Ukrainan konflikti/sota
Täytyi olla arvokkaita ryssiä, kun olivat vaivautuneet kuskaamaan kalmot ruumishuoneelle. Olisihan ne voinut sinne poterojen seinämien vahvistukseksi jättää, kuten tavan stormtrooperit.
Lähtisitkö itse eturintamaan vastaanottamaan droneja ilman uskottavaa asetta jolla voit torjua niitä? Tällä hetkellä asevoimien etulinjaan asettuminen näyttää kovin itsemurhatehtävältä.
Tilanne on toki sama Venäjällekin, joka kuitenkin pystyy nähtävästi saamaan jatkuvasti uutta väkeä itsemurhatehtäviin. Diktatuuri pystyy tietty pakottamaan, mutta ilmeisen suuri osa lähtee mukaan vapaaehtoisesti.
Benelli
Respected Leader
Pitäisikö porukalle sitten jakaa katkaistupiippuiset haulikot tukiaseeksi?
Kiusankpl
Respected Leader
Kun katsoo eilistä ryssän tappiolistaa, niin ei tuolla iivanoita rynnäköi prikaatitolkulla.
Niitä muutaman ukon ryhmiä tai joukkueellinen kerrallaan taitaa tuon haarukan kärjissä toikkaroida.
Jos tuo olisi "all in" -pusku ryssillä nyt, niin parempia ryssiä olisi 1500-2000 / päivä.
Kuten vielä alkuvuodesta nähtiin...
Nämä pitäisi kyetä drooneille etsimään ja epistä niskaan. Todennäköisesti etsivät reittiä eteenpäin. Haarukan juuri on nyt ollut jo jonkin aikaa ryssän hallussa ja jos pioneereja ei ole kyetty estämään droonein tai epäsuoralla, niin sieltä on jo kulkureitti järeämmällekin kalustolle kun se reitti löytyy.
Antares
Respected Leader
GUR:n Skibitsky on kertonut julki muutamia tuoreita arvioita ryssän dronejen ja ohjusten tuotantomääristä (lainaan artikkelin koko tekstin seuraavissa viesteissä):
GUR Deputy Chief Vadym Skibitskyi said Russia plans "to produce 79,000 Shahed-type unmanned aerial vehicles in 2025. If broken down by type, that’s 40,000 Geran-2 units, 5,700 Harpiya-1 units, and about 34,000 Gerbera and other decoy targets,"
https://suspilne.media/1089054-akso...gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/
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Tämä RBC-Ukraine artikkeli siteeraa yllä viitattua Suspilne nettisivun pidempää Skibitsky haastattelua:
"According to Skibitskyi, the situation with missiles in Russia is different — all missiles produced are immediately used. This trend is seen with the Kh-101, Kalibr, and Kinzhal missiles.
The accuracy of Russian missiles has improved. Previously, when attempting to strike the airfield in Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region, Kinzhal missiles deviated by 3 to 15 kilometers. This was partly due to international sanctions as well as Russia’s inability to create its own navigation system.
'That’s why cruise missiles hit our civilian buildings. If you remember, even in 2022, when they struck the Artem plant in the Tatarka area of Kyiv, two or three times, a cruise missile hit a large civilian building instead. This is because, back in Soviet times, that building did not exist — they planned the strikes using maps from those old days,' Skibitskyi said.
Now, according to him, the situation has changed — Iskander missiles have become more accurate and maneuverable."
https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/shahed-production-targets-for-2025-and-missile-1755027325.html
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"One of the strengths of the Russian Federation's armed forces is that they have operational reserves. They use them to carry out rotations and reinforce the most critical areas of the front. And, accordingly, to replenish the losses they suffer on the battlefield...
the Russian Federation's monthly recruitment plans are being fulfilled by at least 105-110%. To date, about 67% of the 343,000 they planned to recruit this year have already been recruited. And there is preliminary data that they have already decided to increase this figure by at least 15-17%...
In general, they currently have no problems with recruitment. They offer a generous social package and large payments for signing the first contract...
Look, they announced a partial mobilization only once – in the fall of 2022. They recruited 300,000. The rest they are recruiting without mobilization. That is, people are leaving, they are also being lured with benefits – for example, free education for children in higher education institutions, attractive mortgage terms, and so on.
And, importantly, families in the Russian Federation support this."
GUR Deputy Chief Vadym Skibitskyi said Russia plans "to produce 79,000 Shahed-type unmanned aerial vehicles in 2025. If broken down by type, that’s 40,000 Geran-2 units, 5,700 Harpiya-1 units, and about 34,000 Gerbera and other decoy targets,"
https://suspilne.media/1089054-akso...gur-pro-plani-rosian-ta-ihnij-zapas-micnosti/
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Tämä RBC-Ukraine artikkeli siteeraa yllä viitattua Suspilne nettisivun pidempää Skibitsky haastattelua:
"According to Skibitskyi, the situation with missiles in Russia is different — all missiles produced are immediately used. This trend is seen with the Kh-101, Kalibr, and Kinzhal missiles.
The accuracy of Russian missiles has improved. Previously, when attempting to strike the airfield in Starokostiantyniv, Khmelnytskyi region, Kinzhal missiles deviated by 3 to 15 kilometers. This was partly due to international sanctions as well as Russia’s inability to create its own navigation system.
'That’s why cruise missiles hit our civilian buildings. If you remember, even in 2022, when they struck the Artem plant in the Tatarka area of Kyiv, two or three times, a cruise missile hit a large civilian building instead. This is because, back in Soviet times, that building did not exist — they planned the strikes using maps from those old days,' Skibitskyi said.
Now, according to him, the situation has changed — Iskander missiles have become more accurate and maneuverable."
https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/shahed-production-targets-for-2025-and-missile-1755027325.html
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"One of the strengths of the Russian Federation's armed forces is that they have operational reserves. They use them to carry out rotations and reinforce the most critical areas of the front. And, accordingly, to replenish the losses they suffer on the battlefield...
the Russian Federation's monthly recruitment plans are being fulfilled by at least 105-110%. To date, about 67% of the 343,000 they planned to recruit this year have already been recruited. And there is preliminary data that they have already decided to increase this figure by at least 15-17%...
In general, they currently have no problems with recruitment. They offer a generous social package and large payments for signing the first contract...
Look, they announced a partial mobilization only once – in the fall of 2022. They recruited 300,000. The rest they are recruiting without mobilization. That is, people are leaving, they are also being lured with benefits – for example, free education for children in higher education institutions, attractive mortgage terms, and so on.
And, importantly, families in the Russian Federation support this."
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tässä GUR:n Vadim Skibitsky haastattelun tekstin käännös, artikkeli on pitkä joten jaan sen kahdessa osassa (Suspilne nettisivun artikkeli julkaistu 12.8.2025): LÄHDE
Olena Removska
August 12, 19:03
Olena Removska
August 12, 19:03
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
Vadym Skibitsky – Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major General. Member of the Ukrainian delegation at the negotiations in Istanbul. Suspilne met with Vadym Skibitsky in early August to discuss the Russian plans at the front, the Russian Federation's massive combined attacks on Ukrainian cities, as well as the Kremlin's margin of safety in the context of waging war. Vadym Skibitsky talks about this and more in the "Removskaya Interview" project. Watch the video version of the interview at the link .
I'll start with what is probably the most pressing question for the general public: What is the purpose of the Russians' massive combined strikes on Ukraine in recent months, and how long can they continue?
We have been closely monitoring all actions of the Russian Federation regarding such strikes since October 2022. It was during this period that the Iranian “shaheeds” were first used, and this was a kind of starting point: what will the Russian Federation use, how, what tactics will it choose? And most importantly, what targets will be hit?
At that time — and this is the reliable information we had — they clearly identified all the targets that were to be destroyed. The first is air defense. Then our aviation, including airfields. The next issue is the system of command of the Armed Forces, in general, all our military formations. Then the logistics system and the defense-industrial complex.
Since then, little has changed in terms of target selection. Instead, tactics have clearly changed, since the strikes they had previously inflicted (in particular, on our energy infrastructure) with purely cruise missiles did not yield results. In fact, the “blackout” for Ukraine never came: we preserved the energy system, our people with electricity. It was from that moment that the Russian Federation began to more actively apply in planning processes the same approaches that we apply. These are NATO standards, standards of the world's leading countries in determining targets, in planning to strike these targets — and, accordingly, then summing up.
What do we have today? The production of unmanned aerial vehicles, the preservation and expansion of production, primarily of Iskander ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, now allows the Russian Federation to carry out combined strikes. First, various types of unmanned aerial vehicles are used, then either cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. Sometimes ballistic missiles are used separately specifically against critical infrastructure facilities or against our armed formations, which involve striking very quickly and at a specific location.
But first of all, what do we state? The nature of the targets chosen by the Russian Federation has not changed. This is, again, our air defense, aviation, critical infrastructure. And now we see that they have returned to the energy system again. To our oil refining complexes. And last year they were very active in our gas fields. They are also actively trying to hit our defense-industrial complex facilities, because we have increased the production of our own weapons. It is effective on the battlefield and this poses a threat to the Russian Federation.
Sorry, but there are no civilian targets in this list of targets you have announced. And we see how many civilian casualties there are from almost every such massive combined strike.
The logistics system and critical infrastructure are often combined with civilian facilities. Most of the facilities of any critical infrastructure are currently located within cities. And the accuracy and effectiveness of the guidance of the Russian Federation's strike weapons - ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, "shaheeds" - are not yet at such a high level as in leading Western countries. For example, in the USA or in Israel.
It is in our homes that we see the difference between the precision weapons available in the world's leading countries and the "precision weapons" of the Russian Federation.
Rescuers clear the rubble of a house in the Svyatoshynskyi district of Kyiv, July 31, 2025. The combined Russian attack on the capital killed 31 people in this house, including five children. Social News/Olexander Magula
You touched on the issue of production. In this context, I will ask first of all about “shaheeds”. At the end of May, the President of Ukraine, Zelensky, announced that the goal set by the Russian Federation is 300-500 “shaheeds” per day. What are the realities as of now?
Unfortunately, the Russian Federation may increase the pace of production of unmanned aerial vehicles of various types. I will give the main figures. They plan to produce 79 thousand unmanned aerial vehicles of the “Shahed” type in 2025. If we break it down by type, then “Geran-2” – 40,000 units, “Harpy-1” – 5,700, “Gerbera” and other false targets – about 34,000. These are the plans that the Russian Federation has.
And we see what is driving this increase in production. First, they have launched additional production lines – in the same Izhevsk, in Yelabuz. Next – they are trying to completely replace the import of all the components they use. Today, the glider is already theirs, the internal combustion engine that they install is also theirs. The navigation system, with the exception of chips and microelectronics, is Russian-made. The antennas are the same “Comet”, if you have heard. These are the elements that allow you to avoid the effects of electronic warfare.
Thus, Russia is trying to be self-sufficient in the production of this type of weapon. The potential is there. Our task here is to prevent all this, to prevent such an increase. And, if possible, to destroy the production facilities.
Thanks to long-range strikes deep into Russia?
I mentioned NATO standards [for identifying targets and inflicting damage]. We, namely military intelligence, have been using them since June 2022. We switched to this standard because it allows for both kinetic and non-kinetic strikes. That is, these are both long-range strikes and other means related to carrying out acts of sabotage, disruption of production.
As for international sanctions – if we talk about critical elements for the Russian Federation, then yes, they are trying to circumvent and are circumventing these sanctions. But it takes them some time. We need to involve other companies, third countries, which today perceive direct supplies to the Russian Federation with caution.
Thus, on our part, this is a comprehensive approach aimed at both interrupting this production, disrupting all these production ties — and preventing a further increase in the production of weapons and military equipment.
You mentioned the Russian factory in Yelabuga . Is it true that the Russians are recruiting citizens of other countries to work there, in particular, from Central Asian countries?
Indeed, it is. In general, they have an interesting production. For example, they attract a large number of students. This is due to the fact that a lot of operations are carried out on the assembly line and do not require highly qualified personnel. This is the first.
Second, tasks at such production can be performed by the same international students from other countries who studied or are studying in Russia.
Third, in many cases, the Russian Federation uses this for propaganda. By involving North Korea, military personnel, or workers from other countries, the Russian Federation emphasizes that it has the support of the international community, allied countries, in waging war against Ukraine.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
And what is the situation with the Russians' missiles?
They have production. But what they produce is immediately used. We saw this clearly in the X-101 cruise missiles, in the Calibers, and in the Kinzhals.
But it is necessary to say about the accuracy of such strikes. If we recall the first strikes on Starokostyantyniv in the Khmelnytskyi region, on our airfield, then the deviation of the Kinzhal missiles was from 3 to 15 km from the object itself. And here we are talking about the impact of international sanctions, among other things. Russia is trying to create its own navigation system, but it is still not the same as the American-made systems.
And here in the Russian Federation there is a problem. There is a problem in obtaining such systems. And what they are trying to do is not always perfect.
That's why cruise missiles hit our civilian buildings. If you remember, even in 2022, when they were hitting the Artem plant in Tatarka [in Kyiv], two or three times a cruise missile hit a large civilian building. That's because this building didn't exist in the Soviet Union — and they planned the strikes using maps from those old days.
Indeed, they are improving all of this now. We see this, for example, in the Iskander ballistic missile. It has become more accurate and maneuverable.
I also wanted to talk to you about the situation on the front. We see how the Russians are gradually advancing - you can see this almost every day in DeepState. From the point of view of the data that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has, what makes this possible?
Let's start with the fact that the strategic goals that the Russian Federation set for itself in the so-called “Special Military Operation” have not been achieved. At that time, they concerned the complete occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. This is not the case. This is the first.
Second. The big task facing them is to hold the captured territories. I mean the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.
And third, we see constant adjustments to the plans they have.
As of today — and this is already confirmed information that the Main Intelligence Directorate has received — we know all the plans and their adjustments. The achievement of the preliminary results should fall on them by the end of summer — the beginning of autumn. This applies to Kupyansk, and to Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Chasovye Yar — the dates are clearly defined there. It is the end of August — the beginning of September.
At the same time, they postponed their plans for the complete occupation of the Donetsk region until the end of the year, although at the beginning of the year they planned to do this by August 1.
But the threat here is greater because the Russians are constantly changing the tactics of using their units. For example, in 2023 and especially in 2024, assault groups consisted of 5-8 people, now they are 2-3 people.
The next issue is the movement of servicemen one by one, two by two — and this is confirmed by all our troops — over a long distance. 3-5 km — and this person goes to our rear, bases himself somewhere there and waits for the rest. And so one by one, two by two they infiltrate our rear areas and then wait for the right opportunity to start fighting.
We saw this in Pokrovsk. This is how they try to penetrate the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Now we are capturing many Russian prisoners of war during their movement like this.
Such a person has a clear task. He has his own route, he has the reference points where he must arrive — and the final section, where he must wait for two, three days, a week. Over a certain period of time, for example, 15 more people approach him. And they will already be waiting for the main units to arrive there.
This is a new tactic today.
Another change in tactics - let's take the same Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, other settlements that Russia first destroys, and then begins to enter them. This is a completely different approach than in 2022-23, when they entered a settlement - whether it was a village, a town, or a large city.
Then they began to surround this city, without going inside, because these are very large losses. Let's remember Bakhmut: Prigozhin himself then frankly said that he lost about 25 thousand just in killed. Now they have abandoned this tactic.
Now the Russian Federation's tactics are as follows. The first is the destruction of all objects that can be used for defense. The second is the forced evacuation of the population. Under constant shelling, the population is evacuated out of principle. And these one or two people [of the sabotage and reconnaissance group], they enter an empty village. No one sees them, no one can control them, they sit down somewhere in a cellar or some basement and wait.
These days, we see, massive shelling of Kherson has begun. The plans of the Russian Federation clearly stated - to begin massive shelling of Kherson. Including in order to force the local population to evacuate.
This is what the Russian Federation's tactics are now. Yes, this progress is not so fast, but it is yielding results.
But, when we know the tactics of their actions, there will be a counterattack. We have an understanding of how to defend. We know the exact number of such assault groups, their routes. Accordingly, it remains only to prevent their massive penetration into our rear areas.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
As of the end of June , 695,000 Russian troops were stationed in Ukraine . What does the process of recruiting people into the Russian army look like in general?
One of the strengths of the Russian Federation's armed forces is that they have operational reserves. They use them to carry out rotations, reinforce the most critical areas of the front, and, accordingly, to replenish the losses they suffer on the battlefield.
This is an important element and we clearly monitor it - when rotations occur, when units are withdrawn for replenishment, to restore losses. The staffing of the armed forces of the Russian Federation is quite high. For example, all groups of troops are staffed by 98% of officers. This is a very high figure.
They are trying to maintain the same high figures for personnel recruitment. The figures that were announced – 30-35 thousand people [per month] depending on the activity of hostilities – go to replenish the losses of the units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
About 25% of this number today are people who are in prison, are under investigation, and have criminal cases filed against them.
In general, the Russian Federation's recruitment plans are being fulfilled by at least 105-110% each month. To date, about 67% of the 343,000 they planned to recruit this year have already been fulfilled. And there are preliminary data that they have already decided to increase this figure by at least 15-17%. But we do not yet have confirmation whether this decision has come into effect.
In general, today they have no problems with recruiting. They have a powerful social package, large payments for signing the first contract. Now in the Moscow and Leningrad regions, payments are much higher than, for example, in the Far East or in the central part of the Russian Federation, in Siberia. These are payments from the Ministry of Defense for the first contract, from the president, from the governor, from the enterprise where this worker worked. And there are others.
For an average citizen of the Russian Federation, a simple worker, this is a lot of money. In the case of the first contract, we are talking about an average of 1.5-2 million Russian rubles. This is a lot of money. Plus, there is a large salary for those who take direct part in the fighting – 200-250 thousand Russian rubles.
If we talk about the depressed regions of the Russian Federation, they can no longer recruit as many people there as, for example, in 2023-24.
You see, they announced partial mobilization only once – in the fall of 2022. They recruited 300 thousand. They recruit the rest without mobilization. That is, people go, they are also lured with benefits – for example, free education for children in higher educational institutions, attractive mortgage conditions, etc.
And, importantly, families in the Russian Federation support this. They, as they say, are positive about their father, or brother, or son dying in the war. But the family will have money. Especially, you know, when the wife says: "It's better to go and fight than to stay here drinking vodka all day."
It is incomprehensible to us. And how does society perceive it there, you know? There are no pickets there, no other issues. Have you seen pickets anywhere that say, return Russian prisoners of war to the territory of Russia? Or “Down with the war”? There simply is none. If there were some individual moments in 22 — in Dagestan, in the North Caucasus, regarding mobilization — then there is no such thing now. Let’s even take the sociological survey: 74% support Putin and 78% approve of his policies.
Representatives of the Russian opposition would tell you now that these studies are unrepresentative.
I would then turn to this opposition and ask: "Where do you live?" Why? Because there simply is no real opposition on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Accordingly, if there is no opposition there, no people who can convey the truth, then we and the entire international community use the data provided by the Russian side.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
Do Ukrainian strikes on various Russian regions somehow affect public opinion?
They affect, especially in the border areas. And especially those regions and cities where, let's say, budget-generating enterprises are located. For example, the same oil refineries that provide jobs and welfare, but at the same time produce aviation kerosene, diesel fuel, gasoline, which goes directly to the front.
However, this has not yet reached a critical point for the civilian population.
And I'll tell you why. The Russian command also recognizes this: we are really hitting military facilities, or those infrastructure facilities that ensure the conduct of war. Unlike what the Russian Federation is doing.
The story we saw at the end of last year and the beginning of this year on the front line is North Korean military personnel on the side of Russia. Do the Russians still need them?
They need them in any application. Military personnel are one topic. And, for example, members of the engineering troops and various kinds of logistical support are completely different. And the third is a political moment that shows that these countries are allies. That North Korea fulfills its allied obligations to the Russian Federation, because it signed an agreement on providing assistance.
What do we have now in all these areas? First, the DPRK military personnel continue to be in the Kursk region, and in the European part of Russia in general. They remain at the training grounds where these four brigades were created.
How many people are there approximately?
This is about 11 thousand servicemen. They continue to be in Russia and it is clearly defined that their main area of responsibility is the Kursk and Belgorod regions. We have seen this both in terms of combat use and in terms of their presence in this region. This is a first.
The second question. We are already expecting the arrival of the first batch, about 1,200 servicemen of the North Korean armed forces, specifically in the Kursk region. There is a preliminary agreement between the Russian Federation and the DPRK to send a total of six thousand servicemen to carry out demining work, engineering work, infrastructure restoration, construction of bridges and roads, and the provision of medical services. These are the people who will carry out tasks in the Kursk and Belgorod regions.
Now, regarding political cooperation and other areas that are currently relevant for both sides.
We see that delegations from the Russian Federation constantly visit North Korea. This includes Shoigu a couple of times, Defense Minister Belousov, and military personnel. These are official delegations. Their task is to help train the North Korean armed forces. From the technical side, this is the beginning or improvement of ammunition production, the beginning of the production of unmanned aerial vehicles already on the territory of North Korea.
The result of the involvement of the DPRK is the experience that the military personnel of this country gained during the fighting. This is a modern war, a modern conflict. If we remember December and January, when the North Korean military personnel first appeared - how they, for example, did not understand what FPV drones were. Now they have this understanding. They understand how much this is a new approach and a new element at the tactical level.
Because of that, we are already seeing both the conduct of exercises and the beginning of the production of all this weapons on the territory of North Korea. For this region - where Japan, South Korea, China, North Korea - is one of the most knowledgeable countries in this area of the modern conflict, the use of FPV drones and other drones, their combination with artillery systems, conducting reconnaissance, tactics of using units in assault operations.
For North Korea, this is a significant experience.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
"Russia would like to resolve the "Ukrainian issue" by 2026," - Skibitsky from the GUR on the Russians' plans and their margin of safety
Olena Removska
August 12, 19:03
"Russia would like to resolve the "Ukrainian issue" by 2026," - Skibitsky from the GUR on the Russians' plans and their margin of safety
Olena Removska
August 12, 19:03
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
Vadym Skibitsky – Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major General. Member of the Ukrainian delegation at the negotiations in Istanbul. Suspilne met with Vadym Skibitsky in early August to discuss the Russian plans at the front, the Russian Federation's massive combined attacks on Ukrainian cities, as well as the Kremlin's margin of safety in the context of waging war. Vadym Skibitsky talks about this and more in the "Removskaya Interview" project. Watch the video version of the interview at the link .
I'll start with what is probably the most pressing question for the general public: What is the purpose of the Russians' massive combined strikes on Ukraine in recent months, and how long can they continue?
We have been closely monitoring all actions of the Russian Federation regarding such strikes since October 2022. It was during this period that the Iranian “shaheeds” were first used, and this was a kind of starting point: what will the Russian Federation use, how, what tactics will it choose? And most importantly, what targets will be hit?
At that time — and this is the reliable information we had — they clearly identified all the targets that were to be destroyed. The first is air defense. Then our aviation, including airfields. The next issue is the system of command of the Armed Forces, in general, all our military formations. Then the logistics system and the defense-industrial complex.
Since then, little has changed in terms of target selection. Instead, tactics have clearly changed, since the strikes they had previously inflicted (in particular, on our energy infrastructure) with purely cruise missiles did not yield results. In fact, the “blackout” for Ukraine never came: we preserved the energy system, our people with electricity. It was from that moment that the Russian Federation began to more actively apply in planning processes the same approaches that we apply. These are NATO standards, standards of the world's leading countries in determining targets, in planning to strike these targets — and, accordingly, then summing up.
What do we have today? The production of unmanned aerial vehicles, the preservation and expansion of production, primarily of Iskander ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, now allows the Russian Federation to carry out combined strikes. First, various types of unmanned aerial vehicles are used, then either cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. Sometimes ballistic missiles are used separately specifically against critical infrastructure facilities or against our armed formations, which involve striking very quickly and at a specific location.
But first of all, what do we state? The nature of the targets chosen by the Russian Federation has not changed. This is, again, our air defense, aviation, critical infrastructure. And now we see that they have returned to the energy system again. To our oil refining complexes. And last year they were very active in our gas fields. They are also actively trying to hit our defense-industrial complex facilities, because we have increased the production of our own weapons. It is effective on the battlefield and this poses a threat to the Russian Federation.
Sorry, but there are no civilian targets in this list of targets you have announced. And we see how many civilian casualties there are from almost every such massive combined strike.
The logistics system and critical infrastructure are often combined with civilian facilities. Most of the facilities of any critical infrastructure are currently located within cities. And the accuracy and effectiveness of the guidance of the Russian Federation's strike weapons - ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, "shaheeds" - are not yet at such a high level as in leading Western countries. For example, in the USA or in Israel.
It is in our homes that we see the difference between the precision weapons available in the world's leading countries and the "precision weapons" of the Russian Federation.
Rescuers clear the rubble of a house in the Svyatoshynskyi district of Kyiv, July 31, 2025. The combined Russian attack on the capital killed 31 people in this house, including five children. Social News/Olexander Magula
You touched on the issue of production. In this context, I will ask first of all about “shaheeds”. At the end of May, the President of Ukraine, Zelensky, announced that the goal set by the Russian Federation is 300-500 “shaheeds” per day. What are the realities as of now?
Unfortunately, the Russian Federation may increase the pace of production of unmanned aerial vehicles of various types. I will give the main figures. They plan to produce 79 thousand unmanned aerial vehicles of the “Shahed” type in 2025. If we break it down by type, then “Geran-2” – 40,000 units, “Harpy-1” – 5,700, “Gerbera” and other false targets – about 34,000. These are the plans that the Russian Federation has.
And we see what is driving this increase in production. First, they have launched additional production lines – in the same Izhevsk, in Yelabuz. Next – they are trying to completely replace the import of all the components they use. Today, the glider is already theirs, the internal combustion engine that they install is also theirs. The navigation system, with the exception of chips and microelectronics, is Russian-made. The antennas are the same “Comet”, if you have heard. These are the elements that allow you to avoid the effects of electronic warfare.
Thus, Russia is trying to be self-sufficient in the production of this type of weapon. The potential is there. Our task here is to prevent all this, to prevent such an increase. And, if possible, to destroy the production facilities.
Thanks to long-range strikes deep into Russia?
I mentioned NATO standards [for identifying targets and inflicting damage]. We, namely military intelligence, have been using them since June 2022. We switched to this standard because it allows for both kinetic and non-kinetic strikes. That is, these are both long-range strikes and other means related to carrying out acts of sabotage, disruption of production.
As for international sanctions – if we talk about critical elements for the Russian Federation, then yes, they are trying to circumvent and are circumventing these sanctions. But it takes them some time. We need to involve other companies, third countries, which today perceive direct supplies to the Russian Federation with caution.
Thus, on our part, this is a comprehensive approach aimed at both interrupting this production, disrupting all these production ties — and preventing a further increase in the production of weapons and military equipment.
You mentioned the Russian factory in Yelabuga . Is it true that the Russians are recruiting citizens of other countries to work there, in particular, from Central Asian countries?
Indeed, it is. In general, they have an interesting production. For example, they attract a large number of students. This is due to the fact that a lot of operations are carried out on the assembly line and do not require highly qualified personnel. This is the first.
Second, tasks at such production can be performed by the same international students from other countries who studied or are studying in Russia.
Third, in many cases, the Russian Federation uses this for propaganda. By involving North Korea, military personnel, or workers from other countries, the Russian Federation emphasizes that it has the support of the international community, allied countries, in waging war against Ukraine.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
And what is the situation with the Russians' missiles?
They have production. But what they produce is immediately used. We saw this clearly in the X-101 cruise missiles, in the Calibers, and in the Kinzhals.
But it is necessary to say about the accuracy of such strikes. If we recall the first strikes on Starokostyantyniv in the Khmelnytskyi region, on our airfield, then the deviation of the Kinzhal missiles was from 3 to 15 km from the object itself. And here we are talking about the impact of international sanctions, among other things. Russia is trying to create its own navigation system, but it is still not the same as the American-made systems.
And here in the Russian Federation there is a problem. There is a problem in obtaining such systems. And what they are trying to do is not always perfect.
That's why cruise missiles hit our civilian buildings. If you remember, even in 2022, when they were hitting the Artem plant in Tatarka [in Kyiv], two or three times a cruise missile hit a large civilian building. That's because this building didn't exist in the Soviet Union — and they planned the strikes using maps from those old days.
Indeed, they are improving all of this now. We see this, for example, in the Iskander ballistic missile. It has become more accurate and maneuverable.
I also wanted to talk to you about the situation on the front. We see how the Russians are gradually advancing - you can see this almost every day in DeepState. From the point of view of the data that the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has, what makes this possible?
Let's start with the fact that the strategic goals that the Russian Federation set for itself in the so-called “Special Military Operation” have not been achieved. At that time, they concerned the complete occupation of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. This is not the case. This is the first.
Second. The big task facing them is to hold the captured territories. I mean the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions.
And third, we see constant adjustments to the plans they have.
As of today — and this is already confirmed information that the Main Intelligence Directorate has received — we know all the plans and their adjustments. The achievement of the preliminary results should fall on them by the end of summer — the beginning of autumn. This applies to Kupyansk, and to Pokrovsk, Toretsk, Chasovye Yar — the dates are clearly defined there. It is the end of August — the beginning of September.
At the same time, they postponed their plans for the complete occupation of the Donetsk region until the end of the year, although at the beginning of the year they planned to do this by August 1.
But the threat here is greater because the Russians are constantly changing the tactics of using their units. For example, in 2023 and especially in 2024, assault groups consisted of 5-8 people, now they are 2-3 people.
The next issue is the movement of servicemen one by one, two by two — and this is confirmed by all our troops — over a long distance. 3-5 km — and this person goes to our rear, bases himself somewhere there and waits for the rest. And so one by one, two by two they infiltrate our rear areas and then wait for the right opportunity to start fighting.
We saw this in Pokrovsk. This is how they try to penetrate the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region. Now we are capturing many Russian prisoners of war during their movement like this.
Such a person has a clear task. He has his own route, he has the reference points where he must arrive — and the final section, where he must wait for two, three days, a week. Over a certain period of time, for example, 15 more people approach him. And they will already be waiting for the main units to arrive there.
This is a new tactic today.
Another change in tactics - let's take the same Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, other settlements that Russia first destroys, and then begins to enter them. This is a completely different approach than in 2022-23, when they entered a settlement - whether it was a village, a town, or a large city.
Then they began to surround this city, without going inside, because these are very large losses. Let's remember Bakhmut: Prigozhin himself then frankly said that he lost about 25 thousand just in killed. Now they have abandoned this tactic.
Now the Russian Federation's tactics are as follows. The first is the destruction of all objects that can be used for defense. The second is the forced evacuation of the population. Under constant shelling, the population is evacuated out of principle. And these one or two people [of the sabotage and reconnaissance group], they enter an empty village. No one sees them, no one can control them, they sit down somewhere in a cellar or some basement and wait.
These days, we see, massive shelling of Kherson has begun. The plans of the Russian Federation clearly stated - to begin massive shelling of Kherson. Including in order to force the local population to evacuate.
This is what the Russian Federation's tactics are now. Yes, this progress is not so fast, but it is yielding results.
But, when we know the tactics of their actions, there will be a counterattack. We have an understanding of how to defend. We know the exact number of such assault groups, their routes. Accordingly, it remains only to prevent their massive penetration into our rear areas.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
As of the end of June , 695,000 Russian troops were stationed in Ukraine . What does the process of recruiting people into the Russian army look like in general?
One of the strengths of the Russian Federation's armed forces is that they have operational reserves. They use them to carry out rotations, reinforce the most critical areas of the front, and, accordingly, to replenish the losses they suffer on the battlefield.
This is an important element and we clearly monitor it - when rotations occur, when units are withdrawn for replenishment, to restore losses. The staffing of the armed forces of the Russian Federation is quite high. For example, all groups of troops are staffed by 98% of officers. This is a very high figure.
They are trying to maintain the same high figures for personnel recruitment. The figures that were announced – 30-35 thousand people [per month] depending on the activity of hostilities – go to replenish the losses of the units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.
About 25% of this number today are people who are in prison, are under investigation, and have criminal cases filed against them.
In general, the Russian Federation's recruitment plans are being fulfilled by at least 105-110% each month. To date, about 67% of the 343,000 they planned to recruit this year have already been fulfilled. And there are preliminary data that they have already decided to increase this figure by at least 15-17%. But we do not yet have confirmation whether this decision has come into effect.
In general, today they have no problems with recruiting. They have a powerful social package, large payments for signing the first contract. Now in the Moscow and Leningrad regions, payments are much higher than, for example, in the Far East or in the central part of the Russian Federation, in Siberia. These are payments from the Ministry of Defense for the first contract, from the president, from the governor, from the enterprise where this worker worked. And there are others.
For an average citizen of the Russian Federation, a simple worker, this is a lot of money. In the case of the first contract, we are talking about an average of 1.5-2 million Russian rubles. This is a lot of money. Plus, there is a large salary for those who take direct part in the fighting – 200-250 thousand Russian rubles.
If we talk about the depressed regions of the Russian Federation, they can no longer recruit as many people there as, for example, in 2023-24.
You see, they announced partial mobilization only once – in the fall of 2022. They recruited 300 thousand. They recruit the rest without mobilization. That is, people go, they are also lured with benefits – for example, free education for children in higher educational institutions, attractive mortgage conditions, etc.
And, importantly, families in the Russian Federation support this. They, as they say, are positive about their father, or brother, or son dying in the war. But the family will have money. Especially, you know, when the wife says: "It's better to go and fight than to stay here drinking vodka all day."
It is incomprehensible to us. And how does society perceive it there, you know? There are no pickets there, no other issues. Have you seen pickets anywhere that say, return Russian prisoners of war to the territory of Russia? Or “Down with the war”? There simply is none. If there were some individual moments in 22 — in Dagestan, in the North Caucasus, regarding mobilization — then there is no such thing now. Let’s even take the sociological survey: 74% support Putin and 78% approve of his policies.
Representatives of the Russian opposition would tell you now that these studies are unrepresentative.
I would then turn to this opposition and ask: "Where do you live?" Why? Because there simply is no real opposition on the territory of the Russian Federation.
Accordingly, if there is no opposition there, no people who can convey the truth, then we and the entire international community use the data provided by the Russian side.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
Do Ukrainian strikes on various Russian regions somehow affect public opinion?
They affect, especially in the border areas. And especially those regions and cities where, let's say, budget-generating enterprises are located. For example, the same oil refineries that provide jobs and welfare, but at the same time produce aviation kerosene, diesel fuel, gasoline, which goes directly to the front.
However, this has not yet reached a critical point for the civilian population.
And I'll tell you why. The Russian command also recognizes this: we are really hitting military facilities, or those infrastructure facilities that ensure the conduct of war. Unlike what the Russian Federation is doing.
The story we saw at the end of last year and the beginning of this year on the front line is North Korean military personnel on the side of Russia. Do the Russians still need them?
They need them in any application. Military personnel are one topic. And, for example, members of the engineering troops and various kinds of logistical support are completely different. And the third is a political moment that shows that these countries are allies. That North Korea fulfills its allied obligations to the Russian Federation, because it signed an agreement on providing assistance.
What do we have now in all these areas? First, the DPRK military personnel continue to be in the Kursk region, and in the European part of Russia in general. They remain at the training grounds where these four brigades were created.
How many people are there approximately?
This is about 11 thousand servicemen. They continue to be in Russia and it is clearly defined that their main area of responsibility is the Kursk and Belgorod regions. We have seen this both in terms of combat use and in terms of their presence in this region. This is a first.
The second question. We are already expecting the arrival of the first batch, about 1,200 servicemen of the North Korean armed forces, specifically in the Kursk region. There is a preliminary agreement between the Russian Federation and the DPRK to send a total of six thousand servicemen to carry out demining work, engineering work, infrastructure restoration, construction of bridges and roads, and the provision of medical services. These are the people who will carry out tasks in the Kursk and Belgorod regions.
Now, regarding political cooperation and other areas that are currently relevant for both sides.
We see that delegations from the Russian Federation constantly visit North Korea. This includes Shoigu a couple of times, Defense Minister Belousov, and military personnel. These are official delegations. Their task is to help train the North Korean armed forces. From the technical side, this is the beginning or improvement of ammunition production, the beginning of the production of unmanned aerial vehicles already on the territory of North Korea.
The result of the involvement of the DPRK is the experience that the military personnel of this country gained during the fighting. This is a modern war, a modern conflict. If we remember December and January, when the North Korean military personnel first appeared - how they, for example, did not understand what FPV drones were. Now they have this understanding. They understand how much this is a new approach and a new element at the tactical level.
Because of that, we are already seeing both the conduct of exercises and the beginning of the production of all this weapons on the territory of North Korea. For this region - where Japan, South Korea, China, North Korea - is one of the most knowledgeable countries in this area of the modern conflict, the use of FPV drones and other drones, their combination with artillery systems, conducting reconnaissance, tactics of using units in assault operations.
For North Korea, this is a significant experience.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
Antares
Respected Leader
Jatkoa edellisessä viestissä lainatulle artikkelille, tässä osa 2/2:
We also remember cases of Chinese citizens being detained on the battlefield . Has this become some kind of systemic phenomenon?
The Russians are recruiting citizens of many countries — 138, according to our calculations. Most of them are from post-Soviet republics. Unfortunately, including Ukraine — from our temporarily occupied territories, because people there still have passports of Ukrainian citizens.
There are also Chinese. This number is not so large, but nevertheless – there are Chinese citizens. We provided a lot of information about how they get to the territory of the Russian Federation. Including through the countries of Central Asia, the same Kazakhstan, how they are then collected in a single center in the Moscow region. If they are fit for service, they are sent to specially designated regiments for training for a month. Then they return to this recruiting center again – and from there to the units.
But what's special about this? The soldiers from the DPRK were gathered into specially created units for North Korean servicemen, these are four brigades. Russia is trying not to combine other nationalities into any one national unit. And they are not exactly isolated - but they do not have the opportunity to unite along national lines.
There is a problem with the language barrier. Nevertheless, they fight, they carry out the tasks that the Russian leadership sets for them.
We detained Chinese citizens in completely different directions. They did not know the structure of the [armed forces] or their commanders perfectly. They only knew who the immediate commander was and what his task was.
But such recruiting exists. It also concerns the financial side. Also, for example, one of the Chinese said that he always wanted to be a soldier - but his health did not allow him to join the ranks of the Chinese People's Army. Therefore, he decided to go and fight on the side of Russia.
So, unlike the case with the North Koreans, are we not talking about some kind of state policy of China? Is this simply the aspiration of individual citizens?
Yes. Another question is how much of this information does the state possess? There were loud scandals regarding India, Nepal, and other countries when it turned out that their citizens were fighting on the side of the Russian Federation and that they were actually dragged there by force.
Our Coordination Headquarters for the Exchange of Prisoners of War even created several films about citizens of different countries, where they tell how they ended up in the Russian army. One of the heroes clearly says: "I was simply deceived." He was told that he would be an IT specialist in some unit, but the time came - and he was sent to an assault squad.
But most countries clearly monitor the situation, understand it, and can control the entry of such citizens into the Russian Federation.
Those Chinese citizens who gave a press conference in Kyiv said they were not against being exchanged. Were they on the exchange lists? Is that possible?
It is much simpler when we are talking about citizens of Ukraine and citizens of Russia. Because these are bilateral agreements. And here a third party is involved. And everything will depend on the position of this country, on many factors.
I won't comment, but this is a complicated process. Much more complicated than the exchange of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexander Sova
You are a participant in the meetings in Istanbul, a member of the Ukrainian delegation. How do you understand the fact that neither massive strikes nor advances on the front by the Russians have stopped — and, despite this, attempts to bring the end of the war closer continue — in particular, in Istanbul?
Indeed, negotiations are underway. The Russian Federation is making a lot of efforts — and we see this on the battlefield — to seize as much territory as possible before reaching a ceasefire. To have strong positions.
But the position of our delegation - and Mr. Umerov has voiced this every time, including the last meeting - is that our president insists on this and proposes to meet with the president of the Russian Federation, to agree on the most critical issues for the negotiation process.
At the second meeting, Mr. Umerov clearly said: we understand that without Putin's decision you will not do anything. If Putin gives the command, the negotiation process will begin. If there is no such command from Putin, no matter how many times we meet, there will be no result.
There have already been two appeals from President Zelensky regarding holding the first meeting. Now – to hold such a meeting by the end of August. Well, we are waiting for a response from Russia.
We really see that the Russian side is trying its best to delay the issue of a meeting – not just a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky, but, for example, with the participation of US President Trump . How would you explain why? What do you think?
They believe that it is necessary to prepare a clear document.
But again, in his last speech today, Putin again returned to the demands that Mr. Medinsky voiced at the first meeting in Istanbul. Do you want a ceasefire? No questions asked. Completely withdraw your troops from the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, and we will ensure their peaceful withdrawal. But, you know, I clearly remember Ilovaisk . There was also “ensuring a peaceful corridor”, withdrawal, and so on and so forth. There is no point in trusting the Russian Federation.
This is the first. And the second — unfortunately, although the negotiation process is underway, the demands of the Russian Federation remain unchanged. And these are demands that, firstly, we definitely cannot accept — and secondly, they are not yet aimed at discussing all these issues. Because the negotiation process involves discussion, actually negotiations. But when a delegation arrives, they read you the entire text of the letter, and then at a press conference they read the same thing, word for word — this shows that the delegation is not in the mood for any discussion.
Representatives of the Ukrainian negotiating team led by Defense Minister Rustam Umerov (center) leave the Ciragan Palace for a trilateral meeting with the Russians mediated by Turkish partners in Istanbul, Turkey, June 2, 2025. Deputy Chief of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky is pictured third from left. Getty Images/Anadolu/Hakan Akgun
What can be achieved by these meetings in Istanbul? We will now talk about the exchanges - this is, of course, an important achievement. But as far as the prospect of ending the war is concerned, are these meetings in Istanbul simply a delaying move on the part of the Russians?
In any case, negotiations are necessary. We have a positive result, mainly on humanitarian issues related to the exchange. And at the same time, we are discussing not only the exchange of prisoners of war - but also the return of other citizens, journalists, political figures and others who were forcibly taken to the territory of the Russian Federation, including children. This is a very painful issue for our society - unlike the Russian Federation. Many people have been [still] in captivity since 2022.
At the previous meeting, we very clearly outlined the proposal: “all for all” in two categories. The first is the seriously injured and seriously ill. And the second is everyone born after 2000. These are people who are 25 years old and younger.
At the third meeting, we put forward another proposal. We have a lot of prisoners of war who have been in captivity since 2022. We understand what captivity is for more than three years [and proposed to exchange them]. The Russian Federation is considering this issue — and I think we will resolve it. If the discussion has started, this is already the first step towards there being some result. Maybe not one hundred percent — but the discussion is going on. And we hope that we will complete everything that we started at the second “Istanbul”, “all for all” — and begin the process of returning those boys and girls who have been in captivity for a very long time.
It is probably worth noting that there is a separate category altogether – these are people who have been held captive since the ATO. Both military and civilian. Are they even mentioned in these negotiations?
All categories are mentioned.
The process is underway, but it is not easy, because the Russian side has its own approaches. For example, when we talk about the seriously wounded, they say: let's set up a commission there. Okay, they set up national commissions. Then, for example, they say: we no longer consider this or that person wounded, they have already recovered, their health has stabilized, and we have already sent them to a colony somewhere. That is, for them they are “no longer seriously wounded” — but for us they remain so. Because we understand: any serious injury negatively affects a person's overall health. And for them — they are “already healed.” Well, a person doesn't have a leg — so what?
That's why there should be a discussion. And considering that we've had such a communication channel since 22 - look how many of our prisoners of war, civilians we've returned from captivity during this time. Historically, we haven't seen such precedents. First there's a war, a conflict - then it ends, then some kind of peace agreement and the exchange of prisoners of war begins. We started doing this in March 2022.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
However, we continue to see that the Russians are not giving up the “Azovites.” What are the difficulties here?
It's very simple: manipulation. They just don't give it away.
Do they voice any wishes, who do they want for these people?
No — they just don't include them on the return list.
Can this situation change somehow?
We are trying. We are constantly talking about it. Again, look, a very vivid example. We said: young people, under 25, “everyone for everyone.” There are many “Azovites” in these groups. But the result for us so far is not what we want. They are still there.
Believe me, we know about everyone. We know where they are. There are certain problems with those prisoners of war — with our citizens — who are in the territory of the so-called “LPR” and “DPR”. But with regard to those who are in the territory of the Russian Federation, it is much simpler.
By the way, the Red Cross helps us a little there. But, unfortunately, this is not yet the mechanism that works in accordance with all conventions.
What are the difficulties with the return of civilians? For example, the journalistic community is familiar with the name of Dmytro Khylyuk , a journalist with the UNIAN agency, who was captured by the Russians as a civilian during the occupation of the Kyiv region in early 2022.
I can't say exactly how to understand the logic of the Russian Federation. But, in my opinion, they are afraid of such people. Why? Because they are active citizens. A journalist always brings the truth. And they are simply afraid that all this torture, the treatment of prisoners of war, detainees - and in general what is happening in Russian colonies and prisons - will not come to the attention of the world community.
It's, you know, like the Gulags in the Soviet Union. Nobody knew what was going on there until later. It's exactly the same situation now.
What about the children? As I understand it, the list that the Ukrainian side submitted in Istanbul includes over 300 children.
Yes, a list of 336 children was submitted. But, again, there is manipulation from Russia. They even say: they say, three, or how many Medinsky named, are already adults. Well, it is clear that some of those who were children in 2012 are now 18 years old. This is a first.
And secondly, they believe that these are completely different circumstances under which the children appeared on the territory of the Russian Federation. As they say, this is not the removal of children, this was an “evacuation.” They say, we saved them from you, from the war, and so on.
This is a debatable issue. We have a representative in the working group who works directly with the relevant departments of the Russian Federation to make decisions regarding children.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
I will also mention Belarus: this summer it returned to the news. We saw that Putin and Lukashenko recently met on the Russian island of Valaam. And before that, Keith Kellogg, the US President's special representative for Ukraine, came to Lukashenko. What processes are taking place in Belarus now?
The first direction: after all, Belarus wants to maintain relations with Western countries. Accordingly, there are meetings at the Belarus-United States level.
The second direction for Belarus concerns the sale of their products. And there is a fairly wide range there, especially agricultural machinery and mineral fertilizers.
And the third is to never be directly involved in the war. This is Lukashenko's position, and he is trying to adhere to it.
Yes, active preparations are underway for the Zapad-2025 exercises. But if you compare this with the Zapad-2017 exercises or others that were held on the territory of Belarus, it is completely different.
That is, Lukashenko does not want this to worsen the attitude towards Belarus, despite the fact that Belarus is the main ally of the Russian Federation. And at the same time, he is trying to preserve a kind of sovereignty and personal position regarding the place of Belarus in the modern security environment.
Yes, there are many questions - they say, some new equipment has appeared on the territory of Belarus, there are already many comments, reports about this. Planned preparations for [military] exercises are underway. We are monitoring it, we know all the stages, we understand what troop movements will take place and in what terms. There is nothing unusual so far. The level of threat associated with these exercises is quite low.
And most importantly: the Russian Federation currently has no free reserves to deploy a large group to participate in this exercise. All troops are currently at the front in the war against Ukraine.
That is, is the threat potential after these exercises – for Ukraine or, for example, for the European Union and NATO – low?
If we talk about the active phase and the number of troops that are being accumulated, yes, it is low. This is a staff training, a staff exercise. This is not the creation of a powerful strike group, as was the case in December 21, January 22 on the territory of Belarus, from where the invasion towards Kyiv began.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
I remembered Keith Kellogg's visit to Belarus. Kellogg is, after all, the US President's special representative for Ukraine. Can Belarus somehow be useful in the issue of achieving peace in Ukraine?
Lukashenko is once again offering Minsk as a platform for negotiations. But this is a past stage and let's not return to it.
In the spring, you mentioned 2026 as the year when Russia wants to end the war. Please explain what you mean? Because 2026 is coming soon.
We voiced this, but the Russian Federation spoke about it. In their strategic planning documents, they clearly stated: "The Ukrainian issue must be resolved by 2026." This is direct language from the planning documents of the Russian Federation.
We understand why. Because the costs of war in the Russian Federation are very high. We see the negative trends that are present in their economy today. In essence, it has entered a stage of stagnation. Everything related to the extraction of minerals or, for example, metallurgy. Their sales markets have shrunk. These are large expenses that are now going to the defense-industrial complex - 42% of the budget is, in fact, going to war. And this affects other sectors of the economy. This is the first.
Second: they predicted possible scenarios for the development of events. And, among other things, they concluded that if they continued the war at the same pace and with the same costs, they would never be able to compete with either the United States of America or China.
Then they become an ordinary regional power, [whose influence] will be limited to the post-Soviet space and some individual elements of other continents, including Africa. And the level of the US and China will be unattainable for them. And they understand this.
So is a pause necessary? Perhaps it is.
There is the issue of lifting sanctions. It is very serious for them. The latest forecast that we see is that they are satisfied with an oil price of $50 [per barrel]. At that, the Stabilization Fund – this is their welfare fund, which is now essentially being used to wage war – will last for 18 months.
If we say that oil is $30, then the Stabilization Fund will only last until the end of the year.
The complex of problems that may fall on the Russian Federation is much broader than it actually seems. In particular, these are demographic issues. The labor market is shrinking, now they are mobilizing 350 thousand people [per year] into the army. If you add up the losses, the labor market will lose 500 thousand. Let's take industry - today 90% of companies in industry, in production, say that they lack labor. The unemployment rate, for example, is now the lowest since the Soviet Union. This is because there are no free laborers. Everyone who could have been has already been taken from the labor market.
These are the conclusions they draw in their planning documents.
About Russian influences in Ukraine. We don't have much time, but perhaps you can characterize these areas as follows: what should our viewers and listeners pay attention to? According to your information, in what areas is Russia currently working with us, Ukrainians, outside the front?
I would outline three main areas.
The first is intimidation. Not only through propaganda and the information space, but also intimidation through missile and drone strikes.
The second direction is the use of social networks, especially Telegram channels, to manipulate Ukrainian citizens. You see how powerfully they work with young people regarding bombings and other sabotage and terrorist acts, and attracting them to cooperation.
And the third is the destabilization of the situation. By undermining trust in the authorities, the alleged inability of the state to protect people, and other [trigger issues].
Today, if we talk about the restoration of this powerful element of the information struggle of the Russian Federation, then it has happened. If we compare it with 22, for example. Then both Europe and Ukraine understood what Russian propaganda was. Today, Russia has managed to restore this powerful component [of influence].
I will give a very simple example. The issue is currently being considered to turn Rossotrudnichestvo into a separate agency that will not be subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other. Separate funding, a separate agency directly subordinate to the president, which will have an impact on other countries.
They are still trying to influence.
And it will be even stronger. With free hands to solve the most pressing problems of Russian propaganda - both in our country and elsewhere. Imposing their own opinions, their own narratives - and, accordingly, their own vision of the world order and the European security system.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexander Tyminsky
What is the key to Russia's strength now? We mentioned the price of oil - but it's probably not the only one.
The basis is, after all, natural resources. Natural resources are the first.
The second is the propaganda machine. And the punitive machine of the Russian Federation is now, perhaps, even tougher than it was in the Soviet Union. It is impossible to do anything there. And you can see that perfectly well.
And the third is, perhaps, the specificity of the Russian population. They are ready, as they say, to eat soup with their hands — but “the tsar is good” and we will defeat the enemies. The propaganda painted the enemy very simply – it is the West, it is Ukraine. That is what unites this society. Unfortunately.
But there are different moments. [The situation can change] either time or, as they say, a “black swan.” It also sometimes flies to the Russian Federation.
Let's hope for "black swans" in our favor.
The Russians are recruiting citizens of many countries — 138, according to our calculations. Most of them are from post-Soviet republics. Unfortunately, including Ukraine — from our temporarily occupied territories, because people there still have passports of Ukrainian citizens.
There are also Chinese. This number is not so large, but nevertheless – there are Chinese citizens. We provided a lot of information about how they get to the territory of the Russian Federation. Including through the countries of Central Asia, the same Kazakhstan, how they are then collected in a single center in the Moscow region. If they are fit for service, they are sent to specially designated regiments for training for a month. Then they return to this recruiting center again – and from there to the units.
But what's special about this? The soldiers from the DPRK were gathered into specially created units for North Korean servicemen, these are four brigades. Russia is trying not to combine other nationalities into any one national unit. And they are not exactly isolated - but they do not have the opportunity to unite along national lines.
There is a problem with the language barrier. Nevertheless, they fight, they carry out the tasks that the Russian leadership sets for them.
We detained Chinese citizens in completely different directions. They did not know the structure of the [armed forces] or their commanders perfectly. They only knew who the immediate commander was and what his task was.
But such recruiting exists. It also concerns the financial side. Also, for example, one of the Chinese said that he always wanted to be a soldier - but his health did not allow him to join the ranks of the Chinese People's Army. Therefore, he decided to go and fight on the side of Russia.
So, unlike the case with the North Koreans, are we not talking about some kind of state policy of China? Is this simply the aspiration of individual citizens?
Yes. Another question is how much of this information does the state possess? There were loud scandals regarding India, Nepal, and other countries when it turned out that their citizens were fighting on the side of the Russian Federation and that they were actually dragged there by force.
Our Coordination Headquarters for the Exchange of Prisoners of War even created several films about citizens of different countries, where they tell how they ended up in the Russian army. One of the heroes clearly says: "I was simply deceived." He was told that he would be an IT specialist in some unit, but the time came - and he was sent to an assault squad.
But most countries clearly monitor the situation, understand it, and can control the entry of such citizens into the Russian Federation.
Those Chinese citizens who gave a press conference in Kyiv said they were not against being exchanged. Were they on the exchange lists? Is that possible?
It is much simpler when we are talking about citizens of Ukraine and citizens of Russia. Because these are bilateral agreements. And here a third party is involved. And everything will depend on the position of this country, on many factors.
I won't comment, but this is a complicated process. Much more complicated than the exchange of prisoners of war between Russia and Ukraine.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexander Sova
You are a participant in the meetings in Istanbul, a member of the Ukrainian delegation. How do you understand the fact that neither massive strikes nor advances on the front by the Russians have stopped — and, despite this, attempts to bring the end of the war closer continue — in particular, in Istanbul?
Indeed, negotiations are underway. The Russian Federation is making a lot of efforts — and we see this on the battlefield — to seize as much territory as possible before reaching a ceasefire. To have strong positions.
But the position of our delegation - and Mr. Umerov has voiced this every time, including the last meeting - is that our president insists on this and proposes to meet with the president of the Russian Federation, to agree on the most critical issues for the negotiation process.
At the second meeting, Mr. Umerov clearly said: we understand that without Putin's decision you will not do anything. If Putin gives the command, the negotiation process will begin. If there is no such command from Putin, no matter how many times we meet, there will be no result.
There have already been two appeals from President Zelensky regarding holding the first meeting. Now – to hold such a meeting by the end of August. Well, we are waiting for a response from Russia.
We really see that the Russian side is trying its best to delay the issue of a meeting – not just a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky, but, for example, with the participation of US President Trump . How would you explain why? What do you think?
They believe that it is necessary to prepare a clear document.
But again, in his last speech today, Putin again returned to the demands that Mr. Medinsky voiced at the first meeting in Istanbul. Do you want a ceasefire? No questions asked. Completely withdraw your troops from the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions, and we will ensure their peaceful withdrawal. But, you know, I clearly remember Ilovaisk . There was also “ensuring a peaceful corridor”, withdrawal, and so on and so forth. There is no point in trusting the Russian Federation.
This is the first. And the second — unfortunately, although the negotiation process is underway, the demands of the Russian Federation remain unchanged. And these are demands that, firstly, we definitely cannot accept — and secondly, they are not yet aimed at discussing all these issues. Because the negotiation process involves discussion, actually negotiations. But when a delegation arrives, they read you the entire text of the letter, and then at a press conference they read the same thing, word for word — this shows that the delegation is not in the mood for any discussion.
Representatives of the Ukrainian negotiating team led by Defense Minister Rustam Umerov (center) leave the Ciragan Palace for a trilateral meeting with the Russians mediated by Turkish partners in Istanbul, Turkey, June 2, 2025. Deputy Chief of the Defense Ministry of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky is pictured third from left. Getty Images/Anadolu/Hakan Akgun
What can be achieved by these meetings in Istanbul? We will now talk about the exchanges - this is, of course, an important achievement. But as far as the prospect of ending the war is concerned, are these meetings in Istanbul simply a delaying move on the part of the Russians?
In any case, negotiations are necessary. We have a positive result, mainly on humanitarian issues related to the exchange. And at the same time, we are discussing not only the exchange of prisoners of war - but also the return of other citizens, journalists, political figures and others who were forcibly taken to the territory of the Russian Federation, including children. This is a very painful issue for our society - unlike the Russian Federation. Many people have been [still] in captivity since 2022.
At the previous meeting, we very clearly outlined the proposal: “all for all” in two categories. The first is the seriously injured and seriously ill. And the second is everyone born after 2000. These are people who are 25 years old and younger.
At the third meeting, we put forward another proposal. We have a lot of prisoners of war who have been in captivity since 2022. We understand what captivity is for more than three years [and proposed to exchange them]. The Russian Federation is considering this issue — and I think we will resolve it. If the discussion has started, this is already the first step towards there being some result. Maybe not one hundred percent — but the discussion is going on. And we hope that we will complete everything that we started at the second “Istanbul”, “all for all” — and begin the process of returning those boys and girls who have been in captivity for a very long time.
It is probably worth noting that there is a separate category altogether – these are people who have been held captive since the ATO. Both military and civilian. Are they even mentioned in these negotiations?
All categories are mentioned.
The process is underway, but it is not easy, because the Russian side has its own approaches. For example, when we talk about the seriously wounded, they say: let's set up a commission there. Okay, they set up national commissions. Then, for example, they say: we no longer consider this or that person wounded, they have already recovered, their health has stabilized, and we have already sent them to a colony somewhere. That is, for them they are “no longer seriously wounded” — but for us they remain so. Because we understand: any serious injury negatively affects a person's overall health. And for them — they are “already healed.” Well, a person doesn't have a leg — so what?
That's why there should be a discussion. And considering that we've had such a communication channel since 22 - look how many of our prisoners of war, civilians we've returned from captivity during this time. Historically, we haven't seen such precedents. First there's a war, a conflict - then it ends, then some kind of peace agreement and the exchange of prisoners of war begins. We started doing this in March 2022.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
However, we continue to see that the Russians are not giving up the “Azovites.” What are the difficulties here?
It's very simple: manipulation. They just don't give it away.
Do they voice any wishes, who do they want for these people?
No — they just don't include them on the return list.
Can this situation change somehow?
We are trying. We are constantly talking about it. Again, look, a very vivid example. We said: young people, under 25, “everyone for everyone.” There are many “Azovites” in these groups. But the result for us so far is not what we want. They are still there.
Believe me, we know about everyone. We know where they are. There are certain problems with those prisoners of war — with our citizens — who are in the territory of the so-called “LPR” and “DPR”. But with regard to those who are in the territory of the Russian Federation, it is much simpler.
By the way, the Red Cross helps us a little there. But, unfortunately, this is not yet the mechanism that works in accordance with all conventions.
What are the difficulties with the return of civilians? For example, the journalistic community is familiar with the name of Dmytro Khylyuk , a journalist with the UNIAN agency, who was captured by the Russians as a civilian during the occupation of the Kyiv region in early 2022.
I can't say exactly how to understand the logic of the Russian Federation. But, in my opinion, they are afraid of such people. Why? Because they are active citizens. A journalist always brings the truth. And they are simply afraid that all this torture, the treatment of prisoners of war, detainees - and in general what is happening in Russian colonies and prisons - will not come to the attention of the world community.
It's, you know, like the Gulags in the Soviet Union. Nobody knew what was going on there until later. It's exactly the same situation now.
What about the children? As I understand it, the list that the Ukrainian side submitted in Istanbul includes over 300 children.
Yes, a list of 336 children was submitted. But, again, there is manipulation from Russia. They even say: they say, three, or how many Medinsky named, are already adults. Well, it is clear that some of those who were children in 2012 are now 18 years old. This is a first.
And secondly, they believe that these are completely different circumstances under which the children appeared on the territory of the Russian Federation. As they say, this is not the removal of children, this was an “evacuation.” They say, we saved them from you, from the war, and so on.
This is a debatable issue. We have a representative in the working group who works directly with the relevant departments of the Russian Federation to make decisions regarding children.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
I will also mention Belarus: this summer it returned to the news. We saw that Putin and Lukashenko recently met on the Russian island of Valaam. And before that, Keith Kellogg, the US President's special representative for Ukraine, came to Lukashenko. What processes are taking place in Belarus now?
The first direction: after all, Belarus wants to maintain relations with Western countries. Accordingly, there are meetings at the Belarus-United States level.
The second direction for Belarus concerns the sale of their products. And there is a fairly wide range there, especially agricultural machinery and mineral fertilizers.
And the third is to never be directly involved in the war. This is Lukashenko's position, and he is trying to adhere to it.
Yes, active preparations are underway for the Zapad-2025 exercises. But if you compare this with the Zapad-2017 exercises or others that were held on the territory of Belarus, it is completely different.
That is, Lukashenko does not want this to worsen the attitude towards Belarus, despite the fact that Belarus is the main ally of the Russian Federation. And at the same time, he is trying to preserve a kind of sovereignty and personal position regarding the place of Belarus in the modern security environment.
Yes, there are many questions - they say, some new equipment has appeared on the territory of Belarus, there are already many comments, reports about this. Planned preparations for [military] exercises are underway. We are monitoring it, we know all the stages, we understand what troop movements will take place and in what terms. There is nothing unusual so far. The level of threat associated with these exercises is quite low.
And most importantly: the Russian Federation currently has no free reserves to deploy a large group to participate in this exercise. All troops are currently at the front in the war against Ukraine.
That is, is the threat potential after these exercises – for Ukraine or, for example, for the European Union and NATO – low?
If we talk about the active phase and the number of troops that are being accumulated, yes, it is low. This is a staff training, a staff exercise. This is not the creation of a powerful strike group, as was the case in December 21, January 22 on the territory of Belarus, from where the invasion towards Kyiv began.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexandr Bramsky
I remembered Keith Kellogg's visit to Belarus. Kellogg is, after all, the US President's special representative for Ukraine. Can Belarus somehow be useful in the issue of achieving peace in Ukraine?
Lukashenko is once again offering Minsk as a platform for negotiations. But this is a past stage and let's not return to it.
In the spring, you mentioned 2026 as the year when Russia wants to end the war. Please explain what you mean? Because 2026 is coming soon.
We voiced this, but the Russian Federation spoke about it. In their strategic planning documents, they clearly stated: "The Ukrainian issue must be resolved by 2026." This is direct language from the planning documents of the Russian Federation.
We understand why. Because the costs of war in the Russian Federation are very high. We see the negative trends that are present in their economy today. In essence, it has entered a stage of stagnation. Everything related to the extraction of minerals or, for example, metallurgy. Their sales markets have shrunk. These are large expenses that are now going to the defense-industrial complex - 42% of the budget is, in fact, going to war. And this affects other sectors of the economy. This is the first.
Second: they predicted possible scenarios for the development of events. And, among other things, they concluded that if they continued the war at the same pace and with the same costs, they would never be able to compete with either the United States of America or China.
Then they become an ordinary regional power, [whose influence] will be limited to the post-Soviet space and some individual elements of other continents, including Africa. And the level of the US and China will be unattainable for them. And they understand this.
So is a pause necessary? Perhaps it is.
There is the issue of lifting sanctions. It is very serious for them. The latest forecast that we see is that they are satisfied with an oil price of $50 [per barrel]. At that, the Stabilization Fund – this is their welfare fund, which is now essentially being used to wage war – will last for 18 months.
If we say that oil is $30, then the Stabilization Fund will only last until the end of the year.
The complex of problems that may fall on the Russian Federation is much broader than it actually seems. In particular, these are demographic issues. The labor market is shrinking, now they are mobilizing 350 thousand people [per year] into the army. If you add up the losses, the labor market will lose 500 thousand. Let's take industry - today 90% of companies in industry, in production, say that they lack labor. The unemployment rate, for example, is now the lowest since the Soviet Union. This is because there are no free laborers. Everyone who could have been has already been taken from the labor market.
These are the conclusions they draw in their planning documents.
About Russian influences in Ukraine. We don't have much time, but perhaps you can characterize these areas as follows: what should our viewers and listeners pay attention to? According to your information, in what areas is Russia currently working with us, Ukrainians, outside the front?
I would outline three main areas.
The first is intimidation. Not only through propaganda and the information space, but also intimidation through missile and drone strikes.
The second direction is the use of social networks, especially Telegram channels, to manipulate Ukrainian citizens. You see how powerfully they work with young people regarding bombings and other sabotage and terrorist acts, and attracting them to cooperation.
And the third is the destabilization of the situation. By undermining trust in the authorities, the alleged inability of the state to protect people, and other [trigger issues].
Today, if we talk about the restoration of this powerful element of the information struggle of the Russian Federation, then it has happened. If we compare it with 22, for example. Then both Europe and Ukraine understood what Russian propaganda was. Today, Russia has managed to restore this powerful component [of influence].
I will give a very simple example. The issue is currently being considered to turn Rossotrudnichestvo into a separate agency that will not be subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other. Separate funding, a separate agency directly subordinate to the president, which will have an impact on other countries.
They are still trying to influence.
And it will be even stronger. With free hands to solve the most pressing problems of Russian propaganda - both in our country and elsewhere. Imposing their own opinions, their own narratives - and, accordingly, their own vision of the world order and the European security system.
Deputy Head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Vadym Skibitsky during an interview with Suspilne, Kyiv, August 2025. Suspilne News/Olexander Tyminsky
What is the key to Russia's strength now? We mentioned the price of oil - but it's probably not the only one.
The basis is, after all, natural resources. Natural resources are the first.
The second is the propaganda machine. And the punitive machine of the Russian Federation is now, perhaps, even tougher than it was in the Soviet Union. It is impossible to do anything there. And you can see that perfectly well.
And the third is, perhaps, the specificity of the Russian population. They are ready, as they say, to eat soup with their hands — but “the tsar is good” and we will defeat the enemies. The propaganda painted the enemy very simply – it is the West, it is Ukraine. That is what unites this society. Unfortunately.
But there are different moments. [The situation can change] either time or, as they say, a “black swan.” It also sometimes flies to the Russian Federation.
Let's hope for "black swans" in our favor.
Jaahas venäjä valmistelee provokaatiota ja massiivisia siviilien pommituksia Harkovaan rauhanneuvottelujen aikana.
www.iltalehti.fi
Venäjältä hurjia väitteitä ennen Trumpin ja Putinin tapaamista: ”Valmistelee provokaatiota” – IL seuraa sotaa
Iltalehti seuraa Ukrainan sotaa ja sen seurauksia hetki hetkeltä.
www.iltalehti.fi
Playfran (yleensä hyvin informoitu) mukaan ryssillä olisi Dobropilyan puskussa myös erikoisjoukkoja. Ei siis pelkästään pahnan pohjimmaisia. Rubicon -drooniyksikkö kuuluu myös eliittiin.
Ranskalainen Osint -twiittaaja on tutkinut Sentinel-kuvista ryssän liitopommien käyttöä Pokrovsnin seudulla. Se on erittäin massiivista. Arvellaan, että ne olisivat myös syynä Ukrainan uusimman puolustuslinjan rakennustöiden keskeytykseen.
Ranskalainen Osint -twiittaaja on tutkinut Sentinel-kuvista ryssän liitopommien käyttöä Pokrovsnin seudulla. Se on erittäin massiivista. Arvellaan, että ne olisivat myös syynä Ukrainan uusimman puolustuslinjan rakennustöiden keskeytykseen.
wargame
Kapteeni
Jaa, vihdoinkin joku on keksinyt miten asemista pääsee läpi? Näin se toimii ja lääkettä tuohon ei ole koska ei ole kunnon ilmavoimia. Huono juttu Ukrainalaisille.
Benelli
Respected Leader
Perinteisesti siirryttäisiin vaihtoasemiin pommituksen ajaksi mutta drone ajalla tämä ei taida olla niin yksinkertaista.
Ukrainan F-16 koneisiin pitäisi integroida joku Amraam-ER.
Lisää poimintoja tuosta Maljukin haastattelusta.
Krimin silta – vaarallinen rakenne, iskut siihen ovat muodostuneet SBU:n tunnusmerkiksi, sanoo Vasyl Maljuk
Kolme onnistunutta iskua Krimin siltaan ovat muodostuneet yhdeksi Ukrainan turvallisuuspalvelun (SBU) tunnusmerkeistä ja merkittävästi häirinneet miehittäjien sotilaslogistiikkaa. Näin totesi turvallisuuspalvelun päällikkö, kenraalimajuri Vasyl Maljuk, My-Ukraina-kanavan haastattelussa uutismaratonissa Yhdistetyt uutiset.
”Todellisuudessa meillä on satoja toteutettuja operaatioita, ja jokainen niistä ansaitsee kunnioitusta ja huomiota. Mutta jos tarvitaan jokin kirkas käyntikortti, se on Krimin silta. Ensimmäisellä kerralla lähestyimme maalta, toisella kerralla veden pintaa pitkin. Ja vuonna 2025 menimme veden alta. Kohdistimme vakavia vaurioita siltaan, erityisesti niin sanottuihin ‘härkiin’ eli tukiin. Käytännössä silta toimii nyt rajoitetussa tilassa – sitä pitkin kulkee vain enintään 5 tonnin painoisia kuorma-autoja. Vihollinen ei käytä sitä lainkaan sotilaslogistiikkaan. Siksi sanoisin, että kyseessä on eräänlainen vaarallinen rakenne”, totesi Maljuk.
Turvallisuuspalvelun päällikön mukaan viimeisimmässä vedenalaisessa iskussa SBU teki siltaan kaksi iskua, joista jokaisen teho oli 1,1 tonnia trotyyliekvivalenttia.
Kenraalimajuri korosti, että Ukrainan erikoispalvelu jatkaa Ukrainan ylipäällikön, presidentti Volodymyr Zelenskyin, antaman tehtävän toteuttamista Venäjän herruuden lopettamiseksi Mustallamerellä. Tätä varten kehitetään meridronejen käyttöä.
”Kyse ei ole enää pelkästä itsemurhamoodista. Nämä ovat monikäyttöisiä alustoja. Nämä ovat ‘lentotukialuksia’: ne kuljettavat FPV-lennokkeja, konekivääriaseistusta. Ne käyvät täysimittaisesti taisteluun vihollisen ilma-alusten kanssa, miinoittavat ja voivat tehdä paljon muutakin”, Maljuk korosti.
Vastatessaan toimittajan kysymykseen oman henkensä uhasta Maljuk totesi, että onnistuneiden iskujen Krimin siltaan ja erikoisoperaation ”Hämähäkinverkko” jälkeen hänestä on tullut yksi vihollisen tärkeimmistä kohteista.
”He työskentelevät tämän parissa koko ajan. Se on heidän prioriteettinsa. Me ymmärrämme sen. Turvallisuussyistä en voi kertoa kaikkia yksityiskohtia, mutta minulla on useita varakomennuspisteitä. Ymmärrettävästi vaihdan jatkuvasti asuinpaikkaani. He eivät pysty ulottumaan minuun sabotaasilla, joten tällä hetkellä he toimivat ohjus- ja Shahed-iskuin. En kuitenkaan ole tästä lainkaan huolissani – päinvastoin, se motivoi minua. Olenhan tässä teidän edessänne, elossa, terveenä, hymyilen – kaikki on hyvin”, Maljuk päätti.
Служба безпеки України
Кримський міст – аварійна конструкція, удари по ньому стали візитівкою СБУ, – Василь Малюк Три успішні ураження Кримському мосту стали однією з візитівок СБУ і значно порушили військову логістику рашистів. Про це Голова Служби безпеки генерал-лейтенант Василь Малюк зазначив під час інтерв’ю...t.me
Wall Street Journalin artikkeli Syrskyista ja ukrainan asevoimien vieläkin vaikuttavasta neuvostoperinteisestä johtamisesta.
Ukraine’s Once Nimble Army Is Mired in Soviet Decision-Making
As U.S.-Russia summit approaches, Ukrainian military faces growing divisions between the rank-and-file and top brass. ‘If you’re dumb and obedient, they leave you alone.’
Varmuuden varoiksi x-postaus, josta löytyy linkki tuohon WSJ:n artikkeliin. Sieltä aukesi itselle koko artikkeli ilman maksumuuria.
ido59
Majuri
PV:n strategian pääopettaja evl Perheentupa aprikoi, ettei Ukrainan itärintamalla ole tapahtumassa käänteentekeviä. Väitteet läpimurrosta ja satojen neliökilometrien valtaamisesta nyt ennen Alaskaa ovat pääosin ryssän info-operaatio, joka on mennyt lännen mediassa läpi.
Ukrainan nuorisoa säästävää mobilisointistrategiaa hän ei pidä suoranaisena epäonnistumisena, koska ryssää on pidätelty.
Ukrainalla ei ole tällä hetkellä neuvotteluvoimaa oikeudenmukaiseen rauhaan.
Alaskassa hän seuraa etenkin milllaisilla yksityiskohdilla asioita kytketään rintamatilanteeseen sekä aikamääreitä jatkosta. kauppalehti
Venäjä etenee nopeammin kuin koskaan aiemmin yli kolmevuotisen sodan aikana, eletään Ukrainan kannalta kriittisiä hetkiä.
Näin voi summata viime päivien huolestuttavia tietoja Ukrainan sotarintamalta, ja tapahtumat ajoittuvat vieläpä Donald Trumpin ja Vladimir Putinin tapaamisen alle.
Venäjän esimerkiksi kerrotaan vallanneen tiistain aikana 110 neliökilometrin suuruisen alueen Itä-Ukrainassa ilman suurempaa vastarintaa.
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun strategian pääopettaja, everstiluutnantti Christian Perheentupa huomauttaa, että Venäjä haluaa neuvottelujen alla osoittaa kaikin keinoin, että tilanne rintamalla on sille edullisempi kuin se todellisuudessa on.
Kyse on siis ainakin osin informaatiovaikuttamisesta.
”Julkistetut tiedot kytkeytyvät neuvottelutilanteeseen. Venäjä pyrkii ja Venäjää lähellä olevat tahot pyrkivät nyt esittämään nämä [etenemiset] mahdollisimman merkittävinä. Ilmeisesti on ollut kysymys pienistä joukoista tai eräänlaisista soluttautumishyökkäyksistä, joilla on pyritty syöttämään läpi sotilaita, jotta tilanne näyttäisi mahdollisimman hyvältä Venäjän kannalta. Tällä informaatio-operaatiolla pyritään vaikuttamaan neuvotteluihin”, Perheentupa sanoo.
Oletko siis sitä mieltä, että rintamalla ei oikeasti ole tapahtunut mitään kovin mullistavaa?
”Ei ole mitään niin isoa muutosta näkyvissä, että sen takia jommalla kummalla, varsinkaan Venäjällä, on mitään tarvetta tehdä pakkoratkaisua. Rintamatilanne ei nyt sanele sitä, mihin suuntaan neuvotteluissa edetään.”
”Pitää olla riittävästi aseita, jotta voi neuvotella itselleen hyväksyttävän rauhan.”
”Ukrainan kriisinkestävyys on jatkunut pitkälti yli kolme vuotta. Kyllä heillä on tarve saada pienempänä osapuolena tämä päättymään. Mutta vaikea heidän on tällä hetkellä saavuttaa oikeudenmukaista rauhaa. Jossain vaiheessa se on kuitenkin tehtävä ja se pitää kyetä myymään kansalle. Rauhan on taattava Ukrainan turvallisuus ja elinvoima.”
”Venäjää voi olla vaikea saada mihinkään todellisiin neuvotteluihin, niin kauan kuin se voi katsoa rintamalta jotain saavansa. Se on sitten eri asia, jos Yhdysvaltain paine kasvaa niin suureksi, että Venäjä katsoo tuen johdosta tilanteen kääntyvän sille epäedulliseksi.”
Voiko länsi puolustaa Ukrainaa uskottavasti ilman Yhdysvaltain aseita?
”Sen arvioi Venäjä, mutta kyllä Yhdysvaltojen rooli on aivan keskeinen. Viestin pitää joka tapauksessa olla se, että USA ja koko länsi ovat valmiit pitkäaikaiseen tukemiseen. Ei voida antaa sellaista näkymää, että tuki loppuisi ja Venäjä pääsisi toteuttamaan omia sotilaallisia tavoitteitaan.”
”Se on pidemmän aikaa ollut kriittinen kysymys ja kytkeytyy sodan hyväksyttävyyteen eli esimerkiksi siihen, mitkä ikäluokat määrätään asepalvelukseen.”
Ukraina on säästänyt nuorempaa ikäluokkaa asepalvelukselta, onko strategia ollut oikea?
”Vaikea arvioida. Ei sitä voi suoranaisena epäonnistumisenakaan pitää, koska maa on kyennyt vastustamaan yli kolme vuotta sotilaallista suurvaltaa Venäjää. Suomessa suunnitelmamme reserviläisten käytöstä on erilainen.”
”Seuraan erityisesti, todetaanko jatkoaskeleista, tuleeko jotain tarkkoja aikamääreitä jatkosta? Millä yksityiskohdilla asioita kytketään rintamatilanteeseen, millaisia osaratkaisuja tehdään, päästäänkö sopuun esimerkiksi merioperaatioiden rauhoittamisesta tai vaikkapa ilmaiskujen päättämisestä?
Tuleeko uusia avauksia ja kuka tulokset lopulta esittää? Puhuuko Trump, Putin vaiko alempi virkakunta?”
Ukrainan nuorisoa säästävää mobilisointistrategiaa hän ei pidä suoranaisena epäonnistumisena, koska ryssää on pidätelty.
Ukrainalla ei ole tällä hetkellä neuvotteluvoimaa oikeudenmukaiseen rauhaan.
Alaskassa hän seuraa etenkin milllaisilla yksityiskohdilla asioita kytketään rintamatilanteeseen sekä aikamääreitä jatkosta. kauppalehti
Sotastrategian pääopettaja: Venäjä sumuttaa suuren tapaamisen alla
Venäjä etenee nopeammin kuin koskaan aiemmin yli kolmevuotisen sodan aikana, eletään Ukrainan kannalta kriittisiä hetkiä.
Näin voi summata viime päivien huolestuttavia tietoja Ukrainan sotarintamalta, ja tapahtumat ajoittuvat vieläpä Donald Trumpin ja Vladimir Putinin tapaamisen alle.
Venäjän esimerkiksi kerrotaan vallanneen tiistain aikana 110 neliökilometrin suuruisen alueen Itä-Ukrainassa ilman suurempaa vastarintaa.
Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun strategian pääopettaja, everstiluutnantti Christian Perheentupa huomauttaa, että Venäjä haluaa neuvottelujen alla osoittaa kaikin keinoin, että tilanne rintamalla on sille edullisempi kuin se todellisuudessa on.
Kyse on siis ainakin osin informaatiovaikuttamisesta.
”Julkistetut tiedot kytkeytyvät neuvottelutilanteeseen. Venäjä pyrkii ja Venäjää lähellä olevat tahot pyrkivät nyt esittämään nämä [etenemiset] mahdollisimman merkittävinä. Ilmeisesti on ollut kysymys pienistä joukoista tai eräänlaisista soluttautumishyökkäyksistä, joilla on pyritty syöttämään läpi sotilaita, jotta tilanne näyttäisi mahdollisimman hyvältä Venäjän kannalta. Tällä informaatio-operaatiolla pyritään vaikuttamaan neuvotteluihin”, Perheentupa sanoo.
Oletko siis sitä mieltä, että rintamalla ei oikeasti ole tapahtunut mitään kovin mullistavaa?
”Ei ole mitään niin isoa muutosta näkyvissä, että sen takia jommalla kummalla, varsinkaan Venäjällä, on mitään tarvetta tehdä pakkoratkaisua. Rintamatilanne ei nyt sanele sitä, mihin suuntaan neuvotteluissa edetään.”
Rauhakin on solmittava
Kumpaa Ukraina tarvitsee nyt enemmän, aseita vai neuvotteluja?”Pitää olla riittävästi aseita, jotta voi neuvotella itselleen hyväksyttävän rauhan.”
”Ukrainan kriisinkestävyys on jatkunut pitkälti yli kolme vuotta. Kyllä heillä on tarve saada pienempänä osapuolena tämä päättymään. Mutta vaikea heidän on tällä hetkellä saavuttaa oikeudenmukaista rauhaa. Jossain vaiheessa se on kuitenkin tehtävä ja se pitää kyetä myymään kansalle. Rauhan on taattava Ukrainan turvallisuus ja elinvoima.”
”Venäjää voi olla vaikea saada mihinkään todellisiin neuvotteluihin, niin kauan kuin se voi katsoa rintamalta jotain saavansa. Se on sitten eri asia, jos Yhdysvaltain paine kasvaa niin suureksi, että Venäjä katsoo tuen johdosta tilanteen kääntyvän sille epäedulliseksi.”
Voiko länsi puolustaa Ukrainaa uskottavasti ilman Yhdysvaltain aseita?
”Sen arvioi Venäjä, mutta kyllä Yhdysvaltojen rooli on aivan keskeinen. Viestin pitää joka tapauksessa olla se, että USA ja koko länsi ovat valmiit pitkäaikaiseen tukemiseen. Ei voida antaa sellaista näkymää, että tuki loppuisi ja Venäjä pääsisi toteuttamaan omia sotilaallisia tavoitteitaan.”
Suomi käyttää reserviä toisin
Kuinka kriittinen on Ukrainan miehistöpula?”Se on pidemmän aikaa ollut kriittinen kysymys ja kytkeytyy sodan hyväksyttävyyteen eli esimerkiksi siihen, mitkä ikäluokat määrätään asepalvelukseen.”
Ukraina on säästänyt nuorempaa ikäluokkaa asepalvelukselta, onko strategia ollut oikea?
”Vaikea arvioida. Ei sitä voi suoranaisena epäonnistumisenakaan pitää, koska maa on kyennyt vastustamaan yli kolme vuotta sotilaallista suurvaltaa Venäjää. Suomessa suunnitelmamme reserviläisten käytöstä on erilainen.”
Huippuviikon tärpit
Keskiviikkona Euroopan johtajat ja Trump keskustelivat ja edessä on Trumpin ja Putinin tapaaminen perjantaina Alaskassa. Millaisia odotusarvoja näet tähän viikkoon kohdistuvan?”Seuraan erityisesti, todetaanko jatkoaskeleista, tuleeko jotain tarkkoja aikamääreitä jatkosta? Millä yksityiskohdilla asioita kytketään rintamatilanteeseen, millaisia osaratkaisuja tehdään, päästäänkö sopuun esimerkiksi merioperaatioiden rauhoittamisesta tai vaikkapa ilmaiskujen päättämisestä?
Tuleeko uusia avauksia ja kuka tulokset lopulta esittää? Puhuuko Trump, Putin vaiko alempi virkakunta?”
Micek kommentoi Pokrovskin suuntaa:
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https://x.com/Artur_Micek
Rodynśke - at the present moment, after more than 48 hours have passed, we now know that we are dealing with a Russian INCURSION rather than a BREAKTHROUGH of Ukrainian defense lines. This is good news, but not optimistic - why - more on that later.The Russians have pushed large infantry forces into the resulting incursion to hold this area and then expand its base. Heavy fighting continues in the region of the villages of Wilne, Wołodymyriwka, and Oktiabrśke. Very bloody battles are ongoing for the Dorożnie railway depot.Here, the Russians are the attacking side. The attacks are conducted with strong support from Russian aviation, which is pounding the Ukrainians with glide bombs - often striking Ukrainian positions located less than a kilometer from their own forces. If the Russians manage to control the region of these two towns, they will establish a foundation for deepening the incursion. The situation for Ukrainian forces would then become very dangerous.On the other hand, we already know that yesterday and today, the Ukrainians attacked toward the towns of Zołotyj Kołodiaź and Hruźke. Unfortunately, the operation ended in failure. Although some positions were recaptured, including those running along the road from Dobropola to Kramatorsk, this is too little to speak of stabilizing the front in this region.What awaits us in the coming days - further attempts to widen and then deepen the Russian incursion. The Russians have indeed sent armored equipment into it, but these were individual infantry fighting vehicles. A larger raid cannot be expected here at the moment due to:- A large number of Ukrainian drone units urgently deployed to this region- The lack of a good road network to supply these forces- The too-narrow width of the incursion, which at its narrowest point at the base is only less than 5 kilometers.- The lack of nearby adequate reserves and operational space to deploy them.This does not change the fact that the situation is very dangerous and threatening. If Ukrainian reserves do not arrive there in time and do not attempt to eliminate this incursion, the Russians will sooner or later, at the cost of thousands of dead and wounded, expand it and lead to the deployment of heavy forces into Ukrainian operational space west of Kramatorsk. This would be a catastrophe for the Ukrainian front stretching from Pokrowka to Łymań.PS. Dobropole is today being mercilessly bombarded by the Russians because Ukrainian reserves, which I wrote about yesterday, have appeared there.
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https://x.com/Artur_Micek
Rodynśke - at the present moment, after more than 48 hours have passed, we now know that we are dealing with a Russian INCURSION rather than a BREAKTHROUGH of Ukrainian defense lines. This is good news, but not optimistic - why - more on that later.The Russians have pushed large infantry forces into the resulting incursion to hold this area and then expand its base. Heavy fighting continues in the region of the villages of Wilne, Wołodymyriwka, and Oktiabrśke. Very bloody battles are ongoing for the Dorożnie railway depot.Here, the Russians are the attacking side. The attacks are conducted with strong support from Russian aviation, which is pounding the Ukrainians with glide bombs - often striking Ukrainian positions located less than a kilometer from their own forces. If the Russians manage to control the region of these two towns, they will establish a foundation for deepening the incursion. The situation for Ukrainian forces would then become very dangerous.On the other hand, we already know that yesterday and today, the Ukrainians attacked toward the towns of Zołotyj Kołodiaź and Hruźke. Unfortunately, the operation ended in failure. Although some positions were recaptured, including those running along the road from Dobropola to Kramatorsk, this is too little to speak of stabilizing the front in this region.What awaits us in the coming days - further attempts to widen and then deepen the Russian incursion. The Russians have indeed sent armored equipment into it, but these were individual infantry fighting vehicles. A larger raid cannot be expected here at the moment due to:- A large number of Ukrainian drone units urgently deployed to this region- The lack of a good road network to supply these forces- The too-narrow width of the incursion, which at its narrowest point at the base is only less than 5 kilometers.- The lack of nearby adequate reserves and operational space to deploy them.This does not change the fact that the situation is very dangerous and threatening. If Ukrainian reserves do not arrive there in time and do not attempt to eliminate this incursion, the Russians will sooner or later, at the cost of thousands of dead and wounded, expand it and lead to the deployment of heavy forces into Ukrainian operational space west of Kramatorsk. This would be a catastrophe for the Ukrainian front stretching from Pokrowka to Łymań.PS. Dobropole is today being mercilessly bombarded by the Russians because Ukrainian reserves, which I wrote about yesterday, have appeared there.
Myroshnykov. Tämä prikaati jonka alueella läpimurto tapahtui (mainittu jo monessa paikassa mutta en nyt muista) mahdollisesti valehdellut tilanteesta ylöspäin.
All I can say about the "Dobropil worm" is that combat operations are ongoing.The scum are gradually being identified and eliminated. There are already captured scum.This won’t be easy. This won’t be quick.And it’s far from certain that we’ll be able to restore the front line as it was before the breakthrough. Most likely, we won’t regain 2-3-4-5 kilometers.But let’s not speculate. Better yet, let’s help our Armed Forces!I know that this situation has made many in the command think seriously about real checks on the placement of personnel at positions deep within our lines.I also send a big "hello" to a certain XXX brigade, in whose sector the breakthrough occurred and which lied about controlling certain positions.Lies will kill us.
All I can say about the "Dobropil worm" is that combat operations are ongoing.The scum are gradually being identified and eliminated. There are already captured scum.This won’t be easy. This won’t be quick.And it’s far from certain that we’ll be able to restore the front line as it was before the breakthrough. Most likely, we won’t regain 2-3-4-5 kilometers.But let’s not speculate. Better yet, let’s help our Armed Forces!I know that this situation has made many in the command think seriously about real checks on the placement of personnel at positions deep within our lines.I also send a big "hello" to a certain XXX brigade, in whose sector the breakthrough occurred and which lied about controlling certain positions.Lies will kill us.