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Perversely, the current state of affairs in the Donbass — that is, a semi-frozen conflict — has become the best option for Kiev. True, soldiers and civilians on both sides of the front continue to die, and this is not a good thing. But Ukraine has been spared immense costs: It’s no longer obliged to sustain a rust belt that once drained its coffers, endure the region’s corrupt oligarchs, political elites, and criminal gangs, or appease its pro-Soviet and pro-Russian population. Had Russia not occupied the Donbass after the 2014 Euromaidan revolution, Kiev would not have been able to adopt systemic reforms and construct an increasingly stable and democratic state enjoying the support of its patriotically inclined citizens. Since Russia’s occupation of the Donbass — and of equally anti-Ukrainian Crimea — has forced Moscow to bear the economic costs of both depressed regions, it is small wonder that Ukraine has been in no hurry to implement the Minsk accords and bring the Donbass back into the fold.
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Putin would then withdraw his troops from Ukraine, cut off assistance to the separatists, and inform Kiev that it can have its territory back. ... But the consequences of this gift would be ugly. Kiev would likely face an all-out war with the abandoned separatists, one that it would probably win, but then have to follow with enormous investments to fix the devastated region and try to win the hearts and minds of its anti-Kiev population. Estimates of how much it would cost to undo the damage done by Russia start at $20 billion, according to economist Anders Aslund; Ukraine’s entire budget amounts to about $26 billion.
No less debilitating for Ukraine would be the political consequences of reintegrating the occupied Donbass. Several million anti-Western voters would be brought into the fold, to vote against Ukraine’s pro-Western reforms. The pro-Russian political forces that ruled and still rule the region would get a second life. And the oligarchs and thieves who mismanaged the Donbass for decades would return to power. The Donbass would then play the same retrograde role it has played in Ukrainian politics since independence in 1991. Political tensions would increase, East-West polarization would return, Kiev would be rendered politically and economically impotent, and Putin would have achieved what he wanted all along — a thoroughly unstable Ukraine, minus the cost of funding a low-level conflict in an economically doomed enclave.
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