Tuon voisi halutessaan tulkita venäjän sotatoimena Yhdysvaltoja vastaan.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
fulcrum
Greatest Leader
Tuosta 40 miljardin paketista vain 6 miljardia on suoraa aseapua, lisäksi siitä on varattu 11 miljardia "presidentin reserviin" josta tämä voi tarpeen vaatiessa käyttää rahaa sellaisiin tavaroihin ja asioihin joita ukrainalaiset tarvitsevat lyhyellä varoitusajalla, eikä Bidenin tarvitse joka kulua hyväksyttää kongressissa. Lopuista osa on korvaamaan sitä aseistusta jonka USA on jo lähettänyt (tai on lähettämässä) Ukrainaan, sitten on amerikkalaisten omiin kuluihin, ruoka-apuun, pakolaisten auttamiseen yms.
Eli se paketti ei siis ole sellainen että tässä on 40 miljardilla tankkeja, tykkejä, ohjuksia, pitäkää hauskaa vaan siinä on monta osa-aluetta jotka kaikki ei mene Ukrainalle suoraan, eikä kaikkea käytetä heti.
Lend - Lease on ollut kyllä tiedossa. Tuo takaa että aseiden virta jatkuu, kyse ei ole avun "kymmenkertaistamisesta" eikä siitä, että jotain erikoista tapahtuisi vasta kuukauden kahden päästä.
Käsittäkseni eniten kysymys on siitä, kuinka monta raskasta ja motorisoitua uutta prikaatia kunnon tykistöllä UA saa varustettua ja koulutettua länsi Ukrainassa / Puolassa. Tähän toki menee aikaa. Tuohon prikaatien varustamiseen tuo Lend-Lease ohjelma toki auttaa paljon. Ei ihan halpaa, jos noita luodaan miltei tyhjästä.
Minulla on kuitenkin etiäinen, että pitkä sota luo vähitellen ongelmia myös länteen. Ukrainaa tukevat poliitikot, Biden, Boris saattavat myöhemmin syksyllä ajautua vaikeuksiin, jos sota alkaa vaatimaan yhä suurempia panostuksia. Elokuuhun mennessä pitäisi saada kerättyä niin paljon sotilaallista voimaa ja kalustoa, että tuo RU:n selkäranka saataisiin murrettua. Silloin pitäisi olla toimitettu ja käytössä kaikkea mahdollista lännen aseistusta.
Toivottavasti ei rajoiteta mitään aseistusta mitä tuonne toimitetaan. Haluaisin ehdottomasti nähdä länsihävittäjiäkin tositoimissa. Lisäksi haluan nähdä Venäjän Mustanmeren laivaston upotus-orgiat. HIMARS:ja yms. moukaroimassa pakenevia joukkokeskittymiä. Yms yms.
Nyt taisi hiukan silmäkulma kostuaOttakaa itsellenne kolmen minuutin tauko kaikesta muusta ja kuunnelkaa tämä.
Kiitos Viro!
fulcrum
Greatest Leader
Varmaan voisi, mutta tiedustelutiedon antamisen Ukrainalle voi myös tulkita sotatoimeksi Venäjää vastaan...
Ukrainalla lienee nyt kysymys mihin se pystyy pysäyttämään Venäjän paikallisesti keskitetyt resurssit. Kiusallista tuossa on että kaikki tuhoutuu paikalleen jähmettyvässä tykistösodassa. Jo 10 000 siviiliä jumissa jossain kellareissa (Sjevjerodonetsk) on ikävä juttu, pitää valita päästääkö vihollisen paikalle vai taisteleeko loppuun asti.
AMC
Ylipäällikkö
Zelenskyi: Donbasin alueella käynnissä "teurastus"
Ukrainan sodan keskiössä ovat olleet lähiaikoina Itä-Ukrainan tapahtumat, kun Venäjän on raportoitu kiihdyttäneen taisteluja alueella.Ukrainan presidentti Volodymyr Zelenskyi luonnehti BBC:n mukaan maanantaina myöhäisillassa julkaisteussa videopuheessaan Donbasin tilannetta todella synkäksi. Zelenskyin mukaan Venäjän joukot ovat järjestäneet "teurastuksen" Donbasissa ja yrittävä tuhota "kaiken elävän" alueella.
- Kukaan ei ole tuhonnut Donbasia niin paljon kuin Venäjän armeija nyt, Zelenskyi sanoi.
Aiemmin maanantaina maailman talousfoorumille pitämänsä puheenvuoron aikana Zelenskyi totesi, että venäläisjoukoilla on "20 kertaa enemmän laitteistoa" Donbasissa kuin Ukrainalla. Hän korosti, että Ukraina tarvitsee pitkän kantaman aseita estääkseen tappiot. IS
tankki-tapsa
Kenraali
Tämä minuakin on vähän ärsyttänyt. Jatkuvasti toitotetaan ryssän yli 100 000 "örkin" tappiosta, siis hyökkäysarmeijan puoliintumisesta, ja toisaalla kohta miljoonaan mieheen nousevasta Ukrainan armeijasta mutta ryssä on silti vallannut erittäin tärkeän maayhteyden Krimille ja Donbassissakin etenee. Ei oikein täsmää uutisointi varsinkaan kun toinen on se heikkomotivoitunut ja -koulutettu örkkijoukko ja toiset suorastaan Thermopylain solan ja Raatteen tien puolustajia....
Halutessaan minkä tahansa avun antamisen voisi tulkita sotatoimeksi. Ja sama toisinpäin, eli halutessa minkä tahansa toimen voi tulkita olevan ei-sotatoimi ja jättää sikseen..
Kai siellä joku vähän täysjärkisempi on kertonut ettei kannata kaivaa kuoppaa syvemmälle haastamalla riitaa jenkkien kanssa jos yksi Ukraina jo tuottaa hankaluuksia..
Tyrsky
Eversti
Tämän kyselyn tulokset todistaa sen ettei Venäjä voi siviileitä pommittamallakaan kääntää tätä sotaa enää voitoksi. Vaikka kuinka on höykytetty Ukrainan siviiliväestöä ja tehty epäinhimillisiä tekoja sitä kohtaan, niin siltikään he eivät ole valmiita vaihtamaan tuumaakaan omasta Isänmaasta jotta saisivat rauhan. Kaikista kansakunnista ei tähän olisi.
Ukrainalaisilla on kyllä teräksinen selkäranka ja rautaiset hermot, ja siitä kaikki Kunnia heille!
Kansainvälisessä ilmatilassa saa lennellä ja kurvailla. Saa vaikka kuunnella muiden radioliikennettä jos haluaa. Mutta toisen omistaman lentokoneen suunnan muuttaminen väkisin menee jo tietyn rajan yli.
ido59
Majuri
John Ridge
A
on Russian tank losses in Ukraine:
1/19)
Yesterday, the UA Gen. Staff. noted intel in their daily update that RU has begun pulling T-62s from long-term storage to equip newly formed BTGs slated for deployment to Ukraine. This has serious implications for RU’s armored forces.
2/19) As background, RU is estimated by the ISS to have a total of ~2,900 T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s in active service with an additional ~10,000 of those types in reserve/storage (2021). Stratfor also estimates RU has 2,000 T-64s, 2,500 T-62s, and 2,800 T-55s in storage (2017).
3/19) This report leads to a damning implication. RU has potentially nearly exhausted its immediately operable reserves of T-64s, T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s. Frankly, there is absolutely no reason to deploy a T-62 if you have access to a more modern T-64, T-72, T-80, or T-90.
4/19) So how did RU get here? Ukrainian action on top of poor to nonexistent maintenance due to corruption. As of today (May 23), UA’s MoD estimates nearly 1,300 RU tanks have been destroyed.
5/19) In addition to battlefield losses, it’s well documented that stored RU vehicles have been chronically unmaintained due to pervasive corruption. @TrentTelenko and @kamilkazani have very insightful threads on this.
@ChrisO_wiki previously explored this same subject.
Unroll available on Thread Reader
6/19) As @ChrisO_wiki notes, reports from UA Defense Intelligence indicate that up to 90% of stored RU tanks in at least one depot are non-operable. We can do some back-of-the-envelope math with all these figures. First, let’s assume UA’s estimate of RU tank loses is accurate.
7/19) That means RU needs to replace at least 1,300
loses with tanks from its stores. Activating T-62s indicates they have <1,300 operable T-72/80/90s in storage. In other words, >87% are inoperable. Adding in T-64s, you get >89% of 12,000 stored T-64/72/80/90s are inoperable.
8/19) Rounding to 90% inoperable and assuming the stored T-62s are not in worse condition, that means there are at most 250 operable T-62s out of 2,500 in storage. After that, RU will have to turn to T-55s. And if these numbers hold, there are at most only 280 operable.
9/19) Adding up all the stored tanks gives us 14,500 plus the 1,600 remaining in active service. With only 10% of the stored tanks operable, that gives a total of 3,050 remaining tanks that RU could deploy. I’m discounting the T-55s (I’ll eat a hat if they actually deploy them).
10/19) Some implicit underlying assumptions. RU has not recovered, repaired, and put any loses back into service. If this is not true, then actual RU loses must be greater than UA claims and/or significantly more than 90% of stored tanks must be inoperable to explain the T-62s.
11/19) RU’s ability to produce additional tanks is also discounted as the two major tank factories in the country, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ), have reportedly halted production due to sanctions.
12/19) It is also likely that not all the inoperable tanks will remain so. I think that they will be able to make some of them usable. However, this takes time and they will need to scavenge even more other tanks for parts and really only a small fraction can be made operational.
13/19) The shutdown of UVZ and ChTZ will further hinder RU efforts to repair the inoperable tanks and efforts to repair tanks damaged in the field. Additionally, sanctions call into question RU’s ability to replace critical electronic components such as optics.
14/19) Now, addressing the other ~1,600 T-72/80/90s in active service. I’ve seen estimates that the initial invasion force contained ~1,200 tanks with ~400 as a reserve force based upon nominal RU TO&Es and assuming roughly full strength BTGs (almost certainly false).
15/19) Working with these estimates and assumptions, RU has lost ~100% of the tanks it deployed with and ~25% of its reserve force for the invasion. What is interesting here, is that it seems that RU could just try to pull ~1,300 tanks from the 1,600 to replace losses.
16/19) But the report implies they haven’t, as T-62s are being activated for deployment to UA, not for deployment elsewhere to replace T-72/80/90s being redeployed to UA. Also, if they have redeployed the active tanks, that means actual RU loses would have to be nearly 2x…
17/19) …larger than UA claims to justify the deployment of just the stored T-72/80/90s, let alone T-62/64s. I suspect the likely explanation is that Putin and the RU Gen. Staff. do not want to leave RU itself defended by T-62/64s while all the modern(ish) tanks are sent to UA.
18/19) Summary: Russia likely has at most ~3,100 deployable tanks before it has totally exhausted its active and operable stockpiled tanks. Given they have suffered ~1,300 loses in the first 3 months, I’m skeptical they can continue combat operations through the end of the year.
19/19) Key takeaway: We are witnessing the utter eradication of Russian armored forces by the Ukrainians and Russia’s own mismanagement of their military stockpiles. These losses are totally unsustainable and they may literally run out of usable tanks if the war drags on.
Yesterday, the UA Gen. Staff. noted intel in their daily update that RU has begun pulling T-62s from long-term storage to equip newly formed BTGs slated for deployment to Ukraine. This has serious implications for RU’s armored forces.
2/19) As background, RU is estimated by the ISS to have a total of ~2,900 T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s in active service with an additional ~10,000 of those types in reserve/storage (2021). Stratfor also estimates RU has 2,000 T-64s, 2,500 T-62s, and 2,800 T-55s in storage (2017).
3/19) This report leads to a damning implication. RU has potentially nearly exhausted its immediately operable reserves of T-64s, T-72s, T-80s, and T-90s. Frankly, there is absolutely no reason to deploy a T-62 if you have access to a more modern T-64, T-72, T-80, or T-90.
4/19) So how did RU get here? Ukrainian action on top of poor to nonexistent maintenance due to corruption. As of today (May 23), UA’s MoD estimates nearly 1,300 RU tanks have been destroyed.
5/19) In addition to battlefield losses, it’s well documented that stored RU vehicles have been chronically unmaintained due to pervasive corruption. @TrentTelenko and @kamilkazani have very insightful threads on this.
@ChrisO_wiki previously explored this same subject.
Unroll available on Thread Reader
6/19) As @ChrisO_wiki notes, reports from UA Defense Intelligence indicate that up to 90% of stored RU tanks in at least one depot are non-operable. We can do some back-of-the-envelope math with all these figures. First, let’s assume UA’s estimate of RU tank loses is accurate.
7/19) That means RU needs to replace at least 1,300
loses with tanks from its stores. Activating T-62s indicates they have <1,300 operable T-72/80/90s in storage. In other words, >87% are inoperable. Adding in T-64s, you get >89% of 12,000 stored T-64/72/80/90s are inoperable.
8/19) Rounding to 90% inoperable and assuming the stored T-62s are not in worse condition, that means there are at most 250 operable T-62s out of 2,500 in storage. After that, RU will have to turn to T-55s. And if these numbers hold, there are at most only 280 operable.
9/19) Adding up all the stored tanks gives us 14,500 plus the 1,600 remaining in active service. With only 10% of the stored tanks operable, that gives a total of 3,050 remaining tanks that RU could deploy. I’m discounting the T-55s (I’ll eat a hat if they actually deploy them).
10/19) Some implicit underlying assumptions. RU has not recovered, repaired, and put any loses back into service. If this is not true, then actual RU loses must be greater than UA claims and/or significantly more than 90% of stored tanks must be inoperable to explain the T-62s.
11/19) RU’s ability to produce additional tanks is also discounted as the two major tank factories in the country, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant (ChTZ), have reportedly halted production due to sanctions.
12/19) It is also likely that not all the inoperable tanks will remain so. I think that they will be able to make some of them usable. However, this takes time and they will need to scavenge even more other tanks for parts and really only a small fraction can be made operational.
13/19) The shutdown of UVZ and ChTZ will further hinder RU efforts to repair the inoperable tanks and efforts to repair tanks damaged in the field. Additionally, sanctions call into question RU’s ability to replace critical electronic components such as optics.
14/19) Now, addressing the other ~1,600 T-72/80/90s in active service. I’ve seen estimates that the initial invasion force contained ~1,200 tanks with ~400 as a reserve force based upon nominal RU TO&Es and assuming roughly full strength BTGs (almost certainly false).
15/19) Working with these estimates and assumptions, RU has lost ~100% of the tanks it deployed with and ~25% of its reserve force for the invasion. What is interesting here, is that it seems that RU could just try to pull ~1,300 tanks from the 1,600 to replace losses.
16/19) But the report implies they haven’t, as T-62s are being activated for deployment to UA, not for deployment elsewhere to replace T-72/80/90s being redeployed to UA. Also, if they have redeployed the active tanks, that means actual RU loses would have to be nearly 2x…
17/19) …larger than UA claims to justify the deployment of just the stored T-72/80/90s, let alone T-62/64s. I suspect the likely explanation is that Putin and the RU Gen. Staff. do not want to leave RU itself defended by T-62/64s while all the modern(ish) tanks are sent to UA.
18/19) Summary: Russia likely has at most ~3,100 deployable tanks before it has totally exhausted its active and operable stockpiled tanks. Given they have suffered ~1,300 loses in the first 3 months, I’m skeptical they can continue combat operations through the end of the year.
19/19) Key takeaway: We are witnessing the utter eradication of Russian armored forces by the Ukrainians and Russia’s own mismanagement of their military stockpiles. These losses are totally unsustainable and they may literally run out of usable tanks if the war drags on.
Poland to acquire Korean K2 & German Leopard 2 tanks to replace T-72s donated to Ukraine | Defense News May 2022 Global Security army industry | Defense Security global news industry army year 2022 | Archive News year
Poland is in discussion with Germany and South Korea to replace its T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) donated to Ukraine with German Leopard 2 and South Korean K2 Black Panther.
Leo2 vs K2, kumpi voittaa? Mielenkiintoiseksi menee nämä kaluston päivityksen ympäri eurooppaa. Veikkaisin Leo2a7 voittajaksi, koska se on suunniteltu euroopan olosuhteisiin.
nofate
Kersantti
Uskoakseni Ukrainan taktiikkana on tappioiden tuottaminen alueiden valtaamisen ja pitämisen sijasta.
New Zealand to train Ukrainian army to use 105mm L119 howitzer | Defense News May 2022 Global Security army industry | Defense Security global news industry army year 2022 | Archive News year
New Zealand to train Ukrainian army to use 105mm L119 light gun
Eli 105mm kurssi käydään briteissä, ja se on neljän viikon intensiivinen rupeama. Mitä ne tekee sillä lisäviikolla?
Analysis: Ukrainian army destroys Russian 2S4 240mm mortar revealed by
According to a video released on the Internet and Social Networks on May 21, 2022, the Ukrainian army has destroyed a Russian 2S4 Tyulpan 240mm self-propel
www.armyrecognition.com
vuoroin vieraissa, video linkin alla
Mamba Mk 2 4x4 armored vehicles formerly from Estonian army now used b
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www.armyrecognition.com
viro luovutti laatu vehkeitä, mutta konetykille tuota ei voi näyttää. Ei myöskään kestää DShK kurmootusta, ainakaan paperilla.
