skärdis
Greatest Leader
Ei tuokaan ihan nuorimman saapumiserän ukkoja ole.Ryssä lähettelee terveisiä kotipuoleen, mutta juttu jää kesken
Ukrainan konflikti/sota
-TripleX-
Respected Leader
Saratovin jalostamosta olikin jo maininta, mutta siellä on nyt aamulla parikin paloa jäljellä mikä merkitsee vanhojen tulosten mukaan, että mikä palaa pitkään, palaa kunnolla.
Kyseessä on Rosneftin jalostamo kuten taisi olla ne kaksi muutakin ja noin 7 miljoonan tonnin vuosikapasiteetti ja ainakin osa raakaöljystä on toimitettu sinne putkilinjoilla, miksi tämä on tärkeä tieto on siitä syystä, että osittainenkin tuotannon korvaaminen muualla vaatii sekä raaka-aineen että lopputuotteiden rahtaamisen rautateillä, joiden kapasiteetti on nyt jo punaisella.
Kiire on varmasti yrittää saada laitos korjattua.
Kyseessä on Rosneftin jalostamo kuten taisi olla ne kaksi muutakin ja noin 7 miljoonan tonnin vuosikapasiteetti ja ainakin osa raakaöljystä on toimitettu sinne putkilinjoilla, miksi tämä on tärkeä tieto on siitä syystä, että osittainenkin tuotannon korvaaminen muualla vaatii sekä raaka-aineen että lopputuotteiden rahtaamisen rautateillä, joiden kapasiteetti on nyt jo punaisella.
Kiire on varmasti yrittää saada laitos korjattua.
Tää ei ole mikään tuore juttu, ainakin 2022 oli noi olemassa.On vaan noussu ajankohtasuuden takia uudelleen pinnalle.Ryssälässä alkoi ilmestyä mainostauluja, joissa luki ”Alaska on meidän!”. Tämä on Krasnojarskissa.
Katso liite: 123779
Tässä kokonainen ketju noista Alaska on Venäjän jutuista.
Thread by @GrandTurion on Thread Reader App
@GrandTurion: russian threats to Alaska 🧵 #VatnikSoup Аляска наша! - Alaska is ours! The company that put up the billboards was described as "patriots". "It’s just that our director is very patriotic, so we decided ...…
threadreaderapp.com
ddude
Majuri
Krimillä on ollut vielä aiemmin,ainakin vuodesta 2016 alkaen kilpi jossa lukee jotenkin: "Me otimme Krimin, on teidän vuoro ottaa Alaska"Tää ei ole mikään tuore juttu, ainakin 2022 oli noi olemassa.On vaan noussu ajankohtasuuden takia uudelleen pinnalle.
Tässä kokonainen ketju noista Alaska on Venäjän jutuista.
Thread by @GrandTurion on Thread Reader App
@GrandTurion: russian threats to Alaska 🧵 #VatnikSoup Аляска наша! - Alaska is ours! The company that put up the billboards was described as "patriots". "It’s just that our director is very patriotic, so we decided ...…
Kiusankpl
Respected Leader
Ryssän jalostamoiden paskominen on yhä hyvässä vauhdissa.
Nyt olisi loppurutistuksen paikka.
Ja ballistista sinne dronejen & risteilevien sekaan!
Antares
Respected Leader
FIRMS näkee paitsi tulipalot niin myös kuumat palokaasut (myös tehtaiden savupiipuista, vaikkei oikeaa tulipaloa olisikaan), joten on mahdollista että palokaasujen noustessa yläilmoihin se hieman hämää ja palava alue näyttää suuremmalta kuin mitä se todellisuudessa onkaan. Pienempien tulipalojen osalta se on tarkempi, koska ei ole tätä hämäävää vaikutusta.
Toki on myös mahdollista että tulipalo olisi levinnyt.
Näin. Joidenkin teollisuuslaitosten kohdalla firms näyttää paloa koko alueella 24/7.
Antares
Respected Leader
Pokrovskin seudulta tuore karttapäivitys, tämän kaupungin "menetyksestä" on spekuloitu jo pidempään mutta kaupungin itäpuolella oleva "pullistuma" on kieltämättä uhkaava.
Ensimmäiseen karttakuvaan viivoituksella merkitty kärki kohti pohjoista on uusi muutos, sanotaan että ryssä olisi edennyt ko. paikassa 13km kahden viimeisen päivän aikana. Selittäväksi tekijäksi sanotaan / väitetään yksinkertaisesti sitä että ryssällä on alueella selvästi suurempi määrä jalkaväkeä mistä syystä puolustuksen aukkoja onnistutaan löytämään ja hyödyntämään (aina silloin tällöin).
Updated map showing Russian advances north of Pokrovsk and in the Serebryansky forest. According to the map, the grey zone is only a little over 8 kilometers to Dobropillia.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.4480007/37.1495232
Ensimmäiseen karttakuvaan viivoituksella merkitty kärki kohti pohjoista on uusi muutos, sanotaan että ryssä olisi edennyt ko. paikassa 13km kahden viimeisen päivän aikana. Selittäväksi tekijäksi sanotaan / väitetään yksinkertaisesti sitä että ryssällä on alueella selvästi suurempi määrä jalkaväkeä mistä syystä puolustuksen aukkoja onnistutaan löytämään ja hyödyntämään (aina silloin tällöin).
Updated map showing Russian advances north of Pokrovsk and in the Serebryansky forest. According to the map, the grey zone is only a little over 8 kilometers to Dobropillia.
https://deepstatemap.live/en#12/48.4480007/37.1495232
Antares
Respected Leader
Ukrainan drone tai dronet ovat lentäneet Komin tasavallan alueelle eli noin 1700km matkan ja siellä olevan öljynjalostamon yhteen polttoainesäiliöön on osuttu. Ainakin alustavien videoiden perusteella yksi osuma ja säiliö vuotaa mutta ei syttynyt tuleen:
Right now Russian Lukoil oil reservoirs in Ukhta, Komi region of Russia, are under drone attack. 1700km from the frontline.
Drone of unknown model was spotted in the Komi region of Russia prior to the attack.
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Tässä karkea geopaikannus dronen osumasta:
Territory of the Lukoil oil refinery, 1700km from the frontline was targeted less than an hour ago. Oil refinery in Ukhta has the capacity of 4,2mln tons per year.
Russians published a video which shows damage to one of the fuel tanks. (63.5778254, 53.7327713). Red arrow shows direction of the operator on the video in the attached post.
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En muista että tämän jalostamon alueelle olisi isketty aikaisemmin ja samaa sanoo tämä twitter-tili (hän myös kirjoittaa että tämä on etäisyyden osalta yksi kaukaisimmista öljynjalostamoista joihin on isketty - tosin ei kaikkein kaukaisin): LÄHDE
This refinery (Ukhta refinery in Komi republic) hasnt been yet attacked at all until now.
With 1700 kms, this is also one of longest distance attacks on refineries - after attack on Usinsk refinery, also in Komi Republic.
Right now Russian Lukoil oil reservoirs in Ukhta, Komi region of Russia, are under drone attack. 1700km from the frontline.
Drone of unknown model was spotted in the Komi region of Russia prior to the attack.
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Tässä karkea geopaikannus dronen osumasta:
Territory of the Lukoil oil refinery, 1700km from the frontline was targeted less than an hour ago. Oil refinery in Ukhta has the capacity of 4,2mln tons per year.
Russians published a video which shows damage to one of the fuel tanks. (63.5778254, 53.7327713). Red arrow shows direction of the operator on the video in the attached post.
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En muista että tämän jalostamon alueelle olisi isketty aikaisemmin ja samaa sanoo tämä twitter-tili (hän myös kirjoittaa että tämä on etäisyyden osalta yksi kaukaisimmista öljynjalostamoista joihin on isketty - tosin ei kaikkein kaukaisin): LÄHDE
This refinery (Ukhta refinery in Komi republic) hasnt been yet attacked at all until now.
With 1700 kms, this is also one of longest distance attacks on refineries - after attack on Usinsk refinery, also in Komi Republic.
Antares
Respected Leader
Laarin pohjia raavitaan, ainakin tietynlaisten ajoneuvojen osalta:
As time passes there's ever more evidence of refurbs of all kinds of AFVs. For example, PRP-3/4 artillery support vehicles to BMP-like APCs:
The 216th Repair Battalion of the Russian Armed Forces is converting a decommissioned PRP-4 into an ersatz APC. The video mentions that the vehicle is written off. It’s visible that the interior is covered with a layer of rust, which is being manually removed. Everything is stripped out of the vehicle, leaving only the armored hull. The vehicle is intended for use in the autumn-winter period, as currently, everything is on wheeled vehicles and motorcycles, according to the video.
Additional protection is traditionally provided by rubber-fabric screens following GABTU guidelines, with an extra screen installed at the rear.
The footage also shows a similar upgrade for a BMP.
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Or BMP-1AMs from Rubstovk:
Train Echelon of 20 BMP-1AM 675-sb3KDZ IFV's - Summer 2025
Source - https://t.me/btvt2019/21553
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Location: Novosibirsk (Новосибирск), Novosibirsk Oblast, Russia at 54.97329, 83.03950 LÄHDE
https://google.com/maps/place/54%C2%B058'23.9%22N+83%C2%B002'22.2%22E/@54.9732936,83.0369277,514m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d54.9732905!4d83.0395026
A Russian train with T-54 and T-62, and BMP-2M / BMP-1AM 675-sb3KDZ infantry fighting vehicles moves west.
As time passes there's ever more evidence of refurbs of all kinds of AFVs. For example, PRP-3/4 artillery support vehicles to BMP-like APCs:
The 216th Repair Battalion of the Russian Armed Forces is converting a decommissioned PRP-4 into an ersatz APC. The video mentions that the vehicle is written off. It’s visible that the interior is covered with a layer of rust, which is being manually removed. Everything is stripped out of the vehicle, leaving only the armored hull. The vehicle is intended for use in the autumn-winter period, as currently, everything is on wheeled vehicles and motorcycles, according to the video.
Additional protection is traditionally provided by rubber-fabric screens following GABTU guidelines, with an extra screen installed at the rear.
The footage also shows a similar upgrade for a BMP.
-
Or BMP-1AMs from Rubstovk:
Train Echelon of 20 BMP-1AM 675-sb3KDZ IFV's - Summer 2025
Source - https://t.me/btvt2019/21553
-
Location: Novosibirsk (Новосибирск), Novosibirsk Oblast, Russia at 54.97329, 83.03950 LÄHDE
https://google.com/maps/place/54%C2%B058'23.9%22N+83%C2%B002'22.2%22E/@54.9732936,83.0369277,514m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m4!3m3!8m2!3d54.9732905!4d83.0395026
A Russian train with T-54 and T-62, and BMP-2M / BMP-1AM 675-sb3KDZ infantry fighting vehicles moves west.
Antares
Respected Leader
Samaa nähtävissä panssarivaunujen osalta, Jompy kirjoitti tällaista neljä päivää sitten:
And just like that, there are a lot of likely T-72As parked in the yards outside UVZ now. Probably some T-72Bs from the 1311th as well. Surely they'll be refurbished sooner or later.
Kudos to @Ath3neN0ctu4 and @waffentraeger for pointing it out.
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Just to made it clear, there are also T-90s there.
And also this: T-72A converted to some sort of T-72B3 (kudos to @Ath3neN0ctu4). (alla olevan kuvan lähde = LÄHDE)
https://t.me/btvt2019/21583?single
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Poimin viesteihin tulleita kommentteja ja vastauksia spoilerin taakse:
And just like that, there are a lot of likely T-72As parked in the yards outside UVZ now. Probably some T-72Bs from the 1311th as well. Surely they'll be refurbished sooner or later.
Kudos to @Ath3neN0ctu4 and @waffentraeger for pointing it out.
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Just to made it clear, there are also T-90s there.
And also this: T-72A converted to some sort of T-72B3 (kudos to @Ath3neN0ctu4). (alla olevan kuvan lähde = LÄHDE)
https://t.me/btvt2019/21583?single
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Poimin viesteihin tulleita kommentteja ja vastauksia spoilerin taakse:
Kommentti: Quick question why haven't the Russians reactivated the T72As much earlier in the war? Is it a lack of parts or is the fact that a lot of them are just in such poor state
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: They didn't need them. LÄHDE
Kommentti: Don't joke. It is much more better than the T-62/55/54's.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: Those were easier and cheaper to refurb. They didn't need to invest time and money on T-72As. LÄHDE
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Kommentti: Fingers crossed we'll get some factory footage to further what we see here.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: Seems likely. I think this is somehow related to those unmanned tanks we saw recently at UVZ. If all you need is a glorified battle taxi, then it makes sense. LÄHDE
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Kommentti: And what's the plan with them? Not only they've been sitting in storage for decades but they also need much more upgrades to bring them up to modern standards (new armor inserts bigger autoloader etc)
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: You don't need to modernize turtle tanks. Just a thorough refurb. LÄHDE
Kommentti: But arent they also incompatible with modern apfsds rounds? Like didnt the B3 got a new loader because the rounds would literally not fit in the old one?
Johon Waffentraeger vastasi näin: Many Turtle tanks lack the gun alltogether. They are just heavy armored APCs, no longer tanks. The way Russia is fighting right now, that's what is needed, not tanks that can take ou other tanks. LÄHDE
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Kommentti: If the T-72As at 349th and the T-72Bs at 1311th are being moved to UVZs, that means that they'll be left only with T-62s at the 769th, T-64s at the 2456th and T-72As at the 2544th with significant numbers in storage, meaning tank storage bases will be completely empty by 2026.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: They're also taking T-72As from the 2544th. That said, emtpying storage bases means Russia will refurb enough hundreds of tanks for several years of losses at the current attrition level. LÄHDE
Johon Waffentraeger vastasi näin: To be fair, the current attrition levels mean Russia almost isn't using tanks at all. So, not using something or not having something is, while not the same, pretty similarily felt on the front. The fact that it costs more men to keep up the meat grinder and makes decisive breakthroughs all but impossible is likely a disadvantage. Time and manpower can't be easily (if at all) recovered. You don't adopt motorcycle assaults because they work, only because you have to. LÄHDE
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: Yeah, but what I try to say is that people shouldn't mentally associate depleted bases with no equipment left in active service. At all. LÄHDE
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Kommentti: Personally, I dont think theyre preserving armor for any push - they would already do this.
I think theyre trying to replenish what they lost before, and filling back holes in other units in Far East and other places where they took equipment before.
But quality is huge drop.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: They didn't need them. LÄHDE
Kommentti: Don't joke. It is much more better than the T-62/55/54's.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: Those were easier and cheaper to refurb. They didn't need to invest time and money on T-72As. LÄHDE
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Kommentti: Fingers crossed we'll get some factory footage to further what we see here.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: Seems likely. I think this is somehow related to those unmanned tanks we saw recently at UVZ. If all you need is a glorified battle taxi, then it makes sense. LÄHDE
-
Kommentti: And what's the plan with them? Not only they've been sitting in storage for decades but they also need much more upgrades to bring them up to modern standards (new armor inserts bigger autoloader etc)
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: You don't need to modernize turtle tanks. Just a thorough refurb. LÄHDE
Kommentti: But arent they also incompatible with modern apfsds rounds? Like didnt the B3 got a new loader because the rounds would literally not fit in the old one?
Johon Waffentraeger vastasi näin: Many Turtle tanks lack the gun alltogether. They are just heavy armored APCs, no longer tanks. The way Russia is fighting right now, that's what is needed, not tanks that can take ou other tanks. LÄHDE
-
Kommentti: If the T-72As at 349th and the T-72Bs at 1311th are being moved to UVZs, that means that they'll be left only with T-62s at the 769th, T-64s at the 2456th and T-72As at the 2544th with significant numbers in storage, meaning tank storage bases will be completely empty by 2026.
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: They're also taking T-72As from the 2544th. That said, emtpying storage bases means Russia will refurb enough hundreds of tanks for several years of losses at the current attrition level. LÄHDE
Johon Waffentraeger vastasi näin: To be fair, the current attrition levels mean Russia almost isn't using tanks at all. So, not using something or not having something is, while not the same, pretty similarily felt on the front. The fact that it costs more men to keep up the meat grinder and makes decisive breakthroughs all but impossible is likely a disadvantage. Time and manpower can't be easily (if at all) recovered. You don't adopt motorcycle assaults because they work, only because you have to. LÄHDE
Johon Jompy vastasi näin: Yeah, but what I try to say is that people shouldn't mentally associate depleted bases with no equipment left in active service. At all. LÄHDE
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Kommentti: Personally, I dont think theyre preserving armor for any push - they would already do this.
I think theyre trying to replenish what they lost before, and filling back holes in other units in Far East and other places where they took equipment before.
But quality is huge drop.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tässä erään OSINT-ryhmän seuranta ryssän junarataverkkoa vastaan tehdyistä iskuista. Tarkat päivämäärät näkyvät karttakuvasta, mutta vanhin merkitty isku on 19.7.2025 eli puhutaan viimeisestä kolmesta viikosta:
Ukrainian forces have conducted 12 precision strikes on Russian railway infrastructure in recent weeks, mainly in the south. These attacks have disrupted key junctions and slowed military cargo flows to Crimea, Donbas, and the North Caucasus, complicating Russian supply chains, Ukrainian analysts at Conflict Capital report.
https://t.me/conflictcapital/1225
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Analysts at Conflict Capital note that Russian forces failed to achieve strategic gains this summer, but several threats remain. The northern front near Kharkiv is stable, with Russian attacks repelled and the enemy focused on holding ground and exhausting Ukrainian units.
From Siversk to Pokrovsk, Russia relies on massed artillery and small assault groups. Fighting near Rodynske is key, as Russian forces try to pressure Ukrainian logistics and avoid direct urban combat. In the Kostiantynivka area, Russian troops attempt to cut off Toretsk’s supply routes by attacking from multiple directions and seizing key heights for FPV drone deployment.
In the Serebrianske Forest, Russian units increasingly use small infiltration groups to probe weak points, achieving limited advances and threatening rear areas. The southern front remains the most dynamic, with Russia holding defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia but moving reserves near Berdyansk and Mariupol. In Kherson, both sides fight for control of river islands and crossing points.
Analysts emphasize that the situation remains tense across all sectors, with Russia seeking any opportunity for a breakthrough to exploit Ukrainian defenses.
Ukrainian forces have conducted 12 precision strikes on Russian railway infrastructure in recent weeks, mainly in the south. These attacks have disrupted key junctions and slowed military cargo flows to Crimea, Donbas, and the North Caucasus, complicating Russian supply chains, Ukrainian analysts at Conflict Capital report.
https://t.me/conflictcapital/1225
Front without pauses: August trends.
It's time to return to the mini-forecast regarding the LBZ. In particular, against the backdrop of the negotiations in Istanbul at the time, it was a "hell of a summer." Fortunately, the Russian units did not achieve strategic success (thanks to the stunning efforts of the SOU and deep strikes, which will be discussed later).
️However, there are still a number of threats that need to be understood:
In the northern direction (Kharkiv region), the front remains stable: Russian attempts to advance remain unsuccessful. The enemy is clearly focused on holding the captured bridgeheads and exhausting our units through regular shelling and regular assaults.
The key points remain the Seversky to Pokrovsky shades. Here the Russian Federation continues to use mass tactics: increasing the density of artillery and using small assault groups.
Pokrovsk–Mirnograd — the battle for the Rodynske settlement, the “key” to two large cities. Here the enemy is trying to implement the “claw” tactic, advancing step by step along the flanks, instead of a frontal assault on Pokrovsk (the distance to the “fire bag” is about 18 km). The main efforts are to create multi-node pressure on the rear logistics centers (Grishyne, Shevchenko, which remain secondary arteries) in order to force the SOU to retreat without large-scale battles in the cities themselves.
Konstantinovka — the enemy is trying to create a “scissors effect” for Toretsk’s logistics, attacking simultaneously from two directions . A feature: the focus on controlling the heights for deploying FPV drones, which makes even small villages critically important for both sides. At the same time, the enemy is saturating this direction with small groups (1-3 people), but with the support of drones and mortars.
It is important that the Konstantinovka “node” is one of the three main routes for providing support to the Toretsk agglomeration. Its breakthrough or blocking immediately increases the risk of losing the entire agglomeration in the future, since only two logistical arteries will remain that can be quickly taken under fire control from new Russian positions.
In addition, a rather indicative trend can be seen in the Serebryansk Forestry. Enemy units will change tactics, relying on infiltration by small groups into weak points of defense (de facto two/three "Rusaks" try to either organize a sprint or crawl under cover for several hours/days). This gives local advances, especially in the rear areas, and creates a threat in the Torske and Zarechne areas.
The Southern Theater is the largest concentration of risks and opportunities. In the Zaporizhia direction, the enemy maintains its defense, but in the area of Berdyansk and Mariupol, increased activity in the transfer of reserves is recorded . In the Kherson region, fighting continues on islands and coastal areas , where both sides are trying to establish control over logistically convenient crossing points.
🛤So we return to the positive news: a key innovation in recent weeks is the intensification of attacks on Russian railway infrastructure , especially in the south. From July 19 to August 5, more than ten point attacks were recorded (Timashevsk, Salsk, Novocherkassk, Frolovo, etc.), affecting hub stations and junctions through which the main flows of military cargo to Crimea, Donbass, and the North Caucasus pass.
🗂For a better understanding, one-time and point strikes do not give an effect (the track is repaired in a few days, which makes such strikes inexpedient). However, the current massive attacks do not just delay trains - they create the effect of "accumulation of traffic jams" when reserve routes are overloaded, and throughput drops across the entire network.
Thus, the Russian Federation enters August with a front that is held mainly due to the inertia of accumulated reserves and stable logistics from the central regions. If the pace of deep strikes on the rear is maintained, then by the fall the Russian troops may face systemic disruptions in the provision of the southern grouping , which will open up space for local Ukrainian offensive actions.
However, the situation at the front remains tense in all directions : the enemy is exerting pressure, seeking to break the defense at least somewhere in order to then make a local breakthrough and develop it into a large-scale offensive .
🗞Conflict Capital |Support
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t.me/conflictcapital/1225
1.01KviewsAug 10 at 17:50
It's time to return to the mini-forecast regarding the LBZ. In particular, against the backdrop of the negotiations in Istanbul at the time, it was a "hell of a summer." Fortunately, the Russian units did not achieve strategic success (thanks to the stunning efforts of the SOU and deep strikes, which will be discussed later).️However, there are still a number of threats that need to be understood:In the northern direction (Kharkiv region), the front remains stable: Russian attempts to advance remain unsuccessful. The enemy is clearly focused on holding the captured bridgeheads and exhausting our units through regular shelling and regular assaults.The key points remain the Seversky to Pokrovsky shades. Here the Russian Federation continues to use mass tactics: increasing the density of artillery and using small assault groups.Pokrovsk–Mirnograd — the battle for the Rodynske settlement, the “key” to two large cities. Here the enemy is trying to implement the “claw” tactic, advancing step by step along the flanks, instead of a frontal assault on Pokrovsk (the distance to the “fire bag” is about 18 km). The main efforts are to create multi-node pressure on the rear logistics centers (Grishyne, Shevchenko, which remain secondary arteries) in order to force the SOU to retreat without large-scale battles in the cities themselves.Konstantinovka — the enemy is trying to create a “scissors effect” for Toretsk’s logistics, attacking simultaneously from two directions . A feature: the focus on controlling the heights for deploying FPV drones, which makes even small villages critically important for both sides. At the same time, the enemy is saturating this direction with small groups (1-3 people), but with the support of drones and mortars.It is important that the Konstantinovka “node” is one of the three main routes for providing support to the Toretsk agglomeration. Its breakthrough or blocking immediately increases the risk of losing the entire agglomeration in the future, since only two logistical arteries will remain that can be quickly taken under fire control from new Russian positions.
In addition, a rather indicative trend can be seen in the Serebryansk Forestry. Enemy units will change tactics, relying on infiltration by small groups into weak points of defense (de facto two/three "Rusaks" try to either organize a sprint or crawl under cover for several hours/days). This gives local advances, especially in the rear areas, and creates a threat in the Torske and Zarechne areas.The Southern Theater is the largest concentration of risks and opportunities. In the Zaporizhia direction, the enemy maintains its defense, but in the area of Berdyansk and Mariupol, increased activity in the transfer of reserves is recorded . In the Kherson region, fighting continues on islands and coastal areas , where both sides are trying to establish control over logistically convenient crossing points.🛤So we return to the positive news: a key innovation in recent weeks is the intensification of attacks on Russian railway infrastructure , especially in the south. From July 19 to August 5, more than ten point attacks were recorded (Timashevsk, Salsk, Novocherkassk, Frolovo, etc.), affecting hub stations and junctions through which the main flows of military cargo to Crimea, Donbass, and the North Caucasus pass.
🗂For a better understanding, one-time and point strikes do not give an effect (the track is repaired in a few days, which makes such strikes inexpedient). However, the current massive attacks do not just delay trains - they create the effect of "accumulation of traffic jams" when reserve routes are overloaded, and throughput drops across the entire network.
Thus, the Russian Federation enters August with a front that is held mainly due to the inertia of accumulated reserves and stable logistics from the central regions. If the pace of deep strikes on the rear is maintained, then by the fall the Russian troops may face systemic disruptions in the provision of the southern grouping , which will open up space for local Ukrainian offensive actions.
However, the situation at the front remains tense in all directions : the enemy is exerting pressure, seeking to break the defense at least somewhere in order to then make a local breakthrough and develop it into a large-scale offensive .🗞Conflict Capital |Support
39165❤4321t.me/conflictcapital/1225
1.01KviewsAug 10 at 17:50
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Analysts at Conflict Capital note that Russian forces failed to achieve strategic gains this summer, but several threats remain. The northern front near Kharkiv is stable, with Russian attacks repelled and the enemy focused on holding ground and exhausting Ukrainian units.
From Siversk to Pokrovsk, Russia relies on massed artillery and small assault groups. Fighting near Rodynske is key, as Russian forces try to pressure Ukrainian logistics and avoid direct urban combat. In the Kostiantynivka area, Russian troops attempt to cut off Toretsk’s supply routes by attacking from multiple directions and seizing key heights for FPV drone deployment.
In the Serebrianske Forest, Russian units increasingly use small infiltration groups to probe weak points, achieving limited advances and threatening rear areas. The southern front remains the most dynamic, with Russia holding defensive lines in Zaporizhzhia but moving reserves near Berdyansk and Mariupol. In Kherson, both sides fight for control of river islands and crossing points.
Analysts emphasize that the situation remains tense across all sectors, with Russia seeking any opportunity for a breakthrough to exploit Ukrainian defenses.
StepanRudanskij
Respected Leader
Aika on suhteellista.
Mutta jännä kaikki vaan lähti mäkeen toi drone lentää kävely vauhtia niin ei sit ollu mitään millä torjua.
Leaderdog
Kaukopartio
Kattelin ihan samaa, tähystääkö koko porukka autoissa 360 astetta koko ajan nähdäkseen lähestyvän vaaran??
Voi tietysti olla ihan drone pelkoo, kun vähän surisee jossain niin otetaan jalat alle