmasta viestistä että Ukrainan tuoreet iskut suuria ammusvarikkoja vastaan näkyvät varmasti ryssän kyvyssä ja halussa tuhlata tykistön laukauksia.
Kuin tilauksesta tuli vastaan tällainen eilen julkaistu valitus, että ryssän joukkoja lähetetään hyökkäyksiin ilman riittävää tykistön tukea:
Russian military started complaining about shell starvation and attacks on ammunition depots after Ukrainian strikes on Russian warehouses.
"Z-blogger" Yegor Guzenko ("Thirteenth") said the Russian soldiers are still sent into assaults but are not given enough ammunition.
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Pian ammusvarastojen tuhoamisen jälkeen nähtiin myös kommentteja että niillä ruokittiin pääasiassa Kurskin, Belgorodin ja Kharkovan suuntia eli suurimmat puutteet näkyivät ensimmäisenä siellä.
Tosin sama ryssän sotabloggeri kirjoitti että muilta sektoreilta lähetetään ammuksia paikkaamaan tilannetta ja "asioiden odotetaan muuttavan paremmiksi piakkoin".
Antares
Respected Leader
Moni tätä ketjua pidempään seurannut saattaa muistaa venäläisen Volya Media telegram-kanavan, jolla oli tapana julkistaa ns. butchers bill eli tappioiden numeroiden artikkeli. He tekivät tätä melko tunnollisesti aina kesään 2023 asti vaan sitten niiden julkaisemiseen tuli pidempi tauko.
Nyt tuli pitkästä aikaa twitter-viesti jossa oli linkki heidän tuoreimpaan artikkeliinsa. Viestin kommenteista selviää että he aloittivat näiden julkaisemisen "muutama kuukausi sitten":
They have restarted their posts in this regard a few months ago. LÄHDE
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Minulla oli tapana jakaa heidän artikkeleitaan tässä ketjussa aina silloin tällöin ja ne herättivät aina kovasti keskustelua, koska heidän lähteidensä mukaan tappiot olivat / ovat selvästi suuremmat kuin mihin on totuttu tai mitä on nähty erilaisissa arvioissa tai "virallisissa numeroissa".
Laitan spoilerin taakse heidän tuoreimman artikkelinsa koko tekstin (artikkeli julkaistu 29.9.2024):
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Tässä artikkelin numerot, nämä ovat aikavälille 24.2.2022 - 28.9.2024 - ensin ryssä.
Killed, missing, captured and deserters = 383 594
Wounded and sick leave = 880 253
Näiden summa = 1 263 847
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Ukrainan numerot.
Killed, missing, captured and deserters = 149 538
Wounded and sick leave = 392 576
Näiden summa = 542 114
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Tämä oli myös mielenkiintoinen kohta, siinä käsitellään ryssän joukkojen määrän muutosta vuodenvaihteesta tähän päivään:
As of January 1, 2024, the number of Russian Armed Forces involved in the “special military operation” and located in the border area, as well as in Belarus, according to our data, was 692,000 people.
On September 26, we interviewed 11 people from among our Russian military sources and compared these figures with the assessment of Ukrainian sources on the number of groups of the Russian Armed Forces in different directions. As of the 25th, sources from both sides estimated it approximately the same - at 539,200-554,000 people.
If we subtract the monthly losses as of August 25 from the number of the Russian Armed Forces as of January 1 and add monthly reinforcements, we get a figure close to our sources' estimate of 559,780 people. Considering that sources on both sides could have left out some units both near the front and in the rear, and could have deliberately left out some, the difference in the two figures is quite explainable and understandable.
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En tiedä heidän numeroidensa lähdettä enkä sitä, miten luotettavia ne ovat.
Toisaalta he jakavat taulukot tappioista eri aikaväleillä, joten ainakin nämä ovat tarkistettavissa ja verrattavissa muiden lähteiden kanssa (sikäli kun sellaisia on).
He myös spekuloivat että Putin ei tule julistamaan "toista mobilisaatiokierrosta" paitsi jos rintaman tilanteessa tapahtuu dramaattinen käänne - kuten tapahtui syksyllä 2022 Ukrainan päästyä läpimurtoon Kharkovan seudulla. Sitä seurasi hyvin nopealla aikataululla "ensimmäinen mobilisaatiokierros".
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MUOKKAUS: hyvä myös muistaa että Ukrainan ilmoittama "päivän numero" on 655 560 mikä on selvästi pienempi kuin Volya Median numero:
Nyt tuli pitkästä aikaa twitter-viesti jossa oli linkki heidän tuoreimpaan artikkeliinsa. Viestin kommenteista selviää että he aloittivat näiden julkaisemisen "muutama kuukausi sitten":
They have restarted their posts in this regard a few months ago. LÄHDE
-
Minulla oli tapana jakaa heidän artikkeleitaan tässä ketjussa aina silloin tällöin ja ne herättivät aina kovasti keskustelua, koska heidän lähteidensä mukaan tappiot olivat / ovat selvästi suuremmat kuin mihin on totuttu tai mitä on nähty erilaisissa arvioissa tai "virallisissa numeroissa".
Laitan spoilerin taakse heidän tuoreimman artikkelinsa koko tekstin (artikkeli julkaistu 29.9.2024):
September 29
In August and September, the intensity of military actions and, as a result, the losses of the parties increased sharply, even compared to June-July. In addition, another direction was added - Kursk, however, there is still no complete data on the losses of the RF and UA Armed Forces in the Kursk region. The most accurate sources from both sides were still able to name figures that more or less coincided with each other, but they also say that the order of these figures corresponds to reality, but the exact number of dead and missing will be known later.
So far, the figures for the losses of the parties in the Kursk region from August 6 to September 28 look like this:
RF Armed Forces
1,891 killed, missing, captured, deserted (262 Russian prisoners have already been exchanged for Ukrainian servicemen).
8,871 wounded, left due to illness.
Armed Forces of Ukraine
748 killed, missing, captured, deserted
3,521 wounded, left due to illness.
The order of the figures provided by our sources coincides with the data on Russian losses in the Kursk region published in the “Spy Dossier” channel , with the adjustment that the data there is for the period from the beginning of the operation to September 20.
Losses exceeded gains
Since June 2024, that is, since the beginning of the full-scale summer offensive of the Russian Armed Forces, the losses of Russian troops in all categories have exceeded the rate of recruitment of new recruits (mobilized, volunteers, contract soldiers).
The figures for losses and gains are worth examining in detail.
Since the Butcher's List is compiled from data provided to us by sources on both sides, we cannot regulate the periods of loss accounting, nor can we regulate the receipt of information. Therefore, in the graph above, losses are indicated for uneven periods.
For greater clarity, we will provide a breakdown of losses and a set of replenishments for the periods from January 1 to September 25, 2024.
Russian Armed Forces losses in 2024 by month up to September 25. The first figure is losses killed, missing, captured, deserters. The second figure is losses wounded and sick. The sum is total losses in all categories.
January-May - 40,972 + 70,280 = 112,052
June - 13,130 + 30,162 = 43,292
July - 17,684 + 47,722 = 65,406
August - 25,230 + 58,390 = 83,620
September - 26,850 + 61,000 = 87,850kl
Total: 392,220
We know the recruitment figures, according to sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense, on a monthly basis.
Recruitment by month from January 2024 to September 25, 2024
January - 41,000
February - 36,000
March - 32,000
April - 28,000
May - 24,000
June - 17,000
July - 11,000
August - 34,000
September - 36,000 (until 25.09)
Total: 260,000
As of January 1, 2024, the number of Russian Armed Forces involved in the “special military operation” and located in the border area, as well as in Belarus, according to our data, was 692,000 people.
On September 26, we interviewed 11 people from among our Russian military sources and compared these figures with the assessment of Ukrainian sources on the number of groups of the Russian Armed Forces in different directions. As of the 25th, sources from both sides estimated it approximately the same - at 539,200-554,000 people.
If we subtract the monthly losses as of August 25 from the number of the Russian Armed Forces as of January 1 and add monthly reinforcements, we get a figure close to our sources' estimate of 559,780 people. Considering that sources on both sides could have left out some units both near the front and in the rear, and could have deliberately left out some, the difference in the two figures is quite explainable and understandable.
In the absence of a full-fledged mobilization, which Putin really does not want to start because it will have to be carried out in large cities, and not, as before, in villages, towns and cities with a population of 20 to 150,000 people, the situation for the Russian Armed Forces does not look optimistic at all.
It should be added that the current recruitment system, based on payments for signing a contract and enticing people with future money (both monthly and posthumous payments and in case of injury), is extremely unstable. Sources in the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces say that it is impossible to predict recruitment for the autumn months. In August and September, it increased two to three times compared to June-July, but this is already a familiar growth. It was approximately the same in the same period of 2022 and in 2023. But it is impossible to predict the rate of recruitment of reinforcements in October-November. They can be either at the level of September, or lower or higher. That is, if we take into account that the intensity of hostilities in the coming months is unlikely to decrease, with a smaller recruitment, Russian troops will simply not be able to maintain either the pace or the scale of the current offensive.
The intensity of military actions will decrease only after the goals of the Russian offensive are achieved. Let us recall that this is an exit to the borders of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, blocking and transition to assaults of the fortified Ukrainian region of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk and blocking or capturing Pokrovsk. The Russian Armed Forces will definitely not have enough time to achieve these goals in September or October; most likely, Russian troops will be able to get as close to solving the tasks as possible by the end of December (if they can at all). Therefore, we should expect a decrease in the intensity of the Russian offensive if the rate of recruitment of reinforcements decreases and if the Ukrainian Armed Forces in any of the directions switch to active counter-attack actions on a corps scale.
A reduction in the intensity of military operations will automatically lead to a prolongation of the timeframe for completing the tasks assigned to the Russian Armed Forces group by the political leadership of Russia.
It should be taken into account that even if the deadlines are extended, Vladimir Putin will not rush to full mobilization. This will significantly reduce the margin of safety of his power, so mobilization in the Russian Federation is possible only in the event of a truly major defeat of Russian troops on one of the sections of the front, when it will be necessary to plug the holes with mobilized troops (as was the case in the fall of 2022). Or in a situation where the recruitment rate drops to June and July figures, losses increase and the Russians will be forced to go on the defensive on all sections of the front. And even in this case, Putin will almost certainly expect the situation to worsen even more.
Losses of both sides as of September 28
Losses of both sides in killed, missing, captured and deserters
-
Losses of both sides in wounded and sick leave
The main source of losses for both sides remains the Pokrovskoe direction. More precisely, Pokrovskoe-Kurakhovskoe. In second place are Kupyanskoe and Limanskoe, in third place is Toretskoe, in fourth place is Chasov Yar.
Where do the numbers come from?
Even before the invasion began, we agreed with sources in the armies of both sides to exchange information on the dead. Every few days we receive fresh figures for Russian and Ukrainian losses - killed, missing, wounded, sick. We check them with several sources on each side and cross-check them. We compare them with the intensity of the fighting to minimize the exaggeration of the enemy's losses and the understatement of our own, which is standard in war.
We do not claim that our figures are accurate to the last man, but the order of the numbers is consistent with or overlaps with open data or intelligence insiders published in American and European media. Our data also correlates with the calculation of Russian military losses conducted by Mediazona and the BBC, based on open source information (more on this below, in the chapter on analyzing overall losses).
How we count deserters and prisoners
Every few weeks we receive data on deserters and prisoners. Their accuracy cannot be verified by anything other than the words of a wide range of military sources, while the information on deserters on both sides is far from complete and fragmentary, so we only count those who have been confirmed by two or more sources. According to our calculations, deserters are only those who left their unit in the combat zone and did not return to the unit's location. Some of them were written off by their commanders as missing, others were declared wanted and left to the military police to search. The general summary of the Russian group in Ukraine includes data on the number of deserters for a specific period, but it often includes those who left their unit earlier and does not include those whom the commanders did not report. A similar situation is with the Ukrainian army. They are also in no hurry to report deserters. According to our data, from the beginning of the war until May 28, 2024, 54,000 servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces left their units. In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there were 19,000 such people during the same period. These figures are added to the category of irretrievable losses according to the calculation periods, since deserters only rarely end up in war again.
It is important to understand that a conscientious objector, that is, a soldier or officer who refused to go on the attack or to the positions, is not a deserter; he remains in his unit or is sent to a penal unit (they exist not only in the Russian Armed Forces, but also in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, although there are significantly fewer of them in the Ukrainian army).
Deserters have different fates. Some try to get home, some hide in abandoned villages, some turn into marauders and criminals. Many die on mines, from friendly fire or trying to hide from the military police.
Russian deserters are trying to get to the “mainland” through the Rostov and Voronezh regions, while Ukrainian ones are either waiting somewhere in the central part of the country or trying to get to Europe through Moldova and other neighboring countries.
The situation with prisoners is even more complicated. Since the beginning of the war, both sides often take prisoners for a quick exchange on the spot. They are not included in official lists, they do not end up in prisoner of war camps. If there are adequate officers on both sides in a specific section of the front, they exchange their prisoners without attracting the attention of their superiors. This is standard practice for any war and the current one is no exception. With those who are transferred to the rear, it is a separate story. Data on prisoners is classified on both sides and is much more difficult to obtain than the numbers of killed and wounded. In addition, having received the numbers, they are often impossible to publish, so as not to expose the source of information. Therefore, we deliberately do not single out prisoners in a separate category when counting, adding them to the figures of irretrievable losses.
Since in this war there were no operations (except for the Kharkov offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the fall of 2022) with a rapid and deep advance into the enemy's rear and the mass taking of prisoners (the exception is the surrender of Azovstal in Mariupol), the weekly increase in prisoners is measured in units and tens.
How we count the dead and missing
A serviceman whose body is found or at least visually observed and identified is considered dead. A serviceman who is not found is considered missing. In the Russian Armed Forces, those whose bodies are found but not picked up, either deliberately or due to circumstances, are often considered missing. There is no need to pay compensation to relatives for a missing person, and if a missing person is not reported, he will continue to receive money and allowance, which is the direct income of officers.
Soldiers and officers who were hit directly by a shell or bomb or burned in a fire are also often listed as missing in action. In the Russian Armed Forces, up to 50% of losses are written off as missing in action. In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, missing in action is 20% of all irrecoverable losses.
The 30% difference between the armies is due to several factors. Firstly, the Russian Armed Forces often use formations hastily assembled from different units. As soon as such a formation gets into an unsuccessful combat situation, people do not pull each other out, do not have time to learn the names, surnames, or even call signs of short-term comrades-in-arms. Therefore, the dead and abandoned wounded become missing in action. Secondly, the Russian Armed Forces, conducting assaults on Ukrainian positions, almost do not evacuate the dead and even the wounded. And even if Russian troops advance on a section strewn with the bodies of their own soldiers, they do not properly identify them. Thirdly, poor coordination of units in the Russian Armed Forces and problems in management regularly lead to the fact that some formation confuses the direction, gets lost, comes under fire and dies, but the place of its death is in the area of responsibility of another Russian unit. The Ukrainian army also has such problems, but there are significantly fewer of them.
As a rule, a missing person is a dead person. Therefore, we count them in the same category as killed.
How we count the wounded and sick
Information on the wounded is compiled on the basis of data on the evacuation and acceptance of the wounded into hospitals and medical institutions (both sides also use civilian hospitals for the treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded), and also (relevant for data on the RF Armed Forces) on the basis of reports from unit commanders, which reach corps headquarters and army headquarters.
The total number of wounded Russian and Ukrainian soldiers includes those who received minor wounds and concussions, serious wounds, wounds that resulted in amputations, and those who were out of action due to illness. This number includes only those who sought medical care and this care was documented and then included in the army's internal reports and summaries.
It is important to understand that among the wounded, 10 to 15% were wounded or concussed twice, and some even three times. If a serviceman was officially seen by doctors each time after being wounded, then he is included in our count of the wounded as many times as he was registered.
It is also important to know that the total number of wounded servicemen of the Russian or Ukrainian Armed Forces does not mean that right now that many people are being treated in hospitals. Those who are in hospitals are those who have received serious wounds and wounds that have resulted in amputations or other serious health consequences. That is, in each calculation period, this is (very roughly) no more than 35% of all wounded during this period. For example, if 2,000 people were wounded from May 1 to 10, this means that a maximum of 700 people or less will end up in hospitals.
In the Russian Armed Forces, up to 70% of the wounded who have not lost limbs, sight or hearing return to service after recovery (often they do not wait for a full recovery and return people to their units). In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this percentage is even higher, but not so much because of the commanders' demands, but because of the motivation of soldiers and officers. Many of our interlocutors in the Ukrainian army have long been saying the same phrase: "we are now fighting for each other." This military brotherhood makes people return to the front.
In the Russian Armed Forces, the survival rate of the wounded has improved significantly compared to 2022. This refers to those who were evacuated from the place of injury and fell into the hands of doctors. In this case, the survival rate today is up to 92%. In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this percentage, on the contrary, has decreased and is 89%. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are doing much better than the Russian Armed Forces in terms of evacuation and first aid near the front lines. Ukrainian wounded survive three times more often than Russian ones, who can simply be left without assistance and evacuation. Of course, there are exceptions when Ukrainian wounded cannot be pulled out due to dense enemy fire or due to the incompetence of the commander or the lack of transport. But these are still exceptions.
For those who are used to counting the ratio of killed to wounded as 1 to 3 or 1 to 4, we inform you that this war differs from World War II, for which such a ratio was relevant, in the power and quality of ammunition. The Russian army uses shells similar to those used in 1941-1945. Therefore, in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the ratio of killed to wounded is often close to 1 to 3.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces often use more powerful and more accurate ammunition, the destructive effect of which is higher. Therefore, in the Russian Armed Forces, the ratio of wounded to killed is often closer to 1 to 2, and sometimes 1 to 1. For example, after a hit by a missile fired from a HIMARS, there will be more killed than wounded, because due to the characteristics of the ammunition, everyone who was hit will receive multiple wounds and most will die from blood loss or other causes before evacuation, and it is almost impossible to save such wounded in the field.
========
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Butcher's List. Ukrainian and Russian Military Casualties as of 09/28/2024
Text: Telegram channel "Volya"
In August and September, the intensity of military actions and, as a result, the losses of the parties increased sharply, even compared to June-July. In addition, another direction was added - Kursk, however, there is still no complete data on the losses of the RF and UA Armed Forces in the Kursk region. The most accurate sources from both sides were still able to name figures that more or less coincided with each other, but they also say that the order of these figures corresponds to reality, but the exact number of dead and missing will be known later.
So far, the figures for the losses of the parties in the Kursk region from August 6 to September 28 look like this:
RF Armed Forces
1,891 killed, missing, captured, deserted (262 Russian prisoners have already been exchanged for Ukrainian servicemen).
8,871 wounded, left due to illness.
Armed Forces of Ukraine
748 killed, missing, captured, deserted
3,521 wounded, left due to illness.
The order of the figures provided by our sources coincides with the data on Russian losses in the Kursk region published in the “Spy Dossier” channel , with the adjustment that the data there is for the period from the beginning of the operation to September 20.
Losses exceeded gains
Since June 2024, that is, since the beginning of the full-scale summer offensive of the Russian Armed Forces, the losses of Russian troops in all categories have exceeded the rate of recruitment of new recruits (mobilized, volunteers, contract soldiers).
The figures for losses and gains are worth examining in detail.
Since the Butcher's List is compiled from data provided to us by sources on both sides, we cannot regulate the periods of loss accounting, nor can we regulate the receipt of information. Therefore, in the graph above, losses are indicated for uneven periods.
For greater clarity, we will provide a breakdown of losses and a set of replenishments for the periods from January 1 to September 25, 2024.
Russian Armed Forces losses in 2024 by month up to September 25. The first figure is losses killed, missing, captured, deserters. The second figure is losses wounded and sick. The sum is total losses in all categories.
January-May - 40,972 + 70,280 = 112,052
June - 13,130 + 30,162 = 43,292
July - 17,684 + 47,722 = 65,406
August - 25,230 + 58,390 = 83,620
September - 26,850 + 61,000 = 87,850kl
Total: 392,220
We know the recruitment figures, according to sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense, on a monthly basis.
Recruitment by month from January 2024 to September 25, 2024
January - 41,000
February - 36,000
March - 32,000
April - 28,000
May - 24,000
June - 17,000
July - 11,000
August - 34,000
September - 36,000 (until 25.09)
Total: 260,000
As of January 1, 2024, the number of Russian Armed Forces involved in the “special military operation” and located in the border area, as well as in Belarus, according to our data, was 692,000 people.
On September 26, we interviewed 11 people from among our Russian military sources and compared these figures with the assessment of Ukrainian sources on the number of groups of the Russian Armed Forces in different directions. As of the 25th, sources from both sides estimated it approximately the same - at 539,200-554,000 people.
If we subtract the monthly losses as of August 25 from the number of the Russian Armed Forces as of January 1 and add monthly reinforcements, we get a figure close to our sources' estimate of 559,780 people. Considering that sources on both sides could have left out some units both near the front and in the rear, and could have deliberately left out some, the difference in the two figures is quite explainable and understandable.
In the absence of a full-fledged mobilization, which Putin really does not want to start because it will have to be carried out in large cities, and not, as before, in villages, towns and cities with a population of 20 to 150,000 people, the situation for the Russian Armed Forces does not look optimistic at all.
It should be added that the current recruitment system, based on payments for signing a contract and enticing people with future money (both monthly and posthumous payments and in case of injury), is extremely unstable. Sources in the Main Organizational and Mobilization Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces say that it is impossible to predict recruitment for the autumn months. In August and September, it increased two to three times compared to June-July, but this is already a familiar growth. It was approximately the same in the same period of 2022 and in 2023. But it is impossible to predict the rate of recruitment of reinforcements in October-November. They can be either at the level of September, or lower or higher. That is, if we take into account that the intensity of hostilities in the coming months is unlikely to decrease, with a smaller recruitment, Russian troops will simply not be able to maintain either the pace or the scale of the current offensive.
The intensity of military actions will decrease only after the goals of the Russian offensive are achieved. Let us recall that this is an exit to the borders of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, blocking and transition to assaults of the fortified Ukrainian region of Slavyansk-Kramatorsk and blocking or capturing Pokrovsk. The Russian Armed Forces will definitely not have enough time to achieve these goals in September or October; most likely, Russian troops will be able to get as close to solving the tasks as possible by the end of December (if they can at all). Therefore, we should expect a decrease in the intensity of the Russian offensive if the rate of recruitment of reinforcements decreases and if the Ukrainian Armed Forces in any of the directions switch to active counter-attack actions on a corps scale.
A reduction in the intensity of military operations will automatically lead to a prolongation of the timeframe for completing the tasks assigned to the Russian Armed Forces group by the political leadership of Russia.
It should be taken into account that even if the deadlines are extended, Vladimir Putin will not rush to full mobilization. This will significantly reduce the margin of safety of his power, so mobilization in the Russian Federation is possible only in the event of a truly major defeat of Russian troops on one of the sections of the front, when it will be necessary to plug the holes with mobilized troops (as was the case in the fall of 2022). Or in a situation where the recruitment rate drops to June and July figures, losses increase and the Russians will be forced to go on the defensive on all sections of the front. And even in this case, Putin will almost certainly expect the situation to worsen even more.
Losses of both sides as of September 28
Losses of both sides in killed, missing, captured and deserters
-
Losses of both sides in wounded and sick leave
The main source of losses for both sides remains the Pokrovskoe direction. More precisely, Pokrovskoe-Kurakhovskoe. In second place are Kupyanskoe and Limanskoe, in third place is Toretskoe, in fourth place is Chasov Yar.
Where do the numbers come from?
Even before the invasion began, we agreed with sources in the armies of both sides to exchange information on the dead. Every few days we receive fresh figures for Russian and Ukrainian losses - killed, missing, wounded, sick. We check them with several sources on each side and cross-check them. We compare them with the intensity of the fighting to minimize the exaggeration of the enemy's losses and the understatement of our own, which is standard in war.
We do not claim that our figures are accurate to the last man, but the order of the numbers is consistent with or overlaps with open data or intelligence insiders published in American and European media. Our data also correlates with the calculation of Russian military losses conducted by Mediazona and the BBC, based on open source information (more on this below, in the chapter on analyzing overall losses).
How we count deserters and prisoners
Every few weeks we receive data on deserters and prisoners. Their accuracy cannot be verified by anything other than the words of a wide range of military sources, while the information on deserters on both sides is far from complete and fragmentary, so we only count those who have been confirmed by two or more sources. According to our calculations, deserters are only those who left their unit in the combat zone and did not return to the unit's location. Some of them were written off by their commanders as missing, others were declared wanted and left to the military police to search. The general summary of the Russian group in Ukraine includes data on the number of deserters for a specific period, but it often includes those who left their unit earlier and does not include those whom the commanders did not report. A similar situation is with the Ukrainian army. They are also in no hurry to report deserters. According to our data, from the beginning of the war until May 28, 2024, 54,000 servicemen in the Russian Armed Forces left their units. In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, there were 19,000 such people during the same period. These figures are added to the category of irretrievable losses according to the calculation periods, since deserters only rarely end up in war again.
It is important to understand that a conscientious objector, that is, a soldier or officer who refused to go on the attack or to the positions, is not a deserter; he remains in his unit or is sent to a penal unit (they exist not only in the Russian Armed Forces, but also in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, although there are significantly fewer of them in the Ukrainian army).
Deserters have different fates. Some try to get home, some hide in abandoned villages, some turn into marauders and criminals. Many die on mines, from friendly fire or trying to hide from the military police.
Russian deserters are trying to get to the “mainland” through the Rostov and Voronezh regions, while Ukrainian ones are either waiting somewhere in the central part of the country or trying to get to Europe through Moldova and other neighboring countries.
The situation with prisoners is even more complicated. Since the beginning of the war, both sides often take prisoners for a quick exchange on the spot. They are not included in official lists, they do not end up in prisoner of war camps. If there are adequate officers on both sides in a specific section of the front, they exchange their prisoners without attracting the attention of their superiors. This is standard practice for any war and the current one is no exception. With those who are transferred to the rear, it is a separate story. Data on prisoners is classified on both sides and is much more difficult to obtain than the numbers of killed and wounded. In addition, having received the numbers, they are often impossible to publish, so as not to expose the source of information. Therefore, we deliberately do not single out prisoners in a separate category when counting, adding them to the figures of irretrievable losses.
Since in this war there were no operations (except for the Kharkov offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the fall of 2022) with a rapid and deep advance into the enemy's rear and the mass taking of prisoners (the exception is the surrender of Azovstal in Mariupol), the weekly increase in prisoners is measured in units and tens.
How we count the dead and missing
A serviceman whose body is found or at least visually observed and identified is considered dead. A serviceman who is not found is considered missing. In the Russian Armed Forces, those whose bodies are found but not picked up, either deliberately or due to circumstances, are often considered missing. There is no need to pay compensation to relatives for a missing person, and if a missing person is not reported, he will continue to receive money and allowance, which is the direct income of officers.
Soldiers and officers who were hit directly by a shell or bomb or burned in a fire are also often listed as missing in action. In the Russian Armed Forces, up to 50% of losses are written off as missing in action. In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, missing in action is 20% of all irrecoverable losses.
The 30% difference between the armies is due to several factors. Firstly, the Russian Armed Forces often use formations hastily assembled from different units. As soon as such a formation gets into an unsuccessful combat situation, people do not pull each other out, do not have time to learn the names, surnames, or even call signs of short-term comrades-in-arms. Therefore, the dead and abandoned wounded become missing in action. Secondly, the Russian Armed Forces, conducting assaults on Ukrainian positions, almost do not evacuate the dead and even the wounded. And even if Russian troops advance on a section strewn with the bodies of their own soldiers, they do not properly identify them. Thirdly, poor coordination of units in the Russian Armed Forces and problems in management regularly lead to the fact that some formation confuses the direction, gets lost, comes under fire and dies, but the place of its death is in the area of responsibility of another Russian unit. The Ukrainian army also has such problems, but there are significantly fewer of them.
As a rule, a missing person is a dead person. Therefore, we count them in the same category as killed.
How we count the wounded and sick
Information on the wounded is compiled on the basis of data on the evacuation and acceptance of the wounded into hospitals and medical institutions (both sides also use civilian hospitals for the treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded), and also (relevant for data on the RF Armed Forces) on the basis of reports from unit commanders, which reach corps headquarters and army headquarters.
The total number of wounded Russian and Ukrainian soldiers includes those who received minor wounds and concussions, serious wounds, wounds that resulted in amputations, and those who were out of action due to illness. This number includes only those who sought medical care and this care was documented and then included in the army's internal reports and summaries.
It is important to understand that among the wounded, 10 to 15% were wounded or concussed twice, and some even three times. If a serviceman was officially seen by doctors each time after being wounded, then he is included in our count of the wounded as many times as he was registered.
It is also important to know that the total number of wounded servicemen of the Russian or Ukrainian Armed Forces does not mean that right now that many people are being treated in hospitals. Those who are in hospitals are those who have received serious wounds and wounds that have resulted in amputations or other serious health consequences. That is, in each calculation period, this is (very roughly) no more than 35% of all wounded during this period. For example, if 2,000 people were wounded from May 1 to 10, this means that a maximum of 700 people or less will end up in hospitals.
In the Russian Armed Forces, up to 70% of the wounded who have not lost limbs, sight or hearing return to service after recovery (often they do not wait for a full recovery and return people to their units). In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this percentage is even higher, but not so much because of the commanders' demands, but because of the motivation of soldiers and officers. Many of our interlocutors in the Ukrainian army have long been saying the same phrase: "we are now fighting for each other." This military brotherhood makes people return to the front.
In the Russian Armed Forces, the survival rate of the wounded has improved significantly compared to 2022. This refers to those who were evacuated from the place of injury and fell into the hands of doctors. In this case, the survival rate today is up to 92%. In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this percentage, on the contrary, has decreased and is 89%. At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are doing much better than the Russian Armed Forces in terms of evacuation and first aid near the front lines. Ukrainian wounded survive three times more often than Russian ones, who can simply be left without assistance and evacuation. Of course, there are exceptions when Ukrainian wounded cannot be pulled out due to dense enemy fire or due to the incompetence of the commander or the lack of transport. But these are still exceptions.
For those who are used to counting the ratio of killed to wounded as 1 to 3 or 1 to 4, we inform you that this war differs from World War II, for which such a ratio was relevant, in the power and quality of ammunition. The Russian army uses shells similar to those used in 1941-1945. Therefore, in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the ratio of killed to wounded is often close to 1 to 3.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces often use more powerful and more accurate ammunition, the destructive effect of which is higher. Therefore, in the Russian Armed Forces, the ratio of wounded to killed is often closer to 1 to 2, and sometimes 1 to 1. For example, after a hit by a missile fired from a HIMARS, there will be more killed than wounded, because due to the characteristics of the ammunition, everyone who was hit will receive multiple wounds and most will die from blood loss or other causes before evacuation, and it is almost impossible to save such wounded in the field.
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September 29, 23:25
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Tässä artikkelin numerot, nämä ovat aikavälille 24.2.2022 - 28.9.2024 - ensin ryssä.
Killed, missing, captured and deserters = 383 594
Wounded and sick leave = 880 253
Näiden summa = 1 263 847
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Ukrainan numerot.
Killed, missing, captured and deserters = 149 538
Wounded and sick leave = 392 576
Näiden summa = 542 114
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Tämä oli myös mielenkiintoinen kohta, siinä käsitellään ryssän joukkojen määrän muutosta vuodenvaihteesta tähän päivään:
As of January 1, 2024, the number of Russian Armed Forces involved in the “special military operation” and located in the border area, as well as in Belarus, according to our data, was 692,000 people.
On September 26, we interviewed 11 people from among our Russian military sources and compared these figures with the assessment of Ukrainian sources on the number of groups of the Russian Armed Forces in different directions. As of the 25th, sources from both sides estimated it approximately the same - at 539,200-554,000 people.
If we subtract the monthly losses as of August 25 from the number of the Russian Armed Forces as of January 1 and add monthly reinforcements, we get a figure close to our sources' estimate of 559,780 people. Considering that sources on both sides could have left out some units both near the front and in the rear, and could have deliberately left out some, the difference in the two figures is quite explainable and understandable.
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En tiedä heidän numeroidensa lähdettä enkä sitä, miten luotettavia ne ovat.
Toisaalta he jakavat taulukot tappioista eri aikaväleillä, joten ainakin nämä ovat tarkistettavissa ja verrattavissa muiden lähteiden kanssa (sikäli kun sellaisia on).
He myös spekuloivat että Putin ei tule julistamaan "toista mobilisaatiokierrosta" paitsi jos rintaman tilanteessa tapahtuu dramaattinen käänne - kuten tapahtui syksyllä 2022 Ukrainan päästyä läpimurtoon Kharkovan seudulla. Sitä seurasi hyvin nopealla aikataululla "ensimmäinen mobilisaatiokierros".
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MUOKKAUS: hyvä myös muistaa että Ukrainan ilmoittama "päivän numero" on 655 560 mikä on selvästi pienempi kuin Volya Median numero:
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kumpujen yöstä
Kapteeni
Niin sitä pitää. Ryssää lakoon.
teknohippi
Ylipäällikkö
Otin tähän nyt leikkaamalla nuo ryssän numerot. Eli 1,3milj. Erilähteistä on ollut tietoa että koko armeija olisi noin 2milj miestä joista Ukrainassa se 1,5milj. Mitä ilmeisimmin todellisuudessa armeijan riveissä on suurin osa kuolleista ja haavoittuneista jotta miesluku näyttää korkealle. Todennäköisesti tämä on tietoinen valinta lilliputtelinhallinnolta koska näin saadaan kotirintama pysymään tyytyväisenä: örkki tuo rahaa kotiin oli elossa, kuollut tai jossain siinä välimaastossa. Järjestelyssä ihan kaikki voittaa: armeijassa on kirjavahvuutena paljon örkkiä, maan sisäinen järjestys pysyy kunnossa ja kukaan ei toivo sodan loppua koska silloin örkki tulee kotiin eikä tuo enää rahaa.
No luvut ovat mitä ovat ryssällä mutta kuvio itsessään sopii suoraan ryssän korruptoituneeseen mätäpaiseeseen. Sota pyörii ruplilla ja nykysysteemissä sitä kannattaa kaikkien tukea!
buckethead
Korpraali
Ryssä on niin saatanan tyhmä.. ei voi muuta sanoa. Odotin että olis heittänyt nallin tai jotai turvallisempaa ja posauttanut kauempaa mutta vitut. Stalin tappoi kaikki älymmystön niin tätä se jälki on vieläkin. Vai lenin, ihan sama mutta tyhmuä kuin saappaat
Harvapartio
Eversti
Lainaan omaa viestiäni 2.5 vkon takaa. Silloin puhe oli 16 Bohdanan kuukausituotannosta, nyt Zelenskyi on ilmeisesti sanonut että niitä tehdään "20kpl asti" kuussa. Eli tuo lienee kattotaso tällä hetkellä. Myös ensimmäinen Marder on korjattu Ukrainassa.
Harvapartio
Eversti
Czechoslovak Group ja Ukrainian Armor sopimukseen 155mm tuotannosta. Tämän kautta on tarkoitus tehdä noin 100 tuhatta kranaattia ensi vuonna ja yli 300 tuhatta 2026, osa Ukrainassa ja osa Tsekissä. Standardia kuulaa ja pitkän kantaman variantteja. Laitteisto on jo valmistelussa. Myös muunlaista tuotantoa on suunnitteilla, siitä lisää artikkelissa.