tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Ainakin taistelupanssarivaunun kuolemaa on julistettu viimeiset päälle sata vuotta.
Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Mustaruuti
- Aloitus PVM
Ainakin taistelupanssarivaunun kuolemaa on julistettu viimeiset päälle sata vuotta.
AKE-ukki
Respected Leader
Lopeteataan "Väinämöinen/Ilmarinen" projekti ja hankitaan sillä rahoituksella sama dronekyky kuin Ukrainalla. Itämerellä ei sen jälkeen sodan aikana liiku yhtään tst-kykyistä ryssän alusta. Saattuetoiminnan kyllä suorittaa NATO-ystävämme. Hoidetaan me se lähimerialueiden puolustaminen kustannustehokkaasti. Unohdetaan omien merivoimien Nelson-kompleksi ja keskitytään olennaiseen.
Viimeksi muokattu:
Perutaan samoin F-35 ja ohjuskaupat, ollaanhan lahes NATO-jäsen?
AKE-ukki
Respected Leader
Ei kuitenkaan unohdeta ohjusveneitä ja rannikkopuolustusta.
miheikki
Greatest Leader
Vaikka olet pieni ja ketterä niin nykyaikana se ei riitä, aina osutaan. Miksei sotalaivoissa päädyttäisi ratkaisuun, jossa vain iso koko ja taistelunkestävyys toisi turvaa.
Laitetaan tänne ketjuun kun on enemmän pohdintaa kuin seurantaa. En nyt ihmeemmin ala referoimaan kun kuiten kohtuu nopeasti katottavaa ja tiukkaa tavaraa niille jotka eivät kerkeä seuraamaan sotaa sotaketjussa tai muuten. Mutta suurinpiirtein että tuleeko nyt sodassa uusi vaihe kun Surovikistä tuli uusi komentaja koko sotatoimille ( jollaista ei aiemmin ollut ) ja hänelle annettaan "puhdas pöytä" kun Khersonista peräydytään ja saadaan vaikeasta tilanteesta resurssit vapautettua. Eli Surovikille "sankarin" tai syntipukin viittaa tarjolla.
Isoalaviiva
Majuri
Panssari Salama
Respected Leader
Ukrainan sodan pitkittyessä sodasta tulee myös sotateollisen kapasiteetin sota. Länsi ei ole vielä täysin herännyt muutokseen, jossa sodat eivät enää ole rajoitettuja täsmäaseiden sotaa, vaan laajaa teollista sotaa, kirjoittaa @warinthefuture.
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Thread by @WarintheFuture on Thread Reader App
@WarintheFuture: The reality here is that the West is saying that they don’t wish to step up military production to any great extent because of the cost. Meanwhile, the Russians are beginning to mobilise their indus...…
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John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Laitetaan tänne havaintoihin. Toverin kommennti on hyvä-
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Lennokki kuvasi rajun rynnäkön ja lähitaistelun - "Itse en noin räväkästi hyökkäisi" | Verkkouutiset
Lennokki kuvasi rajun rynnäkön ja lähitaistelun - "Itse en noin räväkästi hyökkäisi" | Verkkouutiset
www.verkkouutiset.fi
Nuijamies
Kapteeni
Vähän tulee mieleen, että alkoholilla saattoi olla osuutta asiaan. "Perskele Jätkät. Nyt mennään vetää ryssää turpaan! ". No onneksi taisivat selvitä tappioitta.Laitetaan tänne havaintoihin. Toverin kommennti on hyvä-
Lennokki kuvasi rajun rynnäkön ja lähitaistelun - "Itse en noin räväkästi hyökkäisi" | Verkkouutiset
Lennokki kuvasi rajun rynnäkön ja lähitaistelun - "Itse en noin räväkästi hyökkäisi" | Verkkouutiset
Antares
Respected Leader
Otetaan tänne talteen, käyttäjä APCR laittoi tämän alunperin Ukrainan sodan seuranta -ketjuun, hänen kuvaus:
Todella, todella pitkä QA hostomelin taistelusta ja ylipäätään sodan alusta. Haastatellaan Omega-yksikön luutnanttia.
Suora linkki haastatteluun:
https://teletype.in/@tysknip/HostomelEN#HkOT
MUOKKAUS: vahva suositus lukea koko artikkeli, huomattavan tarkasti kerrottu ja sisältää myös havaintoja vihollisen toiminnasta joka oli ammattimaisempaa kuin mitä äkkiseltään luulisi (ainakin VDV:n ja helikopterien osalta Hostomelissa sekä osa erikoisjoukoista).
Lainaan siitä pätkän tähän alle, käsittelee kentän taistelujen aikaan havaittuja ongelmia. Lisäksi lainasin alle muita minun mielenkiinnon napanneita kommentteja ja yksityiskohtia:
Todella, todella pitkä QA hostomelin taistelusta ja ylipäätään sodan alusta. Haastatellaan Omega-yksikön luutnanttia.
The Only Easy Day Was Yesterday. Hostomel. Special Unit "Omega"
Suora linkki haastatteluun:
https://teletype.in/@tysknip/HostomelEN#HkOT
MUOKKAUS: vahva suositus lukea koko artikkeli, huomattavan tarkasti kerrottu ja sisältää myös havaintoja vihollisen toiminnasta joka oli ammattimaisempaa kuin mitä äkkiseltään luulisi (ainakin VDV:n ja helikopterien osalta Hostomelissa sekä osa erikoisjoukoista).
Lainaan siitä pätkän tähän alle, käsittelee kentän taistelujen aikaan havaittuja ongelmia. Lisäksi lainasin alle muita minun mielenkiinnon napanneita kommentteja ja yksityiskohtia:
The number one problem that arose in the defence of Hostomel was communication. Unfortunately, National Guard radios operate on high frequencies, we had Motorola, Harris, in general we had a mixed type of radios. The SOF used Harris's exclusively, while units 3018 and 3027 only used Motorola. There were very serious difficulties with communication for obvious reasons. And initially there were attempts of friendly fire, but fortunately because of the experience and professionalism of some units it was possible to avoid casualties among the cooperating units of the 200s and 300s. The second problem is the low supply of air defence equipment. ZU-23-2 had no ammo and had to be rearmed later, and the conscripts got ammo boxes from some stash, and anti-aircraft gunners urgently rearmed them – well, this is ridiculous. MANPADS were only available to 3018, that is, it took time to first find them, then they were brought into fighting position – well... it was hard enough, let's just say. Regarding defence: there's a lot of people claiming sole participation in the defence of Hostomel airport. There were many units involved in the defence of Antonov airport, and it's kind of hushed up.
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I would further add to the disadvantages the lack of air defence equipment in sufficient quantities. In fact, there was a situation where, by some miracle, MANPADs were not in our vehicles when we left for Hostomel, because we were told that "guys, you shouldn't take them, everything is there" - this was the first task 200 I received during this war, that is, in the first hours I received task 200, a dumb task that could not be accomplished without these MANPADs. The third problem was that the enemy reached Hostomel airport very quickly with minimal casualties along the way. Yes, the AA autocannons were deployed: for example, at Mezhigir'ya there were several ZU-23-2 squads, MANPADS operators were deployed, and for some reason something went wrong, to put it mildly. I cannot say exactly what happened there because I was not personally present there and only rumours reached me as it all happened, but in fact the situation was such that the air defence did not manage to repel the airborne troops to the full extent, i.e. the enemy was not eliminated in volumes sufficient to terminate the operation. So we had what we had: the landing at Hostomel, the first hours of the battle (up to 12 pm) and then we got what we had. If there were ZU-23-2s, they would have torn those helicopters to pieces at such an altitude, most likely, if there was a satisfactory density of fire and a sufficient number of anti-aircraft guns. Unfortunately, the exact route was unknown, so there were probably no AAs there. MANPADs were used in Hostomel – to a limited extent, but they were used. In fact, MANPADs proved quite effective against helicopters, including the attack helicopters Ka-52. It is a good enough thing for countering low-flying, medium-speed targets, and one of the main lessons of this war is that MANPADs have to be necessarily present in the companies, whatever company they may be.
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Our major mistakes in some sense overlap with the Russians, i.e. we have underestimated them, we have made very big mistakes in timing, because we were expecting the enemy on February 23rd, nothing happened on the 23rd and accordingly what? Everybody relaxed. And on the 24th everything fucked up. That's how unpleasant the situation was. The organisation of communication also left much to be desired, in the first days cooperation was organised badly, because there were very frequent cases of friendly fire, getting hit by their own and enemy artillery shells, general confusion and, so to say, slow transfer of intelligence, orders, combat orders from the HQ or from the higher headquarters to the bottom, because there were situations where the lack of communication and so on (Starlink terminals were not available yet in sufficient quantity) operational transfer of information was complicated. Another such significant problem was that some units were de jure combat-ready but de facto there was nothing – this was more about the National Guard.
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I would further add to the disadvantages the lack of air defence equipment in sufficient quantities. In fact, there was a situation where, by some miracle, MANPADs were not in our vehicles when we left for Hostomel, because we were told that "guys, you shouldn't take them, everything is there" - this was the first task 200 I received during this war, that is, in the first hours I received task 200, a dumb task that could not be accomplished without these MANPADs. The third problem was that the enemy reached Hostomel airport very quickly with minimal casualties along the way. Yes, the AA autocannons were deployed: for example, at Mezhigir'ya there were several ZU-23-2 squads, MANPADS operators were deployed, and for some reason something went wrong, to put it mildly. I cannot say exactly what happened there because I was not personally present there and only rumours reached me as it all happened, but in fact the situation was such that the air defence did not manage to repel the airborne troops to the full extent, i.e. the enemy was not eliminated in volumes sufficient to terminate the operation. So we had what we had: the landing at Hostomel, the first hours of the battle (up to 12 pm) and then we got what we had. If there were ZU-23-2s, they would have torn those helicopters to pieces at such an altitude, most likely, if there was a satisfactory density of fire and a sufficient number of anti-aircraft guns. Unfortunately, the exact route was unknown, so there were probably no AAs there. MANPADs were used in Hostomel – to a limited extent, but they were used. In fact, MANPADs proved quite effective against helicopters, including the attack helicopters Ka-52. It is a good enough thing for countering low-flying, medium-speed targets, and one of the main lessons of this war is that MANPADs have to be necessarily present in the companies, whatever company they may be.
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Why do you think there were not enough air defence weapons in the potentially endangered areas? What prevented these locations from being reinforced?
— The problem is that the senior leadership did not really seriously consider the possibility of carrying out a real air assault on critical infrastructure such as military and civilian airfields, well, or a dual purpose. Accordingly, with this turned out such a fucking funny situation, I would say that the enemy knew that we were skeptical about such options and hit exactly where we expected, but not so seriously. But in addition the units of m/hr 3027 were responsible for the airfields, and there the staffing was mainly composed of conscripts, the number of contract servicemen was minimal. The enemy knew about the real state of things in the units which were responsible for protecting the airfield. They knew that 4th RRB was on rotation and was well aware of the conditions that had developed by the 24th February. Additionally, I believe that a very big blunder by the HQ was that the enemy was underestimated.-
Our major mistakes in some sense overlap with the Russians, i.e. we have underestimated them, we have made very big mistakes in timing, because we were expecting the enemy on February 23rd, nothing happened on the 23rd and accordingly what? Everybody relaxed. And on the 24th everything fucked up. That's how unpleasant the situation was. The organisation of communication also left much to be desired, in the first days cooperation was organised badly, because there were very frequent cases of friendly fire, getting hit by their own and enemy artillery shells, general confusion and, so to say, slow transfer of intelligence, orders, combat orders from the HQ or from the higher headquarters to the bottom, because there were situations where the lack of communication and so on (Starlink terminals were not available yet in sufficient quantity) operational transfer of information was complicated. Another such significant problem was that some units were de jure combat-ready but de facto there was nothing – this was more about the National Guard.
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How would you assess the performance of the self-propelled SAMs as well as the S-300 SAMs? At what point did air defence systems like the "Osa" and "Buk" start operating on the line of battle?
— Had it not been for the Buk, S-300 SAMs of various modifications, which were in the Vyshgorod anti-aircraft missile division, it would have been very, very bad, as the enemy would have had complete air superiority and they would have done whatever they wanted. Thanks to the fact that the S-300 SAM units were spread out beforehand, at first the enemy aviation could not achieve air superiority and provide support to the landing force that ended up in Hostomel. Their combination of Special Forces+aircraft did not work. "Osa" started to operate around the 25th when enemy aviation was operating on the Irpin-Guta-Mezhigorskoye line. At that time the Osa-AKM SAM system, as far as I know, shot down one Mi-8AMTSh. "Buk"s entered Kyiv somewhere on 27-28th, i.e. the enemy aviation action was almost nullified thanks to the fact that "Buk"/"Osa" appeared. So I want to say that the anti-aircraft missile systems, even though they were Soviet-made, played a pretty serious role in repelling air strikes and destroying cruise missiles and other types of weaponry.-
How did the Russians manage to get to the outskirts of Kyiv so quickly? What do you attribute it to?
— It is simple: they did not stop during the movement, they did not unfold the front line and did not prepare for prolonged battles. And we were bringing their communications and logistics to a collapse, so that we could use the advantage of firepower. There was no other way.-
What do you think about the use of ATGMs in February and March – both domestic- and foreign-made?
— The number and frequency of the use of ATGMs, I think, in this and subsequent periods is staggering. In every infantry unit it was mandatory to have at least a couple of anti-tank missile systems in some variation. We received the Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles on the evening of 26th. They were simply unloaded from the transport vehicle and told to use them to their full potential. They were used. The vast majority of the enemy's armored vehicle losses were the result of artillery and ATGM fire.-
How would you assess the level of assistance of the local population to the military?
— The level of interaction between the local population and the military was quite high. Indeed, if there was need in any equipment or someone needed a ride – locals provided it without too many questions. I appreciate it very much, it helped a lot and those people who remained in the occupied territories were providing information on the location of enemy's headquarters, high-tech equipment (electronic warfare, signals intelligence) and counter-battery radars which were of interest to certain structures. Back then, if you remember, both the SSU and the MDI (Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine) often published photos and technical descriptions of the vehicles they were interested in. It happened quite often and then these objects were pointed specifically – where they were located, where they were deployed and in 99.9% of cases this turned out to be true. The percentage of so-called false information was minimal.-
What were the tactics of using tanks in the conditions of the Kyiv Region geography?
— Tanks were used more as "assault guns". There were no tank duels as such in the Kyiv region, although the only instance when I personally observed a tank vs tank combat was in Gorenka, when a tank platoon of the 72nd brigade entered the village, and engaged two shoot-and-scooting T-72B3s from the enemy's side. The duel ended with our tankers hitting the seventy-two with synchronous fire from two firing positions on the opposite bank of the river – he, it turns out, was firing from the side of the glass factory, where they had a firing position. It was hit, there was no epic explosion with the turret blown off, but by the looks of it, the crew was either badly shell-shocked or some of the fire control system elements were damaged – in general, the tank was abandoned and it stood there until it was towed away the next morning. In general – tanks were used as assault guns, as infantry support, but they were not used as breakthrough vehicles. Basically, either BMPs or BMDs – both from our side and from the enemy's side – were mostly encountered. In the direction of Gorenka-Romanovka-Moshchun, our units mainly used wheeled APCs like those BTR-3Es (I have not seen BTR-4s, but as far as I know, they were there too). Vehicles were used in a very limited and very careful manner.-
What about the performance of regular Ukrainian and Russian artillery units? How would you assess their effectiveness?
— I have been in the middle of artillery duels: our crews of self-propelled artillery divisions, towed howitzers (if we are talking about 2A36 "Hyacinth-B"), mortar batteries have shown incredible efficiency and effectiveness. I can tell you from the example of a mortar battery in one of the military units of the National Guard: the guys very quickly learned how to fight, because before that it was mainly firing exercises and, let's say, they had minimal time to deploy – they arrived, fired, left. All this, together with a solid salvo against enemy positions took up to 15 minutes and the return fire came in about 20-25 minutes and then, quite askew – there was a large dispersion and even if the mortar men were on the spot, they would hardly be hit. Again, the mortar batteries from the other side were most likely "Vasilki" (82-mm gun-mortar) or regimental 120mm mortars, there was a wide scattering there. As for the work of large artillery (122, 152), they were firing quite densely, sometimes pretty accurately, but they could not get into a counter-battery fight with our units, because ours were faster, more accurate and, accordingly, the Russians tried to leave the position as quickly as possible, so there is no need to talk about the counter-battery. Although it was present at first. Roughly speaking, two weeks since we were stationed in Gorenka – they regularly played this biathlon there and fortunately our units in most cases won the artillery duel. So I think the effectiveness was extremely high.-
Is there an example of illogical actions?
— Stretching communications; send logistical convoys without escort, trucks only: convoys go in marching order, where our SRGs might operate, go without advance guard, without side patrols, i.e. the organization of movement of convoys was about zero. The leading patrol, the so-called forward outpost (which is found in battalion and bigger units), patrols (company and smaller) were very seldom met – all of this was very rarely encountered. In other words, the enemy messed up very basic elements of warfare. I do not know how their officers were trained and in what training institutions, but let's just say they would not have passed the exam.-
Were the remaining fortifications from the times of the Second World War, and in particular those of Kyiv Fortified Region used?
— Yes, the pillboxes were used as proper pillboxes with different types of armament and as command posts. Some of them were already in a bad condition, but the majority of them were still usable. They were actively used and it played to our advantage that we had such fortifications on our side.
Viimeksi muokattu:
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Nämä ensikäden kokemukset on aina lukemisen arvoisia. Ja epäilemättä uskoisin että myös suomalaiset ammattisotilaat lukevat näitä samoja päästäkseen kärryille ryssän taktiikoista ja osaamistasosta.
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Fransmannien miinoja.
YliKoo
Greatest Leader
Tuohon Puolaan iskeneeseen ohjukseen voisi soveltaa vanhaa afrikkalaismiesten sanontaa:
"Lyö aina vaimoasi, jos et tiedä miksi, niin vaimo kyllä tietää."
Eli ryssää pitää rankaista raskaimman jälkeen, olipa se syyllinen tai ei. Ei mene hukkaan. Ensimmäinen vaihe on tietenkin niin väkevä lisäys ilmatorjuntaan, että se ohjusten lähetteleminen loppuu.
"Lyö aina vaimoasi, jos et tiedä miksi, niin vaimo kyllä tietää."
Eli ryssää pitää rankaista raskaimman jälkeen, olipa se syyllinen tai ei. Ei mene hukkaan. Ensimmäinen vaihe on tietenkin niin väkevä lisäys ilmatorjuntaan, että se ohjusten lähetteleminen loppuu.
Satchel
Kapteeni
Tämä siviili-infraan iskeminen on kyllä nostanut esille ITn tarpeellisuuden. Sitä tarvitaan Suomessakin lisää. Maa on suuri ja lavetteja pitää olla riittävästi. Karua ajatella jos ryssä yrittäisi ottaa Suomen sähköverkon ja lämmitys laitokset pois pelistä. Ikävä kyllä perille tulisi paljon enemmän kuin Ukrainassa.
Kuinka paljon muuntamoita, linjoja ja voimalaitoksia voisi vahvistaa kestämään esim. Risteilyohjusten osumaa?
Kuinka paljon muuntamoita, linjoja ja voimalaitoksia voisi vahvistaa kestämään esim. Risteilyohjusten osumaa?
Jep. Ukraina on pinta-alaltaan kolmen Suomen kokoinen ja asukasluvultaan n. seitsenkertainen. Siksi maalejakin on siellä moninkertaisesti Suomeen verrattuna. Suomen siviili-infra olisi vastaavassa pommituksessa ottanut huomattavasti pahemmin osumaa.
Toki IT:llä suojattavia kohteita on vähemmän kuin Ukrainassa.
Sähkö ja rautatie-logistiikka pois ohjuksilla. Nuo voidaan perustella helposti sotilaskohteina. Jätetään käyttö- ja jätevesi pois, samoin kaukolämpö (tosin menevät varmaan sähkön kanssa samanaikaisesti). Ei isketä suoriin siviili- tai siviilihallinnonkohteisiin. Nämä hoidetaan kirurgintarkasti. Ja sotilaskohteisiin mielellään aluepommituksia rypäle-, napalmi- ja fosforiammuksille.
Edit.
Siis tietenkin mahdollisuuksien mukaan nuo sotilaskohteiden rypäle-/napalmi- ja fosforiammukset saavat olla älyammuksia.
Antares
Respected Leader
Otetaan tänne talteen "Ukrainan sodan seuranta" -ketjusta. Aina kun haastatellaan "käyttäjiä" niin minun kiinnostus herää. Linkki alkuperäiseen haastetteluun löytyy tästä twitter-ketjusta:
Twitter-ketjun teksti:
Suora linkki alkuperäiseen haastatteluun:
https://i-vin.info/news/dron-–-ce-y...yesh-u-pari-–-operator-bezpilotnika-3983.html
Artikkelin tekstin käännös:
08.11.2022 18:10
Drone operator Yevhen talked about the peculiarities of his work
A full-scale war in Ukraine is called a war of drones. After all, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are used everywhere: in reconnaissance, for adjusting fire, for combat purposes. Russia is now actively using Shahed kamikaze drones to attack our critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military is improving the available equipment in order to successfully fight the enemy and beat him on all fronts. I-VIN.INFO spoke with the operator of the R18 drone, Yevgeny, a member of the NGO "Aerozvidka" and found out what capabilities our drones have to effectively confront the enemy.
- At first I made copters myself, it was my hobby. And in 2015, he joined air reconnaissance. Eventually the war became more positional and I moved away from that. I saw, was aware of events, but did not actively engage. And before the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, we just agreed on a meeting at 8 o'clock on February 24 to coordinate all actions in case of war. And here it is necessary. And on the night of the 24th to the 25th, we worked in Gostomel. They bombed the paratroopers who landed there. We were very charged. We didn't have to say, "Guys, let's go." They offered help themselves. And since then we have been actively working all the time.
Do you usually need to be closer to the front lines?
- Yes, although we try to live in safe places, not where we work. For example, we live in Mykolaiv, but we travel further. It also takes time – it sometimes takes two hours to drive to the position. But closer than from Kyiv. A drone is not only a device that flies, it is a whole complex. Our main product is the R-18 bomber. We started back in 2016, and it was a scout, but it turned out to be so powerful that we realized: it can carry quite a lot of shells. And at first they tried to use it with infantry, but then they realized that it is much more effective to fire heavy equipment. And this is its main feature.
Why heavy equipment? Does it depend on the type of projectiles?
– Our R-18 contains three large armor-piercing cluster bombs. It is noteworthy that all military equipment in the Russian Federation is arranged in such a way that it has strong armor only in front and on the sides. And from above it is very thin and very impressive. If you still manage to get into the engine, then there are generally fireworks that can be seen from afar.
But can the enemy spot the drone and shoot it down? How do you manage to complete a combat mission and return the drone?
– It happens that our R-18s are shot down. I have lost two large drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. I lost one completely, and the other will return, but it was in such a condition that half of it needs to be replaced. No one believed that he would even be able to return with such damage. He was shot through one battery and caught fire in the air. After that, they started shooting at him even harder. It all happened at night and was clearly visible. And before that, he bombed them on a new BMP, some kind of cool one, with thermal imagers. That's why they poured fire on him like that. The motor was shot, after which the battery burned and fell off. It weighs a lot, and the drone would not be able to carry it. At first, they thought that it would not last long. Then they saw that he could, but he would sit in a gray zone and have to go there and return. But he was able to fly straight to the launch site. We planted him. Afterwards they joked
But the threat is not only for the drone, but also for the operator?
- Of course. But sometimes you realize that you worry more about the drone than about yourself. When the shelling starts and you, in a good way, need to lie down somewhere in a trench, and you have a drone in the air. And you wait for him to come back. You take a risk, because his loss is very painful financially. Honestly, and morally, it is already like a comrade in arms who works with you in pairs.
And silent drones are too small and will not be able to carry projectiles?
- If he is small, he will not be able to fly far. These are suitable for cleaning. When the military enters a city and needs to see what's around the corner, behind the fence. Small drones like this help. And our drones, from which we bomb, fly 10 kilometers deep. There are planes that fly 30 kilometers. And the deeper they fly, the greater the possibility of losing them, because the Russian air defense system works. And if you have to look at warehouses in Crimea, it is almost unreal. If the drone is as big as "Bayraktar", it is very clearly visible, even if it flies high, then air defense can still see it and not spare the missile. By the way, the Russians do not even spare very expensive missiles, which are ten times more expensive than that drone. And they shout. We have this opinion that they simply make a report after that that they shot down "Bayraktar" or something else.
Can drones be targeted not only by missiles, but also by electronic warfare (EW)? Is there anything that can be opposed to this?
- When we manufacture new products, we work with a view to radio frequencies, to anti-REBs. And we bypass the use of EW tactically and technologically. There are problems with this, of course, if there is a WB machine, then we do not work there. Let's put it this way: it makes the job more difficult, but not impossible.
If we compare that war and this one: how much more technological is the current one?
- The war is the same in our country, but in 2014-2015 the use of drones was much less. Now there are a lot of different drones. But it is worth remembering that the horde cannot be destroyed by quantity, it must be destroyed by quality.
We will remind you that two Shaheds were shot down over Vinnytsia.
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Photos provided by Aerorozovdka NGO
Twitter-ketjun teksti:
QUICK THREAD based on an interview in an article below with an operator of a Ukrainian heavy R-18 multirotor drone. Main points below:
"Our main product is the R-18 bomber. We started back in 2016, and it was a scout, but it turned out to be so powerful that we realized: it can carry quite a lot of shells."
"And at first it was used against infantry, but then the operators realized that it is much more effective to strike heavy equipment. And this is now its main feature."
"Our R-18 drone carries three large armor-piercing cluster bombs. It is noteworthy that most Russian military equipment is built with strong armor only in front and on the sides. And from above the armor it is very thin..."
"Sometimes our R-18s are shot down. I have lost two large drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. I lost one completely, and the other flew back, but it was in such a condition that half of it needed to be replaced."
"But the threat is not only for the drone, but also for the operator? Of course. But sometimes you realize that you worry more about the drone than about yourself. When the shelling starts and you need to lie down somewhere in a trench, and you have a drone in the air..."
"...and you wait for the drone to come back. You take a risk, because its loss is very painful financially. Honestly, and morally, it is already like a comrade in arms who works with you in pairs."
"What about small drones that do not carry projectiles? If it is small, it will not be able to fly far. These are suitable for observation, when the military enters a city and needs to see what's around the corner, behind the fence. Small drones can help."
"And our drones, from which we bomb, fly 10 kilometers deep, and the deeper they fly, the greater the possibility of losing them, because the Russian air defense system works."
"By the way, the Russians don't spare very expensive missiles, which can be ten times more expensive than a large drone. We have this opinion that they simply make a report saying they shot down a "Bayraktar" or something else. And they get a medal for that..."
"When we manufacture new products, we consider radio frequencies and anti-EW concepts. We bypass the enemy EW tactically and technologically - if there is an EW system, then we do not fly there. Let's put it this way: it makes the job more difficult, but not impossible."
"In the 2014-2015 war, the use of drones was much less. Now there are a lot of different drones. But it is worth remembering that the (enemy) cannot be destroyed by quantity, it must be destroyed by quality."
"Our main product is the R-18 bomber. We started back in 2016, and it was a scout, but it turned out to be so powerful that we realized: it can carry quite a lot of shells."
"And at first it was used against infantry, but then the operators realized that it is much more effective to strike heavy equipment. And this is now its main feature."
"Our R-18 drone carries three large armor-piercing cluster bombs. It is noteworthy that most Russian military equipment is built with strong armor only in front and on the sides. And from above the armor it is very thin..."
"Sometimes our R-18s are shot down. I have lost two large drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. I lost one completely, and the other flew back, but it was in such a condition that half of it needed to be replaced."
"But the threat is not only for the drone, but also for the operator? Of course. But sometimes you realize that you worry more about the drone than about yourself. When the shelling starts and you need to lie down somewhere in a trench, and you have a drone in the air..."
"...and you wait for the drone to come back. You take a risk, because its loss is very painful financially. Honestly, and morally, it is already like a comrade in arms who works with you in pairs."
"What about small drones that do not carry projectiles? If it is small, it will not be able to fly far. These are suitable for observation, when the military enters a city and needs to see what's around the corner, behind the fence. Small drones can help."
"And our drones, from which we bomb, fly 10 kilometers deep, and the deeper they fly, the greater the possibility of losing them, because the Russian air defense system works."
"By the way, the Russians don't spare very expensive missiles, which can be ten times more expensive than a large drone. We have this opinion that they simply make a report saying they shot down a "Bayraktar" or something else. And they get a medal for that..."
"When we manufacture new products, we consider radio frequencies and anti-EW concepts. We bypass the enemy EW tactically and technologically - if there is an EW system, then we do not fly there. Let's put it this way: it makes the job more difficult, but not impossible."
"In the 2014-2015 war, the use of drones was much less. Now there are a lot of different drones. But it is worth remembering that the (enemy) cannot be destroyed by quantity, it must be destroyed by quality."
Suora linkki alkuperäiseen haastatteluun:
https://i-vin.info/news/dron-–-ce-y...yesh-u-pari-–-operator-bezpilotnika-3983.html
Artikkelin tekstin käännös:
"A DRONE IS LIKE A COMRADE IN ARMS THAT YOU WORK WITH" - A DRONE OPERATOR
Tetyana Shcherbatiuk, Ruslana Sivak08.11.2022 18:10
Drone operator Yevhen talked about the peculiarities of his work
A full-scale war in Ukraine is called a war of drones. After all, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are used everywhere: in reconnaissance, for adjusting fire, for combat purposes. Russia is now actively using Shahed kamikaze drones to attack our critical infrastructure. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian military is improving the available equipment in order to successfully fight the enemy and beat him on all fronts. I-VIN.INFO spoke with the operator of the R18 drone, Yevgeny, a member of the NGO "Aerozvidka" and found out what capabilities our drones have to effectively confront the enemy.
- At first I made copters myself, it was my hobby. And in 2015, he joined air reconnaissance. Eventually the war became more positional and I moved away from that. I saw, was aware of events, but did not actively engage. And before the full-scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, we just agreed on a meeting at 8 o'clock on February 24 to coordinate all actions in case of war. And here it is necessary. And on the night of the 24th to the 25th, we worked in Gostomel. They bombed the paratroopers who landed there. We were very charged. We didn't have to say, "Guys, let's go." They offered help themselves. And since then we have been actively working all the time.
Do you usually need to be closer to the front lines?
- Yes, although we try to live in safe places, not where we work. For example, we live in Mykolaiv, but we travel further. It also takes time – it sometimes takes two hours to drive to the position. But closer than from Kyiv. A drone is not only a device that flies, it is a whole complex. Our main product is the R-18 bomber. We started back in 2016, and it was a scout, but it turned out to be so powerful that we realized: it can carry quite a lot of shells. And at first they tried to use it with infantry, but then they realized that it is much more effective to fire heavy equipment. And this is its main feature.
Why heavy equipment? Does it depend on the type of projectiles?
– Our R-18 contains three large armor-piercing cluster bombs. It is noteworthy that all military equipment in the Russian Federation is arranged in such a way that it has strong armor only in front and on the sides. And from above it is very thin and very impressive. If you still manage to get into the engine, then there are generally fireworks that can be seen from afar.
But can the enemy spot the drone and shoot it down? How do you manage to complete a combat mission and return the drone?
– It happens that our R-18s are shot down. I have lost two large drones since the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. I lost one completely, and the other will return, but it was in such a condition that half of it needs to be replaced. No one believed that he would even be able to return with such damage. He was shot through one battery and caught fire in the air. After that, they started shooting at him even harder. It all happened at night and was clearly visible. And before that, he bombed them on a new BMP, some kind of cool one, with thermal imagers. That's why they poured fire on him like that. The motor was shot, after which the battery burned and fell off. It weighs a lot, and the drone would not be able to carry it. At first, they thought that it would not last long. Then they saw that he could, but he would sit in a gray zone and have to go there and return. But he was able to fly straight to the launch site. We planted him. Afterwards they joked
But the threat is not only for the drone, but also for the operator?
- Of course. But sometimes you realize that you worry more about the drone than about yourself. When the shelling starts and you, in a good way, need to lie down somewhere in a trench, and you have a drone in the air. And you wait for him to come back. You take a risk, because his loss is very painful financially. Honestly, and morally, it is already like a comrade in arms who works with you in pairs.
And silent drones are too small and will not be able to carry projectiles?
- If he is small, he will not be able to fly far. These are suitable for cleaning. When the military enters a city and needs to see what's around the corner, behind the fence. Small drones like this help. And our drones, from which we bomb, fly 10 kilometers deep. There are planes that fly 30 kilometers. And the deeper they fly, the greater the possibility of losing them, because the Russian air defense system works. And if you have to look at warehouses in Crimea, it is almost unreal. If the drone is as big as "Bayraktar", it is very clearly visible, even if it flies high, then air defense can still see it and not spare the missile. By the way, the Russians do not even spare very expensive missiles, which are ten times more expensive than that drone. And they shout. We have this opinion that they simply make a report after that that they shot down "Bayraktar" or something else.
Can drones be targeted not only by missiles, but also by electronic warfare (EW)? Is there anything that can be opposed to this?
- When we manufacture new products, we work with a view to radio frequencies, to anti-REBs. And we bypass the use of EW tactically and technologically. There are problems with this, of course, if there is a WB machine, then we do not work there. Let's put it this way: it makes the job more difficult, but not impossible.
If we compare that war and this one: how much more technological is the current one?
- The war is the same in our country, but in 2014-2015 the use of drones was much less. Now there are a lot of different drones. But it is worth remembering that the horde cannot be destroyed by quantity, it must be destroyed by quality.
We will remind you that two Shaheds were shot down over Vinnytsia.
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Photos provided by Aerorozovdka NGO