Outo kommentti. Jos tuolla perustelee, niin terävää keppiä monimutkaisempaa ei voisi lähettää. Tottakait huolto täytyy huomioida lahjoituksissa ja epäilemättä näin on tehtykin.
Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Mustaruuti
- Aloitus PVM
Ukraina lienee paikka jossa saadaan kyllä huollettua ja rassattua jokseenkin mikä tahansa mekaaninen laite. Varaosien saanti ja elektroniikkapuoli voivat olla ongelmallisempia.
Lienee kuitenkin niin että ihmeellisiä asioita pitää tapahtua jotta Japani alkaisi laivata panssarivaunuja Ukrainaan.
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Vielä RUSI-raportista. Sotaaan johtanut kehitys Venäjän taholta.
Vladimir Putin johti itse Ukrainan sodan suunnittelua - Raportti paljastaa, mihin kaikki kaatui | Verkkouutiset
Venäjä oli Ukrainassa paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
www.verkkouutiset.fi
-TripleX-
Respected Leader
Ukraina ketjussa oli twiitti liittyen näihin Kh-22 tai X-22 ohjuksiin, että niissä on kätevä itsetuhotoiminto sisäänrakennettuna.
Löytyy aika monesta lähteestä samoja asioita, että nestemäiset polttoaineet syövyttävät ohjuksen polttoainesäiliöt ja mahdollisesti muutakin sisältäpäin ja niitä on täysi painajainen ylläpitää sekä varmasti erittäin jännittävää laukaista. Ongelmia on esiintynyt vaihtelevasti jo 20 vuotta sitten tehdyissä koeammunnoissa. Jo kymmeniä vuosia sitten jenkit kyenneet ELSOlla häiritsemään ko. ohjuksien maalitusta niin, että venäläiset lähteen mukaan kehittivät doktriinia niin, että alueelle ammutaan ensin summittaisesti ydinohjus ja toiveena on sillä saada ELSO pois jonka jälkeen Kh-22:a tusina perään niin, että lentotukialukset saadaan toimintakyvyttömäksi. Lienee selvää, että kun Ukrainassa ei ole käytetty ydinaseita niin 2020-luvun ELSO ohjaa nuo johonkin muualle kuin mihin ne piti mennä. Siksi kai ne sit roiskitaan kaupunkeihin kun muuten eivät osuisi mihinkään. Kuvastaa hyvin kuinka mikään muu kuin syöpä ei kehity Venäjällä.
Jossain luki, että Ukrainan aseluovutuksissa näitä palautettiin reilut 800 kpl. Onkohan niihin mitään jekkuja tehty ennen palautusta?
Missilery.info
Löytyy aika monesta lähteestä samoja asioita, että nestemäiset polttoaineet syövyttävät ohjuksen polttoainesäiliöt ja mahdollisesti muutakin sisältäpäin ja niitä on täysi painajainen ylläpitää sekä varmasti erittäin jännittävää laukaista. Ongelmia on esiintynyt vaihtelevasti jo 20 vuotta sitten tehdyissä koeammunnoissa. Jo kymmeniä vuosia sitten jenkit kyenneet ELSOlla häiritsemään ko. ohjuksien maalitusta niin, että venäläiset lähteen mukaan kehittivät doktriinia niin, että alueelle ammutaan ensin summittaisesti ydinohjus ja toiveena on sillä saada ELSO pois jonka jälkeen Kh-22:a tusina perään niin, että lentotukialukset saadaan toimintakyvyttömäksi. Lienee selvää, että kun Ukrainassa ei ole käytetty ydinaseita niin 2020-luvun ELSO ohjaa nuo johonkin muualle kuin mihin ne piti mennä. Siksi kai ne sit roiskitaan kaupunkeihin kun muuten eivät osuisi mihinkään. Kuvastaa hyvin kuinka mikään muu kuin syöpä ei kehity Venäjällä.
Jossain luki, että Ukrainan aseluovutuksissa näitä palautettiin reilut 800 kpl. Onkohan niihin mitään jekkuja tehty ennen palautusta?
Missilery.info
Viimeksi muokattu:
Samaa mieltä, ei juuri hankalampaa logistista sijaintia voi keksiä. Toivottavasti Euroopassa ymmärretään huoltaa varastoituna olevia Leoja käyttökuntoon. Espanjassa ne ainakin oli käyttökelvottomassa kunnossa. Sama koskee meidän vanhimpia vaunuja, alkaa olla niissäkin tunnit täynnä
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Mehän voitaisiin antaa ne sata Leo 2A4:sta Ukrainalle, jos Saksa toimittaa tilalle sanotaan 50 Leo 2A7:aa viimeisillä härpäkkeillä. Hyvä alku Ukrainan uudelle länsimaiselle panssarikalustolle. Muilta sitten lisää, Norskit, Espanjan romut kunnostettuna, keitä näitä nyt onkaan.
Jopuni
Ylipäällikkö
Pitäs saada tilalle 60 kpl A7:ja jotta riittäis kahdelle mekanisoidulle taisteluosastolle, nämä yhdistämällä sais sitten panssariprikaatin.
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Ne sata 2A6:sta riittävät jo KARPR:lle ja MEKeille. 2A4:t kaksi komppaniaa sitten MOTeilla, yksi per MOTti.
Antares
Respected Leader
Lisätään tämän tueksi tämä reilu tunnin video missä käsittelevät raporttia. En ole ehtinyt kuuntelemaan tätä vielä, ehkä myöhemmin tänään on aikaa joten jos on turhaa höpinää ja oman selän taputtelua, niin otan pois:
Video katsottavissa myös suoraan heidän nettisivuilla, varsinainen esitys alkaa videon ajanhetkellä 4:00 joten voi kelata ensimmäiset neljä minuuttia:
https://rusi.org/events/open-to-all...entional-warfighting-russias-invasion-ukraine
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Tässä jo aikaisemmin viitattu Mikko Laaksosen HYVIN PITKÄ twitter-ketju RUSI:n raportista (yli 100 viestiä):
Tämän pitkän ketjun lopussa on linkitetty kaksi muuta erillistä ketjua, jossa hän antaa omat arvionsa miten tätä tulisi tulkita Suomen puolustuksen kannalta:
- Laaksosen omat näkemykset Venäjän hyökkäyksestä: LINKKI TWITTER-KETJUUN
- Hänen suositukset Suomen puolustuksen kannalta: LINKKI TWITTER-KETJUUN
Lainaan alle spoilerin taakse tuon pitkän ketjun lopusta RUSI:n ns. yhteenvedot sekä Laaksosen suositukset Suomen puolustukselle:
RUSI-raportin lopun yhteenvedot, Laaksosen pitkän ketjun lopusta (viestit nro 90-94):
Report conclusions on #Russia AF:
1. The air force and navy are subordinated to the ground force: "it is evident that Russian jointery functions as a hierarchy in which the Navy and VKS are subordinated to the Ground Force’s needs."
2. "#Russian Force Generation is Not Aligned with its Concepts of Operation". Essentially: BTG is a non-functional concept, support elements are lacking, staff insufficient. Overall, junior leaders are lacking.
3. "The #Russian Military Has a Tendency to Reinforce Failure" "all instructions as valid until directly countermanded, and all intelligence as accurate unless contradicted" -> leads to repeated attempts of the same when failing.
4. "The Russian Military is Culturally Vulnerable to Deception". Systemic confirmation bias, lack of honest reporting, focus on single tasks reinforce this.
5. "Russian Forces Are Prone to Fratricide" "Russian air defences have regularly engaged friendly aircraft. When Russian troops deviate from their assigned axes or the timing of their actions becomes desynchronised, they are often bracketed by their own artillery"
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Suositukset Suomen puolustukselle, koko ketjun teksti (otin yhden kuvan alle mutta jätin linkitetyt videot pois): LINKKI TWITTER-KETJUUN
Lessons from @rusi_org #Finland. The overall military doctrine of #Finland is correct against the expected adversary. As situation, particularly in long-distance precision fires is better than #Ukraine, the results can be expected faster.
The area defence doctrine can be expected to blunt, wear out and destroy an invading force, possibly in space of days or couple of weeks if the supply chain can be destroyed. The #Ukraine fighting resembled closely #Finland doctrine.
The mobilization plan of #Finland cannot be blocked by #Russia entirely, but dispersal must take place, and the first stages of mobilization must be ordered early enough. The mobilization of the remaining force must take place in short time.
The new dispersed combat #tactic of the infantry is correct and prevents the destruction of the force by massed artillery fire. However, communications can be blocked by EW, requiring high independence of companies, platoons and squads.
Maavoimien uusi taistelutapa -video - LINKKI YOUTUBE-VIDEOON
#Finland has adequate number of artillery and long-range precision fires such as 155 mm artillery, #M240 #MLRS, #JASSM and #JDAM to attack the logistics, HQ:s and concentrations deep in battlespace. The number of munitions must be increased.
#Ukraine deception plans must be studied and importance of deception also on tactical level, practiced also by reserve junior leaders, emphasized as #Russian C2 can be disrupted by deception.
#Drones are a key system. Main part of the drones must be relatively cheap and disposable as they can be expected to operate only for 3 – 6 flights. The main use of medium drones is surveillance, not strikes.
Unlike #Russian or #Ukrainian air force, #Finnish air force can be expected to penetrate the enemy air defense to some depth. We can prevent the use of our airspace with the exception of the line of contact. Deconfliction must be by area
Unlike #Russia and #Ukraine, #Finland has a competent, modern and sufficient navy to prevent naval blockade and landings. Together with allies we can reach full control of #Baltic. However, we lack capacity for sealift to support our allies.
In #Finland majority of the terrain is more forested and broken by water than in northern #Ukraine, allowing delaying tactics and ambushes even more than observed
The large and medium size cities are the main source of reservists, particularly leaders. Protecting them and mobilization in them is a key task not always sufficiently underlined.
Ballistic and cruise missile strikes are the main threat to #Finnish cities, civilians and key infrastructure. Launch sites must be destroyed. The missile defence must be improved as planned.
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Näiden lisäksi Laaksosen pitkän ketjun lopussa (viestit nro 97-103) oli useampi viesti jotka tulkitsen hänen lisäpohdinnaksi opetuksista:
There Is No Sanctuary. The first clear lesson from the war in #Ukraine is that #Russia can conduct strikes on targets throughout its adversary’s operational depth with long-range precision fires
For #Ukraine air force, the ability to conduct dispersed operations was critical to survivability. For ground forces, long-range precision strikes were used against their stockpiles, against training establishments and against maintenance facilities, which must be dispersed.
Warfighting Demands Significant Slack Capacity - meaning there must be sufficient stocks and then production, training, logistics and maintenance capacities for wartime needs.
Classic quote: "The oft-cited refrain of the #UK MOD that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside #NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in #Finland."
#UAS and #CUAS Must Be Available Across All Branches and Echelons. Small drones for tactical units, medium for surveillance. Counter-UAS a specific concern.
Fighting for the Right to Precision. Left uncontested, #EW slows kill chains, increases confusion and, perhaps most importantly, degrades precision. Attriting enemy precision capabilities or EW assets is critical in fighting for the right to precision
Disperse, Dig Deep or Move Fast. #Ukraine forces usually dispersed, but in counterattacks they had to concentrate, and then movement speed was crucial. Static forces must dig deep.
Report conclusions on #Russia AF:
1. The air force and navy are subordinated to the ground force: "it is evident that Russian jointery functions as a hierarchy in which the Navy and VKS are subordinated to the Ground Force’s needs."
2. "#Russian Force Generation is Not Aligned with its Concepts of Operation". Essentially: BTG is a non-functional concept, support elements are lacking, staff insufficient. Overall, junior leaders are lacking.
3. "The #Russian Military Has a Tendency to Reinforce Failure" "all instructions as valid until directly countermanded, and all intelligence as accurate unless contradicted" -> leads to repeated attempts of the same when failing.
4. "The Russian Military is Culturally Vulnerable to Deception". Systemic confirmation bias, lack of honest reporting, focus on single tasks reinforce this.
5. "Russian Forces Are Prone to Fratricide" "Russian air defences have regularly engaged friendly aircraft. When Russian troops deviate from their assigned axes or the timing of their actions becomes desynchronised, they are often bracketed by their own artillery"
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Suositukset Suomen puolustukselle, koko ketjun teksti (otin yhden kuvan alle mutta jätin linkitetyt videot pois): LINKKI TWITTER-KETJUUN
Lessons from @rusi_org #Finland. The overall military doctrine of #Finland is correct against the expected adversary. As situation, particularly in long-distance precision fires is better than #Ukraine, the results can be expected faster.
The area defence doctrine can be expected to blunt, wear out and destroy an invading force, possibly in space of days or couple of weeks if the supply chain can be destroyed. The #Ukraine fighting resembled closely #Finland doctrine.
The mobilization plan of #Finland cannot be blocked by #Russia entirely, but dispersal must take place, and the first stages of mobilization must be ordered early enough. The mobilization of the remaining force must take place in short time.
The new dispersed combat #tactic of the infantry is correct and prevents the destruction of the force by massed artillery fire. However, communications can be blocked by EW, requiring high independence of companies, platoons and squads.
Maavoimien uusi taistelutapa -video - LINKKI YOUTUBE-VIDEOON
#Finland has adequate number of artillery and long-range precision fires such as 155 mm artillery, #M240 #MLRS, #JASSM and #JDAM to attack the logistics, HQ:s and concentrations deep in battlespace. The number of munitions must be increased.
#Ukraine deception plans must be studied and importance of deception also on tactical level, practiced also by reserve junior leaders, emphasized as #Russian C2 can be disrupted by deception.
#Drones are a key system. Main part of the drones must be relatively cheap and disposable as they can be expected to operate only for 3 – 6 flights. The main use of medium drones is surveillance, not strikes.
Unlike #Russian or #Ukrainian air force, #Finnish air force can be expected to penetrate the enemy air defense to some depth. We can prevent the use of our airspace with the exception of the line of contact. Deconfliction must be by area
Unlike #Russia and #Ukraine, #Finland has a competent, modern and sufficient navy to prevent naval blockade and landings. Together with allies we can reach full control of #Baltic. However, we lack capacity for sealift to support our allies.
In #Finland majority of the terrain is more forested and broken by water than in northern #Ukraine, allowing delaying tactics and ambushes even more than observed
The large and medium size cities are the main source of reservists, particularly leaders. Protecting them and mobilization in them is a key task not always sufficiently underlined.
Ballistic and cruise missile strikes are the main threat to #Finnish cities, civilians and key infrastructure. Launch sites must be destroyed. The missile defence must be improved as planned.
-
Näiden lisäksi Laaksosen pitkän ketjun lopussa (viestit nro 97-103) oli useampi viesti jotka tulkitsen hänen lisäpohdinnaksi opetuksista:
There Is No Sanctuary. The first clear lesson from the war in #Ukraine is that #Russia can conduct strikes on targets throughout its adversary’s operational depth with long-range precision fires
For #Ukraine air force, the ability to conduct dispersed operations was critical to survivability. For ground forces, long-range precision strikes were used against their stockpiles, against training establishments and against maintenance facilities, which must be dispersed.
Warfighting Demands Significant Slack Capacity - meaning there must be sufficient stocks and then production, training, logistics and maintenance capacities for wartime needs.
Classic quote: "The oft-cited refrain of the #UK MOD that these deficiencies are not a problem because the UK fights alongside #NATO allies would be more credible if the situation were much better among any of the UK’s European allies. It is not, except in #Finland."
#UAS and #CUAS Must Be Available Across All Branches and Echelons. Small drones for tactical units, medium for surveillance. Counter-UAS a specific concern.
Fighting for the Right to Precision. Left uncontested, #EW slows kill chains, increases confusion and, perhaps most importantly, degrades precision. Attriting enemy precision capabilities or EW assets is critical in fighting for the right to precision
Disperse, Dig Deep or Move Fast. #Ukraine forces usually dispersed, but in counterattacks they had to concentrate, and then movement speed was crucial. Static forces must dig deep.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Muistui mieleen toukokuun alussa näkemäni puolalaisen twitter-ketju: LINKKI ALKUPERÄISEEN VIESTIINI
Ketjun tekstin käännös:
AMMUNITION PLOT In this thread, I will present you how much ammunition we really need for our artillery - from the moź. 60mm up to 122mm wr. Due to the fact that the data in training publications concern limited types of weapons, the majority will be estimates.
It is necessary to systematize where these estimates will come from. Namely, the terms DOS and CDOS. DOS is an old unit of fire, while CDOS is an assumed use of ammunition for one day of combat. It depends on the intensity of actions and their type (attack, defense).
In the case of CDOS offensive actions it is the equivalent of ~ 3 DOS. The thread will discuss the worst-case scenario, i.e. the amount of ammunition needed for 30 days of offensive actions. It is about the total amount of ammunition present in combat and ammunition vehicles and in stocks.
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Kirjoitin tuolloin näin:
Jos tulkitsen hänen viestiketjua oikein, hän käyttää lyhennettä bz jonka arvaan olevan lyhennelmä puolalaisesta "brygada zmechanizowana" eli mekanisoidusta prikaatista. Tämä laskelma on siis puolalaisen mekanisoidun prikaatin heittimien, panssarihaupitsien sekä panssarintorjuntaohjusten tarve (laskennallinen). Hän halusi arvioida, paljonko olisi tarve 30 päivää kestävien hyökkäysoperaatioiden kannalta (eli 30 x CDOS).
Kokosin ketjussa luetellut numerot tähän taulukkoon:
Katsoopa sitten saraketta "30 pv DOS kpl määrä" tai "30 pv CDOS kpl määrä" niin puhutaan suurista määristä.
Hänen viimeisen viestin käännös:
SUMMARY Based on the orders of the Spikes, it should be assumed that the military could realistically determine its ammunition demand for ~ 30 DOS, not 30 CDOS. This, on the other hand, means that you have to divide the numbers in the thread by 3 to get the possibly real values.
Hän laski viesteissään pelkän CDOS vaan minä laitoin DOS sen viereen.
Lainaan NATO:n Logistics Handbook vm. 2012 sivulta 72 termin "DOS" selityksen: LÄHDE
The Sustainability Statement includes the Days of Supply (DOS) to be held in theatre. This should include both the initial phase of the mission, and the expected sustainment period.
Hän siis arvioi että laskennallisesti heidän armeijan hankkimien Spike pst-ohjusten määrän perusteella ollaan valmiita 30 DOS kulutukseen TAI toisinpäin ajateltuna varasto riittää 30 päivää kestävien operaatioiden tarpeisiin, mutta jos hyökkäysoperaatiossa (CDOS) tarve on kolme kertaa suurempi niin riittävät 10 päiväksi tai olisi ehkä parempi sanoa 10 päivää jatkuvaan hyökkäysoperaatioon.
HUOM: laskea voi kuka vain, nämä ovat ilmeisesti ohjeellisia arvoja eikä jokainen sotapäivä ole identtinen. Välillä puolustetaan, välillä hyökätään jne. Suolaa siis mukaan kun tavaa numeroita. Täälläkin on kuitenkin pohdittu millainen on esim. tykistön laukausmäärät per päivä. Tässä yksi arvaus mekanisoidulle prikaatille (sellainen kuin se on Puolassa).
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Ei ole tällä haavaa lisättävää tuohon, minulla on sama levy päällä kuin kuukausi sodan alkamisen jälkeen kun höpötin talvi- ja jatkosodan tykistön ammuskulutuksesta tässä ketjussa (sama höpötys jatkui kesällä): LINKKI VIESTIIN, TOINEN VIESTI, KOLMAS VIESTI
Nyt kun lukee näitä tuoreempia kirjoituksia siitä miten kaikkea kuluu ja tarvitaan paljon suuremmat määrät kuin mitä on arvioitu, niin ei voi olla palaamatta näihin. Helppo looginen päättelyketju:
1. tykistö ja heittimet (sekä erilaiset rakettiaseet) tuottavat suurimmat määrät vihollisen tappioista
2. näitä pitää siis olla suuret määrät
3. ja näille pitää olla vielä suuremmat määrät SEKÄ älykästä ETTÄ tyhmää kranaattia varastossa, sopivassa suhteessa - pitää voida ampua niin paljon kuin koetaan tarpeelliseksi ("kunnes saadaan riittävä vaikutus aikaan") ja aina kun sille on vähänkin tarvetta. Kyselin aikaisemmin pitääkö varautua siihen että ammutaan yli 10 000 tykistön laukausta per päivä MUTTA nyt kysymys kuuluu myös miten kauan tätä pitää voida jatkaa? Ukrainan sodassa on nyt 282. päivä joten keskiarvoinen 10 000 laukausta per päivä koko tämän sodan ajan tarkoittaisi 2 820 000 ammuttua laukausta eikä sota ole vielä valmis, ei lähelläkään. Näiden lisäksi pitää varautua että menetetään tietty osa viholliselle joko kaapattuna tai tuhottuna, jokainen voi arvata itse mikä prosenttiosuus olisi sopiva. Vertailun vuoksi: haaveilin linkittämissäni viesteissä että Suomella pitäisi olla varastossa useita miljoonia tykistön kranaatteja JA heittimille pitäisi olla ainakin vastaava määrä, ellei enemmän. Tuumailin että tykistölle pitäisi olla ainakin sama määrä kuin jatkosotaan lähdettäessä eli silloisen 1.7.1941 kirjanpidon mukaan 2 760 755 kpl - tuskin kukaan laittaa vastaan jos tuon pyöristää ylöspäin tasaluvuksi 3 000 000 kpl. HUOM: heittimille sama määrä, ellei enemmän. Jotta ollaan määrien osalta turvallisella puolella, lisätään vielä että nämä määrät pitäisi olla tyhmää kranaattia, älykranaatteja sitten sopivaksi koettu määrä näiden lisäksi.
4. toisaalta Venäjän onnistui tuhota suuri määrä varastoituja kranaatteja erilaisissa sabotaaseissa aikavälillä 2014-2022 joten vartiointi ja suojaus sekä hajauttaminen pitää olla asianmukaisesti tehty myös rauhanaikana sekä tietysti harmaassa vaiheessa. Lainasin alla olevassa viestissä käyttäjä e7i tuumailua, tässä siitä pätkä havainnollistamaan:
Ryssän sabotoimaa ammusmäärä voi suhteuttaa seuraavasti. 152 mm kranaatti propellaatin ja laatikon kanssa painaa joku 80 kg. Tonniin mahtuu siis tusina. Suoraan 152mm muutettuna ryssä tuhosi 210 000 * 12 = 2,5 miljoonaa kranaattia. UA on ampunut kiivaina päivinä luokkaa 5000 kranaattia. Tuhottu määrä olisi riittänyt 500 päiväksi. Sodan kulku olisi voinut mennä Ukrainan kannalta olennaisesti paremmin alkukuukausina, mikäli nämä varastot olisivat olleet käytössä, putkia ja heittimiä oli simona.
Jos otetaan tuo laskelma annettuna, se tarkoittaa että Ukrainalla on täytynyt olla useita miljoonia 122mm ja 152mm laukauksia varastoissa. Väitetysti valtaosa tuhotuista oli 152mm sekä erilaisia raketteja eli sitä arvokkaampaa tavaraa kantaman, vaikutuskyvyn yms. kannalta. Nämä ovat tietysti valtaosaksi Neuvostoliiton perintöä, mutta silti antaa perspektiiviä määristä. Sabotaasista huolimatta Ukraina kykeni taistelemaan rajusti hyökkääjää vastaan, tosin alkukesästä tilanne oli jonkin aikaa hyvin vaikea kun 122mm ja 152mm kranaatit alkoivat käydä vähiin (länsimaiden tuki 105mm ja 155mm kaluston ja laukausten myötä tuli avuksi).
5. eikä sovi unohtaa tykistön ja heittimien varaosia, uusia tuliputkia yms. mitä kuluu kun ammutaan paljon. Ulkomuistista tapailen että käyttäjä ERAkko olisi maininnut putken kestoiäksi 2 000 - 2 500 laukausta, toki tämäkin riippuu monesta tekijästä, ei vähiten siitä mikä määrä ammutaan missä ajassa eli miten kuumaksi putki tulee (pahoittelut jos muistin väärin)
6. Ukrainasta kuuluvien uutisten perusteella tykistön nopea maalinosoitus on ensiarvoisen tärkeää ja tämä pitää tehdä mahdollisimman ketteräksi ja sujuvaksi
7. kaiken näiden päälle pitää olla ketterä ja toimiva logistiikka jotta saadaan tykit ja heittimet ruokittua sitä mukaa kun tarvitsevat lisää MUTTA varastointi hajautettu koska oletus on että vihollinen kykenee paikallistamaan ja tuhoamaan osan ns. välivarastoista
Ketjun tekstin käännös:
AMMUNITION PLOT In this thread, I will present you how much ammunition we really need for our artillery - from the moź. 60mm up to 122mm wr. Due to the fact that the data in training publications concern limited types of weapons, the majority will be estimates.
It is necessary to systematize where these estimates will come from. Namely, the terms DOS and CDOS. DOS is an old unit of fire, while CDOS is an assumed use of ammunition for one day of combat. It depends on the intensity of actions and their type (attack, defense).
In the case of CDOS offensive actions it is the equivalent of ~ 3 DOS. The thread will discuss the worst-case scenario, i.e. the amount of ammunition needed for 30 days of offensive actions. It is about the total amount of ammunition present in combat and ammunition vehicles and in stocks.
-
Kirjoitin tuolloin näin:
Jos tulkitsen hänen viestiketjua oikein, hän käyttää lyhennettä bz jonka arvaan olevan lyhennelmä puolalaisesta "brygada zmechanizowana" eli mekanisoidusta prikaatista. Tämä laskelma on siis puolalaisen mekanisoidun prikaatin heittimien, panssarihaupitsien sekä panssarintorjuntaohjusten tarve (laskennallinen). Hän halusi arvioida, paljonko olisi tarve 30 päivää kestävien hyökkäysoperaatioiden kannalta (eli 30 x CDOS).
Kokosin ketjussa luetellut numerot tähän taulukkoon:
Katsoopa sitten saraketta "30 pv DOS kpl määrä" tai "30 pv CDOS kpl määrä" niin puhutaan suurista määristä.
Hänen viimeisen viestin käännös:
SUMMARY Based on the orders of the Spikes, it should be assumed that the military could realistically determine its ammunition demand for ~ 30 DOS, not 30 CDOS. This, on the other hand, means that you have to divide the numbers in the thread by 3 to get the possibly real values.
Hän laski viesteissään pelkän CDOS vaan minä laitoin DOS sen viereen.
Lainaan NATO:n Logistics Handbook vm. 2012 sivulta 72 termin "DOS" selityksen: LÄHDE
The Sustainability Statement includes the Days of Supply (DOS) to be held in theatre. This should include both the initial phase of the mission, and the expected sustainment period.
Hän siis arvioi että laskennallisesti heidän armeijan hankkimien Spike pst-ohjusten määrän perusteella ollaan valmiita 30 DOS kulutukseen TAI toisinpäin ajateltuna varasto riittää 30 päivää kestävien operaatioiden tarpeisiin, mutta jos hyökkäysoperaatiossa (CDOS) tarve on kolme kertaa suurempi niin riittävät 10 päiväksi tai olisi ehkä parempi sanoa 10 päivää jatkuvaan hyökkäysoperaatioon.
HUOM: laskea voi kuka vain, nämä ovat ilmeisesti ohjeellisia arvoja eikä jokainen sotapäivä ole identtinen. Välillä puolustetaan, välillä hyökätään jne. Suolaa siis mukaan kun tavaa numeroita. Täälläkin on kuitenkin pohdittu millainen on esim. tykistön laukausmäärät per päivä. Tässä yksi arvaus mekanisoidulle prikaatille (sellainen kuin se on Puolassa).
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Ei ole tällä haavaa lisättävää tuohon, minulla on sama levy päällä kuin kuukausi sodan alkamisen jälkeen kun höpötin talvi- ja jatkosodan tykistön ammuskulutuksesta tässä ketjussa (sama höpötys jatkui kesällä): LINKKI VIESTIIN, TOINEN VIESTI, KOLMAS VIESTI
Nyt kun lukee näitä tuoreempia kirjoituksia siitä miten kaikkea kuluu ja tarvitaan paljon suuremmat määrät kuin mitä on arvioitu, niin ei voi olla palaamatta näihin. Helppo looginen päättelyketju:
1. tykistö ja heittimet (sekä erilaiset rakettiaseet) tuottavat suurimmat määrät vihollisen tappioista
2. näitä pitää siis olla suuret määrät
3. ja näille pitää olla vielä suuremmat määrät SEKÄ älykästä ETTÄ tyhmää kranaattia varastossa, sopivassa suhteessa - pitää voida ampua niin paljon kuin koetaan tarpeelliseksi ("kunnes saadaan riittävä vaikutus aikaan") ja aina kun sille on vähänkin tarvetta. Kyselin aikaisemmin pitääkö varautua siihen että ammutaan yli 10 000 tykistön laukausta per päivä MUTTA nyt kysymys kuuluu myös miten kauan tätä pitää voida jatkaa? Ukrainan sodassa on nyt 282. päivä joten keskiarvoinen 10 000 laukausta per päivä koko tämän sodan ajan tarkoittaisi 2 820 000 ammuttua laukausta eikä sota ole vielä valmis, ei lähelläkään. Näiden lisäksi pitää varautua että menetetään tietty osa viholliselle joko kaapattuna tai tuhottuna, jokainen voi arvata itse mikä prosenttiosuus olisi sopiva. Vertailun vuoksi: haaveilin linkittämissäni viesteissä että Suomella pitäisi olla varastossa useita miljoonia tykistön kranaatteja JA heittimille pitäisi olla ainakin vastaava määrä, ellei enemmän. Tuumailin että tykistölle pitäisi olla ainakin sama määrä kuin jatkosotaan lähdettäessä eli silloisen 1.7.1941 kirjanpidon mukaan 2 760 755 kpl - tuskin kukaan laittaa vastaan jos tuon pyöristää ylöspäin tasaluvuksi 3 000 000 kpl. HUOM: heittimille sama määrä, ellei enemmän. Jotta ollaan määrien osalta turvallisella puolella, lisätään vielä että nämä määrät pitäisi olla tyhmää kranaattia, älykranaatteja sitten sopivaksi koettu määrä näiden lisäksi.
4. toisaalta Venäjän onnistui tuhota suuri määrä varastoituja kranaatteja erilaisissa sabotaaseissa aikavälillä 2014-2022 joten vartiointi ja suojaus sekä hajauttaminen pitää olla asianmukaisesti tehty myös rauhanaikana sekä tietysti harmaassa vaiheessa. Lainasin alla olevassa viestissä käyttäjä e7i tuumailua, tässä siitä pätkä havainnollistamaan:
Ryssän sabotoimaa ammusmäärä voi suhteuttaa seuraavasti. 152 mm kranaatti propellaatin ja laatikon kanssa painaa joku 80 kg. Tonniin mahtuu siis tusina. Suoraan 152mm muutettuna ryssä tuhosi 210 000 * 12 = 2,5 miljoonaa kranaattia. UA on ampunut kiivaina päivinä luokkaa 5000 kranaattia. Tuhottu määrä olisi riittänyt 500 päiväksi. Sodan kulku olisi voinut mennä Ukrainan kannalta olennaisesti paremmin alkukuukausina, mikäli nämä varastot olisivat olleet käytössä, putkia ja heittimiä oli simona.
Jos otetaan tuo laskelma annettuna, se tarkoittaa että Ukrainalla on täytynyt olla useita miljoonia 122mm ja 152mm laukauksia varastoissa. Väitetysti valtaosa tuhotuista oli 152mm sekä erilaisia raketteja eli sitä arvokkaampaa tavaraa kantaman, vaikutuskyvyn yms. kannalta. Nämä ovat tietysti valtaosaksi Neuvostoliiton perintöä, mutta silti antaa perspektiiviä määristä. Sabotaasista huolimatta Ukraina kykeni taistelemaan rajusti hyökkääjää vastaan, tosin alkukesästä tilanne oli jonkin aikaa hyvin vaikea kun 122mm ja 152mm kranaatit alkoivat käydä vähiin (länsimaiden tuki 105mm ja 155mm kaluston ja laukausten myötä tuli avuksi).
5. eikä sovi unohtaa tykistön ja heittimien varaosia, uusia tuliputkia yms. mitä kuluu kun ammutaan paljon. Ulkomuistista tapailen että käyttäjä ERAkko olisi maininnut putken kestoiäksi 2 000 - 2 500 laukausta, toki tämäkin riippuu monesta tekijästä, ei vähiten siitä mikä määrä ammutaan missä ajassa eli miten kuumaksi putki tulee (pahoittelut jos muistin väärin)
6. Ukrainasta kuuluvien uutisten perusteella tykistön nopea maalinosoitus on ensiarvoisen tärkeää ja tämä pitää tehdä mahdollisimman ketteräksi ja sujuvaksi
7. kaiken näiden päälle pitää olla ketterä ja toimiva logistiikka jotta saadaan tykit ja heittimet ruokittua sitä mukaa kun tarvitsevat lisää MUTTA varastointi hajautettu koska oletus on että vihollinen kykenee paikallistamaan ja tuhoamaan osan ns. välivarastoista
Viimeksi muokattu:
Pitkä ketju https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1598009741216976896.html
Laaksosen omat havainnot https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1598600627252248576.html
Laaksosen Suomi-havainnot https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1598611306868838401.html
Antares
Respected Leader
Laitetaan tämä verkkouutisten artikkeli myös, tässä on taustalla sama RUSI:n artikkeli:
https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/vlad...ortti-paljastaa-mihin-kaikki-kaatui/#edfc5cc7
Vladimir Putin johti itse Ukrainan sodan suunnittelua – Raportti paljastaa, mihin kaikki kaatui
Venäjä oli Ukrainassa paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
Julkaistu 02.12.2022 | 11:24
Päivitetty 02.12.2022 | 13:13
Venäjä oli Ukrainassa paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
Julkaistu 02.12.2022 | 11:24
Päivitetty 02.12.2022 | 13:13
Kasperi Summanen
Kasperi Summanen on Verkkouutisten ja Nykypäivän päätoimittaja.
Varsinaisten sotatoimien Ukrainassa piti kestää kymmenen päivää, minkä jälkeen Venäjän asevoimien oli määrä siirtyä miehitysvaiheeseen ja lopulta liittää Ukraina Venäjään tämän vuoden elokuuhun mennessä. Suunnitelma oli myös vähällä onnistua.
Näin arvioidaan arvostetun brittiläisen Royal United Services Instituten (RUSI) jättiraportissa. Se valottaa ensimmäistä kertaa kattavasti Ukrainan sodan alun tapahtumia poikkeuksellisen aineiston pohjalta. Tästä ladattavassa raportissa pyritään selvittämään, mitä länsimaiset asevoimat voivat oppia helmikuun ja heinäkuun välisistä tapahtumista rintamalla.
RUSI:n tutkijat pääsivät perehtymään Ukrainan pääesikunnan pitkälti salattuihin operaatiotietoihin, kaapattuihin venäläisiin sotasuunnitelmiin sekä tietoihin ja lähteisiin, joiden luonnetta ja alkuperää ei voida avata niiden arkaluontoisuuden takia.
Verkkouutiset kokosi alle raportin Venäjän sotasuunnitelman syntyä koskevan keskeisen annin.
Moskovan sotasuunnitelman ytimessä oli RUSI:n mukaan nopeus ja tehokas hämäys. Näistä jälkimmäinen onnistui varsin hyvin.
Julkisuuteen myöhemmin tulleiden tietojen perusteella monissa länsimaissa ja todennäköisesti myös Ukrainassa uskottiin Yhdysvaltain kovista varoituksista huolimatta viimeiseen asti, ettei helmikuun 24. päivänä alkanutta invaasiota ehkä tulisikaan.
Taustalla oli vuotta aiemmin alkanut prosessi.
Raportin mukaan hyökkäyksen perusta valettiin jo maaliskuussa 2021. Tuolloin Venäjä keräsi suuret määrät joukkoja Ukrainan rajalle, mutta mitään ei lopulta tapahtunut.
Tätä käytettiin seuraavana talvena monissa huolia tyynnyttelevissä läntisissä puheenvuoroissa esimerkkinä siitä, miten Venäjä käyttää joukkojen siirtoja poliittisen painostuksen keinona.
RUSI arvioi, että maaliskuun siirroilla oli kuitenkin kaksi muutakin tarkoitusta. Näin Venäjä sai kerättyä ja jätettyä kalustoa ja sotatarvikkeita rajalle myöhemmin tulevaa hyökkäystä varten sekä arvioitua muiden maiden reaktioita.
– Ukrainan kansainväliset kumppanit sivuuttivat uhan 2021 keväällä, koska ne eivät havainneet Venäjän joukko-osastojen sisältävän kaikkea, mitä hyökkäys vaatisi tai hyökkäyksen tukemiseen tarvittavaa informaatioympäristön poliittista muokkausta. He olivat oikeassa molemmissa kohdissa – joukkojen kokoaminen paljastui mobilisaatioharjoitukseksi, raportissa todetaan.
Venäjä sai kuitenkin elintärkeän oppitunnin. RUSI:n mukaan Moskovassa ymmärrettiin, että hyökkäyksen ”mahdollistajat” voidaan tuoda paikalle nopeammin kuin Ukrainan kumppanit pystyvät siirtämään omia sotilaallisia kykyjään.
– Kremlin varmuus siitä, että se voisi hyökätä Ukrainaan ilman merkittävää kansainvälistä puuttumista oli tärkeä vaikutin täyteen hyökkäykseen lähtemisen taustalla.
Venäjän sotasuunnitelman laatimisesta vastasivat RUSI:n mukaan ennen kaikkea tiedustelupalvelut ja Venäjän presidentinhallinnon alaisuuteen koottu pieni ydinryhmä yhdessä korkeiden puolustusministeriön virkamiesten kanssa.
Venäjän turvallisuuspalvelu FSB aloitti varsinaiset sotavalmistelut heinäkuussa 2021. Tuolloin laadittiin sittemmin kehnosti tehdyiksi ja korruption vesittämiksi paljastuneet selvitykset, joiden perusteella Ukrainan poliittisesti apaattinen yhteiskunta ei luottanut johtajiinsa, huoli lähinnä taloudesta ja uskoi, ettei maiden välille voisi syttyä täysimittaista sotaa.
Venäjän presidentti Vladimir Putin vahvisti itse heinäkuussa julkaistussa esseessään Venäjän ja Ukrainan olevan samaa kansaa ja toisti uskoaan siihen, että ukrainalaiset suhtautuvat myönteisesti Venäjään.
RUSI huomauttaa, että Venäjän asevoimissa oltiin vahvasti sitä mieltä, ettei ukrainalaisista olisi minkäänlaista vastusta pitkän modernisointiohjelman läpi käyneille venäläisjoukoille.
Venäjän asevoimien yleisesikuntapäällikkö, kenraali Valeri Gerasimovin henkilökohtaisten vakuutusten armeijansa kyvyistä kerrotaan olleen avainroolissa tiedustelupalvelujen laatiman sotasuunnitelman synnyssä.
Lopullinen suunnitelma rakentui raportin mukaan neljälle keskeiselle oletukselle.
Nopeus katsottiin ensinnäkin kriittiseksi, koska se varmistaisi, ettei kansainvälinen yhteisö ehtisi reagoida tapahtumiin. Ukrainan poliittisen johdon kaataminen taas antaisi oletetuille Venäjä-mielisille ukrainalaisille tilaa ilmaista tukensa miehittäjälle. Kolmanneksi arvioitiin, että poliittisesti apaattista ukrainalaisten suurta massaa pystyttäisiin hallitsemaan tehokkaasti kriittisen infrastruktuurin kuten lämmityksen, sähkönjakelun ja pankkijärjestelmän kontrollilla. Viimeiseksi venäläiset laskivat, että Venäjän asevoimat päihittäisi ukrainalaiset sotakentällä.
Tämä kaikki saavutettaisiin tuhoamalla ensi-iskuilla Ukrainan ilmavoimat, merivoimat ja ilmapuolustus, voittamalla Ukrainan maavoimat sitomalla ne maan itäosiin, eliminoimalla maan poliittinen johto ja tuhoamalla keskeiset instituutiot sekä ennen kaikkea hämäämällä Ukrainan hallitusta niin, ettei hyökkäyksen laajuudesta, paikasta tai ajasta tulisi tietoa ennen kuin olisi jo liian myöhäistä.
Syksyllä 2021 Ukrainan lähelle kerätyille Venäjän joukoille jaettiin käskyt, joiden perusteella komennus kestäisi yhdeksän kuukautta. Moskova siis odotti hallitsevansa Ukrainaa täysin kesään mennessä.
Suunnitelmat olivat RUSI:n mukaan paljon parempia kuin on annettu ymmärtää. Mikäli ne olisi kyetty panemaan täytäntöön kokonaisuudessaan, olisivat ne arvion mukaan voineet hyvinkin menestyä. Raportissa todetaankin, että Venäjä oli paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
Raportissa kiinnitetään kuitenkin huomiota tiettyihin suunnitteluprosessin ”kummallisuuksiin”.
Varsinaiset suunnitelmat laati erittäin pieni joukko presidentti Vladimir Putinin alaisuudessa. Raportissa todetaan ”aikeiden” tulleen suunnittelijoille Putinilta. Monet varsinaisia valmisteluja johtaneista viranomaisista ja sotilasjohtajista eivät kuitenkaan tienneet suunnitelmien todellista päämäärää. RUSI:n tietojen mukaan jopa Venäjän pääesikunnan osastojen apulaisjohtajat saivat tietää hyökkäysaikeista vasta päiviä ennen h-hetkeä. Joukoille käskyt tulivat taas vain tunteja ennen hyökkäyksen alkua.
Ajatuksena oli noudattaa äärimmäistä operaatioturvallisuutta ja pitää venäläisten aikeet hämärän peitossa viimeiseen asti. Sotakentällä tämä johti kuitenkin tunnetusti sekaannukseen ja kehnoihin taktisiin suorituksiin.
Pieni valmisteluryhmä näyttää myös raportin mukaan toimineen täysin ilman haastajia ja ulkopuolisia arvioita. Ryhmän todetaankin antautuneen yltiöoptimistiseen ajatteluun Venäjän kyvyistä ja suunnitelman menestyksestä.
Julkisuudessa on tähän tullessa toisteltu FSB:n virhearvioiden ukrainalaisten asenteista olleen suurimpia syitä Venäjän epäonnistumiseen.
RUSI:n mukaan tämän merkitystä on liioiteltu. Raportissa arvioidaan, että venäläisten raskain virhe oli todellisuudessa vaihtoehtoisten skenaarioiden ja varasuunnitelmien täydellinen puuttuminen. Raportin mukaan suunnittelijat eivät olleet varautuneet millään tavalla siihen, että kaikki ei menisikään niin kuin piti.
– Ei ole mitään todisteita, että kukaan olisi kysynyt, mitä tapahtuu, jos jokin perusoletuksista onkin pielessä.
https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/vlad...ortti-paljastaa-mihin-kaikki-kaatui/#edfc5cc7
Vladimir Putin johti itse Ukrainan sodan suunnittelua – Raportti paljastaa, mihin kaikki kaatui
Vladimir Putin johti itse Ukrainan sodan suunnittelua – Raportti paljastaa, mihin kaikki kaatui
Venäjä oli Ukrainassa paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
Julkaistu 02.12.2022 | 11:24
Päivitetty 02.12.2022 | 13:13
Vladimir Putin johti itse Ukrainan sodan suunnittelua – Raportti paljastaa, mihin kaikki kaatui
Venäjä oli Ukrainassa paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
Julkaistu 02.12.2022 | 11:24
Päivitetty 02.12.2022 | 13:13
Kasperi Summanen
Kasperi Summanen on Verkkouutisten ja Nykypäivän päätoimittaja.
Varsinaisten sotatoimien Ukrainassa piti kestää kymmenen päivää, minkä jälkeen Venäjän asevoimien oli määrä siirtyä miehitysvaiheeseen ja lopulta liittää Ukraina Venäjään tämän vuoden elokuuhun mennessä. Suunnitelma oli myös vähällä onnistua.
Näin arvioidaan arvostetun brittiläisen Royal United Services Instituten (RUSI) jättiraportissa. Se valottaa ensimmäistä kertaa kattavasti Ukrainan sodan alun tapahtumia poikkeuksellisen aineiston pohjalta. Tästä ladattavassa raportissa pyritään selvittämään, mitä länsimaiset asevoimat voivat oppia helmikuun ja heinäkuun välisistä tapahtumista rintamalla.
RUSI:n tutkijat pääsivät perehtymään Ukrainan pääesikunnan pitkälti salattuihin operaatiotietoihin, kaapattuihin venäläisiin sotasuunnitelmiin sekä tietoihin ja lähteisiin, joiden luonnetta ja alkuperää ei voida avata niiden arkaluontoisuuden takia.
Verkkouutiset kokosi alle raportin Venäjän sotasuunnitelman syntyä koskevan keskeisen annin.
Maaliskuu 2021
Moskovan sotasuunnitelman ytimessä oli RUSI:n mukaan nopeus ja tehokas hämäys. Näistä jälkimmäinen onnistui varsin hyvin.
Julkisuuteen myöhemmin tulleiden tietojen perusteella monissa länsimaissa ja todennäköisesti myös Ukrainassa uskottiin Yhdysvaltain kovista varoituksista huolimatta viimeiseen asti, ettei helmikuun 24. päivänä alkanutta invaasiota ehkä tulisikaan.
Taustalla oli vuotta aiemmin alkanut prosessi.
Raportin mukaan hyökkäyksen perusta valettiin jo maaliskuussa 2021. Tuolloin Venäjä keräsi suuret määrät joukkoja Ukrainan rajalle, mutta mitään ei lopulta tapahtunut.
Tätä käytettiin seuraavana talvena monissa huolia tyynnyttelevissä läntisissä puheenvuoroissa esimerkkinä siitä, miten Venäjä käyttää joukkojen siirtoja poliittisen painostuksen keinona.
RUSI arvioi, että maaliskuun siirroilla oli kuitenkin kaksi muutakin tarkoitusta. Näin Venäjä sai kerättyä ja jätettyä kalustoa ja sotatarvikkeita rajalle myöhemmin tulevaa hyökkäystä varten sekä arvioitua muiden maiden reaktioita.
– Ukrainan kansainväliset kumppanit sivuuttivat uhan 2021 keväällä, koska ne eivät havainneet Venäjän joukko-osastojen sisältävän kaikkea, mitä hyökkäys vaatisi tai hyökkäyksen tukemiseen tarvittavaa informaatioympäristön poliittista muokkausta. He olivat oikeassa molemmissa kohdissa – joukkojen kokoaminen paljastui mobilisaatioharjoitukseksi, raportissa todetaan.
Venäjä sai kuitenkin elintärkeän oppitunnin. RUSI:n mukaan Moskovassa ymmärrettiin, että hyökkäyksen ”mahdollistajat” voidaan tuoda paikalle nopeammin kuin Ukrainan kumppanit pystyvät siirtämään omia sotilaallisia kykyjään.
– Kremlin varmuus siitä, että se voisi hyökätä Ukrainaan ilman merkittävää kansainvälistä puuttumista oli tärkeä vaikutin täyteen hyökkäykseen lähtemisen taustalla.
Heinäkuu 2021
Venäjän sotasuunnitelman laatimisesta vastasivat RUSI:n mukaan ennen kaikkea tiedustelupalvelut ja Venäjän presidentinhallinnon alaisuuteen koottu pieni ydinryhmä yhdessä korkeiden puolustusministeriön virkamiesten kanssa.
Venäjän turvallisuuspalvelu FSB aloitti varsinaiset sotavalmistelut heinäkuussa 2021. Tuolloin laadittiin sittemmin kehnosti tehdyiksi ja korruption vesittämiksi paljastuneet selvitykset, joiden perusteella Ukrainan poliittisesti apaattinen yhteiskunta ei luottanut johtajiinsa, huoli lähinnä taloudesta ja uskoi, ettei maiden välille voisi syttyä täysimittaista sotaa.
Venäjän presidentti Vladimir Putin vahvisti itse heinäkuussa julkaistussa esseessään Venäjän ja Ukrainan olevan samaa kansaa ja toisti uskoaan siihen, että ukrainalaiset suhtautuvat myönteisesti Venäjään.
RUSI huomauttaa, että Venäjän asevoimissa oltiin vahvasti sitä mieltä, ettei ukrainalaisista olisi minkäänlaista vastusta pitkän modernisointiohjelman läpi käyneille venäläisjoukoille.
Venäjän asevoimien yleisesikuntapäällikkö, kenraali Valeri Gerasimovin henkilökohtaisten vakuutusten armeijansa kyvyistä kerrotaan olleen avainroolissa tiedustelupalvelujen laatiman sotasuunnitelman synnyssä.
Lopullinen suunnitelma rakentui raportin mukaan neljälle keskeiselle oletukselle.
Nopeus katsottiin ensinnäkin kriittiseksi, koska se varmistaisi, ettei kansainvälinen yhteisö ehtisi reagoida tapahtumiin. Ukrainan poliittisen johdon kaataminen taas antaisi oletetuille Venäjä-mielisille ukrainalaisille tilaa ilmaista tukensa miehittäjälle. Kolmanneksi arvioitiin, että poliittisesti apaattista ukrainalaisten suurta massaa pystyttäisiin hallitsemaan tehokkaasti kriittisen infrastruktuurin kuten lämmityksen, sähkönjakelun ja pankkijärjestelmän kontrollilla. Viimeiseksi venäläiset laskivat, että Venäjän asevoimat päihittäisi ukrainalaiset sotakentällä.
Tämä kaikki saavutettaisiin tuhoamalla ensi-iskuilla Ukrainan ilmavoimat, merivoimat ja ilmapuolustus, voittamalla Ukrainan maavoimat sitomalla ne maan itäosiin, eliminoimalla maan poliittinen johto ja tuhoamalla keskeiset instituutiot sekä ennen kaikkea hämäämällä Ukrainan hallitusta niin, ettei hyökkäyksen laajuudesta, paikasta tai ajasta tulisi tietoa ennen kuin olisi jo liian myöhäistä.
Helmikuu 2022
Syksyllä 2021 Ukrainan lähelle kerätyille Venäjän joukoille jaettiin käskyt, joiden perusteella komennus kestäisi yhdeksän kuukautta. Moskova siis odotti hallitsevansa Ukrainaa täysin kesään mennessä.
Suunnitelmat olivat RUSI:n mukaan paljon parempia kuin on annettu ymmärtää. Mikäli ne olisi kyetty panemaan täytäntöön kokonaisuudessaan, olisivat ne arvion mukaan voineet hyvinkin menestyä. Raportissa todetaankin, että Venäjä oli paljon lähempänä onnistumista kuin yleisesti uskotaan.
Raportissa kiinnitetään kuitenkin huomiota tiettyihin suunnitteluprosessin ”kummallisuuksiin”.
Varsinaiset suunnitelmat laati erittäin pieni joukko presidentti Vladimir Putinin alaisuudessa. Raportissa todetaan ”aikeiden” tulleen suunnittelijoille Putinilta. Monet varsinaisia valmisteluja johtaneista viranomaisista ja sotilasjohtajista eivät kuitenkaan tienneet suunnitelmien todellista päämäärää. RUSI:n tietojen mukaan jopa Venäjän pääesikunnan osastojen apulaisjohtajat saivat tietää hyökkäysaikeista vasta päiviä ennen h-hetkeä. Joukoille käskyt tulivat taas vain tunteja ennen hyökkäyksen alkua.
Ajatuksena oli noudattaa äärimmäistä operaatioturvallisuutta ja pitää venäläisten aikeet hämärän peitossa viimeiseen asti. Sotakentällä tämä johti kuitenkin tunnetusti sekaannukseen ja kehnoihin taktisiin suorituksiin.
Pieni valmisteluryhmä näyttää myös raportin mukaan toimineen täysin ilman haastajia ja ulkopuolisia arvioita. Ryhmän todetaankin antautuneen yltiöoptimistiseen ajatteluun Venäjän kyvyistä ja suunnitelman menestyksestä.
Julkisuudessa on tähän tullessa toisteltu FSB:n virhearvioiden ukrainalaisten asenteista olleen suurimpia syitä Venäjän epäonnistumiseen.
RUSI:n mukaan tämän merkitystä on liioiteltu. Raportissa arvioidaan, että venäläisten raskain virhe oli todellisuudessa vaihtoehtoisten skenaarioiden ja varasuunnitelmien täydellinen puuttuminen. Raportin mukaan suunnittelijat eivät olleet varautuneet millään tavalla siihen, että kaikki ei menisikään niin kuin piti.
– Ei ole mitään todisteita, että kukaan olisi kysynyt, mitä tapahtuu, jos jokin perusoletuksista onkin pielessä.
Antares
Respected Leader
Sanoisin että tämä voisi olla hyvä kumppani RUSI:n tuoreen raportin kaveriksi, antaa perspektiivisiä sille missä kunnossa Ukrainan asevoimat olivat vuonna 2014 kun sota syttyi ja miten niitä kehitettiin sodan ensimmäisten vuosien aikana. Perspektiivi ja johtopäätökset tehdään Puolan näkökulmasta, koska kirjoittajat ovat puolalaisia (toinen on Jaroslaw Wolski, joka julkaisi kirjoituksen omilla nettisivuillaan) mutta sanoisin että tässä voi olla sisältöä myös suomalaisesta näkökulmasta katsoen.
Artikkeli on julkaistu vuonna 2017 eli viisi vuotta sitten, joten tämä on hyvä pitää mielessä kun lukee sitä SEKÄ kirjoittajien tekemiä johtopäätöksiä.
Käännös on Google Translaten kautta, joka tuottaa joskus omituisia tuloksia kun kääntää puolasta. Oranssit korostukset ovat Jaroslaw Wolskin tekemiä, eivät minun.
On niin pitkä artikkeli että pitää lainata neljässä osassa - ensimmäinen sisältää vuoden 2014 tapahtumat, toinen alkuvuoden 2015 JA varsinaiset johtopäätökset löytyvät kolmannesta ja neljännestä osasta. HUOM: paikkojen nimet ovat puolaksi ja siten hieman omituisia, jos on tottunut englanniksi tai edes ukrainaksi kirjoitettuihin nimiin, mutta en ala kääntämään, koita pärjätä.
Artikkeli on julkaistu vuonna 2017 eli viisi vuotta sitten, joten tämä on hyvä pitää mielessä kun lukee sitä SEKÄ kirjoittajien tekemiä johtopäätöksiä.
Käännös on Google Translaten kautta, joka tuottaa joskus omituisia tuloksia kun kääntää puolasta. Oranssit korostukset ovat Jaroslaw Wolskin tekemiä, eivät minun.
On niin pitkä artikkeli että pitää lainata neljässä osassa - ensimmäinen sisältää vuoden 2014 tapahtumat, toinen alkuvuoden 2015 JA varsinaiset johtopäätökset löytyvät kolmannesta ja neljännestä osasta. HUOM: paikkojen nimet ovat puolaksi ja siten hieman omituisia, jos on tottunut englanniksi tai edes ukrainaksi kirjoitettuihin nimiin, mutta en ala kääntämään, koita pärjätä.
UKRAINE 2014-2016 LESSONS FROM THE COMBAT - THE POLISH CONTEXT
MILITARY CONFLICT October 16, 2022
The text is a fragment of the publication: "Tanks in Ukraine 2014-2017" published as part of Combat Vehicles of the World, No. 4/2017 by Jarosław Wolski and Paweł Przeździecki .
Although the following analysis was written five years ago - in 2017 - and presents lessons from the struggles of the first conflict in Ukraine, it is worth recalling the experiences of that time. They are a good introduction to the outline of preliminary conclusions from the fighting in Ukraine in 2022 in the context of the reforms of the Polish Armed Forces, currently being prepared by the author.
-
FOREWORD
The specifics of the 2014-2016 conflict .
As a result of the changes from 2004-2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine remained on the eve of the war with two armored brigades, six mechanized brigades, a mountain infantry brigade, four airmobile brigades, four artillery brigades and three air force brigades. In total, this resulted in 21 theoretically developed unions, compared to 42 in 2004. It is necessary to emphasize that the description of the above-mentioned units as "developed" is far too much because their completion had little to do with mobilization development. In reality, each of the brigades turned out to be able to deploy forces no larger than an incomplete tactical battalion group or only a complete company tactical group. Fortunately, Ukraine had quite a well-preserved mobilization system - it was partly a relic from the times of the USSR and, surprisingly, it was not destroyed or significantly reduced in relation to its original capabilities. Despite the massive sale of arms and military equipment, large enough quantities were retained that, combined with an efficient mobilization system, it was possible to supplement the heavy losses from 2014 and 2015 and to issue new units.
Finally, it turned out that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are able to deploy additionally (above the state from 2013) 3 armored brigades, 8 mechanized brigades, 4 motorized brigades, 2 mountain infantry brigades, 4 airmobile brigades, a marine infantry brigade, a land forces aviation brigade, 3 artillery. Thus, in total, the cadre army from 2013 and its mobilization development from 2014-2017 amounted to 46 large units and allowed it to reach the levels from a decade ago. This is an impressive achievement, but it is also probably the end of Ukrainian possibilities - mainly as a result of the exhaustion of armament and military equipment stocks.
On the eve of the outbreak of war, the Ukrainian armored forces constituted the main component of the land forces - in total: 2 armored and 6 mechanized brigades. However, the above-mentioned units were poorly equipped, and only about 350 out of the 732 "officially" owned tanks turned out to be capable of being put into the field. The owned equipment was heavily exploited and with a significant repair overhang. The individual training of the crews did not meet the standards of Western countries or even Russia. The problem was the lack of resources (MPS, ammunition, free resources) to conduct classes and an inefficient training system that has been unrealistic in 22 years, even compared to the times of the USSR. The training of the conscripts was basically a sham, as was the manpower reserve.
The situation was slightly improved by the presence of a few soldiers with extensive mission experience or mobilized officers remembering the times of the USSR and mercenary service in the 1990s and 2000s. As later experience showed, the morale of soldiers and non-commissioned officers was at a good level. The above contrasted with the skills and morale of the commanders of the battalion level and above - time has shown that Napoleon Bonaparte's saying that "an army of rams, led by a lion, is stronger than an army of lions led by a ram” has not lost its relevance in any way, and the commanders of higher echelons were the weakest element of the Ukrainian army.
The second critical area was communication - rickety and broken at the company-battalion level and theoretically existing but (as later experience showed again) easy to eliminate at the battalion level - higher command levels. Command automation (except for a few Machine for Artillery complexes) basically did not exist, and the "Manewer" system in armored forces was not (according to available sources) used in combat.
For all its weakness, the Ukrainian army had several strengths.
The first was the huge amounts of armaments and military equipment in the mobilization supply. Together with the remaining destructive (albeit still impressive) economy mobilization program, it allowed to double the number of the so-called large units in the course of mobilization and at the same time supplement the losses of the units participating in the fighting.
The second advantage turned out to be the availability of a large reserve after military training (despite its questionable quality) and the multitude of patriotic volunteers who, as part of the national uprising, joined the recruitment commissions.
Without both of the above factors, the Ukrainian army in 2014 would have shared the fate of the Libyan, Iraqi or Georgian army.
The invasion and annexation of Crimea can be considered a gigantic military success for Russia. Basically, with zero own starts, the Russians completely neutralized and then smashed the Ukrainian forces on the peninsula, counted on 19,000 soldiers. This was done by means of a well-conducted hybrid war, in which the will to fight and morale of the Ukrainian command in the Crimea were destroyed, and a significant part of the soldiers deserted or went over to the side of the enemy. The scale of the phenomenon is evidenced by the fact that over 6,000 soldiers joined the Russians, and the same number deserted and left the army.
Initially, the scenario of the fighting in eastern Ukraine was quite similar to the one in Crimea - protests of the population and immigrant provocateurs in front of public buildings ended with them being taken over by unspecified paramilitary groups. At the same time, there was a constant infiltration of the border of the eastern oblasts by successive units of special forces from Russia. Attempts to provoke mass protests in eastern Ukraine have been moderately successful – mainly due to the quick reaction of the government in Kiev. Securing the industrial area around Kharkiv, Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk was especially critical as they formed the basis of the Ukrainian army's mobilization base. Its loss would mean a catastrophe, so it is not surprising that basically all available forces were directed to the mentioned cities. The effective pacification enabled further uninterrupted mobilization, but at the same time absorbed most of the available forces and left a large gap in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, where the rebellion quickly achieved the greatest successes. Three large centers (Donetsk, Sloviansk and Lugansk) fell into the hands of the rebels, and at the fourth (Mariupol) skirmishes began on the streets of the city.
On April 13, 2014, the government in Kiev announced the launch of an anti-terrorist operation (ATO). Despite the rescue of the industrial base of the mobilization of the economy and most of the armament and military equipment depots, it turned out that the Ukrainian army is unprepared for war to an alarming degree. In the period from March to May 2014, both armored brigades managed to field only one incomplete battalion tactical group and one (full) company group.
The six mechanized brigades were able to field only six tactical battalion groups in total, and the next four brigades (aeromobile or mountain infantry) had one tactical company group each. In fact, less than 20% of the forces possessed in terms of equipment payments turned out to be capable of fighting. Despite the thinness of the available forces, the active phase of operations began in May 2014.
During the operation, the Ukrainians managed to recapture the airport in Donetsk, pacify Mariupol, capture Jampol and thus surround Sloviansk with a large separatist group located there. However, they managed to break through the encirclement ring on July 4-5 as far as Kramatorsk and then retreat to Donbass. The mobilization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the "flowing" of successive company and battalion tactical groups as well as newly created paramilitary units continued.
As a result of the fighting, by mid-July 2014, the Ukrainian army regained Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol and managed to go as far as Donetsk and Lugansk, including capturing Amrosilivke and reaching Savur Mogiła. This gave some chances to think about regaining the entire territory controlled by the separatists.
Unfortunately, the adopted concept assumed regaining control over the state border and cutting off supplies to both separatist republics by creating a 150 km long cordon along the border stretching from the Sawur-Mogiły hill to the border crossing in Izvarne. There were several flaws in this concept.
The first was to assume the relative passivity of the Russians.
The second was that in order to conquer and hold such a long strip, the extremely meager forces of the Border Guard, subunits of the newly created National Guard, two mines from the 28th and 51st mechanized brigades and a total of five incomplete battalion groups from the 72nd and 24th mechanized brigades and the 79th aeromobile brigade were allocated. Therefore, absolutely insufficient forces of the order of "one and a half" brigade were allocated to secure the section where the division would normally operate.
The third mistake but the forced weak logistical support of the operation was the adoption of the concept of occupying the area and creating permanent forward bases (the so-called FOBs). As a result, mechanized armored forces lost their main advantage and became static points of resistance effectively avoided by the enemy.
The above errors were immediately used by the Russians / Separatists who firstly seized Sawur-Mogiła, cutting off the entire group trying to block the border from supplies, and secondly started artillery fire across the border of Ukrainian FOBs. Since only forces that maneuver out of the fire are able to survive artillery barrages, the effects of attacks corrected by advanced Russian special forces guidance operators were devastating. Laser-corrected ammunition was used in a few cases against particularly important targets, and most of the losses were caused by relatively simple means of destruction: 120mm mortars, 122mm MLRS Grad and 152mm artillery shells.
The effects of over 60 assaults were tragic for the Ukrainian troops stuck in static positions - with the cut-off of supplies after the capture of Savur-Mogiły, the attacked Ukrainian group basically ceased to exist by the end of July 2014, and only groups from the 79th brigade managed to withdraw. Despite this defeat, the Ukrainian forces achieved three serious successes in other sections of the ATO.
The first was the capture of Debaltsevo and the separation of the LPR and the DPR.
The second was the capture of Saur-Mogiła after heavy fighting by the soldiers of the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 51st Mechanized Brigade.
The third was to capture the airport in Lugansk, clear the airport in Donetsk and reach the towns of Torez and Snihne, located north of the captured Saur-Mogiły and only 20 km from the border.
At the same time, the formation of an encirclement ring around Luhansk and Donetsk began. At this stage of the fighting, it can be assumed that the Ukrainians had a real chance to crush the rebellion - and if it had not been for the direct involvement of the Russian Armed Forces in the fight, it would probably have happened.
In the first days of August 2014, the grouping within the ATO had already 32,000 soldiers and about 8,000 in the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, and the Border Guard. Despite the creation of a gap of more than 100 km between the conquered Savur-Mogiła and the border crossing in Izvarne, the ATO command decided to close the encirclement around Donetsk. In order to do this, Iłojawsk, located to the south-east of it, had to be conquered. The assigned forces consisted of several volunteer and territorial defense battalions supported by a reinforced battalion tactical group from the 51st mechanized brigade.
These forces were too small, so they were quickly reinforced by a combat group based on the 17th armored brigade and the 93rd mechanized brigade. Even after this reinforcement, however, the total force attacking the city directly did not exceed a thousand soldiers. The above group got bogged down during the fights for Iłojawsk, although it was temporarily able to control half of the city. At the same time, there were no more reserves to be thrown on this section of the front.
In retrospect, it seems that the ATO command did not believe in the possibility of an outright intervention by the Russians. It was a tragic mistake because already on August 24, Russian troops crossed the border south of Sawur Mogiła. The Russian grouping consisted of about 4,000 soldiers and 20-30 tanks, 90 IFV/BMDs were supported by rocket and barrel artillery and was fielded by the 98th and 106th Airborne Divisions, the 31st Airborne Brigade, the 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade and the 9th Motorized Brigade.
As a result of the Russian strike, the forces of the reinforced battalion group of the 51st mechanized brigade, whose 1,500 soldiers retreated in disarray towards the Donbass, were broken. As a result, the Ukrainians fighting in Iłojawsk became besieged, and the desertion of the entire "Prykarpatia" territorial defense battalion contributed significantly to the closing of the encirclement ring around their forces. The Ukrainian forces in the pocket consisted of about 1,500 soldiers from the volunteer battalions and subunits of the 28th, 93rd and 51st mechanized brigades.
They fought fierce two-day battles in the city with the forces of separatists and Russians who tried to break the Ukrainian forces with a frontal strike. During the described events, subsequent battalion groups of Russians struck in two other strategic directions - Mariupol and Lugansk. A reinforced Russian battalion tactical group with more than 30 tanks (T-72B3 and T-90A) struck towards Mariupol through Novozazovsk - it defeated the Ukrainian "Azov" regiment in combat and managed to approach the city.
In the Luhansk direction, the situation was still worse - despite the repulse by the Ukrainian battalion tactical groups (from the 24th and 30th mechanized brigades) of several strikes by the "separatists" on August 20-22, the force of the attack of the Russian battalion battle group carried out on August 24 was too great. The Russians managed to capture the airfield and the destruction of both Ukrainian groups was prevented by a sacrificial counterattack by a tank company from the 1st independent armored brigade - it suffered heavy losses but allowed the rest of the forces to withdraw.
On August 26 - 29, the main part of the battle took place in the Iłojawski boiler. The Ukrainians made two attempts to unblock the town of Komsomolsk with the forces of two battalion battle groups. Both ended in a catastrophe as a result of first artillery and rocket fire of the marching columns and then (while exiting the fire) coming across the positions of the Russians, who from a distance with the fire of tanks and BWP / BMD were able to completely destroy the remnants of both paralyzed units.
As a result of maintaining the encirclement and running out of ammunition, the forces in the boiler (1,400 soldiers) decided to try to break through on August 29 - this took place after unsuccessful negotiations with the Russians regarding the possibility of leaving the area of fighting with weapons and "technology" - to which the Russians agreed. They did not want to assume the "Crimean" scenario - that is, the march of the soldiers themselves without weapons and heavy equipment. An attempt to break through from the boiler (through three lines of Russians) over a distance of 25 km in a grouping of two parallel marching columns was doomed to failure and ended with the masquerade of one column and the disintegration into small groups of the other. Only 400 Ukrainians reached their own lines - practically without any heavy equipment. As many soldiers were taken prisoner, about 460 were killed and missing. More than 480 were injured, some of whom were evacuated before trying to break through from the boiler.
Iloyask turned out to be a disaster, and with the defeat at Lugansk and the Russian march on Mariupol - a disaster for the entire ATO that forced a general retreat. The Ukrainians were saved by Western pressure and negotiations that ended with the signing of a ceasefire in Minsk on September 5.
-
JATKUU SEURAAVASSA VIESTISSÄ
MILITARY CONFLICT October 16, 2022
The text is a fragment of the publication: "Tanks in Ukraine 2014-2017" published as part of Combat Vehicles of the World, No. 4/2017 by Jarosław Wolski and Paweł Przeździecki .
Although the following analysis was written five years ago - in 2017 - and presents lessons from the struggles of the first conflict in Ukraine, it is worth recalling the experiences of that time. They are a good introduction to the outline of preliminary conclusions from the fighting in Ukraine in 2022 in the context of the reforms of the Polish Armed Forces, currently being prepared by the author.
-
FOREWORD
The specifics of the 2014-2016 conflict .
As a result of the changes from 2004-2014, the Armed Forces of Ukraine remained on the eve of the war with two armored brigades, six mechanized brigades, a mountain infantry brigade, four airmobile brigades, four artillery brigades and three air force brigades. In total, this resulted in 21 theoretically developed unions, compared to 42 in 2004. It is necessary to emphasize that the description of the above-mentioned units as "developed" is far too much because their completion had little to do with mobilization development. In reality, each of the brigades turned out to be able to deploy forces no larger than an incomplete tactical battalion group or only a complete company tactical group. Fortunately, Ukraine had quite a well-preserved mobilization system - it was partly a relic from the times of the USSR and, surprisingly, it was not destroyed or significantly reduced in relation to its original capabilities. Despite the massive sale of arms and military equipment, large enough quantities were retained that, combined with an efficient mobilization system, it was possible to supplement the heavy losses from 2014 and 2015 and to issue new units.
Finally, it turned out that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are able to deploy additionally (above the state from 2013) 3 armored brigades, 8 mechanized brigades, 4 motorized brigades, 2 mountain infantry brigades, 4 airmobile brigades, a marine infantry brigade, a land forces aviation brigade, 3 artillery. Thus, in total, the cadre army from 2013 and its mobilization development from 2014-2017 amounted to 46 large units and allowed it to reach the levels from a decade ago. This is an impressive achievement, but it is also probably the end of Ukrainian possibilities - mainly as a result of the exhaustion of armament and military equipment stocks.
On the eve of the outbreak of war, the Ukrainian armored forces constituted the main component of the land forces - in total: 2 armored and 6 mechanized brigades. However, the above-mentioned units were poorly equipped, and only about 350 out of the 732 "officially" owned tanks turned out to be capable of being put into the field. The owned equipment was heavily exploited and with a significant repair overhang. The individual training of the crews did not meet the standards of Western countries or even Russia. The problem was the lack of resources (MPS, ammunition, free resources) to conduct classes and an inefficient training system that has been unrealistic in 22 years, even compared to the times of the USSR. The training of the conscripts was basically a sham, as was the manpower reserve.
The situation was slightly improved by the presence of a few soldiers with extensive mission experience or mobilized officers remembering the times of the USSR and mercenary service in the 1990s and 2000s. As later experience showed, the morale of soldiers and non-commissioned officers was at a good level. The above contrasted with the skills and morale of the commanders of the battalion level and above - time has shown that Napoleon Bonaparte's saying that "an army of rams, led by a lion, is stronger than an army of lions led by a ram” has not lost its relevance in any way, and the commanders of higher echelons were the weakest element of the Ukrainian army.
The second critical area was communication - rickety and broken at the company-battalion level and theoretically existing but (as later experience showed again) easy to eliminate at the battalion level - higher command levels. Command automation (except for a few Machine for Artillery complexes) basically did not exist, and the "Manewer" system in armored forces was not (according to available sources) used in combat.
For all its weakness, the Ukrainian army had several strengths.
The first was the huge amounts of armaments and military equipment in the mobilization supply. Together with the remaining destructive (albeit still impressive) economy mobilization program, it allowed to double the number of the so-called large units in the course of mobilization and at the same time supplement the losses of the units participating in the fighting.
The second advantage turned out to be the availability of a large reserve after military training (despite its questionable quality) and the multitude of patriotic volunteers who, as part of the national uprising, joined the recruitment commissions.
Without both of the above factors, the Ukrainian army in 2014 would have shared the fate of the Libyan, Iraqi or Georgian army.
The invasion and annexation of Crimea can be considered a gigantic military success for Russia. Basically, with zero own starts, the Russians completely neutralized and then smashed the Ukrainian forces on the peninsula, counted on 19,000 soldiers. This was done by means of a well-conducted hybrid war, in which the will to fight and morale of the Ukrainian command in the Crimea were destroyed, and a significant part of the soldiers deserted or went over to the side of the enemy. The scale of the phenomenon is evidenced by the fact that over 6,000 soldiers joined the Russians, and the same number deserted and left the army.
Initially, the scenario of the fighting in eastern Ukraine was quite similar to the one in Crimea - protests of the population and immigrant provocateurs in front of public buildings ended with them being taken over by unspecified paramilitary groups. At the same time, there was a constant infiltration of the border of the eastern oblasts by successive units of special forces from Russia. Attempts to provoke mass protests in eastern Ukraine have been moderately successful – mainly due to the quick reaction of the government in Kiev. Securing the industrial area around Kharkiv, Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk was especially critical as they formed the basis of the Ukrainian army's mobilization base. Its loss would mean a catastrophe, so it is not surprising that basically all available forces were directed to the mentioned cities. The effective pacification enabled further uninterrupted mobilization, but at the same time absorbed most of the available forces and left a large gap in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, where the rebellion quickly achieved the greatest successes. Three large centers (Donetsk, Sloviansk and Lugansk) fell into the hands of the rebels, and at the fourth (Mariupol) skirmishes began on the streets of the city.
On April 13, 2014, the government in Kiev announced the launch of an anti-terrorist operation (ATO). Despite the rescue of the industrial base of the mobilization of the economy and most of the armament and military equipment depots, it turned out that the Ukrainian army is unprepared for war to an alarming degree. In the period from March to May 2014, both armored brigades managed to field only one incomplete battalion tactical group and one (full) company group.
The six mechanized brigades were able to field only six tactical battalion groups in total, and the next four brigades (aeromobile or mountain infantry) had one tactical company group each. In fact, less than 20% of the forces possessed in terms of equipment payments turned out to be capable of fighting. Despite the thinness of the available forces, the active phase of operations began in May 2014.
During the operation, the Ukrainians managed to recapture the airport in Donetsk, pacify Mariupol, capture Jampol and thus surround Sloviansk with a large separatist group located there. However, they managed to break through the encirclement ring on July 4-5 as far as Kramatorsk and then retreat to Donbass. The mobilization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the "flowing" of successive company and battalion tactical groups as well as newly created paramilitary units continued.
As a result of the fighting, by mid-July 2014, the Ukrainian army regained Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Mariupol and managed to go as far as Donetsk and Lugansk, including capturing Amrosilivke and reaching Savur Mogiła. This gave some chances to think about regaining the entire territory controlled by the separatists.
Unfortunately, the adopted concept assumed regaining control over the state border and cutting off supplies to both separatist republics by creating a 150 km long cordon along the border stretching from the Sawur-Mogiły hill to the border crossing in Izvarne. There were several flaws in this concept.
The first was to assume the relative passivity of the Russians.
The second was that in order to conquer and hold such a long strip, the extremely meager forces of the Border Guard, subunits of the newly created National Guard, two mines from the 28th and 51st mechanized brigades and a total of five incomplete battalion groups from the 72nd and 24th mechanized brigades and the 79th aeromobile brigade were allocated. Therefore, absolutely insufficient forces of the order of "one and a half" brigade were allocated to secure the section where the division would normally operate.
The third mistake but the forced weak logistical support of the operation was the adoption of the concept of occupying the area and creating permanent forward bases (the so-called FOBs). As a result, mechanized armored forces lost their main advantage and became static points of resistance effectively avoided by the enemy.
The above errors were immediately used by the Russians / Separatists who firstly seized Sawur-Mogiła, cutting off the entire group trying to block the border from supplies, and secondly started artillery fire across the border of Ukrainian FOBs. Since only forces that maneuver out of the fire are able to survive artillery barrages, the effects of attacks corrected by advanced Russian special forces guidance operators were devastating. Laser-corrected ammunition was used in a few cases against particularly important targets, and most of the losses were caused by relatively simple means of destruction: 120mm mortars, 122mm MLRS Grad and 152mm artillery shells.
The effects of over 60 assaults were tragic for the Ukrainian troops stuck in static positions - with the cut-off of supplies after the capture of Savur-Mogiły, the attacked Ukrainian group basically ceased to exist by the end of July 2014, and only groups from the 79th brigade managed to withdraw. Despite this defeat, the Ukrainian forces achieved three serious successes in other sections of the ATO.
The first was the capture of Debaltsevo and the separation of the LPR and the DPR.
The second was the capture of Saur-Mogiła after heavy fighting by the soldiers of the 25th Airborne Brigade and the 51st Mechanized Brigade.
The third was to capture the airport in Lugansk, clear the airport in Donetsk and reach the towns of Torez and Snihne, located north of the captured Saur-Mogiły and only 20 km from the border.
At the same time, the formation of an encirclement ring around Luhansk and Donetsk began. At this stage of the fighting, it can be assumed that the Ukrainians had a real chance to crush the rebellion - and if it had not been for the direct involvement of the Russian Armed Forces in the fight, it would probably have happened.
In the first days of August 2014, the grouping within the ATO had already 32,000 soldiers and about 8,000 in the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, and the Border Guard. Despite the creation of a gap of more than 100 km between the conquered Savur-Mogiła and the border crossing in Izvarne, the ATO command decided to close the encirclement around Donetsk. In order to do this, Iłojawsk, located to the south-east of it, had to be conquered. The assigned forces consisted of several volunteer and territorial defense battalions supported by a reinforced battalion tactical group from the 51st mechanized brigade.
These forces were too small, so they were quickly reinforced by a combat group based on the 17th armored brigade and the 93rd mechanized brigade. Even after this reinforcement, however, the total force attacking the city directly did not exceed a thousand soldiers. The above group got bogged down during the fights for Iłojawsk, although it was temporarily able to control half of the city. At the same time, there were no more reserves to be thrown on this section of the front.
In retrospect, it seems that the ATO command did not believe in the possibility of an outright intervention by the Russians. It was a tragic mistake because already on August 24, Russian troops crossed the border south of Sawur Mogiła. The Russian grouping consisted of about 4,000 soldiers and 20-30 tanks, 90 IFV/BMDs were supported by rocket and barrel artillery and was fielded by the 98th and 106th Airborne Divisions, the 31st Airborne Brigade, the 8th Guards Mechanized Brigade and the 9th Motorized Brigade.
As a result of the Russian strike, the forces of the reinforced battalion group of the 51st mechanized brigade, whose 1,500 soldiers retreated in disarray towards the Donbass, were broken. As a result, the Ukrainians fighting in Iłojawsk became besieged, and the desertion of the entire "Prykarpatia" territorial defense battalion contributed significantly to the closing of the encirclement ring around their forces. The Ukrainian forces in the pocket consisted of about 1,500 soldiers from the volunteer battalions and subunits of the 28th, 93rd and 51st mechanized brigades.
They fought fierce two-day battles in the city with the forces of separatists and Russians who tried to break the Ukrainian forces with a frontal strike. During the described events, subsequent battalion groups of Russians struck in two other strategic directions - Mariupol and Lugansk. A reinforced Russian battalion tactical group with more than 30 tanks (T-72B3 and T-90A) struck towards Mariupol through Novozazovsk - it defeated the Ukrainian "Azov" regiment in combat and managed to approach the city.
In the Luhansk direction, the situation was still worse - despite the repulse by the Ukrainian battalion tactical groups (from the 24th and 30th mechanized brigades) of several strikes by the "separatists" on August 20-22, the force of the attack of the Russian battalion battle group carried out on August 24 was too great. The Russians managed to capture the airfield and the destruction of both Ukrainian groups was prevented by a sacrificial counterattack by a tank company from the 1st independent armored brigade - it suffered heavy losses but allowed the rest of the forces to withdraw.
On August 26 - 29, the main part of the battle took place in the Iłojawski boiler. The Ukrainians made two attempts to unblock the town of Komsomolsk with the forces of two battalion battle groups. Both ended in a catastrophe as a result of first artillery and rocket fire of the marching columns and then (while exiting the fire) coming across the positions of the Russians, who from a distance with the fire of tanks and BWP / BMD were able to completely destroy the remnants of both paralyzed units.
As a result of maintaining the encirclement and running out of ammunition, the forces in the boiler (1,400 soldiers) decided to try to break through on August 29 - this took place after unsuccessful negotiations with the Russians regarding the possibility of leaving the area of fighting with weapons and "technology" - to which the Russians agreed. They did not want to assume the "Crimean" scenario - that is, the march of the soldiers themselves without weapons and heavy equipment. An attempt to break through from the boiler (through three lines of Russians) over a distance of 25 km in a grouping of two parallel marching columns was doomed to failure and ended with the masquerade of one column and the disintegration into small groups of the other. Only 400 Ukrainians reached their own lines - practically without any heavy equipment. As many soldiers were taken prisoner, about 460 were killed and missing. More than 480 were injured, some of whom were evacuated before trying to break through from the boiler.
Iloyask turned out to be a disaster, and with the defeat at Lugansk and the Russian march on Mariupol - a disaster for the entire ATO that forced a general retreat. The Ukrainians were saved by Western pressure and negotiations that ended with the signing of a ceasefire in Minsk on September 5.
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JATKUU SEURAAVASSA VIESTISSÄ
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
The winter campaign in eastern Ukraine at the turn of 2014 and 2015 was characterized by a slightly different nature of the fighting. Its apogee was the fight for Debaltseve. The city of Debaltsevo and a large railway junction located there are located halfway along the M04 road connecting Donetsk and Lugansk. As a result of the activities of 2014, the city and the area around it formed a Ukrainian "sack" with a depth of 40 km and a width of up to 19 km, separating the DPR and LPR. Its existence hindered the consolidation of both "people's republics" and at the same time gave hope for a relatively easy encirclement of the Ukrainian forces stationed there.
It has been an obvious target since September 2014. Therefore, it is surprising how carelessly the ATO command approached the preparation of this area for defense. For various reasons, both Russian and Ukrainian propaganda try to show the sack around Debaltsevo as almost a second Kursk arc with a number of well-prepared engineering positions and numerous troops. However, this image has nothing to do with the truth and, on the one hand, is an attempt at a convenient excuse to explain the serious losses and slow progress of the Russians, and on the other hand, it masks the embarrassing lack of preparation on the part of the ATO command. The Ukrainians did not prepare extensive defensive lines or engineering obstacles. They did not even prepare the second and third lines of defense or even prepared positions that could be their skeleton. Mines were used on a very small scale, and the minefields used were shallow and placed in obvious places. Most defensive positions were in the form of heavily fortified but small outposts and firing points grouping a maximum of 4-6 BTRs or IFVs and a tank platoon. The whole is supported by a few firing positions for MGs and ATGMs as well as infantry field shelters.
Very often the posts had only two vehicles (usually a tank + armored personnel carrier) and 2-3 units of team weapons and trenches and shelters for a platoon or two of infantry. These types of positions were 300-500 m away from the next ones and formed a given defensive position - without a cleared and mined foreground, without entanglements, without reserve positions for "techniques" that would allow maneuvering out from under artillery fire to new - also sheltered positions.
As a result, the core of the defense of the Ukrainian positions were few strong points of resistance, but possible to be flanked, and after their destruction or capture - leaving a gap in the defense that could not be "patched" by filling the second and third lines. In tactical terms, it was a regression even compared to the times of the "Great Patriotic War", but it burdens the account of the ATO command, which was neither able nor willing to properly prepare for the defense of the obvious place of the enemy's attack.
Again, this impotence is contrasted by the ingenuity of the soldiers who, despite the scarcity of forces, created small but well-integrated into the terrain and very well fortified outposts. Another curiosity was the use of armored weapons in the performance of Debalcewo. Again, as in 2014, it took the form of tanks, usually assigned in sections to individual points of resistance. Platoons of machines were the maximum forces.
The only change was the efforts of the crews to cover the machines from possible ATGM fire and to leave fortified firing positions only at the crucial moment of the fighting. There are no known examples of creating reserves in the strength of even a company of wagons capable of mobile, maneuvering, defense - again, and not without a hint of malice, it can be seen that it was a regression compared even to the Wehrmacht troops fighting in the same place 70 years earlier.
The issue of the lack of reserves is another embarrassing issue for the Ukrainians related to the defense of Debaltseve - the forces to defend the bag were too small and concentrated to the east and south of Debaltseve. The rest of the defensive positions were occupied too rarely - in reality there was a section of 8-12 km (!) while according to the Soviet school the defense belt of a full battalion is almost twice as small.
As a result, the base of the "sack" was poorly defended - especially the western part. Why Ukrainian officers brought up on myths related to the Battle of Kursk did not anticipate attempts to hit the base of the sack remains an open question. The Ukrainian forces for the entire sector consisted of 13,000 soldiers, 120 tanks, 580 IFVs and TOs, and 240 artillery pieces of over 120mm caliber. About 1/4 of these forces and as much as 1/3 of the "technique" were in the Debaltsev bag.
In contrast, the separatists managed to gather almost 12,000 groups for the attack, supported by over 200 tanks. As a result, they had a numerical advantage of 3:1, and in selected regions of the breakout - higher.
The fighting began on January 16 and until January 23 consisted of frontal attacks by separatists on fortified Ukrainian positions in the area of the north-eastern base of the bag. It was a place well prepared for defense, so the separatist attacks were repelled after fierce battles fought at a distance of less than 400 m. At the same time, DPR forces launched weak attacks on Wuhelirsk, located west of Debaltseve.
On January 24-28, very fierce fighting was again fought in the area of the north-eastern base of the sack between hill 307.5 and the village of Sanzharivka. The Ukrainians maintained their positions after a series of counterattacks. In combat, the separatists lost a total of about a platoon of tanks.
Since these attacks were unsuccessful, the next target was Wuhlehirsk, which was attacked and partially captured on January 29-31. The forces used for the attack were large enough to destroy the positions of the Ukrainians and then repel the counterattack, although there was no question of full control over the city. At the same time, frontal attacks on the positions defending the "top" (the village of Ridkodub) of the sack continued - they had a very limited effect and ended with considerable losses of the separatists.
It was not until February 4 that Wukhehirsk finally fell, and by February 7, the attacking separatists broke through the Ukrainian positions to the west and south of Debaltseve - in the area of the town of Czornuchyne and the village of Ridkodub - but they were unable to expand and use both breaches due to high own losses.
The second significant success of the separatists was the capture of hill 307.9 in the area of Sanzharivka, which allowed for fire control over one of the two main roads leading to Debaltseve. Up to this point, it can be assumed that the attackers did not use sophisticated tactics - the defending positions were tried to be destroyed by artillery barrages and attacks by tanks and mechanized infantry. Such operations turned out to be very costly and limited in consequences.
It was probably realized that closing the Ukrainian forces in the cauldron would require much stronger strikes, which the units of the DPR and LPR are unable to carry out. As an aid, a Russian tactical battalion battle group from the 5th armored brigade from Yakutia was sent to the fighting area - it had T-72B3 tanks in stock and was supposed to finally shut down the Ukrainian forces in the cauldron.
The further course of the battle would probably have been different had the astonishing carelessness (or even treachery) of the sector officers who allowed the battalion battle group defending the village of Łogvinowo (located at the western base of the "bag" on the road from the main Ukrainian positions to Debaltsevo) to withdraw for rest, without replacing the group with another subdivision. In the situation of the fall of Wuhłehirsk and the pressure on Debaltsewo, it was an almost unbelievable recklessness that resulted in the rapid occupation of the village by the Russian reconnaissance unit. They also quickly took advantage of the situation in which one of the most important points of resistance on the western flank remained ... vacant.
By February 9, a strong separatist sub-unit and separate platoons of the Russian brigade occupied and strengthened themselves in Łogwinów, cutting off the main road to Debalcewo. The Ukrainian forces had only one paved road left to the east of the occupied artery - unfortunately, it was under fire from the captured hill 307.9.
From February 10 to 12, fierce Ukrainian attacks on Łogwinowo lasted, as part of which attempts were made to recapture the village and clear the road to Debalcewo. It is this clash that is currently most often described in the context of T-64BM Bulat battles with Russian tanks. In the two-day fighting for the village, the Ukrainians lost three tanks and several IFVs and more than a dozen damaged machines. The effect of these launches was to gain partial control over Łogwinów.
However, all successes were lost after the artillery barrage and the attack of two battalion battle groups of the Russians and the Separatists (costing the latter almost a company of machines) which threw the Ukrainians out of the town. It became clear to everyone that the troops under the sign of the tryzub do not have any reserves to unblock Debaltseve.
On February 15, the Minsk ceasefire entered into force. The Russians had no intention of abiding by it, counting on the final closure of the boiler and forcing the Ukrainians to a humiliating capitulation. Not looking at their own losses and the fact that the Ukrainians had de facto cut off the only supply route, they started the frontal assault of Debaltseve supported by artillery barrages.
At the same time, the Ukrainians began rolling down defensive lines south of the city. By the evening of February 17, the separatists had taken control of 90% of Debaltseve - again at the cost of heavy losses. At the same time, T-64BM Bulats from the 1st Armored Brigade clashed with Russian T-72B3s near Łogwinów in a night battle.
As the situation of the Ukrainian troops in the sack became dramatic, the local command of the 128th brigade decided to break through from the cauldron. This was done against the ATO staff, which again showed a complete detachment from the realities of the battlefield. Had it not been for this decision, there would probably have been a repeat of Iłojawska.
On February 18, there was a retreat from the cauldron, but it would have ended in tragedy if not for the decisive actions of two spetsnaz regiments, an airmobile brigade and a company of T-64BM Bulats from the 1st brigade. These forces pressed the Russians so hard in other sections that they made it impossible to cut off the retreating column of troops. In addition, the artillery of the Ukrainians worked splendidly - the effectiveness of the fire guided by the special forces forces was sensational and enabled the Russians to be "suffocated" for the time of leaving the cauldron.
By February 19, about 2,500 soldiers and 15 tanks and 50 IFVs and TOs had broken out of the encirclement. Vehicles immobilized in position and out of order were blown up.
Theoretically, the battles for Debaltseve ended in a defeat for the Ukrainians. In reality, however, the matter was much more complicated. The losses were less than 250 killed and 230 wounded and prisoners of war. The rest of the troops managed to get out of the encirclement. Hardware losses were serious, but there was no mention of the hecatomb known from 2014.
Between January 16 and February 19, the Ukrainians lost 25 to 30 tanks alone. This accounted for almost half of the machines involved in the fighting, but due to the "micro clashes" with the forces of platoons and companies, they did not overpower this type of losses of any of the several tactical units that took part in the fighting.
The attackers suffered much more serious losses - between 30 and 40 tanks, over 700 killed and about 2,500 wounded. In reality, therefore, instead of a simple repetition of Iłoyavsk, the leading separatist units were put through a "meat grinder" and suffered six and a half times higher personal losses (killed and wounded) than the defenders. The losses of 1/4 of the starting states exhausted the forces of both republics and forced a longer operational pause.
In the end, it was not even possible to encircle the exhausted Ukrainian units and force their surrender. Capturing Debaltseve turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory possible only thanks to the direct participation of Russian units. It is also worth noting that the course of the fighting would have been different had it not been for the already described shameful lack of preparation for defense and the mistakes of the ATO command.
It has been an obvious target since September 2014. Therefore, it is surprising how carelessly the ATO command approached the preparation of this area for defense. For various reasons, both Russian and Ukrainian propaganda try to show the sack around Debaltsevo as almost a second Kursk arc with a number of well-prepared engineering positions and numerous troops. However, this image has nothing to do with the truth and, on the one hand, is an attempt at a convenient excuse to explain the serious losses and slow progress of the Russians, and on the other hand, it masks the embarrassing lack of preparation on the part of the ATO command. The Ukrainians did not prepare extensive defensive lines or engineering obstacles. They did not even prepare the second and third lines of defense or even prepared positions that could be their skeleton. Mines were used on a very small scale, and the minefields used were shallow and placed in obvious places. Most defensive positions were in the form of heavily fortified but small outposts and firing points grouping a maximum of 4-6 BTRs or IFVs and a tank platoon. The whole is supported by a few firing positions for MGs and ATGMs as well as infantry field shelters.
Very often the posts had only two vehicles (usually a tank + armored personnel carrier) and 2-3 units of team weapons and trenches and shelters for a platoon or two of infantry. These types of positions were 300-500 m away from the next ones and formed a given defensive position - without a cleared and mined foreground, without entanglements, without reserve positions for "techniques" that would allow maneuvering out from under artillery fire to new - also sheltered positions.
As a result, the core of the defense of the Ukrainian positions were few strong points of resistance, but possible to be flanked, and after their destruction or capture - leaving a gap in the defense that could not be "patched" by filling the second and third lines. In tactical terms, it was a regression even compared to the times of the "Great Patriotic War", but it burdens the account of the ATO command, which was neither able nor willing to properly prepare for the defense of the obvious place of the enemy's attack.
Again, this impotence is contrasted by the ingenuity of the soldiers who, despite the scarcity of forces, created small but well-integrated into the terrain and very well fortified outposts. Another curiosity was the use of armored weapons in the performance of Debalcewo. Again, as in 2014, it took the form of tanks, usually assigned in sections to individual points of resistance. Platoons of machines were the maximum forces.
The only change was the efforts of the crews to cover the machines from possible ATGM fire and to leave fortified firing positions only at the crucial moment of the fighting. There are no known examples of creating reserves in the strength of even a company of wagons capable of mobile, maneuvering, defense - again, and not without a hint of malice, it can be seen that it was a regression compared even to the Wehrmacht troops fighting in the same place 70 years earlier.
The issue of the lack of reserves is another embarrassing issue for the Ukrainians related to the defense of Debaltseve - the forces to defend the bag were too small and concentrated to the east and south of Debaltseve. The rest of the defensive positions were occupied too rarely - in reality there was a section of 8-12 km (!) while according to the Soviet school the defense belt of a full battalion is almost twice as small.
As a result, the base of the "sack" was poorly defended - especially the western part. Why Ukrainian officers brought up on myths related to the Battle of Kursk did not anticipate attempts to hit the base of the sack remains an open question. The Ukrainian forces for the entire sector consisted of 13,000 soldiers, 120 tanks, 580 IFVs and TOs, and 240 artillery pieces of over 120mm caliber. About 1/4 of these forces and as much as 1/3 of the "technique" were in the Debaltsev bag.
In contrast, the separatists managed to gather almost 12,000 groups for the attack, supported by over 200 tanks. As a result, they had a numerical advantage of 3:1, and in selected regions of the breakout - higher.
The fighting began on January 16 and until January 23 consisted of frontal attacks by separatists on fortified Ukrainian positions in the area of the north-eastern base of the bag. It was a place well prepared for defense, so the separatist attacks were repelled after fierce battles fought at a distance of less than 400 m. At the same time, DPR forces launched weak attacks on Wuhelirsk, located west of Debaltseve.
On January 24-28, very fierce fighting was again fought in the area of the north-eastern base of the sack between hill 307.5 and the village of Sanzharivka. The Ukrainians maintained their positions after a series of counterattacks. In combat, the separatists lost a total of about a platoon of tanks.
Since these attacks were unsuccessful, the next target was Wuhlehirsk, which was attacked and partially captured on January 29-31. The forces used for the attack were large enough to destroy the positions of the Ukrainians and then repel the counterattack, although there was no question of full control over the city. At the same time, frontal attacks on the positions defending the "top" (the village of Ridkodub) of the sack continued - they had a very limited effect and ended with considerable losses of the separatists.
It was not until February 4 that Wukhehirsk finally fell, and by February 7, the attacking separatists broke through the Ukrainian positions to the west and south of Debaltseve - in the area of the town of Czornuchyne and the village of Ridkodub - but they were unable to expand and use both breaches due to high own losses.
The second significant success of the separatists was the capture of hill 307.9 in the area of Sanzharivka, which allowed for fire control over one of the two main roads leading to Debaltseve. Up to this point, it can be assumed that the attackers did not use sophisticated tactics - the defending positions were tried to be destroyed by artillery barrages and attacks by tanks and mechanized infantry. Such operations turned out to be very costly and limited in consequences.
It was probably realized that closing the Ukrainian forces in the cauldron would require much stronger strikes, which the units of the DPR and LPR are unable to carry out. As an aid, a Russian tactical battalion battle group from the 5th armored brigade from Yakutia was sent to the fighting area - it had T-72B3 tanks in stock and was supposed to finally shut down the Ukrainian forces in the cauldron.
The further course of the battle would probably have been different had the astonishing carelessness (or even treachery) of the sector officers who allowed the battalion battle group defending the village of Łogvinowo (located at the western base of the "bag" on the road from the main Ukrainian positions to Debaltsevo) to withdraw for rest, without replacing the group with another subdivision. In the situation of the fall of Wuhłehirsk and the pressure on Debaltsewo, it was an almost unbelievable recklessness that resulted in the rapid occupation of the village by the Russian reconnaissance unit. They also quickly took advantage of the situation in which one of the most important points of resistance on the western flank remained ... vacant.
By February 9, a strong separatist sub-unit and separate platoons of the Russian brigade occupied and strengthened themselves in Łogwinów, cutting off the main road to Debalcewo. The Ukrainian forces had only one paved road left to the east of the occupied artery - unfortunately, it was under fire from the captured hill 307.9.
From February 10 to 12, fierce Ukrainian attacks on Łogwinowo lasted, as part of which attempts were made to recapture the village and clear the road to Debalcewo. It is this clash that is currently most often described in the context of T-64BM Bulat battles with Russian tanks. In the two-day fighting for the village, the Ukrainians lost three tanks and several IFVs and more than a dozen damaged machines. The effect of these launches was to gain partial control over Łogwinów.
However, all successes were lost after the artillery barrage and the attack of two battalion battle groups of the Russians and the Separatists (costing the latter almost a company of machines) which threw the Ukrainians out of the town. It became clear to everyone that the troops under the sign of the tryzub do not have any reserves to unblock Debaltseve.
On February 15, the Minsk ceasefire entered into force. The Russians had no intention of abiding by it, counting on the final closure of the boiler and forcing the Ukrainians to a humiliating capitulation. Not looking at their own losses and the fact that the Ukrainians had de facto cut off the only supply route, they started the frontal assault of Debaltseve supported by artillery barrages.
At the same time, the Ukrainians began rolling down defensive lines south of the city. By the evening of February 17, the separatists had taken control of 90% of Debaltseve - again at the cost of heavy losses. At the same time, T-64BM Bulats from the 1st Armored Brigade clashed with Russian T-72B3s near Łogwinów in a night battle.
As the situation of the Ukrainian troops in the sack became dramatic, the local command of the 128th brigade decided to break through from the cauldron. This was done against the ATO staff, which again showed a complete detachment from the realities of the battlefield. Had it not been for this decision, there would probably have been a repeat of Iłojawska.
On February 18, there was a retreat from the cauldron, but it would have ended in tragedy if not for the decisive actions of two spetsnaz regiments, an airmobile brigade and a company of T-64BM Bulats from the 1st brigade. These forces pressed the Russians so hard in other sections that they made it impossible to cut off the retreating column of troops. In addition, the artillery of the Ukrainians worked splendidly - the effectiveness of the fire guided by the special forces forces was sensational and enabled the Russians to be "suffocated" for the time of leaving the cauldron.
By February 19, about 2,500 soldiers and 15 tanks and 50 IFVs and TOs had broken out of the encirclement. Vehicles immobilized in position and out of order were blown up.
Theoretically, the battles for Debaltseve ended in a defeat for the Ukrainians. In reality, however, the matter was much more complicated. The losses were less than 250 killed and 230 wounded and prisoners of war. The rest of the troops managed to get out of the encirclement. Hardware losses were serious, but there was no mention of the hecatomb known from 2014.
Between January 16 and February 19, the Ukrainians lost 25 to 30 tanks alone. This accounted for almost half of the machines involved in the fighting, but due to the "micro clashes" with the forces of platoons and companies, they did not overpower this type of losses of any of the several tactical units that took part in the fighting.
The attackers suffered much more serious losses - between 30 and 40 tanks, over 700 killed and about 2,500 wounded. In reality, therefore, instead of a simple repetition of Iłoyavsk, the leading separatist units were put through a "meat grinder" and suffered six and a half times higher personal losses (killed and wounded) than the defenders. The losses of 1/4 of the starting states exhausted the forces of both republics and forced a longer operational pause.
In the end, it was not even possible to encircle the exhausted Ukrainian units and force their surrender. Capturing Debaltseve turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory possible only thanks to the direct participation of Russian units. It is also worth noting that the course of the fighting would have been different had it not been for the already described shameful lack of preparation for defense and the mistakes of the ATO command.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
LESSONS FROM COMBAT - THE POLISH CONTEXT .
On the question of the ES as a whole as such, the following points can be noted:
It is a truism to say that the condition of the Armed Forces reflects the outlays and the awareness of political elites and systemic solutions. Nevertheless, it is so - the neglect of peacetime turns out to be basically impossible to make up for during the development of mobilization and the ongoing conflict. From this perspective, it should be considered that WP is on a downward slope (text written in 2017 - JW.). Lack of a consistently and long-term vision of the Armed Forces, randomness of structural reforms, instrumental treatment of the Ministry of National Defense by successive political teams, disastrous military-industry cooperation, the looming defeat of the PMT, more and more serious deficiencies in critical areas of the Polish Armed Forces, the establishment of WOT which broke up the cadres of many units and additionally drains the budget of the Ministry of National Defense - the whole thing leads to the conclusion of gigantic and long-term negligence that significantly reduces, not the highest, theoretical potential of the Armed Forces.
Although the war is started by cadre units, it is ended by mobilized reserves that are able to make up for the irretrievable losses. It seems advisable to maintain the postulated stock of equipment amounting to about 40% of the state "P" (excluding school units and machines in the industry). A reserve of equipment (and personnel) of this size should make it possible to maintain the ability to replenish losses incurred during intensive full-scale combat in the period of 30 - 90 days. In the case of personnel reserves in Poland, they are as theoretical as the Ukrainian reserves, with the reservation that the national mobilization system is less effective and efficient. Probably, the appearance before the WKU and the morale of the mobilized conscripts would not be higher than the Ukrainian ones, which may mean a serious inefficiency of this component of the Polish Armed Forces ...
The national capabilities of reproducing the Armed Forces in the field of armament and military equipment are several times lower than the former Ukrainian ones, and it should be emphasized that they exist microscopically in comparison with the Ukrainian PMG. The withdrawn equipment is stored under a cloud or sold, there is no thought of creating M&M reserves of at least 40%, allowing the ability to restore the affected units and deploy new ones. The few positive examples are rather the result of chance and the elimination of subsequent units/withdrawal of armaments, rather than long-term planning. The whole thing leads to the conclusion that the WPiZ is highly susceptible to losses and the possibility of their recovery is low.
It is important to have domestic repair and repair plants and (optimally) the armaments industry producing basic types of armaments and military equipment. For this, a properly developed and dispersed stock of parts is necessary if their import from abroad is necessary or their domestic production is easily disrupted. Counting on the ability to quickly produce or import missing parts, ammunition and entire weapon systems in the conditions of the ongoing conflict is a pipe dream. From this point of view, a positive aspect is the preservation of the domestic armaments industry, especially the ammunition industry, and repair plants. The capacity to repair and restore Leopard 2s, both in Poznań and Gliwice, should also be assessed positively. However, it should be emphasized that it would be reasonable to prepare a certain stock of critical components, e.g. ammunition, as part of the UGS, which would be impossible to obtain quickly during the war.
An important issue is the combat readiness of sub-units -a large repair overhang and shortages in manpower during peacetime result in deploying in "stages" forces too small and too fragmented to be able to operate effectively on a conventional battlefield. Attempts to operate with forces smaller than the company seem to be pointless and too high risk of losing machines. After 2014, the Polish Armed Forces undertook a number of actions in both areas - the repair overhang is successively eliminated and attempts are made to increase the complement. Unfortunately, in the latter case, as long as the economic situation of the country is good and the salary of soldiers does not reach the level of about two national averages, one should take into account the problematic acquisition of valuable human material for the Polish Armed Forces. The Polish Army is no longer an attractive employer and this fact seems to be ignored with shameful silence. Unfortunately, this fact is not changed by the much needed and commendable recent salary increases. It also seems advisable to introduce a financially attractive 4-6 year contract service in order to rebuild valuable operating reserves.
The training and coordination of sub-units is a key issue - the crews must be able to train not only on simulators and with platoons on the tactical belt, but above all with companies using a laser simulation of the battlefield. Platoons and companies must form well-coordinated teams, and soldiers must know each other and have full confidence in their skills and colleagues. The knowledge possessed by the author of the work does not allow for an objective assessment of the state of the Polish Armed Forces in the above-mentioned issue. It seems, however, that the WpiZ training collapse from the years 2006-2012 is over.
Traditionally, the key issue is the proper command of troops - this applies to both the commanders' skills and their morale, as well as technical means for this, i.e. automated command support systems, appropriate communication, or optimally - full network-centricity of the operating forces. The current model of educating and training cadres in the Polish Armed Forces is debatable because it enables the command of troops by officers who saw the tactical belt for the first and last time while studying at WSOWL. It is worth recalling that command within the ATO by "sterile" educated (in isolation from the realities of training grounds and battlefield) officers, often promoted thanks to connections, turned out to be a disaster. Perhaps it would be reasonable to return to certain requirements regarding the career paths of officers that were required before the millennium reforms. Although the SR RP spends a lot of money annually on communications, and there are air defense and artillery subsystems, it should be recognized that network-centricity in the Polish Armed Forces is still a very theoretical construct.
During the fighting in eastern Ukraine, there was another confirmation of the truth known since the Wermacht operations of WWII - tanks must be supported by reconnaissance and artillery, and optimally - by mechanized infantry and aviation. It is unacceptable when the company commander does not have the means and skills (and even worse, the ability) to call artillery support. The whole thing must be rehearsed and integrated already in peacetime because efficient cooperation of troops is crucial, which must be possible at the company-battalion level. Theoretically, in accordance with NATO requirements, the cooperation of troops is practiced in the Polish Armed Forces, and the commanders are aware of this. Practically, however, you can still feel a certain distance in relation to the capabilities and skills of colleagues from the British Army, Armee de Teree, Bundeshwer, or the US Army.
Logistics must be prepared for excessive consumption of MPSs and ammunition as well as spare parts, with the assumption of their non-linear loss. It seems to be purposeful to support the widest possible repair possibilities already at the brigade level. In this regard, also in previous years, there were gradual and slow positive changes in the Polish Armed Forces.
Traditionally, communication is a critical issue - but at the platoon level its unreliability is still not as destructive as at the company-battalion or, even worse, battalion-brigade level. Due to the modernization of means of communication, it can be considered that the Polish Armed Forces are incomparably better prepared than the former Ukrainian Armed Forces.
More concrete "lessons from combat" can be drawn in terms of the very functioning of armored weapons and company-level combat. The conclusions that come to mind after studying the known sources are as follows:
The psychophysical burden of the fighting crews is so high that it leads to a very rapid decrease in their combat value, and in the case of several weeks of continuous fighting - to its almost complete loss. This leads to the conclusion that the four-company solution adopted in the Polish Armed Forces is correct. Another, more expensive, but perhaps more effective solution would be to have two trained crews per vehicle. It is also worth considering the transfer of logistic and repair capabilities to the lowest possible levels - up to and including the battalion level.
The lack of reconnaissance for the benefit of the fighting units is unacceptable - and the hope of performing it with sections of machines from the company composition threatens their easy loss on the battlefield. The use of drones for this purpose is similarly risky - they are a very useful tool, but their capabilities can be effectively limited by weather conditions and the use of EW. Unfortunately, the national capabilities in the field of reconnaissance are still being built laboriously, although the technical means themselves are definitely better than those available to the Ukrainians.
The role of artillery as the "queen of the battlefield" is unthreatened. Up to 70% of launches in 2014 and 2015 were inflicted by rocket and gun artillery symptomatically, precision ammunition was used very rarely. Artillery was dominant at the level of the 70's and 80's but supported in the case of the Russians by numerous UAVs and special forces and automated artillery command systems. The artillery of the separatists did not differ in quality from the Ukrainian one, but its effectiveness was better thanks to more effective reconnaissance. Once again, it also turned out that even well-engineered permanent defensive positions of infantry and tanks can be destroyed with properly concentrated and intense fire. This leads to the conclusion about the key role of the maneuver and the means of pretense as a means of preventing and recovering from artillery barrages. In the context of the Polish Army, the "Regina", "Rak", "Langusta" and "Homar" programs should be positively assessed - it is crucial to continue building targeting systems and purchase modern ammunition - including "intelligent" self-aiming ammunition. The cost of such a solution is very high, but also the effectiveness in combating armored weapons is extremely high. We should also strive to further introduce DPICM ammunition in the Polish Armed Forces - especially for the WR-40. Assessing the ability to protect own groupings, it seems critical to develop EW capabilities in the field of combating drones and defense of the ground floor defenses capable of combating them. It should also be noted that it is necessary to strengthen the counter-battery fire capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces - there is currently a huge gap in capabilities here.
Attack helicopters not equipped with top defense systems and not cooperating within the integrated battlefield with reconnaissance and artillery can be easily neutralized by anti-aircraft defense of the "lower floor" - i.e. MANPADS and SHORAD launchers. This also applies to battlefield support aircraft from the 1980s. As a result, the fighting armored and mechanized groupings are less susceptible to shock with this type of weapon (Mi-24, Su-25). However, these conclusions should not be too hastily transferred to the realities of combat with modern machines (AH-64E, Mi-28N, Ka-52) supported by artillery, EW and UAV. The above leads to the conclusion about the illusory capabilities of the native Mi-24. It can be considered that these machines perform "bridge" functions until their successors are purchased. If new machines are to be effective, they must have the highest possible capabilities - unfortunately, this also determines their price and therefore the number - probably a maximum of 16 machines. Such a small fleet, combined with the efficiency of machines usually oscillating around 60-70%, however, each one should consider whether it would be more cost-effective to strengthen artillery programs instead of buying new generation attack helicopters.
Dedicated anti-tank weapons corresponding to generations of fighting tanks are usually not very effective at hitting vehicles for +/- 30 degrees from their longitudinal axis. Due to tactical conditions, its effectiveness may be additionally limited by the proper use of terrain and camouflage agents in the form of TAD, multispectral grenades and smoke ammunition. Dedicated anti-tank agents without tandem warheads (or expensive and advanced, so-called optimized warheads with super-fast cumulative flux) are basically completely ineffective against reactive armor and their chance of successfully defeating the tank's armor comes down to the chances of hitting areas not shielded by ERA or structurally impossible to covers. In real terms, this means an effectiveness of about 15% from fired ATGMs. However, the effectiveness of flanking anti-tank fire looks different - it is usually effective and the chance of eliminating the vehicle exceeds 50%. In Polish conditions, it can be considered that the choice of the Spike ATGM (although accidental) was optimal - the NLOS capabilities and targeting via fiber optics and the selection of the hit point give a chance to effectively engage vehicles from the front, also protected by an effective ERA. Unfortunately, the number of Spike ATGMs in the Polish Armed Forces (except for the 6th and 25th brigades) is truly homeopathic - the right model here are the American ABCTs, each of which has 87 Javelin ATGMs and as many as 122 TOW-2A and TOW-2B ATGMs mounted in double launchers on vehicles. In total, this gives 209 launchers of modern anti-tank guided missiles at the brigade level, while domestic mechanized brigades have ten times less of such means.
Infantry anti-tank weapons proved to be equally ineffective. Its effective use was limited to flanking ambushes against armored vehicles operating without support or reconnaissance. Infantry equipped with light anti-tank weapons turned out to be powerless against frontally attacking tanks, which forced them to operate from prepared positions. However, this did not prevent the tanks from approaching to a distance of less than 300 m from infantry positions. This led many times in the winter of 2015 to attempts to "run over" the defenders positions by tanks. This led to the immediate effective use of infantry anti-tank weapons against the sides of vehicles and to the use of improvised anti-tank measures (fugas, grenades thrown through open hatches of vehicles, etc.), which was possible due to the "charges" of the tanks themselves without infantry support. The effectiveness of anti-tank defense conducted at a distance of 50-100 m (!) contrasts here with its ineffectiveness at a distance of 100-700 m, which in the case of proper cooperation of the attackers with infantry and artillery would end tragically for the defenders. Currently, the Polish infantry is as helpless against tanks as their Ukrainian colleagues, unlike the leading NATO countries, there are no plans to buy dedicated and effective anti-tank weapons in the style of NLAW, Spike-SR, SRAW or also PzG-3IT600, instead the Polish Armed Forces are to purchase universal disposable grenade launchers. Paradoxically, in the perspective of a decade, this may turn out to be the right choice due to the poor effectiveness of all anti-tank grenade launchers against armored vehicles with active vehicle protection systems (ASOP) installed. )
Due to the short distance of the clashes (300-700m), the area turned out to be an "ally" to the side of the fight that was better able to use it. It made it possible to compensate for the deficiencies in own control units (thermal cameras), it allowed to reduce the risk of being struck by ATGMs, but it was also able to channel the movement of troops into the area of prepared anti-tank ambushes. The ability of company commanders to "work with the map" and use the terrain during operations turned out to be crucial. It seems important to maintain the ability to navigate without the use of GPS systems, many of which are susceptible to jamming. Perhaps it would be appropriate to equip company (and optimally platoon) commanders with inertial navigation systems known from artillery systems.
BMP-2 and BMP-1 as well as BTR-4 and BTR-70/80 turned out to be vulnerable to both anti-tank and automatic cannon fire. This forced the landing of infantry behind terrain obstacles or at a considerable distance from the battle line. Worse, the IFVs, vulnerable to shock, had problems with supporting infantry during combat, as a result of which their effectiveness either did not differ from TO (armored personnel carriers) - which resulted in a huge decrease in the firepower of infantry platoons, or the vehicles suffered losses disproportionate to the intensity of the fighting. The consequence of this was frequent "cutting off" infantry from the attacking tanks at a distance of about 200-300m from the defenders' positions. In the case of poorly trained separatists, this led to solitary tank charges against dug-in infantry positions, and in the case of Russian battlegroups, to suffocating the defenders with artillery and then destroying their positions at the expense of infantry operating with tank support. The above leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to implement an IFV in the Polish Armed Forces that will not fly, but will be equipped with ASOP and basic armor effective against automatic cannons of 40-57mm caliber. Such constructions (SPz Puma, Namer) already exist.
On the question of the ES as a whole as such, the following points can be noted:
It is a truism to say that the condition of the Armed Forces reflects the outlays and the awareness of political elites and systemic solutions. Nevertheless, it is so - the neglect of peacetime turns out to be basically impossible to make up for during the development of mobilization and the ongoing conflict. From this perspective, it should be considered that WP is on a downward slope (text written in 2017 - JW.). Lack of a consistently and long-term vision of the Armed Forces, randomness of structural reforms, instrumental treatment of the Ministry of National Defense by successive political teams, disastrous military-industry cooperation, the looming defeat of the PMT, more and more serious deficiencies in critical areas of the Polish Armed Forces, the establishment of WOT which broke up the cadres of many units and additionally drains the budget of the Ministry of National Defense - the whole thing leads to the conclusion of gigantic and long-term negligence that significantly reduces, not the highest, theoretical potential of the Armed Forces.
Although the war is started by cadre units, it is ended by mobilized reserves that are able to make up for the irretrievable losses. It seems advisable to maintain the postulated stock of equipment amounting to about 40% of the state "P" (excluding school units and machines in the industry). A reserve of equipment (and personnel) of this size should make it possible to maintain the ability to replenish losses incurred during intensive full-scale combat in the period of 30 - 90 days. In the case of personnel reserves in Poland, they are as theoretical as the Ukrainian reserves, with the reservation that the national mobilization system is less effective and efficient. Probably, the appearance before the WKU and the morale of the mobilized conscripts would not be higher than the Ukrainian ones, which may mean a serious inefficiency of this component of the Polish Armed Forces ...
The national capabilities of reproducing the Armed Forces in the field of armament and military equipment are several times lower than the former Ukrainian ones, and it should be emphasized that they exist microscopically in comparison with the Ukrainian PMG. The withdrawn equipment is stored under a cloud or sold, there is no thought of creating M&M reserves of at least 40%, allowing the ability to restore the affected units and deploy new ones. The few positive examples are rather the result of chance and the elimination of subsequent units/withdrawal of armaments, rather than long-term planning. The whole thing leads to the conclusion that the WPiZ is highly susceptible to losses and the possibility of their recovery is low.
It is important to have domestic repair and repair plants and (optimally) the armaments industry producing basic types of armaments and military equipment. For this, a properly developed and dispersed stock of parts is necessary if their import from abroad is necessary or their domestic production is easily disrupted. Counting on the ability to quickly produce or import missing parts, ammunition and entire weapon systems in the conditions of the ongoing conflict is a pipe dream. From this point of view, a positive aspect is the preservation of the domestic armaments industry, especially the ammunition industry, and repair plants. The capacity to repair and restore Leopard 2s, both in Poznań and Gliwice, should also be assessed positively. However, it should be emphasized that it would be reasonable to prepare a certain stock of critical components, e.g. ammunition, as part of the UGS, which would be impossible to obtain quickly during the war.
An important issue is the combat readiness of sub-units -a large repair overhang and shortages in manpower during peacetime result in deploying in "stages" forces too small and too fragmented to be able to operate effectively on a conventional battlefield. Attempts to operate with forces smaller than the company seem to be pointless and too high risk of losing machines. After 2014, the Polish Armed Forces undertook a number of actions in both areas - the repair overhang is successively eliminated and attempts are made to increase the complement. Unfortunately, in the latter case, as long as the economic situation of the country is good and the salary of soldiers does not reach the level of about two national averages, one should take into account the problematic acquisition of valuable human material for the Polish Armed Forces. The Polish Army is no longer an attractive employer and this fact seems to be ignored with shameful silence. Unfortunately, this fact is not changed by the much needed and commendable recent salary increases. It also seems advisable to introduce a financially attractive 4-6 year contract service in order to rebuild valuable operating reserves.
The training and coordination of sub-units is a key issue - the crews must be able to train not only on simulators and with platoons on the tactical belt, but above all with companies using a laser simulation of the battlefield. Platoons and companies must form well-coordinated teams, and soldiers must know each other and have full confidence in their skills and colleagues. The knowledge possessed by the author of the work does not allow for an objective assessment of the state of the Polish Armed Forces in the above-mentioned issue. It seems, however, that the WpiZ training collapse from the years 2006-2012 is over.
Traditionally, the key issue is the proper command of troops - this applies to both the commanders' skills and their morale, as well as technical means for this, i.e. automated command support systems, appropriate communication, or optimally - full network-centricity of the operating forces. The current model of educating and training cadres in the Polish Armed Forces is debatable because it enables the command of troops by officers who saw the tactical belt for the first and last time while studying at WSOWL. It is worth recalling that command within the ATO by "sterile" educated (in isolation from the realities of training grounds and battlefield) officers, often promoted thanks to connections, turned out to be a disaster. Perhaps it would be reasonable to return to certain requirements regarding the career paths of officers that were required before the millennium reforms. Although the SR RP spends a lot of money annually on communications, and there are air defense and artillery subsystems, it should be recognized that network-centricity in the Polish Armed Forces is still a very theoretical construct.
During the fighting in eastern Ukraine, there was another confirmation of the truth known since the Wermacht operations of WWII - tanks must be supported by reconnaissance and artillery, and optimally - by mechanized infantry and aviation. It is unacceptable when the company commander does not have the means and skills (and even worse, the ability) to call artillery support. The whole thing must be rehearsed and integrated already in peacetime because efficient cooperation of troops is crucial, which must be possible at the company-battalion level. Theoretically, in accordance with NATO requirements, the cooperation of troops is practiced in the Polish Armed Forces, and the commanders are aware of this. Practically, however, you can still feel a certain distance in relation to the capabilities and skills of colleagues from the British Army, Armee de Teree, Bundeshwer, or the US Army.
Logistics must be prepared for excessive consumption of MPSs and ammunition as well as spare parts, with the assumption of their non-linear loss. It seems to be purposeful to support the widest possible repair possibilities already at the brigade level. In this regard, also in previous years, there were gradual and slow positive changes in the Polish Armed Forces.
Traditionally, communication is a critical issue - but at the platoon level its unreliability is still not as destructive as at the company-battalion or, even worse, battalion-brigade level. Due to the modernization of means of communication, it can be considered that the Polish Armed Forces are incomparably better prepared than the former Ukrainian Armed Forces.
More concrete "lessons from combat" can be drawn in terms of the very functioning of armored weapons and company-level combat. The conclusions that come to mind after studying the known sources are as follows:
The psychophysical burden of the fighting crews is so high that it leads to a very rapid decrease in their combat value, and in the case of several weeks of continuous fighting - to its almost complete loss. This leads to the conclusion that the four-company solution adopted in the Polish Armed Forces is correct. Another, more expensive, but perhaps more effective solution would be to have two trained crews per vehicle. It is also worth considering the transfer of logistic and repair capabilities to the lowest possible levels - up to and including the battalion level.
The lack of reconnaissance for the benefit of the fighting units is unacceptable - and the hope of performing it with sections of machines from the company composition threatens their easy loss on the battlefield. The use of drones for this purpose is similarly risky - they are a very useful tool, but their capabilities can be effectively limited by weather conditions and the use of EW. Unfortunately, the national capabilities in the field of reconnaissance are still being built laboriously, although the technical means themselves are definitely better than those available to the Ukrainians.
The role of artillery as the "queen of the battlefield" is unthreatened. Up to 70% of launches in 2014 and 2015 were inflicted by rocket and gun artillery symptomatically, precision ammunition was used very rarely. Artillery was dominant at the level of the 70's and 80's but supported in the case of the Russians by numerous UAVs and special forces and automated artillery command systems. The artillery of the separatists did not differ in quality from the Ukrainian one, but its effectiveness was better thanks to more effective reconnaissance. Once again, it also turned out that even well-engineered permanent defensive positions of infantry and tanks can be destroyed with properly concentrated and intense fire. This leads to the conclusion about the key role of the maneuver and the means of pretense as a means of preventing and recovering from artillery barrages. In the context of the Polish Army, the "Regina", "Rak", "Langusta" and "Homar" programs should be positively assessed - it is crucial to continue building targeting systems and purchase modern ammunition - including "intelligent" self-aiming ammunition. The cost of such a solution is very high, but also the effectiveness in combating armored weapons is extremely high. We should also strive to further introduce DPICM ammunition in the Polish Armed Forces - especially for the WR-40. Assessing the ability to protect own groupings, it seems critical to develop EW capabilities in the field of combating drones and defense of the ground floor defenses capable of combating them. It should also be noted that it is necessary to strengthen the counter-battery fire capabilities of the Polish Armed Forces - there is currently a huge gap in capabilities here.
Attack helicopters not equipped with top defense systems and not cooperating within the integrated battlefield with reconnaissance and artillery can be easily neutralized by anti-aircraft defense of the "lower floor" - i.e. MANPADS and SHORAD launchers. This also applies to battlefield support aircraft from the 1980s. As a result, the fighting armored and mechanized groupings are less susceptible to shock with this type of weapon (Mi-24, Su-25). However, these conclusions should not be too hastily transferred to the realities of combat with modern machines (AH-64E, Mi-28N, Ka-52) supported by artillery, EW and UAV. The above leads to the conclusion about the illusory capabilities of the native Mi-24. It can be considered that these machines perform "bridge" functions until their successors are purchased. If new machines are to be effective, they must have the highest possible capabilities - unfortunately, this also determines their price and therefore the number - probably a maximum of 16 machines. Such a small fleet, combined with the efficiency of machines usually oscillating around 60-70%, however, each one should consider whether it would be more cost-effective to strengthen artillery programs instead of buying new generation attack helicopters.
Dedicated anti-tank weapons corresponding to generations of fighting tanks are usually not very effective at hitting vehicles for +/- 30 degrees from their longitudinal axis. Due to tactical conditions, its effectiveness may be additionally limited by the proper use of terrain and camouflage agents in the form of TAD, multispectral grenades and smoke ammunition. Dedicated anti-tank agents without tandem warheads (or expensive and advanced, so-called optimized warheads with super-fast cumulative flux) are basically completely ineffective against reactive armor and their chance of successfully defeating the tank's armor comes down to the chances of hitting areas not shielded by ERA or structurally impossible to covers. In real terms, this means an effectiveness of about 15% from fired ATGMs. However, the effectiveness of flanking anti-tank fire looks different - it is usually effective and the chance of eliminating the vehicle exceeds 50%. In Polish conditions, it can be considered that the choice of the Spike ATGM (although accidental) was optimal - the NLOS capabilities and targeting via fiber optics and the selection of the hit point give a chance to effectively engage vehicles from the front, also protected by an effective ERA. Unfortunately, the number of Spike ATGMs in the Polish Armed Forces (except for the 6th and 25th brigades) is truly homeopathic - the right model here are the American ABCTs, each of which has 87 Javelin ATGMs and as many as 122 TOW-2A and TOW-2B ATGMs mounted in double launchers on vehicles. In total, this gives 209 launchers of modern anti-tank guided missiles at the brigade level, while domestic mechanized brigades have ten times less of such means.
Infantry anti-tank weapons proved to be equally ineffective. Its effective use was limited to flanking ambushes against armored vehicles operating without support or reconnaissance. Infantry equipped with light anti-tank weapons turned out to be powerless against frontally attacking tanks, which forced them to operate from prepared positions. However, this did not prevent the tanks from approaching to a distance of less than 300 m from infantry positions. This led many times in the winter of 2015 to attempts to "run over" the defenders positions by tanks. This led to the immediate effective use of infantry anti-tank weapons against the sides of vehicles and to the use of improvised anti-tank measures (fugas, grenades thrown through open hatches of vehicles, etc.), which was possible due to the "charges" of the tanks themselves without infantry support. The effectiveness of anti-tank defense conducted at a distance of 50-100 m (!) contrasts here with its ineffectiveness at a distance of 100-700 m, which in the case of proper cooperation of the attackers with infantry and artillery would end tragically for the defenders. Currently, the Polish infantry is as helpless against tanks as their Ukrainian colleagues, unlike the leading NATO countries, there are no plans to buy dedicated and effective anti-tank weapons in the style of NLAW, Spike-SR, SRAW or also PzG-3IT600, instead the Polish Armed Forces are to purchase universal disposable grenade launchers. Paradoxically, in the perspective of a decade, this may turn out to be the right choice due to the poor effectiveness of all anti-tank grenade launchers against armored vehicles with active vehicle protection systems (ASOP) installed. )
Due to the short distance of the clashes (300-700m), the area turned out to be an "ally" to the side of the fight that was better able to use it. It made it possible to compensate for the deficiencies in own control units (thermal cameras), it allowed to reduce the risk of being struck by ATGMs, but it was also able to channel the movement of troops into the area of prepared anti-tank ambushes. The ability of company commanders to "work with the map" and use the terrain during operations turned out to be crucial. It seems important to maintain the ability to navigate without the use of GPS systems, many of which are susceptible to jamming. Perhaps it would be appropriate to equip company (and optimally platoon) commanders with inertial navigation systems known from artillery systems.
BMP-2 and BMP-1 as well as BTR-4 and BTR-70/80 turned out to be vulnerable to both anti-tank and automatic cannon fire. This forced the landing of infantry behind terrain obstacles or at a considerable distance from the battle line. Worse, the IFVs, vulnerable to shock, had problems with supporting infantry during combat, as a result of which their effectiveness either did not differ from TO (armored personnel carriers) - which resulted in a huge decrease in the firepower of infantry platoons, or the vehicles suffered losses disproportionate to the intensity of the fighting. The consequence of this was frequent "cutting off" infantry from the attacking tanks at a distance of about 200-300m from the defenders' positions. In the case of poorly trained separatists, this led to solitary tank charges against dug-in infantry positions, and in the case of Russian battlegroups, to suffocating the defenders with artillery and then destroying their positions at the expense of infantry operating with tank support. The above leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to implement an IFV in the Polish Armed Forces that will not fly, but will be equipped with ASOP and basic armor effective against automatic cannons of 40-57mm caliber. Such constructions (SPz Puma, Namer) already exist.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Vehicles not equipped with thermal cameras in the SKO are currently losing their raison d'être on the battlefield. The lack of thermovision of Ukrainian vehicles meant that their effective operation was limited only to the day and good weather conditions. The lack of cameras also caused serious problems with detecting targets such as infantry or infantry and ATGM team weapons. In contrast to the above - basically all new vehicles of the Polish WPiZ already have thermal cameras in the SKO or gunner's sights. An important advantage would be the introduction of panoramic periscope instruments in WP vehicles - because they are currently only available on Leopard 2A5s.
The ability of tanks to conduct effective fire is a derivative of many components including not expired ammunition, cannons with minimized construction clearances and symmetrically arranged resistors, efficient stabilization system and turret drives in azimuth, backlash-free turret bearing, efficient multi-sensor FCS capable of applying corrections to the movement of the cannon, not the sight grid, etc. In the case of Ukrainian vehicles the closest to the above model were BM Bułat, in terms of Russian vehicles - T-72B3. The rest of the vehicles - including the mobilized T-64BV and T-72B - have questionable ability to fire effectively while the vehicle is moving. In the Polish Army, only Leopards 2A4 and 2A5 have real capabilities to conduct accurate fire on the move and at moving targets. Unfortunately, the PT-91 does not have such capabilities, so it is necessary to modernize the vehicles in service. The proposal of Bumaru-Łabędy presented at this year's MSPO under the name PT-91M2 can be considered close to the ideal in the cost-effect relationship. Replacing the cannon, turret bearing, stabilization system, implementing a new SKO, and changes to the autoloader should provide firepower at least equal to the new T-72B3. Unfortunately, it is not known whether the Polish Ministry of Defense will finally decide on the much needed modernization of the Twarde.
The ability to engage enemy armored vehicles requires effective sub-caliber ammunition.Ukrainian tanks did not have such ammunition and the latest available ammunition was the aforementioned 3BM26. The chances of successfully striking the target were therefore limited to hitting the weakened areas of the front of the turret and hull (from 20 to 40% depending on the type of tank) and shooting at the sides of the vehicles - which was not always possible due to the terrain conditions and, above all, the situational awareness of the crews. Although both sides had leading ATGMs, their use was episodic and did not bring any significant advantage on the battlefield - the key limitation here was the terrain and relatively short distance of the battles.
There is practically no effective 125mm anti-tank ammunition in the Polish army, and the next two years will not lead to any improvement in this matter. The situation of securing the APFSDS ammunition for the PT-91 and T-72M1 is simply dramatic and even worse than in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is all the more scandalous that the domestic munitions with minimally effective performance have already been developed, tested and trial implemented as APFSDS-"Ryś" over 15 years ago. Unfortunately, her purchases were discontinued. The situation with the native 120mm ammunition is no better. The supply of German DM-33A1 from 1988 has been exhausted, while the Polish Pz.541 is equivalent in performance to German, almost 30-year-old ammunition and is currently not sufficient. Although the Polish Armed Forces have taken measures to secure modern APFSDS 120mm ammunition, their pace is small and no significant improvement of the existing condition should be expected before the end of the decade. Some consolation is the existence of a small emergency supply of modern ammunition acquired along with the Leopard 2A5s.
The crews of combat vehicles should have effective personal protective equipment, including ballistic helmets, shrapnel vests, and flame retardant suits. Each crew member should have a sub-carbine with an adequate supply of ammunition and smoke grenades to assist in evacuation from the vehicle. In this respect, the Ukrainian army basically stopped at the times of the USSR, and any positive changes resulted from bottom-up and non-regulatory purchases of the armored vehicles themselves. A well-thought-out and considered one of the most successful in the world set of APS of Russian T-72B3 crews called "Cowboy" contrasted strongly with this. The situation in the Polish WPiZ is twofold here - new PPE enter service, but they are not a systemic solution comparable to what is currently in the line in the elite Russian units (the aforementioned Cowboy), or in the USA or Israel. The development of an appropriate PPE is entirely within the scope of Polish capabilities and as such should be initiated.
The need to equip tanks and IFVs with hard-kill protection measures is indisputable.The Ukrainians, despite the development of such (Curtains), failed to implement them for financial reasons. The Russians plan to equip the new generation tanks and IFVs with mandatory equipment. Polish research centers are conducting interesting work on the Polish ASOP, but their scope of funding is far from sufficient. It is also unknown whether the Polish industry will cope with such a complicated task. Perhaps it would be reasonable to acquire a ready-made foreign system for some vehicles along with the transfer of critical technologies enabling faster and mass introduction of the native ASOP. The (mass) introduction of active hard-kill protection systems seems to be a task practically as urgent as the acquisition of new ammunition and more important than the purchase of new vehicles.
MEMBERS:
It should be borne in mind that the above description of the course of the main phases of the operation and the "lessons from combat" concern the first conflict in Ukraine in 2014-2016, the nature of which was fundamentally different from the current operations, and the most serious difference was the incomparably lower potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it is worth juxtaposing the conclusions drawn by the author five years ago (in 2017) with the current state of knowledge and with what we currently see as part of the war waged since February 2022. The second part is in preparation - it will be in the form of an outline of preliminary conclusions juxtaposed with the changes Polish Armed Forces since 2017. In this way, initially "Ukrainian lessons from AD 2022 combat" will become the author's voice in the discussion on the direction in which the Polish Armed Forces are heading.
JAROSŁAW WOLSKI
The author would like to thank Norbert Bączyk for enabling such a wide self-quotation and at the same time strongly encourages interested readers to purchase the full version of the publication on the website:
https://www.tetragon.com.pl/produkt/czolgi-na-ukrainie-2014-2015/
The ability of tanks to conduct effective fire is a derivative of many components including not expired ammunition, cannons with minimized construction clearances and symmetrically arranged resistors, efficient stabilization system and turret drives in azimuth, backlash-free turret bearing, efficient multi-sensor FCS capable of applying corrections to the movement of the cannon, not the sight grid, etc. In the case of Ukrainian vehicles the closest to the above model were BM Bułat, in terms of Russian vehicles - T-72B3. The rest of the vehicles - including the mobilized T-64BV and T-72B - have questionable ability to fire effectively while the vehicle is moving. In the Polish Army, only Leopards 2A4 and 2A5 have real capabilities to conduct accurate fire on the move and at moving targets. Unfortunately, the PT-91 does not have such capabilities, so it is necessary to modernize the vehicles in service. The proposal of Bumaru-Łabędy presented at this year's MSPO under the name PT-91M2 can be considered close to the ideal in the cost-effect relationship. Replacing the cannon, turret bearing, stabilization system, implementing a new SKO, and changes to the autoloader should provide firepower at least equal to the new T-72B3. Unfortunately, it is not known whether the Polish Ministry of Defense will finally decide on the much needed modernization of the Twarde.
The ability to engage enemy armored vehicles requires effective sub-caliber ammunition.Ukrainian tanks did not have such ammunition and the latest available ammunition was the aforementioned 3BM26. The chances of successfully striking the target were therefore limited to hitting the weakened areas of the front of the turret and hull (from 20 to 40% depending on the type of tank) and shooting at the sides of the vehicles - which was not always possible due to the terrain conditions and, above all, the situational awareness of the crews. Although both sides had leading ATGMs, their use was episodic and did not bring any significant advantage on the battlefield - the key limitation here was the terrain and relatively short distance of the battles.
There is practically no effective 125mm anti-tank ammunition in the Polish army, and the next two years will not lead to any improvement in this matter. The situation of securing the APFSDS ammunition for the PT-91 and T-72M1 is simply dramatic and even worse than in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It is all the more scandalous that the domestic munitions with minimally effective performance have already been developed, tested and trial implemented as APFSDS-"Ryś" over 15 years ago. Unfortunately, her purchases were discontinued. The situation with the native 120mm ammunition is no better. The supply of German DM-33A1 from 1988 has been exhausted, while the Polish Pz.541 is equivalent in performance to German, almost 30-year-old ammunition and is currently not sufficient. Although the Polish Armed Forces have taken measures to secure modern APFSDS 120mm ammunition, their pace is small and no significant improvement of the existing condition should be expected before the end of the decade. Some consolation is the existence of a small emergency supply of modern ammunition acquired along with the Leopard 2A5s.
The crews of combat vehicles should have effective personal protective equipment, including ballistic helmets, shrapnel vests, and flame retardant suits. Each crew member should have a sub-carbine with an adequate supply of ammunition and smoke grenades to assist in evacuation from the vehicle. In this respect, the Ukrainian army basically stopped at the times of the USSR, and any positive changes resulted from bottom-up and non-regulatory purchases of the armored vehicles themselves. A well-thought-out and considered one of the most successful in the world set of APS of Russian T-72B3 crews called "Cowboy" contrasted strongly with this. The situation in the Polish WPiZ is twofold here - new PPE enter service, but they are not a systemic solution comparable to what is currently in the line in the elite Russian units (the aforementioned Cowboy), or in the USA or Israel. The development of an appropriate PPE is entirely within the scope of Polish capabilities and as such should be initiated.
The need to equip tanks and IFVs with hard-kill protection measures is indisputable.The Ukrainians, despite the development of such (Curtains), failed to implement them for financial reasons. The Russians plan to equip the new generation tanks and IFVs with mandatory equipment. Polish research centers are conducting interesting work on the Polish ASOP, but their scope of funding is far from sufficient. It is also unknown whether the Polish industry will cope with such a complicated task. Perhaps it would be reasonable to acquire a ready-made foreign system for some vehicles along with the transfer of critical technologies enabling faster and mass introduction of the native ASOP. The (mass) introduction of active hard-kill protection systems seems to be a task practically as urgent as the acquisition of new ammunition and more important than the purchase of new vehicles.
MEMBERS:
It should be borne in mind that the above description of the course of the main phases of the operation and the "lessons from combat" concern the first conflict in Ukraine in 2014-2016, the nature of which was fundamentally different from the current operations, and the most serious difference was the incomparably lower potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. However, it is worth juxtaposing the conclusions drawn by the author five years ago (in 2017) with the current state of knowledge and with what we currently see as part of the war waged since February 2022. The second part is in preparation - it will be in the form of an outline of preliminary conclusions juxtaposed with the changes Polish Armed Forces since 2017. In this way, initially "Ukrainian lessons from AD 2022 combat" will become the author's voice in the discussion on the direction in which the Polish Armed Forces are heading.
JAROSŁAW WOLSKI
The author would like to thank Norbert Bączyk for enabling such a wide self-quotation and at the same time strongly encourages interested readers to purchase the full version of the publication on the website:
https://www.tetragon.com.pl/produkt/czolgi-na-ukrainie-2014-2015/
Viimeksi muokattu:
Antares
Respected Leader
Tykistöstä puheenollen lainaan alle käyttäjän e7i ajatuksia, mitkä kirjoitti "Ukrainan sodan seuranta" -ketjuun: LINKKI VIESTIIN
Tuoreehko pätkä FH-70 käytöstä Ukrainassa. Tähän liittyen sekalaista jorinaa.
Jotenkin tuntuu että nämä vedettävät länsitykit ovat monin osin soveltuvampia UA:n käyttöön (tässähän on kyllä apumoottori lähiliikkumista varten) kuin modernit telatykit. Ovat paljon halvempia ja olennaisesti yksinkertaisempia huoltaa. Mikä tahansa maastokuorma-auto kelpaa veturiksi. Tarkkuudessa ei ole olennaista eroa. Tuliasemaan meno- ja lähtö tietenkin hitaampaa.
Moderneja telatykkejä vastaan puhuu niiden vähäinen saatavuus ja tekninen monimutkaisuus ja haavoittuvuus. Kolmasosa on koko ajan korjattavana lähinnä käytön aiheuttaman rasituksen takia. Tämä kysymys ei välttämättä ole olennainen, jos kriittinen massa saavutetaan, jolloin huollon lisätyö korvautuu "kenttätyön" tuottavuudella. Kymmenkunta PZH-2000 ei ole kriittinen massa. 100-200 voisi olla.
Kriittistä massaa tarvitaan myös vedettävien osalta, tällä hetkellä M777 lienee ainoa missä kriittinen massa on saavutettu.
Tietenkin juuri nyt Ukraina tarttee kaiken 155 millisen mitä se saa ja pystyy käyttämään, nirsoiluun ei ole varaa. Kriittisellä massalla tarkoitan lähinnä ideaali tilannetta.
EDIT: lisätään nyt vielä, että telatykeillä on tietenkin liikkuvuuden ja nopeuden tuomia huomattavia etuja, jotka ovat välttämättömiä monissa tilanteissa. Molempia tarvitaan. Mietin vain ideaalitilannetta.
Hiljattain julkaistu RUSI-raportti sodan ensikuukausista on varsinainen kultakaivos, jossa on vastaukset satoihin palstalla arvailtuihin kysymyksiin. UA:lla oli 152/122 mm tykistökalustoa erittäin paljon sodan alussa (ja on edelleen) mutta ammusten loppuminen teki suuresta osasta käyttökelvottomia.
The UAF had 1,176 barrel artillery systems, of which 742 were 152-mm calibre systems, 421 were 122-mm howitzers, and 13 units were 203-mm systems. The RViA also fielded 1,680 MLRS of all calibres, as well as about 40 tactical missile systems ‘Tochka-U’. In terms of the number of artillery systems, Ukraine fielded the largest artillery force in Europe after Russia. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not so significant at the beginning of the conflict: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176, and 3,547 MLRS against 1,680. [RUSI sivu 16]
Ammusten osalta sitten kävi näin. Ryssän sabotaasi tuhosi suurimman osan varastoista 2014-2021 välisenä aikana.
[Sodan alussa] The UAF had ammunition to support these systems in high-intensity warfighting for just over six weeks. Ammunition had been depleted by regular explosions at Ukrainian arsenals as a result of Russian sabotage. From 2014 to 2018, there were six such explosions, which destroyed more than 210,000 tonnes of ammunition, a large part of which were 152-mm shells and rockets for MLRS. For comparison, during the five years of the war in Donbas, the UAF spent about 70,000 tons of ammunition in total. [RUSI sivu 16]
Ryssän sabotoimaa ammusmäärä voi suhteuttaa seuraavasti. 152 mm kranaatti propellaatin ja laatikon kanssa painaa joku 80 kg. Tonniin mahtuu siis tusina. Suoraan 152mm muutettuna ryssä tuhosi 210 000 * 12 = 2,5 miljoonaa kranaattia. UA on ampunut kiivaina päivinä luokkaa 5000 kranaattia. Tuhottu määrä olisi riittänyt 500 päiväksi. Sodan kulku olisi voinut mennä Ukrainan kannalta olennaisesti paremmin alkukuukausina, mikäli nämä varastot olisivat olleet käytössä, putkia ja heittimiä oli simona.
https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
-
Minäkin olen miettinyt tämän sodan aikana, mikä rooli perinteisellä vedettävällä tykistöllä on tulevissa sodissa. Ristiriita on ilmeinen: panssarihaupitseilla on kaikkien tuntemat edut vedettävään verrattuna, mutta monimutkaisuus tarkoittaa että vaativat enemmän huoltoa JA ennenkaikkea hinnan takia niitä ei voida hankkia yhtä suurta määrää.
Jos halutaan jatkossakin pitää suuri määrä putkia tykistössä, jouduttaneen hankkimaan myös vedettäviä? Ehkä tässäkin on samankaltainen tilanne kuin älykranaatti vs tyhmä kranaatti: molempia tarvitaan jossakin suhteessa.
MUOKKAUS: koostin heinäkuussa Military Balance 2021 (kertoo siis vuoden 2020 tiedot) julkaisusta Venäjän tykistön tiedot taulukoksi: LINKKI ALKUPERÄISEEN VIESTIIN
Kirjoitin silloin näin (viesti kirjoitettu 4.7.2022):
Tuosta jos laskee pelkästään aktiivikäytössä olevat panssarihaupitsit sekä raketinheitinajoneuvot, niin summa on 1 938 + 1 056 = 2 994. Jos siitä otetaan vaikka 80% niin lukumäärä on silti 2 395 kpl.
Hurjat määrät heillä tätä romua riittää, tietysti kaikki tästä tavarasta ei ole Ukrainaa vastaan. Monen suulla sanottu että heillä olisi tykistössä 8-10 kertainen ylivoima ja että pitkälti tykistö olisi painanut itäisessä Ukrainassa rintamalinjaa pikkuhiljaa länteen päin.
Helppo uskoa molemmat väitteet kun katsoo näitä lukumääriä. Ainakin teoriassa he ovat luopuneet (pitkälti) perässävedettävien käytöstä sekä kaliiperistä 122 mm (eri asia seppojen osalta). Jos panssarihaupitseja ja raketinheittimiä käytetään shoot-and-scoot tyylillä niin vaikea saada tuhottua vastatykistöllä. Toisaalta jos drone-tiedustelu toimii niin ehkä sitten. Ehkä ystäviltä saa satelliittitiedustelun apuja, ehkä rintamalinjojen takana on ystäviä jotka antavat tietoa, ehkä on muitakin keinoja.
Jonnekinhan se vaunu ajaa piiloon tulittamisen jälkeen. Jos omalla tykistöllä riittää kantomatka niin iskee sitten vaunua kun se pysähtyy "suoja-asemaan".
Pelkästään kun miettii tuota prosessia, niin huomaa miten paljon kannattavampaa on iskeä huoltoa vastaan: vaunut tarvitsevat ammuksia ja polttoainetta, miehet vettä, ruokaa yms. Huolto liikkuu kankeammin eikä iso varasto ehdi tulen alta pois. Sitä voi toki yrittää hajauttaa mutta sillekin on rajansa.
-
Hyvä verrata nyt kun on saatu RUSI:n raportista tieto, että tykistön määrässä ei ole ollut 10-kertaista ylivoimaa, mutta varmasti paikallinen ylivoima on ollut siellä ja täällä. TOISAALTA Venäjällä on raportin mukaan ollut moninkertainen ylivoima kesällä, kun Ukrainalta alkoivat loppumaan neuvostovalmisteiset 122mm ja 152mm kranaatit. Ylivoima olisi siis ollut tulen määrän kannalta, mikä on tietysti se oleellisin asia. Putkilla yksin ei tietysti tee mitään jos ei ole mitään mitä ampua.
RUSI:n raportin mukaan Venäjä olisi kohdistanut Ukrainaa vastaan "2,433 barrel artillery systems". Jos katsoo yllä olevaa Military Balancen taulukkoa niin se on enemmän kuin "SP active" rivin 1 938 kpl. Venäjä oli pääasiassa siirtynyt "self-propelled" kalustoon ennen sodan alkua, tosin jos uskotaan Ukrainan kertoma määrä JA Military Balancen numerot, niin voi olla että ovat joutuneet ottamaan varastoista lisää panssarihaupitseja tai vedettäviä tykkejä. Sodan aikana on toki nähty molempien käyttöä.
Toisaalta voi olla että mukaan lasketaan muitakin putkia, kuten 120mm heittimet jne. Voi myös olla että Military Balancen numerot eivät ole ihan prikulleen oikein JA toisaalta voi olla että Venäjä olisi ottanut lisää tykistöä aktiivijoukoille ennen sodan alkua. Voi myös olla että Ukraina on laskenut mukaan DPR:n ja LPR:n joukkojen tykistön, vaikea sanoa. Voisi sanoa numerosta silti että ollaan "samalla sektorilla".
HUOM: Military Balancen numerot antanevat suuntaa muttei niitä kannata pitää ehdottomana totuutena. Olen huomannut että ainakin Venäjän panssarivaunujen osalta heidän kirjaamat määrät ovat selvästi suuremmat kuin useammalla muulla lähteellä, tosin riippuu tietysti puhutaanko valmistusmääristä, aktiivijoukoilla käytössä olevista määristä vai mistä.
Erityisesti suhtautuisin suurella varauksella kaikkeen kalustoon joka on merkitty "in storage" eli varastossa. Mikä määrä on pidetty käyttökelpoisena, mikä määrä purettu varaosiksi, mikä myyty ulkomaille tai metalliromuksi yms. Sodan aikana on nähty että Venäjällä on suuria vaikeuksia toimittaa Ukrainaan menetyksiä korvaavaa kalustoa. Jos heillä olisi tuhansia tai kymmeniä tuhansia toimivia sotakoneita varastossa odottamassa junaan lastaamista, tällaisia ongelmia ei olisi nyt nähdyssä laajuudessa.
Tuoreehko pätkä FH-70 käytöstä Ukrainassa. Tähän liittyen sekalaista jorinaa.
Jotenkin tuntuu että nämä vedettävät länsitykit ovat monin osin soveltuvampia UA:n käyttöön (tässähän on kyllä apumoottori lähiliikkumista varten) kuin modernit telatykit. Ovat paljon halvempia ja olennaisesti yksinkertaisempia huoltaa. Mikä tahansa maastokuorma-auto kelpaa veturiksi. Tarkkuudessa ei ole olennaista eroa. Tuliasemaan meno- ja lähtö tietenkin hitaampaa.
Moderneja telatykkejä vastaan puhuu niiden vähäinen saatavuus ja tekninen monimutkaisuus ja haavoittuvuus. Kolmasosa on koko ajan korjattavana lähinnä käytön aiheuttaman rasituksen takia. Tämä kysymys ei välttämättä ole olennainen, jos kriittinen massa saavutetaan, jolloin huollon lisätyö korvautuu "kenttätyön" tuottavuudella. Kymmenkunta PZH-2000 ei ole kriittinen massa. 100-200 voisi olla.
Kriittistä massaa tarvitaan myös vedettävien osalta, tällä hetkellä M777 lienee ainoa missä kriittinen massa on saavutettu.
Tietenkin juuri nyt Ukraina tarttee kaiken 155 millisen mitä se saa ja pystyy käyttämään, nirsoiluun ei ole varaa. Kriittisellä massalla tarkoitan lähinnä ideaali tilannetta.
EDIT: lisätään nyt vielä, että telatykeillä on tietenkin liikkuvuuden ja nopeuden tuomia huomattavia etuja, jotka ovat välttämättömiä monissa tilanteissa. Molempia tarvitaan. Mietin vain ideaalitilannetta.
Hiljattain julkaistu RUSI-raportti sodan ensikuukausista on varsinainen kultakaivos, jossa on vastaukset satoihin palstalla arvailtuihin kysymyksiin. UA:lla oli 152/122 mm tykistökalustoa erittäin paljon sodan alussa (ja on edelleen) mutta ammusten loppuminen teki suuresta osasta käyttökelvottomia.
The UAF had 1,176 barrel artillery systems, of which 742 were 152-mm calibre systems, 421 were 122-mm howitzers, and 13 units were 203-mm systems. The RViA also fielded 1,680 MLRS of all calibres, as well as about 40 tactical missile systems ‘Tochka-U’. In terms of the number of artillery systems, Ukraine fielded the largest artillery force in Europe after Russia. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not so significant at the beginning of the conflict: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176, and 3,547 MLRS against 1,680. [RUSI sivu 16]
Ammusten osalta sitten kävi näin. Ryssän sabotaasi tuhosi suurimman osan varastoista 2014-2021 välisenä aikana.
[Sodan alussa] The UAF had ammunition to support these systems in high-intensity warfighting for just over six weeks. Ammunition had been depleted by regular explosions at Ukrainian arsenals as a result of Russian sabotage. From 2014 to 2018, there were six such explosions, which destroyed more than 210,000 tonnes of ammunition, a large part of which were 152-mm shells and rockets for MLRS. For comparison, during the five years of the war in Donbas, the UAF spent about 70,000 tons of ammunition in total. [RUSI sivu 16]
Ryssän sabotoimaa ammusmäärä voi suhteuttaa seuraavasti. 152 mm kranaatti propellaatin ja laatikon kanssa painaa joku 80 kg. Tonniin mahtuu siis tusina. Suoraan 152mm muutettuna ryssä tuhosi 210 000 * 12 = 2,5 miljoonaa kranaattia. UA on ampunut kiivaina päivinä luokkaa 5000 kranaattia. Tuhottu määrä olisi riittänyt 500 päiväksi. Sodan kulku olisi voinut mennä Ukrainan kannalta olennaisesti paremmin alkukuukausina, mikäli nämä varastot olisivat olleet käytössä, putkia ja heittimiä oli simona.
https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf
-
Minäkin olen miettinyt tämän sodan aikana, mikä rooli perinteisellä vedettävällä tykistöllä on tulevissa sodissa. Ristiriita on ilmeinen: panssarihaupitseilla on kaikkien tuntemat edut vedettävään verrattuna, mutta monimutkaisuus tarkoittaa että vaativat enemmän huoltoa JA ennenkaikkea hinnan takia niitä ei voida hankkia yhtä suurta määrää.
Jos halutaan jatkossakin pitää suuri määrä putkia tykistössä, jouduttaneen hankkimaan myös vedettäviä? Ehkä tässäkin on samankaltainen tilanne kuin älykranaatti vs tyhmä kranaatti: molempia tarvitaan jossakin suhteessa.
MUOKKAUS: koostin heinäkuussa Military Balance 2021 (kertoo siis vuoden 2020 tiedot) julkaisusta Venäjän tykistön tiedot taulukoksi: LINKKI ALKUPERÄISEEN VIESTIIN
Kirjoitin silloin näin (viesti kirjoitettu 4.7.2022):
Tuosta jos laskee pelkästään aktiivikäytössä olevat panssarihaupitsit sekä raketinheitinajoneuvot, niin summa on 1 938 + 1 056 = 2 994. Jos siitä otetaan vaikka 80% niin lukumäärä on silti 2 395 kpl.
Hurjat määrät heillä tätä romua riittää, tietysti kaikki tästä tavarasta ei ole Ukrainaa vastaan. Monen suulla sanottu että heillä olisi tykistössä 8-10 kertainen ylivoima ja että pitkälti tykistö olisi painanut itäisessä Ukrainassa rintamalinjaa pikkuhiljaa länteen päin.
Helppo uskoa molemmat väitteet kun katsoo näitä lukumääriä. Ainakin teoriassa he ovat luopuneet (pitkälti) perässävedettävien käytöstä sekä kaliiperistä 122 mm (eri asia seppojen osalta). Jos panssarihaupitseja ja raketinheittimiä käytetään shoot-and-scoot tyylillä niin vaikea saada tuhottua vastatykistöllä. Toisaalta jos drone-tiedustelu toimii niin ehkä sitten. Ehkä ystäviltä saa satelliittitiedustelun apuja, ehkä rintamalinjojen takana on ystäviä jotka antavat tietoa, ehkä on muitakin keinoja.
Jonnekinhan se vaunu ajaa piiloon tulittamisen jälkeen. Jos omalla tykistöllä riittää kantomatka niin iskee sitten vaunua kun se pysähtyy "suoja-asemaan".
Pelkästään kun miettii tuota prosessia, niin huomaa miten paljon kannattavampaa on iskeä huoltoa vastaan: vaunut tarvitsevat ammuksia ja polttoainetta, miehet vettä, ruokaa yms. Huolto liikkuu kankeammin eikä iso varasto ehdi tulen alta pois. Sitä voi toki yrittää hajauttaa mutta sillekin on rajansa.
-
Hyvä verrata nyt kun on saatu RUSI:n raportista tieto, että tykistön määrässä ei ole ollut 10-kertaista ylivoimaa, mutta varmasti paikallinen ylivoima on ollut siellä ja täällä. TOISAALTA Venäjällä on raportin mukaan ollut moninkertainen ylivoima kesällä, kun Ukrainalta alkoivat loppumaan neuvostovalmisteiset 122mm ja 152mm kranaatit. Ylivoima olisi siis ollut tulen määrän kannalta, mikä on tietysti se oleellisin asia. Putkilla yksin ei tietysti tee mitään jos ei ole mitään mitä ampua.
RUSI:n raportin mukaan Venäjä olisi kohdistanut Ukrainaa vastaan "2,433 barrel artillery systems". Jos katsoo yllä olevaa Military Balancen taulukkoa niin se on enemmän kuin "SP active" rivin 1 938 kpl. Venäjä oli pääasiassa siirtynyt "self-propelled" kalustoon ennen sodan alkua, tosin jos uskotaan Ukrainan kertoma määrä JA Military Balancen numerot, niin voi olla että ovat joutuneet ottamaan varastoista lisää panssarihaupitseja tai vedettäviä tykkejä. Sodan aikana on toki nähty molempien käyttöä.
Toisaalta voi olla että mukaan lasketaan muitakin putkia, kuten 120mm heittimet jne. Voi myös olla että Military Balancen numerot eivät ole ihan prikulleen oikein JA toisaalta voi olla että Venäjä olisi ottanut lisää tykistöä aktiivijoukoille ennen sodan alkua. Voi myös olla että Ukraina on laskenut mukaan DPR:n ja LPR:n joukkojen tykistön, vaikea sanoa. Voisi sanoa numerosta silti että ollaan "samalla sektorilla".
HUOM: Military Balancen numerot antanevat suuntaa muttei niitä kannata pitää ehdottomana totuutena. Olen huomannut että ainakin Venäjän panssarivaunujen osalta heidän kirjaamat määrät ovat selvästi suuremmat kuin useammalla muulla lähteellä, tosin riippuu tietysti puhutaanko valmistusmääristä, aktiivijoukoilla käytössä olevista määristä vai mistä.
Erityisesti suhtautuisin suurella varauksella kaikkeen kalustoon joka on merkitty "in storage" eli varastossa. Mikä määrä on pidetty käyttökelpoisena, mikä määrä purettu varaosiksi, mikä myyty ulkomaille tai metalliromuksi yms. Sodan aikana on nähty että Venäjällä on suuria vaikeuksia toimittaa Ukrainaan menetyksiä korvaavaa kalustoa. Jos heillä olisi tuhansia tai kymmeniä tuhansia toimivia sotakoneita varastossa odottamassa junaan lastaamista, tällaisia ongelmia ei olisi nyt nähdyssä laajuudessa.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kaikki RUK:n kurssimatrikkelitkin löytynevät Fsb:n kirjastosta.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Perunin PowerPoint -sulkeiset talvisodankäynnistä.