Taitaa olla 67 Leopard 2 vaunujen yhteismäärä nyt (+3 raivausvaunua):
Saksa 18
Puola 14
Ruotsi 10
Espanja 10
Norja 8
Kanada 4
Portugali 3
Eli se kaksi pataljoonaa on jo täynnä.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Saksa 18
Puola 14
Ruotsi 10
Espanja 10
Norja 8
Kanada 4
Portugali 3
Eli se kaksi pataljoonaa on jo täynnä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Lainaan tähän aikaisemmassa viestissä viitatan Tverezo-sivun haastattelun, koska siinä on annettu yksi arvio Venäjän panssarivaunujen määristä, mukaanlukien varastovaunujen määrä (artikkeli julkaistu 7.2.2023): LÄHDE
HUOM: en pysty tekemään juuri nyt tarkkaa vertailua, mutta näyttäisi siltä että tässä viitatut numerot voivat olla Military Balancen tiedoista. Minulla ei ole tuoreinta 2023 julkaisua, mutta jos vertaa vuoden 2022 tietoihin, niin numerot ovat liki samat, mutta hieman erilaiset. Tämä kielii siitä että nämä numerot voivat olla suoraan Military Balance 2023 -julkaisusta (tästä ei voi toki olla varma ennen kuin tarkistaa, onko näin).
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Sivuhuomio: tämä Konstantin Mashovets voi olla tuttu nimi, ainakin joille kuille. Hän kirjoitti viime vuonna mainioita tilannekatsauksia eri julkaisulle nimeltään Realist.online, mutta katosi syksyllä jonnekin (viimeinen julkaistu artikkeli 11.9.2022). Tässä linkki hänen vanhempien artikkeliensa sivulle:
https://realist.online/people/konstantin-mashovets
Tällä sivulla hänelle on annettu "kuvaus":
Participant in hostilities, military journalist, coordinator of the Information Resistance group, writer, blogger.
Norjalaisen The_Lookout_N OSINT-tilin kommentit yhdestä hänen artikkelistaan viime kesältä:
Hänellä on Facebook-sivu, mutta en ole lukenut sitä eikä minulla ole edes tunnuksia Facebookiin:
https://www.facebook.com/ahmenid
Tässä linkki hänen tuoreempiin yhteenvetoihinsa, joita kirjoittanut Tverezolle (hänen ensimmäinen Tverezolle kirjoitettu artikkelinsa on julkaistu 25.1.2023):
https://tverezo.info/post/author/ahmenid
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Muistan että hänen artikkelinsa olivat mainioita, koska niissä seurattiin Venäjän joukkojen liikkeitä hyvällä tarkkuudella. En ole oikeastaan koko sodan aikana seurannut näin tarkasti, joten tarkempaa seurantaa tekevien lähteiden lukeminen oli eduksi yleisen tilannekuvan muodostamisen kannalta. Hänen kirjoitustensa tarkkuudesta voi toki olla montaa mieltä enkä ole lukenut näitä tuoreimpia kirjoituksia.
HUOM: en pysty tekemään juuri nyt tarkkaa vertailua, mutta näyttäisi siltä että tässä viitatut numerot voivat olla Military Balancen tiedoista. Minulla ei ole tuoreinta 2023 julkaisua, mutta jos vertaa vuoden 2022 tietoihin, niin numerot ovat liki samat, mutta hieman erilaiset. Tämä kielii siitä että nämä numerot voivat olla suoraan Military Balance 2023 -julkaisusta (tästä ei voi toki olla varma ennen kuin tarkistaa, onko näin).
https://tverezo.info/post/167958
Questions - answers. Part one.
Andrey Krot: Your opinion about Arty Green's constant statements is very interesting. His theses personally seem extremely dubious to me, but I am not a military person. He constantly talks about the sovkovity of our army, about the sovkovity of the generals, including Zaluzhny, he has some kind of special dislike for Syrsky since the time of Debaltsevo and so on. He is quite a popular character and many people watch him, it seems to me that it is important to analyze his claims in the text.
- The opinion that the level of "sophistication" of our army is high enough is not new and was not born today. It has a very large pile of both objective and subjective reasons, both "for" and "against". And this is a VERY debatable issue.
Anyone who had to undergo active military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces has his own, personal point of view on this matter. Arty Green belongs to this category of people, so he has every right to express his point of view on this issue as a person who has directly encountered the army reality.
Well, it is our right to agree with her or not. In my opinion, there is nothing more to comment here.
Roman Sinchuk: I wanted to ask one thing - why doesn't a gentleman with such deep knowledge of military matters help with the affairs of the front? here, we have guys under supermarkets who have not even served, and the experts - you, Zhdanov, Arestovych - are all far from the front.
- Let's first define the terms.
First of all, I am NOT an expert (all our experts, real ones, serve in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), I am a military pensioner, so to speak, an amateur military observer, nothing more. Therefore, it is not necessary to attribute to me some expert work, which I do not perform in any case.
Secondly, what exactly do you mean by the term "helps with the cause of the front"? If active military service, then my attempts (at least three) to return from the reserve to active military service for certain reasons, including the state of my health, ended in vain. If you mean participation in volunteer activities, then I already take part in it quite actively.
And if you are alluding to the fact that I am not physically located near or directly on the LBZ (front), then I would be quite happy to move to a permanent place of residence somewhere in Bakhmut or Vugledar, but, unfortunately, I am not sure that the state and its armed forces would benefit greatly.
As for the motives and reasons of other users of the media space, who actively express their point of view on the course and content of the war, then it is necessary to ask them. But I don't think that "grabbing guys under supermarkets that didn't even serve" will be a worthy argument here.
I hope I answered your questions.
Dmytro Lykhovyi: Thank you for your work!
1. Can we expect that the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk line is better fortified than the Bakhmut line? Or is it simply easier to defend (compared to Bakhmut six months ago)? I ask because I have heard such a thesis several times.
2. Is it correct to assume that if Bakhmut falls, the front does not automatically go to the above line because there are also fortifications somewhere in between?
3. Can we imagine that hostilities are taking place in Crimea, I ask, because I assume that this lowers the loyalty of local residents even more, because the current war is serious destruction. And the same question, but regarding pseudo-republics.
4. Are Ldnriv people fighting, that is, are they still left, because almost nothing more is heard about them?
5. There are constant shelling of front-line cities, do I understand correctly that all lessons have already been learned, and the military does not settle in large numbers in one city? Is it possible to provide this?
6. Do the Russians have short- and/or medium-range high-precision missiles (like Hymers) that they can use to destroy our warehouses located close to the front? That is, do they apply\are they able to apply the tactics of cutting off logistical means of support, as the Armed Forces do?
7. Is it true that if the fighting of a similar or even more intense nature, as near Bakhmut and Vugledar, continues, it may significantly affect Ukraine's ability to conduct the expected counteroffensive operation?
- There are many questions, so let's go in order...
1. Kramatorsk and Slovyansk in themselves are sufficiently powerful and fortified defense areas. I personally doubt the presence of a line of fortifications between them, because it simply does not make sense from a military point of view. I think that the configuration of fortifications directly on the ground has a completely different appearance than the long line of "supporters" from Sloviansk to Kramatorsk. Which one exactly - I won't say, for obvious reasons.
2. No comments. This constitutes a military and state secret.
3. We can imagine, and some already imagine, although it is clearly premature. The question of loyalty or disloyalty of local residents (to whom?), in my opinion, is quite subjective. I do not think that the sentiments of the residents of these territories will be decisive for the military and political leadership of Ukraine in this sense. But, of course, it is quite possible as a valid argument regarding the choice of methodology and format of deoccupation of these territories.
4. Yes, parts and units of the 1st and 2nd AK of the 8th ZVA South. The defense forces take an active part in hostilities, at least in 3 zones of responsibility of the enemy's defense forces (S) in the South-Western TVD:
- in the area of responsibility of the "West" UA,
- in the area of responsibility of the "Center" UA,
- in the area of responsibility of the "South" UA.
There is also some information about individual parts and divisions of the 1st AK, which operate in the area of responsibility of the Dnipro Military Academy.
5. Well, as far as I understand, the Ukrainian military command has drawn certain conclusions from past cases. As for the possibility of ensuring the dispersion of units and units in the nearest (tactical) rear of the troops, I think it is quite possible.
6. This type of ammunition is in service with the USSR (at least formally). For example, 9M542, 9M528 to the Tornado-S anti-aircraft gun (modernized Smerch anti-aircraft gun). Moreover, the Russian military command has a whole "family" of more or less modern OTRKs of the Iskander-M and Iskander-K type, as well as fairly effective "old" TRKs of the Tochka-U type. All of them are quite capable of performing the tasks you ask about, and the level of "accuracy" they have is quite acceptable.
Yes, from time to time they use them.
7. Hypothetically, it could have an effect, of course. But I highly doubt that this will happen in reality. Because, in fact, the Ukrainian military command currently has a whole series of measures to effectively "counteract" such aspirations of the enemy.
Elena Zhmariova: You write that the Russian training system can train or train about 150,000 conscripts at one time, and so one time at a time. Question: is it possible to provide all these subsequent waves of mobilization with clothing, equipment, food, equip new units with equipment, and if it is possible, then up to what number of new conscriptions of 150 thousand each? Foreign observers also estimate the capacity of the system at 120,000-150,000 mobilized and explain this by the fact that this approximate number of drafts has been observed in Russia for years. At the same time, they are skeptical about the ability to supply weapons (even small arms) and equipment. Please comment.
- You are quite right when you emphasize that in the matter of increasing the number of armed forces, mobilization in itself is not a decisive factor. To a greater extent, it is the state's ability to provide these mobilized masses with proper military and professional training, full-time military equipment, equipment, ammunition, uniforms, food, etc. (and with which, even today, the leadership of the Russian Federation has obvious and obvious problems).
Moreover, all of them still need to be brought together in the definition of organizational and staff structures (that is, to form subdivisions, parts and connections, to learn to act in a coordinated manner in this format). That is, between the actual moment of mobilization and the moment of receiving operational (strategic) reserves or cardinal replenishment of already deployed units and connections, there is a long enough path, and it takes a certain amount of time.
I fully agree that at the moment the Russian military command is able to "miss" during one such mobilization "cycle" approximately 120-150 thousand "mobilized" in accordance with the real assessment of the capabilities of its material and technical base, the availability of relevant resources and organizational and administrative capabilities .
However, in connection with this, it is worth remembering one more indicator - the approximate amount of total losses (killed, wounded, captured, deserters and "missing") suffered by the Soviet Union since the massive invasion of the territory of Ukraine. And this is also approximately 120-130 thousand.
And then it will become obvious that even with the maximum tension of the mobilization system of the Russian Federation and the maximum mobilization and involvement of the entire available material and technical base of the Russian army for the preparation and deployment of the "mobilization component", the enemy will be able to cover only his losses in one "cycle". In such a case, it is hardly possible to talk about a significant increase in numbers.
Another mobilization and additional resources, both logistical and organizational-administrative, are needed here (after all, "chmobikes" will not gather by themselves).
In this case, the question arises, how many such "mobilization cycles" can the Russian Federation conduct in general? In my very meticulous and subjective opinion, hardly more than 2-3 (this is with the most "optimistic" option for them). In fact, I think they will try to hold the next one (because they simply have nowhere to go), during which they will "break". Well, this is my "unbiased" point of view on your question.
Yurii Tovstukha: The Prime Minister of Israel said that he will consider the possibility of providing Ukraine with the Iron Dome system. Do you think it will significantly strengthen our anti-aircraft defenses? Will this system not be able to cope with the loads that the Muscovites' shelling can put on them?
- "Iron Dome" is a very specialized TACTICAL level PRO system. It is designed to intercept missiles, rocket shells, and artillery ammunition that fly from 4 to 70 km. Its targets are Grad missiles, possibly Hurricane missiles, and problems may already arise with Tornadoes. It has a very indirect relation to the air defense system, in the national sense of the term. It is, rather, a means of combating anti-aircraft missile defense systems rather than an anti-missile defense system in the full classical sense of the term.
In the front-line, "close" zone from shelling with MLRS or long-range artillery ammunition, it may well significantly help against KR, ZKR, in general, long-range ballistic and aeroballistic targets with appropriate guidance and trajectory correction systems - unlikely.
Ivan Secretny: If succinctly, the question is: it is not clear what positive goals for ourselves we can realistically achieve and how.
In more detail, there was hope that they would not go for additional mobilizations, but we see that they decided to go to the end, and they have more resources for this (primarily, manpower). There is still a lot of money, and it will be very bad if China starts supplying weapons, and China-US tensions have already gone.
Our goals, in my opinion, except for the return of territories, are security = joining NATO. This is the number one goal for us, and it won't allow it for them either. How can we change the situation?
Below are the options (here, by the word negotiations, I again mean compromise scenarios, where part of the territories are "frozen", and Ukraine remains neutral (such a version of Georgia), which is unacceptable for us, the meaning of all this. Such a "peace" as after 2014, 1) Even
if I stop them again, they will still mobilize, because our situation with recruitment is also not great, and they have 4 times more people, they can do it much less painfully. This will either lead to negotiations, or to the use of TNW and negotiations (and what will happen to TNW, as in 2014 the introduction of their troops, there were also cries that they would not do it).
2) They carry out successful or relatively successful actions, then we go to negotiations, just with an even worse position.
3) Option 1 or 2, but we continue to fight, and so on for 5-10 years, following the example of Afghanistan and Vietnam, until they get tired of us being "tough on" and they leave (leaders change and so on). Option of our victory, but will our society withstand such an option? I am sure that 90% are not ready for this.
The hope is that even if their actions fail (I don't believe in defeat yet, there are many of them and they are learning), they will not "crawl away". And we also get exhausted and tired...
- Yes, the questions are voluminous enough to require lengthy answers. So let's go through the options you have outlined and at the end we will form a conclusion.
1) As I wrote above, mobilization in itself is not a "problem solution option" for the Russian Federation. In fact, their resources are FINITE, not "limitless" (in all their "diversity", not only in the human dimension), and, in fact, the opportunities to beat us in "mobilization tension" are not as great as you think. it seems
ESPECIALLY compared to the military-technical capabilities of our allies to supply us with the means for high-speed and effective disposal of their HUMAN mobilization resource (which they, and following them, you, mistakenly now consider to be their main "trump card"). Even if China "fits in" (which I very much doubt because of the critical dependence of the Chinese economy on the EXTERNAL trade and financial situation), which hardly looks like a suicide.
As for the OVT and technical support of this mobilization competition, then it is time to say, especially when increasing the TECHNOLOGICAL sanctions. Therefore, there will be no negotiations or use of TNAO. Because in the first case they make no sense either for Ukraine or for the West, and in the second case we will talk about accelerating the dismemberment of the Russian Federation itself, which will begin with the TOTAL cleansing of the entire current military and political leadership of the Kremlin (no more, no less).
2) We will not go, at least formally and publicly, and not least because of the reasons I mentioned above. That makes no sense either for Ukraine or for Western elites.
3) No one will "prolong" this war, it is already obvious. And it will become even more obvious when the OPC of the West and its "arms lobby" in general will reach "project capacity". Although, of course, the Western elites will try first without it (they are already doing it), because at one time they spent a lot of effort and money to "convert" their military equipment.
So the conclusion, I hope, is obvious here. The Kremlin's latest bet on a "draw" with the help of its crowds of "chmobikes" was not only well and obviously "read" from the beginning of the current invasion and, accordingly, was predicted, but it was also doomed to failure in advance (which at one time, Western elites hoped for Putin " to prove logically", but he turned out to be "insane"). The Kremlin is stubbornly and unflinchingly heading towards its "national catastrophe". Time and terms, in this sense, may well be debatable, but the general, "general" direction is already obvious and unlikely to change. In March, I described all possible options for the course and end of this war in great detail and thoroughly, from now on this list of options began to narrow VERY rapidly, and clearly not in favor of the Kremlin.
We finish with the first block of questions. And tomorrow morning the "main dish"...
Bogdan Grynazhuk: A question for the future broadcast: how are the sizes of MTZ, which the erephia can deconserve, currently estimated? Namely: tanks, artillery, BBM?
And according to your estimations, how many have they already done during 2022 (to understand how much they will have enough for).
Is this kind of assessment of the possibility of waging war made at all, based on the data - how much (at the average monthly/quarterly) consumption of equipment will be enough to provide the army?
- At the time of the mass invasion, the Soviet Union of the Russian Federation included:
1. Tanks, according to the MBT classification (main battle tank):
T-90, T-90A, T-90AM – 364 (up to 220 in storage),
T-72B3 – 786 (all were in service),
T-80U, T -80BV – up to 430 units (up to 2,890 units of the T-80U\B\BV type were in storage),
T-72B\BA – 1,124 units were in service (up to 6,880 of the T-72\А\B type were in long-term storage , of which at least 60 to 80 T-72B units were in the process of being upgraded to the T-72B3 level).
2. Other BBM (armored combat vehicles):
BRDM-2, BRDM-2A – up to 860 units in service (about 1250 in storage),
BRM-1K – 660 units in service (up to 120 units in storage),
BMP- 1 - up to 530 in service (about 7,210 units - in storage),
BMP-2 - up to 3,640 units in service (about 1,420 more - in storage),
BMP-3 - up to 548 units, all in service... were, on 24.02. 2022
3. Armored vehicles of airborne troops (I do not have reliable data on the presence of this type of armored personnel carrier in long-term storage). As of February 24, 2022, the following were in service:
BMD-1 – 665 units,
BMD-2 – 1,380 units,
BMD-3 – 243 units,
BMD-4M – 412 units,
BTR-D – 736 units.
4. APCs and vehicles equal to them by class:
BTR-80A – up to 128 units (at least half of which underwent modernization to the level of BTR-82A (AM),
BTR-82A, BTR-82AM – up to 1237 units, almost all in service, no more than 70-80 units in storage,
BMO-T – 18 units, all in service,
MT-LB (all types and modifications) – 3,420 in service (at least 1,118 are still in storage, being gradually modernized),
BTR-60 (PB) - up to 710 units were in service,
BTR-70 - up to 244 units in service.
In total, BTR-60\70 in storage at least 3660 units.
BTR-80 - up to 1588 units in service (in storage no more 35-40 units).
5. Armored vehicles and protected vehicles equal to them by class:
BPM-97 "Vystrel" - up to 146 units, all in formation,
"Typhoon"-K63968 - up to 288 units,
"Typhoon - U" - up to 220 units,
GAZ- 2975 "Tiger", AMN 233114 "Tiger-M" - a total of up to 470 units, all in service,
"Rys" - no more than 48 units... the Russian Federation refused to extend the contract with the Italian company IVECO.
6. Artillery systems:
120-mm self-propelled guns 2C34 "Hosta" - 58 units, all in service (8 - in storage),
122-mm self-propelled guns 2C1 "Gvozdika" - up to 218 in service (another 2,240 - in storage),
152- mm self-propelled guns 2C3 "Akatsiya" - up to 864 units in service (about 1,100 more units - in storage),
152-mm self-propelled guns 2C5 "Hyacinth-S" - up to 820 units (about 180 more units - in storage),
152-mm self-propelled guns 2C19 "Msta-S" - up to 462 units in service (up to 186 units - in storage),
203-mm SG "Pion" - up to 86 units in service (up to 280 units - in storage),
120-mm self-propelled guns of the 2C23 class "NONA-SVK", 2C31 "Vena" - together up to 160 units in service (about 70-80 more units - in storage),
240-mm CM 2C4 "Tulip" - 44 were in service (about 410 more units - in storage ).
7. Trailed (towed) artillery:
100-mm MT-12 anti-tank gun - 488 units in service (another 2,184 T-12\MT-12 units are in storage),
120-mm howitzer 2B16 "NONA-K" - up to 166 units in service (up to 24 units - in storage),
122-mm howitzer gun D-30 - up to 1,244 units in service (about 3,780 more units - in storage),
152-mm howitzer D-20 - up to 186 units in service (about 980 units - in storage),
152-mm howitzer 2A36 "Hyacinth-B" - 108 in service (up to 1070 - in storage),
152-mm howitzer 2A65 "Msta-B" - 164 in service (up to 640 - in storage).
8. Missile complexes and reactive artillery of the Soviet Union of the Russian Federation:
122-mm RSZV BM-21 "Grad" - 564 units in service (up to 2,450 - units - in storage),
122-mm RSZV 9K55 "Grad-1" - 322 units in formation (not less than 166 units - in storage),
122-mm Tornado-G self-propelled guns - up to 220 units, all in formation,
220-mm BM-27 "Uragan" self-propelled guns - up to 212 units in formation (710 units - in storage, of which at least up to 24 units have been modernized to the "Uragan-M" level),
300-mm BM-30 "Smerch" self-propelled howitzer (including Tornado-S units) - up to 118 units in service (up to 86 units - in storage),
220-mm self-propelled guns of the type TOS-1 "Buratino" and TOS-1A "Solntsepyok" - up to 22 installations in a formation (up to 6 - in storage),
TRK (tactical missile complex) 9K79 (aka “Scarabey” according to the NATO classification) “Point-U” - 28 PUs were in service (up to 76 - in storage), OTRK (operational tactical missile complex) 9K720 “Iskander - M
\ K" - up to 148 PUs were in service (during 2022-2028, at least 116 more PUs were planned to be delivered to the army).
- In my personal opinion, the total volumes of ALREADY deconserved main types of OVT (mentioned by me above) reached a mark of no less than 45% of the volumes that existed at the time of the massive invasion. And by individual types and classes, it is much more (up to 65-70%).
- I can't tell you even approximately, because the information about the level of losses of the enemy by the main types of anti-aircraft fire is very controversial and subjective. Moreover, I also do not know the average monthly rates of production of the main types of OVT of the Russian Armed Forces, both today and in the conditions of "general mobilization". This is a very "floating" indicator, but it is quite important for answering your questions. Without it, it is simply impossible to draw any definite conclusion. If you insist on it, then in this context, I recommend that you compare them yourself with the daily/monthly reports of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on enemy losses in OVT, although, of course, making a very significant correction for reliability.
- Of course, such assessments are made, they are important for strategic planning. From this you can independently draw a conclusion - where, by whom and how they are made.
Vladimir Levushkin: Question: as far as I understand your thoughts, the enemy's main advantage is observed at the platoon-company level? What are we missing at this level to successfully defend ourselves?
- You misunderstood my thoughts.
Oleg Kolesnyk: A question about the past. The line of defense in the ATO/OOS zone was built for 7-8 years. In practice, it remained almost unchanged in some places (Toretsk, Avdiyivka, Maryinka), while in others it collapsed already in the first 7-10 days of the full-scale invasion (Volnovakha, Chermalyk, Talakivka, Hnutove). Why so?
- Because the enemy planned actions in advance in those areas and directions, covertly concentrated and deployed the predominant forces and means there, and also managed to achieve operational and tactical suddenness of his actions.
Aleksandr Zharkov: Question: over the past few days, Ukraine has destroyed several TORM2 air defense systems in the arctic modification (there is photo and video confirmation). Is it an ongoing process or just luck? And why are they so close to the front line? And why the Arctic modification, they already lack the usual TORs and Armor?
- The process of defeating the elements of the enemy's military air defense has a permanent character in the course of the current hostilities. The enemy is trying to cover the battle formations of his troops from the air, operating with the appropriate forces and means directly in these same battle formations.
Accordingly, they fall into the zone of effective action of various weapons of the Armed Forces. The example you gave is a fairly typical case in this sense. Here, rather, it is worth noting the process of detection, targeting and defeat, rather than being surprised by the very fact of the appearance of a Russian anti-aircraft missile defense system in the zone of effective action of Ukrainian means of destruction. It is obvious that the enemy air defense system was hit by some rather "interesting" munition of the Excalibur type.
- The appearance of the Arctic modification of this air defense system (Tor-M2DT) in a certain area in this case is due to the fact that it is the standard weapon of the 80th anti-aircraft division of the Northern Fleet, whose units are currently operating in the Crimean direction. I do not think that this fact in itself indicates a serious lack of military air defense equipment in the Russian troops.
Ihor Polishchuk: Is it possible to shoot GLSDB with Himars?
- Not just "possible", but I would even say that it is necessary. By the way, the Boeing and SAAB companies created this ammunition in accordance with the "disposal program" of M26 projectiles, which are standard NKRS, created specifically for MLRS of the Hymars and M270 types.
Volodymyr Beliy: I understand correctly that at the strategic level, ours work so that the Russian faction is left with one of two choices: either to leave, or to be surrounded?
- Everything is a little more complicated. But I would not like to publicly go into the details and nuances of the HYPOTHETICAL strategic planning of the Ukrainian military administration bodies. However, I would like to point out that I do not yet see in the near future in any operational area/direction any special opportunities to conduct an operational operation "on the encirclement" of the enemy.
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Artikkelin päätteeksi on kaksi linkkiä tätä seuraaviin katsauksiin, jos kiinnostaa lukea lisää:
https://tverezo.info/post/168103
News from the fronts. 07.02.2023. Part I (video)
08.02.2023 Konstantin Mashovets 0 --- Channel 5 , answers , questions , operational situationQuestions - answers. Part one.
Andrey Krot: Your opinion about Arty Green's constant statements is very interesting. His theses personally seem extremely dubious to me, but I am not a military person. He constantly talks about the sovkovity of our army, about the sovkovity of the generals, including Zaluzhny, he has some kind of special dislike for Syrsky since the time of Debaltsevo and so on. He is quite a popular character and many people watch him, it seems to me that it is important to analyze his claims in the text.
- The opinion that the level of "sophistication" of our army is high enough is not new and was not born today. It has a very large pile of both objective and subjective reasons, both "for" and "against". And this is a VERY debatable issue.
Anyone who had to undergo active military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces has his own, personal point of view on this matter. Arty Green belongs to this category of people, so he has every right to express his point of view on this issue as a person who has directly encountered the army reality.
Well, it is our right to agree with her or not. In my opinion, there is nothing more to comment here.
Roman Sinchuk: I wanted to ask one thing - why doesn't a gentleman with such deep knowledge of military matters help with the affairs of the front? here, we have guys under supermarkets who have not even served, and the experts - you, Zhdanov, Arestovych - are all far from the front.
- Let's first define the terms.
First of all, I am NOT an expert (all our experts, real ones, serve in the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), I am a military pensioner, so to speak, an amateur military observer, nothing more. Therefore, it is not necessary to attribute to me some expert work, which I do not perform in any case.
Secondly, what exactly do you mean by the term "helps with the cause of the front"? If active military service, then my attempts (at least three) to return from the reserve to active military service for certain reasons, including the state of my health, ended in vain. If you mean participation in volunteer activities, then I already take part in it quite actively.
And if you are alluding to the fact that I am not physically located near or directly on the LBZ (front), then I would be quite happy to move to a permanent place of residence somewhere in Bakhmut or Vugledar, but, unfortunately, I am not sure that the state and its armed forces would benefit greatly.
As for the motives and reasons of other users of the media space, who actively express their point of view on the course and content of the war, then it is necessary to ask them. But I don't think that "grabbing guys under supermarkets that didn't even serve" will be a worthy argument here.
I hope I answered your questions.
Dmytro Lykhovyi: Thank you for your work!
1. Can we expect that the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk line is better fortified than the Bakhmut line? Or is it simply easier to defend (compared to Bakhmut six months ago)? I ask because I have heard such a thesis several times.
2. Is it correct to assume that if Bakhmut falls, the front does not automatically go to the above line because there are also fortifications somewhere in between?
3. Can we imagine that hostilities are taking place in Crimea, I ask, because I assume that this lowers the loyalty of local residents even more, because the current war is serious destruction. And the same question, but regarding pseudo-republics.
4. Are Ldnriv people fighting, that is, are they still left, because almost nothing more is heard about them?
5. There are constant shelling of front-line cities, do I understand correctly that all lessons have already been learned, and the military does not settle in large numbers in one city? Is it possible to provide this?
6. Do the Russians have short- and/or medium-range high-precision missiles (like Hymers) that they can use to destroy our warehouses located close to the front? That is, do they apply\are they able to apply the tactics of cutting off logistical means of support, as the Armed Forces do?
7. Is it true that if the fighting of a similar or even more intense nature, as near Bakhmut and Vugledar, continues, it may significantly affect Ukraine's ability to conduct the expected counteroffensive operation?
- There are many questions, so let's go in order...
1. Kramatorsk and Slovyansk in themselves are sufficiently powerful and fortified defense areas. I personally doubt the presence of a line of fortifications between them, because it simply does not make sense from a military point of view. I think that the configuration of fortifications directly on the ground has a completely different appearance than the long line of "supporters" from Sloviansk to Kramatorsk. Which one exactly - I won't say, for obvious reasons.
2. No comments. This constitutes a military and state secret.
3. We can imagine, and some already imagine, although it is clearly premature. The question of loyalty or disloyalty of local residents (to whom?), in my opinion, is quite subjective. I do not think that the sentiments of the residents of these territories will be decisive for the military and political leadership of Ukraine in this sense. But, of course, it is quite possible as a valid argument regarding the choice of methodology and format of deoccupation of these territories.
4. Yes, parts and units of the 1st and 2nd AK of the 8th ZVA South. The defense forces take an active part in hostilities, at least in 3 zones of responsibility of the enemy's defense forces (S) in the South-Western TVD:
- in the area of responsibility of the "West" UA,
- in the area of responsibility of the "Center" UA,
- in the area of responsibility of the "South" UA.
There is also some information about individual parts and divisions of the 1st AK, which operate in the area of responsibility of the Dnipro Military Academy.
5. Well, as far as I understand, the Ukrainian military command has drawn certain conclusions from past cases. As for the possibility of ensuring the dispersion of units and units in the nearest (tactical) rear of the troops, I think it is quite possible.
6. This type of ammunition is in service with the USSR (at least formally). For example, 9M542, 9M528 to the Tornado-S anti-aircraft gun (modernized Smerch anti-aircraft gun). Moreover, the Russian military command has a whole "family" of more or less modern OTRKs of the Iskander-M and Iskander-K type, as well as fairly effective "old" TRKs of the Tochka-U type. All of them are quite capable of performing the tasks you ask about, and the level of "accuracy" they have is quite acceptable.
Yes, from time to time they use them.
7. Hypothetically, it could have an effect, of course. But I highly doubt that this will happen in reality. Because, in fact, the Ukrainian military command currently has a whole series of measures to effectively "counteract" such aspirations of the enemy.
Elena Zhmariova: You write that the Russian training system can train or train about 150,000 conscripts at one time, and so one time at a time. Question: is it possible to provide all these subsequent waves of mobilization with clothing, equipment, food, equip new units with equipment, and if it is possible, then up to what number of new conscriptions of 150 thousand each? Foreign observers also estimate the capacity of the system at 120,000-150,000 mobilized and explain this by the fact that this approximate number of drafts has been observed in Russia for years. At the same time, they are skeptical about the ability to supply weapons (even small arms) and equipment. Please comment.
- You are quite right when you emphasize that in the matter of increasing the number of armed forces, mobilization in itself is not a decisive factor. To a greater extent, it is the state's ability to provide these mobilized masses with proper military and professional training, full-time military equipment, equipment, ammunition, uniforms, food, etc. (and with which, even today, the leadership of the Russian Federation has obvious and obvious problems).
Moreover, all of them still need to be brought together in the definition of organizational and staff structures (that is, to form subdivisions, parts and connections, to learn to act in a coordinated manner in this format). That is, between the actual moment of mobilization and the moment of receiving operational (strategic) reserves or cardinal replenishment of already deployed units and connections, there is a long enough path, and it takes a certain amount of time.
I fully agree that at the moment the Russian military command is able to "miss" during one such mobilization "cycle" approximately 120-150 thousand "mobilized" in accordance with the real assessment of the capabilities of its material and technical base, the availability of relevant resources and organizational and administrative capabilities .
However, in connection with this, it is worth remembering one more indicator - the approximate amount of total losses (killed, wounded, captured, deserters and "missing") suffered by the Soviet Union since the massive invasion of the territory of Ukraine. And this is also approximately 120-130 thousand.
And then it will become obvious that even with the maximum tension of the mobilization system of the Russian Federation and the maximum mobilization and involvement of the entire available material and technical base of the Russian army for the preparation and deployment of the "mobilization component", the enemy will be able to cover only his losses in one "cycle". In such a case, it is hardly possible to talk about a significant increase in numbers.
Another mobilization and additional resources, both logistical and organizational-administrative, are needed here (after all, "chmobikes" will not gather by themselves).
In this case, the question arises, how many such "mobilization cycles" can the Russian Federation conduct in general? In my very meticulous and subjective opinion, hardly more than 2-3 (this is with the most "optimistic" option for them). In fact, I think they will try to hold the next one (because they simply have nowhere to go), during which they will "break". Well, this is my "unbiased" point of view on your question.
Yurii Tovstukha: The Prime Minister of Israel said that he will consider the possibility of providing Ukraine with the Iron Dome system. Do you think it will significantly strengthen our anti-aircraft defenses? Will this system not be able to cope with the loads that the Muscovites' shelling can put on them?
- "Iron Dome" is a very specialized TACTICAL level PRO system. It is designed to intercept missiles, rocket shells, and artillery ammunition that fly from 4 to 70 km. Its targets are Grad missiles, possibly Hurricane missiles, and problems may already arise with Tornadoes. It has a very indirect relation to the air defense system, in the national sense of the term. It is, rather, a means of combating anti-aircraft missile defense systems rather than an anti-missile defense system in the full classical sense of the term.
In the front-line, "close" zone from shelling with MLRS or long-range artillery ammunition, it may well significantly help against KR, ZKR, in general, long-range ballistic and aeroballistic targets with appropriate guidance and trajectory correction systems - unlikely.
Ivan Secretny: If succinctly, the question is: it is not clear what positive goals for ourselves we can realistically achieve and how.
In more detail, there was hope that they would not go for additional mobilizations, but we see that they decided to go to the end, and they have more resources for this (primarily, manpower). There is still a lot of money, and it will be very bad if China starts supplying weapons, and China-US tensions have already gone.
Our goals, in my opinion, except for the return of territories, are security = joining NATO. This is the number one goal for us, and it won't allow it for them either. How can we change the situation?
Below are the options (here, by the word negotiations, I again mean compromise scenarios, where part of the territories are "frozen", and Ukraine remains neutral (such a version of Georgia), which is unacceptable for us, the meaning of all this. Such a "peace" as after 2014, 1) Even
if I stop them again, they will still mobilize, because our situation with recruitment is also not great, and they have 4 times more people, they can do it much less painfully. This will either lead to negotiations, or to the use of TNW and negotiations (and what will happen to TNW, as in 2014 the introduction of their troops, there were also cries that they would not do it).
2) They carry out successful or relatively successful actions, then we go to negotiations, just with an even worse position.
3) Option 1 or 2, but we continue to fight, and so on for 5-10 years, following the example of Afghanistan and Vietnam, until they get tired of us being "tough on" and they leave (leaders change and so on). Option of our victory, but will our society withstand such an option? I am sure that 90% are not ready for this.
The hope is that even if their actions fail (I don't believe in defeat yet, there are many of them and they are learning), they will not "crawl away". And we also get exhausted and tired...
- Yes, the questions are voluminous enough to require lengthy answers. So let's go through the options you have outlined and at the end we will form a conclusion.
1) As I wrote above, mobilization in itself is not a "problem solution option" for the Russian Federation. In fact, their resources are FINITE, not "limitless" (in all their "diversity", not only in the human dimension), and, in fact, the opportunities to beat us in "mobilization tension" are not as great as you think. it seems
ESPECIALLY compared to the military-technical capabilities of our allies to supply us with the means for high-speed and effective disposal of their HUMAN mobilization resource (which they, and following them, you, mistakenly now consider to be their main "trump card"). Even if China "fits in" (which I very much doubt because of the critical dependence of the Chinese economy on the EXTERNAL trade and financial situation), which hardly looks like a suicide.
As for the OVT and technical support of this mobilization competition, then it is time to say, especially when increasing the TECHNOLOGICAL sanctions. Therefore, there will be no negotiations or use of TNAO. Because in the first case they make no sense either for Ukraine or for the West, and in the second case we will talk about accelerating the dismemberment of the Russian Federation itself, which will begin with the TOTAL cleansing of the entire current military and political leadership of the Kremlin (no more, no less).
2) We will not go, at least formally and publicly, and not least because of the reasons I mentioned above. That makes no sense either for Ukraine or for Western elites.
3) No one will "prolong" this war, it is already obvious. And it will become even more obvious when the OPC of the West and its "arms lobby" in general will reach "project capacity". Although, of course, the Western elites will try first without it (they are already doing it), because at one time they spent a lot of effort and money to "convert" their military equipment.
So the conclusion, I hope, is obvious here. The Kremlin's latest bet on a "draw" with the help of its crowds of "chmobikes" was not only well and obviously "read" from the beginning of the current invasion and, accordingly, was predicted, but it was also doomed to failure in advance (which at one time, Western elites hoped for Putin " to prove logically", but he turned out to be "insane"). The Kremlin is stubbornly and unflinchingly heading towards its "national catastrophe". Time and terms, in this sense, may well be debatable, but the general, "general" direction is already obvious and unlikely to change. In March, I described all possible options for the course and end of this war in great detail and thoroughly, from now on this list of options began to narrow VERY rapidly, and clearly not in favor of the Kremlin.
We finish with the first block of questions. And tomorrow morning the "main dish"...
Bogdan Grynazhuk: A question for the future broadcast: how are the sizes of MTZ, which the erephia can deconserve, currently estimated? Namely: tanks, artillery, BBM?
And according to your estimations, how many have they already done during 2022 (to understand how much they will have enough for).
Is this kind of assessment of the possibility of waging war made at all, based on the data - how much (at the average monthly/quarterly) consumption of equipment will be enough to provide the army?
- At the time of the mass invasion, the Soviet Union of the Russian Federation included:
1. Tanks, according to the MBT classification (main battle tank):
T-90, T-90A, T-90AM – 364 (up to 220 in storage),
T-72B3 – 786 (all were in service),
T-80U, T -80BV – up to 430 units (up to 2,890 units of the T-80U\B\BV type were in storage),
T-72B\BA – 1,124 units were in service (up to 6,880 of the T-72\А\B type were in long-term storage , of which at least 60 to 80 T-72B units were in the process of being upgraded to the T-72B3 level).
2. Other BBM (armored combat vehicles):
BRDM-2, BRDM-2A – up to 860 units in service (about 1250 in storage),
BRM-1K – 660 units in service (up to 120 units in storage),
BMP- 1 - up to 530 in service (about 7,210 units - in storage),
BMP-2 - up to 3,640 units in service (about 1,420 more - in storage),
BMP-3 - up to 548 units, all in service... were, on 24.02. 2022
3. Armored vehicles of airborne troops (I do not have reliable data on the presence of this type of armored personnel carrier in long-term storage). As of February 24, 2022, the following were in service:
BMD-1 – 665 units,
BMD-2 – 1,380 units,
BMD-3 – 243 units,
BMD-4M – 412 units,
BTR-D – 736 units.
4. APCs and vehicles equal to them by class:
BTR-80A – up to 128 units (at least half of which underwent modernization to the level of BTR-82A (AM),
BTR-82A, BTR-82AM – up to 1237 units, almost all in service, no more than 70-80 units in storage,
BMO-T – 18 units, all in service,
MT-LB (all types and modifications) – 3,420 in service (at least 1,118 are still in storage, being gradually modernized),
BTR-60 (PB) - up to 710 units were in service,
BTR-70 - up to 244 units in service.
In total, BTR-60\70 in storage at least 3660 units.
BTR-80 - up to 1588 units in service (in storage no more 35-40 units).
5. Armored vehicles and protected vehicles equal to them by class:
BPM-97 "Vystrel" - up to 146 units, all in formation,
"Typhoon"-K63968 - up to 288 units,
"Typhoon - U" - up to 220 units,
GAZ- 2975 "Tiger", AMN 233114 "Tiger-M" - a total of up to 470 units, all in service,
"Rys" - no more than 48 units... the Russian Federation refused to extend the contract with the Italian company IVECO.
6. Artillery systems:
120-mm self-propelled guns 2C34 "Hosta" - 58 units, all in service (8 - in storage),
122-mm self-propelled guns 2C1 "Gvozdika" - up to 218 in service (another 2,240 - in storage),
152- mm self-propelled guns 2C3 "Akatsiya" - up to 864 units in service (about 1,100 more units - in storage),
152-mm self-propelled guns 2C5 "Hyacinth-S" - up to 820 units (about 180 more units - in storage),
152-mm self-propelled guns 2C19 "Msta-S" - up to 462 units in service (up to 186 units - in storage),
203-mm SG "Pion" - up to 86 units in service (up to 280 units - in storage),
120-mm self-propelled guns of the 2C23 class "NONA-SVK", 2C31 "Vena" - together up to 160 units in service (about 70-80 more units - in storage),
240-mm CM 2C4 "Tulip" - 44 were in service (about 410 more units - in storage ).
7. Trailed (towed) artillery:
100-mm MT-12 anti-tank gun - 488 units in service (another 2,184 T-12\MT-12 units are in storage),
120-mm howitzer 2B16 "NONA-K" - up to 166 units in service (up to 24 units - in storage),
122-mm howitzer gun D-30 - up to 1,244 units in service (about 3,780 more units - in storage),
152-mm howitzer D-20 - up to 186 units in service (about 980 units - in storage),
152-mm howitzer 2A36 "Hyacinth-B" - 108 in service (up to 1070 - in storage),
152-mm howitzer 2A65 "Msta-B" - 164 in service (up to 640 - in storage).
8. Missile complexes and reactive artillery of the Soviet Union of the Russian Federation:
122-mm RSZV BM-21 "Grad" - 564 units in service (up to 2,450 - units - in storage),
122-mm RSZV 9K55 "Grad-1" - 322 units in formation (not less than 166 units - in storage),
122-mm Tornado-G self-propelled guns - up to 220 units, all in formation,
220-mm BM-27 "Uragan" self-propelled guns - up to 212 units in formation (710 units - in storage, of which at least up to 24 units have been modernized to the "Uragan-M" level),
300-mm BM-30 "Smerch" self-propelled howitzer (including Tornado-S units) - up to 118 units in service (up to 86 units - in storage),
220-mm self-propelled guns of the type TOS-1 "Buratino" and TOS-1A "Solntsepyok" - up to 22 installations in a formation (up to 6 - in storage),
TRK (tactical missile complex) 9K79 (aka “Scarabey” according to the NATO classification) “Point-U” - 28 PUs were in service (up to 76 - in storage), OTRK (operational tactical missile complex) 9K720 “Iskander - M
\ K" - up to 148 PUs were in service (during 2022-2028, at least 116 more PUs were planned to be delivered to the army).
- In my personal opinion, the total volumes of ALREADY deconserved main types of OVT (mentioned by me above) reached a mark of no less than 45% of the volumes that existed at the time of the massive invasion. And by individual types and classes, it is much more (up to 65-70%).
- I can't tell you even approximately, because the information about the level of losses of the enemy by the main types of anti-aircraft fire is very controversial and subjective. Moreover, I also do not know the average monthly rates of production of the main types of OVT of the Russian Armed Forces, both today and in the conditions of "general mobilization". This is a very "floating" indicator, but it is quite important for answering your questions. Without it, it is simply impossible to draw any definite conclusion. If you insist on it, then in this context, I recommend that you compare them yourself with the daily/monthly reports of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on enemy losses in OVT, although, of course, making a very significant correction for reliability.
- Of course, such assessments are made, they are important for strategic planning. From this you can independently draw a conclusion - where, by whom and how they are made.
Vladimir Levushkin: Question: as far as I understand your thoughts, the enemy's main advantage is observed at the platoon-company level? What are we missing at this level to successfully defend ourselves?
- You misunderstood my thoughts.
Oleg Kolesnyk: A question about the past. The line of defense in the ATO/OOS zone was built for 7-8 years. In practice, it remained almost unchanged in some places (Toretsk, Avdiyivka, Maryinka), while in others it collapsed already in the first 7-10 days of the full-scale invasion (Volnovakha, Chermalyk, Talakivka, Hnutove). Why so?
- Because the enemy planned actions in advance in those areas and directions, covertly concentrated and deployed the predominant forces and means there, and also managed to achieve operational and tactical suddenness of his actions.
Aleksandr Zharkov: Question: over the past few days, Ukraine has destroyed several TORM2 air defense systems in the arctic modification (there is photo and video confirmation). Is it an ongoing process or just luck? And why are they so close to the front line? And why the Arctic modification, they already lack the usual TORs and Armor?
- The process of defeating the elements of the enemy's military air defense has a permanent character in the course of the current hostilities. The enemy is trying to cover the battle formations of his troops from the air, operating with the appropriate forces and means directly in these same battle formations.
Accordingly, they fall into the zone of effective action of various weapons of the Armed Forces. The example you gave is a fairly typical case in this sense. Here, rather, it is worth noting the process of detection, targeting and defeat, rather than being surprised by the very fact of the appearance of a Russian anti-aircraft missile defense system in the zone of effective action of Ukrainian means of destruction. It is obvious that the enemy air defense system was hit by some rather "interesting" munition of the Excalibur type.
- The appearance of the Arctic modification of this air defense system (Tor-M2DT) in a certain area in this case is due to the fact that it is the standard weapon of the 80th anti-aircraft division of the Northern Fleet, whose units are currently operating in the Crimean direction. I do not think that this fact in itself indicates a serious lack of military air defense equipment in the Russian troops.
Ihor Polishchuk: Is it possible to shoot GLSDB with Himars?
- Not just "possible", but I would even say that it is necessary. By the way, the Boeing and SAAB companies created this ammunition in accordance with the "disposal program" of M26 projectiles, which are standard NKRS, created specifically for MLRS of the Hymars and M270 types.
Volodymyr Beliy: I understand correctly that at the strategic level, ours work so that the Russian faction is left with one of two choices: either to leave, or to be surrounded?
- Everything is a little more complicated. But I would not like to publicly go into the details and nuances of the HYPOTHETICAL strategic planning of the Ukrainian military administration bodies. However, I would like to point out that I do not yet see in the near future in any operational area/direction any special opportunities to conduct an operational operation "on the encirclement" of the enemy.
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Artikkelin päätteeksi on kaksi linkkiä tätä seuraaviin katsauksiin, jos kiinnostaa lukea lisää:
News from the fronts. 08.02.2023. Part II (video)
https://tverezo.info/post/168030News from the fronts. 10.02.2023. Part III (video)
https://tverezo.info/post/168103
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Sivuhuomio: tämä Konstantin Mashovets voi olla tuttu nimi, ainakin joille kuille. Hän kirjoitti viime vuonna mainioita tilannekatsauksia eri julkaisulle nimeltään Realist.online, mutta katosi syksyllä jonnekin (viimeinen julkaistu artikkeli 11.9.2022). Tässä linkki hänen vanhempien artikkeliensa sivulle:
https://realist.online/people/konstantin-mashovets
Tällä sivulla hänelle on annettu "kuvaus":
Participant in hostilities, military journalist, coordinator of the Information Resistance group, writer, blogger.
Norjalaisen The_Lookout_N OSINT-tilin kommentit yhdestä hänen artikkelistaan viime kesältä:
Hänellä on Facebook-sivu, mutta en ole lukenut sitä eikä minulla ole edes tunnuksia Facebookiin:
https://www.facebook.com/ahmenid
Tässä linkki hänen tuoreempiin yhteenvetoihinsa, joita kirjoittanut Tverezolle (hänen ensimmäinen Tverezolle kirjoitettu artikkelinsa on julkaistu 25.1.2023):
https://tverezo.info/post/author/ahmenid
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Muistan että hänen artikkelinsa olivat mainioita, koska niissä seurattiin Venäjän joukkojen liikkeitä hyvällä tarkkuudella. En ole oikeastaan koko sodan aikana seurannut näin tarkasti, joten tarkempaa seurantaa tekevien lähteiden lukeminen oli eduksi yleisen tilannekuvan muodostamisen kannalta. Hänen kirjoitustensa tarkkuudesta voi toki olla montaa mieltä enkä ole lukenut näitä tuoreimpia kirjoituksia.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ohjus-tiedustelija
Ylipäällikkö
Vähintään yhtä iso ongelma (kiveksien puutteen lisäksi) on se ettei Saksalla ole enää kalustoa, hyvä jos oma minimi. Tyhjästä on paha nyhjästä, toisin kuin:
Miehitys juu, mutta kalusto on jo Norjassa.
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway - Wikipedia
The Corps moved tanks from secret caves in Norway to Finland. Here’s why.
The Corps’ Abrams have been stored in a series of sprawling cave complexes in Norway.
www.marinecorpstimes.com
Kustavi
Ylipäällikkö
Saatko laskettua kaikki muutkin vanut summuut liikkuvat vehkeet tähän?
Edit. Siis mitä nyt ollaan viemässä, ainakin jenkkien ja ranskan kalusto.
Tämä on tänään ollut kuin Panssarimies-lehden nettiversio.
Sellainen tinapurkkikin on esitelty mihin on hakattu koolingit kylkiin, että voi pistää lisävaneroinnit. Voi sun helevettiläinen.
Hyvää viikonloppua ja Vuosipäivää.
Sellainen tinapurkkikin on esitelty mihin on hakattu koolingit kylkiin, että voi pistää lisävaneroinnit. Voi sun helevettiläinen.
Hyvää viikonloppua ja Vuosipäivää.
Ohjus-tiedustelija
Ylipäällikkö
"Saksan A6" pataljoona 18+10+3 = 31kpl
"Puolan A4" pataljoona 14+10+8+4 = 36kpl (Espanja kertoi alunperin että 6vaunua ja nyt että yrittää saada 10 kuntoon) = 32kpl
Siinä olisi siis täynnä paksumpinahkainen lisäpanssaroitu A5/A6 pataljoona sähköisellä tornilla (Ruotsin vaunut L44 putkella) ja toinen perus A4 pataljoona vanhalla hydraulisella tornilla.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Orban pitänyt puheen. Googlen kääntäjän perusteella oikein kunnon trumppimaista paskaa. Syyttää mm. George Sorosta nyt Unkarin kärsimästä ahdingosta. Suomi ja Ruotsi levittelevät valheita Unkarin muka korruptiosta ja oikeusvaltion ongelmista. Samalla kehtaa syyttää ja syyllistää Ukrainaa kun asepalvelukseen on joutunut ukrainalaisia, joilla on siteitä vanhaan Itävalta-Unkariin.
telex.hu
Orbán a háborúról: Mi az áldozatok között vagyunk, ezt respektálnia kell Brüsszelnek
Szerényen emeli fel a kezét, ő megmondta, hogy egy év múlva is itt lesz a háború. A hadicél tisztázatlan, az is, hogy mit jelentene a háború megnyerése. Elvi alapon kell támogatni a svédek és finnek NATO-csatlakozását. Az infláció letörésére fogadóirodákban is tétet tenne. Pintér Sándortól vár...
telex.hu
Mikfin70
Ylipäällikkö
Kyllä nuo amerikkalaiset tuo ihan oman huollon mukanaan jo kahdessa harjoituksessa. Millog tarjosi tilat ja Amerikan jamppa väänsi.
Mikfin70
Ylipäällikkö
Muistaakseni nämä varastot puretaan ja tuo USMC kalusto menee kansalliskaartien käyttöön. Hyvä kuntoista ja vähän käytettyjä vaunuja.Vähintään yhtä iso ongelma (kiveksien puutteen lisäksi) on se ettei Saksalla ole enää kalustoa, hyvä jos oma minimi. Tyhjästä on paha nyhjästä, toisin kuin:
Miehitys juu, mutta kalusto on jo Norjassa.
Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
The Corps moved tanks from secret caves in Norway to Finland. Here’s why.
The Corps’ Abrams have been stored in a series of sprawling cave complexes in Norway.
Tässä toinen hauska resurssi.Jos täällä on eri sotajoukkoja tarkemmin seuraavia niin tämä lista voi olla avuksi (tai sitten ei sisällä uutta tietoa):
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Viestiin tullut vastaus:
https://topcargo200.com/oob/ (suora linkki viestiin merkitylle sivulle)
Muutama täälläkin näkynyt twitter-tili kiittänyt (Dan ja norjalainen The_Lookout)
Jos ovat neljännelle menossa, niin suuntana Bakhmut.
edit.
Kuvista näkyy
ja 4th Tank Brigaden tunnus on
Viimeksi muokattu:
Mietitte tankkiasiaa ihan väärin. Ukrainan sota on aukottomasti osoittanut että 200 tankkia on liian vähän kun otellaan Venäjää vastaan.
Kysymys on vain osittain mitä Suomessa on valmiina jos sota alkaa. Vaikka on toki parempi että meillä olisi 200 tankkia eikä 190, niin se ei ole ratkaisevaa. Isompi kysymys on, että millaiset valmiudet meillä on ottaa seuraavat 500 avustuksena tulevaa tankkia vastaan ja mistä ne saataisiin!
Tässä yhtälössä Abrams voi olla pakon sanelema vaihtoehto Suomellekin, koska Ukrainan sodan jälkeen jenkeillä on edelleen kyky laittaa vaikka 1000 tankkia laivaan, mutta Euroopassa ei välttämättä enää riitä Leopardeja toimitettaviksi.
Siksi on parempi aloittaa se Abramsin käytön ja huollon harjoittelu täälläkin jo ennen kuin Venäjä kerää itärajalle joukkoja.
Kysymys on vain osittain mitä Suomessa on valmiina jos sota alkaa. Vaikka on toki parempi että meillä olisi 200 tankkia eikä 190, niin se ei ole ratkaisevaa. Isompi kysymys on, että millaiset valmiudet meillä on ottaa seuraavat 500 avustuksena tulevaa tankkia vastaan ja mistä ne saataisiin!
Tässä yhtälössä Abrams voi olla pakon sanelema vaihtoehto Suomellekin, koska Ukrainan sodan jälkeen jenkeillä on edelleen kyky laittaa vaikka 1000 tankkia laivaan, mutta Euroopassa ei välttämättä enää riitä Leopardeja toimitettaviksi.
Siksi on parempi aloittaa se Abramsin käytön ja huollon harjoittelu täälläkin jo ennen kuin Venäjä kerää itärajalle joukkoja.
Antares
Respected Leader
Tack. Sinun viestissä linkki on rikki mutta osoite löytyy siitä, kun hieman siistii:
https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewe...US&ll=48.42522162072407,33.18003022257546&z=6
Sen kun epäilet mutta vastaus: on.
Export version panssari on eri kuin heidän omassa käytössä.
Luuletko että Suomi saisi ei-export malleja? Huutista.
Jenkkien tehtaalla kestää toimittaa kun sillä on tilaus lupauksia samoista export vaunuista mm. Puolaan (250 kpl)
edit. Niille jotka eivät tiedä. Jenkeissä on yksi tehdas, joka tuottaa Abrams vaunuja. Tuotantotahti on 12 kpl kuukaudessa. Ja kuten yllä mainittu tuotantolinja on tukossa Export vaunuja Puolan ja Taiwanin vaunu tilauksista. Ja Taiwan tuskin haluaa omia tilauksiaan sivuuttaa. Puola voisi, mutta väittäisin että Puola on jo omistaan antanut niin paljon juurikin sillä uskalluksella kun Jenkeistä on tulossa tilalle, HUOM TILALLE vaunuja.
Viimeksi muokattu:
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Li on varmasti kuluneen vuoden aikana joutunut miettimään monia asioita uusiksi. Hyväksyy Ukrainan auttamisen asetoimituksin.
www.ku.fi
Li Andersson painottaa Ukrainan aseavun merkitystä: ”Eihän rauhasta voi neuvotella silloin, kun osapuolet ovat täysin epät
Venäjän hyökkäyksestä Ukrainaan tuli perjantaina kuluneeksi vuosi. Li Andersson avaa KU:n haastattelussa aseavun merkitystä. Vasemmistoliitto on Venäjän hyökkäyksen jälkeen kannattanut
www.ku.fi
Rajajääkäri
Ylipäällikkö
Mitä merkitystä tuolla määrällä on? Täytyy kyllä olla huippuvaunuja, kun tuon verran vaunuja tuhoutuu siellä viikossa.