Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset

Kuuntelinpa tässä ukrainalaisia, sodan alussa tehtyjä kappaleita. Niitä oli ryyditetty videomateriaalilla alkupäivistä. Huomasin miettiväni, kuinka valtava muutos noiden kuvien ja tämän hetken välillä on. Ukrainassa on todellakin käynyt talvisodan ihme, tai vielä suurempi Ukrainan ihme. Talvisodan lopulla Suomen armeija oli romahtamispisteessä ja kulutettu, Ukrainan armeija on vahvempi kuin koskaan itsenäisyytensä aikana. Polttopulloja heittelevistä siviileistä mekanisoituihin taisteluosastoihin, Bayraktareista Himarseihin, ällitälleistä Bradleyhin.

Elämme historiaa. Slava Ukraini!

 
Bmpd-blogia ylläpitävä venäläinen Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) on julkaissut muutama päivä sitten arvionsa Ukrainan sodan vaikutuksesta eri teknologioihin sekä aselajeihin (artikkeli julkaistu 25.4.2023). LÄHDE

Lainaan alle artikkelin tekstin kokonaisuudessaan, Google Translate -käännös venäjästä englanniksi:

Prospects for Russian military-technical cooperation in the light of a special military operation

bmpd
April 25th, 11:08 pm

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4689552.html

Prospects for Russian military-technical cooperation in the light of a special military operation

bmpd
April 25th, 11:08 pm

Despite all the military-political cataclysms of recent times, the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) continues its activities, including in its main profile, conducting analytical and research work in the field of military-technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign countries, as well as in relation to the global arms and military equipment market as a whole. Readers are offered some fragments of one of the latest CAST studies with conclusions regarding the prospects for military-technical cooperation between Russia in the light of a special military operation in Ukraine - both in terms of analyzing changes in the structure of demand in the global defense market and possible Russian proposals in this market, and regarding forecasts regarding the functioning of the very mechanism of Russia's military-technical cooperation in the current stressful military conditions.

T90M
Tank T-90M "model 2022" with additional improvised field improvements as part of one of the units of the Russian Armed Forces in the zone of a special military operation in Ukraine, April 2023 (c) social networks


The Special Military Operation (SVO) of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine has become the main factor in the domestic and foreign political situation for Russia, and the influence of the SVO on the situation in and around the country will only grow. The NWO became the largest conventional war on the European continent after 1945 and a radical test of the views of the leadership and theorists of the world's leading armed forces on modern warfare that existed before. The NMD is accompanied by the widespread use of the most modern types of weapons, as well as weapons that until recently formed the basis of the technical equipment of the armies of the leading states of the West and East. This thus provides an unprecedented test of real combat experience of the entire “cut” of weapons and military equipment (WME) of the main military powers that have entered service over the past more than half a century.

In the aggregate, the SVO thus has and will have in the future the most profound impact on the military development of all significant countries and, accordingly, on the world market for military products (MPs). This will lead, according to our forecasts, to the most serious and sometimes radical changes in the structure of arms and military equipment purchases, and thus, the structure of demand for it on the international market.

A feature of the hostilities during the NMD was the fairly rapid exhaustion of the parties' ability to conduct maneuvering combat and the transition to positional combat operations, which led to talk about a return to a "positional dead end" and "material battles" in the spirit of the First World War. It is not yet clear to what extent this trend is characteristic of the entire current stage of modern military affairs or reflects the specifics of military operations in Ukraine. It should be pointed out that the elements of inclination towards positional warfare instead of maneuver warfare have been repeatedly observed in the course of local conflicts of recent decades, especially if one side does not have a cardinal numerical and/or technological superiority (the most striking example was the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988).

One of the main reasons for this trend is the growing vulnerability of the tank on the battlefield, which has been observed continuously since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, which has ultimately led to the fact that the tank has now actually lost the importance of the main means of breakthrough and maneuver, and, accordingly, has deprived maneuverable combat operations of the main technical support. It is not yet possible to judge whether the growth of tank protection (primarily through the introduction of active protection systems) will radically change this situation. It can be assumed that this will stimulate intensive work to improve tanks and intensify the purchase of the most modern and advanced tank platforms. The same can be said about the class of light armored vehicles, in which promising platforms will shift in terms of protection and other characteristics (and cost) to advanced tanks.

On the whole, the NVO showed the decisive role of the ground forces in armed struggle, since only the army is capable of occupying and holding territory. At the same time, the use of ground forces requires a large amount of weapons and military equipment and leads to the consumption of huge amounts of ammunition. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that precision-guided weapons and precision-guided munitions are an effective alternative to the massive and costly use of unguided munitions, since the latter is rather a consequence of the low real military-technical level of both warring parties. In this regard, one can already observe the beginning of a boom in demand for artillery and rocket-artillery systems with high-precision ammunition and having an increased range, and on the other hand, a return to the mass mobilization stockpiling of all types of ammunition.

Combat experience demonstrates the importance of mass saturation of troops with tactical-level guided weapons - from modern anti-tank systems to light loitering ammunition. An important promising weapon could be a tactical missile in the spirit of NLOS and ALAS with a command guidance mode and increased range, which, in principle, can take on a significant part of the role of artillery.

An important aspect of the SVO has become the digitalization and “networking” of the battlefield, which provides unprecedented opportunities for reconnaissance, target designation, control and fire destruction in real time. The massive use of global data transmission systems such as Starlink made it possible to make a "universal" network connection of combat units (up to machines and crews), units and units. This will lead to a further sharp acceleration in the dynamics of the introduction of digital automated control systems and control and communication systems in the armies based on global Internet services, both military and "dual-use".

In the combat use of aviation, the Northern Military District demonstrated the high efficiency of ground-based air defense systems, which led to the actual paralysis of large-scale military aviation operations above the combat zone and in the depths of enemy territory. On the other hand, this experience also pointed to effective ways to neutralize this situation, primarily through the widespread use of high-precision weapons, including increased range. Thus, we can expect both an increase in demand for modern types of air defense systems, and an explosive introduction and purchase of high-precision aircraft weapons of the entire spectrum of application and range. At the same time, the range of weapons in many cases looks like a critical characteristic. NWO signed the final verdict on unguided aircraft weapons.

Combat experience has emphasized the importance of the survivability of aircraft platforms when operating in "contested" airspace, which should be achieved both by improving the onboard defense systems and by increasing stealth. In this regard, the opinion of US Air Force specialists seems important that the current events have demonstrated the obsolescence of all fourth-generation combat aircraft, and that only fifth-generation stealth fighters are able to operate effectively in the face of serious opposition from a modern enemy. Thus, one can expect (and is already observing) an intensification of the purchase of fifth-generation combat aircraft (and, in the future, the sixth generation) and the replacement of fourth-generation platforms by them.

The explosive increase in the scale of the use of UAVs, especially small ones, demonstrated during the NWO, should also find serious development in the form of the creation of a virtually new huge segment of the market for small UAVs for special military purposes (now almost all of this segment is occupied by commercial devices) and small loitering munitions, which are finally turning into regular individual and group weapons of units.

In turn, countermeasures for UAVs of all classes are becoming another colossal rapidly developing market segment. At the same time, there is also a rapid evolution of air defense systems from the classic "anti-aircraft" fight to the fight against UAVs and loitering ammunition, as well as to the tasks of countering rocket and artillery weapons. This poses serious challenges for the development of air defense systems, not only in terms of fire capabilities, but also the cost of hitting a target.

The use of the fleet in the NMD was limited, but demonstrated the decisive nature of coastal "access prevention" missile systems in coastal waters and closed seas, as well as the high importance of aviation. This, in our opinion, raises cardinal conceptual questions regarding the very principles of naval construction in such seas and waters. In essence, we can say that it makes sense to build only such ship platforms that have real combat stability and survivability in such an environment due to powerful air defense and missile defense weapons (that is, ships of a class no less than a “large frigate”).

At sea, the further development of unmanned strike platforms, both surface and air and (in the future) underwater, was shown, which in the future, apparently, will replace, in principle, all the "small" and light forces of the fleet.

Thus, it can be pointed out that the experience of combat operations in the NMD should lead to the activation of the global market for ground weapons, air defense systems, long-range high-precision missile weapons (with ranges from operational-tactical to potentially strategic) and unmanned vehicles. Sales of combat aircraft will shift to the segment of fifth-generation fighters, which, given their high cost, will still provide a large share of the supply of aircraft platforms in the global arms and military equipment market.

Assessing the political prospects of Russia's military-technical cooperation in the light of the NMD, one can only state that they are completely dependent on the course of hostilities and, accordingly, on Russia's relations with the West in this context. It can be assumed that, having been unable to achieve militarily the maximalist goals of the NVO in Ukraine proclaimed on February 24, 2022, the Russian supreme power is now looking for ways out of the conflict by preserving and consolidating the territories occupied by now and forcing Ukraine and its Western sponsors to a truce based on territorial "status quo". To do this, Russia needs to effectively extinguish any attempts by the Ukrainian side to recapture significant occupied territories and it is necessary to finally transfer the conflict to a positional phase similar to the positional period of the Korean War in 1951-1953, at the same time demonstrating to the West that any realistically possible Western efforts to provide military support to Ukraine will not lead to a serious change in the existing “status quo”. Taking into account the Russian electoral cycle, the Russian authorities will apparently try to end the “hot” phase of the conflict on these grounds by February 2024 in this way.

Such a scenario can be considered the most realistic and optimistic for Moscow today. In this case, it is possible to achieve some kind of truce at the front by the spring of 2024, followed by a “transition period” phase, when negotiations will be held on some kind of peace settlement, an integral part of which will be the gradual lifting of at least part of Western sanctions on Russia. Such a “transitional” period can be estimated optimistically in terms of a duration of about a year, that is, until spring-mid-2025.

It should be noted that in this period, the Russian side will continue to face both a shortage of military equipment for delivery abroad (since most of the weapons and military equipment produced in the country will be directed to the accelerated restoration of the potential of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during a possible truce), and accelerated adaptation systems for the work of military-technical cooperation under conditions of restrictions (new forms of payment and delivery routes, etc.).

After that, we can expect a “post-crisis” period of up to three years, when the process of lifting some of the sanctions, easing some of the currency, banking and transport restrictions, etc. will begin. In any case, even under the most optimistic scenarios, we can expect some normalization of the activity of the whole MTC of Russia not earlier than 2027-2028. Only by that time, at best, will it become possible for a significant amount of weapons and military equipment to be delivered abroad, including new models created based on the experience of military operations in the NMD, and the effective effect of a possible easing of sanctions will also manifest itself. Possibly, the political pressure of the West on the customers of the Russian arms and military equipment will also weaken.

It should be noted that all these ideas are based on hypothetical scenarios that are optimistic for the current Russian authorities, the feasibility of which is not obvious. A more pessimistic scenario assumes the continuation of intense hostilities in Ukraine at least until the winter-spring of 2025. In general, in our opinion, it is still most likely that the West will not agree to any serious settlement with the Russian Federation without the withdrawal of the Russian side in Ukraine to the line on February 24, 2022, and this circumstance will be decisive for the dynamics of both the conflict itself and attempts to get out of it.

-

Kuvien tekstien konekäännökset, alkuperäiset kuvat niiden alla:

1682606975422.png
Changing the structure of demand in the global defense market in the light of the experience of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine (c) CAST



1682607008111.png
Possible scenarios for the duration of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine and the processes of post-crisis settlement (c) CAST

-

Alkuperäiset kuvat ilman käännöstä:

slide 1
Changing the structure of demand in the global defense market in the light of the experience of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine (c) CAST


slide 2
Possible scenarios for the duration of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine and the processes of post-crisis settlement (c) CAST
 
Toinen bmpd-blogin tuore artikkeli, jossa lainataan kahta yhdysvaltalaista artikkelia. Tässä käsitellään aihetta, jonka mukaan Venäjä olisi yrittänyt käyttää 14Ts227 Tobol -nimistä järjestelmää Starlink-yhteyksien häirintään (artikkeli julkaistu 20.4.2023:. LÄHDE

Toki "tiedot" onnistumisesta, epäonnistumisesta ja muista tuloksista ovat salaisia, mutta tässä hyvää taustatietoa kyseisestä rakennelmasta.

According to US intelligence, Russia uses Tobol complexes to counter the Starlink system

bmpd

April 20th, 11:17 pm

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/4688329.html

According to US intelligence, Russia uses Tobol complexes to counter the Starlink system

bmpd

April 20th, 11:17 pm


The Washington Post newspaper in the article by Alex Horton “Russia tests secretive weapon to target SpaceX's Starlink in Ukraine. Moscow's bid to sever Ukrainian forces' internet access is more sophisticated than previously known, leaked document shows." more sophisticated than previously known"), Continuing the topic of studying US military intelligence briefings leaked via the Discord social network, reports that, according to one of these intelligence documents, Russia is trying to use its 14Ts227 Tobol ground systems to interfere with the SpaceX Starlink satellite Internet service used by the Ukrainian armed forces, initially created mainly as a means of protecting the Russian satellite constellation from enemy electronic interference.

Tobol
Antenna system of the Russian ground-based space electronic warfare complex 14Ts227 "Tobol" at facility 8282/3 (NIP-13) in Ulan-Ude (Buryatia) (с) www.thespacereview.com


According to a classified US intelligence report obtained by The Washington Post, Russia's drive to block Ukrainian military access to the Internet by targeting the Starlink satellite service that billionaire Elon Musk has provided to Kiev since the early days of the war is more advanced than previously thought.

Moscow has been experimenting with its Tobol electronic warfare systems for months in an attempt to disrupt the data transmission of the Starlink system in Ukraine, according to a top-secret assessment that has not been released before.

The document, among a raft of confidential material leaked through the social networking site Discord, dates from March and does not indicate whether any of these Russian trials were successful. But the intelligence data is nonetheless striking, as it seems to confirm what observers previously only guessed: that a program supposedly designed to protect the Kremlin's satellites could also be used to attack satellites used by its adversaries.

SpaceX, the company that owns Starlink, declined to comment. Last spring, Musk briefly reported on the Kremlin's attempts to target the technology, tweeting in May that while Starlink has demonstrated its resilience to such "jamming and hacking" attempts, the Russians appear to have stepped up their efforts.

The Pentagon did not respond to questions about the leaked assessment. "These systems constitute an important layer in Ukraine's communications network," said Major Charlie Dietz, a spokesman for the US Department of Defense. He added that his agency's focus "remains focused on giving Ukrainians the satellite capabilities they need."

Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Konstantin Zhura said officials in Kyiv are aware of these Russian efforts and "are taking steps to neutralize them." The Russian Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.

Starlink has proven vital to the Ukrainian military, which rely on its small handheld terminals for battlefield communication and intelligence. Russian forces have succeeded in preventing Ukrainians from using other communications equipment, including radios and mobile phones, but satellite signals are harder to interfere with.

Last fall, Musk faced backlash from Ukrainian leaders after putting forward a plan to end the war that critics saw as overly favorable to Russia. Weeks later, the business mogul came under fire again when he threatened to cut emergency funding for the Starlink service [in Ukraine]. The reaction again forced him to quickly change course.

It is not clear whether the Starlink disruptions reported in Ukraine were the result of Russian experiments with Tobol complexes or other suppressive means used by Russian forces, such as the Tirada-2 system mounted on a vehicle chassis. Ukrainian forces reported disruptions in October as they advanced towards Russian positions during successful counter-offensives in the south and east. According to a report in the Financial Times newspaper, at the time, Ukrainian officials speculated that SpaceX had restricted Internet access in those areas to prevent the Russians from using the service.

Analysts have discovered at least seven Tobol complexes in Russia, all located near facilities used to track satellites, according to a report released this month by the Secure World Foundation (SWF), a private space security group. and stability. Some of these sites are centers for mobile jammers, analysts say.

According to the Safe World Foundation, satellite jamming can occur in two environments: in space, where it is aimed directly at satellites, and on the ground, where jamming can be aimed at [space communication] receivers. Interference generated in space, known as uplink jamming, mixes its signals with the original transmission, which distorts the information that all users of a particular satellite receive. According to Bart Hendrix, a researcher who closely followed the program, the Tobol complex almost certainly works this way.

The terrestrial method, known as downlink jamming, transmits the signal on the same frequency as the satellite, which prevents connected devices from receiving the normal signal. This method has a shorter range because it depends on how close the interferer is to the systems it intends to disrupt.

Musk said last year that a software patch helped overcome interference with Starlink terminals. It is not clear if this refers to downlink jamming. The Tobol complex is designed to interrupt the satellite signal itself on the way to the terminal.

The leaked document describes Russia's "ongoing military experiment in targeting the Russian Tobol-1 complex against Starlink satellite communications systems over Ukraine" and identifies three locations in Russia where such tests have taken place. The “probable center” where the interference was aimed, near Bakhmut in the eastern part of the Donetsk region of Ukraine, saw the most intense fighting this year.

The experiment, which began in late September 2022, was supposed to last 25 days, according to a US intelligence assessment, but more than five months have passed since the testing began and the leaked document was prepared for senior US officials. The briefing slide does not say why the experiment took so long, whether Russia encountered any problems, or whether the operation had the expected effect.

While Russia's deployment of Tobol complexes across the country may indicate that they are being used for defensive purposes, the three sites uncovered in the US intelligence assessment — one near Moscow, a site near Crimea, and another in Russia's western exclave of Kaliningrad — are the nearest objects to Ukraine, which makes them suitable for offensive operations. Their area of operation seems to cover the whole of Ukraine, said Brian Weeden, director of program planning for the Secure World Foundation.

“The public documentation that we have says that this is a defensive complex, since Tobol should be used to detect external sources trying to jam or interfere with Russian satellites. It has to analyze these interfering signals, and then transmit an oncoming signal that will try to nullify the interference, ”Wyden said.

"But if you can do that," he added, "you can probably use the same opportunities to interfere offensively with someone else's satellite."

About the program of the Tobol complex, referred to in Russian documents as 14Ts227, there are only weak hints and leaks in the public domain, and its capabilities remained a mystery for many years. The researchers say the program started about ten years ago.

Belgian amateur researcher Bart Hendrickx, whose study of Russian procurement and court documents provided most of the limited public information about the Tobol program, initially concluded that the system was defensive in nature, according to his 2020 analysis published by The Space Review". But further analysis, backed up by court documents describing "specialized space electronic attack systems," led to new revelations, and last year he predicted that Tobol could be used offensively.

Hendrix said in an interview that Starlink satellites pass low enough above the ground that Tobol could probably emit jamming signals at them. But problems remain.

“The problem with Starlink,” he said, “is that you have a lot of satellites there. It is quite difficult to drown them all or even a large number. However, Hendrix acknowledged that disrupting even some of them could help the Russian command by throwing Ukrainian troops into disarray.






On the part of bmpd, we point out that the well-known analyst of Russian military space systems, Bart Hendricks , mentioned in the article, dedicated part of his extensive material “Russia gears up for electronic warfare in space ” to the 14Ts227 Tobol complex (“Russia is preparing for electronic warfare in space”), published by The Space Review in November 2020. A Russian translation of this material was posted at the same timeon the Habr resource. We provide a fragment of this translation concerning the Tobol complex (note that in a number of places this translation does not look quite literate in technical terms, we have removed Hendrix's original references for the sake of reducing the volume).


Tobol: protecting Russian satellites from electronic attack

Another project related to the Russian electronic warfare program [in space] is called Tobol (the name of a river that flows through Russia and Kazakhstan), also designated 14Ts227. The infrastructure for this project, codenamed '8282', is being built at a number of satellite tracking facilities owned by Russia's so-called Command and Measurement Complex (CMC), administered by the Russian Ministry of Defense. The following Tobol facilities are mentioned in the publicly available documentation (the numbers of the satellite tracking facilities (NIP) where they are located, as well as the numbers of the military units operating these facilities are indicated): 8282/1:

in the area of the city of Shchelkovo (Moscow Region) (NIP-14 ) (military unit 26178)

8282/3: near Ulan-Ude (Republic of Buryatia) (NIP-13) (military unit 14129) 8282/4

: near Ussuriysk (Primorsky Krai) NIP-15) (military unit 14038)

8282/5: near Yeniseisk ( Siberia) (NIP-4) (military unit 14058)

8282/6: in the Pionersky district (Kaliningrad region) (NIP number unknown) (military unit 92626)

8282/7: near Armavir (Krasnodar Territory) (NIP number not known known) (military unit 20608)

Object 8282/2 does not have a sign in its documentation. However, some documents mention the construction of infrastructure for "Tobol" in the area of Krasnoznamensk (Moscow region) and Maloyarslavets (Kaluga region), referred to as 8282/OKR. Krasnoznamensk is home to the Titov Main Control Center for Test and Space Systems, the main control center for the Russian fleet of unmanned satellites. In Maloyarslavets (more precisely, in the nearby town of Kudinovo) there is a satellite tracking station NIP-8 (operated by military unit 34122).

None of the publicly available documents reveal anything about the exact purpose of "Tobol". However, the fact that the infrastructure is combined with satellite tracking means that it is aimed at protecting Russian satellites from electronic attacks, and not electronic attacks on foreign satellites.

An official document containing a list of military construction projects identifies 8282/7 as one of a series of "electronic warfare systems for space purposes." Tobol's general contractor is Russian Space Systems (RCS) from Moscow, the main company that plays a leading role in the development of equipment for satellite tracking stations [JSC Russian Corporation of Rocket and Space Instrumentation and Information Systems]. The state contract for what is called "Tobol-1" was signed between the Ministry of Defense and the RKS on May 3, 2012, but there are some indications that the project could have started earlier than this date. In some court documents, Tobol is also associated with two government contracts signed by two parties on December 30, 2013. Although at least one of them appears to was associated with general work on the Russian satellite ground control network during the period 2014-2016, and was not specifically associated with Tobol. As can be seen from various annual reports of the companies, the subcontractors of the RKS for Tobol are the Vladimir Design Bureau of Radio Communications (the general contractor of the Tirada-2 complex), the Special Technology Center (STC) and NPO PM-Razvitie, all three of which are involved in Russian electronic warfare program.

The construction contracts for most of the Tobol sites allow it to be determined that the work includes both the adaptation of existing buildings and the construction of new infrastructure. The latter include the so-called "radio engineering positions" (RTP), which are part of the "stationary specialized complexes" (SSC). They consist of several parabolic antennas, with documentation for stations 8282/3 and 8282/5 indicating antenna diameters of 2, 7.3 and 9.1 meters. Also part of the new infrastructure are transformer substations and diesel power plants, presumably to power RTUs. A recent PowerPoint presentation that somehow ended up online provides an update on construction 8282/3 near Ulan-Ude and shows a site plan that allows the complex to be found on Google Earth.

Photographs of other sites do not show clear signs of construction work on the Tobol. This may indicate delays, but it is also possible that in some areas work is largely limited to adapting existing infrastructure and therefore difficult to capture on satellite imagery. Documents for sites near Pionersky and Armavir (8282/6 and 8282/7) describe that Tobol equipment is mobile, with some of them saying that equipment for 8282/6 will be deployed in conjunction with Pheasant and Varan ". These are the names of truck-mounted satellite tracking systems known to be based in both locations. The site near Pionersky is located in the immediate vicinity of the range 1511/2 of the Pathfinder electronic intelligence complex,

None of the publicly available documents reveal anything about the exact purpose of "Tobol". However, the fact that the infrastructure is combined with satellite tracking means that it is aimed at protecting Russian satellites from electronic attacks, and not electronic attacks on foreign satellites. Since electronic defense is seen as an integral part of electronic warfare, such a goal still fits the description of Tobol as a network of "electronic warfare complexes." At the Titov Main Control Center for Test and Space Systems near Krasnoznamensk, which, judging by the aforementioned PowerPoint presentation, plays a coordinating role in the Tobol project, there is an electronic warfare unit that deals with the electronic protection of both tracking stations and satellites in orbit .

One clue about the aims of the project comes from a Ph.D. thesis review published in 2013. It says that 14Ts227 has equipment for monitoring navigation satellite signals in order to protect them from "narrow-band interference." In particular, it is able to determine "the modulation of navigation signals with an accuracy of 90% at a signal-to-noise ratio of 30 decibels." The review was written by Vladimir Vatutin, who heads a department at the RKS and is listed in the PowerPoint presentation about site 8282/3 as Tobol's chief designer.

Over the years, Vatutin has co-authored several papers and patents that appear to be related to protecting satellites from electronic attacks. Some patents describe a set of terrestrial antennas that will be used to receive and suppress so-called "unauthorized signals" sent to satellites or relayed via satellites to the ground. They could use an effect known as tropospheric scatter, in which some of the energy of a signal passing through the troposphere is reflected back to Earth. In one proposal, unauthorized signals transmitted to the satellite would be picked up by a so-called "tropospheric station" and instantly analyzed to create interference signals that would be transmitted to the satellite to suppress the unauthorized signals.

In another scenario, unauthorized signals transmitted from the satellite to the ground would be identified by "monitoring stations", after which the tropospheric stations would transmit interference signals that reach the receivers after reflection from the troposphere and cancel the effect of unauthorized signals. The advantage of these seemingly cumbersome methods is that they eliminate the need to install anti-jamming systems on the satellites themselves. In the schematic representations of the proposed systems, GLONASS navigation satellites are depicted as targets of unauthorized signals, but they are not specifically mentioned in the accompanying patent descriptions and can only be used as an example. However, it is unclear whether there is any connection between Tobol and the systems presented in these patents.

Another sign that Tobol has something to do with electronic protection is contained in the RKS procurement plan for 2015, where the Russian abbreviation "electronic protection" (REZ) is associated with "radio technical positions" for something called 14Ts225 , which appears to be part of 14Ts227.

If the Tobol facilities are indeed designed to protect Russian satellites from electronic attack, they will only have to perform this task for satellites that are in the field of view of Russian ground stations, but will still be vulnerable to electronic attack from outside the country. This makes GLONASS high-orbit navigation satellites, as well as geostationary communications satellites, the only likely candidates for the role of electronic protection. In particular, Russian communications satellites could be targeted by America's top-secret Counter Communication System (CCS), a mobile space-based electronic warfare system that can be deployed around the world to jam enemy satellite communications. The first two variants ("blocks") of the CCS are believed to have been delivered in 2004. Last update, dubbed Block 10.2, it was officially announced as "the first offensive weapon system delivered to the US Space Force." The United States is also likely to have advanced systems to jam or spoof satellite navigation signals in a particular geographic area.

While it would seem that Tobol plays a defensive rather than an offensive role, Russian Space Systems is also investigating electronic attack systems. An article published in the company's corporate magazine last year [2019] (co-authored with Vatutin) discusses the possibility of using EW techniques to prevent optical and radar reconnaissance satellites from sending images to data relay satellites during their flight over foreign territory. This proposal reflects the growing interest in using electronic warfare systems to counter foreign intelligence assets. The post garnered enough attention to be picked up by several Russian media outlets earlier this year, after which it was removed from the RCC website.


Tobol1
Presentation of the construction scheme of facility 8282/3 of the Russian ground-based space electronic warfare complex 14Ts227 "Tobol" in Ulan-Ude (Buryatia) (c) www.thespacereview.com



Tobol2
GoogleEarth satellite image of the Russian ground-based space electronic warfare complex 14Ts227 "Tobol" at facility 8282/5 (NIP-4) near Yeniseisk (Krasnoyarsk Territory) (c) www.thespacereview.com
 
Otetaan talteen tämäkin, pitkä ja osin rönsyilevä artikkeli, nostona huomiot heidän high tec / low tech armeijastaan. Positiivinen lukukokemus myös koska jakaa ukrainalaisten uskoa voittoon, lukusuositus.

 
Talteen tämäkin, ootellaan notta mitä seuraa... Neljä arviota Kremlin drooni-iskusta

  1. Ukraina onnistui yllättämään tällä pikku iskulla
  2. Ukraina teki kuten yllä mutta FSB antoi tapahtua jotta voi eskaloida
  3. Venäläinen oppositio teki ja FSB ei tiennyt / ei kyennyt estämään, tätä ei tunnustettaisi ikinä
  4. Todennäköisin: Venäläinen false flag, jolla perustellaan kova eskalaatio, ja kirjoittaja Tom Nichols ei edes uskalla arvata mitä tämä voisi olla, koska eivät nytkään välitä ukrainalaisten siviileiden hengestä yhtään mitään:
In any case, faking a drone attack would fit into the long-standing Russian affinity for “false flag” operations. Though conspiracy theorists in the United States often trumpet unfounded claims of false flags, professional intelligence services do conduct such operations, and Moscow has been particularly fond of them all the way back to the Soviet period. The series of apartment bombings in Russia in 1999, for example, that became the pretext for escalation in Chechnya, were almost certainly orchestrated by the secret services (a possibility so disturbing that I and other Russia experts were loath to accept it—but which is now, in my view, undeniable). And in the past year, the Russians warned that the Ukrainians were going to unleash a “dirty bomb,” a ludicrous claim that even led China to give the Kremlin some stink eye for playing around with nuclear threats.

This drone strike looks like the same play, only without nuclear materials. A terrorist attack in the capital would be a pretext for the Russians to warn the world that this time, they’re really going to take the gloves off. Ukrainian officials are worried that this is exactly the Russian plan. Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Zelensky, told the BBC that the incident indicated Russia could be "preparing a large-scale terrorist provocation" in Ukraine. That’s a pretty chilling possibility, considering that the Russian campaign plan at this point already consists of indiscriminate war crimes.

 
Ylen artikkeli asepalvelusta välttelevästä. Ilmeisesti kuitenkin aikoinaan suorittanut asepalveluksen, kun sotilaspassi löytyy?

Ukraina kussee hieman omaan nilkkaan tuossa. Ei tuollaisia miehiä kannata lähettää rintamalle. Laittakoon vaikka Kiovaan varastomieheksi. Rintamalle tulijoita riittänee kuitenkin vielä vapaaehtoisista enemmän kuin on varustaa. Tiedottamisessa voisi korostaa, että jokaiselle löydetään paikka, eikä se 90% varmuudella ole lähelläkään etulinjaa. Vielä viime vuonna näihin aikoihin olisi ollut, mutta nyt tilanne on vakaampi.
 
Tuli tänään mieleen mahdollisuus elektronisen tiedustelun ja iskevien droonien yhdistämisestä. Eli elso laitteet etsivät niitä lähetinsignaaleja ja se tieto tuodaan datalinkkien kautta noiden lentävien pikkupaholaisten näytöille hiukan suodatettuna eli vain osoittaen karkeasti paikkoja, mistä signaaleja tulee. Droonit sitten tiedustelevat ne ja iskevät jos kohde varmistetaan sotilaalliseksi / riittävän arvokkaaksi. Samalla voidaan tehdä tulenjohtoa mikäli siihen kohteeseen tarvitaan enemmänkin voimaa.
Pääpointti olisi kuitenkin löytää johtopaikat, vihollisen droonien lennättäjät, viestikeskukset, tutkat, huoltohubit jne. vaivattomasti ja päästä aikaa ja akkuja tuhlaamatta vaikuttamaan kohteisiin.
 
Onko kiinteiden komentopaikkojen aika ohi, pohditaan artikkelissa.

Pikemminkin voi kysyä, onko liikkuvien komentopaikkojen aika ohi. Jos ilmasotaa voi johtaa satojen kilometrien päästä, niin miksei maasodankäyntiä? Moraalisiin asioihin en sitten ota kantaa, jos taistelua johdetaan toiselta laidalta maata tai manteretta.

Kenttäjohtamisessa hajauttaminen, ajoneuvojen määrän vähentäminen ja panssarointi saattaa auttaa taikka sitten ei. Vuolas bittivirta kulkee eetterissä joka tapauksessa ja herättää huomiota samalla kun hakeutuvia aseita vastaan ei meinaa riittää mikään ballistinen suojaus.

Siviili-infraan piiloutuminen on sitten kokonaan oma ratkaisunsa. Varmaankin liikkuva komentopaikka kannattaa mieluummin ajaa teollisuushallin sisään kuin avomaalle, niin paljastumisen kuin täsmällisen maalittamisenkin estämiseksi. Myös ajoneuvokalustoa voi pohtia tätä taustaa vasten - valkoinen Transporter menee paremmin vähäarvoisesta maalista (ambulanssi, kenttäkeittiö tms.) kuin maastokuorma-auto kontti päällä.
 
En ole jaksanut kahlata koko ketjua läpi, joten pahoittelut jos tästä on aiemmin keskusteltu. Muistan forkalta langan Antautumisen taito tjsp. Langassa keskusteltiin kannattaako sotilaallinen vastarinta lopettaa toivottomassa tilanteessa ihmishenkien säästämiseksi.

Ryssän toiminta Ukrainassa on tehnyt selväksi, ettei ryssälle kannata antautua ja lopettaa vastarintaa. Sotavankeja teloitetaan, kidutetaan ja raiskataan. Vallattujen alueiden siviilejä teloitetaan, kidutetaan, raiskataan ja pakkosiirretään. Ryssää vastaan sotiessa periksi antaminen ei koskaan ole vaihtoehto.

Onneksi ollaan Natossa, joten emme toivottavasti joudu tuollaiseen tilanteeseen.
 
Hesarissa on juttua Ukrainan sodan opetuksista:

Suomi on oppinut Ukrainan sodasta paljon – Majuri listaa viisi tärkeää oppia Suomen armeijalle

Ukrainan sota avasi Puolustusvoimille avoimen ikkunan venäläiseen sodan kuvaan.


Kauko-ohjattavien ilma-alusten merkitys on korostunut Ukrainan sodassa. Ukrainalainen sotilas lennätti tiedustelukopteria Bahmutissa viikko sitten. Kuva: Sergei Shestak / AFP

Jarmo Huhtanen HS
17:38


Puolustusvoimat on vetänyt yhteen Ukrainan sodan ensimmäisen vuoden oppeja Suomen kannalta.

Majuri Petri Pesonen kirjoittaa tuoreessa Jalkaväen vuosikirjassa, että Ukrainan sota on ollut Suomelle ”erityisen relevantti”, koska se on tarjonnut harvinaisen laajan ikkunan venäläiseen sodan kuvaan, toimintaperiaatteisiin ja suorituskykyyn.

Pesonen palvelee jalkaväen tutkimusalajohtajana Maasotakoulun maataistelukeskuksessa.

Hänen Jalkaväen vuosikirjaan kirjoittamansa artikkeli on otsikoitu Venäjän ja Ukrainan välisestä sodasta kootut havainnot jalkaväen kehittämisen tukena.

Jalkaväen vuosikirja on Jalkaväen säätiön parin vuoden välein kustantama artikkelikokoelma, jossa käsitellään jalkaväen erityiskysymyksiä.

Pesonen nostaa esille viisi suomalaisten tekemää havaintoa: tarve varautua pitkittyneeseen taisteluun, linnoitteiden rakentamiskyky, miehittämättömät ilma-alukset, panssarivaunut ja venäläisten tapa ryhmittyä puolustukseen.

Pesosen mukaan Ukrainan sota on tuonut esiin tarpeen kehittää Puolustusvoimien kykyä käydä pitkää sotaa.

Se on osoittanut, miten valtavasti sotamateriaalia sota vaatii. Ampumatarvikkeiden kulutus voi olla kiivaiden taisteluiden aikana erittäin suurta.

Esiin nousevat kysymykset erityisesti panssarintorjunta-aseiden riittävyydestä sekä niistä ampumatarvikkeista, joita ei valmisteta Suomessa.

Ukrainan sota on osoittanut myös sen, että Puolustusvoimat tarvitsee laajan reservin kärsittyjen tappioiden korvaamiseksi.

Yhdysvallat on arvioinut, että pelkästään joulukuun jälkeen Venäjä on kärsinyt Ukrainassa 100 000 miehen tappiot. Näistä 20 000 olisi kuolleita.

Ukrainan tappioista ei ole vastaavaa arvioita, mutta nekin ovat suuria.

Puolustusvoimat on tähän mennessä varautunut siihen, että kiivaissa taisteluissa taisteluosaston tappiot saattavat nousta vuorokauden aikana jopa 20 prosenttiin rivivahvuudesta.

Tämä tarkoittaa sitä, että noin parin tuhannen miehen taisteluosaston tappiot voisivat olla pahimmillaan satoja miehiä päivässä, joista viidennes olisi kaatuneita.

Edellä mainittu HS:n tieto perustuu viime vuosikymmenellä valmistelussa olleeseen kaatuneiden huollon oppaaseen.

Pesonen korostaa myös linnoittamisen osaamista ja yksittäisen sotilaan suojavarusteiden tärkeyttä.

”Liikkeen pysähtyessä kenttälapio on edelleen tärkein jalkaväkitaistelijan suojaväline nykyaikaisten asejärjestelmien suurta tulivoimaa vastaan”, hän kirjoittaa.

”Pukematon suojavaruste ei suojaa ketään, joten varusteiden käyttömukavuudesta ja ergonomiasta on tulossa yksi suojavarusteiden tärkeimmistä ominaisuuksista.”

Ukrainan sota on nostanut miehittämättömien ilma-aluksien eli lennokkien tai dronejen merkityksen aivan uudelle tasolle. Sotaa voitaneenkin kutsua ensimmäiseksi ”droonisodaksi”.

Pesonen kirjoittaa, että sota on näyttänyt selkeästi miehittämättömien ilma-alusten käytön mahdollisuudet ja uhat. Hänen mukaansa lennokkien tähystykseltä ja hyökkäyksiltä suojautuminen on tarpeellista jatkossa kouluttaa jokaiselle sotilaalle.

Omien joukkojen käyttöön olisikin saatava lisää lennokkeja. Pesosen mukaan ”micro-UAV:t” aiotaankin liittää jalkaväen kokoonpanoihin jo tänä vuonna.

Maavoimat on aiemmin kertonut, että se on parhaillaan hankkimassa 1 000–2 000 tällaista järjestelmää eri puolustushaarojen käyttöön tiedusteluun, valvontaan ja maalinosoitukseen.

Kaupat on määrä lyödä lukkoon tänä vuonna. Rahaa on varattu 14 miljoonaa euroa.

Yksi Ukrainan sodan yllätyksistä on ollut se, miten helppoja saaliita venäläiset taistelupanssarivaunut ovat olleet Ukrainan panssaritorjunnalle. Ukrainalaiset ovat vuoden aikana tuhonneet merkittävän osan venäläisten moderneimmista vaunuista.

Edellä mainitusta huolimatta Pesonen katsoo, että panssarivaunut ovat säilyttäneet merkittävän roolinsa sodassa.

Hänen mukaansa ”panssarikalustoa tarvitaan nykyaikaisella taistelukentällä vähintään yhtä paljon kuin ennenkin, mutta panssarivaunujen suojaaminen edellyttää hyvää aselajien välistä yhteistoimintaa erityisesti suojaavan jalkaväen, tykistön, ilmatorjunnan ja pioneerien kanssa”.

Yksi kiinnostavimmista havainnoista on se, että venäläinen moottoroitu jalkaväki ja panssarijoukot pyrkivät puolustuksessa ryhmittymään rakennetulle alueelle kuten kyliin.

”Tukikohdat rakennetaan joukkueittain ympäripuolustettaviksi, ja tukikohdan ympärille pyritään saamaan laaja, avoin ampuma-ala alueen valvontaa ja raskaiden aseiden tulenkäyttöä helpottamaan”, hän kirjoittaa.

Venäläiset suojaavat ryhmityksensä jalkaväki- eli henkilömiinoilla. Venäjä ei ole mukana Ottawan henkilömiinat kieltävässä sopimuksessa kuten esimerkiksi Suomi ja Ukraina.

Linnoitettuun tukikohtaan hyökkääminen on vaativa operaatio. Pesonen pohtiikin, pitäisikö taisteluhautojen vyöryttämiseen ja lähitaisteluun panostaa suomalaisessa varusmieskoulutuksessa enemmän.

Pesonen arvioi, että on todennäköistä, että huonosti mennyt sota aiheuttaa muutoksia Venäjän asevoimissa. Tämä tekee tulevaisuuden ennakoinnin vaikeaksi.

Hänen mukaansa on jo näkyvissä ensimmäisiä merkkejä Venäjän pyrkimyksistä asevoimien koon kasvattamiseen ja siirtymisestä pataljoonan taisteluosastoista kohti täysinä yhtyminä toimimista.
Ukrainassa on käyty sotaa Venäjää vastaan jo vuodesta 2014, joten on hyvin outoa puhua sodan ensimmäisestä vuodesta. Ainoa mikä muuttui keväällä 2022 on sodan mittakaava. Toimittelijat voisivat kysyä vaikka Valeri Zaluzhnyiltä, jos eivät muuten usko. Ottawan sopimuksesta pitäisi irtautua heti eikä huomenna.
 
Hesarissa on juttua Ukrainan sodan opetuksista:


Ukrainassa on käyty sotaa Venäjää vastaan jo vuodesta 2014, joten on hyvin outoa puhua sodan ensimmäisestä vuodesta. Ainoa mikä muuttui keväällä 2022 on sodan mittakaava. Toimittelijat voisivat kysyä vaikka Valeri Zaluzhnyiltä, jos eivät muuten usko. Ottawan sopimuksesta pitäisi irtautua heti eikä huomenna.
Jotenkin ihmettelen, että sotamateriaalin kulutus tulee aina "yllätyksenä"? Kun miettii ensimmäistä ja toista maailmansotaa, Korean sotaa, Vietnamin sotaa jne., niin aina puhutaan huomattavasta määrästä sotakalustoa. Teollisen vallankumouksen jälkeen kulutussodasta tuli The Thing. Sotamateriaalin kulutusta on tuskin koskaan yliarvioitu. Ainoa poikkeus taitaa olla Normandian maihinnousu, jossa uutta tankkia ja kuorma-autoa tuli siihen tahtiin, että alkoi loppua parkkitila kun tappiot eivät olleetkaan sitä luokkaa mitä oli laskettu.

Enkä ymmärrä nyt myöskään ympäripuolustettavan tukikohdan yllätyksellisyyttä? Ainakin siinä materiaalissa, mitä olen lukenut neukkulan opeista ja A2-materiaalista, toiminta on sääntö? Vai viitataanko tässä siihen, että juuri asutuskeskukset ovat se paikka eikä esim. keskelle Höttölänjänkää?
 
CSIS eli Center for Strategic & International Studies tuorein raportti, tällä kertaa aiheena Venäjän ohjussota:

Putin’s Missile War​

Russia’s Strike Campaign in Ukraine

Report by Ian Williams

Published May 5, 2023

Russia’s missile campaign against Ukraine has severely underperformed expectations. In the invasion’s early days, Russia underestimated the necessary scale and effort of its missile campaign. Since then, Russia has changed course multiple times, most recently moving to target Ukrainian electrical grid and civilian infrastructure during the winter months. Russia’s haphazard missile campaign reflects both internal strategic failures and Ukraine’s critical forward thinking in the days prior to the invasion. Early Russian failures also gave time for Ukraine to develop its air defense strategy and capabilities which have only grown in effectiveness, thanks in large part to Western aid. This report provides an in-depth review of these and related “missile war” dynamics.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report.

-

Linkki raportin sisältävälle sivulle:

https://www.csis.org/analysis/putins-missile-war

Suora linkki varsinaiseen raporttiin (avaa pdf-tiedoston):

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazon...df?VersionId=0rahER.P81oo5ispb8.UGcT_90DmLoSb

-

Käyttäjä Poteropio jakoi tämän Ukrainan sodan seuranta -ketjussa, lainaan hänen viestistään (LINKKI) "key findings" -osion tähän alle (löytyy raportin sivuilta 1 ja 2, pdf-tiedoston sivuilta 8 ja 9):

Key Findings

▪ Russia’s long-range strike campaign of air and missile attacks has fallen short of producing the strategic effects necessary to achieve a decisive victory.

▪ Key drivers of this failure have been the Ukrainian military’s extensive use of dispersion, mobility, and deception and the comparative slowness of Russia’s over-the-horizon targeting cycle.

▪ At the war’s outset, Russia significantly underestimated the scale of effort required to accomplish its goals. In its initial operation to gain air superiority, Russia failed to achieve mass and tried to attack too many targets with too few missiles over too short a period to achieve its desired results.

▪ Russia’s strike campaign has also been undermined by frequent shifts in targeting priorities and the irregular availability of precision-guided munitions.

▪ Ukrainian air defenses have deterred Russian Air Force aircraft from launching penetrating sorties against strategic targets deep behind the front lines. This success has greatly shaped the course of the war, limiting Russian striking power to diminishing numbers of stand-off missiles or uncrewed aerial systems.

▪ Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure and industry have deepened Ukraine’s dependency on the West. This dependency supports Russia’s goal of exhausting the West’s patience and compelling Western capitals to pressure Ukraine to make concessions. This Russian theory of victory will also fail, however, unless Western governments accommodate it.

▪ Russia has seen relatively greater operational success in its campaign to degrade the Ukrainian electrical grid, though Ukraine has proven resilient to these hardships.

▪ Ukraine has seen increasing success in intercepting Russian cruise missiles, particularly since the influx of Western air defenses systems in October and November 2022.

▪ Ukrainian air and missile defenses have not been leak-proof, however, highlighting the importance of passive defense and maintaining the capacity to quickly reconstitute capabilities and infrastructure.

▪ Since the fall of 2022, Russia’s long-range missile attacks against Ukraine have become larger but less frequent as Russia attempts to overcome the growing efficiency of Ukrainian air defenses.

▪ Russia is likely to struggle to maintain the frequency of attacks moving forward as its missile stockpiles diminish and it becomes more reliant on newly produced or recently acquired projectiles to fuel its attacks.

▪ Even with a diminished frequency, sustained air attacks against Ukraine’s electrical grid over the long term risk exhausting Ukraine’s capacity to sustain repairs.

▪ In addition to degrading Ukraine’s electrical grid, the composition of Russian missile salvos since October 2022 suggests a secondary Russian goal of depleting Ukrainian air defense capacity.

▪ Diminished air defense capacity would not only put Ukraine at greater risk from Russian missile attack but raise the prospects of the Russian Air Force resuming penetrating sorties into Ukrainian airspace.

▪ To the extent possible, replenishing Ukraine’s air defense capacity should remain a priority for Western military aid for the foreseeable future.

▪ Ukraine has demonstrated throughout the war that Russian ballistic and cruise missiles are manageable threats and can be countered effectively through active and passive defenses

-

Kannattaa lukea loppuun asti, liitteissä on pitkä taulukko (jaettu neljään osaan) johon on koottu tunnettujen ohjuslaukaisujen päivämäärät, kohteet ja arvio ohjusten määristä sekä tyypeistä. Löytyy raportin sivuilta 37-44 eli pdf-tiedoston sivuilta 44-51

Taulukon aikavälit ovat

24.2.2022 - 25.3.2022
30.3.2022 - 20.6.2022
25.6.2022 - 29.9.2022
10.10.2022 - 26.1.2023

Pitääpä tutustua paremmalla ajalla.

-

Ohjuslaukaisuihin liittyvää ns. tukevaa materiaali:

Oleksii Reznikov julkaissut sodan aikana kolme katsausta, tässä puhutaan Venäjän ohjusvarantojen koosta, sodan aikana ampumien ohjusten määristä sekä sota-ajan uustuotannosta. Hän on julkaissut näitä kolme kertaa:

1. julkaisu 12.10.2022

FfBIOG-XkAQr3l8


2. julkaisu 18.11.2022

FiKSjoPWIAAhR7k


3. julkaisu 3.1.2023

Fl0FHQLXwAUcJrP


-

Puolalainen Jaroslaw Wolski kommentoi näistä ensimmäistä omassa viestiketjussaan (julkaistu 15.10.2022) ja antoi siinä oman arvionsa uustuotannosta. LINKKI

-

Jaoin aikaisemmin Ukrainan sodan seuranta -ketjussa oman hyvin yksinkertaisen laskelman, joka pohjautui tuohon 3.1.2023 julkaistuun dataan:

1678000646970-png.74989


-

Tässä vielä viesti, johon on koottu Venäjän ohjusiskujen määrät per aikavälit (syksy - loppuvuosi 2022 ja tammikuu 2023): LINKKI

#RussiaIsATerroristState missile launches by date:

Oct 10-11: 111 missiles;
Oct 17-22: 49 missiles;
Oct 31: 50 missiles;
Nov 15-17: 120 missiles;
Nov 23: 70 missiles;
Dec 5: 70 missiles;
Dec 16: 76 missiles;
Dec 29-31: 89 missiles;
Jan 14: 38 missiles;
Jan 26: 55 missiles.

#RussiaIsATerroristState missiles launches by month:

Oct: 210;
Nov: 190;
Dec: 235;
Jan: 90.

A total of 728 missiles.

Blackout happened once, on Nov 23,2023. Since that time, RU terrorists have never managed to "put down" UA energy. #Ukraine survived.

-

Tässä vielä yksi vanhempi kuvaaja, CSIS Missile Defence niminen twitter-tili julkaisi päivityksiä tähän kuvaajaan kesään 2022 asti. Tässä viimeinen kuvaaja, julkaistu 29.6.2022. Tämän jälkeen ei ole nähty uutta päivitystä, tosin en olisi yllättynyt jos tämä tuore raportti sisältäisi samaa dataa. En muista, perustuiko tämä kuvaaja julkisiin lähteisiin vai Yhdysvaltain viranomaisten raportteihin. LÄHDE

FWb_9U3WYAIVcVf
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Jotenkin ihmettelen, että sotamateriaalin kulutus tulee aina "yllätyksenä"? Kun miettii ensimmäistä ja toista maailmansotaa, Korean sotaa, Vietnamin sotaa jne., niin aina puhutaan huomattavasta määrästä sotakalustoa. Teollisen vallankumouksen jälkeen kulutussodasta tuli The Thing. Sotamateriaalin kulutusta on tuskin koskaan yliarvioitu. Ainoa poikkeus taitaa olla Normandian maihinnousu, jossa uutta tankkia ja kuorma-autoa tuli siihen tahtiin, että alkoi loppua parkkitila kun tappiot eivät olleetkaan sitä luokkaa mitä oli laskettu.
Valitettavasti ei ole tarjota linkkiä, eli ulkomuistista laitan...."Vuosi sitten UK olisi kyennyt materiaalinsa puolesta käymään nyt käytävän kaltaista kulutussotaa venäjän kanssa n. 10 päivää".
 
Twitter-jakojen kommentteja ao. loistojutusta.
Very interesting article, for me especially the wide civil support. Regular Ukranians were using their wedding drones and gas-station security camers to target spot and adjust fire for Ukrainian artillery. and russians thought these people would surrender?
This is just extraordinary. The description of the early days of the war, when they are just calling up people who live nearby their targets and asking them to spot for them, is astonishing.
I love it. Looking up local phone numbers on Google maps and having civilians correct artillery fire! Slava Ukraini
besides the everything from artillery barrels, drones, and rifles have a very short lifespan in heavy fighting vs insurgency wars note how they use local assets to do fire missions, that is to say, they call a gas station clerk to ask where the Russians are
 
Yhdysvaltain hallinto uskoo useiden Lennart Meri -turvallisuuskonferenssissa Tallinnassa puhuneiden asiantuntijoiden mukaan onnistuneensa estämään Venäjää käyttämästä taktisia ydinaseita Ukrainaa vastaan viestittämällä, että mahdollinen ydinisku johtaisi lännen massiivisiin vastatoimiin tavanomaisin asein.

Jos tiedot pitävät paikkansa, on nimekkään brittiläisen turvallisuuspolitiikan asiantuntijan Keir Gilesin mielestä entistä vaikeampi käsittää, miksi Yhdysvallat on noudattanut korostetun varovaista linjaa suhteessa Kremlin toistuviin vihjailuihin ydinaseiden käytöstä.

 
Back
Top