Ukrainan konflikti/sota


On taas yksi hyvä video lisää, joka kertoo miten ryssäläisen logistiikka toimii. Tohtiiko kukaan arvata, kauanko tällainen junan "purkaminen" kestää ja toisaalta kauanko menee aikaa että tämä radan varteen nostettu tavara on saatu lastattua kuorma-autoihin ja ajettua pois. Varmista puhutaan "useista tunneista".

Paikallistettu:

"Russian invaders unloading military equipment in the village of Sokolohirne, Henichesk, Kherson Oblast, close to border with Zaphorizai Oblast."

46.503486, 34.953174


Sijainti kartalla:

Sokolohirne, Henichesk, Kherson Oblast.jpg

Erikoinen paikka, Dzhankoin ja Melitopolin välillä. Tuosta on noin 50 km Melitopoliin.

Eilen raportoitiin että Melitopolissa oli räjähdyksiä, jäi epäselväksi oliko kyseessä HIMARS tai muut ohjukset vaiko paikallinen sabotaasiryhmä. Mahtaako tämä olla ryssän reaktio siihen eli ei tohdita ajaa huoltoa kaupunkiin asti? Vai onkohan tätä jatkunut jo pidemmän aikaa, jolloin ei olisi reaktio tuoreeseen iskuun vaan johonkin aikaisempaan "täysosumaan"?
 
Mikähän on naapurin tilanne näiden kamikaze-dronejen osalta, eli kuinka paljon lienee varastossa ja kuinka hyvin pystyvät tuota materiaalia tuottamaan nykyään? Ei ollenkaan näyttänyt hyvältä nämä videot..
Näissä venäläisten omissa kamikaze-droneissa ei tuo hyötykuorma taida olla kovinkaan suuri. Toki sillä jotain tutkapeilejä ja ohjusvaunuja tuhoaa, mutta mitään suurta vahinkoa ei taida saada aikaiseksi. Noita on varmaan aika vaikeaa saada tuhottua millään perinteisellä ilmatorjunnalla.
 
Mobilisaation julistamisesta lähtien on kuulunut samaan suuntaan viittaavia huhuja eli mobilisoidut ohjattu varuskuntiin tai koulutuskeskuksiin ja käytännössä jätetty oman onnensa nojaan. Ei käytetä edes ampumaradalla tai anneta peruskoulutusta eri varusteiden käytöstä, puhumattakaan mistään monimutkaisemmasta kuten ryhmänä toimimisesta.

Tässä pari tuoreehkoa viestiä aiheesta:


Tämä ketju on eiliseltä vaan en muista nähneeni täällä:

What's life like for newly-mobilised Russian troops in their barracks and temporary accomodation? Terrible, from all accounts, with no heating, no food, no sleeping bags, no hot water, no toilets, freezing tents, bedbug-infested mattresses and no training. Thread follows.

Katso liite: 69294

The independent Russian media outlet Verstka reports on the experiences of mobilised men from Ufa and Chelyabinsk, two major cities in west-central Russia. The family of one mobilised man named Semyon spent about 40,000 rubles ($625) to equip him for the war.

Semyon and others from the region were sent to a training centre in Elani near Yekaterinburg. To his shock, there were not enough beds and no food at all. He told his family that the only food the mobilised men had was what they had brought with them.

Katso liite: 69292

Those with more food were sharing with the hungry. "For two days no dry rations were given, not even a piece of bread each. It doesn't make sense," Semyon said. They were subsequently taken to Rostov, where there was still no food.

The men were told they would not be getting any training and would be sent straight to Luhansk in Ukraine. Semyon asked his superiors for tactical gloves and a hunting knife. The knives given to the soldiers turned out to be blunt.

Two days later they were taken to Luhansk, where again there was no food. Semyon contacted his relatives to ask them to send him 4,000 rubles ($63) to buy food for himself.

Another soldier ended up in another military camp near the village of Popovka in Saratov region. On the first day, all the mobilised men were made to stand for several hours on the parade ground in the pouring rain while the commanders decided what to do with them.

Katso liite: 69293

The wet soldiers were assigned to barracks, but there were no stoves so the men could not dry their clothes and walked around in wet clothes. There were no showers, baths or hot water either. The barracks toilets also did not work.

Sleeping bags were not provided and the men slept on old, dirty mattresses infested with bedbugs.

At another mobilisation camp at Dubki in Saratov region, the men were at least given three meals a day on most days. The exception was on days when the new soldiers were being assigned to their units. On such days they stand for many hours on the parade ground and skip lunch.

According to one soldier from Ufa in Bashkortostan, commanders were only interested in three military specialities – likely indicative of where the Russian army is facing manpower shortages – sappers, signallers and gunners.

The mobilised men reportedly sleep on mattresses in their outer clothing, as no one was given sleeping bags. Thirty people are housed in each room. There are no showers, baths or hot water, so the men wash themselves with cold water.

In another mobilisation camp in Tatarstan, the men say they are living outdoors in large army tents. They were not given sleeping bags or mattresses. The men heat a small potbelly stove and sleep in outerwear on the wooden floor.

Very similar conditions are visible in this video from a mobilisation camp in Yugra, near Omsk. The narrator says that they have been given nothing, including uniforms and mattresses, so they are having to steal from others to survive.


The men are receiving little or no training. Semyon from Chelyabinsk was sent immediately to Luhansk without any training. Maria from Ufa says that her husband's group "are just wasting time. They walk around the territory of the unit, rest. They didn't get any guidance."

The men say they are in the dark about their future. A group from Bashkortostan was given assault rifles but not taught how to use them, and they do not know when or whether they will be trained: "No one explains anything to them", says the wife of one.

One wife posted a complaint on the social media page of the head of Bashkortostan, Radiy Khabirov, that the men were being treated badly. She was told that she was “whining” and “crying”. The authorities say the mobilised are "provided with everything necessary".

(And remember, all of this is likely to be far better than what they'll experience in the trenches in the Ukrainian winter.)

/end

Source:

https://verstka.media/mobilizovannye-bez-edy-vody-posteley/


Sanoisin että tältä meno näyttää kun mobilisaatio on olemassa vain paperilla eikä sitä ole harjoiteltu, saati mietitty sen enempää.

Toisaalta arvaan että moni meistä on ollut mukana tilaisuuksissa missä suuri määrä ihmisiä pitää majoittaa tai sijoittaa jonnekin (vaikka sitten lyhyeksi aikaa) - usein se tarkoittaa sohvilla ja lattialla nukkumista, jos ei ole mitään suurempaa resurssia (kuten hotellit, motellit yms.) käytettävissä.

Samoin tulee mieleen se muutaman vuoden takainen Fyre-festivaali mieleen. Se taas on esimerkki siitä kun miehet jotka eivät ole koskaan järjestäneet massafestivaalia kuvittelevat tietävänsä mitä sellaisen järjestäminen vaatii ja aikaa tai rahaa ei käytetä tarpeeksi sen valmisteluun. Kaikesta on pulaa, mitään ei ole tarpeeksi ja ihmiset käytännössä jätetään oman onnensa nojaan.
Kouluttajatkin viety rintamalle, joten ei ole enää ketään kouluttamaan mobilisoituja. Siemenviljan syöminen on lopulta turmiollista.
 

Mikä ihmeellinen itsesuojeluvaiston puute venäläisillä oikein on? Eikö tulisi viimeistään jo tuossa vaiheessa mieleen, että jos alku vedetään vihkoon, niin tuskin se retki tästä paremminkaan tulee sujumaan. Luulisi järkevämmän jampan jo katselevan itselleen poistumisreittiä, mutta eipä nämä. Siellä ihan lampaina vain odotellaan että joku tulee ja taluttaa viimeiselle matkalle.
 
Kouluttajatkin viety rintamalle, joten ei ole enää ketään kouluttamaan mobilisoituja. Siemenviljan syöminen on lopulta turmiollista.

Tämä on nähty täällä aikaisemminkin, mutta laitetaan uudestaan kun sopii tilanteeseen niin hyvin:


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Jaroslaw Wolskin ajatuksia eilen nähdystä Ukrainan arviosta Venäjän jäljellä olevista ohjusmääristä (tietyt tyypit).

Ukrainan ilmoituksen mukaan jäljellä olisi 609 ohjusta ja Venäjä olisi ampunut 1 235 ohjusta.

Hänen laskujen mukaan kyseinen arvio on optimistinen, antaa ketjussa oman arvionsa (hän kirjoittaa risteilyohjuksista ja SRBMs eli Iskander-M ballistisista):

How many cruise missiles and SRBMs are still in Russia? You all know the graphics he posted @oleksiireznikov in your profile.

According to Russia's graphics, there were to be 609 missiles as a result of the use of 1235 missiles for attacks on targets in Ukraine.

Personally, this is a great optimism.

Russia has several basic types of cruise missiles, apart from some types only with the "A" warhead, we are interested in: Kh-555, Kh-101, 9М728 / R-500 Iskander, 3M14 Kalibr

With the SRBM, we have a 9M723 missile range of the Iskander system and the Tochka-U complex missiles. How many rockets could there be in Russia in February 2022?

These are, of course, confidential data, but there are some estimates as to their quantity. They are based on (explicit) engine manufacturer data turbojets for Kh-101, Kh-35 Uran, Kh-59, R-500 missiles.

In addition, there are data on the number of Kh-55 missiles taken from Ukraine and then converted into Kh-555. The data of the SRBM missiles are already burdened with a very large error because based on the number of Iskander sets in the number and the estimated unit of fire to them.

It is also worth mentioning that the USSR alone Kh-55 from 1983 to 1993 produced 1612 units, of which Russia bought 575 Kh-55 missiles from Ukraine in 2005. Some of them were converted to the Kh-555

So how many maneuvering missiles does Russia have?

Until 2010, most of the rockets in Russia had R95-300 turbojet engines from the USSR, bought back together with the 575 Kh-55 from Ukraine in 2005, and from the supplies accumulated by Russia.

Since 2010, however, Russia has developed three turbo-jets for its cruise and derivative missiles:

- simplified R95-300 for Kh-35 Uranus
- ТРДД-50 (from 2010) for 9M729 R-500, Kh-59, 3M14 Kalibr
- ТРДД-50 v.2 (from 2014) for 3M14T Kalibr and Kh-101

ANNUAL PRODUCTION of ТРДД-50 was about 45-50 units of each variant (!)

Data for «ОДК-Сатурн»

This gives us from 2010 to 2022 about 600 ТРДД-50 engines and about 400 ТРДД-50 v.2 engines.

A total of about 1000 pieces.

In addition, Russia bought 575 Kh-55 missiles from Ukraine in 2005, most of which were converted to Kh-555 before 2010.

In total, therefore, Russia could have slightly less than 1,600 cruise missiles (minus a certain number of Kh-59) minus a certain number of "A" weapon carriers - probably up to 1/4 of that number. So, in real terms, Russia could have around 1,200 conventional cruise missiles in February 2022.

If the Ukrainian data on the launch of 485 cruise missiles are correct, it means that the Russians have already used more than 40% of their reserves. They have around 700 left.

In the case of the Iskander system, in fact, the production of 900 pieces seems to be a rational estimate, officially it was reported that the RUS industry produced up to 50 Iskander-M ballistic missiles A YEAR which for 18 years of production (since 2004) is correct

if the Ukrainian data are true and as many as 770 SRBM missiles of the Iskander system were fired, only the missiles with "A" warheads could be left + current production which goes straight to the front.

Resume for Leftists: Russians are in s*** :

out of 900 Iskander-M, about 30-60 remain
out of 1,200 cruise missiles, up to 700 are left

Ukrainians have a FEW TIMES more GMLRS than RUS Iskander-M :)


Yksi ketjun kommentti:

Anyone count how many rockets they fired in Syria? There may be more losses in warehouses

Johon Wolski vastasi näin:

about 100

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Jos ei jaksa lukea ketjua, niin tässä hänen arvionsa (poimin nämä lauseet ketjusta epäjärjestyksessä, mutta asia käynee selväksi):

out of 900 Iskander-M, about 30-60 remain
out of 1,200 cruise missiles (Kalibr, Kh-101, Kh-59, Kh-55), up to 700 are left

officially it was reported that the RUS industry produced up to 50 Iskander-M ballistic missiles A YEAR

if the Ukrainian data are true and as many as 770 SRBM missiles of the Iskander system were fired, only the missiles with "A" warheads could be left (oletan että tällä tarkoitetaan ydinkärjellisiä eli taktisia ydinaseita - ne jotka toimitetaan risteilyohjuksella) + current production which goes straight to the front.

Kalibr-, Kh-59 ja Kh-101 risteilyohjuksista hän kirjoittaa että vuoden 2010 jälkeen tuotannossa on ollut kaksi eri moottorityyppiä, vuosituotannoksi on kerrottu:

ANNUAL PRODUCTION of ТРДД-50 was about 45-50 units of each variant (eli suomeksi tuotantokapasiteetti 90-100 kpl per vuosi)

MUOKKAUS: Wolski päätti täsmentää numeroitaan seuraavalla viestillä: LÄHDE

Let me add that: the estimates included just over 100 calibers used in Syria and about 200 missiles of this type exported to various recipients.

Saman viestin kommenteissa häneltä kysyttiin arviota osumaprosentille: LÄHDE

This is another question - what percentage is unskilled / will not hit after sending? Any data?

Hän vastasi näin: LÄHDE

around 22-27% xD
 
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