- Radio-electronic combat stations.
The category may include such facilities as “Leer -2 and “Leer-3.” They are in service of the radio electronic combat subunits but may be used in the interests of the psychological operations units.
“Leer-3” is a station imitating the work of the basic station of mobile connections. Therefore, all mobile phones around the station would automatically be connected to it. It helps to automatically localize groups of subscribers (individual subscribers), and to automatically send the co-ordinates to their artillery to administer a blow.

a unit from the “Leer-3” station (Photo courtesy of: Vitaliy Kuzmin)

a unit from the “Leer-3” station (Photo courtesy of: Vitaliy Kuzmin)
As a radio relay station, the “Leer-3” station uses the UAV Orlan-10, which is part of the station.

The UAV unit from the “Leer-3” station (Photo courtesy of: Vitaliy Kuzmin)
For the purposes of psychological influence on the enemy, the station may send text messages to groups of subscribers of the enemy (or to individual subscribers). Examples of text messages received by the Ukrainian military and by civilians:
Moreover, it may be assumed that given the access to the telephone numbers of a group of subscribers of the enemy, the station may automatically search for profiles of the subscribers in social media.
The most interesting feature are the technical means acquired in the recent 8 to 10 years, due to rapid growth of digital computer technologies and social media. In the recent decade, there has been a significant shift of informational confrontation into the cyber-space.
There is no verified or precise information on any available information on any software and hardware facilities in the arsenal of Russian psychological operations units to monitor and influence the cyber-space. However, taking into account the verified information on the available software in the related military and security services (Foreign Intelligence Agency and FSB), it may be assumed that the psychological operations units do have such means in their disposal.
For instance, as early as in 2012,
Foreign Intelligence Agency of Russia held a tender to procure the specialized software to monitor and exert informational influence in social media.
Certainly, over the recent eight years, the equipment has been significantly improved.
Conclusions
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have many years of experience of psychological operations, dating back to the 1930s. Over many decades, the experience has been accumulated and improved.
The current system for psychological operations of the Russian Army includes multiple layers and is flexible. It is beingly continuously improved and developed.
In the second half of the 2000s, the Russian army command focused on the development of the radio-electronic combat systems and cyber-operations systems. It largely expanded the capacity of the Psychological operations units.
Moreover, the capacity of PsO units has been largely enhanced by the experie3nce of hybrid military operations by the Russian army in armed conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and in other countries in other regions. By all means, huge experience has been earned in the course of military aggression on the territory of Ukraine.
Psychological operations units of the Russian army, jointly with the special operations forces and the special operations forces, are the key tool of the Russia’s military aggression exercised in the form of the “hybrid war.”
To counteract the informational psychological impact of the respective units of the Russian Army, Ukraine shall enhance the work to collect information on the structure, composition, technical capacity, forms and methods of operations of the Russian PsO units.
By MARINER spec. for MIL.IN.UA