Hmm, Sergein kuulia ?
Nää Namasin puikkoja tai lavetteja
Edit: ihan sillä kun viime vuoden puolella hankittiin ohjuksia, Niin kai noissa on joku käyttö ikä.
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Edit: ihan sillä kun viime vuoden puolella hankittiin ohjuksia, Niin kai noissa on joku käyttö ikä.
Kehäraakki
Alokas
Mediazonan tunnistettujen ryssän kaatuneiden lista päivitetty taas tänään, https://en.zona.media/article/2022/05/20/casualties_eng-trl: 93 641 tunnistettua kaatunutta, +2582 kahden viime viikon aikana.
Artikkelissa mainitaan myös että kadonneiksi merkittyjä on vähintään 12000. Aihetta käsittelevän pari viikkoa sitten julkaistun jutun mukaan oikeushakemukset henkilön julistamiseksi kadonneeksi tai kuolleeksi ovat yli tuplaantuneet vuonna 2024 vuoteen 2023 verrattuna. Perivenäläiseen tapaan Putin näyttelee kovista mutta vellin määrä housuissa kasvaa...
Artikkelissa mainitaan myös että kadonneiksi merkittyjä on vähintään 12000. Aihetta käsittelevän pari viikkoa sitten julkaistun jutun mukaan oikeushakemukset henkilön julistamiseksi kadonneeksi tai kuolleeksi ovat yli tuplaantuneet vuonna 2024 vuoteen 2023 verrattuna. Perivenäläiseen tapaan Putin näyttelee kovista mutta vellin määrä housuissa kasvaa...
Perjantaikevennys: Tästäkin näkee, kuinka YLIVOIMAINEN T-14 Armata on. Ei ainuttakaan tuhottu!
Antares
Respected Leader
Muistutuksena: arvailin aikaisemmin että ryssän seuraava "merkittävä ohjusisku" voisi tapahtua aikavälillä 14.2. - 21.2.2025 eli tästä päivästä alkaen viikko eteenpäin laskien.
Syy arvaukselle oli aikaisempien iskujen aikavälien tarkastelu JA se että edellinen "merkittävä ohjusisku" tapahtui 1.2.2025.
HUOM: ryssä käytti jonkinlaisen määrän risteilyohjuksia ja ballistisia ohjuksia 11.2.2025, mutta Ukraina ei ole täsmentänyt eri ohjustyyppien määriä:
Missiles:
■ 19 cruise, ballistic, and guided aviation missiles (types not yet reported but among them Kh-101 &Kh-69)
-
En ole laskenut tätä "merkittäväksi ohjusiskuksi" koska olen asettanut sellaisen rajaksi 20 kpl strategisia ohjuksia tai enemmän, joten 19 kpl ei täytä kriteeriä.
Lisäksi en ole laskenut Kh-59/Kh-69 ohjuksia koska ne ovat pieniä, lyhyen kantomatkan risteilyohjuksia eivätkä strategisia aseita. Täten, sikäli kun tuo lainattu teksti pitää paikkansa, niin 11.2. laukaistujen strategisten ohjusten määrä on pienempi kuin 19 kpl.
JOS Ukraina tai joku OSINT-lähde kykenee tarkentamaan 11.2. iskussa käytettyjen ohjustyyppien määrän JA jos seuraavaa "merkittävää ohjusiskua" ei nähdä seuraavan viikon tai kahden aikana niin silloin pitää tarkastella asiaa uudestaan, eli mahdollisesti laskea 11.2. tehty isku mukaan näiden "merkittävien ohjusiskujen" sarjaan.
Toistaiseksi on kuitenkin liian aikaista miettiä tällaista, pidetään tämä 11.2. tehty isku kuitenkin mielessä, koska se on niin lähellä tuota minun keinotekoista rajaa.
Syy arvaukselle oli aikaisempien iskujen aikavälien tarkastelu JA se että edellinen "merkittävä ohjusisku" tapahtui 1.2.2025.
HUOM: ryssä käytti jonkinlaisen määrän risteilyohjuksia ja ballistisia ohjuksia 11.2.2025, mutta Ukraina ei ole täsmentänyt eri ohjustyyppien määriä:
Missiles:
■ 19 cruise, ballistic, and guided aviation missiles (types not yet reported but among them Kh-101 &Kh-69)
-
En ole laskenut tätä "merkittäväksi ohjusiskuksi" koska olen asettanut sellaisen rajaksi 20 kpl strategisia ohjuksia tai enemmän, joten 19 kpl ei täytä kriteeriä.
Lisäksi en ole laskenut Kh-59/Kh-69 ohjuksia koska ne ovat pieniä, lyhyen kantomatkan risteilyohjuksia eivätkä strategisia aseita. Täten, sikäli kun tuo lainattu teksti pitää paikkansa, niin 11.2. laukaistujen strategisten ohjusten määrä on pienempi kuin 19 kpl.
JOS Ukraina tai joku OSINT-lähde kykenee tarkentamaan 11.2. iskussa käytettyjen ohjustyyppien määrän JA jos seuraavaa "merkittävää ohjusiskua" ei nähdä seuraavan viikon tai kahden aikana niin silloin pitää tarkastella asiaa uudestaan, eli mahdollisesti laskea 11.2. tehty isku mukaan näiden "merkittävien ohjusiskujen" sarjaan.
Toistaiseksi on kuitenkin liian aikaista miettiä tällaista, pidetään tämä 11.2. tehty isku kuitenkin mielessä, koska se on niin lähellä tuota minun keinotekoista rajaa.
Viimeksi muokattu:
En ole kuullut mitään ryssien varuskunnista. Paitsi suomen rajalta ovat kaikki kuulemma tyhjennetty. Mitä on tapahtunut etelä ja itäpuolella? Ei kai niitä nyt ihan tyhjäksi uskalla vetää muualla kuin NATOn rajalla. Joka on siis venäjälle ainoa oikeasti turvallinen raja.
taantumu
Ylipäällikkö
Venäjä toki on allekirjoittanut YK:n Kansainvälisen yleissopimuksen ydinterrorismin torjumisesta jonka toisen artiklan mukaan on rikos:
Sopimuksessa kuitenkin mainitaan ettei se koske asevoimia jos ne hoitavat virallisia tehtäviä muiden kansainvälisten sopimusten mukaisesti.
https://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sopsteksti/2009/20090006/20090006_2
Antares
Respected Leader
En muista, onko tämä ollut aikaisemmin tässä ketjussa (viitattu Kyiv Insider artikkeli on julkaistu tänään, mutta aiheesta on ollut kirjoituksia jo 12.2.2025 koska artikkelissa lainattu RBC.ru artikkeli on julkaistu silloin - tämä on siis mahdollisesti jaettu jo aikaisemmin mutta laitan varalta jakoon uudestaan)
Russia's National Welfare Fund could be gone within 6 months if the war continues, Russian finance Minister warns.
https://kyivinsider.com/former-russ...f-imminent-depletion-of-national-wealth-fund/
Already on a negative trajectory since 2020, Russia's National Wealth Fund, now holding only 1.9% of GDP, could be gone in six months if war expenditures don't come to an end, according to former Russian Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov.
Russia’s National Wealth Fund (NWF), established as a financial safeguard for rainy days, is now facing imminent depletion amid ongoing economic challenges. In an article for Russia’s RBC, Former Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov has raised concerns that the fund’s liquid assets may be exhausted within six months if the current level of war expenditures continue.
As of February 1, the NWF’s liquid assets—comprising foreign currency and gold reserves held by the Central Bank—have dwindled to 3.8 trillion rubles, representing less than 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This marks a substantial decrease from the 7.4% of GDP recorded before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The NWF has been instrumental in covering budget deficits, especially as the nation grapples with the financial strains of the prolonged conflict in Ukraine. The war has led to increased military expenditures and has disrupted traditional revenue streams, notably from the energy sector.
In January 2025, Russia’s budget deficit surged to 1.7 trillion rubles ($17.73 billion), a 14-fold increase compared to the same month in the previous year. This deficit equates to 0.8% of the national output and is attributed to a 73.6% rise in spending early in the year. While officials have described these expenditures as front-loaded and not indicative of the annual trend, the significant increase underscores the mounting fiscal pressures.
The energy sector, a cornerstone of Russia’s economy, is facing significant challenges. Sanctions have restricted access to tankers, and drone attacks have damaged refineries, leading to a potential reduction in oil production. The U.S. recently imposed sanctions on 180 Russian tankers to pressure Russia to end the war in Ukraine. Additionally, drone attacks have targeted Russian refineries, cutting 10% of its refining capacity. These challenges have forced Russia to adapt by acquiring smaller tankers and coping with rising costs, ultimately impacting the Russian economy and oil revenue significantly.
The broader economic landscape presents further concerns. Internal reports from the Russian economy ministry and central bank highlight significant economic risks, including lower oil prices, budget constraints, and rising corporate debt. Despite public claims of economic resilience, these reports indicate the potential for a faster economic slowdown leading to a technical recession, while high inflation persists at 10%. The reports emphasize the risk of high interest rates (expected to stay at 21%), which are curbing lending and investment, threatening growth prospects. Additionally, potential increases in U.S. and OPEC oil output pose further risks to the federal budget. The economy ministry foresees substantial cost increases for companies in 2025, hindering financial stability and potentially leading to more bad debts. Recent economic strains are exacerbated by labor shortages, a weak rouble, and high interest rates. The budget, reliant on energy income, faces challenges despite higher oil prices helping manage fiscal deficits. The National Wealth Fund, used to cover deficits, has significantly decreased, indicating unsustainable long-term support.
Zadornov emphasizes that only by ending the war can the Russian government hope to restore budgetary balance. The prolonged conflict has not only strained public finances but has also led to international sanctions that further pressure the economy.
Let’s hope Mr Zadornov is now avoiding high buildings, and tea, and cars, planes..
-
Linkki alkuperäiseen lähteeseen:
https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/finances/12/02/2025/67ac429f9a794766b7083972
Russia's National Welfare Fund could be gone within 6 months if the war continues, Russian finance Minister warns.
https://kyivinsider.com/former-russ...f-imminent-depletion-of-national-wealth-fund/
Former Russian Finance Minister Warns Of Imminent Depletion Of National Wealth Fund
February 14, 2025 at 09:11 PM
Russia’s National Wealth Fund (NWF), established as a financial safeguard for rainy days, is now facing imminent depletion amid ongoing economic challenges. In an article for Russia’s RBC, Former Finance Minister Mikhail Zadornov has raised concerns that the fund’s liquid assets may be exhausted within six months if the current level of war expenditures continue.
As of February 1, the NWF’s liquid assets—comprising foreign currency and gold reserves held by the Central Bank—have dwindled to 3.8 trillion rubles, representing less than 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This marks a substantial decrease from the 7.4% of GDP recorded before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The NWF has been instrumental in covering budget deficits, especially as the nation grapples with the financial strains of the prolonged conflict in Ukraine. The war has led to increased military expenditures and has disrupted traditional revenue streams, notably from the energy sector.
In January 2025, Russia’s budget deficit surged to 1.7 trillion rubles ($17.73 billion), a 14-fold increase compared to the same month in the previous year. This deficit equates to 0.8% of the national output and is attributed to a 73.6% rise in spending early in the year. While officials have described these expenditures as front-loaded and not indicative of the annual trend, the significant increase underscores the mounting fiscal pressures.
The energy sector, a cornerstone of Russia’s economy, is facing significant challenges. Sanctions have restricted access to tankers, and drone attacks have damaged refineries, leading to a potential reduction in oil production. The U.S. recently imposed sanctions on 180 Russian tankers to pressure Russia to end the war in Ukraine. Additionally, drone attacks have targeted Russian refineries, cutting 10% of its refining capacity. These challenges have forced Russia to adapt by acquiring smaller tankers and coping with rising costs, ultimately impacting the Russian economy and oil revenue significantly.
The broader economic landscape presents further concerns. Internal reports from the Russian economy ministry and central bank highlight significant economic risks, including lower oil prices, budget constraints, and rising corporate debt. Despite public claims of economic resilience, these reports indicate the potential for a faster economic slowdown leading to a technical recession, while high inflation persists at 10%. The reports emphasize the risk of high interest rates (expected to stay at 21%), which are curbing lending and investment, threatening growth prospects. Additionally, potential increases in U.S. and OPEC oil output pose further risks to the federal budget. The economy ministry foresees substantial cost increases for companies in 2025, hindering financial stability and potentially leading to more bad debts. Recent economic strains are exacerbated by labor shortages, a weak rouble, and high interest rates. The budget, reliant on energy income, faces challenges despite higher oil prices helping manage fiscal deficits. The National Wealth Fund, used to cover deficits, has significantly decreased, indicating unsustainable long-term support.
Zadornov emphasizes that only by ending the war can the Russian government hope to restore budgetary balance. The prolonged conflict has not only strained public finances but has also led to international sanctions that further pressure the economy.
Let’s hope Mr Zadornov is now avoiding high buildings, and tea, and cars, planes..
-
Linkki alkuperäiseen lähteeseen:
https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/finances/12/02/2025/67ac429f9a794766b7083972
Military operation in Ukraine , 12 Feb, 14:27
155 394
Share
EXCLUSIVE
Mikhail Zadornov
https://www.rbc.ru/story/658c98dc9a...58c98dc9a794706712c381b&utm_term=10.4Z_noauth
Mikhail Zadornov (Photo: Mikhail Grebenshchikov / RBC)
What does peace mean for Russia and Ukraine? Statements of readiness for peace and negotiations are heard from both sides, contacts between the Kremlin and the White House, Kyiv and Washington have clearly intensified. All this speaks of a chance to stop the military actions, which are three years old.
Trump's election is a trigger. But the conditions necessary for peace in Russia, Ukraine, and among decision-makers in many countries are increasingly clear even without his arrival. The resources expended by both sides, especially human ones, and the costs are increasingly placing a heavy burden on both the economy and people's daily lives.
Sociological surveys reflect the readiness of the majority of the population in both Ukraine and Russia for peace, and this is a key prerequisite for any agreement.
Without prejudging the terms of a possible peace agreement, let us assess the socio-economic consequences for each of the parties.
Russia's available labor force for 2022–2024, in addition to military action, has been reduced by approximately 2 million people due to demographics: significantly more people retired each year than entered the labor market as school, college, and university graduates.
According to official data, at least 1.1 million people were called up to participate in the SVO over three years (330 thousand mobilized in the fall of 2022, 350 thousand and 420 thousand contract soldiers in 2023 and 2024).
Approximately 550 thousand people from civilian industries moved to work in the military-industrial complex (see the assessment of First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov in the summer of 2024) and at least 500-600 thousand young Russians of clearly working age went abroad, although some of them continue to work for Russian enterprises.
Thus, the resource that Russia most needed in these and subsequent years has been noticeably reduced.
Naturally, partial demobilization will return the labor force to the economy. There will be a reverse flow from the military-industrial complex to civilian engineering, complex production and other industries, because, despite the preservation of the defense order, such a workload of many enterprises will not be required.
Not immediately, but after some time, we can expect the return of some of the young people who left for the near or far abroad. Not immediately, because they and their parents will watch how events develop here, analyze the further development of the political situation.
But if military action continues, we will see, albeit not on such a scale, a further exodus of young people – out of fear of being called up to the front in the coming years.
We must also not forget that today we are experiencing a reduction in migration from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other countries—not only because of the devaluation of the ruble, but because of concerns related to the CIS and the conflict in Ukraine.
Second. Only after the end of military operations will the government be able to balance the budget . The budget stimulus for 2022-2025 is approximately 10% of Russia's GDP, or 2.5-3% of GDP per year.
In today's money, this is approximately 20 trillion rubles. The result of this budget stimulus was an increase not only in defense orders, but also in salaries throughout the country. The downside is that the National Welfare Fund, essentially the country's reserve fund, the liquid part of which reached 7.4% of GDP at the end of 2021, was only 3.8 trillion rubles as of February 1, which is already less than 2% of GDP. In the event of a sharp drop in oil prices - God forbid, it happens - this will be enough for no more than six months of financing budget expenditures.
The inertia of continued funding will exist even if military actions stop, but a significant portion of the annual defense spending that has increased by 2.5-3% of GDP can be redistributed both for the restoration of new territories and the Kursk region, which must be done, and for other purposes, primarily development. And this is trillions of rubles.
Without the end of the SVO, the budget cannot be balanced. A balanced budget is a key factor in defeating inflation. The Central Bank alone and only by raising the key rate and limiting the growth of lending cannot cope with it.
The consequences of inflation, which the Russian population and businesses are increasingly feeling, are obvious. This is a further depreciation of the ruble, a tax on everyone , but first of all on the poor, a depreciation of their savings and assets, and also a significant slowdown in investments, which at such an interest rate become absolutely meaningless.
Accordingly, the end of military operations and budget consolidation make it possible for the monetary authorities to bring down inflation through joint efforts.
The reduction of the key rate of the Central Bank and the cost of money opens the way for private investments of the population , non-state investments in the economy. This will contribute to the acceleration of economic growth over a two-three year horizon.
Immediately, even at the first signs of peace agreements, we will see an increase in the capitalization of the Russian stock market . We can estimate an approximate increase in the value of shares by 30-40%, this is shown by the graph of the capitalization of the Russian market from 2009 to 2024.
The yield will immediately fall and the cost of OFZ and corporate securities, other assets that our citizens manage, will increase. These assets will increase in price in a short time, which will affect people's moods and their willingness to spend and invest.
And lastly, although not the least important, is the issue of sanctions . The sanctions will not be lifted immediately and in full. But even a reduction in new sanctions risks, a reduction in the huge transaction costs of purchasing and delivering goods, traveling abroad, the cost of air and train tickets both inside and outside the country will become significant positive changes for the Russian middle class and for business.
At the same time, already in a short period after the easing of sanctions, even in today's sanctions regime, we will see an influx of capital, primarily from Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Gradually, other capital will return to the Russian market. In addition to labor resources, this will provide the second necessary condition for further economic growth.
Thus, for Russia, the end of the SVO means saving lives, increasing – and quite quickly – the labor force, defeating inflation through a balanced budget, some strengthening of the ruble, and resources for further development, both economic and social.
****
For Ukraine, whose economy contracted by almost 30% in 2022 and then grew slightly, according to the IMF, by 5.3% in 2023 and by 4% in the first three quarters of 2024, the key issue for further development is also the lives of people and the population size in the territory controlled by Kiev .
The fact is that currently 9 million Ukrainians continue to live abroad (22% of the country's population in 2022). The largest number is in Poland - about 2 million, more than 1 million in Germany, 200 thousand in the UK, many in Romania and Canada.
At the same time, according to fairly representative surveys conducted in Germany and Great Britain, 70% of those who left there, mainly women and children, want to stay in the countries where they are now by any means necessary, because they do not see a safe future in Ukraine.
Therefore, the end date of military actions for Ukraine is not only the preservation of life and health of the military who are at the front, but also, first of all, the chance to return at least some of the refugees. For Ukraine, this is probably the key issue of preserving not only the economy, but also the country itself, its development . The sooner military actions are ended, the greater the chances of some part of the population returning to the country.
Second. Despite economic growth and more than $40 billion in gold and foreign exchange reserves, Ukraine is completely dependent on external aid to finance not only defense but also budget expenditures . From aid primarily from the European Union, then the United States of America and also international financial organizations, since a significant part of this aid goes through the IMF and the World Bank. External support covers up to 40% of the budget, so without direct external aid the Ukrainian economy cannot exist.
Therefore, one of the conditions for ending the conflict in Ukraine is the continuation of this assistance, which will apparently gradually decrease over a two- to three-year period until the economy starts working on its own.
Judging by the decisions already taken, European countries, Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States are ready to provide support to the Ukrainian government.
For example, decisions made in August 2024 allowed Ukraine to partially write off and shift about $40 billion of debt to 2028, that is, to relieve the external debt burden for the next three years.
Thirdly, and this is very important, Ukraine gets a chance to restore its infrastructure and economy . Let's not estimate the required sizes now, there is and will be a lot of speculation here.
The hopes of the Ukrainian leadership that Russia will pay for the restoration of what was destroyed are groundless. Russia is unlikely to be able to return its gold and foreign exchange reserves in the foreseeable future, but it will also not be possible to legally direct them to the restoration of the Ukrainian economy. They will remain in an uncertain status in the medium term. Russia has never paid reparations, and there are no political conditions for this to happen now .
The source of financing for Ukraine's recovery will probably be a certain European fund created by the European Union and Great Britain following the example of the fund for the recovery of the European economy after Covid. Let me remind you that about €750 billion was collected there, which is now being spent on infrastructure and investments in European countries in the form of grants and loans.
It must be said that the option of implementing the "Marshall Plan", only not for Europe but for Ukraine, has certain chances of success. But there may also be another development of events - following the example of the former Yugoslavia, when after the end of military actions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, interest in Yugoslavia and investments in the Balkans gradually faded. Other events pushed attention aside, as often happens in the world and in life. And whether the necessary amount of support will be provided to Ukraine in the next 5-10 years is a big question.
It is not only about the talents of the political leadership of Ukraine. Everything will be determined by global trends that we will see in the next decade. Much will depend not only on the leadership of Ukraine, but also on its society : how ready it will be to develop a clear program for the restoration, development of the country and to consistently implement it.
****
For the European Union, the end of military action in Ukraine means, first of all, a noticeable reduction in the financial burden at a time of acute budget deficit and the elimination of the need to raise taxes in almost all European countries .
Europe has provided Ukraine with serious support in the last three years. It is measured at approximately €120 billion. The main contribution was made by Germany, Great Britain, and a number of other countries. But today we see budget deficits in France of 6% of GDP, in Italy of 5% of GDP, and in a number of other major countries. In Germany, these are two years of recession and disputes about whether it is possible to violate the limits on the budget deficit established by the Constitution. The public debt in the largest EU countries, except for Germany and the Netherlands, has reached or exceeded 100% of GDP.
Therefore, when there is a choice between increasing taxes, cutting social spending, and the need to increase defense spending, reducing priority aid to Ukraine is a serious relief for the governments and budgets of the largest countries in Europe.
This will allow us to shift attention from the military agenda to solving domestic problems , working with the new American administration, which is not the most favorable partner for European countries today, coordinating work between the EU countries themselves, and discussing plans for the future.
It should be understood that after the conflict in Ukraine, Europe will have to significantly increase defense spending. Obviously, in a calmer situation, EU countries will do this gradually and not as urgently as in the last two years.
And energy issues, relations with China and international trade will come to the fore in Europe in 2026-2027.
-
About the author
MIKHAIL ZADORNOVEconomist, Chairman of the Board of FC Otkritie Bank from 2018 to 2022
The views of the authors whose articles are published in the "Opinions" section may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
155 394
Share
EXCLUSIVE
Mikhail Zadornov
What does peace mean for Russia and Ukraine?
https://www.rbc.ru/story/658c98dc9a...58c98dc9a794706712c381b&utm_term=10.4Z_noauth
Mikhail Zadornov (Photo: Mikhail Grebenshchikov / RBC)
What does peace mean for Russia and Ukraine? Statements of readiness for peace and negotiations are heard from both sides, contacts between the Kremlin and the White House, Kyiv and Washington have clearly intensified. All this speaks of a chance to stop the military actions, which are three years old.
Trump's election is a trigger. But the conditions necessary for peace in Russia, Ukraine, and among decision-makers in many countries are increasingly clear even without his arrival. The resources expended by both sides, especially human ones, and the costs are increasingly placing a heavy burden on both the economy and people's daily lives.
Sociological surveys reflect the readiness of the majority of the population in both Ukraine and Russia for peace, and this is a key prerequisite for any agreement.
Without prejudging the terms of a possible peace agreement, let us assess the socio-economic consequences for each of the parties.
What does peace in Ukraine mean for Russia?
First of all, it's saving lives . No new wounded, no new victims, fewer people with post-traumatic stress disorder. This is actually a key resource for our country.Russia's available labor force for 2022–2024, in addition to military action, has been reduced by approximately 2 million people due to demographics: significantly more people retired each year than entered the labor market as school, college, and university graduates.
According to official data, at least 1.1 million people were called up to participate in the SVO over three years (330 thousand mobilized in the fall of 2022, 350 thousand and 420 thousand contract soldiers in 2023 and 2024).
Approximately 550 thousand people from civilian industries moved to work in the military-industrial complex (see the assessment of First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov in the summer of 2024) and at least 500-600 thousand young Russians of clearly working age went abroad, although some of them continue to work for Russian enterprises.
Thus, the resource that Russia most needed in these and subsequent years has been noticeably reduced.
Naturally, partial demobilization will return the labor force to the economy. There will be a reverse flow from the military-industrial complex to civilian engineering, complex production and other industries, because, despite the preservation of the defense order, such a workload of many enterprises will not be required.
Not immediately, but after some time, we can expect the return of some of the young people who left for the near or far abroad. Not immediately, because they and their parents will watch how events develop here, analyze the further development of the political situation.
But if military action continues, we will see, albeit not on such a scale, a further exodus of young people – out of fear of being called up to the front in the coming years.
We must also not forget that today we are experiencing a reduction in migration from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and other countries—not only because of the devaluation of the ruble, but because of concerns related to the CIS and the conflict in Ukraine.
Second. Only after the end of military operations will the government be able to balance the budget . The budget stimulus for 2022-2025 is approximately 10% of Russia's GDP, or 2.5-3% of GDP per year.
In today's money, this is approximately 20 trillion rubles. The result of this budget stimulus was an increase not only in defense orders, but also in salaries throughout the country. The downside is that the National Welfare Fund, essentially the country's reserve fund, the liquid part of which reached 7.4% of GDP at the end of 2021, was only 3.8 trillion rubles as of February 1, which is already less than 2% of GDP. In the event of a sharp drop in oil prices - God forbid, it happens - this will be enough for no more than six months of financing budget expenditures.
The inertia of continued funding will exist even if military actions stop, but a significant portion of the annual defense spending that has increased by 2.5-3% of GDP can be redistributed both for the restoration of new territories and the Kursk region, which must be done, and for other purposes, primarily development. And this is trillions of rubles.
Without the end of the SVO, the budget cannot be balanced. A balanced budget is a key factor in defeating inflation. The Central Bank alone and only by raising the key rate and limiting the growth of lending cannot cope with it.
The consequences of inflation, which the Russian population and businesses are increasingly feeling, are obvious. This is a further depreciation of the ruble, a tax on everyone , but first of all on the poor, a depreciation of their savings and assets, and also a significant slowdown in investments, which at such an interest rate become absolutely meaningless.
Accordingly, the end of military operations and budget consolidation make it possible for the monetary authorities to bring down inflation through joint efforts.
The reduction of the key rate of the Central Bank and the cost of money opens the way for private investments of the population , non-state investments in the economy. This will contribute to the acceleration of economic growth over a two-three year horizon.
Immediately, even at the first signs of peace agreements, we will see an increase in the capitalization of the Russian stock market . We can estimate an approximate increase in the value of shares by 30-40%, this is shown by the graph of the capitalization of the Russian market from 2009 to 2024.
The yield will immediately fall and the cost of OFZ and corporate securities, other assets that our citizens manage, will increase. These assets will increase in price in a short time, which will affect people's moods and their willingness to spend and invest.
And lastly, although not the least important, is the issue of sanctions . The sanctions will not be lifted immediately and in full. But even a reduction in new sanctions risks, a reduction in the huge transaction costs of purchasing and delivering goods, traveling abroad, the cost of air and train tickets both inside and outside the country will become significant positive changes for the Russian middle class and for business.
At the same time, already in a short period after the easing of sanctions, even in today's sanctions regime, we will see an influx of capital, primarily from Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Gradually, other capital will return to the Russian market. In addition to labor resources, this will provide the second necessary condition for further economic growth.
Thus, for Russia, the end of the SVO means saving lives, increasing – and quite quickly – the labor force, defeating inflation through a balanced budget, some strengthening of the ruble, and resources for further development, both economic and social.
****
For Ukraine, whose economy contracted by almost 30% in 2022 and then grew slightly, according to the IMF, by 5.3% in 2023 and by 4% in the first three quarters of 2024, the key issue for further development is also the lives of people and the population size in the territory controlled by Kiev .
The fact is that currently 9 million Ukrainians continue to live abroad (22% of the country's population in 2022). The largest number is in Poland - about 2 million, more than 1 million in Germany, 200 thousand in the UK, many in Romania and Canada.
At the same time, according to fairly representative surveys conducted in Germany and Great Britain, 70% of those who left there, mainly women and children, want to stay in the countries where they are now by any means necessary, because they do not see a safe future in Ukraine.
Therefore, the end date of military actions for Ukraine is not only the preservation of life and health of the military who are at the front, but also, first of all, the chance to return at least some of the refugees. For Ukraine, this is probably the key issue of preserving not only the economy, but also the country itself, its development . The sooner military actions are ended, the greater the chances of some part of the population returning to the country.
Second. Despite economic growth and more than $40 billion in gold and foreign exchange reserves, Ukraine is completely dependent on external aid to finance not only defense but also budget expenditures . From aid primarily from the European Union, then the United States of America and also international financial organizations, since a significant part of this aid goes through the IMF and the World Bank. External support covers up to 40% of the budget, so without direct external aid the Ukrainian economy cannot exist.
Therefore, one of the conditions for ending the conflict in Ukraine is the continuation of this assistance, which will apparently gradually decrease over a two- to three-year period until the economy starts working on its own.
Judging by the decisions already taken, European countries, Great Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States are ready to provide support to the Ukrainian government.
For example, decisions made in August 2024 allowed Ukraine to partially write off and shift about $40 billion of debt to 2028, that is, to relieve the external debt burden for the next three years.
Thirdly, and this is very important, Ukraine gets a chance to restore its infrastructure and economy . Let's not estimate the required sizes now, there is and will be a lot of speculation here.
The hopes of the Ukrainian leadership that Russia will pay for the restoration of what was destroyed are groundless. Russia is unlikely to be able to return its gold and foreign exchange reserves in the foreseeable future, but it will also not be possible to legally direct them to the restoration of the Ukrainian economy. They will remain in an uncertain status in the medium term. Russia has never paid reparations, and there are no political conditions for this to happen now .
The source of financing for Ukraine's recovery will probably be a certain European fund created by the European Union and Great Britain following the example of the fund for the recovery of the European economy after Covid. Let me remind you that about €750 billion was collected there, which is now being spent on infrastructure and investments in European countries in the form of grants and loans.
It must be said that the option of implementing the "Marshall Plan", only not for Europe but for Ukraine, has certain chances of success. But there may also be another development of events - following the example of the former Yugoslavia, when after the end of military actions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, interest in Yugoslavia and investments in the Balkans gradually faded. Other events pushed attention aside, as often happens in the world and in life. And whether the necessary amount of support will be provided to Ukraine in the next 5-10 years is a big question.
It is not only about the talents of the political leadership of Ukraine. Everything will be determined by global trends that we will see in the next decade. Much will depend not only on the leadership of Ukraine, but also on its society : how ready it will be to develop a clear program for the restoration, development of the country and to consistently implement it.
****
For the European Union, the end of military action in Ukraine means, first of all, a noticeable reduction in the financial burden at a time of acute budget deficit and the elimination of the need to raise taxes in almost all European countries .
Europe has provided Ukraine with serious support in the last three years. It is measured at approximately €120 billion. The main contribution was made by Germany, Great Britain, and a number of other countries. But today we see budget deficits in France of 6% of GDP, in Italy of 5% of GDP, and in a number of other major countries. In Germany, these are two years of recession and disputes about whether it is possible to violate the limits on the budget deficit established by the Constitution. The public debt in the largest EU countries, except for Germany and the Netherlands, has reached or exceeded 100% of GDP.
Therefore, when there is a choice between increasing taxes, cutting social spending, and the need to increase defense spending, reducing priority aid to Ukraine is a serious relief for the governments and budgets of the largest countries in Europe.
This will allow us to shift attention from the military agenda to solving domestic problems , working with the new American administration, which is not the most favorable partner for European countries today, coordinating work between the EU countries themselves, and discussing plans for the future.
It should be understood that after the conflict in Ukraine, Europe will have to significantly increase defense spending. Obviously, in a calmer situation, EU countries will do this gradually and not as urgently as in the last two years.
And energy issues, relations with China and international trade will come to the fore in Europe in 2026-2027.
-
About the author
MIKHAIL ZADORNOVEconomist, Chairman of the Board of FC Otkritie Bank from 2018 to 2022
The views of the authors whose articles are published in the "Opinions" section may not coincide with the opinion of the editors.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Varsinaisia sotauutisia saa edelleen etsiä koska kaikki silmät ovat näissä rauhanneuvoitteluissa. Aiheesta keskustellaan täällä (vaikea oli löytää itselleni) ja kiinnostaa varmaan monia tässä ketjussa. Banaaniperjantai näkyy olevan käynnissä.
Tähän mennessä 48 000 hyvää tai puolihyvää ryssää Kurskissa.
Tähän mennessä 48 000 hyvää tai puolihyvää ryssää Kurskissa.
Antares
Respected Leader
Mielenkiintoinen "puhuva drone" ollut käytössä tässä ryssän antautumisessa. En muista nähneeni vastaava aikaisemmin tai jos sellainen on nähty, niin ei kovin usein (ehkä muistan väärin, ehkä joku toinen osaa korjata harhaluuloni jos sellainen kyseessä).
Tuntuisi erikoiselta että tällaista ei oltaisi kokeiltu jo aikaisemmin, koska idea on niin yksinkertainen. On kyllä nähty erilaisia antautumiseen kannustavia viestejä ja kommunikointeja, sekä "seuraa dronea antautumispaikalle" kaltaisia temppuja, mutta "puhuvaa dronea" en muista nähneeni (MUOKKAUS: tuossa alempana huomautettiinkin että tällaista on käytetty ainakin yli vuoden ajan, löytyy siitä uutisia - tosin ei tietoa yleisyydestä):
Ukrainian Defenders captured 9 Russians with the help of a 'talking' drone.
Soldiers of the 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade attacked the occupiers' positions with FPV drones and decided to try using a drone with a loudspeaker, recording a message for them to surrender, which three days later they did.
One of the captured Russian soldiers shared that he had been at the front for less than two weeks, but had managed to see so many dead bodies of his comrades that it broke him.
Video: 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade/Telegram
-
Tällainen drone voisi olla erityisen toimiva nyt, kun kuullaan väitteitä että yhä useampi sopimuksen allekirjoittava venäläinen ei olisi "tietoinen sodan reaaliteeteista" ja rintaman todellisuus tulee sitten syvänä järkytyksenä (pitkä twitter-ketju joten lainaan sen kokonaisuudessaan spoilerin taakse):
Most Russian recruits who arrive on the front lines are almost completely unaware of the nature of the war in Ukraine, say Russian warbloggers.
They blame it on deliberate, conscious ignorance and say that it is exploited by commanders to throw unprepared men into assaults.
Tuntuisi erikoiselta että tällaista ei oltaisi kokeiltu jo aikaisemmin, koska idea on niin yksinkertainen. On kyllä nähty erilaisia antautumiseen kannustavia viestejä ja kommunikointeja, sekä "seuraa dronea antautumispaikalle" kaltaisia temppuja, mutta "puhuvaa dronea" en muista nähneeni (MUOKKAUS: tuossa alempana huomautettiinkin että tällaista on käytetty ainakin yli vuoden ajan, löytyy siitä uutisia - tosin ei tietoa yleisyydestä):
Ukrainian Defenders captured 9 Russians with the help of a 'talking' drone.
Soldiers of the 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade attacked the occupiers' positions with FPV drones and decided to try using a drone with a loudspeaker, recording a message for them to surrender, which three days later they did.
One of the captured Russian soldiers shared that he had been at the front for less than two weeks, but had managed to see so many dead bodies of his comrades that it broke him.
Video: 25th Sicheslav Airborne Brigade/Telegram
-
Tällainen drone voisi olla erityisen toimiva nyt, kun kuullaan väitteitä että yhä useampi sopimuksen allekirjoittava venäläinen ei olisi "tietoinen sodan reaaliteeteista" ja rintaman todellisuus tulee sitten syvänä järkytyksenä (pitkä twitter-ketju joten lainaan sen kokonaisuudessaan spoilerin taakse):
Most Russian recruits who arrive on the front lines are almost completely unaware of the nature of the war in Ukraine, say Russian warbloggers.
They blame it on deliberate, conscious ignorance and say that it is exploited by commanders to throw unprepared men into assaults.
Most Russian recruits who arrive on the front lines are almost completely unaware of the nature of the war in Ukraine, say Russian warbloggers. They blame it on deliberate, conscious ignorance and say that it is exploited by commanders to throw unprepared men into assaults.
Mobilised paratrooper, warblogger and volunteer Nikita Tretyakov writes that Russians who come to fight in Ukraine "know catastrophically little about the war."
"Yes, not all 100%, but the vast majority come to the front without even the most basic understanding of what the war looks like.
"Many not only do not know how to behave properly when a kamikaze drone flies at them, but also do not know that such things even exist; not only do not know how to apply a tourniquet, but have never seen it even on the screen.
"And in general, they imagine the war almost as a triumphal procession, expect from the modern army incredible miracles of constant and excessive training and provision, support of each soldier with artillery and aviation.
"When they sign a contract for a certain period, they often do not even realise that the contracts are automatically renewed and are now de facto indefinite."
It may seem surprising in the third year of war, Tretyakov says, but "time after time, we encounter such people, and there are more and more of them in each 'wave' of new contract soldiers."
"But no amount of amazement can even begin to compare with the shock that overtakes such a freshly minted soldier, who knows nothing, on his first combat mission. This is a real shock, often felt by these people as a deception on the part of the system, as a kind of betrayal."
"Today, more information is published on the military specialisms that interest me almost every day than I can read.
"There is a flood of analyses of the general situation at the front, in addition to coverage of those aspects that are obvious at the front, but are unknown to the general public. Videos of battles of both infantry and equipment, of artillery and UAVs are published.
"And anyone can access all this by simply reaching out and writing a search query. The notorious truth about the Special Military Operation, its realities from the fighter's point of view – no one hides it.
"Moreover, it is possible not only to get an idea of the war, but also to prepare for it: at least to get knowledge that can help you survive.
And yet we see very few informed or self-trained recruits at the front. Why?...
"My thought followed a well-trodden path: criticism of the major media and criticism of the candidates themselves – they say that the TV shows only positive things, and people blindly believe and go without trying to find out anything more.
"But these factors do not seem to me exhaustive or even basic for the formation of this unfortunate phenomenon.
"It cannot be that people who are considering the decision to go to war and risk their lives there do not try to look deeper into the subject, to understand where they are going and what is going on there in general...
"Yes, the truth about the Special Military Operation is not hard to find out. Yes, most adult men, when considering going to war, delve into the subject and try to understand what awaits them there. And they do.
"And they don't go to the military enlistment office, don't sign a contract, don't go to the front.
The truth of this war is not attractive, not glamorous.
"It is cruel and disgusting, it stinks of blood and dirt, bestiality, a feeling of helplessness and uselessness, almost zero value of life and dignity.
Most people realise this quickly. And they don't go.
"Call it ‘survivorship bias’ or ‘negative selection’, but most of those who do go to the front do so precisely because of ignorance. It gives them false hope that the war will help them in their difficult life situations, which is what pushes them to that decision.
"And yes, they are entitled to feel deceived, because a choice out of desperation is not a choice, just as a choice due to ignorance or induced delusion is not a choice.
"When you see the news tomorrow of a village being taken, know this: it was done by those who were at the front almost by mistake, in the darkness of ignorance, and yet they came to the light."
Responding to Tretyakov's commentary, Svyatoslav Golikov (the 'Philologist in ambush') notes:
"The determining motive for the radically overwhelming majority of new contract soldiers is indeed the desired way out of social dead ends, primarily a material one."
"A huge mass of these people represent the poor, disadvantaged, vulnerable strata of the population of our country. There are people among the new contract soldiers who generally understand what they are signing up for. These people are simply going on a fatalistic chance."
"But the masses of people actually go as if to some kind of fairy tale, not understanding how ugly and scary this fairy tale is in reality, and the opportunities to get out of this fairy tale with an army contract are extremely limited.
"Despite the fact that there really are wagonloads of information about the actual situation.
"To a significant extent, this darkness of ignorance grows out of an undeveloped or atrophied ability for (self) learning, mental laziness, failures in critical thinking and the actively practiced ignorance of the broad masses of our fellow citizens themselves.
"But there is a nuance here. Our state itself has seriously screwed up in terms of stimulating the development of human capital. Of course, man is a biological entity, but that is precisely why he requires special education.
"Furthermore, people who are deeply immersed in the daily life that surrounds them and are almost literally fighting for survival are often either stupidly detached from what is happening out there, or simply do not have the opportunity to delve into the problems in detail, they simply have no time for it. For the same reason, by the way, it is not surprising that people have a massive lack of basic knowledge, skills, and abilities.
"Alcoholics and drug addicts are generally on their own wavelength, they even sign a contract without really coming to their senses.
And here, official propaganda definitely plays its role.
"People overloaded with their own worries and troubles (not to mention the characters in altered states of consciousness) snatch scraps of uplifting stories and victorious reports from the media space.
"Paradoxically, given the fairly wide scepticism regarding officially broadcast information, it is precisely the reports of continuous successes on the fronts and the latest unique weapons that really grab people's attention.
"Accordingly, people form "logical" thoughts like 'they'll teach me there / I'm not stupid, I'll learn on the spot / it'll work out somehow'.
"What is characteristic is that the system itself does not set up newly arriving contract soldiers even for elementary physical conditioning, not to mention proper training in general.
"People are often either urgently tortured in an inadequately tight time frame to the point of exhaustion (essentially finishing off their already sad physical condition) and disgust, or, on the contrary, thrown into a rotten swamp of suffering and bullshit...
"By the way, it is precisely the darkness of ignorance that to a large extent underlies the fact that the trick [by commnders] of setting the task in the style of 'go/drive there, there is no one there, the artillery worked' continues to work.
"This is one of the reasons why newly arriving marching reinforcements are being thrown into assaults as quickly as possible instead of a gradual testing, since gradual immersion in existing realities, fraught with premature awareness of all the bottom depths, increases the likelihood of failures of the enlightened, and urgent assault tasks will not fulfill themselves (especially if the command has accumulated territorial credits [i.e. falsely claimed to have captured territory which they only hold on paper]).
"And here is the saddest thing in all this is, perhaps, that against the background of a choice from despair with false hope, such darkness of ignorance is extremely convenient for the system in the conditions of the existing practice of warfare.
"Failures in the development of human capital turned out to be very useful. Those who delve into details really do abstain [from going to war] for the most part. But the ignorant, on the contrary, go.
"Except that everything is quite unfavourable with exiting from darkness to light. These are just flashes on a conveyor belt."
/end
-
Sources:
https://t.me/tretyakov_n/1493
https://t.me/philologist_zov/1978
Mobilised paratrooper, warblogger and volunteer Nikita Tretyakov writes that Russians who come to fight in Ukraine "know catastrophically little about the war."
"Yes, not all 100%, but the vast majority come to the front without even the most basic understanding of what the war looks like.
"Many not only do not know how to behave properly when a kamikaze drone flies at them, but also do not know that such things even exist; not only do not know how to apply a tourniquet, but have never seen it even on the screen.
"And in general, they imagine the war almost as a triumphal procession, expect from the modern army incredible miracles of constant and excessive training and provision, support of each soldier with artillery and aviation.
"When they sign a contract for a certain period, they often do not even realise that the contracts are automatically renewed and are now de facto indefinite."
It may seem surprising in the third year of war, Tretyakov says, but "time after time, we encounter such people, and there are more and more of them in each 'wave' of new contract soldiers."
"But no amount of amazement can even begin to compare with the shock that overtakes such a freshly minted soldier, who knows nothing, on his first combat mission. This is a real shock, often felt by these people as a deception on the part of the system, as a kind of betrayal."
"Today, more information is published on the military specialisms that interest me almost every day than I can read.
"There is a flood of analyses of the general situation at the front, in addition to coverage of those aspects that are obvious at the front, but are unknown to the general public. Videos of battles of both infantry and equipment, of artillery and UAVs are published.
"And anyone can access all this by simply reaching out and writing a search query. The notorious truth about the Special Military Operation, its realities from the fighter's point of view – no one hides it.
"Moreover, it is possible not only to get an idea of the war, but also to prepare for it: at least to get knowledge that can help you survive.
And yet we see very few informed or self-trained recruits at the front. Why?...
"My thought followed a well-trodden path: criticism of the major media and criticism of the candidates themselves – they say that the TV shows only positive things, and people blindly believe and go without trying to find out anything more.
"But these factors do not seem to me exhaustive or even basic for the formation of this unfortunate phenomenon.
"It cannot be that people who are considering the decision to go to war and risk their lives there do not try to look deeper into the subject, to understand where they are going and what is going on there in general...
"Yes, the truth about the Special Military Operation is not hard to find out. Yes, most adult men, when considering going to war, delve into the subject and try to understand what awaits them there. And they do.
"And they don't go to the military enlistment office, don't sign a contract, don't go to the front.
The truth of this war is not attractive, not glamorous.
"It is cruel and disgusting, it stinks of blood and dirt, bestiality, a feeling of helplessness and uselessness, almost zero value of life and dignity.
Most people realise this quickly. And they don't go.
"Call it ‘survivorship bias’ or ‘negative selection’, but most of those who do go to the front do so precisely because of ignorance. It gives them false hope that the war will help them in their difficult life situations, which is what pushes them to that decision.
"And yes, they are entitled to feel deceived, because a choice out of desperation is not a choice, just as a choice due to ignorance or induced delusion is not a choice.
"When you see the news tomorrow of a village being taken, know this: it was done by those who were at the front almost by mistake, in the darkness of ignorance, and yet they came to the light."
Responding to Tretyakov's commentary, Svyatoslav Golikov (the 'Philologist in ambush') notes:
"The determining motive for the radically overwhelming majority of new contract soldiers is indeed the desired way out of social dead ends, primarily a material one."
"A huge mass of these people represent the poor, disadvantaged, vulnerable strata of the population of our country. There are people among the new contract soldiers who generally understand what they are signing up for. These people are simply going on a fatalistic chance."
"But the masses of people actually go as if to some kind of fairy tale, not understanding how ugly and scary this fairy tale is in reality, and the opportunities to get out of this fairy tale with an army contract are extremely limited.
"Despite the fact that there really are wagonloads of information about the actual situation.
"To a significant extent, this darkness of ignorance grows out of an undeveloped or atrophied ability for (self) learning, mental laziness, failures in critical thinking and the actively practiced ignorance of the broad masses of our fellow citizens themselves.
"But there is a nuance here. Our state itself has seriously screwed up in terms of stimulating the development of human capital. Of course, man is a biological entity, but that is precisely why he requires special education.
"Furthermore, people who are deeply immersed in the daily life that surrounds them and are almost literally fighting for survival are often either stupidly detached from what is happening out there, or simply do not have the opportunity to delve into the problems in detail, they simply have no time for it. For the same reason, by the way, it is not surprising that people have a massive lack of basic knowledge, skills, and abilities.
"Alcoholics and drug addicts are generally on their own wavelength, they even sign a contract without really coming to their senses.
And here, official propaganda definitely plays its role.
"People overloaded with their own worries and troubles (not to mention the characters in altered states of consciousness) snatch scraps of uplifting stories and victorious reports from the media space.
"Paradoxically, given the fairly wide scepticism regarding officially broadcast information, it is precisely the reports of continuous successes on the fronts and the latest unique weapons that really grab people's attention.
"Accordingly, people form "logical" thoughts like 'they'll teach me there / I'm not stupid, I'll learn on the spot / it'll work out somehow'.
"What is characteristic is that the system itself does not set up newly arriving contract soldiers even for elementary physical conditioning, not to mention proper training in general.
"People are often either urgently tortured in an inadequately tight time frame to the point of exhaustion (essentially finishing off their already sad physical condition) and disgust, or, on the contrary, thrown into a rotten swamp of suffering and bullshit...
"By the way, it is precisely the darkness of ignorance that to a large extent underlies the fact that the trick [by commnders] of setting the task in the style of 'go/drive there, there is no one there, the artillery worked' continues to work.
"This is one of the reasons why newly arriving marching reinforcements are being thrown into assaults as quickly as possible instead of a gradual testing, since gradual immersion in existing realities, fraught with premature awareness of all the bottom depths, increases the likelihood of failures of the enlightened, and urgent assault tasks will not fulfill themselves (especially if the command has accumulated territorial credits [i.e. falsely claimed to have captured territory which they only hold on paper]).
"And here is the saddest thing in all this is, perhaps, that against the background of a choice from despair with false hope, such darkness of ignorance is extremely convenient for the system in the conditions of the existing practice of warfare.
"Failures in the development of human capital turned out to be very useful. Those who delve into details really do abstain [from going to war] for the most part. But the ignorant, on the contrary, go.
"Except that everything is quite unfavourable with exiting from darkness to light. These are just flashes on a conveyor belt."
/end
-
Sources:
https://t.me/tretyakov_n/1493
https://t.me/philologist_zov/1978
Viimeksi muokattu:
rty19
Greatest Leader
On näitä antautumisdroneja joskus käytetty, ainakin vuosi sitten.
EDIT: tuossa yksi
Ukrainian troops persuaded Russian soldiers to surrender by playing them a message from a drone, report says
The moment came in an assault on the village of Andriivka in September, The Wall Street Journal reported.
www.businessinsider.com
Kaiuttimella varustettuja siviilidronejakin on myynnissä, esim
DJI M30 loudspeaker | DJI Matrice 30 speaker
The loudspeaker for the DJI M30 drone is based on DJI SDK, operated via DJI Pilot 2, supports real-time speaking and plays the stored audio, Max 1KM clear sound transmission.
www.uavfordrone.com
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
On näitä antautumisdroneja joskus käytetty, ainakin vuosi sitten.
Kaiuttimella varustettuja siviilidronejakin on myynnissä, esim
DJI M30 loudspeaker | DJI Matrice 30 speaker
The loudspeaker for the DJI M30 drone is based on DJI SDK, operated via DJI Pilot 2, supports real-time speaking and plays the stored audio, Max 1KM clear sound transmission.
Selvä juttu, olisikin tuntunut liian omituiselta että tällaisen kokeilemiseen olisi mennyt kolme kokonaista vuotta.
MUOKKAUS: tuo jakamasi Business Insider -artikkeli (LINKKI) on päivätty 4.10.2023 mutta siinä kirjoitetaan tällaisen "puhuvan dronen" käytöstä 14.9.2023 tapahtuneen operaation yhteydessä.
Eli tämän perusteella näitä on käytetty jossain muodossa ja määrässä ainakin siitä alkaen.
Se tarkoittaisi että ainakin 1 vuoden ja 5 kuukauden ajan.
Viimeksi muokattu:
RFU:ssa temuörkkien paluusta. Eli ryssä "ystävineen" suoritti ison hyökkäyksen Kurskin ulokkeen länsilaidalla vetääkseen Ukrainan joukkoja pois itälaidalta, jotteivat nämä voi varmistaa viimepäivien menestystä.
Seurasi jopa poikkeuksellisen suoraviivainen tappio, jossa helvettiin pääsi 150 örkkiä.
Seurasi jopa poikkeuksellisen suoraviivainen tappio, jossa helvettiin pääsi 150 örkkiä.
Lahtinen
Majuri
Onko tästä mitään tarkempaa tietoa, mitä jenkit olisivat antaneet vastineeksi?
Olen katsellut näitä viestejä pari päivää ja etsinyt viestien aiheista lähteitä ja koittanut tullikta niitä omasta mielestä.
Joten alotellan usa
1. Trumpi ja hänen vaali lupauksensa lupasi lopettaa sodan. No jenkki politiikka pöyrii kun tuuli viiri. Bidenin hallinon alla ryssän kanssa ei neuvoteltu mutta ei kyllä haluttu loukata pikku rottaa(ei lupia pitkän matkan iskuille). No töyhtö tukan on varmaan neuvotelta. En usko että hän voisi pommittta Ukrainaa tai kaalikansaa mailmankartalta pois. Ukrainan ehdoilla näissä menään on ihan turha kuvitellaa että rotta ja oranssi messias saisi rauhan aikaiseksi.
2. Mies pula Ukrainassa . https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-military-is-980-000-soldiers-strong-zelensky-says/ 980k sotilasta vs https://kyivindependent.com/nearly-...t-against-ukraine-military-intelligence-says/ noin 600 k. Pitäs varmaan ensin käsittää mitä tarkoitetaan miespulalla. Siis 980 k ei voi taistella 580 k vastaan kun on miespula. Koko hiivatin miespula tulee kun jollakin sektorilla menetetään maata ja siellä on ylivoima vihollisella. Toinen asia on halutaanko sinne laittaa ukkoja puolustamaan jos suhde 100k vs 50 k vai kulutetaanko ? esim otetaan adviiikan suunta. Niin ryssä sai siellä onnistumisen rotaation aikaan hyökättiin ja sen jälkeen ukraina laitto sinne puolustuukseen uuden prikaatin. Ja ryssä eteni ovat pokrovs edustalla. Mutta oisko Ukraina kattanut noitten maa alueiden puolustamiseen käytää vaikka 100k ukraina sotilaan henkeä vai vaan kuluttaa ? No sbu on hoitanut tämän onneksi nyt. Ukrainalla ei todellakaan ole mies pulaaa jos 90 % hakeneista voidaan hylätä. No tosin siitä voi miettä kellä se mies pula on kun lähetetään linjaan raaja rikkoja.
Sitten näistä neuvotteluista Kyllä se on ryssä kun haluaa tulitaon. Ukraina voi jatkaa ryssä ei. Totta kai Ukraina tarvitsee tukea, mutta kun heillä on se tuki(lähes kaikki EU maat on luvat niin pitkään kun tarvii). Ensinnäkin jos ette ole lukeneet venäjän talous ketjua niin luka seppa joku 15 sivua taakse päin. Ukrainalla ei ole mitään hätää tässä sodassa odotetaan vaan että punkkeri rotta ottaa hatun kouraan ja sanoo säästäkää meidät.
Joten alotellan usa
1. Trumpi ja hänen vaali lupauksensa lupasi lopettaa sodan. No jenkki politiikka pöyrii kun tuuli viiri. Bidenin hallinon alla ryssän kanssa ei neuvoteltu mutta ei kyllä haluttu loukata pikku rottaa(ei lupia pitkän matkan iskuille). No töyhtö tukan on varmaan neuvotelta. En usko että hän voisi pommittta Ukrainaa tai kaalikansaa mailmankartalta pois. Ukrainan ehdoilla näissä menään on ihan turha kuvitellaa että rotta ja oranssi messias saisi rauhan aikaiseksi.
2. Mies pula Ukrainassa . https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-military-is-980-000-soldiers-strong-zelensky-says/ 980k sotilasta vs https://kyivindependent.com/nearly-...t-against-ukraine-military-intelligence-says/ noin 600 k. Pitäs varmaan ensin käsittää mitä tarkoitetaan miespulalla. Siis 980 k ei voi taistella 580 k vastaan kun on miespula. Koko hiivatin miespula tulee kun jollakin sektorilla menetetään maata ja siellä on ylivoima vihollisella. Toinen asia on halutaanko sinne laittaa ukkoja puolustamaan jos suhde 100k vs 50 k vai kulutetaanko ? esim otetaan adviiikan suunta. Niin ryssä sai siellä onnistumisen rotaation aikaan hyökättiin ja sen jälkeen ukraina laitto sinne puolustuukseen uuden prikaatin. Ja ryssä eteni ovat pokrovs edustalla. Mutta oisko Ukraina kattanut noitten maa alueiden puolustamiseen käytää vaikka 100k ukraina sotilaan henkeä vai vaan kuluttaa ? No sbu on hoitanut tämän onneksi nyt. Ukrainalla ei todellakaan ole mies pulaaa jos 90 % hakeneista voidaan hylätä. No tosin siitä voi miettä kellä se mies pula on kun lähetetään linjaan raaja rikkoja.
Sitten näistä neuvotteluista Kyllä se on ryssä kun haluaa tulitaon. Ukraina voi jatkaa ryssä ei. Totta kai Ukraina tarvitsee tukea, mutta kun heillä on se tuki(lähes kaikki EU maat on luvat niin pitkään kun tarvii). Ensinnäkin jos ette ole lukeneet venäjän talous ketjua niin luka seppa joku 15 sivua taakse päin. Ukrainalla ei ole mitään hätää tässä sodassa odotetaan vaan että punkkeri rotta ottaa hatun kouraan ja sanoo säästäkää meidät.
Mielenkiintoinen ketju näistä sopimusörkeistä.
Tietoa sodan todellisesta luonteesta on helposti saatavilla ryssänmaassa. Rintamalle päätyvistä örkeistä suurin osa on pahnanpohjimmaisia, jotka katsovat vain TV-propagandaa eivätkä kykene/välitä itse hankkia tietoa. Osa jonkinlaisia fatalistisia uhrautujia, jotka vain pyrkivät kohottamaan omaa/lähimmäisten taloudellista tilannetta kun omalla elämällä ei ole mitään väliä.
Tällaisella materiaalilla ei voi päästä kovin pitkälle. Kenties raja ollaan vähitellen saavuttamassa.
Antares
Respected Leader
RUSI:lta uusi julkaisu, luettavaa viikonlopuksi (25 sivuinen pdf-tiedosto):
After visiting brigades along the Donetsk and Sumy fronts, Nick Reynolds and I have published at @RUSI_org observations of the current tactical dynamics in Ukraine, highlighting measures to strengthen @DefenceUA's defence and to ensure @NATO's readiness:
https://rusi.org/explore-our-resear...opments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war
-
Suora linkki raporttiin (avaa pdf-tiedoston):
https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf
After visiting brigades along the Donetsk and Sumy fronts, Nick Reynolds and I have published at @RUSI_org observations of the current tactical dynamics in Ukraine, highlighting measures to strengthen @DefenceUA's defence and to ensure @NATO's readiness:
https://rusi.org/explore-our-resear...opments-during-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war
-
Suora linkki raporttiin (avaa pdf-tiedoston):
https://static.rusi.org/tactical-developments-third-year-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2205.pdf
Toisaalta, ilon kautta (mikä on omalla pessimismilleni vierasta), länsikalustosta miehistö poistuu todennäköisemmin elävänä vs itäkalusto.
Mutta, kuten sanoit, kalustoa on toki Ukrainalla vähemmmän…