tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Nexta. Iäkkäitä örkkejä. Valehteleeko mun silmäni vai onko noilla yksi plate per ryhmä?
Toivottavasti joka ukko päätyy lannoitteeksi Ukrainan pelloille.
Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Mustaruuti
- Aloitus PVM
Toivottavasti joka ukko päätyy lannoitteeksi Ukrainan pelloille.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Perunin uusin video.
Nexta. Iäkkäitä örkkejä. Valehteleeko mun silmäni vai onko noilla yksi plate per ryhmä?
He,he! Täyttä ropagantaa! Nuo myrtyneet ilmeet johtuu siitä, kun kaikki nuo (kuvausta varten) päällä olevat kamppeet otetaan pois ja tilalle annetaan NL:n rytkyt peltipottineen ja Mosin-Naganteineen...
Viimeksi muokattu:
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Sopinee tänne havaintona.
Mika Aaltola: Venäjän aggressio sisältää kansanmurhaisen vihan | Verkkouutiset
Myös Suomen tulee tutkijan mukaan ottaa huomioon, että rajan takana on vihan ideologian vallassa oleva taantunut Venäjä.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Antares
Respected Leader
Puolalaisen tuumailua Venäjän TOR-videosta (huom: video ei ole yhtenänen vaan 24 ja 25 sekunnin välillä on hyppäys, ehkä leikattu vain pois "liikaa aikaa"?):
Finally, I had a moment to look at this video. A very interesting case. After analyzing it, I only confirmed my earlier opinion. In fact, Russian soldiers seem to be watching an approaching volley of GMLRS missiles.
For easier viewing, I am posting a straightened version of the film. The main and the most important visible element is the screen of the fire control station. It shows everything that Tor sees and presents other information relevant to the fight against air targets.
This Tor starts the engagement with the 9M330 / 331/332 family 7 missile fire unit with radio command guidance. One chamber remains empty.
In this short video, we see the routes of potential targets appearing for just a few seconds. The observation is probably carried out with the use of longwall sector fire control radar.
A single, dashed line probably shows the direction in which the tower is facing with the fire control radar and optoelectronic system.
In single frames of the film, we see potential targets appear quickly, then their route is refreshed 1-2 times, and then suddenly disappear. The target route designed by the system indicates its very high speed.
The key thing is that the radar sees the target very close to the launcher's position, then is able to refresh the target's position basically 1 time, after which the target disappears as it either flies out of the radar's field of view or hits the target (or is intercepted by another system
) .
Additionally, I would like to remind you that Tor's fire control radar can operate in a position optimized for the detection of low-flying targets or those falling from above. This also affects the timing of detection and the observation time of a target such as the GMLRS. What mode does this track work in? I do not know
During the fight, one of the missiles is fired. In the video, we clearly hear the moment of a cold start of the missile, it seems that we can see a cloud of its exhaust gases on the TV channel. In addition, you can see that the number of available missiles in the launcher is decreasing.
Under these conditions, I estimate that the chances of this Tor infecting GMLRS are practically none. Its missiles are radio-command guided and require fire control radar to observe the target throughout the entire battle. There is simply no time for that here.
The launch of a Tor missile does not mean that it will manage to reach the target, being guided by the transmitted commands. If the target disappears from the radar / optoelectronic system, the Tor rocket cannot find it. She is blind.
In addition, there is one more snag - activation of the Tor missile proximity fuse and detonation of its warhead in such a way as to actually strike the target. My guess is that in some situations it will be very difficult.
For example, the Tamir missiles of the Iron Dome system shape their trajectory in a theoretically energy ineffective manner from the point of view of their range. They do it precisely in order to set their flight path appropriately in relation to the trajectory of their targets.
The Tor showdown video is cut, but we can see that his turret has most likely been slightly rotated. Perhaps so that the observed targets were in the radar's field of view as long as possible.
At the end, the decision to change position seems to be made. I interpret the presented image as a transition into the movement mode. There are also some noises that indicate a more intense engine operation.
If the Torah does not have a different radar mode to counter such high-speed artillery ammunition, the chances of routine GMLRS interceptions are slim. This is not surprising, however, as Tor was not designed against such targets.
Perhaps entire Torah batteries supported by command vehicles and pre-detection radars would be able to operate more effectively, but I don't think they would be able to provide actual security to high-value targets without the support of the Buks or the S-300/400.
I will write about why missiles such as GMLRS, Wilcha or Smierczy guided missiles are a difficult target for VSHORAD systems, which have certain C-RAM capabilities, in the next week.
Of course, if anyone has direct experience with Russian air defense equipment, or preferably with Tor, I encourage you to make constructive comments. I hope, however, that I did not make too many mistakes, and yet the meaning remains.
Ketjun kommenteista:
Fantastic thread. I will add only to: "Its missiles are radio-command guided, they require observation of the target by the fire control radar throughout the clash." - if the target is observed by the camera, the radar may be turned off. Only the command antenna works which gives them based on elevation and optical tracking azimuth. Even the range to the target is not needed with the three-point method and activating the radio-fighter immediately after firing the rocket, which can also be done by OSA
Finally, I had a moment to look at this video. A very interesting case. After analyzing it, I only confirmed my earlier opinion. In fact, Russian soldiers seem to be watching an approaching volley of GMLRS missiles.
For easier viewing, I am posting a straightened version of the film. The main and the most important visible element is the screen of the fire control station. It shows everything that Tor sees and presents other information relevant to the fight against air targets.
This Tor starts the engagement with the 9M330 / 331/332 family 7 missile fire unit with radio command guidance. One chamber remains empty.
In this short video, we see the routes of potential targets appearing for just a few seconds. The observation is probably carried out with the use of longwall sector fire control radar.
A single, dashed line probably shows the direction in which the tower is facing with the fire control radar and optoelectronic system.
In single frames of the film, we see potential targets appear quickly, then their route is refreshed 1-2 times, and then suddenly disappear. The target route designed by the system indicates its very high speed.
The key thing is that the radar sees the target very close to the launcher's position, then is able to refresh the target's position basically 1 time, after which the target disappears as it either flies out of the radar's field of view or hits the target (or is intercepted by another system
) .Additionally, I would like to remind you that Tor's fire control radar can operate in a position optimized for the detection of low-flying targets or those falling from above. This also affects the timing of detection and the observation time of a target such as the GMLRS. What mode does this track work in? I do not know
During the fight, one of the missiles is fired. In the video, we clearly hear the moment of a cold start of the missile, it seems that we can see a cloud of its exhaust gases on the TV channel. In addition, you can see that the number of available missiles in the launcher is decreasing.
Under these conditions, I estimate that the chances of this Tor infecting GMLRS are practically none. Its missiles are radio-command guided and require fire control radar to observe the target throughout the entire battle. There is simply no time for that here.
The launch of a Tor missile does not mean that it will manage to reach the target, being guided by the transmitted commands. If the target disappears from the radar / optoelectronic system, the Tor rocket cannot find it. She is blind.
In addition, there is one more snag - activation of the Tor missile proximity fuse and detonation of its warhead in such a way as to actually strike the target. My guess is that in some situations it will be very difficult.
For example, the Tamir missiles of the Iron Dome system shape their trajectory in a theoretically energy ineffective manner from the point of view of their range. They do it precisely in order to set their flight path appropriately in relation to the trajectory of their targets.
The Tor showdown video is cut, but we can see that his turret has most likely been slightly rotated. Perhaps so that the observed targets were in the radar's field of view as long as possible.
At the end, the decision to change position seems to be made. I interpret the presented image as a transition into the movement mode. There are also some noises that indicate a more intense engine operation.
If the Torah does not have a different radar mode to counter such high-speed artillery ammunition, the chances of routine GMLRS interceptions are slim. This is not surprising, however, as Tor was not designed against such targets.
Perhaps entire Torah batteries supported by command vehicles and pre-detection radars would be able to operate more effectively, but I don't think they would be able to provide actual security to high-value targets without the support of the Buks or the S-300/400.
I will write about why missiles such as GMLRS, Wilcha or Smierczy guided missiles are a difficult target for VSHORAD systems, which have certain C-RAM capabilities, in the next week.
Of course, if anyone has direct experience with Russian air defense equipment, or preferably with Tor, I encourage you to make constructive comments.
I hope, however, that I did not make too many mistakes, and yet the meaning remains. Ketjun kommenteista:
Fantastic thread. I will add only to: "Its missiles are radio-command guided, they require observation of the target by the fire control radar throughout the clash." - if the target is observed by the camera, the radar may be turned off. Only the command antenna works which gives them based on elevation and optical tracking azimuth. Even the range to the target is not needed with the three-point method and activating the radio-fighter immediately after firing the rocket, which can also be done by OSA
Viimeksi muokattu:
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Joko Ukrainaan hyökkäyksen havainnot ja opetukset alkavat tuntua örkeissäkin? Venäjän armeijaa lähellä olevat lähteet ovat yhä enemmän huolissaan pitkittyvästä sodasta, vertaavat "erikoisoperaatiotaan" jo mm. jenkkien Vietnamin sotaan.
Lisää aseita ja murkulaa urhealle Ukrainan kansalle, örkit takaisin Mordoriin.
cepa.org
Lisää aseita ja murkulaa urhealle Ukrainan kansalle, örkit takaisin Mordoriin.
Russia’s Military Grows Afraid of the Long War
Voices within the Russian military community are beginning to express anxiety about the future course of the war against Ukraine.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Joko Ukrainaan hyökkäyksen havainnot ja opetukset alkavat tuntua örkeissäkin? Venäjän armeijaa lähellä olevat lähteet ovat yhä enemmän huolissaan pitkittyvästä sodasta, vertaavat "erikoisoperaatiotaan" jo mm. jenkkien Vietnamin sotaan.
Lisää aseita ja murkulaa urhealle Ukrainan kansalle, örkit takaisin Mordoriin.
Russia’s Military Grows Afraid of the Long War
Voices within the Russian military community are beginning to express anxiety about the future course of the war against Ukraine.
Mitenköhän pitkään saavat vielä huijattua & lahjottua riviin vapaaehtoista tykinruokaa syrjäkyliltä ja provinsseista ? Mitä sitten kun se virta tyrehtyy ? Sodanjulistus, pakko-otot väkeen Pietarin ja Moskovan nuorien keskuudesta ?
Kysymykseesi en osaa vastata, mutta mikäli näin olisi, kannattaisi se yksi levy laittaa ryhmyrille ja hänellekin selkäpuolelle.
Antares
Respected Leader
Aina mielenkiintoista lukea kun haastatellaan sotilaita ja johtajia. Tässä yhden käännös:
https://wartranslated.com/ukrainian...v-about-lysychansk-and-morale-of-ua-soldiers/
Many wondered why the battle for Severodonetsk was quite lengthy, but AFU could not hold that long in Lysychansk, which is on higher ground and across the river. Ukrainian Brigadier General Dmytro Krasylnykov about Lysychansk and morale of UA soldiers:
Translation provided by Volodymyr: https://twitter.com/VolodyaTretyak
-
"Unfortunately, it turned out that for some reason, everyone forgets the problem. I have always said that the main problem is not the top-down, not the altitude or the lowlands. The main problem is logistics and provision because you can be courageous. You can be fearless. You can be super prepared, have three night-vision eyes, and all that. But what happened to Severodonetsk?
Three bridges that connected Lysychansk and Severodonetsk were destroyed. That is, any supply could have been conducted by what? By pontoon crossing or by boat. Even if this Severodonetsk could be filled with ammunition, in advance, water, food – anything. But you can’t evacuate the wounded in advance. The wounded appear during the battle.
The main problem is evacuating the wounded soldiers. If there is no evacuation of the injured, as soon as there is no medical assistance in time, that’s it. We can consider that the unit is already lost. Because everyone starts thinking, “aha, if I get wounded, what if I’m bleeding just the same, waiting for someone to come by boat or something?”
How many times have I heard the rationale of that Severodonetsk, why we needed Lysychansk, we did not need Severodonetsk, stand to the death, and so on – you can do anything. Especially since at that time in Severodonetsk, there were those units of the SDF, the National Guard motivated, which could generally conduct the defense. But again – for what? So they could complete the defense until this defense was more valuable than the withdrawal to previously prepared positions.
Everyone hoped that would happen with Lysychansk, but what happened with Lysychansk is that the enemy went to Lysychansk from the other side. So we moved reserves to Severodonetsk, and the enemy broke through the oil refinery to Lysychansk from the southern side.
How did this happen? Well, again, everything has a limit on patience, a limitation on endurance, and so on. That is, I saw a unit that had been repulsing all the attacks for three months, had been counterattacking, had been chasing the enemy. And then the moment came when – bang! And everybody refused to do the mission. Just abruptly, that’s all. So there was some breakdown.
When there are very few experienced and motivated service members, they no longer affect the morale of the entire unit. And when many of the mobilized servicemen arrive, who have no experience, skills, desire, nothing, they override with their panic any rational grain of those people who make up the backbone of the unit.
In my opinion, we need to look clearly: as soon as the unit becomes somewhere around 50% of the regular unit, it already needs to be withdrawn for at least 5, 7 days to recover, even to a second line. So let’s say not to the “mainland” part of the country where there are no hostilities, but even 20 km, 30 km from the front line. So that at least they are not hit by gun artillery. The main task is to get them out from under the barrel artillery. And there, they can quietly reformat and ditch the units coming in for re-staffing.
I mean, what’s the problem? Even if this sergeant wanted to pass on some of his experience to a soldier new to the unit, he couldn’t pass it on. Why not? Because he’s here, he’s in a different position. There is a constant battle. You can’t just talk about anything, and you can’t teach anybody anything. Just simply to put his head on straight. There’s no time. And there’s just no opportunity. So it is necessary to keep a specific limit of fatigue, a boundary."
https://wartranslated.com/ukrainian...v-about-lysychansk-and-morale-of-ua-soldiers/
Ukrainian Brigadier General Dmytro Krasylnykov about Lysychansk and morale of UA soldiers
Many wondered why the battle for Severodonetsk was quite lengthy, but AFU could not hold that long in Lysychansk, which is on higher ground and across the river. Ukrainian Brigadier General Dmytro Krasylnykov about Lysychansk and morale of UA soldiers:
Translation provided by Volodymyr: https://twitter.com/VolodyaTretyak
-
"Unfortunately, it turned out that for some reason, everyone forgets the problem. I have always said that the main problem is not the top-down, not the altitude or the lowlands. The main problem is logistics and provision because you can be courageous. You can be fearless. You can be super prepared, have three night-vision eyes, and all that. But what happened to Severodonetsk?
Three bridges that connected Lysychansk and Severodonetsk were destroyed. That is, any supply could have been conducted by what? By pontoon crossing or by boat. Even if this Severodonetsk could be filled with ammunition, in advance, water, food – anything. But you can’t evacuate the wounded in advance. The wounded appear during the battle.
The main problem is evacuating the wounded soldiers. If there is no evacuation of the injured, as soon as there is no medical assistance in time, that’s it. We can consider that the unit is already lost. Because everyone starts thinking, “aha, if I get wounded, what if I’m bleeding just the same, waiting for someone to come by boat or something?”
How many times have I heard the rationale of that Severodonetsk, why we needed Lysychansk, we did not need Severodonetsk, stand to the death, and so on – you can do anything. Especially since at that time in Severodonetsk, there were those units of the SDF, the National Guard motivated, which could generally conduct the defense. But again – for what? So they could complete the defense until this defense was more valuable than the withdrawal to previously prepared positions.
Everyone hoped that would happen with Lysychansk, but what happened with Lysychansk is that the enemy went to Lysychansk from the other side. So we moved reserves to Severodonetsk, and the enemy broke through the oil refinery to Lysychansk from the southern side.
How did this happen? Well, again, everything has a limit on patience, a limitation on endurance, and so on. That is, I saw a unit that had been repulsing all the attacks for three months, had been counterattacking, had been chasing the enemy. And then the moment came when – bang! And everybody refused to do the mission. Just abruptly, that’s all. So there was some breakdown.
When there are very few experienced and motivated service members, they no longer affect the morale of the entire unit. And when many of the mobilized servicemen arrive, who have no experience, skills, desire, nothing, they override with their panic any rational grain of those people who make up the backbone of the unit.
In my opinion, we need to look clearly: as soon as the unit becomes somewhere around 50% of the regular unit, it already needs to be withdrawn for at least 5, 7 days to recover, even to a second line. So let’s say not to the “mainland” part of the country where there are no hostilities, but even 20 km, 30 km from the front line. So that at least they are not hit by gun artillery. The main task is to get them out from under the barrel artillery. And there, they can quietly reformat and ditch the units coming in for re-staffing.
I mean, what’s the problem? Even if this sergeant wanted to pass on some of his experience to a soldier new to the unit, he couldn’t pass it on. Why not? Because he’s here, he’s in a different position. There is a constant battle. You can’t just talk about anything, and you can’t teach anybody anything. Just simply to put his head on straight. There’s no time. And there’s just no opportunity. So it is necessary to keep a specific limit of fatigue, a boundary."
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Laitan opetuksena tänne:
"Venäjän diktaattori uskoi kansan ottavan armeijan vastaan kukkasin" | Verkkouutiset
Professori sanoo Vladimir Putinin tehneen naapurimaastaan leppymättömän vihollisen.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
väärä vitja
Antares
Respected Leader
WSJ:n artikkeli drone-operaattoreista:
Suora linkki: https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrain...-new-kind-of-war-11659870805?mod=hp_lead_pos8
PRYBUZKE, Ukraine—“Fire,” a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit commander said after receiving a message from the artillery team on his mobile phone’s messaging app.
It took more than 20 seconds for the sound of an outgoing Ukrainian artillery round to reach this narrow strip of woodland on the front line between Ukrainian-held Mykolaiv and Russian-occupied Kherson in southern Ukraine.
As the shell whistled overhead, another member of the team who goes by the call sign Zhora zoomed in on his terminal’s screen to see where it landed. A third member, Thor, leaned over to mark the location on a tablet with Kropyva, a mapping and artillery software developed for the Ukrainian military.
A plume of dark smoke could be seen on the drone’s feed before the sound of the explosion traveled back. “Oh, that was real close!” said the 34-year-old Zhora with a smile, noting the short distance between the impact spot and a fortified Russian position sheltering a BMD armored fighting vehicle.
That is how much of the fighting goes on these days in Ukraine, where the front lines—with the exception of some parts of the Donbas area in the east—haven’t moved much in months. The two armies try to weaken each other in daily artillery exchanges that are guided by hundreds of spotters flying drones over enemy lines.
Abdulla, the commander of this special drone reconnaissance platoon, known as Terra, relayed the coordinates for the next round of artillery. Like most other Ukrainian soldiers, members of the platoon are allowed to be identified only by their call signs.
Just minutes earlier, Abdulla and his men were themselves scampering to seek cover in two dugouts after Russian forces spotted their drone in the air and fired several rounds in their general direction. The rounds landed too far away to cause damage. Not far from the spot, the remains of a burned-out car marked Russia’s success in eliminating another Ukrainian drone team a few weeks earlier.
“It’s a different kind of war now,” said Abdulla, a motorbike-race driver who obtained his law degree just before the war. “As people here say, if it comes down to exchanging gunfire, you’ve already made a mistake.” He volunteered during the 2014-15 war against Russian proxies in the Donbas area.
“When I was in my first campaign, I thought, what on earth are those drones, I have to be the real man, carry a gun on my shoulder, go seek out the enemy,” said the 33-year-old. “I’m older and wiser now.”
While drones have been around for decades, employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by Azerbaijan to devastating effect against Armenian forces in 2020, the high saturation of the front lines by unmanned aircraft is a unique feature of the Ukrainian war.
Both Russia and Ukraine operate professional military drones. Russia’s large fleet of Orlan-10 winged observation drones poses a serious problem for Ukrainian forces, which often don’t have the means to shoot them down. Ukraine employs its own fixed-wing observation drones, Leleka and Furia, as well as the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drones that played an important role in destroying Russian armored columns in the early days of the war. Kyiv has also deployed so-called kamikaze drones such as the U.S.-made Switchblade and the Polish-supplied Warmate.
Much more widespread on the front lines are off-the-shelf commercial drones, such as Chinese-made DJI quadrocopters, operated by teams attached to individual battalions and companies of troops. With a retail price of around $3,000 for a DJI Mavic 3 and upward of $10,000 for the bigger DJI Matrice series, these drones can make all the difference on the battlefield, according to soldiers.
“They get bought by friends, by relatives, by volunteers—and then become the eyes of the front line units,” said Alex, a Ukrainian drone operator who fought in the battle for Lysychansk in the Donbas area in June. “The situation can change in 10 minutes, and you need to see what the enemy is doing right away.” The powerful Russian jamming and electronic-warfare capabilities in the Donbas area, he added, disabled the GPS navigation systems used by most other drones—but didn’t disrupt the flights of quadrocopters such as DJI Mavic 3 that can be flown manually.
In confronting a much larger and better-equipped enemy, Ukraine’s military has had to become more flexible and inventive, accommodating teams of volunteers such as the Terra drone platoon into its structure. Most members of the platoon, which works with an infantry brigade on the Mykolaiv front, used to be Kyiv professionals who knew each other because of their joint interest in re-enacting medieval knight tournaments. Their preferred activity was cosplaying 15th century Flemish knights. The platoon, named after the home planet in the Warhammer 40,000 videogame, started up as part of Kyiv’s Territorial Defense when Russia invaded on Feb. 24.
On a recent day, Abdulla—who took his call sign from a character in a cult 1970 Soviet action movie—and three other soldiers, with guns, two drones in their carrying cases and backpacks full of spare batteries, got into a spray-painted pickup truck. The platoon’s drones and vehicles had been purchased with money contributed or collected by the team members themselves.
The pickup sped south of Mykolaiv, navigating around shell craters on rutted roads and passing the burned-out remains of the villages that changed hands in the first months of the war. At a strip of forest that serves as one of the unit’s launching grounds, Abdulla, Zhora and Thor jumped out and ran under the trees as the pickup sped back to avoid being spotted by Russian drones operating in the area. Thor, a 33-year-old project manager with an engineering degree, wore a patch saying “Avada Kedavra Bitch,” a reference to the deadliest curse in the Harry Potter series, next to a tourniquet on his body armor.
Upon arrival, Abdulla opened up a transmitter and created an internet connection. “It’s time for some nonverbal communication with the Russians,” he said. Zhora, who packaged nonperforming loans for a Kyiv bank before the war, began the mission with the DJI Mavic 3 drone, piloting it against the wind and into Russian lines. The drone, the size of a book, is relatively quiet and, with adaptations, can fly as far as 4 miles.
Zhora studied the landscape of Russian trenches and fortified positions, looking for priority targets, such as artillery pieces, tanks or ammunition stocks in the open. “Would be a prize to hit that one, but it is driving way too fast,” he said as a Russian Grad multiple-rocket launcher traveled on a road in the distance. A minute later, Zhora spotted another Russian vehicle, likely an armored ambulance, careening away from a Russian position. “Maybe one of them died?” he wondered. “Or maybe someone just had too much vodka,” Abdulla replied.
There weren’t any easy pickings, and Abdulla decided to focus on the Russian fortifications where armored vehicles were parked under thick concrete panels. Only a lucky direct hit can be effective against such defenses.
The strategy, however, was more complex. Firing on these fortifications could force the Russians to react by revealing additional positions and provoking troop movements. Russian response artillery fire could be used to pinpoint and target Russian guns. And barrages in the direct vicinity of Russian positions would degrade Russian troops even if they didn’t cause physical casualties.
“It’s a cat-and-mouse game here,” said Abdulla. “They must be under stress every day. It’s very important. If one day we have to launch an offensive, or they get the order to attack, they will be demoralized and fatigued.” The Russians are constantly shelling Ukrainian positions for the same reason.
Just as the small drone was returning from the first flight, a thud of an outgoing Russian artillery round, followed by a whistle, broke the chirping of birds. Everyone dove to the ground and scrambled for cover. The shell missed by a relatively comfortable distance, as did several others that followed. “They don’t know where we are,” Abdulla said, exhaling. “We keep working.”
Tapping on his phone from the dugout, he arranged for a Ukrainian artillery team in the rear to prepare for a fire mission some 30 minutes later. He didn’t know which caliber of gun and from where. It is considered bad form to inquire about details that, if intercepted, could be used by the Russians to destroy the Ukrainian artillery.
To guide fire, Zhora launched a bigger, DJI Matrice drone that can stay in the air longer and, because of superior optics, doesn’t have to fly so close to the enemy lines. With every round, the spotters tried to bring the shells closer to the Russian positions. On this day, none apparently sustained a decisive hit.
On the previous day, one of the shells hit a patch of forest that was teeming with Russian soldiers shortly before impact.
On the following day, Abdulla said, Ukrainian artillery fire that his team directed hit a Russian infantry fighting vehicle concealed under a wooden roof, and then struck again when Russian soldiers emerged from dugouts to try extinguishing the fire. Terra’s documented hits, which the platoon posts on its YouTube and Instagram accounts, include several Russian tanks, self-propelled and towed artillery pieces and other military vehicles.
“What is demoralizing somewhat is that they have lots more stuff,” Zhora said. “You blow something up, and then you see them replace it already the next day.”
As Russian guns returned fire, prompting it to relocate, the day’s mission ended. All in all, the amount of artillery fire from both sides was apparently similar—a dramatic change from the recent past, when Russia significantly outgunned Ukrainian troops in this area. Ukrainian HIMARS missile strikes have targeted Russia bridges and logistics hubs across the Kherson region in recent weeks.
“Maybe they are running low on ammunition now,” Abdulla said. “Maybe they are saving it up for the offensive. Or maybe their commander went to headquarters for a meeting and they don’t fire without him.”
Packing up their drones, the team waited as the pickup truck roared up in reverse, and then jumped in and left the front line for the day. “We will be back to fish tomorrow,” Abdulla said. “We are the biggest predator in this body of water.”
Suora linkki: https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukrain...-new-kind-of-war-11659870805?mod=hp_lead_pos8
Ukraine’s Drone Spotters on Front Lines Wage New Kind of War
A reconnaissance unit using drones to direct artillery strikes is frequently a target itself. Commercially available drones selling for as little as $3,000 are revolutionizing combat.
PRYBUZKE, Ukraine—“Fire,” a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit commander said after receiving a message from the artillery team on his mobile phone’s messaging app.
It took more than 20 seconds for the sound of an outgoing Ukrainian artillery round to reach this narrow strip of woodland on the front line between Ukrainian-held Mykolaiv and Russian-occupied Kherson in southern Ukraine.
As the shell whistled overhead, another member of the team who goes by the call sign Zhora zoomed in on his terminal’s screen to see where it landed. A third member, Thor, leaned over to mark the location on a tablet with Kropyva, a mapping and artillery software developed for the Ukrainian military.
A plume of dark smoke could be seen on the drone’s feed before the sound of the explosion traveled back. “Oh, that was real close!” said the 34-year-old Zhora with a smile, noting the short distance between the impact spot and a fortified Russian position sheltering a BMD armored fighting vehicle.
That is how much of the fighting goes on these days in Ukraine, where the front lines—with the exception of some parts of the Donbas area in the east—haven’t moved much in months. The two armies try to weaken each other in daily artillery exchanges that are guided by hundreds of spotters flying drones over enemy lines.
Abdulla, the commander of this special drone reconnaissance platoon, known as Terra, relayed the coordinates for the next round of artillery. Like most other Ukrainian soldiers, members of the platoon are allowed to be identified only by their call signs.
Just minutes earlier, Abdulla and his men were themselves scampering to seek cover in two dugouts after Russian forces spotted their drone in the air and fired several rounds in their general direction. The rounds landed too far away to cause damage. Not far from the spot, the remains of a burned-out car marked Russia’s success in eliminating another Ukrainian drone team a few weeks earlier.
“It’s a different kind of war now,” said Abdulla, a motorbike-race driver who obtained his law degree just before the war. “As people here say, if it comes down to exchanging gunfire, you’ve already made a mistake.” He volunteered during the 2014-15 war against Russian proxies in the Donbas area.
“When I was in my first campaign, I thought, what on earth are those drones, I have to be the real man, carry a gun on my shoulder, go seek out the enemy,” said the 33-year-old. “I’m older and wiser now.”
While drones have been around for decades, employed by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by Azerbaijan to devastating effect against Armenian forces in 2020, the high saturation of the front lines by unmanned aircraft is a unique feature of the Ukrainian war.
Both Russia and Ukraine operate professional military drones. Russia’s large fleet of Orlan-10 winged observation drones poses a serious problem for Ukrainian forces, which often don’t have the means to shoot them down. Ukraine employs its own fixed-wing observation drones, Leleka and Furia, as well as the Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drones that played an important role in destroying Russian armored columns in the early days of the war. Kyiv has also deployed so-called kamikaze drones such as the U.S.-made Switchblade and the Polish-supplied Warmate.
Much more widespread on the front lines are off-the-shelf commercial drones, such as Chinese-made DJI quadrocopters, operated by teams attached to individual battalions and companies of troops. With a retail price of around $3,000 for a DJI Mavic 3 and upward of $10,000 for the bigger DJI Matrice series, these drones can make all the difference on the battlefield, according to soldiers.
“They get bought by friends, by relatives, by volunteers—and then become the eyes of the front line units,” said Alex, a Ukrainian drone operator who fought in the battle for Lysychansk in the Donbas area in June. “The situation can change in 10 minutes, and you need to see what the enemy is doing right away.” The powerful Russian jamming and electronic-warfare capabilities in the Donbas area, he added, disabled the GPS navigation systems used by most other drones—but didn’t disrupt the flights of quadrocopters such as DJI Mavic 3 that can be flown manually.
In confronting a much larger and better-equipped enemy, Ukraine’s military has had to become more flexible and inventive, accommodating teams of volunteers such as the Terra drone platoon into its structure. Most members of the platoon, which works with an infantry brigade on the Mykolaiv front, used to be Kyiv professionals who knew each other because of their joint interest in re-enacting medieval knight tournaments. Their preferred activity was cosplaying 15th century Flemish knights. The platoon, named after the home planet in the Warhammer 40,000 videogame, started up as part of Kyiv’s Territorial Defense when Russia invaded on Feb. 24.
On a recent day, Abdulla—who took his call sign from a character in a cult 1970 Soviet action movie—and three other soldiers, with guns, two drones in their carrying cases and backpacks full of spare batteries, got into a spray-painted pickup truck. The platoon’s drones and vehicles had been purchased with money contributed or collected by the team members themselves.
The pickup sped south of Mykolaiv, navigating around shell craters on rutted roads and passing the burned-out remains of the villages that changed hands in the first months of the war. At a strip of forest that serves as one of the unit’s launching grounds, Abdulla, Zhora and Thor jumped out and ran under the trees as the pickup sped back to avoid being spotted by Russian drones operating in the area. Thor, a 33-year-old project manager with an engineering degree, wore a patch saying “Avada Kedavra Bitch,” a reference to the deadliest curse in the Harry Potter series, next to a tourniquet on his body armor.
Upon arrival, Abdulla opened up a transmitter and created an internet connection. “It’s time for some nonverbal communication with the Russians,” he said. Zhora, who packaged nonperforming loans for a Kyiv bank before the war, began the mission with the DJI Mavic 3 drone, piloting it against the wind and into Russian lines. The drone, the size of a book, is relatively quiet and, with adaptations, can fly as far as 4 miles.
Zhora studied the landscape of Russian trenches and fortified positions, looking for priority targets, such as artillery pieces, tanks or ammunition stocks in the open. “Would be a prize to hit that one, but it is driving way too fast,” he said as a Russian Grad multiple-rocket launcher traveled on a road in the distance. A minute later, Zhora spotted another Russian vehicle, likely an armored ambulance, careening away from a Russian position. “Maybe one of them died?” he wondered. “Or maybe someone just had too much vodka,” Abdulla replied.
There weren’t any easy pickings, and Abdulla decided to focus on the Russian fortifications where armored vehicles were parked under thick concrete panels. Only a lucky direct hit can be effective against such defenses.
The strategy, however, was more complex. Firing on these fortifications could force the Russians to react by revealing additional positions and provoking troop movements. Russian response artillery fire could be used to pinpoint and target Russian guns. And barrages in the direct vicinity of Russian positions would degrade Russian troops even if they didn’t cause physical casualties.
“It’s a cat-and-mouse game here,” said Abdulla. “They must be under stress every day. It’s very important. If one day we have to launch an offensive, or they get the order to attack, they will be demoralized and fatigued.” The Russians are constantly shelling Ukrainian positions for the same reason.
Just as the small drone was returning from the first flight, a thud of an outgoing Russian artillery round, followed by a whistle, broke the chirping of birds. Everyone dove to the ground and scrambled for cover. The shell missed by a relatively comfortable distance, as did several others that followed. “They don’t know where we are,” Abdulla said, exhaling. “We keep working.”
Tapping on his phone from the dugout, he arranged for a Ukrainian artillery team in the rear to prepare for a fire mission some 30 minutes later. He didn’t know which caliber of gun and from where. It is considered bad form to inquire about details that, if intercepted, could be used by the Russians to destroy the Ukrainian artillery.
To guide fire, Zhora launched a bigger, DJI Matrice drone that can stay in the air longer and, because of superior optics, doesn’t have to fly so close to the enemy lines. With every round, the spotters tried to bring the shells closer to the Russian positions. On this day, none apparently sustained a decisive hit.
On the previous day, one of the shells hit a patch of forest that was teeming with Russian soldiers shortly before impact.
On the following day, Abdulla said, Ukrainian artillery fire that his team directed hit a Russian infantry fighting vehicle concealed under a wooden roof, and then struck again when Russian soldiers emerged from dugouts to try extinguishing the fire. Terra’s documented hits, which the platoon posts on its YouTube and Instagram accounts, include several Russian tanks, self-propelled and towed artillery pieces and other military vehicles.
“What is demoralizing somewhat is that they have lots more stuff,” Zhora said. “You blow something up, and then you see them replace it already the next day.”
As Russian guns returned fire, prompting it to relocate, the day’s mission ended. All in all, the amount of artillery fire from both sides was apparently similar—a dramatic change from the recent past, when Russia significantly outgunned Ukrainian troops in this area. Ukrainian HIMARS missile strikes have targeted Russia bridges and logistics hubs across the Kherson region in recent weeks.
“Maybe they are running low on ammunition now,” Abdulla said. “Maybe they are saving it up for the offensive. Or maybe their commander went to headquarters for a meeting and they don’t fire without him.”
Packing up their drones, the team waited as the pickup truck roared up in reverse, and then jumped in and left the front line for the day. “We will be back to fish tomorrow,” Abdulla said. “We are the biggest predator in this body of water.”
President of Estonia 2006-16
@IlvesToomas
is an active member our our territorial defense organisation - the Defense League.
@IlvesToomas
is an active member our our territorial defense organisation - the Defense League.
Liitteet
Raveni
Greatest Leader
Mielestäni yksi sodan suurimpia havaintoja on ollut ydinasepelotteen käyttö tukemaan omaa toimintaa ja estämään aseellista tukea = eristämään kohde. Ukraina on toki saanut materiaalista apua ja vapaa-ehtoisiakin mutta raaka voima on jäänyt puuttumaan. Siinä missä Venäjää on virallisestikin alettu syyttämään kansanmurhasta, terrorismista ja sotarikoksista jotka monessa tapauksessa yksinäänkin olisivat riittäneet lännen interventioon niin nyt ydinsodan pelossa länsi lähinnä keskittyy tuomitsemaan. Jos sota jotain on opettanut on se, että puolustuksen tulee olla kunnossa ja siihen pitää ohjata riittävästi resursseja pitkällä aikavälillä. Sen, että ydinase-arsenaalin omaava hyökkääjä pyrkii hankkimaan toimintavapauden ydinaseilla uhkailemalla ja onnistumalla vielä siinä. Hankittu toimintavapaus on jopa niin suuri, että hyökkääjä saa suhteellisen rauhassa suorittaa vaikkapa kansanmurhaa ilman, että reaktiona olisi muuta kuin materiaaliapua, syvää paheksuntaa sekä talouspakotteita. Länsi on jopa talouspakotteissa kohdellut Venäjää silkkihansikkain; suomen rajan yli saa edelleenkin matkustella lomailemaan, talouspakotteita voi edelleenkin kiertää kolmansien maiden kautta koska ei ole varsinaisesti julistettu taloussaartoa joka pakottaisi myös mm. Kiinan ja Turkin reagoimaan asiaan.
Tosiasiassa siis lännen pelko oman talouden tilanteesta pakottaa lännen etsimään vähemmän vaikuttavia keinoja mutta kuitenkin keinoja, että voidaan sanoa jotain tehdyn. Ydinaseet estävät laajemman puuttumisen (sotilaallisen) kansanmurhaan.
En yhtään epäilisi etteikö Venäjä laskisi sen kortin varaan, että jahka Ukraina on hoideltu for good niin länsi pikkuhiljaa unhoittaa pakotteet ja lähtee normalisoimaan suhteita. Kunnes Venäjä lähtee kokeilemaan kepillä jäätä jossain muualla.
Tosiasiassa siis lännen pelko oman talouden tilanteesta pakottaa lännen etsimään vähemmän vaikuttavia keinoja mutta kuitenkin keinoja, että voidaan sanoa jotain tehdyn. Ydinaseet estävät laajemman puuttumisen (sotilaallisen) kansanmurhaan.
En yhtään epäilisi etteikö Venäjä laskisi sen kortin varaan, että jahka Ukraina on hoideltu for good niin länsi pikkuhiljaa unhoittaa pakotteet ja lähtee normalisoimaan suhteita. Kunnes Venäjä lähtee kokeilemaan kepillä jäätä jossain muualla.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Venäläiseltä ajatuspajalta vaihteeksi hyvin tehty juttu.
Venäjällä varoitetaan: Jalkaväki ei riitä, rintamalinja on liian pitkä | Verkkouutiset
Asiantuntijan mukaan hyökkääjän lentokoneet ja panssarivaunut ovat vanhentuneita.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Antares
Respected Leader
Laitetaan tämä tähänkin ketjuun: pitkä mutta mielenkiintoinen VDV:n sotilaan Pavel Filatiev kirjoitus kokemuksistaan Ukrainassa, vietti kaksi kuukautta Ukrainassa:
Linkki kirjoitukseen.
Artikkelissa on linkki hänen julkaisemaan kirjaan, se on luettavissa ilmaiseksi - tosin pitää joko osata lukea kyrillisiä tai sitten ajaa se käännöstyökalun läpi. Yksi vaihtoehto: kopioi tekstin kirjasta Google Translate -palveluun ja kääntää pala kerrallaan. Google Translate taitaa rajoittaa yhden käännöksen 3 000 tai 4 000 merkkiin, mutta tämä on ainakin ilmainen ja kohtuullisen taitava kääntäjä. Toki on olemassa myös kunnon ohjelmia, joilla voi kääntää eikä tarvitse pelleillä noin kömpelösti Google Translaten kanssa - jokainen tyylillään. Google Lens tekee myös käännöksiä, toki on muitakin.
Suora linkki kirjaan:
https://vk.com/doc365182800_6421736...l=WJ3c0dtpmjLZ2edp4LHBYWjJ282qlH9Sd1AyPRKvHcz
Otsikko ja jutun alku niin voi tuumailla, kiinnostaako lukea lisää (vaatii toki käännöstyökalun käytön):
"It's been a month and a half since I returned from the war. I know that you can't say the word "war", it's banned. <...> So this is a war: our Russian army shoots at the Ukrainian army, and it shoots back, shells and rockets explode there. <...> At the same time, the military on both sides, as well as civilians who are "lucky" to live where they decided to start a war, calling it a "special operation" are dying, "- this is how the memoirs of the Russian soldier Pavel Filatyev, which he published , back from Ukraine.
Pavel Filatyev, a 33-year-old paratrooper originally from the Volgograd region, served in Chechnya in the 2010s, and in August last year, due to problems with work and lack of money, he decided to sign a new service contract. He participated in the war on the territory of Ukraine as part of the 56th Air Assault Regiment. His unit in the first days of the invasion was sent to storm Kherson. Due to injuries received on the battlefield, Filatiev was evacuated for treatment, he never returned to the front. Now Filatiev opposes the war: he tells the truth about what he saw with his own eyes. He described his memories in the book "ZOV". Important Stories publishes abridged excerpts from Pavel Filatiev's book about the mess in the Russian army, soldiers' attitudes towards war, and senseless deaths.
-
Alla yhden twitter-tilin poimintoja artikkelista, hänen huomion kiinnittäneet yksityiskohdat: LINKKI ketjuun
A VDV soldier published a book titled «ZOV». Describes realities.
- from 56 Airborne regt, WIA
- Aug 2021: no proper size, so no boots issued
- Oct 2021: winter uniforms issued, secondhand, again no proper size
- Winter: open truck transport to livex, pneumonia
- no weapon issued for 100+ days
- complaint to MoD, therefore the worst soldier
- MoD response: have an airborne health, be a disciplined trooper
⁃ mid Feb 2022: airborne coy (40 personnel) in one tent, it was better in Chechnya (no running water)
⁃ 23 Feb: a Div cdr briefing (salary up to $69 daily, something is boiling)
⁃ 24 Feb: it started with the rocket artillery, no info if NATO or Ukraine attacked
⁃ feel abused by fake patriotic propaganda, law/orders, money, promotions
⁃ Only then I understand Russia attacked Ukraine
⁃ first WIA, no medevac
⁃ all escapee vehicles use dashboard cameras
⁃ 28 Feb: first civilians killed
⁃ no surprise factor, Kherson prepared
⁃ regiment consists of 500 PAX
⁃ meet 11 Airborne Bde, only 50 PAX survived
⁃ no comms, no CAS, no artillery, no sleeping bags, no water, no food, frost, homeless enjoy better life, stealing abundant
⁃ 3 March: infantry refused to fight, VDV keeps the frontline
⁃ Groundhog Day by day
⁃ One MRE for 2 days
⁃ no fresh ammo, uniforms, boots, Russia promises to pay for every Ukrainian killed
⁃ families send food/clothes packages
⁃ some self wounded (3,0 million for being WIA)
⁃ 2 months of hunger, frost, diseases, sweat
⁃ 50% of Russian airborne used Ukrainian uniforms (better quality)
⁃ no morphine for wounded
⁃ no army insurance or compensation for medical treatment, so decision made to quit due to medical condition
⁃ 56 Airborne depleted to below 50% (KIA/WIA, discharged)
⁃ despite public info, the real salary was approximately 100k RUR a month
⁃ why Russian army failed:
1. no rightness to conquer a friendly nation
2. why attacking with artillery, missiles. It builds no populace support.
3. Old Soviet command style.
4. Weaponry & ammo is obsolete
⁃ children of Russian VIPs never saw and experience the military service
⁃ Russian soldiers are hostages of patriotism, careers, fear
Linkki kirjoitukseen.
Artikkelissa on linkki hänen julkaisemaan kirjaan, se on luettavissa ilmaiseksi - tosin pitää joko osata lukea kyrillisiä tai sitten ajaa se käännöstyökalun läpi. Yksi vaihtoehto: kopioi tekstin kirjasta Google Translate -palveluun ja kääntää pala kerrallaan. Google Translate taitaa rajoittaa yhden käännöksen 3 000 tai 4 000 merkkiin, mutta tämä on ainakin ilmainen ja kohtuullisen taitava kääntäjä. Toki on olemassa myös kunnon ohjelmia, joilla voi kääntää eikä tarvitse pelleillä noin kömpelösti Google Translaten kanssa - jokainen tyylillään. Google Lens tekee myös käännöksiä, toki on muitakin.
Suora linkki kirjaan:
https://vk.com/doc365182800_6421736...l=WJ3c0dtpmjLZ2edp4LHBYWjJ282qlH9Sd1AyPRKvHcz
Otsikko ja jutun alku niin voi tuumailla, kiinnostaako lukea lisää (vaatii toki käännöstyökalun käytön):
The war in Ukraine through the eyes of a Russian soldier: a mess, mediocre command and unwillingness to kill
The story of a Russian paratrooper about the state of the army and affairs at the front after two months spent in Ukraine"It's been a month and a half since I returned from the war. I know that you can't say the word "war", it's banned. <...> So this is a war: our Russian army shoots at the Ukrainian army, and it shoots back, shells and rockets explode there. <...> At the same time, the military on both sides, as well as civilians who are "lucky" to live where they decided to start a war, calling it a "special operation" are dying, "- this is how the memoirs of the Russian soldier Pavel Filatyev, which he published , back from Ukraine.
Pavel Filatyev, a 33-year-old paratrooper originally from the Volgograd region, served in Chechnya in the 2010s, and in August last year, due to problems with work and lack of money, he decided to sign a new service contract. He participated in the war on the territory of Ukraine as part of the 56th Air Assault Regiment. His unit in the first days of the invasion was sent to storm Kherson. Due to injuries received on the battlefield, Filatiev was evacuated for treatment, he never returned to the front. Now Filatiev opposes the war: he tells the truth about what he saw with his own eyes. He described his memories in the book "ZOV". Important Stories publishes abridged excerpts from Pavel Filatiev's book about the mess in the Russian army, soldiers' attitudes towards war, and senseless deaths.
-
Alla yhden twitter-tilin poimintoja artikkelista, hänen huomion kiinnittäneet yksityiskohdat: LINKKI ketjuun
A VDV soldier published a book titled «ZOV». Describes realities.
- from 56 Airborne regt, WIA
- Aug 2021: no proper size, so no boots issued
- Oct 2021: winter uniforms issued, secondhand, again no proper size
- Winter: open truck transport to livex, pneumonia
- no weapon issued for 100+ days
- complaint to MoD, therefore the worst soldier
- MoD response: have an airborne health, be a disciplined trooper
⁃ mid Feb 2022: airborne coy (40 personnel) in one tent, it was better in Chechnya (no running water)
⁃ 23 Feb: a Div cdr briefing (salary up to $69 daily, something is boiling)
⁃ 24 Feb: it started with the rocket artillery, no info if NATO or Ukraine attacked
⁃ feel abused by fake patriotic propaganda, law/orders, money, promotions
⁃ Only then I understand Russia attacked Ukraine
⁃ first WIA, no medevac
⁃ all escapee vehicles use dashboard cameras
⁃ 28 Feb: first civilians killed
⁃ no surprise factor, Kherson prepared
⁃ regiment consists of 500 PAX
⁃ meet 11 Airborne Bde, only 50 PAX survived
⁃ no comms, no CAS, no artillery, no sleeping bags, no water, no food, frost, homeless enjoy better life, stealing abundant
⁃ 3 March: infantry refused to fight, VDV keeps the frontline
⁃ Groundhog Day by day
⁃ One MRE for 2 days
⁃ no fresh ammo, uniforms, boots, Russia promises to pay for every Ukrainian killed
⁃ families send food/clothes packages
⁃ some self wounded (3,0 million for being WIA)
⁃ 2 months of hunger, frost, diseases, sweat
⁃ 50% of Russian airborne used Ukrainian uniforms (better quality)
⁃ no morphine for wounded
⁃ no army insurance or compensation for medical treatment, so decision made to quit due to medical condition
⁃ 56 Airborne depleted to below 50% (KIA/WIA, discharged)
⁃ despite public info, the real salary was approximately 100k RUR a month
⁃ why Russian army failed:
1. no rightness to conquer a friendly nation
2. why attacking with artillery, missiles. It builds no populace support.
3. Old Soviet command style.
4. Weaponry & ammo is obsolete
⁃ children of Russian VIPs never saw and experience the military service
⁃ Russian soldiers are hostages of patriotism, careers, fear
Viimeksi muokattu:
Liberaali humanisti sisälläni tuskailee Ukrainan sodan aiheuttamaa inhimillistä kärsimystä ja toivoo konfliktille mahdollisimman nopeaa loppumista.
Bismarckilain reaalipoliitikko myhäilee ei pelkästään Venäjän asevoimien suorituskyvyn tuhoa, vaan myös sitä että Venäjän kyky rakentaa armeijansa uudestaan romahtaa vuosikymmeniksi eteenpäin. Suomeen khdistuva sotilaallinen uhka on jossain mitättömän ja naurettavan välimaastossa niin kauan kuin minussa henki vielä pihisee.
Bismarckilain reaalipoliitikko myhäilee ei pelkästään Venäjän asevoimien suorituskyvyn tuhoa, vaan myös sitä että Venäjän kyky rakentaa armeijansa uudestaan romahtaa vuosikymmeniksi eteenpäin. Suomeen khdistuva sotilaallinen uhka on jossain mitättömän ja naurettavan välimaastossa niin kauan kuin minussa henki vielä pihisee.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Everstiluutnantti Aleksandr Hodakovski oli Ukrainan tiedustelupalvelu SBU:n Alfa-joukkojen upseeri, mutta loikkasi venäläismielisten puolelle heti alkuvuodesta 2014. Hän oli perustamassa niin sanottua ”Donetskin kansantasavaltaa” toimien sen ”turvallisuusministerinä”.
Donetskin sisäisten valtataisteluiden myötä hän lähti Venäjälle vuonna 2018. Nyt Venäjän aloitettua täysimittaisen sodan Ukrainassa on Hodakovski palannut rintamalle johtamaan Venäjän armeijan alaisuudessa vuonna 2014 perustamaansa Vostok-pataljoonaa (”Itäpataljoona”).
Hodakovski valittaa Ukrainan tykistön olevan tehokasta.
Koko juttu täällä:
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Donetskin sisäisten valtataisteluiden myötä hän lähti Venäjälle vuonna 2018. Nyt Venäjän aloitettua täysimittaisen sodan Ukrainassa on Hodakovski palannut rintamalle johtamaan Venäjän armeijan alaisuudessa vuonna 2014 perustamaansa Vostok-pataljoonaa (”Itäpataljoona”).
Hodakovski valittaa Ukrainan tykistön olevan tehokasta.
Koko juttu täällä:
Venäläissotilas: Kaikki tappiot tulevat nyt tykistöstä | Verkkouutiset
Venäläissotilas: Kaikki tappiot tulevat nyt tykistöstä | Verkkouutiset
www.verkkouutiset.fi
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Everstiluutnantti Aleksandr Hodakovski oli Ukrainan tiedustelupalvelu SBU:n Alfa-joukkojen upseeri, mutta loikkasi venäläismielisten puolelle heti alkuvuodesta 2014. Hän oli perustamassa niin sanottua ”Donetskin kansantasavaltaa” toimien sen ”turvallisuusministerinä”.
Donetskin sisäisten valtataisteluiden myötä hän lähti Venäjälle vuonna 2018. Nyt Venäjän aloitettua täysimittaisen sodan Ukrainassa on Hodakovski palannut rintamalle johtamaan Venäjän armeijan alaisuudessa vuonna 2014 perustamaansa Vostok-pataljoonaa (”Itäpataljoona”).
Hodakovski valittaa Ukrainan tykistön olevan tehokasta.
Koko juttu täällä:
Venäläissotilas: Kaikki tappiot tulevat nyt tykistöstä | Verkkouutiset
Venäläissotilas: Kaikki tappiot tulevat nyt tykistöstä | Verkkouutiset
Niinpä. Ja tätä ryssä ei itse osaa tai ei halua näin toimia vaan noudattaa vanhaa kankeaa neuvostoajan taktiikkaa.
– Ukraina soveltaa nyt aktiivisesti Naton ajattelutapaa, joka antaa jokaiselle kersantille mahdollisuuden toimia itsenäisesti. Hän saa tarvittavat välineet ongelman ratkaisemiseksi. Mutta meidän järjestelmämme ei tätä mahdollista: täytyy käydä läpi koko komentoketju hyväksymisineen ennen kuin ylempänä oleva komentaja päättää tarjota tarvittavat välineet.