Ukrainan konflikti/sota

Mutta näiden kiinalaissotilaiden merkitystä en vielä liioittelisi; voivat olla yksittäisiä ukkoja samalla tavalla kuin esim Suomesta on mennyt porukkaa taistelemaan Ukrainan joukkoihin. Toki Kiinasta voi olla vaikeampi lähteä ulkomaille sotimaan kuin länsimaista, mutta nämä voivat olla esim jotain opiskelijoita jotka olivat jo valmiiksi Venäjällä. Parhaimmillaan ovat jotain pakkovärvättyjä. Voi toki olla myös niin, että Kiina on lähettänyt virallisia vahvistuksia Pohjois-Korean tapaan, mutta en pitäisi sitä kovin todennäköisenä.
Venäjän kaukoidässä asuu pari miljoonaa Kiinan kansalaista. Niinkuin normaali olotila, siellä on prospektia eteenpäin pyrkiville. Helppo siitä on värväytyä jos tarjottu korvaus on houkutteleva.
 
Asevoimien entinen komentaja myöntää sen aikaisemmin ketjuun linkatun artikkelin olleen totta.
Olihan tiedossa jo aikoinaan, että suunnittelivat operaatioita yhdessä ja pelasivat sotapelejä eri variaatioina löytääkseen toimivia. Jenkit lähinnä torppasivat monta operaatiota koska ne vaan eivät sotapelinä eivät onnistuneet vaikka uket olikin innokkaita.
 
Olihan tiedossa jo aikoinaan, että suunnittelivat operaatioita yhdessä ja pelasivat sotapelejä eri variaatioina löytääkseen toimivia. Jenkit lähinnä torppasivat monta operaatiota koska ne vaan eivät sotapelinä eivät onnistuneet vaikka uket olikin innokkaita.
Kyllä ja torpasivat menossa olleita hyökkäyksiä kun pelkäsivät että ryssät käytää ydinaseita.
 
Mikäli oikein muistan niin tällä Tšekin ammusohjelmalla oli rahoitus syyskuuhun saakka hankkia ammuksia Ukrainalle sillä 1.5 miljoonan ammuksen vuositahdilla. Nyt Norja laittaa sinne reippaat 360 miljoonaa taalaa lisää, joten eiköhän tuolla saada tämän vuoden ammukset kustannettua.

Miljardi kruunua menee Norjalta vielä toiseenkin hankkeeseen.

 
The Atlantic Councilin kirjoitus tilanteesta tulitauon suhteen ja miksi Putin vain pelaa aikaa löytämällä jatkuvasti uusia tekosyitä sille, että ei suostu tulitaukoon eikä siten mihinkään todelliseen rauhansuunnitelmaankaan sen jatkoksi. Sota ei ole sellaisessa pisteessä, jossa Venäjä voisi lopettaa ja mitenkään todeta tavoitteiden täyttyneen, ei edes osittain.


Suurin osa asioista on mennyt päin helvettiä ja jatkaa samalla radalla edelleen vaikka laivaa on monin eri tavoin yritetty kääntää tuhoisalta kurssiltaan.

Raha pitää ryssäsotilaat toistaiseksi taistelualueella ja ajaa heitä tapattamaan itseään ja toisiaan. Putin ei voi olla vakuuttunut siitä, että mahdollisen rauhan tai edes tulitauon tullessa joukot pysyisivät asemissaan ja vähintään ne vaativat saman tasoista maksua, mitä taas on erittäin vaikea ylläpitää pidemmän päälle kun talous on henkitoreissaan lähes kaikilla sektoreilla.

Muitakin riskitekijöitä on, mutta tuo sotimisen päättäminen ja miten rahalla houkutellut sotilaat sen jälkeen toimivat on varmasti yksi merkittävimmistä. No, tuskimpa on tapahtumassa aivan lähitulevaisuudessa kun ryssillä vielä toistaiseksi jotain kalustoa ja helposti joukkohautaan houkuteltavia vielä löytyy.

 
Mikäli oikein muistan niin tällä Tšekin ammusohjelmalla oli rahoitus syyskuuhun saakka hankkia ammuksia Ukrainalle sillä 1.5 miljoonan ammuksen vuositahdilla. Nyt Norja laittaa sinne reippaat 360 miljoonaa taalaa lisää, joten eiköhän tuolla saada tämän vuoden ammukset kustannettua.

Miljardi kruunua menee Norjalta vielä toiseenkin hankkeeseen.


Vuosi sitten "Tsekin löytämien" 1,5 miljoonan laukauksen hinnaksi kerrottiin noin 3 miljardia euroa eli 2000 euroa per laukaus. LÄHDE

Jos oletetaan että tällä hetkellä rahoitus riittää syyskuun loppuun, se tarkoittaa 3/4 koko vuoden määrästä eli kolmen kuukauden osuus puuttuu. Se tarkoittaa keskiarvoisesti 125000 laukausta per kuukausi.

375000 laukausta olisi siis vielä "ostamatta" jos jaetaan määrä tasan koko vuoden ajalle ja jos oletetaan sama 2000 euroa per laukaus, niin niiden hinta on 750 miljoonaa euroa.

Tällä hinnalla Norjan 365 miljoonaa euroa saadaan 182500 laukausta eli noin puolet vuoden viimeisen neljänneksen määrästä (eli 1,5 kuukauden osuus).

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Toki ostohinta riippuu monesta tekijästä: mitä ostettu ja keneltä, uutta vai vanhaa varastoista, paljonko hinta on noussut yhden vuoden aikana jne jne.

Linkittämässäni viestissä mainitaan toinen vuoden takainen osto jossa yhden laukauksen hinnaksi tuli 3200 euroa per laukaus.

Tällä hinnalla Norjan 365 miljoonaa euroa saadaan 114062 laukausta eli vajaa kolmannes vuoden viimeisen neljänneksen määrästä (vajaan kuukauden osuus, 91,25% kuukauden määrästä jos ollaan tarkkoja).

Toki on myös tulkinnanvaraista, mikä osuus on jo rahoitettu: elokuun vai syyskuun loppuun asti eli 8 vai 9 kuukauden määrä. Muistelen että tästä on kirjoitettu sanoilla until September. Yleisen tulkinnan mukaan tuo tarkoittaa "syyskuun ajaksi" eli syyskuun loppuun asti MUTTA jos muistan väärin ja sanamuoto olikin by September, se tarkoittaisi "syyskuun alkuun mennessä" eli nykyinen rahoitus kattaisi koko elokuun muttei syyskuuta (eli vuoden 8 ensimmäistä kuukautta, jolloin 4 kuukauden osuus olisi vielä rahoittamatta).

Niin tai näin, Norjan tuore lahjoitus on merkittävä ja tärkeä, vaikkei se tarkoitakaan koko puuttuvan osuuden rahoittamista.

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MUOKKAUS: yhden tuoreen lähteen mukaan se on until September (eli yleisen tulkinnan mukaan syyskuun loppuun asti). LÄHDE
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Onko tämä nyt uusi vai vanha tapahtuma?

Tu-22M3 tuhottu droonilla laskeutumisen yhteydessä?


On siellä ryssälässä ollut muutenkin vilkkaanpuoleinen yö noiden droonien suhteen, vähän siellä täällä on pitänyt kiirettä.

"Muutama päivä sitten"

 
Homma haiskastaa koko ajan vahvemmin maailmansodalta...


Zelenskyi: Ukraina ottanut kaksi Venäjän riveissä sotinutta kiinalaista vangiksi

Ukrainan presidentin Volodymyr Zelenskyin mukaan kuusi kiinalaista sotilasta on taistellut Itä-Ukrainan Donetskissa Ukrainan armeijaa vastaan.

Zelenkyi paljasti asian toimittajille Kiovassa tiistaina iltapäivällä. Hän myös julkaisi videon pidätyssiteissä olevasta kiinalaisesta sotilaasta sosiaalisen median kanavillaan.

Presidentin mukaan kaksi kiinalaisista on jäänyt ukrainalaisten sotavangeiksi.

Zelenskyi on määrännyt Ukrainan ulkoministerin hankkimaan virallisen selityksen Kiinalta.

Hän katsoo Kiinan liittyneen sotaan Venäjän rinnalle sodassa. Zelenskyi sanoo odottavansa, että Yhdysvallat reagoi asiaan.

Pidätetyt kiinalaissotilaat ovat nyt Ukrainan turvallisuuspalvelun hallussa.

AFP, Reuters
 
Tekever niminen droonien valmistaja liittyy siihen laajaan joukkoon, joka on siirtänyt tuotantoa, tukea ja huoltoa suoraan Ukrainaan. Tuottaa mm. laadukkaita tiedusteludrooneja, joita Ukraina on käyttänyt jo vuodesta 2022 alkaen.


According to TEKEVER, its Ukrainian facilities are positioned to allow access to operational areas and are designed to be mobile in case of security concerns. The company highlights that the move reflects broader shifts in the European security landscape and an increased emphasis on regional defence cooperation.

A Ukrainian soldier using TEKEVER drones shared: “Our unit are the ‘eyes’, providing critical intelligence for missile and artillery units. We maintain very close contact with TEKEVER and continuously provide them with feedback we gather from our missions.”

TEKEVER states that the new arm of its operations will support ongoing system development, training efforts, and cooperation with Ukrainian partners in the defence technology sector.


Linkki valmistajan omille sivuille, malliston huipulla on sateliittipohjaiseen tiedonsiirtoon kykenevä drooni esimerkiksi merialueiden valvontaan, joten kyseessä ei ole mikään autotallipaja.

 
Miksi ryssä vetäytyy joiltakin alueilta, ei kai näillä tienoilla ole mitään Ukrainan puskuakaan ollut etenkään kun meneillään on rospuuttoaika, mutta silti sieltä täältä irtoaa venäläisten kynnet? Eikö ole varmistusjoukkoja, onko johto viety jo niin kauas, että miehet lähtevät asemistaan omin lupineen? Eikö huolto toimi ja on pakko väistyä vai mistä on kyse?

 
Jos arvailla pitäisi niin oletan että Ukrainan tilanne olisi tällä hetkellä moninverroin huonompi ilman tuota amerikkalaisten apua.

Kyllä jo pelkästään tiedusteluapu oli hyvin merkittävässä roolissa, ainakin jos artikkelia on uskominen.

Se jaettiin "lahjalinkillä" tähän ketjuun aikaisemmin eli pääsee lukemaan maksumuurin ohi, vahva suositus tälle vaikka onkin pitkä (silti jäin myös kaipaamaan lisätietoa, tässä pompitaan sodan alusta Ukrainan vastahyökkäykseen ja sen jälkeen lähemmäs nykyhetkeä eli ohitetaan monta kiinnostavaa vaihetta - toki ei tällaiselta voi vaatia mahdottomia):

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive...e_code=1.704.wf1z.d_h6QJP4hnhv&smid=url-share

Voidaan ja pitääkin kyseenalaistaa, missä määrin tämä on totta eli onko tätä kiillotettu amerikkalaisille suotuisammaksi ja Ukrainan osaaminen näyttäytyy sen takia huonompana. Tässä on artikkelin kirjoittajalla iso vastuu eli pitäisi olla laaja joukko ketä haastatellaan ja haetaan sitä totuuden ydintä, jos on ristiriitaisia lausuntoja.

Minä olen taipuvainen uskomaan että tämä artikkeli kertoisi hyvin tarkasti sen, miten asiat todellisuudessa menivät eri aikoina. Varsinkin Ukrainan vastahyökkäys kesällä 2023 meni pieleen, monestakin syystä. Suuri tekijä oli voimien jakaminen kahdelle eri suunnalla (Melitopol ja Bakhmut), tästä saa kantaa myös kenraali Syrskyi suuren vastuun (MUOKKAUS: tuossa alempana onkin kenraali Syrskyin tuore, pitkä haastattelu jossa hän kiistää että olisi rohmunnut joukkoja Bakhmutin vastahyökkäystä varten ja siten sotkenut Melitopolin hyökkäyksen - eli jokaisella on näistä omat näkemyksensä ja tulkintansa). Toinen tekijä oli se että Melitopolin suuntaan tehtyä hyökkäystä johtavat eivät enää luottaneet amerikkalaisten toimittamaan maalidataan vaan kaikki piti "varmistaa" omilla droneilla, mikä hidasti hyökkäystä merkittävästi. Tämä puolestaan antoi ryssälle aikaa kaivautua ja vahvistaa puolustusta.

Olisipa ollut mielenkiintoista nähdä, miten tuossa olisi käynyt jos joukkoja ei oltaisi jaettu vaan olisi keskitetty koko voima Melitopolin suuntaan. Samoin, jos olisivat luottaneet kerrottuun tietoon ja tehneet hyökkäystoimia niiden perusteella eli pidetty tempo niin korkealla kuin mahdollista, ilman hidasteita. Tämä on hyödytöntä haaveilua tässä vaiheessa, mutta muistan että tässäkin ketjussa haaveiltiin "vahvasta tikarin pistosta kohti Melitopolia ja Krimin maasillan katkaisusta", mikä on hyvin lähellä sitä mitä suuremmissakin esikunnissa selvästi suunniteltiin.

Joka tapauksessa, menneet ovat menneitä ja nyt on nyt. Kenties vuosien kuluttua kun sota on ohi, tästä tullaan kirjoittamaan enemmän ja tarkemmin. Toisaalta siinä vaiheessa sotaa johtaneilla ja päätöksiä tehneillä on tietysti suuri motiivi kaunistella omaa osuuttaan eli pitää varautua siihen että saadaan useita eri näkökulmia eri vaiheista ja pitää tehdä omat johtopäätökset niitä vertailemalla.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
"Muutama päivä sitten"


Tuossa on linkitetty pidempi kenraali Syrskyi haastattelu, lainaan sen käännöksen spoilerin taakse (artikkeli julkaistu 9.4.2025 - se on pitkä joten pakko jakaa kolmessa osassa): LÄHDE

https://lb.ua/society/2025/04/09/670107_oleksandr_sirskiy_pidgotovleniy.html


HomeSocietyWar — April 9, 2025, 07:00

Oleksandr Syrsky: "The enemy's prepared mobilization resource is about 5 million people. And the total mobilization resource is 20 million."​

Not long ago, many in Ukraine (and around the world) associated the US presidential election with hopes for a quick end to the Russian-Ukrainian war. Importantly, the end is fair.

But that didn't happen. Thematic negotiations are still ongoing, but there are no illusions left - the war continues. Moreover, its pace is increasing. The Russians have planned another exercise in Belarus for the fall.

"The visibility of the exercises is the most acceptable way to relocate, transfer troops, concentrate in a certain direction and create a grouping of troops. Actually, this is how 2022 began," says Oleksandr Syrsky , Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in a conversation with LB.ua.

According to him, the offensive on Sumy and Kharkiv regions, which President Zelensky previously spoke about, has already begun. "Since the beginning of the aggression, the enemy has increased its group fivefold. Every month they increase it by 8-9 thousand, in a year it turns out 120-130 thousand. As of January 1, 2025, there were 603 thousand military personnel in Russia, today there are already 623 thousand," Syrskyi specifies.

We have been waiting for this meeting for a long time. Syrsky is at the front almost all the time, rarely appears in Kyiv, so the conversation was postponed for several months in a row and many questions accumulated. From the current situation on the battlefield, problems with the supply of ammunition, with mobilization, rotations and SZCH to the production of the latest equipment, countering Russian KABs with our own guided bombs, the prospects of the peacekeeping contingent, etc. A special focus is on problematic issues such as the training of fighters, fictitious reporting in the army, the equipment of defensive lines, numerous replacements of commanders, the affairs of generals . In addition, there are many new, previously unknown details about the beginning of the great war, the Kursk operation. For example: before the start of our counteroffensive, some commanders refused to cross the state border, because it was "illegal."

For more details , see Oleksandr Syrsky's extensive interview for LB.ua. (ELI lue alle lainattu koko haastattelu)

Sonya Koshkina , Editor-in-Chief of LB.ua
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky
Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky


Last summer, in an interview with The Guardian, you said that Russia had achieved small tactical victories, but still had not made significant progress. Although the enemy is ready to sacrifice a huge number of infantry for its tactical victories. Has anything changed since then?

The situation has not changed radically. The enemy continues its strategic offensive operation with the aim of seizing our territory, defeating our troops, advancing deep into the country, seeking to completely seize the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, and create a buffer zone in the Kharkiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv regions.

He adheres to those goals or tries to complete those tasks that are set for him.

And they don't seem to be stopping there...

You see, despite all the negotiations, we are only observing an increase in the intensity of offensive actions.

President Volodymyr Zelensky said in an interview with Le Figaro that Russia is preparing for a new offensive on the Sumy and Kharkiv regions .

I can say that the president is absolutely right and this offensive has actually already begun.

Because for several days, almost a week, we have been observing an almost doubling of the number of enemy offensive actions in all main directions.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky and Editor-in-Chief of <i>LB.ua</i> Sonya Koshkina

Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky and Editor-in-Chief of LB.ua Sonya Koshkina


This fall, Belarus will hold large-scale joint exercises with the Russian armed forces, called Zapad-2025. Could they also be part of preparations for a new offensive against Ukraine from the territory of Belarus?

All exercises have a purpose. And one of these purposes is the covert creation of offensive troop groups. That is, the visibility of exercises is the most acceptable way to rebase, transfer troops, concentrate in a certain direction, and create a troop group.

Actually, this is how 2022 began. You remember that initially a group was created, it conducted exercises, and we all hoped that they would end, and the Russian troops would return to their territory.

But when the decision was made to continue these exercises, it became obvious to me that everything was fine.

Are you waiting for the same thing in the fall ?

Not that I expect it. But we definitely have to take this factor into account.

According to your information, the ratio of artillery on the front is now one to two in favor of the enemy, while a year ago it was one to ten. So, can we talk about almost parity, considering that we operate with more advanced means of destruction?

We mean the ammunition ratio.

We can say that we carried out a series of very successful strikes as part of Operation Deepstrike (strikes on the enemy on its territory. — S.K.) . If you remember, we hit several arsenals. And after that, the number of artillery shells used by the enemy per day almost halved.

They used to spend about 40,000 or more rounds of ammunition every day. And after our strikes, the figure changed dramatically and is hovering around 23, now it has crept up a little — to 27–28 thousand.

An occupant near a BM-21 Grad self-propelled 122 mm multiple launch rocket system.

Photo: EPA/UPG
An occupant near a BM-21 "Grad" self-propelled 122 mm multiple launch rocket system.


What is this growth related to?

Perhaps with the supply of ammunition from North Korea . Perhaps from Iran. Perhaps with the increase in the pace of its own production.

The development of high-tech weapons systems does not require a large number of personnel to service them. The massive use of such systems to a depth of 30–300 km will transfer the burden of war from the front line deep into the occupied territory. The question is: is our General Staff creating such a doctrine? Will the development of high-tech systems reduce the need for mobilization?

First, this is indeed one of the main areas of our work. We created the world's first unmanned forces. Russia is repeating our experience - at the end of last year it also announced the creation of its own unmanned forces and is now actively building up and scaling up its units.

We continue to expand in this direction, increasing the number, scale and capabilities within the framework of deepstrike , that is, long-range destruction, and have already exceeded the figure of 1,700 kilometers. On the one hand.

On the other hand, all our brigades are also increasing the unmanned component. This project already covers dozens of brigades, thereby we save the lives of soldiers. We are increasing the technical component and thanks to this we will be able to reduce the direct participation of our servicemen in combat operations.

The effectiveness of drones depends on weather conditions, the performance of the enemy's electronic warfare systems, and many other factors . Perhaps it makes sense to set the goal not only of a million drones, but also of millions of mines and shells that we can make ourselves?

There is growth in other areas as well. There can be no increase in drone production without an increase in ammunition. These are interrelated processes.

Domestic drone production

Photo: video screenshot
Domestic drone production


We have strayed a bit from the topic of the new Russian offensive. How long, according to your estimates, is the Russian Federation capable of continuing its offensive actions and what does the Ukrainian Defense Forces need to stabilize the front?

Today we summed up the results with the commanders of unmanned units, unmanned brigades, and regiments. We hold this event every month, and our intelligence introduces what is emerging in the field of application of unmanned systems: what are the newest types of UAVs, the newest means of electronic warfare and means of combating them. This process is so fast that in fact something changes every month: more powerful systems appear, the range of applications, for example, of electronic warfare means, increases, their order of operation increases. This is such a technological industry, and we need to keep our advantage here.

Still. Do our partners have the ability and/or means to change the strategic situation in our favor? And it's not just about weapons.

Support from partners, of course, plays a crucial role. Especially when we were helped by the United States of America. Now the assistance from the United States has decreased. And the main assistance comes from our partners in Europe.

But we must also rely on our own strength. And we have successes in the production of artillery. Quite significant successes in electronic warfare. We are making progress - our partners are already studying our experience.

UAVs, again. So many models, types of different UAVs that strike the enemy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

That is, even if US support stops completely, as it did for a short period not so long ago, will we, in principle, be able to cope together with our partners?

Yes, of course. Support from partners is essential, but we have to rely on our own strength.

How long will it take for us to be able to rely solely on our own resources in terms of production capacity ? Without the support of partners?

In my opinion, this process has moved forward very quickly over the past year. I think that this year will also give us a significant boost, because we have, in principle, entered such a, let's say, afterburner mode of operation. And the situation itself requires the exertion of all our strength. Everyone understands this.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky

Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrsky


Continuing on about partners, The New York Times recently published a sensational article about the cooperation between Ukraine and the United States during the Great War. In particular, it said that at the beginning there was distrust between you and the Americans and that you allegedly even told US representatives: “We are at war with the Russians. You are not. Why should we listen to you?” Was there really such an episode?

You know, I learned a lot about what I supposedly said and what I did. I wonder who, let's say, came up with it.

In the same text, The New York Times claims that on your initiative , the 2023 offensive plan was changed and instead of one direction of attack, the Defense Forces launched offensive actions in three directions at once. And this, according to the Americans, was allegedly the reason for the failure. Can you comment on this statement ?

Every one of our officers, generals who participated in combat operations, knows that this is not true at all.

Yes, we conducted an offensive south of Bakhmut. But we conducted offensive operations with two brigades from the group. If we had five brigades, I think that both Bakhmut and Soledar would have been liberated.

Moreover, the enemy would have left them himself. Because the idea of this operation was that we would have cut the three main roads that provided logistical support to this group.

When we planned these actions, we understood that our forces were not enough. We have two brigades without additional ammunition. That is, within the limits of what was supplied to us for conducting ordinary actions in the usual mode. But we counted on surprise, on the fact that we would break through the enemy's defense with such not just adventurous, but courageous actions, taking into account the fact that it was not ready, it was not like, for example, in Zaporizhia. There, all the fortifications were in an ordinary field.

And so we were counting on being able to advance, to cut the road between Bakhmut and Horlivka. Once.

Soldiers of the 44th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine fire from a 2S22 Bogdana wheeled self-propelled howitzer near the front line in Zaporizhia region, April 5, 2025.

Photo: EPA/UPG
Soldiers of the 44th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine fire from a 2S22 "Bogdana" wheeled self-propelled howitzer near the front line in Zaporizhia region, April 5, 2025.


The second road that we wanted to cut on one side was the road between Bakhmut and Debaltseve. This is the main route that we used for logistical support. And the road to Popasna branched off from it. This is another road that led to the main highway.

So, in principle, these are three roads that were used to logistically support a group of 20,000. If we managed to cut these roads, the enemy would be forced to retreat. Otherwise, he would fall into a trap.

But that didn't happen.

Unfortunately, we simply did not have enough strength and resources.

Concluding this block, I cannot help but recall Valery Zaluzhny's phrase from the summer of 1923 that the situation at the front has reached a dead end , when neither side can advance because it is equally technologically equipped, and this is reminiscent of the events of the First World War.

You can judge for yourself whether this assessment is correct, because after that there was the Kursk Offensive. And in fact, it completely recreated the offensive operation that took place in Kharkiv.

President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly said that the offensive operation in the Kursk region has already accomplished its task — it prevented an offensive on the Sumy-Kharkiv regions. Emphasis on the word "already."

If you remember, last summer the situation was critical for us - the enemy launched an offensive operation. At first he wanted to attack Kharkiv, but we managed to get ahead of him in action. The enemy did not expect that we had any reserves.

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi in Sumy region.

Photo: General Staff
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi in Sumy region.


We managed to withdraw seven brigades for rotation, and when it became absolutely clear that the enemy would launch an offensive on Kharkiv, and there was a lot of evidence of this: data from our intelligence, the Main Intelligence Directorate, front-line intelligence, that is, interception, - and they all concerned the fact that the Russians were withdrawing units, giving them time to regroup, to rest, and starting the offensive in early May. (Actually, they planned it for the 20th of April, but then this date was moved to early May.) When it became clear, I reported to the president and we moved all our reserves (brigades that were at the training grounds, to restore combat readiness) to the border.

In general, the main idea of the enemy was that they planned to carry out this strategic offensive after the combat coordination of the 44th Army Corps. It formed the basis of this group. It was completely re-formed, that is, it was a new unit. And the number of this group, as far as I remember, fluctuated within 140-160 thousand, which is a lot. They planned to attack in two directions - Kharkiv and Sumy.

When we began to advance our units to the state border — and this corps ( 44th — S.K. ) had not yet completed combat coordination, its units were at the training grounds — the Russian command, in response to our actions, which were unexpected for them, decided to attack with the forces they had. According to our data, this is about 46 thousand in the Belgorod area and 23–26 thousand in the Sumy direction.

Then you know - the actions began, they turned out to be generally unsuccessful, because the enemy got stuck in Vovchansk. They advanced nine kilometers in the Liptsiv area near Kharkiv , but then we managed to push them back two kilometers and the line actually stabilized.

The enemy suffered very heavy losses and gradually began to transfer those units that were preparing for the offensive on Sumy to the Kharkiv direction. So they also got involved and got stuck. Thus, this offensive, let's say, failed.

After that, the enemy regrouped, completed the preparation of the 44th Corps, and in fact, from mid-June, began a strategic operation on the entire front. It began to attack Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, New York, Pokrovsk, Zaporizhia, in the Kupyansk direction, in the Lymansk direction, that is, practically everywhere.

The situation was critical, and in these conditions it was necessary to do something to weaken the enemy's pressure as much as possible. And then, in fact, the idea was born to conduct a counterattack where the enemy did not expect it and where he was weakest.

We studied the situation in detail and came to the conclusion that precisely where the enemy planned to attack the Sumy region, since he had transferred all his units to the Kharkiv direction, he only had units that covered the state border or were in the depths to carry out some separate tasks.

When five brigades were replenished, they replaced the brigades of the Airborne Assault Troops, which were in the battles in the Torets direction (95th brigade), in the area of Chasovoye Yar (80th brigade was stationed there). We managed to withdraw them, prepare them. And all this happened practically from the wheels. The brigades left, not even fully replenished - there were two battalions each, because the third ones were only replenished. Then we had to disband two brigades, you remember - the 153rd and the 155th - and they replenished these brigades.

And they launched the offensive on August 6.

The main thing is that we managed to keep it all a secret. No one knew.

You said that initially only four people knew about it.

At first, four people, then, two weeks before the offensive, of course, the commanders knew.

But this required very detailed, thorough preparation. In particular, the training of personnel, because crossing the state border, as it turned out, was also a kind of moral barrier for some.

Chief editor of <i>LB.ua</i> Konya Koshkin

Photo: Main Communications Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The chief editor of LB.ua is Konya Koshkina


In a sense?! Why?

On the eve of the offensive, I literally toured all the units and companies, met with the soldiers, and told everyone why we were going there and why we were here.

Because there were even commanders who questioned whether it was legal.

So they attacked us — that's legal, but for us to cross the state border into enemy territory when there's a war is illegal? That 's absurd !

At the front, the moral and psychological state is of great importance. When everyone retreats, they are depressed, they do not believe in anything, that it is possible to advance, that it is possible to crush the enemy. And when we advance, there is a change in consciousness, in the moral and psychological state, this motivates not only the troops that are advancing, but everyone. Because it turns out that the enemy is not like that, and you see, in one day we advanced 12 kilometers deep, defeated all the border units, overcame the border strip.

By the way, the strip along the border was very powerfully built. We were only able to make passages in their barriers around 12 noon.

This problem exists in some other areas as well. Imagine having to cross two anti-tank ditches, each up to three or four meters deep and wide. All the tetrahedrons ( anti- tank fortifications , also called “ dragon ’s teeth .” — S.K. ) are connected by a metal cable, and in some areas they are also mined. Engineering equipment begins to pull them together, and then anti-tank mines are detonated.

And drones. We were very lucky that the enemy didn't have fiber-optic drones at that time (they were just starting to appear). This later became a big problem for us. And at that time, the number of our drones was greater, we managed to coordinate the UAV units with the actions of the assault units.

FPV drone operators of the 93rd separate mechanized brigade Kholodny Yar in Donetsk region, March 22, 2025.

Photo: EPA/UPG
FPV drone operators of the 93rd separate mechanized brigade "Kholodny Yar" in Donetsk region, March 22, 2025.


By the way, then for the first time assault battalions declared themselves. They showed high efficiency. Remember, there was a thesis that it was necessary to recruit only those brigades that had traditions, experience, which fought, and these units were formed from scratch. Some commanders were not even personnel.

And they went ahead, went first, made passages together with the engineers, broke through the defenses. They went as advanced units in front of our landing brigades.

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