Ukrainan konflikti/sota
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Röh, röh. Possut kiittävät juhla-aterioista.
Grisly video shows Ukraine pigs gorging on body of Russian captain
A graphic video shared on the Cargo 200 Telegram channel shows pigs devouring what appears to be a human corpse in Ukraine. The person recording the video says that the body is that of a Russian ar…
nypost.com
Antares
Respected Leader
50 000 on se määrä mistä on kysytty, mutta "yli 100 000" on tämän mukaan todellinen "kadonneiden" määrä.
Osa varmasti on "oikeasti kadoksissa" mutta helppo uskoa että valtaosa lienee kuollut:
The Ukrainian hotline "I Want to Find" has received over 50,000 requests from relatives of missing Russian soldiers.
"Russians have over 100,000 missing persons in total, not including those we already know have died. Many missing Russians are scattered across our fields, their remains being carried away by dogs. Identification of these remains is of no interest to Russia." - said Bohdan Okhrimenko, a representative of the Coordination Headquarters.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Syyrialle on oma ketjunsa, mutta mainittakoon nyt täällä, kun tässä trollataan ryssää. Eli, Ukraina solmii diplomaattisuhteet Syyrian uuteen Assadin jälkeiseen hallintoon.
www.kyivpost.com
While the Russian troops that supported the Assad regime will be forced to leave Syria. At the same time, Ukraine is establishing diplomatic relations with the new Syrian government. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha has arrived in Syria for talks.
Russia to Move Forces From Syria to Libya – HUR
Russian forces in Tartus are awaiting several of their ships, which are currently in the Mediterranean Sea, HUR says.
www.kyivpost.com
While the Russian troops that supported the Assad regime will be forced to leave Syria. At the same time, Ukraine is establishing diplomatic relations with the new Syrian government. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha has arrived in Syria for talks.
rty19
Greatest Leader
Saksan edustajat tuolla jo kävivät. Naisministeriä ei kätelty.
Seuraavaksi it-ohjus lentävän dronen kyytiin
ddude
Majuri
Mielenkiintoista nähdä missä kohdin tulee ryssällä lasissa reunat vastaan.
Ei noi tappion kestot ole rajattomat sielläkään vaikka sen kuvan antavatkin ulospäin.
Se "Sotilaiden Äitien" yhdistyksen vaimentaminen kertoo samaa tarinaa.
Nostetaampa tässäkin ketjussa esille kun laitteista valtaosa taitaa olla toimitettu Ukrainaan suojaamaan sotilaita sekä arvokkaita kohteita Venäjän hyökkäyksiltä.
Suomalainen Sensofusion on kehittänyt sekä valmistaa droonien havainnointi- ja lamautuslaitteita, joissa radiosignaalin löytäminen sekä älykäs häirintä ovat ne tekijät joilla homma toimii.
Myös Israeliin Netanjahun kansliaan on kelvannut suomalainen droonisuojaus ja kasvavassa määrin myös moniin kotimaisiin kriittisiin kohteisiin.
Yhtiön uusin tuote on Air Fence Military edition, joka vihjaa, että droonien torjunnassa käytetään jotain muutakin tekniikkaa kuin ohjaussignaalin häirintää, voi tarkoittaa lennokin teknisten osien fyysistä vahingoittamista jollain keinolla, mitä ei kuitenkaan tarkemmin avata ja hyvä niin.
Military | Sensofusion
Airfence Military Edition has a wide variety of countermeasures against modern drones. Drone detection capability is included in full scale.sensofusion.com
Jokatapauksessa hienoa, että Suomesta nousee tällaisia yrityksiä ja onnea menestystä heille myös jatkossa, Eurooppa tarvitsee nyt juuri tällaista osaamista. Kolmen edellisen vuoden summautunut kasvu yrityksellä on yli 300 %, mikä kertonee että kysyntä ylittänee kapasiteetin.
Toivottavasti tätä yritystä ei myydä vuoden päästä jollekkin ulkolaiselle sijoittajaporukalle isojen rahojen toivossa... Kuten muuta infraa jnpp...
Ei mulla muuta... Sori OT.
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Eli ryssä on nyt käytännössä myöntäny, että 50k ukkoa on kadonnu ja 600k on vakavasti haavoittunut ja lisäksi on se 80k kaatunutta ukkoa joiden henkilöllisyys on selvillä. Eli tuosta tulee, että Venäjän tappiot on vähintää 730k koko sodan ajalta. Ja Ukrainan ilmottama arvioitu lukema kokonaistappioiksi huitelee 790k:ssa. Kuka uskoo, että kadonneiden+kaatuneiden suhde (vakavasti)haavoittuneisiin on venäjän puolella 1:4,6, ei kyllä Ukrainan ilmottama lukema näiden lukujen valossa riitä millään Venäjän kärsimiksi kokonaistappioiksi. Edit: Niin ja tuo 600k vakavasti haavoittunutta on vaan yhden sotilaspiirin lukema.
Toivotaan mutta toivottavasti täällä vallitsee markkinatalouden lait vielä vuodenkin päästä.
Isoalaviiva
Eversti
harmi vaan kun ei kauaa kerkee nauttiin siitä.
kapteenin mora
Alikersantti
H I Suttonin twitterista huomasin kuvia Magyra V5 meridronen ilmasta-ilmaan ohjusversiosta
Kuvassa rannalla oleva dronekin näyttää saaneen Mustasta merestä itseensä, ei liene helppo tehtävä paukuttaa 50 solmua aallokossa tommonen lasti päällä. Kannella näyttäisi olevan Starlinkin antenni. Kumma ettei ryssät ole vielä yrittäneet (vai ovatko?) häiritä Starlinkin toimintaa.
Kyseessä ei ole mikään kovin pieni drone enää, kun AA-11 Archer / R-73 AA-ohjuksella on mittaa kolme metriä ja painoakin 105 kg kappale. Mikä on mielenkiinnoista, niin en ole tiennyt, että AA-ohjus irtoaa ripustimesta vaikka se on nurinpäin.
R-73 (missile) - Wikipedia
Lisätään nyt vielä samaan viestiin. Alla olevassa väitetään, että Ukraina on yrittänyt kesällä salakuljettaa aseripustimia maahan ryssälästä. Ja ilmeisesti sitten myöhemmin onnistuikin niitä saamaan, kun Magyralla on tiputettu todistetusti ryssän koptereita.
Foiled smuggling of 12 missile launch rails from Russia to Ukraine
Russian media recently revealed how federal customs services in Russia foiled an attempt to smuggle missile launchers from Russia to Ukraine.
bulgarianmilitary.com
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
H I Suttonin twitterista huomasin kuvia Magyra V5 meridronen ilmasta-ilmaan ohjusversiosta
Kuvassa rannalla oleva dronekin näyttää saaneen Mustasta merestä itseensä, ei liene helppo tehtävä paukuttaa 50 solmua aallokossa tommonen lasti päällä. Kannella näyttäisi olevan Starlinkin antenni. Kumma ettei ryssät ole vielä yrittäneet (vai ovatko?) häiritä Starlinkin toimintaa.
Kyseessä ei ole mikään kovin pieni drone enää, kun AA-11 Archer / R-73 AA-ohjuksella on mittaa kolme metriä ja painoakin 105 kg kappale. Mikä on mielenkiinnoista, niin en ole tiennyt, että AA-ohjus irtoaa ripustimesta vaikka se on nurinpäin.
R-73 (missile) - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Lisätään nyt vielä samaan viestiin. Alla olevassa väitetään, että Ukraina on yrittänyt kesällä salakuljettaa aseripustimia maahan ryssälästä. Ja ilmeisesti sitten myöhemmin onnistuikin niitä saamaan, kun Magyralla on tiputettu todistetusti ryssän koptereita.
Foiled smuggling of 12 missile launch rails from Russia to Ukraine
Russian media recently revealed how federal customs services in Russia foiled an attempt to smuggle missile launchers from Russia to Ukraine.
Ovat he tietysti yrittäneet häiritä Starlink-yhteyksiä, mutta tulokset ovat olleet hyvin vaihtelevia ja ilmeisesti menestys vähäistä ja harvinaista.
Muistan vuosi tai pari sitten, miten joku Yhdysvaltain kenraali kehui SpaceX:ää notkeudesta ja nopeudesta. Hänen mukaansa jokin onnistunut EW-häirintä oli ohitettu "ohjelmapäivityksen" avulla eli ilmeisesti ryssällä on ollut jotain toimivaa mutta se toimi vain hetken, eikä sen jälkeen uudestaan.
Nämä ovat tietysti niitä aiheita joista kuullaan vähän. Kuvaavaa silti että molemmat pyrkivät käyttämään Starlink yhteyksiä mahdollisimman paljon. Tämä kertoo siitä että järjestelmälle ei ole toista yhtä hyvää korvaajaa ja sen häirintä lienee hyvin vaikeaa.
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Samuel Bendett lainaa tässä ketjussa useampaa ryssäläistä kirjoittajaa, kommentoivat Ukrainan Magura-meridroneja ja erityisesti näitä ilmatorjuntaohjuksella varustettuja malleja:
QUICK THREAD: Russian mil bloggers on a Ukrainian USV destroying a Rus helicopter in the Black Sea (below), trying to come up with proposals on dealing with such threats:
"...the issue of using anti-aircraft missile launchers (on USVs) was only a matter of time."
This is a consequence of the proven effectiveness of Rus forces intercepting USVs with helicopters. While they were just kamikaze USVs, (our tactic) was extremely effective and allowed us to eliminate the USVs (let's keep quiet about why they (Rus MOD) didn't start doing this back in 2022, because the words that come to mind are mostly obscene).
But the helicopter interception of USVs over the Black Sea provided us with six months of quiet. But sooner or later we had to be ready for the enemy's next move, they did not particularly hide their methods of fighting helicopters. And therefore, it is necessary to move on to intercepting USVs with the help of FPV drones or ATGMs, which can easily operate beyond the reach of MANPADS and ersatz anti-aircraft guns from Air-to-Air missiles. Plus, it is necessary to install on-board defenses on our helicopters, like on the Ka-52.
And further, it is worth considering that the Ukrainians are preparing their next step, like the use of AIM-120 missiles from a launcher on a USV, which, in fact, will be able to operate with a radar homing head at a fairly significant range.
To do this, it is necessary to think through an active jamming system in advance - fortunately, it is impossible to place a powerful radar on a USV. And in general, in this case, the enemy gives us a lesson in how it is possible, without an actual fleet, to cause damage and to attack the shore."
In this regard, a big question is, why is there no active USV use, or experience development on our part? Yes, we don't really need our own USVs in the kamikaze variant, since Ukr. have no targets to attack - but against coastal objects, against enemy aircraft near the coast nothing prevents us from making reusable USVs (this allows us to reduce the problem re. the lack of our own communications, as today, there is still a need to install the expensive Kometa system as an alternative to Starlink). On board of these USVs we can place ATGMs, MANPADS, FPV drones, we can strike at the Ukrainian Navy bases, at their air defense missile systems at the moment when our Kalibr missiles attack - all their hidden positions are revealed and we can immediately strike them with FPVs equipped with thermal imagers we can mine the exits from the harbor, and cover the landing of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The latter is generally an excellent opportunity to pull back a large number of troops to protect the coastline. At the same time, the length of the coast is quite significant, there are many convenient places for landings where the population is very loyal to us. That is, we can make caches for the underground, carry out sabotage, and force the Ukrainian Armed Forces to withdraw several brigades from the front.
The Russian fleet obviously needs a revival of an aggressive offensive spirit, the ability to act with fire and ingenuity. After all, it is impossible to achieve victory at sea while hiding behind booms in bays. Moreover, it is necessary to obtain the most modern, extremely necessary experience for our fleet, to draw the right conclusions and adjust naval development.
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MORE: other Russian military bloggers are pessimistic they will find an antidote to the Ukrainian USVs for the foreseeable future:
"...the situation in the Black Sea has changed dramatically in a single day, and not in our favor."
https://t.me/fighter_bomber/19439
"Now we can essentially destroy USVs only during the day, in good weather, using jet aircraft and assault aviation. And not just good weather, but "very good weather" with fewer clouds. Perhaps we will try to use Ka-52s helos, but only until the first losses."
"At the moment, Rus surface fleet is not able to protect itself from USVs on the open sea. With varying success, it can protect itself in bays and at bases. So once we lose the helicopter advantage, we (and essentially no one) cannot ensure the safety of civilian shipping at sea."
"There are already USVs (out there) in the air defense version with missiles and automatic machine gun turrets. We can expect the appearance of USVs carrying drones, electronic warfare systems and MLRS missiles."
"Due to USV's speed and maneuverability, it is almost impossible to hit it with a drone, or with quadcopter munition drops or ATGMs. And where to launch them from? It doesn’t really work from a helicopter - it gets blown away by the air flow from the propeller."
This particular point is interesting given that the Russian Navy is reportedly training to launch FPV drones from a helicopter- see this video:
Plus, helicopters are now being shot down. Launch FPVs from the shore - it won’t fly far. From a ship? Well, maybe only from a ship that is near the shore. And given the inevitable appearance of USVs in the EW version, if by some miracle the FPV or any drones show some effectiveness, then things will get hot very fast. Today, we can state that the "mosquito fleet" strategy has completely defeated the strategy of a large fleet in the Black Sea.
This likely (wont be the same) on the open ocean yet, but it's just a matter of a couple of years. It's obvious that the same thing will happen there. And underwater drones will be used as soon as the issue of their remote control under water is resolved.
The most interesting thing is that this tactic was predicted in Russia and some military personnel even tried to push through and develop it long before the Ukraine invasion. But it was not possible to (go against the grain then). Perhaps the problem with USVs will be temporarily solved when we learn to jam the USV control frequencies, maybe Starlink or other communication satellites. But in three years of this war, neither side has been able to do this effectively.
We can talk about attack drones with anti-USV weapons, but today no one has them. Only in theory. So the battle at sea has moved to a new level. And we (Russians), once we lose the helicopter advantage, "suddenly" move into the position of catching up to the Ukrainians.
-
AND MORE - other Rus bloggers are also pessimistic:
"On the one hand, missiles have been on the USVs for more than half a year, and back in May we wrote that the effectiveness would be low, but not zero. On the other hand, I know at least a dozen USV projects in Russia..."
https://t.me/UAVDEV/7752
Of these, 6 are serious projects, with 2 fully ready for combat, and one has already visited Odessa. What I don't know is who oversees this in the Russian Navy? If with FPV drones the state interfered and we have the Sudoplatov effort, then USVs are self-generated, self-tested, self-applied work.
As we can see from the (Ukr) Magura, it is a Starlink (that is essential) - apart from Starlink, there is no real technology there, everything is done at the level of a radio club. Starlink is the holy grail, the center of all over-the-horizon weapons.
"...the issue of using anti-aircraft missile launchers (on USVs) was only a matter of time."
This is a consequence of the proven effectiveness of Rus forces intercepting USVs with helicopters. While they were just kamikaze USVs, (our tactic) was extremely effective and allowed us to eliminate the USVs (let's keep quiet about why they (Rus MOD) didn't start doing this back in 2022, because the words that come to mind are mostly obscene).
But the helicopter interception of USVs over the Black Sea provided us with six months of quiet. But sooner or later we had to be ready for the enemy's next move, they did not particularly hide their methods of fighting helicopters. And therefore, it is necessary to move on to intercepting USVs with the help of FPV drones or ATGMs, which can easily operate beyond the reach of MANPADS and ersatz anti-aircraft guns from Air-to-Air missiles. Plus, it is necessary to install on-board defenses on our helicopters, like on the Ka-52.
And further, it is worth considering that the Ukrainians are preparing their next step, like the use of AIM-120 missiles from a launcher on a USV, which, in fact, will be able to operate with a radar homing head at a fairly significant range.
To do this, it is necessary to think through an active jamming system in advance - fortunately, it is impossible to place a powerful radar on a USV. And in general, in this case, the enemy gives us a lesson in how it is possible, without an actual fleet, to cause damage and to attack the shore."
In this regard, a big question is, why is there no active USV use, or experience development on our part? Yes, we don't really need our own USVs in the kamikaze variant, since Ukr. have no targets to attack - but against coastal objects, against enemy aircraft near the coast nothing prevents us from making reusable USVs (this allows us to reduce the problem re. the lack of our own communications, as today, there is still a need to install the expensive Kometa system as an alternative to Starlink). On board of these USVs we can place ATGMs, MANPADS, FPV drones, we can strike at the Ukrainian Navy bases, at their air defense missile systems at the moment when our Kalibr missiles attack - all their hidden positions are revealed and we can immediately strike them with FPVs equipped with thermal imagers we can mine the exits from the harbor, and cover the landing of sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The latter is generally an excellent opportunity to pull back a large number of troops to protect the coastline. At the same time, the length of the coast is quite significant, there are many convenient places for landings where the population is very loyal to us. That is, we can make caches for the underground, carry out sabotage, and force the Ukrainian Armed Forces to withdraw several brigades from the front.
The Russian fleet obviously needs a revival of an aggressive offensive spirit, the ability to act with fire and ingenuity. After all, it is impossible to achieve victory at sea while hiding behind booms in bays. Moreover, it is necessary to obtain the most modern, extremely necessary experience for our fleet, to draw the right conclusions and adjust naval development.
-
MORE: other Russian military bloggers are pessimistic they will find an antidote to the Ukrainian USVs for the foreseeable future:
"...the situation in the Black Sea has changed dramatically in a single day, and not in our favor."
https://t.me/fighter_bomber/19439
"Now we can essentially destroy USVs only during the day, in good weather, using jet aircraft and assault aviation. And not just good weather, but "very good weather" with fewer clouds. Perhaps we will try to use Ka-52s helos, but only until the first losses."
"At the moment, Rus surface fleet is not able to protect itself from USVs on the open sea. With varying success, it can protect itself in bays and at bases. So once we lose the helicopter advantage, we (and essentially no one) cannot ensure the safety of civilian shipping at sea."
"There are already USVs (out there) in the air defense version with missiles and automatic machine gun turrets. We can expect the appearance of USVs carrying drones, electronic warfare systems and MLRS missiles."
"Due to USV's speed and maneuverability, it is almost impossible to hit it with a drone, or with quadcopter munition drops or ATGMs. And where to launch them from? It doesn’t really work from a helicopter - it gets blown away by the air flow from the propeller."
This particular point is interesting given that the Russian Navy is reportedly training to launch FPV drones from a helicopter- see this video:
Plus, helicopters are now being shot down. Launch FPVs from the shore - it won’t fly far. From a ship? Well, maybe only from a ship that is near the shore. And given the inevitable appearance of USVs in the EW version, if by some miracle the FPV or any drones show some effectiveness, then things will get hot very fast. Today, we can state that the "mosquito fleet" strategy has completely defeated the strategy of a large fleet in the Black Sea.
This likely (wont be the same) on the open ocean yet, but it's just a matter of a couple of years. It's obvious that the same thing will happen there. And underwater drones will be used as soon as the issue of their remote control under water is resolved.
The most interesting thing is that this tactic was predicted in Russia and some military personnel even tried to push through and develop it long before the Ukraine invasion. But it was not possible to (go against the grain then). Perhaps the problem with USVs will be temporarily solved when we learn to jam the USV control frequencies, maybe Starlink or other communication satellites. But in three years of this war, neither side has been able to do this effectively.
We can talk about attack drones with anti-USV weapons, but today no one has them. Only in theory. So the battle at sea has moved to a new level. And we (Russians), once we lose the helicopter advantage, "suddenly" move into the position of catching up to the Ukrainians.
-
AND MORE - other Rus bloggers are also pessimistic:
"On the one hand, missiles have been on the USVs for more than half a year, and back in May we wrote that the effectiveness would be low, but not zero. On the other hand, I know at least a dozen USV projects in Russia..."
https://t.me/UAVDEV/7752
Of these, 6 are serious projects, with 2 fully ready for combat, and one has already visited Odessa. What I don't know is who oversees this in the Russian Navy? If with FPV drones the state interfered and we have the Sudoplatov effort, then USVs are self-generated, self-tested, self-applied work.
As we can see from the (Ukr) Magura, it is a Starlink (that is essential) - apart from Starlink, there is no real technology there, everything is done at the level of a radio club. Starlink is the holy grail, the center of all over-the-horizon weapons.
Viimeksi muokattu: