Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Sitten kun ollaan naurettu riittävästi zenäjän naurettavan pientä tankkien ja lentokoneiden tuotantoa voimme hakata toisiamme selkää eurooppalaisen Naton mahtituotannolla. Tuotantolinjathan syytävät uutta tankkia ja lentokonetta laakerit punaisina nyt kun shöZimmätkin poliitikot ymmärtävät että ei se zenäjän hyökkäys läntiseen Eurooppaan ole mitenkään mahdotonta.
Näytä mulle se suorin reitti mistä ryssän tankkilautat rymistelevät Eurooppaan. Maantiede ei ole muuttunut. Fuldan aukon molemmat puolet kuuluvat nyt Natoon, ja siitä itään on vielä kahdeksan muuta Nato-maata, ja Ukrainastakin pitäisi huopatossun päästä läpi. Tankkeja tarvitaan Ukrainalle annettavaksi. Suuria panssaritaisteluita ei sitä lännempänä tulla käymään.

Myös Välimerelle ajelu on aika tekemätön paikka. Kilometrejä tulee, ja jokia ja vuoristoja, ja ne perhanan ilmavoimat...
 
Näitä etäisyyksiä mietinkin tänään. Zenäjä vois seuraavana siirtää tuotannot ja sitäkautta asutuksen tuon rajan taakse. Vaikka edes 1300km päähän. Toki voitais kelata jo Napoleonin oppien mukaisesti Moskovan polttoon tai sitten tietty siihen kohtaan, kun kääpiö puraisee syanidikapselin bunkkerissaan. Säästyisi maailma monelta harmilta ja Zenäjä sais hyvän puskurin Ukrainaan nähden.
 
viimeyön iskut onnistuneet aivan helvetin hyvin :love:

Iskussa tuhottu tämän hetkisen tiedon mukaan:

Engels-2 ainakin 3 kpl Tu-95MS strategista pommikonetta lähde
Morozovsk Airbase ainakin 6 kpl Su-34 tai Su-27 hävittäjäpommittajaa lähde
Aeroport Yeysk ainakin 2 kpl Su-25 maataistelukonetta lähde

kohteet kartalla:
1712340428920.png



googlen mukaan Aeroport Yeysk on nyt suljettu pysyvästi :ROFLMAO:

Minä aloitin juuri viikonloppuni lasillisella konjakkia. Terveiset bunkkeriin, joko alkaa kädet täristä?
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Ja tähän perään se tyhmä kyssäri että entäs sitte ?

Meinaan vaan että paljonko tähänkään asti on tankeilla saavutettu tässä kahinassa jossa dronet naulii tankkeja kun kärpäsiä, mut joo ei väitellä tästä turhia enempää
Vahva veikkaus on, että nykyisillä tankeilla ei saavuteta enää yhtään mitään, ei oikein missään päin maailmaa. Varsinkaan silloin jos vastapuoli on ollut ns. hereillä (vaikka esim. stugna, miinat ja dronet ym) tai muuten vaan hiukan kehittyneempi yhteiskunta tai sitä mahdollista lisäkalustoa ulkopuolelta saava osapuoli. Jätetään toki pois tästä ajatelmasta se massiivinen ilmaylivoima, jolloin vaikka kävellään eteenpäin käsittääkseni. Ja eläkkeellä olevat belgialaiset kenraalit ja ym. muut tankkikouluttajat saavat ja varmaan pitääkin olla eri mieltä. Hatullisen nappaan mämmiä jos olen väärässä; harvoin olen.
 
Tjaah. Siellä on 10000 abramsia ja challengeria odotuksella, päälle 5000 modernia lentokonetta ja päälle tuhansia tomahawkeja. Ukrainan tuki vaatisi vaunuja laakerit punaisena, mutta isossa sodassa jenkit laivaisi aika tavalla kalustoa eurooppaan, kuten jo nyt laivailee.. zyzzän homma perustuu massaan ja jos ei ole vaunuja tehdä massoissa, niin homma pissii.

Venäjän vaunut ovat halpaa ja kehnolaatuista massaa jota käytetään pääosin ihan erilaisilla periaatteilla kuin miten perinteisessä panssarisodassa toimittaisiin.

Jos lännessä lähdetään samasta ajattelusta, niin täällä pitäisi kehittää myös jotain halpaa massaa joka ei maksa 8-numeroista euromäärää kappaleelta.
 
Taas on keskiviikkoilta joten aika tarkistaa mitä Rosstat kertoo viime viikon bensiinin ja dieselin viikkotuotantomääräksi.

Stanimir Dobrev kertoo viime viikon numerot ja kommentoi niitä näin:

Russian gasoline production the week of 25-31th March rose slightly to 775 000 tons and diesel production dropped a bit to 1618 400 tons.

IN 2023 between March 27th and April 2nd gasoline production was 874 800 and diesel production was 1768 900.


Katso liite: 96082

Katso liite: 96083

Gasoline prices for AI-92 barely moved to from 50,59 to 50,62 rubles per liter.

For AI-95 they remained the same at 55,30 rubles and for AI-98 they went from 68,67 to 68,70 rubles.

The gasoline recovery is due to the fast repair of the Ryazan refinery:

The Rosneft refinery in Ryazan has restarted operation of its АВТ-4 refining unit and it is planning on restarting operation of the АВТ-6 on March 31st 2024. The refinery is currently operating at 60%. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6595879


03/27/2024, 20:06
7K1 min.7

Reuters: The Ryazan oil refinery launched the AVT-4 unit, which was stopped due to a UAV attack​


The Ryazan oil refinery (controlled by Rosneft (MOEX: ROSN )) launched the AVT-4 primary oil refining unit, the operation of which was suspended after the drone attack on March 13, Reuters reports, citing sources. The installation's load volume has been increased to 60% of the pre-emergency level.

“Ryazan is running at 60% of normal capacity. AVT-4 was returned to work. AT-6 is launched on March 31 and reaches operating mode within a few days,” the agency quotes one of the interlocutors as saying.

The regional governor, Pavel Malkov, announced a drone attack on an oil refinery in the Ryazan region on the morning of March 13 . Reuters found that two of the four primary processing units, AVT-4 and AT-6, were damaged as a result of the fire that broke out after the attack. Later, the agency’s information was confirmed by Kommersant’s interlocutor in the industry.

According to Reuters, in 2023, Rosneft's Ryazan oil refinery processed 12.7 million tons of oil, accounting for 4.6% of total oil refining in Russia. At the end of last year, the plant produced 2.8 million tons of gasoline (6.4% of the total volume in the Russian Federation), 3.64 million tons of diesel fuel (4.1%), 3.12 million tons of fuel oil (7.7%) and 0.87 million tons of jet fuel (8%).

AVT-4 and AT-6 account for about 70% of the total primary refining capacity of the Ryazan Refinery. The production capacity of AVT-4 is 11.4 thousand tons of oil per day, AT-6 - 23.2 thousand tons per day.

For more information about how accidents at refineries affected the supply of gasoline to the Russian domestic market, see the Kommersant article “Gasoline Lifted from Tanks . ”

Milena Kostereva

However even at 775 000 tons Russia's weekly gasoline production remains below consumption and will be dependent on the ~1850 000 tons in storage and Belarus imports. Again much much worse for AI-95 and AI-98 gasoline.


-

Tässä vielä hänen julkaisemistaan twiiteistä keräämäni tarkat numerot:

Katso liite: 96084

Tässä vielä yksi lisätieto ryssän bensiinin osalta: Stanimir Dobrevin tuoreimman tilannakatsauksen kommenteissa häneltä kysyttiin tietoa / arviota ryssän yhden viikon bensiinin kulutukselle.

Hän vastasi näin (LÄHDE):

Last data we had is from mid march at 794 000 tons per week: (alla oleva ketju on julkaistu 29.3.2024)

We have data on the Ru weekly consumption of gasoline for March, it rose by 13 000 tons per day in March to 794 000 tons a week and currently Ru oil firms are supplying more to the market than they are producing with 13-19 of Mar supply of 779 400 tons.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6596233

03/29/2024, 00:01
1K7 min.

Fear has high prices​

The Russian fuel market is afraid of shortages​

Against the backdrop of the shutdown of a number of refining capacities at refineries, the government is trying to prevent a fuel shortage in Russia. The first step was a ban on gasoline exports. The second could be organizing priority transportation of petroleum products by rail and providing companies with tanks. Experts believe that this, in theory, could help stabilize the situation on the market, but much will depend on the final timing of planned and unscheduled repairs at factories.


KMO_195937_00005_1_t218_124907.jpg

Photo: Viktor Korotaev, Kommersant



The main task of the state and the Russian fuel and energy complex over the past two months has been to provide the domestic market with a sufficient amount of fuel. And so far it has succeeded. As reported by the Ministry of Energy, in March, gasoline shipments to Russian consumers showed an increase of 13 thousand tons per day compared to February (up to 794 thousand tons), diesel fuel - by 15.5 thousand tons per day. At the same time, according to the Central Dispatch Department of the Fuel and Energy Complex, in mid-March the volume of supplies exceeded the volume of production for the first time since September 2023. During the week of March 13–19, it fell by 3.9% relative to the previous week and by 5.2% relative to the planned level - to 779.4 thousand tons (111.3 thousand tons per day). Oil companies were able to cover the difference between these values using accumulated reserves of petroleum products, which as of March 22 amounted to 1.9 million tons of gasoline and 3.4 million tons of diesel fuel.

A blow to primary processing​


The risk of a fuel shortage has arisen due to the shutdown of refining capacities at a number of plants. The first to fail at the very beginning of the year was the catalytic cracking unit at one of the largest Russian sites - the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery of LUKOIL (capacity - 200 thousand tons per month). The reason was the breakdown of foreign compressor equipment, which cannot yet be replaced due to Western sanctions. According to authorities, finding an alternative and repairing it will take from several months to a year and a half. In the next two months, accidents due to drone attacks occurred at LUKOIL's Volgograd Refinery, Rosneft's Tuapse Refinery and Ilsky Refinery in the Krasnodar Territory. But the damage to their capacities did not significantly affect the supply of the domestic market, since the factories worked largely for export.

Russian oil workers suffered more significant losses in March. Thus, on March 12, drones damaged a primary oil refining unit at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery of LUKOIL, which accounts for 53% of the plant’s capacity. Its failure can lead to an almost twofold reduction in diesel fuel output and a quarter reduction in gasoline output. Drone attacks on March 13 and 16 disabled two similar installations at the Ryazan Oil Refinery (capacity - about 35 thousand tons per day) and one at the Syzran Oil Refinery (17 thousand tons). Both enterprises belong to Rosneft. The reduction in motor gasoline production at RNPK could be about 35%, despite a 70% reduction in plant utilization, if cat cracking is provided with raw materials in the required volume, Reuters calculated. The drop in the production of motor gasoline and diesel fuel at the three sites could amount to up to 5.8% and 6.6% of total Russian production, respectively. But such a reduction, market participants believe, will not be critical and can be compensated by other Russian refineries, which in the low season have sufficient capacity to produce additional volumes of fuel. Reuters estimates the overall productivity of primary oil refining units that are in emergency shutdown after the attacks at 13% of the total capacity in the Russian Federation.



Bins of the Motherland​


Despite unscheduled repairs at these refineries, the Ministry of Energy predicts the volume of primary oil refining in 2024 at last year’s level. At the end of 2023, oil refining in Russia increased by 1.2%, to 275 million tons. “The forecast for oil refining volume remains at a level close to last year,” said the head of the ministry, Nikolai Shulginov, on March 20. At the end of February, he reported that oil refining had decreased by about 7% since the beginning of 2024. But later, First Deputy Head of the Ministry of Energy Pavel Sorokin said that primary processing at the end of this year will be lower than last year, but due to these volumes Russia will increase exports.

Sergei Kondratyev from the Institute of Energy and Finance predicts that by the end of March output will likely be 4% below plan, which, taking into account available reserves, will avoid a shortage on the domestic market. In April, in his opinion, the situation on the fuel market will depend on how quickly it is possible to return damaged installations to operation and additionally load other refineries.

Provide at any cost​


To prevent fuel shortages on the domestic market, the government has taken a number of measures. The first step was a ban on the export of all types of gasoline introduced on March 1 until August 31. The exception is supplies within the framework of international intergovernmental agreements, including member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as for fuel exported by citizens for personal use and for the provision of international humanitarian assistance. Also, from March 1, the standard for the sale of diesel fuel at exchange trading was increased from 12.5% to 16%.

But the introduction of an embargo on gasoline exports disrupted the usual logistics models, which complicated the situation with rail shipments. First of all, there was confusion with the directions and priority of shipments. The point is that some cargo is exported from Russia as a matter of priority. These are military cargo, cargo for emergency response, as well as cargo on behalf of the president, including the export of coal from Kuzbass, Khakassia, Tuva, Irkutsk region, Buryatia and Yakutia.

Now this list may also include petroleum products. According to Kommersant, fuel will receive increased priority on the railway in relation to other cargo. Following a meeting on the situation on the domestic petroleum products market on March 22, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak instructed oil companies, together with Russian Railways, to “ensure uninterrupted export of petroleum products and loading of refineries in accordance with the schedule and growing spring demand.” As part of these instructions, the Ministry of Energy, oil companies and Russian Railways are developing monthly schedules for the transportation of petroleum products, the implementation of which will be monitored by the government.

The transport monopoly itself stated that the railways have already adapted to the new situation. “The change in existing supply chains required a significant restructuring of the technological process. We interact with oil companies and tank owners around the clock. We have reallocated resources for timely processing of trains at loading and unloading stations,” notes Russian Railways. According to the company, loading of petroleum products on the domestic market for the week from March 18 to March 24 increased by 11% compared to the same period last year. Since the beginning of March, shipments of gasoline and diesel fuel to the domestic market have increased by 9.5%, including in the eastern direction by 22.3%.

The cabinet also took control of the timely unloading of wagons with petroleum products. Market participants constantly complain that petroleum products purchased at the plant can take more than two months to reach consumers. Kommersant's interlocutors point out that the monopoly historically does not plan domestic oil transportation and does not respond with conventions to shipments to problem areas, which leads to overstocking of tanks and wagons. The Ministry of Energy expects that the volume of export of petroleum products will increase due to an increase in the turnover of the car fleet due to improved planning (including exchange cargo), as well as coordination of the actions of oil companies and Russian Railways. At the same time, increasing the efficiency of fuel export should not worsen the situation with the export of other goods.

According to the head of Infoline-Analytics, Mikhail Burmistrov, fuel prioritization on the railway will reduce the risk of fuel shortages at the start of the sowing campaign, and can also have a positive impact on the dispatch situation on the network, reducing tank downtime.
At the same time, oil workers note not only the slow operation of the railway, but also the shortage of tank cars themselves. The heads of the largest oil and gas companies - LUKOIL, Gazprom Neft, Tatneft and NOVATEK - turned to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak with a request to solve the worsening problem, Interfax reported. Every year, about 180 thousand tank cars are used to transport about 220 million tons of oil cargo. But since 2022, a shortage has formed in the country due to the high rate of write-off of cars at the end of their service life. In general, over the past ten years, about 65 thousand tank cars have been written off, while only about 16 thousand new units were purchased, the companies indicate. In addition, due to sanctions, the turnaround time for wagons on the Russian Railways network has increased. In turn, the monopoly is confident that the existing tank fleet is more than enough to organize both domestic and export transportation. They indicate that in February, almost 18 thousand oil and gasoline tanks stood idle on non-public tracks without operations every day, and oil workers often use the cars as “warehouses on wheels.”

Quotes scared damper​


The nervousness of market participants against the backdrop of a possible shortage pushed wholesale fuel prices at St. Petersburg International Trading Exchange upward throughout the second ten days of March. Thus, prices for AI-92 gasoline began to rise on March 11 from 46.9 thousand rubles. for 1 ton, and by March 22, after a continuous increase, they reached 54.1 thousand rubles. for 1 ton (price increase by 15.3%). The price of AI-95 gasoline during the same period rose by 14%, to 66.9 thousand rubles. for 1 ton. Trading participants explain this sharp dynamics, among other things, by the fact that large oil companies are entering the exchange as buyers, which need to provide their own gas stations with petroleum products. The situation is also complicated by the stop of sales at car depots. However, since March 23, the cost of the two most popular brands of gasoline began to decline.

The cost of diesel fuel also adjusted as quotations reached the threshold value for receiving export subsidies for March. Its oil companies lose if the monthly average price of AI-92 gasoline or diesel fuel on bases in the European part of the Russian Federation exceeds the conditional price of the domestic market established by the government by 10% and 20%, respectively. For 2024, this figure is 66.6 thousand rubles. for 1 ton. “For oil companies in March, the task of containing prices has already arisen, since diesel fuel is trading close to the cut-off zone for damper payments,” says Maxim Dyachenko, managing partner of Petroleum Trading. He notes that towards the end of March the fuel market calmed down somewhat due to increased sales from vertically integrated oil companies, but prices still remain at fairly high levels due to the upcoming spring repairs. In his opinion, in the future, prioritizing fuel supplies by rail could, in theory, improve the situation, but the details of this measure are not yet clear.

-

Irina Salova

-

The Russian oil companies are covering the deficit via an accumulated pool of 1,9 million tons of gasoline as of March 22nd. However a smaller part of that is high octane gasoline due its production being impacted for a while now.

The repairs of Lukoil's Nizhny Novgorod facility and its broken Western parts now are said to take not a few months but from several months to 2 and a half years. We also know the daily refining capacity of Ryazan and Syzran, 35 000 and 17 000 tons.

Based on Reuters assessment Russia's oil refining capacity due to emergency outages is down 13%. Preliminary Russian data suggested that refining for 2024 by March 20th decreased 7%. Due to available reserves shortages were avoided.

However it remains to be seen how Russia will handle April if attacks and breakdowns continue. And this is also impacted by Russian Railways' ability to ship gasoline within Russia which is 4 days slower than when shipping to export.

The country is operating 180 000 tank railway cars to move oil and petroleum products but since 2022 there's a shortage due to a high rate of write offs. 65 000 tank railway cars have been written off with just 16 000 new ones.

Also with the higher price of fuels on the wholesale market gas stations are close to losing money with the recent increases of 15% increases in March 2024 alone as the country nears the Spring refinery maintenance period.



-

Bensiinin kulutus on tietysti muuttuva numero, viikot eivät ole identtisiä keskenään. Perinteisesti, kun hinta nousee, ihmiset vähentävät auton käyttöä (sikäli kun se on mahdollista) ja tällöin polttoainetta kuluu vähemmän. MUTTA kaikkea ajamista ei voi leikata ja korkeammat polttoaineen hinnat näkyvät suoraan kaikkien kumipyörillä rahdattavien hinnoissa. Eli hintojen nousu näkyy laajasti monessa muussakin.

Jos otetaan maaliskuun 2024 puolivälin viikkokulutus 794 000 tonnia vertailuarvoksi, niin nähdään kahden viimeisen viikon (17.3.2024 - 24.3.2024 ja 25.3.2024 - 31.3.2024) aikana viikon bensiinin tuotanto on selvästi tuota pienempi: 754 600 ja 775 000 tonnia.

Stanimir Dobrev kommentoi asiaa näin:

However even at 775 000 tons Russia's weekly gasoline production remains below consumption and will be dependent on the ~1 850 000 tons in storage and Belarus imports. Again much much worse for AI-95 and AI-98 gasoline.

Varastoitu määrä siis kompensoi, samoin Valko-Venäjän tuonti.

Kokeillaan silti huvin vuoksi, miten kauan tuo varastoitu määrä riittäisi jos jätetään Valko-Venäjän tuonti pois. Hyvin karkeasti, kahden viimeisen viikon datan perusteella kulutus oli 39 400 ja 19 000 tonnia tuotantoa suurempi. Näiden keskiarvo on 29 200 tonnia per viikko.

1 850 000 / 29 200 = 63,3562 viikkoa eli toisin sanoen 1 vuosi ja 2,84 kuukautta.

MUTTA todellisuudessa Valko-Venäjän tuontia ei voi jättää pois laskuista, vaikka se tietysti leikkaa ryssän sotakassaa ns. tarpeettomasti. Mieluiten he tietysti tekisivät bensiinin itse, koska heillä on paitsi sen raaka-ainetta niin myös jalostuskapasiteettia (ainakin niin kauan kuin se on toimintakunnossa). Toinen MUTTA on tietysti ryssän kyky korjata rikottua kapasiteettia, tämä on tuntematon tekijä. Jos katsotaan viimeisen kahden viikon dataa niin viikon 12 tuotantomäärä oli pienempi kuin viikon 13, mikä kertoisi siitä että jotain saatiin kunnostettua. TOISAALTA 31.3.2024 nähtiin taas isku yhdelle merkittävälle jalostamolle, joten miten lie käynee viikon 14 tuotantomäärän osalta...

Sanoisin että tämäkin asia on hyvä laittaa oikeaan kokoluokkaan: nämä iskut ovat tärkeitä ja vaikutuksiltaan mahdollisesti merkittäviä mutta tässäkin on odotettavissa hidas näivettyminen, eikä nopeaa romahdusta. Vertaisin tilannetta ryssän varastotukikohtien tyhjenemiseen: se vie aikansa. Sama tilanne bensiinivarastojen ja uustuotannon kapasiteetin syömisen osalta.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Asiallista puolustusrakennelmaa Chernihivin suunnilla
Linkki
Bunkkerin aukkoon pikakytkimellä luukun eteen putoavat kartionmuotoiset teräspalat tai ihan vaikka dragons teeth betonimöhkäleet. Kun ne olisi kiskossa ja bunkkerissa vinssi, ne saisi kymmenessä sekunnissa takaisin ylös ja ampuminen jatkuu. Dronet ovat bunkkerin surma, mutta niitä vastaan tuollainen äärettömän yksinkertainen luukku toimisi täydellisesti = havainto dronesta, joku lyö vinssin vapaalle ja ovi putoaa eteen. Kartio, jotta läpäisy ontelosta menee sivuille, ja termobaariset tai HE kärjellä olevat paukkuu vain ulkopuolella. Saa vinkata, hintaa pari sataa per luukku, kun kerran hitsareita näemmä löytyy.
 
Venäjän vaunut ovat halpaa ja kehnolaatuista massaa jota käytetään pääosin ihan erilaisilla periaatteilla kuin miten perinteisessä panssarisodassa toimittaisiin.

Jos lännessä lähdetään samasta ajattelusta, niin täällä pitäisi kehittää myös jotain halpaa massaa joka ei maksa 8-numeroista euromäärää kappaleelta.
Pitää muistaa, että panssarivoimien keskittäminen ei nykyään enää onnistu huomaamatta. Yöllä ajamalla sen 100-200km tai jopa 300-400km teoreettisesti jonkinlaiseen hetkelliseen yllätysmomenttiin voisi ehkä päästä. Silti se Javelinien, Stugnien ym kantavuudet jos nykyisestä vielä nousee ja dronet sinne 30-100km, älykranaatit sinne +40km ja muut kilkkeet päälle eli lentokoneista ja koptereista ammuttavat jne. Sillä tästäkin päästäneen. Kohtuu helposti. Rahaa vaan pöytään ja heti.
 
Suuri Kysymys on juuri se että laivaisiko.. Euroopan pitäisi itsekin olla vahva.
Lisäys: paljonko niitä Challengereja on edes tehty? 2-300?
Tarkistettu; n. 400 ja parikymmentä vientiin.
USA on mahdoton valloittaa. Valtava reservi, kuivan ilmaston kalustovarikot täynnä kamaa, maaseudulla puolet siviileistä omistaa rynnäkkökiväärin... Mutta Eurooppa? NATOn pehmeä maha.
 
Pato murtunut venäjällä....
Karma is a bitch...
Orskin pato kazakstanin rajalla ural joessa

1712344700072.png




Google mapsista lähin pato minkä Orskin vierestä löysin:
1712345140892.png

patoallas on rastin muotoinen, n 40 km pituus ja 20 km leveys. Yllä olevan kuvan pato siis irklinskin kohdalla ja laskee suoraan orskiin. Siellä on muuten ravintola nimeltä popeda


1712345212455.png


Iriklinskaya HPP on vesivoimala Ural-joella Orenburgin alueella Iriklinskyn kylässä lähellä Orskin kaupunkia.

Uralin suurin vesivoimala. Aseman omistaja on PJSC Inter RAO
Rakentamisen alkamisvuosi1941
Yksikön käyttöönotto vuosia1958-1959
Sähköteho, MW22.5 Laitteen ominaisuudet Turbiinin määrä ja merkki3×RO-123-VM-200
Päärakenteet kivitäyte
Padon korkeus, m36
Padon pituus, m448
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Tässä vielä yksi lisätieto ryssän bensiinin osalta: Stanimir Dobrevin tuoreimman tilannakatsauksen kommenteissa häneltä kysyttiin tietoa / arviota ryssän yhden viikon bensiinin kulutukselle.

Hän vastasi näin (LÄHDE):

Last data we had is from mid march at 794 000 tons per week: (alla oleva ketju on julkaistu 29.3.2024)

We have data on the Ru weekly consumption of gasoline for March, it rose by 13 000 tons per day in March to 794 000 tons a week and currently Ru oil firms are supplying more to the market than they are producing with 13-19 of Mar supply of 779 400 tons.

https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6596233

03/29/2024, 00:01
1K7 min.

Fear has high prices​

The Russian fuel market is afraid of shortages​

Against the backdrop of the shutdown of a number of refining capacities at refineries, the government is trying to prevent a fuel shortage in Russia. The first step was a ban on gasoline exports. The second could be organizing priority transportation of petroleum products by rail and providing companies with tanks. Experts believe that this, in theory, could help stabilize the situation on the market, but much will depend on the final timing of planned and unscheduled repairs at factories.


KMO_195937_00005_1_t218_124907.jpg

Photo: Viktor Korotaev, Kommersant



The main task of the state and the Russian fuel and energy complex over the past two months has been to provide the domestic market with a sufficient amount of fuel. And so far it has succeeded. As reported by the Ministry of Energy, in March, gasoline shipments to Russian consumers showed an increase of 13 thousand tons per day compared to February (up to 794 thousand tons), diesel fuel - by 15.5 thousand tons per day. At the same time, according to the Central Dispatch Department of the Fuel and Energy Complex, in mid-March the volume of supplies exceeded the volume of production for the first time since September 2023. During the week of March 13–19, it fell by 3.9% relative to the previous week and by 5.2% relative to the planned level - to 779.4 thousand tons (111.3 thousand tons per day). Oil companies were able to cover the difference between these values using accumulated reserves of petroleum products, which as of March 22 amounted to 1.9 million tons of gasoline and 3.4 million tons of diesel fuel.

A blow to primary processing​


The risk of a fuel shortage has arisen due to the shutdown of refining capacities at a number of plants. The first to fail at the very beginning of the year was the catalytic cracking unit at one of the largest Russian sites - the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery of LUKOIL (capacity - 200 thousand tons per month). The reason was the breakdown of foreign compressor equipment, which cannot yet be replaced due to Western sanctions. According to authorities, finding an alternative and repairing it will take from several months to a year and a half. In the next two months, accidents due to drone attacks occurred at LUKOIL's Volgograd Refinery, Rosneft's Tuapse Refinery and Ilsky Refinery in the Krasnodar Territory. But the damage to their capacities did not significantly affect the supply of the domestic market, since the factories worked largely for export.

Russian oil workers suffered more significant losses in March. Thus, on March 12, drones damaged a primary oil refining unit at the Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery of LUKOIL, which accounts for 53% of the plant’s capacity. Its failure can lead to an almost twofold reduction in diesel fuel output and a quarter reduction in gasoline output. Drone attacks on March 13 and 16 disabled two similar installations at the Ryazan Oil Refinery (capacity - about 35 thousand tons per day) and one at the Syzran Oil Refinery (17 thousand tons). Both enterprises belong to Rosneft. The reduction in motor gasoline production at RNPK could be about 35%, despite a 70% reduction in plant utilization, if cat cracking is provided with raw materials in the required volume, Reuters calculated. The drop in the production of motor gasoline and diesel fuel at the three sites could amount to up to 5.8% and 6.6% of total Russian production, respectively. But such a reduction, market participants believe, will not be critical and can be compensated by other Russian refineries, which in the low season have sufficient capacity to produce additional volumes of fuel. Reuters estimates the overall productivity of primary oil refining units that are in emergency shutdown after the attacks at 13% of the total capacity in the Russian Federation.



Bins of the Motherland​


Despite unscheduled repairs at these refineries, the Ministry of Energy predicts the volume of primary oil refining in 2024 at last year’s level. At the end of 2023, oil refining in Russia increased by 1.2%, to 275 million tons. “The forecast for oil refining volume remains at a level close to last year,” said the head of the ministry, Nikolai Shulginov, on March 20. At the end of February, he reported that oil refining had decreased by about 7% since the beginning of 2024. But later, First Deputy Head of the Ministry of Energy Pavel Sorokin said that primary processing at the end of this year will be lower than last year, but due to these volumes Russia will increase exports.

Sergei Kondratyev from the Institute of Energy and Finance predicts that by the end of March output will likely be 4% below plan, which, taking into account available reserves, will avoid a shortage on the domestic market. In April, in his opinion, the situation on the fuel market will depend on how quickly it is possible to return damaged installations to operation and additionally load other refineries.

Provide at any cost​


To prevent fuel shortages on the domestic market, the government has taken a number of measures. The first step was a ban on the export of all types of gasoline introduced on March 1 until August 31. The exception is supplies within the framework of international intergovernmental agreements, including member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as for fuel exported by citizens for personal use and for the provision of international humanitarian assistance. Also, from March 1, the standard for the sale of diesel fuel at exchange trading was increased from 12.5% to 16%.

But the introduction of an embargo on gasoline exports disrupted the usual logistics models, which complicated the situation with rail shipments. First of all, there was confusion with the directions and priority of shipments. The point is that some cargo is exported from Russia as a matter of priority. These are military cargo, cargo for emergency response, as well as cargo on behalf of the president, including the export of coal from Kuzbass, Khakassia, Tuva, Irkutsk region, Buryatia and Yakutia.

Now this list may also include petroleum products. According to Kommersant, fuel will receive increased priority on the railway in relation to other cargo. Following a meeting on the situation on the domestic petroleum products market on March 22, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak instructed oil companies, together with Russian Railways, to “ensure uninterrupted export of petroleum products and loading of refineries in accordance with the schedule and growing spring demand.” As part of these instructions, the Ministry of Energy, oil companies and Russian Railways are developing monthly schedules for the transportation of petroleum products, the implementation of which will be monitored by the government.

The transport monopoly itself stated that the railways have already adapted to the new situation. “The change in existing supply chains required a significant restructuring of the technological process. We interact with oil companies and tank owners around the clock. We have reallocated resources for timely processing of trains at loading and unloading stations,” notes Russian Railways. According to the company, loading of petroleum products on the domestic market for the week from March 18 to March 24 increased by 11% compared to the same period last year. Since the beginning of March, shipments of gasoline and diesel fuel to the domestic market have increased by 9.5%, including in the eastern direction by 22.3%.

The cabinet also took control of the timely unloading of wagons with petroleum products. Market participants constantly complain that petroleum products purchased at the plant can take more than two months to reach consumers. Kommersant's interlocutors point out that the monopoly historically does not plan domestic oil transportation and does not respond with conventions to shipments to problem areas, which leads to overstocking of tanks and wagons. The Ministry of Energy expects that the volume of export of petroleum products will increase due to an increase in the turnover of the car fleet due to improved planning (including exchange cargo), as well as coordination of the actions of oil companies and Russian Railways. At the same time, increasing the efficiency of fuel export should not worsen the situation with the export of other goods.

According to the head of Infoline-Analytics, Mikhail Burmistrov, fuel prioritization on the railway will reduce the risk of fuel shortages at the start of the sowing campaign, and can also have a positive impact on the dispatch situation on the network, reducing tank downtime.
At the same time, oil workers note not only the slow operation of the railway, but also the shortage of tank cars themselves. The heads of the largest oil and gas companies - LUKOIL, Gazprom Neft, Tatneft and NOVATEK - turned to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak with a request to solve the worsening problem, Interfax reported. Every year, about 180 thousand tank cars are used to transport about 220 million tons of oil cargo. But since 2022, a shortage has formed in the country due to the high rate of write-off of cars at the end of their service life. In general, over the past ten years, about 65 thousand tank cars have been written off, while only about 16 thousand new units were purchased, the companies indicate. In addition, due to sanctions, the turnaround time for wagons on the Russian Railways network has increased. In turn, the monopoly is confident that the existing tank fleet is more than enough to organize both domestic and export transportation. They indicate that in February, almost 18 thousand oil and gasoline tanks stood idle on non-public tracks without operations every day, and oil workers often use the cars as “warehouses on wheels.”

Quotes scared damper​


The nervousness of market participants against the backdrop of a possible shortage pushed wholesale fuel prices at St. Petersburg International Trading Exchange upward throughout the second ten days of March. Thus, prices for AI-92 gasoline began to rise on March 11 from 46.9 thousand rubles. for 1 ton, and by March 22, after a continuous increase, they reached 54.1 thousand rubles. for 1 ton (price increase by 15.3%). The price of AI-95 gasoline during the same period rose by 14%, to 66.9 thousand rubles. for 1 ton. Trading participants explain this sharp dynamics, among other things, by the fact that large oil companies are entering the exchange as buyers, which need to provide their own gas stations with petroleum products. The situation is also complicated by the stop of sales at car depots. However, since March 23, the cost of the two most popular brands of gasoline began to decline.

The cost of diesel fuel also adjusted as quotations reached the threshold value for receiving export subsidies for March. Its oil companies lose if the monthly average price of AI-92 gasoline or diesel fuel on bases in the European part of the Russian Federation exceeds the conditional price of the domestic market established by the government by 10% and 20%, respectively. For 2024, this figure is 66.6 thousand rubles. for 1 ton. “For oil companies in March, the task of containing prices has already arisen, since diesel fuel is trading close to the cut-off zone for damper payments,” says Maxim Dyachenko, managing partner of Petroleum Trading. He notes that towards the end of March the fuel market calmed down somewhat due to increased sales from vertically integrated oil companies, but prices still remain at fairly high levels due to the upcoming spring repairs. In his opinion, in the future, prioritizing fuel supplies by rail could, in theory, improve the situation, but the details of this measure are not yet clear.

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Irina Salova

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The Russian oil companies are covering the deficit via an accumulated pool of 1,9 million tons of gasoline as of March 22nd. However a smaller part of that is high octane gasoline due its production being impacted for a while now.
The repairs of Lukoil's Nizhny Novgorod facility and its broken Western parts now are said to take not a few months but from several months to 2 and a half years. We also know the daily refining capacity of Ryazan and Syzran, 35 000 and 17 000 tons.
Based on Reuters assessment Russia's oil refining capacity due to emergency outages is down 13%. Preliminary Russian data suggested that refining for 2024 by March 20th decreased 7%. Due to available reserves shortages were avoided.
However it remains to be seen how Russia will handle April if attacks and breakdowns continue. And this is also impacted by Russian Railways' ability to ship gasoline within Russia which is 4 days slower than when shipping to export.
The country is operating 180 000 tank railway cars to move oil and petroleum products but since 2022 there's a shortage due to a high rate of write offs. 65 000 tank railway cars have been written off with just 16 000 new ones.
Also with the higher price of fuels on the wholesale market gas stations are close to losing money with the recent increases of 15% increases in March 2024 alone as the country nears the Spring refinery maintenance period.



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Bensiinin kulutus on tietysti muuttuva numero, viikot eivät ole identtisiä keskenään. Perinteisesti, kun hinta nousee, ihmiset vähentävät auton käyttöä (sikäli kun se on mahdollista) ja tällöin polttoainetta kuluu vähemmän. MUTTA kaikkea ajamista ei voi leikata ja korkeammat polttoaineen hinnat näkyvät suoraan kaikkien kumipyörillä rahdattavien hinnoissa. Eli hintojen nousu näkyy laajasti monessa muussakin.

Jos otetaan maaliskuun 2024 puolivälin viikkokulutus 794 000 tonnia vertailuarvoksi, niin nähdään kahden viimeisen viikon (17.3.2024 - 24.3.2024 ja 25.3.2024 - 31.3.2024) aikana viikon bensiinin tuotanto on selvästi tuota pienempi: 754 600 ja 775 000 tonnia.

Stanimir Dobrev kommentoi asiaa näin:

However even at 775 000 tons Russia's weekly gasoline production remains below consumption and will be dependent on the ~1 850 000 tons in storage and Belarus imports. Again much much worse for AI-95 and AI-98 gasoline.

Varastoitu määrä siis kompensoi, samoin Valko-Venäjän tuonti.

Kokeillaan silti huvin vuoksi, miten kauan tuo varastoitu määrä riittäisi jos jätetään Valko-Venäjän tuonti pois. Hyvin karkeasti, kahden viimeisen viikon datan perusteella kulutus oli 39 400 ja 19 000 tonnia tuotantoa suurempi. Näiden keskiarvo on 29 200 tonnia per viikko.

1 850 000 / 29 200 = 63,3562 viikkoa eli toisin sanoen 1 vuosi ja 2,84 kuukautta.

MUTTA todellisuudessa Valko-Venäjän tuontia ei voi jättää pois laskuista, vaikka se tietysti leikkaa ryssän sotakassaa ns. tarpeettomasti. Mieluiten he tietysti tekisivät bensiinin itse, koska heillä on paitsi sen raaka-ainetta niin myös jalostuskapasiteettia (ainakin niin kauan kuin se on toimintakunnossa). Toinen MUTTA on tietysti ryssän kyky korjata rikottua kapasiteettia, tämä on tuntematon tekijä. Jos katsotaan viimeisen kahden viikon dataa niin viikon 12 tuotantomäärä oli pienempi kuin viikon 13, mikä kertoisi siitä että jotain saatiin kunnostettua. TOISAALTA 31.3.2024 nähtiin taas isku yhdelle merkittävälle jalostamolle, joten miten lie käynee viikon 14 tuotantomäärän osalta...

Sanoisin että tämäkin asia on hyvä laittaa oikeaan kokoluokkaan: nämä iskut ovat tärkeitä ja vaikutuksiltaan mahdollisesti merkittäviä mutta tässäkin on odotettavissa hidas näivettyminen, eikä nopeaa romahdusta. Vertaisin tilannetta ryssän varastotukikohtien tyhjenemiseen: se vie aikansa. Sama tilanne bensiinivarastojen ja uustuotannon kapasiteetin syömisen osalta.

Muutaman kuukauden päästä tuo vaje on saattanut paisua kaksin-kolminkertaiseksi kun Ukraina jatkaa iskujaan. Jolloin varastojen riittävyys perspektiivi onkin jo lyhentynyt vuoden loppuun. Tässäkin ryssällä on pakko olla joku raja, jonka alle se ei voi päästä varastotasojaan. Tällöin laajamittaiseen säännöstelyyn saatettaisiin joutua jo syksyllä.

Maan laajuus kääntyy tässä skenaariossa ryssää vastaan. Ukraina rummutti ensin jalostamoita (joille saatettiin pikasiirtää huomattava määrä ilmatorjuntaa), nyt sitten sotilaslentokenttiä. Seuraavaksi voi olla taas jalostamoita, tai kriittisiä kemian tehtaita, sähköntuotantoa, muuntamoita, ...

Mikäli dronekantama kasvaa tuonne 2000-2500 kilometriin niin lienee luokkaa 70-80 % ryssän kaikesta tuotantokapasiteetista loopin alla. Luku on puhdas arvaus, saa korjata.
 
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