I don't know how credible this figure is, but it is very informative.
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Kupyansk-Kremennaya. The combat readiness of the regiments of the "shock" divisions of the orcs. Orcs have a total shortage of AFVs. You can remove the Nth number of motorcycle leagues from storage, but this does not save the situation. The effectiveness of the regiments can be slightly increased by recruiting not 3, but 4-5 battalions of chmobiks.
2 MSDs, 3 MSDs and 144 MSDs are combat-ready. 2 MSD was coordinated in Bulbostan and equipped with the most modern weapons. It will be the bet in the expected "breakthrough" to Liman or Kupyansk. If, of course, it takes place. There is strength - but it is far from 24.02.22
First of all, the issue of strength, the Tamanskaya Division (2nd GMRD) has been close to full strength, the 3rd MRD also has a great status recovery (to 22.2.24 status), and the 144th GMRD also seems to have recovered strength to some extent.
The rest, i.e. the 4th GTD, 47 GTD, 18th GMRD and the 90th GTD are in poor condition: no better than August-September 2022.
This figure explains the complete OOB of the 47th GTD, which was never completely known before: the 26th GTR, 153rd TR, 197th GTR, and the 245th GMRR, which is exactly the same as what the 47th GTD had in 1988.
It is very likely that the 245th GMRR was returned from the 3rd MRD. Back in 2022, the 245th GMRR was still part of the 3rd MRD.
It seems that the 3rd MRD formed a new motor rifle regiment, the 362nd. Back in the Cold War, the 362nd was a part of the 52nd Motor Rifle Division of the 39th Army, Transbaikal MD. I do not know where the relationship comes from.
The complete OOB of the 18th GMRD: the 11th GTR, the 79th GMRR, and the 275th GMRR. The newly emerged 275th GMRR is reusing the number from the old 18th GMRD back in the Cold War.
The fate of 423rd GMRR of the 4th GTD is unknown. It is now replaced by the 60th MRR. The designation of the 60th MRR appears to come from the 16th GTD of the 2nd GTA, GSFG.
A total of 38 BTGs are now deployed at a front of some 54km width, which is clearly an offensive posture. This group of forces roughly equals to what Russia deployed at Chernihiv-Glukhiv-Sumy axis back in Feb-22, while has a much narrower width of breakthrough (54km vs 600km).
This time the Russians won't make the same mistake back in Feb-April 2022: newly formed TrV units (and there is a lot of them) will be deployed to secure the rear area. And the Russians will likely set a limited goal (i.e. Kupyansk) to prevent overstretch.
The strength balance in Svatove front is now heavily in favour of the Russians. Caution must be given for a serious Russian offensive operation right after or even during Rasputitsa.
Eventhough that the Ukrainians are relatively well prepared to defend in depth, a Ru push to Kupyansk (or at least to the east bank of Oskil) is still possible since the Ukr has to preserve forces for further operations.
