Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Sinun näkemyksesi mukaan meidän pitäisi jotenkin hyötyä tästä? Meillä on melko suuri tykistä, ja 122 on joka tapauksessa pienempää / piakkoin väistyvää / romutettavaa kalustoa. Onko kaikille tykeille nykytilanteessa miehitystäkään? Tottakai voimme 122 tykkejä satakunta luovuttaa. Tykin poutki on joka tapauksessa oikeaan suuntaan. Itään.
122H näpsäkkä värkki, vai että romuksi. Ketterä ja täysin ympäri ampuva, aina löytyy käyttöä. Miettikääs isompaa kalustoa, ei kelpaa asemaksi mikä vaan maasto, ei saa 155K ta kääntymään , ja painaa versiosta riippuen 9.5 10.5 t ajappa se kiinni pehmeään, siinä on. Iso kalusto vaatii isot tilat. Eläpä huolehdi miehityksestä 122H koulutettua on paljon ja 400 värkkiä vaatii vain 1+7 eli 400x8 löytyy heti. ( toki ennenkuin joku viisastelee pston muukin henkilöstö tarvitaan, mutta muulle porukalle se on ihan sama millä kalustolla mennään, asekohtaisen koultuksen tarve oli puheena ja oikeastaan ei siinä asekohtaisen koulutuksen saaneita tarvita edes per laite ,
 
Lavrovista tulee mieleen eräs suomalainen poliitikko. Hän aukaisi suunsa, niin 400 ihmistä erosi kirkosta.
Lavrov aukaisee suunsa ja viikon sisään 400 panssarisotilasta pääsee ryssän helvettiin...
Ei taida riittää 400. Tuossa avattiin vasta korkki pullosta eli ylitettiin kynnys. Kauanko luulet päätöksen Iron Domesta kestävän? Tai jostain muusta seksikkäästä systeemistä. Aika kivoja meriohjuksia tekevät muun muassa. Nyt vähän Lavrovilta löylyä, niin hyvä tulee..
 
Kiinassa varmaan jo 3D mallinnetaan Javelineja Putinille tuttavahintaan pursotettaviksi. Tämä pälkähti päähäni vuosien ajan kertyneestä havainnosta, että kiinalaisia piraattikopioita on tullut markkinoille samassa aikataulussa alkuperäisten high-tech tuotteiden kanssa. Kun kerran erehdyin kaverille sanomaan, että Kiinassa mitä tahansa Amazonissa myytäviä 3D-tulostetaan ilman varastointikustannuksia pihavajassa, hän huomautti, ettei siellä pihavajoja ole. Vuokraavat aikaa yhteiskäytössä olevilta koneilta. En ole käynyt siellä katsomassa enkä edes tiedä oliko kaveri oikeassa.

Lipsuu ohi aiheen mutta olen myös kuullut Kiinan osalta näistä ns. ylimääräisistä työvuoroista eli tehdään vaikka neljän vuoron ajan sitä oikeaa tuotetta ja sitten yksi vuoro piraattikopiota samalla linjalla, samoilla koneilla. Logot yms. päällepäin näkyvä tietysti vaihdetaan mutta muuten suora kopio.

Toinen tarina on nämä tehtaat esim. Nike joka siirtää tuotantonsa jonnekin halvempaan maahan, mutta tehdas jää Kiinaan. Mikäs siinä, jatkaa tuotantoa samoilla koneilla ja materiaaleilla. Uuden tuotteen kopioiminen on myös kohtuu helppoa kun on CNC-koneet ja CAD/CAM-mallit käytössä. Riippuu tietysti tuotteen monimutkaisuudesta, materiaaleista yms. Toiset helpompi kopioida kuin toiset.

Isot ja kasvavat markkinat omasta takaa, ei mallisuojaa tai patenttisuojaa, valtavan kova kilpailu missä varastavat kokoajan toisiltaan sekä tuotteet että parhaat työntekijät. Se on hurja maa, monessakin mielessä, olen käynyt kerran Pekingissä ja pari kertaa Shanghaissa työasioissa, vaan pakko sanoa että suomalaisena vaikea tottua siihen ilmansaasteen määrään. Kovaa he pyrkivät pois hiilitaloudesta vaan matkaa on vielä jäljellä ja kova kasvu vaatii energiaa. Heillä on myös paljon kiinni rahaa infrassa ja rakennuksissa (kuten muuallakin) ja siitä spekuloitu, miten vahvalla pohjalla kasvu todella on. Maailman tehdas se on, ainakin toistaiseksi joten ei ihme että kapasiteettia on myös kaikenlaiseen kopioimiseen.

Mistä tullaan kiertotien kautta Ukrainaan: Kiina on pyrkinyt esiintymään tämän sodan aikana rauhaa haluavana maana, muttei ole tuominnut Venäjän toimia juurikaan ja toisaalta ollut nopea tuomitsemaan "Lännen" jo ei syyllisenä niin ainakin osasyyllisenä tilanteeseen. Toisaalta, kun tässä viime vuosina on pyöritelty Eteläkiinanmeren laittomia tekosaaria ja Kiinan selviä valtapyrkimyksiä, niin muistan usein kuulleeni, miten suursodassa Kiina ja sen paras kaveri Venäjä nousevat yhdessä rintamassa meitä vastaan. Eipä ole tuota näkynyt, liekö heidän "tasavahvassa suhteessa" Venäjä tukisi Kiinaa vaan Kiina ei tue Venäjää? Ei ainakaan sillä tavoin kuin jotkut ovat spekuloineet.
 
iltapalaksi pari Bayraktar-iskua. Ensimmäinen lienee osumaa johonkin komentopaikkaan ja ilmeisesti siinä yritetään järjestää ikkunatreffejä Venäjän upseeriston ja legendaarisen "Unelma Sirpa-Leena"-naisoletetun välille.

Jälkimmäisessä osumassa tussahtaa kyllä joku asevarasto, kun sähisee ja paukkuu niin kauhian kauniisti.

 
Mielenkiintoinen artikkeli jossa kerrotaan vähän erilaisesta kohtaamisesta venäläisten sotilaiden kanssa, vaikka tässäkin tarinassa kodin tuhoutuminen tapahtuu.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/a...=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share
The Horbonoses—Irina, 55; Sergey, 59; and their 25-year-old son, Nikita—spent the next night in a neighbor’s cellar, but it was so wet and cold that they returned to theirs. Upon arrival, they found five Russian soldiers living inside.

“Where are we meant to live?” Irina asked. “This is our home.” The soldiers told the Horbonos family that they could return home—they could all live there together. And so the Horbonoses moved back in.
They would spend about three weeks with those five Russian soldiers, eating together, walking together, talking together. The Russian soldiers would make nonsensical declarations about their mission and ask alarmingly basic questions about Ukraine, yet also offer insights into their motivations and their morale; the Horbonoses would push back on their claims, angrily scream at them, and also drink with them, using that measure of trust to prod at the soldiers’ confidence in Vladimir Putin’s war.

Over the course of those several weeks, a period the Horbonoses recounted to me аnd my colleague Andrii Bashtovyi, the cellar in Lukashivka became a microcosm of the war’s propaganda front. On one side were the Russians, who repeated a litany of falsehoods they had been told about their assault; on the other, the Ukrainians, wondering how their home could be decimated by aggressors driven by a fiction.

Yet after meeting with the Horbonoses and, in the same week, with their nation’s leader, President Volodymyr Zelensky, I was struck by how clearly the family’s experience also informs a question haunting the many politicians, officials, journalists, and activists in Ukraine and abroad desperately trying to bring this war to a close: How do you persuade Russians who have been fed an unending series of lies to drop their support for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine?

At first, the Horbonoses were too scared to talk to their Russian housemates. The soldiers, for their part, always clung to their guns. They rarely left the cellar unless called to duty, fearful, like their hosts, of the artillery barrages overhead as the Ukrainian and Russian armies battled for the area surrounding the nearby city of Chernihiv.
After several days of this, however, the two groups began to get to know each other, initially discussing what felt like neutral subjects, such as food, and popular Ukrainian recipes. The Horbonos family learned that the five soldiers were military mechanics. Among them was a captain, the youngest of the group at 31. Three others were in their 40s—two had served in Syria; one’s face had been burned when a vehicle he was in detonated a mine on the way to Lukashivka, and he would curse as he rubbed his face with ointment. All four of them were from Siberia. The fifth was also in his 40s, a Tatar, an ethnic group with its own large republic in central Russia. The others found his incessant singing of Tatar tunes annoying, and would tease him for his apparent cowardice, because he always seemed to be the first to scamper into the cellar when artillery barrages began.

At first, the captain fervently repeated Kremlin propaganda: He and his compatriots were in Ukraine to rescue the Horbonoses, he said; the soldiers were fighting not Ukrainians but Americans; this wasn’t a war, but rather a “special operation.” Once it was over, they could all live happily under Putin’s rule, he said.
Irina would push back. She didn’t need rescuing, she would say. There were no American soldiers or bases in Lukashivka, or anywhere in Ukraine. She didn’t want to live under Putin. When the captain said that he had been told Ukrainians were barred from speaking Russian, she told him they could speak in any language they chose. (I spoke with the Horbonoses in Russian.)

Gradually, he was worn down, confronted not simply with Irina’s protestations but with the grim facts of the war. In the conflict’s early days, he was buoyant, believing conquest to be imminent. He would rush into the cellar, declaring, “Kyiv is surrounded! Chernihiv is about to fall!” But as the weeks went by, and neither Kyiv nor Chernihiv fell, his mood soured. At one point, Sergey told me, he had to show the captain where Kyiv was on a map, leaving the Russian surprised to learn that it was not anywhere nearby, as he had assumed, but nearly 100 miles away.
The other soldiers were less fervent than their captain. Two retreated into cynicism, unwilling to trust reports or information from either Russians or Ukrainians. The one whose face was burnt was as fervently anti-Putin as the captain was pro-. He openly cursed the president, calling him a goat. He had never voted for Putin’s party.
Gradually, a kind of trust was built. One night, a drunk Russian sergeant major roamed Lukashivka, wearing a leather coat and a U.S.S.R. pin, threatening to kill local residents as revenge for the soldiers he’d lost. He was too drunk to make good on his threat, but the incident was not an isolated one: Younger soldiers were drinking and getting high, shouting at the Ukrainians that they all needed to be “punished.” The Horbonoses rarely ventured beyond their orchard. They felt safer in their cellar, with their five soldiers.

When the Russians would leave the cellar for a drink or a smoke, they would invite Sergey to join them. The group would dilute raw spirits with a little water, and Sergey would roll up tobacco with newspaper pages. Their conversations became more reflective. “What are you doing here?” Sergey would ask. “What’s the point of this war?” Despondently, the Russians would answer that they had come expecting not a fight but a celebration. They had come, one said, “for a victory march in Kyiv.”
The soldiers’ low morale, their cynicism and distrust, is in some ways unsurprising. Putin’s famed propaganda system has always been less about ginning up enthusiasm and more about spreading doubt and uncertainty, proliferating so many versions of “the truth” that people feel lost and turn to an authoritarian leader to guide them through the murkiness. In a domestic political context, these tactics make sense: They keep people passive, unsure of what is truly happening. But they show their limits when you want to move a country toward the rabid enthusiasm required for war.
I lived and worked as a TV producer and documentary director in Russia during Putin’s first two terms as president, from 2000 to 2008. As one of Putin’s spin doctors told me then, the Kremlin has always had a problem motivating people. Whenever it needed to put on a progovernment demonstration, officials were forced to bus in civil servants and pay extras. It is notable that, despite rampant censorship, thousands have been locked up for protesting against the war. For all the supposed domestic support the Kremlin claims for the invasion, there have been no mass demonstrations in the streets of Russian cities in favor of the government’s actions.

Even for the legions of Russians who buy into the conspiracy theories—that their country is under threat from the U.S., that Russia deserves an empire—there is the issue of whether the Kremlin is competent enough to pursue such ambitions. The longer the war drags on, the more questions will surface about whether the Kremlin knows what it’s doing. Men like the officer who lived with the Horbonoses will begin to doubt what the country is capable of when confronted with reality.
Other signs indicate that Russians are not wholly convinced by the Kremlin’s narrative. Some of the top searches on the Russian internet recently have been about the whereabouts of the defense minister, Sergey Shoigu, who mysteriously went AWOL for a time after being seen as responsible for misadventures at the front. Other top searches were about the atrocities allegedly committed by Russian forces when they withdrew from Bucha, outside Kyiv. Researchers at the Public Sociology Laboratory, an independent institute, conducted 134 in-depth interviews with Russians, and found that even those who bought the underlying idea that their country was surrounded by enemies and that the war in Ukraine was the fault of NATO nevertheless doubted apparent evidence supplied by Moscow. One of the researchers who conducted the study, Natalia Savalyeva, concluded, “There are many whose attitudes balance between support and opposition … They don’t understand the reasons for the invasion, and instead repeat the opinions they have heard from others. They report confusion in the face of an ‘information war’ fought by all the parties involved, and ‘propaganda’ coming from both sides.”

Polling in a dictatorship is a questionable business during the best of times. How honest do you expect people to be when even using the word war carries a potential 15-year jail sentence? But evidence suggests that morale isn’t low just among soldiers such as those who stayed with the Horbonos family, but among ordinary Russians too. Right after the start of the invasion, research circulating among a small group of academics that I obtained showed that though nearly half of respondents in a nationally representative poll supported Putin’s “special operation,” the emotions they felt were shallow—hope and pride. By contrast, the fifth or so who opposed the war had much deeper feelings, citing shame, guilt, anger, and outrage. About a quarter said they had no strong opinions, or supported the war with reservations, but nevertheless said they felt sadness.
Putin’s propaganda strategy, it appears, is more vulnerable than it might seem at first.

As the weeks progressed, the Horbonos family began to see that the Russian soldiers were beginning to understand how much unnecessary damage they had wrought.
The Horbonoses’ home, a house they had been building for 30 years, was completely destroyed; their library burned for two days before collapsing into rubble. When Irina couldn’t take it anymore, she would begin to cry and scream at the soldiers in the darkness of the cellar: “We had everything! What are you doing here?” The Russians would only sit in the dark, silent.

One morning, she took them with her to gather wild herbs for tea. As they walked through what little was left of the Horbonoses’ lives, the soldiers apologized for all the destruction they had brought. It would be so much better, one said, if they could someday visit as guests. Sergey was livid. “You’ve come here to kill me and destroy my home,” he said, “and we are meant to be friends? We can only be enemies.” The Russians again apologized, and soon all of them began to say that the war was senseless. They even began calling it a war.
The Horbonos family also got unusual insight into the Russians’ motivations. When I asked Sergey what he thought drove them, he was unequivocal. The soldiers, he said, were propelled not by national pride or expansionary zeal but by money.
The soldiers all said they had debt—mortgages, loans, medical bills—and needed their army salaries. Even those wages weren’t enough. Their job as mechanics was to repair tanks, but their skill set meant they were also proficient at taking them apart. During breaks in the shelling, they would find damaged or destroyed Russian vehicles and smelt down plates with gold wiring. One plate would get them 15,000 rubles, or about $200, back home.
Other Russian soldiers were less creative. On the day the Russian army left the village, many grabbed everything they could. Their tanks were piled high with mattresses and suitcases; their armored vehicles were stuffed full of bedsheets, toys, washing machines. (When the Tatar soldier came to say goodbye, he told Sergey that he would soon retire, and promised to send the Horbonoses part of his pension.)

On the surface, Russian officials may exalt Putin’s new model of splendid isolation, claiming that their people don’t care about sanctions, that they don’t need any other countries, that Russia is its own civilization. But Russian behavior suggests otherwise: Think of the stampedes to buy out IKEA before the Swedish furniture chain closed its stores in the country, or the widespread use of virtual private networks and mirror sites to use Instagram and Netflix.
Economists differentiate between stated preferences—what people say they want—and revealed preferences, what their actions show they actually want. Russians might claim they don’t need the West, but at the end of the day, the goods that those Russian soldiers were so keen to ransack in Ukraine were largely Western-made.
----------------

The situation in the Horbonoses’ cellar was unique. Russians rarely have to confront reality or their victims so directly. But the Horbonoses’ experience points to a possible strategy to engage the Russian people—and speed up the end of Putin’s wars.
Counterintuitively, the war is not necessarily the topic to focus on. Instead, the issues that affect Russians’ lives and define their behaviors are what really matter—mortgages, medicine, schools, their children’s future, and their desire to be part of the wider world.
For his system to work, Putin depends on millions of people, including doctors, soldiers, academics, and police officers, to all be motivated and play along. That motivation is being sucked out of the system. Whether Putin has the repressive mechanisms necessary to rule purely through fear is unclear: The prisons are already packed. The endgame in Russia doesn’t involve anything as dramatic as regime change, to say nothing of revolution. All it needs is for people to stop pulling their weight, because they can see that the government is no longer competent or acting in their interests. (Something similar happened in the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s: The system seized up as people gave up on it, leading to elites changing course. Back then, a senseless war in Afghanistan catalyzed despondency. Today, Ukraine could play an analogous role.)

Prodemocracy media and communication—from independent Russian sources, the West, or Ukraine—can hurry this process along. Despite the bans on websites and some social-media platforms, the technical means to engage with the Russian people are available: radio, Telegram channels, satellite TV, secure messaging groups, mirror sites, and VPNs.
Russian state media now put out wall-to-wall political propaganda, which is always a disastrous content decision. Russians will soon look for alternative entertainment. That sort of demand offers opportunities to support unconventional sources.
Backing the (now largely exiled) independent Russian media is vital. In the past, these outlets and organizations have typically appealed to an already prodemocracy audience. They and others must be encouraged to engage groups outside the liberal bubble, who have their own priorities.
It’s not just the agendas and audiences that need considering; it’s the genres too. We all know how the Kremlin conducts its foreign information war, using troll farms, conspiracy-peddling state media, and abusive officials who belittle and insult anyone who dares to criticize them. Democratic governments’ efforts to reach everyday Russians have to be utterly different. Think online town halls involving ordinary Russians, where Western celebrities who have large Russian fan bases, such as Arnold Schwarzenegger (whose recent video appeal to his Russian fans got millions of views) envision a different Russia. Think responsive media, where Russians can ask for details about what is happening at the front, and receive evidence-based answers. Think online forums, where doctors discuss how ordinary people can manage the looming Russian health crisis, or YouTube channels where psychologists delve into the psychological stresses that Russians are experiencing.

-------
As I drove back to Kyiv, I reflected on her story, and what Zelensky had told us days earlier. Irina seemed to believe that all she had done was survive, but in reality she and her family had done far more. Zelensky, through his endless search for empathy, and the Horbonoses, through their remarkable dialogue with their Russian enemies, had shown us how this war could actually end.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
AdgCozk.jpg


Satoja kraatereita ja tankin raatoja

Hyvä havainnekuva, jos ajatellaan ettei murkulat samaan kuoppaan tule, ainakin osittain tuskallisen lähelle toisistaan on maata reijitetty....
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Täällä on ehdotettukin annettavaksi vain kohtuudella vanhentuvaa ei ensivaiheen kalustoa tilanteessa, jossa olemme kohta Natokandidaatti ja viimeistään vuoden päästä jäsen. Ja jossa Venäjä on sormi perseessään miettimässä miten kouluttaa reserviä, mitä reserviä ja mille kalustolle.
Toki näinkin. Mutta muistetaan, että Venäjä ei ole tähänkään mennessä tehnyt rationaalisia päätöksiä. He voivat katsoa, että heille riittää ensi vaiheessa jäätyneen konfliktin luominen puutteellisestikin koulutetuilla ja kalustetuilla reserveillä Suomen kanssa, kunhan estetään Nato-hakemuksen hyväksyminen. Tällä voidaan hakea aikavoittoa jotta voidaan keskittyä Ukrainaan ja kouluttaa loppureserviä. Pitää myös muistaa, että Nato-hakijalle ei anneta automaattisesti turvatakuita, eikä niitä ole toistaiseksi saatu (tai edes vihjattu). Oma arveluni myös on, että materiaaliapu ainakin EU-mailta voi olla jo siinä kohtaa kortilla kun pitäisi tukea kahta sotaa käyvää maata, kun EU:ssa on eletty niin pitkään lintukodossa.

Eniten tässä sapettaa se, että hakemus on jätetty ihan viime tinkaan ja on luotettu Venäjän hyväntahtoisuuteen. Nyt apua harkitessa joudutaan miettimään tälläisiä asioita, että osaako Venäjä hakuaikana laskelmoida, ettei konfliktin eskaloiminen koskemaan Suomea kannata heidän kantiltaan vai pitääkö varautua pahimpaan. Myös Euroopan 30 vuotta kestänyt sinisilmäisyys "historian päättymisestä" termin kaikessa naiiviudessaan ottaa päähän.
 
Ei taida riittää 400. Tuossa avattiin vasta korkki pullosta eli ylitettiin kynnys. Kauanko luulet päätöksen Iron Domesta kestävän? Tai jostain muusta seksikkäästä systeemistä. Aika kivoja meriohjuksia tekevät muun muassa. Nyt vähän Lavrovilta löylyä, niin hyvä tulee..
Israel tuottaa erittäin kehittynyttä asetekniikkaa, kuten mainitsit. Saa nähdä menikö herne miten syvälle nenään Jerusalemin pojilla tästä lausunnosta ja alkavatkin myydä Ukrainaan tuotteita.

Kumminkin tausta piruna venäjä hämmentämään Syyria rajanaapurissa toisaalta...
 

Olen kyllä odottanut että Starlink tulee tekemään isoja muutoksia sodan kommunikaatioon vaan en osannut odottaa että olisi näin pian isosti mukana, se on kuitenkin vielä pahasti kesken eikä satelliittien välisiä laserlinkkejä ole vielä taivaalla. Menee useampi vuosi ennen kuin on paremmassa iskussa.

Eipä silti, Yhdysvaltain ilmavoimat ja ilmeisesti Army myös on testannut näitä ainakin 2018 lähtien. Saarnaan tässä tietysti kuorolle, mutta jos et ole seurannut heidän ABMS eli Advanced Battle Management System kehitystyötä viimeisen viiden vuoden aikana niin saatat yllättyä mitä kaikkea nopealla, pienen viiveen yhteydellä voi saada aikaiseksi. Pari artikkelia 2020 vuodelta:

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/...bilities-in-upcoming-live-fire-demonstration/

https://defence-blog.com/u-s-army-howitzer-shoot-down-cruise-missile-for-the-first-time/

ABMS ei ole tietysti PELKÄSTÄÄN Starlink vaan sekoitus muitakin kaupallisia satelliitti-internet palveluita, mutta Starlink on näistä isoin ja nopeimmin kasvava. Myöskin, pitää olla rehellinen, heillä on aina ollut mahdollisuus nopeaan dataliikenteeseen satelliittien kautta, mutta ero entiseen on tämä: Starlink satelliittien kiertorata on matala 550 km joten viive on pieni ja toisekseen se on tarjolla melkein koko maapallon laajuisesti. Kun aikaisemmin heidän piti valita, mikä joukko tai kone pääsee käsiksi siihen nopeaan datayhteyteen, niin lähivuosina tällainen on KAIKKIEN käytössä kenellä vain on antenni mukana + virtalähde. Suomeksi tuo tarkoittaa sitä että esim- F-35 on mahdollista jakaa kaikkien sensorien data melkein reaaliajassa minnepäin tahansa maailmassa (ei vielä, sen jälkeen kun satelliittien väliset laserlinkit on toiminnassa) ja sama koskee jokaista sensorialustaa millä on sopiva antenni.

Luin yhdestä harjoituksesta, olikohan viime vuonna missä F-35 hävittäjät Euroopassa välitti maalidataa ABMS kautta toisilleen. En muista yksityiskohtia tarkasti, mutta tyyliin näin: hollantilainen F-35 maalasi tutkalla kohdetta ja kaikki ilmassaolevat F-35 koneet näki sen kohteen. Ei siis pelkästään lähellä olevan normaalin datalinkin välityksellä vaan myös hävittäjät jossain hyvin kaukana. Ymmärtääkseni tuossa risteilyohjuksen ampumisessa oli sama takana eli hävittäjäkone maalasi sen tutkalla ja (raskaasti modattu) telatykki ampui sen alas saamansa maalidatan perusteella (ei normaalilla sirpalekranaatilla vaan erikoisammuksella jolla oli liikehtimiskykyä yms.).

Haasteita tietysti on vielä paljon: satelliitit liikkuvat hurjaa vauhtia taivaalla, ja jos liikkuva ajoneuvo haluaa pitää katkeamattoman yhteyden niin antennin pitää olla tosi täsmällinen. Toisaalta on testattu nopealla hävittäjällä ja hitaalla kuljetuskoneella, joten ei mahdoton ongelma ratkaistavaksi, vaatii aikaa ja rahaa.

Starlinkin käytöstä on tihkunut pieniä murusia aina silloin tällöin, kannattaa ehdottomasti seurata mitä siitä kuuluu. Monet on puhuneet että se on ollut yksi vahvimpia suorittajia Ukrainassa, on pitänyt yhteydet auki eri joukkoihin ja ovat siten pystyneet koordinoimaan omaa toimintaa kokoajan. Normaalisti vanjan ELSO hiljentäisi yhteyksiä vaan nyt sitä ei ole tapahtunut (ei ainakaan ole tiedossa tapauksia).
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Back
Top