Alla pari otosta Lawrence Freedmanin näkemyksestä, miksi Ukraina saattaa voittaa.
Koko
artikkeli.
Time for the Russian Army to take stock
Lawrence Freedman
In my last
post I asked whether Ukraine could win this war, to which I answered it could, although it was not yet clear whether it would. In this post I want to expand on one of the reasons I came to this conclusion
Nikolai Patrushev, the head of Russia's security council, still claims that the aim is to ‘demilitarize’ all of Ukraine.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov explained that his boss was simply reminding everyone that ‘Russia’s potential is so great in this regard that only a small part of it is now involved in a special military operation … And therefore, all these statements by the Westerners [to the effect that the Russian armed forces are facing shortages of men and equipment] are literally absurd.
Why are the armed forces only using a small part of their capabilities when they need to get the war over as soon as possible? What are they waiting for? Why are we deploying old tanks and old soldiers? many of the reinforcements now coming in to service ‘are ad hoc groupings, deploying with obsolete or inappropriate equipment.’
There are three aspects of the current situation that will be worrying the Russian high command:
First, manpower shortages.
Second, inadequate equipment.
Third, by way of contrast, the accuracy of Ukrainian systems is starting to tell, especially in attacks on these ammunition dumps.
The impact of these attacks on core Russian capacity will be felt when Ukraine seeks to retake Kherson, a province vital to its economic well-being.
There is also a widespread assumption that Putin is too stubborn and determined ever to concede that the war is lost, and that such a powerful state as Russia always has something in reserve with which to turn any battle round. These assumptions cannot be easily dismissed. This is why the conclusion to this post may well be contested
If they can still find ways to advance and keep Ukraine on the back foot then they will carry on. But should a time come when the positions have been reversed and retreats are becoming routine, then the high command will have to ask what losses are acceptable to maintain its honour and that of Putin, and how much of its future should be mortgaged in the Donbas.
The point of my stress on the threat posed to the institution of the Russian military is that it redefines the challenge facing Ukraine. It is not necessary to think in terms of pushing Russian forces right back to their own border, although some pushing will be required, but
to concentrate on continuing to undermine the capabilities and reputation of the Russian military, and consequentially their role in the Russian state.