Ukrainan sodan havainnot ja opetukset

Mielenkiintoinen karttakuva. Miten linnoitettu asema kestää modernia liikkuvaa sotaa? Riippuu monesta tekijästä, mutta itäisen Ukrainan alueella osa aikavälillä 2014-2021 rakennetuista puolustusasemista on yhä ukrainalaisten miehittämiä. Hyvä myös muistaa, että osaa ei varsinaisesti menetetty suorien hyökkäysten takia vaan saarrostusuhan takia vetäytyminen oli väistämätöntä (eteläinen Ukraina ja Mariupolin alue sekä Luhanskin oblastin katkaisevat puolustusasemat)

In eastern Ukraine, many of the defensive lines built by pro-Russian and Ukrainian forces during fighting between 2014 and 2022 are now inside Russian-occupied territory.This map update shows where these older fortifications overlap with newer defenses.

(twitter-ketjusta löytyy suurempi versio tästä kuvasta)
1685164267096.png

A few important notes on this map of fortifications in eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2022:

First, this data only reflects trenches, barriers, and revetments built before February 2022 that are now within territory occupied by Russian forces.

Second, Russian forces have not maintained or expanded most of these positions which dramatically reduces their usefulness when compared to newer defenses.

Third, this data is not exhaustive and there may be older fortifications not shown on the map.

Nature has overtaken many of the older defensive lines built in eastern Ukraine between 2014 and 2022.

Others are in better condition but still poorly positioned for the current front line.


1685164414901.png

In several instances, new fortifications constructed by Russian forces intersect older defensive lines.

1685164470786.png

In other areas, older fortifications have been expanded and upgraded since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

1685164544893.png

Check out the full map and several high resolution satellite images of Russia’s fortifications in Ukraine here:

https://read.bradyafrick.com/p/russian-field-fortifications-in-ukraine

 
Wall Street Journalin artikkeli jossa pohditaan Saksan ja liittokansleri Angela Merkelin roolia, samalla kun Putin rohkaistui ja Venäjä vahvistui: LÄHDE

Did Merkel Pave the Way for the War in Ukraine?​

The former German chancellor is unapologetic as critics reexamine her deals with Putin and reluctance to punish his previous aggressions.

May 26, 2023 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/did-me...he-war-in-ukraine-4abef297?st=vqeap17849bfqrb

Did Merkel Pave the Way for the War in Ukraine?​

The former German chancellor is unapologetic as critics reexamine her deals with Putin and reluctance to punish his previous aggressions.

im-788810

PHOTO ILLUSTRATION BY JOAN WONG. SOURCE PHOTOGRAPHS: HANS-CHRISTIAN PLAMBECK/LAIF/REDUX; ISTOCK/GETTY IMAGES

By Bojan Pancevski
Follow

May 26, 2023 12:01 am ET
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(3 min)

Dressed in an imperial purple blazer, Angela Merkel beamed at a ceremony in April as she received Germany’s highest honor, recognizing the achievements of her 16-year chancellorship. It was her first appearance on a live broadcast since leaving office more than a year ago. She was at peace with herself, she said. She now had time to indulge her long-standing interest in the Renaissance, and though politics had the reputation of being a “snake pit,” she added, she could recall joyful moments from her time in power.

For any other leader, receiving the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit at Berlin’s understated Bellevue Palace would have marked the crowning of a legacy. Only two other people had previously received the honor: Konrad Adenauer, the first post-World War II chancellor, and Helmut Kohl, Merkel’s own mentor.

But the award kicked off a controversy. Adenauer and Kohl would be remembered as great chancellors, said Wolfgang Schäuble, a member of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union who twice served as a key minister in her governments. For Merkel, he said, “It’s too early.”

im-787977

Angela Merkel receives the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit at Berlin’s Bellevue Palace, April 17. PHOTO: MICHAEL KAPPELER/PICTURE ALLIANCE/GETTY IMAGES

The ceremony belatedly jolted Germany into reappraising Merkel’s role in the years leading up to today’s European crises—and the verdict has not been positive. As Vladimir Putin wages a war of aggression in Ukraine, Merkel’s critics argue that the close ties she forged with Russia are partly responsible for today’s economic and political upheaval. Germany’s security policies over the past year have been, in many ways, a repudiation of her legacy. Earlier this month, Berlin announced a new $3 billion military aid package to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and an approaching NATO summit is expected to discuss how to include Ukraine in Europe’s security architecture—an extension of the alliance that Merkel consistently resisted.

Merkel was a key architect of the agreements that made the economies of Germany and its neighbors dependent on Russian energy imports. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has destroyed that strategic partnership, forcing Germany to find its oil and natural gas elsewhere at huge costs to business, government and households. Berlin was able to secure enough natural gas to carry its economy through last winter, but it is unclear how Germany will meet its long-term supply needs.

Merkel’s successive governments also squeezed defense budgets while boosting welfare spending. Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais, commander of the army, posted an emotional article on his LinkedIn profile on the day of the invasion, lamenting that Germany’s once-mighty military had been hollowed out to such an extent that it would be all but unable to protect the country in the event of a Russian attack.

Most controversially, former allies of Merkel and other experts say that her refusal to stop buying energy from Putin after he seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014—she instead worked to double gas imports from Russia—emboldened him to finish the job eight years later.

im-787978
German workers assemble pipes for Nord Stream 2, November 2018. Merkel’s government approved the pipeline to carry natural gas from Russia to Germany, but it was scrapped by her successor. PHOTO: BERND WUSTNECK/PICTURE ALLIANCE/GETTY IMAGES

At an event last year, Merkel recalled that after annexing Crimea, Putin had told her that he wanted to destroy the European Union. But she still forged ahead with plans to build the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, linking Germany directly to Siberia’s natural gas fields, in the face of protests from the U.S. Merkel’s government also approved the sale of Germany’s largest gas storage facilities to Russia’s state-controlled gas giant Gazprom.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline was set to double Russian gas exports to Germany at a time when the country already depended on Putin for 55% of its gas supply. The pipeline was built but never came online, and it was later scrapped by Merkel’s successor because of the war in Ukraine.

Since leaving office, Merkel has defended the pipeline project as a purely commercial decision. She had to choose, she said, between importing cheap Russian gas or liquefied natural gas, which she said was a third more expensive.

After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then NATO secretary general, warned her against making Germany more dependent on a rogue Putin, who had just occupied and annexed part of a European nation. For Putin, he said, the pipeline “had nothing to do with business or the economy—it was a geopolitical weapon.”

im-789279

im-788433

Wolfgang Schäuble (left) and Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer served as ministers under Angela Merkel and have criticized her policies toward Russia.FROM LEFT: CLEMENS BILAN/POOL/GETTY IMAGES; SVEN HOPPE/DPA/GETTY IMAGES

Officials who served under Merkel, including Schäuble and Frank-Walter Steinmeier (her former foreign minister and now Germany’s federal president), have apologized or expressed regret for their roles in these decisions. They believe that Merkel’s policies empowered Putin without setting boundaries to his imperial ambitions.

Merkel, by contrast, has acknowledged no mistakes and offered no apology in interviews since leaving office. She declined to be interviewed for this article.

At the time her policies were made, they reflected the dominant view among German politicians and industrialists, who saw trade as the main source of growth for the German economy and did not think the country could interact just with Western-style democracies. Merkel has also spoken of her conviction that economic engagement with authoritarian countries could bring about a rapprochement.

Merkel didn’t react when Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly invited her last April to visit Bucha, the site of alleged Russian war crimes, to see what he described as the results of her policy of concessions to Putin. Though she has condemned the invasion of Ukraine as barbaric, she also has urged negotiations with Putin.

In a speech last September, she said the late Chancellor Kohl would not only have supported Ukraine but ”would also think about what currently appears unthinkable, simply unimaginable—namely, how to develop something like relations with and to Russia again.” Delivered just as international organizations were launching investigations into Russian atrocities, the suggestion of rebuilding ties to Moscow struck some critics as, at the least, ill-timed.

im-788424
Destroyed buildings in Bakhmut, Ukraine, May 15. PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/ASSOCIATED PRESSE

Joachim Gauck, who was president of Germany when Putin first invaded Ukraine in 2014, said Merkel’s decision to boost energy imports from Russia in the wake of Putin’s aggression was clearly a mistake. “Some people recognize their mistakes earlier, and some later,” he said.

That mistake had its roots in another decision by Merkel: Her move to greatly accelerate Germany’s planned phasing out of nuclear energy in 2011, in response to the Fukushima disaster in Japan. The gap in energy supply created by this dramatic shift meant that Germany had to import more energy, and it had to do so as cheaply as possible. This meant becoming dependent on Russian natural gas, said Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who served as defense minister under Merkel.

Kramp-Karrenbauer, once picked by Merkel as a possible successor, opposed Nord Stream 2 and tried in vain to rebuild Germany’s depleted armed forces. Her push to meet a NATO target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense, agreed upon after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, was blocked by the chancellery, Kramp-Karrenbauer said.

im-788187

Russian soldiers on the march during the occupation of Crimea, March 2014. PHOTO: SHUTTERSTOCK

“We broke the promise to NATO, and I believe this was a big mistake,” Kramp-Karrenbauer said. “We abandoned the lessons of the Cold War. Diplomacy must be accompanied by military strength.”

Merkel’s role in shaping NATO policy toward Ukraine goes back to 2008, when she vetoed a push by the Bush administration to admit Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance, said Fiona Hill, a former National Security Council official and presidential adviser on Russia.

Merkel instead helped to broker NATO’s open but noncommittal invitation to Ukraine and Georgia, an outcome that Hill said was the “worst of all worlds” because it enraged Putin without giving the two countries any protection. Putin invaded Georgia in 2008 before marching into Ukraine.

After Putin first attacked Ukraine, Merkel led the effort to negotiate a quick settlement that disappointed Kyiv and imposed no substantial punishment on Russia for occupying its neighbor, Hill added. “No red lines were drawn for Putin,” she said. “Merkel took a calculated risk. It was a gambit, but ultimately it failed.”

Some observers believe that the failure to establish red lines and Germany’s continuing economic cooperation encouraged Putin to attempt a full-scale attack in 2022. “OK, so I could get away with that,” Putin concluded in 2014, according to Rasmussen. “So why not continue?”

im-788204
Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel at the G-20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany, July 2017. PHOTO: VISTAPRESS/CAMERA PRESS/REDUX

Merkel still has supporters, and as Germany begins to grapple with her complicated legacy, many still hold a more nuanced view of her role in laying the groundwork for today’s crises.

Joe Kaeser, the former chief executive of the German conglomerate Siemens, worked closely with Merkel and accompanied her and other senior government figures on official travels, including to Russia, where his company was one of the largest foreign investors.

Kaeser, who now chairs the supervisory board of Siemens Energy, a listed subsidiary, agrees that Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas grew under Merkel, but he says that there was—and is—no alternative for powering Europe’s industrial engine at a viable price.

“We didn’t expect that there would be war in Europe with the methods of the 20th century. This never featured in our thinking,” said Kaeser, who himself met Putin several times. He believes that Merkel’s Russia policy was justified. Even Germany’s new government has not found a sustainable and affordable replacement for Russian energy exports, he said, which could lead to deindustrialization.


Many defenders of Merkel say that she merely articulated a consensus. Making her country dependent on Washington for security, on Moscow for energy and on Beijing for trade (China became Germany’s biggest trade partner under her chancellorship) was what all of Germany’s political parties wanted at the time, said Constanze Stelzenmüller of the Brookings Institution.

“Without backing from the U.S.A., which was very restrained at the time, any tougher German reaction to the annexation of Crimea could hardly have been possible,” said Jürgen Osterhammer, a historian whose work on globalization and China has been cited by Merkel as an influence on her thinking.

For her part, Merkel is determined not to rely on historians for the historical record of her tenure. While unwinding from her long years of public service, she told German media, she is working on a memoir under a major publishing contract.

In retirement, Merkel told the German news magazine Der Spiegel, she has watched “Munich,” a Netflix movie about Prime Minister Neville’s Chamberlain’s infamous negotiations with Hitler in the run-up to World War II. Though Chamberlain’s name has become synonymous with the delusions of appeasement, the film offers a more nuanced picture of the British leader as a realist statesman working to postpone the inevitable conflict. That reinterpretation appealed to Merkel, the magazine reported.

She has also made an effort to rejuvenate relations with another retired statesman, President Barack Obama, whom she visited in Washington, D.C., last June. The former leaders enjoyed a museum visit and dinner at his favorite Italian restaurant. After the trip, Merkel complained that the growing criticism she is facing at home betrayed a lack of respect for her role as leader. “It is part of democracy to endure criticism, but my impression is that an American president who’s left office is being treated with greater respect by the public than a German chancellor,” she told Der Spiegel.

In April, Merkel was again asked on stage at a book fair whether she would not reconsider her refusal to admit having made some mistakes. “Frankly,” she responded, “I don’t know whether there would be satisfaction if I were to say something that I simply don’t think merely for the sake of admitting error.”

Bojan Pancevski is The Wall Street Journal’s Germany correspondent.

Corrections & Amplifications
A caption in an earlier version of this article incorrectly identified Angela Merkel as Andrea Merkel. (Corrected on May 26)

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the May 27, 2023, print edition as 'Did Merkel Pave the Way For the War in Ukraine? Merkel’s Troubling Legacy With Putin'.

-

En ole niin höpsö että kaataisin kaiken syyn yhden ihmisen niskaan, olipa sitten kyseessä Saksan liittokansleri. Merkel ei luonut Saksan ja yleisemmin Euroopan riippuvuutta idän kaasusta ja öljystä: sen suuntaviivat ja ensimmäiset askeleet otettiin yli 50 vuotta sitten kun solmittiin ensimmäiset sopimukset putkien rakentamisesta idän ja lännen välille.

The Guardian kirjoitti tästä pitkän ja erinomaisen artikkelin kesällä 2022, joten en ala toistamaan yksityiskohtia enempää - lukusuositus tälle, jos ei ole entuudestaan tuttu: LINKKI

Ei voida myöskään sanoa, etteikö tämä kasvava riippuvuus olisi herättänyt huolta mm. Yhdysvalloissa kylmän sodan viimeisinä vuosikymmeninä, lainasin näitä arkistopoimintoja toisessa ketjussa - linkki vanhaan viestiini: LINKKI

Jos mitään, sanoisin että Merkel jatkoi näiden oppi-isien ja -äitien viitoittamalla tiellä. Sama koskee kylmän sodan päättymistä seurannutta asevoimien alasajoa.

MUTTA ei voi jättää pois laskuista Putinin valtakauden aikana tehtyjä päätöksiä, varsinkin Georgian sodan 2008 ja Krimin valtaamisen 2014 sekä sitä seuranneen sodan jälkeen. Puhutaan kuitenkin kahdeksasta vuodesta, ennen kuin tämä tuorein hyökkäys alkoi 24.2.2022.

Ei voi sanoa, etteikö vaaran merkkejä ollut ilmassa JA niistä huolimatta ei tehty korjausliikkeitä tai suunnan muutoksia.

Sanoisin että Merkelin valtakausi kaipaa syväluotaavan tutkimisen, mutta sanoisin samaa myös Suomen roolista ja valtaapitävistä paitsi kylmän sodan aikana niin myös sen päättymisen jälkeen - erityisesti Putinin valtakauden aikana. Halonen, Tuomioja, Aho, Lipponen yms. Lista on pitkä ja monen taholta nähtävissä Venäjää suosivien päätösten teko, toisinaan Suomen itsensä kustannuksella. Nord Stream -kaasuputketkin nuijittiin meillä läpi "pelkkinä taloudellisina projekteina" ja itäisen Euroopan maiden vastalauseet sivuutettiin miltei pelkällä olankohautuksella. Oliko tässä takana Venäjän paine vai myös Saksan paine?

Kuten sanottua, näen tämän lähihistorian syväluotauksen yhtenä sodan opeista. Ehkä nyt vihdoin NATO-jäsenyyden turvin uskalletaan ottaa askeleita tähän suuntaan. En kaipaa noitavainoja, mutta toisaalta olisi rehellisintä tehdä tutkimukset nyt kun tutkimusten kohteet ovat vielä hengissä - ja täten heillä on tilaisuus puolustaa sanomisiaan ja tekojaan.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Wall Street Journalin artikkeli jossa pohditaan Saksan ja liittokansleri Angela Merkelin roolia, samalla kun Putin rohkaistui ja Venäjä vahvistui: LÄHDE

Did Merkel Pave the Way for the War in Ukraine?​

The former German chancellor is unapologetic as critics reexamine her deals with Putin and reluctance to punish his previous aggressions.

May 26, 2023 12:01 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/did-me...he-war-in-ukraine-4abef297?st=vqeap17849bfqrb

Did Merkel Pave the Way for the War in Ukraine?​

The former German chancellor is unapologetic as critics reexamine her deals with Putin and reluctance to punish his previous aggressions.

im-788810

PHOTO ILLUSTRATION BY JOAN WONG. SOURCE PHOTOGRAPHS: HANS-CHRISTIAN PLAMBECK/LAIF/REDUX; ISTOCK/GETTY IMAGES

By Bojan Pancevski
Follow

May 26, 2023 12:01 am ET
Share
Resize
478

Listen
(3 min)

Dressed in an imperial purple blazer, Angela Merkel beamed at a ceremony in April as she received Germany’s highest honor, recognizing the achievements of her 16-year chancellorship. It was her first appearance on a live broadcast since leaving office more than a year ago. She was at peace with herself, she said. She now had time to indulge her long-standing interest in the Renaissance, and though politics had the reputation of being a “snake pit,” she added, she could recall joyful moments from her time in power.

For any other leader, receiving the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit at Berlin’s understated Bellevue Palace would have marked the crowning of a legacy. Only two other people had previously received the honor: Konrad Adenauer, the first post-World War II chancellor, and Helmut Kohl, Merkel’s own mentor.

But the award kicked off a controversy. Adenauer and Kohl would be remembered as great chancellors, said Wolfgang Schäuble, a member of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union who twice served as a key minister in her governments. For Merkel, he said, “It’s too early.”

im-787977

Angela Merkel receives the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit at Berlin’s Bellevue Palace, April 17. PHOTO: MICHAEL KAPPELER/PICTURE ALLIANCE/GETTY IMAGES

The ceremony belatedly jolted Germany into reappraising Merkel’s role in the years leading up to today’s European crises—and the verdict has not been positive. As Vladimir Putin wages a war of aggression in Ukraine, Merkel’s critics argue that the close ties she forged with Russia are partly responsible for today’s economic and political upheaval. Germany’s security policies over the past year have been, in many ways, a repudiation of her legacy. Earlier this month, Berlin announced a new $3 billion military aid package to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia, and an approaching NATO summit is expected to discuss how to include Ukraine in Europe’s security architecture—an extension of the alliance that Merkel consistently resisted.

Merkel was a key architect of the agreements that made the economies of Germany and its neighbors dependent on Russian energy imports. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has destroyed that strategic partnership, forcing Germany to find its oil and natural gas elsewhere at huge costs to business, government and households. Berlin was able to secure enough natural gas to carry its economy through last winter, but it is unclear how Germany will meet its long-term supply needs.

Merkel’s successive governments also squeezed defense budgets while boosting welfare spending. Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais, commander of the army, posted an emotional article on his LinkedIn profile on the day of the invasion, lamenting that Germany’s once-mighty military had been hollowed out to such an extent that it would be all but unable to protect the country in the event of a Russian attack.

Most controversially, former allies of Merkel and other experts say that her refusal to stop buying energy from Putin after he seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014—she instead worked to double gas imports from Russia—emboldened him to finish the job eight years later.

im-787978
German workers assemble pipes for Nord Stream 2, November 2018. Merkel’s government approved the pipeline to carry natural gas from Russia to Germany, but it was scrapped by her successor. PHOTO: BERND WUSTNECK/PICTURE ALLIANCE/GETTY IMAGES

At an event last year, Merkel recalled that after annexing Crimea, Putin had told her that he wanted to destroy the European Union. But she still forged ahead with plans to build the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, linking Germany directly to Siberia’s natural gas fields, in the face of protests from the U.S. Merkel’s government also approved the sale of Germany’s largest gas storage facilities to Russia’s state-controlled gas giant Gazprom.

The Nord Stream 2 pipeline was set to double Russian gas exports to Germany at a time when the country already depended on Putin for 55% of its gas supply. The pipeline was built but never came online, and it was later scrapped by Merkel’s successor because of the war in Ukraine.

Since leaving office, Merkel has defended the pipeline project as a purely commercial decision. She had to choose, she said, between importing cheap Russian gas or liquefied natural gas, which she said was a third more expensive.

After Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then NATO secretary general, warned her against making Germany more dependent on a rogue Putin, who had just occupied and annexed part of a European nation. For Putin, he said, the pipeline “had nothing to do with business or the economy—it was a geopolitical weapon.”

im-789279

im-788433

Wolfgang Schäuble (left) and Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer served as ministers under Angela Merkel and have criticized her policies toward Russia.FROM LEFT: CLEMENS BILAN/POOL/GETTY IMAGES; SVEN HOPPE/DPA/GETTY IMAGES

Officials who served under Merkel, including Schäuble and Frank-Walter Steinmeier (her former foreign minister and now Germany’s federal president), have apologized or expressed regret for their roles in these decisions. They believe that Merkel’s policies empowered Putin without setting boundaries to his imperial ambitions.

Merkel, by contrast, has acknowledged no mistakes and offered no apology in interviews since leaving office. She declined to be interviewed for this article.

At the time her policies were made, they reflected the dominant view among German politicians and industrialists, who saw trade as the main source of growth for the German economy and did not think the country could interact just with Western-style democracies. Merkel has also spoken of her conviction that economic engagement with authoritarian countries could bring about a rapprochement.

Merkel didn’t react when Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky publicly invited her last April to visit Bucha, the site of alleged Russian war crimes, to see what he described as the results of her policy of concessions to Putin. Though she has condemned the invasion of Ukraine as barbaric, she also has urged negotiations with Putin.

In a speech last September, she said the late Chancellor Kohl would not only have supported Ukraine but ”would also think about what currently appears unthinkable, simply unimaginable—namely, how to develop something like relations with and to Russia again.” Delivered just as international organizations were launching investigations into Russian atrocities, the suggestion of rebuilding ties to Moscow struck some critics as, at the least, ill-timed.

im-788424
Destroyed buildings in Bakhmut, Ukraine, May 15. PHOTO: MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES/ASSOCIATED PRESSE

Joachim Gauck, who was president of Germany when Putin first invaded Ukraine in 2014, said Merkel’s decision to boost energy imports from Russia in the wake of Putin’s aggression was clearly a mistake. “Some people recognize their mistakes earlier, and some later,” he said.

That mistake had its roots in another decision by Merkel: Her move to greatly accelerate Germany’s planned phasing out of nuclear energy in 2011, in response to the Fukushima disaster in Japan. The gap in energy supply created by this dramatic shift meant that Germany had to import more energy, and it had to do so as cheaply as possible. This meant becoming dependent on Russian natural gas, said Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who served as defense minister under Merkel.

Kramp-Karrenbauer, once picked by Merkel as a possible successor, opposed Nord Stream 2 and tried in vain to rebuild Germany’s depleted armed forces. Her push to meet a NATO target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on defense, agreed upon after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, was blocked by the chancellery, Kramp-Karrenbauer said.

im-788187

Russian soldiers on the march during the occupation of Crimea, March 2014. PHOTO: SHUTTERSTOCK

“We broke the promise to NATO, and I believe this was a big mistake,” Kramp-Karrenbauer said. “We abandoned the lessons of the Cold War. Diplomacy must be accompanied by military strength.”

Merkel’s role in shaping NATO policy toward Ukraine goes back to 2008, when she vetoed a push by the Bush administration to admit Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance, said Fiona Hill, a former National Security Council official and presidential adviser on Russia.

Merkel instead helped to broker NATO’s open but noncommittal invitation to Ukraine and Georgia, an outcome that Hill said was the “worst of all worlds” because it enraged Putin without giving the two countries any protection. Putin invaded Georgia in 2008 before marching into Ukraine.

After Putin first attacked Ukraine, Merkel led the effort to negotiate a quick settlement that disappointed Kyiv and imposed no substantial punishment on Russia for occupying its neighbor, Hill added. “No red lines were drawn for Putin,” she said. “Merkel took a calculated risk. It was a gambit, but ultimately it failed.”

Some observers believe that the failure to establish red lines and Germany’s continuing economic cooperation encouraged Putin to attempt a full-scale attack in 2022. “OK, so I could get away with that,” Putin concluded in 2014, according to Rasmussen. “So why not continue?”

im-788204
Vladimir Putin and Angela Merkel at the G-20 Summit in Hamburg, Germany, July 2017. PHOTO: VISTAPRESS/CAMERA PRESS/REDUX

Merkel still has supporters, and as Germany begins to grapple with her complicated legacy, many still hold a more nuanced view of her role in laying the groundwork for today’s crises.

Joe Kaeser, the former chief executive of the German conglomerate Siemens, worked closely with Merkel and accompanied her and other senior government figures on official travels, including to Russia, where his company was one of the largest foreign investors.

Kaeser, who now chairs the supervisory board of Siemens Energy, a listed subsidiary, agrees that Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas grew under Merkel, but he says that there was—and is—no alternative for powering Europe’s industrial engine at a viable price.

“We didn’t expect that there would be war in Europe with the methods of the 20th century. This never featured in our thinking,” said Kaeser, who himself met Putin several times. He believes that Merkel’s Russia policy was justified. Even Germany’s new government has not found a sustainable and affordable replacement for Russian energy exports, he said, which could lead to deindustrialization.


Many defenders of Merkel say that she merely articulated a consensus. Making her country dependent on Washington for security, on Moscow for energy and on Beijing for trade (China became Germany’s biggest trade partner under her chancellorship) was what all of Germany’s political parties wanted at the time, said Constanze Stelzenmüller of the Brookings Institution.

“Without backing from the U.S.A., which was very restrained at the time, any tougher German reaction to the annexation of Crimea could hardly have been possible,” said Jürgen Osterhammer, a historian whose work on globalization and China has been cited by Merkel as an influence on her thinking.

For her part, Merkel is determined not to rely on historians for the historical record of her tenure. While unwinding from her long years of public service, she told German media, she is working on a memoir under a major publishing contract.

In retirement, Merkel told the German news magazine Der Spiegel, she has watched “Munich,” a Netflix movie about Prime Minister Neville’s Chamberlain’s infamous negotiations with Hitler in the run-up to World War II. Though Chamberlain’s name has become synonymous with the delusions of appeasement, the film offers a more nuanced picture of the British leader as a realist statesman working to postpone the inevitable conflict. That reinterpretation appealed to Merkel, the magazine reported.

She has also made an effort to rejuvenate relations with another retired statesman, President Barack Obama, whom she visited in Washington, D.C., last June. The former leaders enjoyed a museum visit and dinner at his favorite Italian restaurant. After the trip, Merkel complained that the growing criticism she is facing at home betrayed a lack of respect for her role as leader. “It is part of democracy to endure criticism, but my impression is that an American president who’s left office is being treated with greater respect by the public than a German chancellor,” she told Der Spiegel.

In April, Merkel was again asked on stage at a book fair whether she would not reconsider her refusal to admit having made some mistakes. “Frankly,” she responded, “I don’t know whether there would be satisfaction if I were to say something that I simply don’t think merely for the sake of admitting error.”

Bojan Pancevski is The Wall Street Journal’s Germany correspondent.

Corrections & Amplifications
A caption in an earlier version of this article incorrectly identified Angela Merkel as Andrea Merkel. (Corrected on May 26)

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the May 27, 2023, print edition as 'Did Merkel Pave the Way For the War in Ukraine? Merkel’s Troubling Legacy With Putin'.

-

En ole niin höpsö että kaataisin kaiken syyn yhden ihmisen niskaan, olipa sitten kyseessä Saksan liittokansleri. Merkel ei luonut Saksan ja yleisemmin Euroopan riippuvuutta idän kaasusta ja öljystä: sen suuntaviivat ja ensimmäiset askeleet otettiin yli 50 vuotta sitten kun solmittiin ensimmäiset sopimukset putkien rakentamisesta idän ja lännen välille.

The Guardian kirjoitti tästä pitkän ja erinomaisen artikkelin kesällä 2022, joten en ala toistamaan yksityiskohtia enempää - lukusuositus tälle, jos ei ole entuudestaan tuttu: LINKKI

Ei voida myöskään sanoa, etteikö tämä kasvava riippuvuus olisi herättänyt huolta mm. Yhdysvalloissa kylmän sodan viimeisinä vuosikymmenin, lainasin näitä arkistopoimintoja toisessa ketjussa - linkki vanhaan viestiini: LINKKI

Jos mitään, sanoisin että Merkel jatkoi näiden oppi-isien ja -äitien viitoittamalla tiellä. Sama koskee kylmän sodan päättymistä seurannutta asevoimien alasajoa.

MUTTA ei voi jättää pois laskuista Putinin valtakauden aikana tehtyjä päätöksiä, varsinkin Georgian sodan 2008 ja Krimin valtaamisen 2014 sekä sitä seuranneen sodan jälkeen. Puhutaan kuitenkin kahdeksasta vuodesta, ennen kuin tämä tuorein hyökkäys alkoi 24.2.2022.

Ei voi sanoa, etteikö vaaran merkkejä ollut ilmassa JA niistä huolimatta ei tehty korjausliikkeitä tai suunnan muutoksia.

Sanoisin että Merkelin valtakausi kaipaa syväluotaavan tutkimisen, mutta sanoisin samaa myös Suomen roolista ja valtaapitävistä paitsi kylmän sodan aikana niin myös sen päättymisen jälkeen - erityisesti Putinin valtakauden aikana. Halonen, Tuomioja, Aho, Lipponen yms. Lista on pitkä ja monen taholta nähtävissä Venäjää suosivien päätösten teko, toisinaan Suomen itsensä kustannuksella. Nord Stream -kaasuputketkin nuojittiin meillä läpi "täysin taloudellisina projekteina" ja itäisen Euroopan maiden vastalauseet sivuutettiin miltei pelkällä olankohautuksella. Oliko tässä takana Venäjän paine vai myös Saksan paine?

Kuten sanottua, näen tämän lähihistorian syväluotauksen yhtenä sodan opeista. Ehkä nyt vihdoin NATO-jäsenyyden turvin uskalletaan ottaa askeleita tähän suuntaan. En kaipaa noitavainoja, mutta toisaalta olisi rehellisintä tehdä tutkimukset nyt kun tutkimusten kohteet ovat vielä hengissä - ja täten heillä on tilaisuus puolustaa sanomisiaan ja tekojaan.

Vasta eilen (vaiko toissapäivänä) Kaasuputki-Lipponen oli moittimassa Niinistöä siitä mitenkä pääministeri on syrjäytetty Nato-päätöksenteossa tms. Lipposen rooli ryssän lobbarina tulisi kyllä selvittää pohjamutia myöten. Kuten myös sellaisten veitikoiden kuin Esko Aho, Eero Heinäluoma.
 
Täälläkin on hyvä muistaa, että perivihollinen käyttää massamaisesti miinoja ja sirotteita, eikä RAT:ien määräkään jää pieneksi, vaan laadullisten puutteiden ja määrän takia niitä syntyy paljon. Ensimmäisen juttun kopiointi tänne ei onnistunut. Raivaamiseen on siis hyvä varautua sekä taidollisesti, että välineiden osalta.

https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/030bf6c5-d38c-4edf-9f79-232ee824b9cf




https://www.iltalehti.fi/iltvuutiset/a/319627ea-1dd6-4921-afed-df5c6ee93223
IL-TVIL-TV UUTISET

Vanhuksen koskettava arki Ukrainassa: Raivaa miinoja suojellakseen lehmäänsä​

Eläkeläisnainen haravoi sodan raunioittamaa kotikyläänsä miinojen varalta voidakseen päästää lehmänsä laitumelle.
Miia Sirén
Tänään klo 7:12
67-vuotias eläkeläinen Hanna Plishchynska haravoi miinoja voidakseen päästää lehmänsä laitumelle ja istuttaakseen kasvimaata.
– Ilman lehmääni en tekisi tätä, nainen kertoo.

Naisen kotikylä Stepova Dolyna sijaitsee kaakkois-Ukrainassa Mykolajivin ja Hersonin liepeillä sodan aiemman etulinjan alueella. Pahimpien tulitusten aikana Hanna kotieläimineen pakeni, mutta lopullisesti hän ei halunnut jättää tilaansa.

Raunioituneelle kylälleen palannut Hanna etsii nyt miinoja metallinpaljastimella. Löytäessään merkkejä mahdollisesta miinasta hän ilmoittaa paikasta poliisille. Vaarattomaksi toteamansa kappaleet Hanna poistaa itse.
– Minulle nauretaan, mutta toisaalla laitumelle päästetyt lehmät ovat kuolleet astuttuaan miinoihin. Mitä tekisin, jos niin kävisi omalleni?
Katso video Hannasta ja hänen lehmästään jutun alusta.
Lähde: Reuters
 
Sotien tulos ei tietysti ole pelkästä rahasta kiinni, mutta tässä yksi analyysi eri asejärjestelmien kustannustehokkuudesta, kun huomioidaan niiden hinta:

1685277479318.png


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Viestin kommenteista löytyy useita kritiikkejä, poimin niistä pari:

Table does not include cost adjustment for probability, or cost of failure [eg with drones] in terms of casualty, so quite pointless.

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Excalibur, SMArt, BONUS and Vulcano cannot be jammed and are effectively impossible to shoot down. Use them like snipers-take out enemy artillery, GBAD, C3I, EW and concentrations of troops/supplies. There are costs of NOT using the appropriate weapon, in money and lives.

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Monimutkaisia asioista, hinta on vain yksi kriteeri.
 
Tuore analyysi dronejen käytöstä Ukrainan sodan aikana:

THREAD: Our @CNA_org Russia Studies Program has a new report out - we (@sambendett and @jeffaedmonds) examine Russia's use of uncrewed systems in the Ukraine War. You can find it at this link - our main points highlighted below:

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/russias-use-of-drones-in-ukraine


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Jos ei halua lukea raporttia kokonaisuudessaan, tässä Shashank Joshin poimimat hänen silmäänsä osuneet yksityiskohdat raportista:

 
Mielenkiintoinen karttakuva. Miten linnoitettu asema kestää modernia liikkuvaa sotaa? Riippuu monesta tekijästä, mutta itäisen Ukrainan alueella osa aikavälillä 2014-2021 rakennetuista puolustusasemista on yhä ukrainalaisten miehittämiä. Hyvä myös muistaa, että osaa ei varsinaisesti menetetty suorien hyökkäysten takia vaan saarrostusuhan takia vetäytyminen oli väistämätöntä (eteläinen Ukraina ja Mariupolin alue sekä Luhanskin oblastin katkaisevat puolustusasemat)
<snip>
Muistaakseni ennen Ukrainan sotaa ajattelu oli, että tykistö, täsmä- ja termobaariset aseet pystyvät jauhamaan kiinteät puolustusasemat hajalle. Ryssä on kuitenkin käyttänyt runsaasti tykistöä mahdollistamaan etenemisen esimerkiksi Bahmutissa, mutta vanhat linnoitetut linjat ovat pitäneet. Ilmeisesti ryssällä on ollut vähänlaisesti täsmäpommeja eivätkä ilmavoimat ole häikäisseet toiminnallaan. Näkisin, että ryssää vastaan kiinteät puolustusasemat toimivat hyvin.

Droonien yleistyessä asemien maastouttaminen on tärkeää. Ryssän asemat on helppo paikantaa roskaläjien perusteella, joten siisteys on tärkeää. Aluskasvillisuuskerros on siirrettävä pois kaivamistöiden ajaksi ja lopuksi käytettävä paljastuneen maan peittelyyn, koska vastakaivettu hiekka loistaa kauas. Mielestäni kannattaa pohtia asemien kattamista koska se auttaa sekä naamioinnissa että droonin pudottamia kranaatteja vastaan. Avoimet asemat olisi syytä naamioida vähintään naamioverkolla. Muuta pohdittavaa on puolustautuminen Lancetteja vastaan verkoilla sekä ajoneuvoliikenteen jälkien peittäminen/naamioiminen. Onneksi Suomessa peitteinen maasto auttaa asiaa, varsinkin kesällä kun puissa on lehdet.
 
Yksi analyysi sodan opeista, alla Samuel Bendettin twitteriin lainaamat pätkät:

"The importance of a military’s ability to write algorithms at the edge of battle and use them effectively, combined with a willingness to change doctrine and tactics to anticipate/destroy enemy forces, may be the biggest lessons of the Ukraine war."

"Knowing how much ammunition you’ve used, where you can get more and how quickly you can move it. Knowing the best ways to move troops in and out of the front lines as they grow weary. Knowing how many drones you’ve used and where and when you can get more has been especially important for the Ukrainians, who depend on them for recon and counter-reconnaissance."


Suora linkki viitattuun artikkeliin (julkaistu 30.5.2023):

https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/write-algorithms-wage-ew-share-data-lessons-from-ukraine-war/?utm_campaign=Breaking Defense Land&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=260553350&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_qSnty_3ctUR0h_HNKGktlIVqbm9iz7mV4Qw_7CLX65prxkt5o702Q43SYt8WBikji7rlYqBV7mzRb23SUUuSOaNjd-w&utm_content=260553350&utm_source=hs_email

Write algorithms, wage EW, share data: Lessons from Ukraine war

"The loss rate for Ukrainian UAVs at the moment is about 10,000 UAVs a month," Jack Watling, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, said. "That's the level of equipment that both sides are going through."​

By COLIN CLARKon May 30, 2023 at 12:51 PM

 
Muistaakseni ennen Ukrainan sotaa ajattelu oli, että tykistö, täsmä- ja termobaariset aseet pystyvät jauhamaan kiinteät puolustusasemat hajalle. Ryssä on kuitenkin käyttänyt runsaasti tykistöä mahdollistamaan etenemisen esimerkiksi Bahmutissa, mutta vanhat linnoitetut linjat ovat pitäneet. Ilmeisesti ryssällä on ollut vähänlaisesti täsmäpommeja eivätkä ilmavoimat ole häikäisseet toiminnallaan. Näkisin, että ryssää vastaan kiinteät puolustusasemat toimivat hyvin.

Droonien yleistyessä asemien maastouttaminen on tärkeää. Ryssän asemat on helppo paikantaa roskaläjien perusteella, joten siisteys on tärkeää. Aluskasvillisuuskerros on siirrettävä pois kaivamistöiden ajaksi ja lopuksi käytettävä paljastuneen maan peittelyyn, koska vastakaivettu hiekka loistaa kauas. Mielestäni kannattaa pohtia asemien kattamista koska se auttaa sekä naamioinnissa että droonin pudottamia kranaatteja vastaan. Avoimet asemat olisi syytä naamioida vähintään naamioverkolla. Muuta pohdittavaa on puolustautuminen Lancetteja vastaan verkoilla sekä ajoneuvoliikenteen jälkien peittäminen/naamioiminen. Onneksi Suomessa peitteinen maasto auttaa asiaa, varsinkin kesällä kun puissa on lehdet.
Eihän nuo mitään uusia juttuja ole, ne on vain unohdettuja asioita nyky Suomen armeijassa, koska lyhyt 5,5 kk palvelusaika ei vain yksinkertaisesti riitä näiden perusasioiden opettamiseen.

Kuinka moni on kaivanut poteron varusmiehenä? Ja toistanut suorituksen säännöllisesti koko palvelusajan. Ennen ensimmäinen potero kaivettiin peruskoulutuskaudella ja samalla opetettiin perusasiat poteron naamioinnista, pintamaan maan sijoittaminen ympärille, poteron kattaminen, naamiointi. Jokainen osaa varmasti kaivaa kuopan, mutta tee se niin, että sulautuu maastoon ja edessä on hyvä tuliala aseelle on jo ammattitaitoa.
 
Suursodassa tavaran kulutus on suurta. Tässä puhutaan ohjuksista ja länsiohjusten integroimisesta neuvostovalmisteisiin SA-11 Buk ilmatorjuntajärjestelmiin MUTTA tämä ei olisi mahdollista, jos ei ole tavaraa mitä integroida. Sama koskee kaikkea muutakin: jos ei ole, mistä ottaa, niin vaikea siinä on auttaa.

Yksi sodan oppeja on, että jos aidosti valmistaudutaan suursotaan, vanhoja aseita ja asejärjestelmiä ei tulisi heittää menemään säästämisen nimissä.

AIM-7 Sparrow/RIM-7 Sea Sparrow is not new for Ukraine, they are being integrated onto the SA-11 Buk mobile air defense systems to solve the dwindling missile stocks issue.

From Jan: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...surface-to-air-missiles-are-headed-to-ukraine

Good lesson in not throwing away your surplus weaponry just to get it off the books and save on storage and basic maintenance.


 
Vasta eilen (vaiko toissapäivänä) Kaasuputki-Lipponen oli moittimassa Niinistöä siitä mitenkä pääministeri on syrjäytetty Nato-päätöksenteossa tms. Lipposen rooli ryssän lobbarina tulisi kyllä selvittää pohjamutia myöten. Kuten myös sellaisten veitikoiden kuin Esko Aho, Eero Heinäluoma.

Hyvä olisi selvitellä. Mutta sitä ennen Antti Pelttari pitää saada Supon johdosta pois. Presidentti vaihtuukin ihan itsestään.
Tämän jälkeen latu on vapaa tutkijoille alkaa hommiin.

En kuitenkaan usko, että mitään tutkintaa tehdään, ainakaan valtion toimesta. Suomen tapa on unohtaa.

Yksityiset kirjailijat, toimittajat yms. tutkii mitä tutkivat, mutta hyvin vaikeaa se niille on kun eivät pääse käsiksi aineistoon.
 
Wall Street Journalin artikkeli jossa pohditaan Saksan ja liittokansleri Angela Merkelin roolia, samalla kun Putin rohkaistui ja Venäjä vahvistui.
En ole niin höpsö että kaataisin kaiken syyn yhden ihmisen niskaan, olipa sitten kyseessä Saksan liittokansleri. Merkel ei luonut Saksan ja yleisemmin Euroopan riippuvuutta idän kaasusta ja öljystä
Joo, samaa mieltä siitä että ei yksi ihminen tuota ole aiheuttanut.

Saksan käyttäytymisessä on isossa kuvassa se kansantrauma mikä seurasi maailmansotaa ja trauma jatkuu edelleen. Saksa otti turpaan Neuvostoliitolta ja on sen jälkeen ollut kyykyssä ja nöyrä sinne suuntaan. Yhteistöiden vakuuttaminen on jatkunut sodan jälkeisestä ajasta Venäjänkin kanssa eikä Merkel siinä tehnyt eroa edeltäviin aikoihin. Nyt Venäjän aloittaessa sota Euroopassa, Saksassa kipuillaan muutoksen edessä. Kansantraumasta johtuen on eräillä edelleen epäselvää mitä pitää sanoa ja mitä saa sanoa.
Saksan syvä kyykky yleisellä tasolla on tilanteiden syy, ei yksin Merkel.

Nyt onneksi muutosta kuitenkin näkyvissä mutta laiva ei käänny niin nopeasti.
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Historiakatsaus Venäjän tekemiin Ukrainaa epävakauttaneisiin toimiin ennen varsinaista hyökkäystä. Tämä on toki osaksi muinaishistoriaa ja osalle tuttua, jos seurasi Ukrainan tapahtumia Maidanin aikoihin ja sitä seurannutta Krimin kaappausta ja sotaa itäisessä Ukrainassa. (ketju julkaistu 1.12.2022)

Mitä tästä voi oppia? Monenlaista, tällainen valtion kaappaamisen projekti sisältää monta vaihetta:

There are no separatists in the Donbas. The War in Donbas was an elaborate russian ploy. Some global media sources keep referencing the so-called DPR and LPR patched russian troops as "pro-russian separatists." In this thread, I aim to explain why it is russian propaganda.

russian aggression against Ukraine could be broadly broken down into three phases:

1. Hybrid warfare phase, 2009-Feb. 20 2014
2. "Plausible" deniability invasion, Feb. 20 2014-Feb. 24 2022
3. Full-scale invasion, Feb. 24, 2022-ongoing

The hybrid warfare phase commenced in 2009. It did not involve any conventional warfare means. Instead, russia utilized economic blackmail, cyber warfare, psy ops, and info warfare (propaganda) against Ukraine.

Here's an excerpt from a report by the 21st Century Center for Global Studies:

"...at the end of 2005, the 'Donetsk Republic' project emerged, as a successor of the Donetsk-Kryvyi Rih Soviet Republic of 1918. The project was unsuccessful, and the organization was banned in Ukraine, but it continued its underground operations with comprehensive support from russia. It was fully reactivated at the beginning of 2009. The 2009 russia-Ukraine gas dispute had far-reaching goals [russia limited natural gas deliveries to Ukraine]...

"It was supposed to spark an internal political conflict in Ukraine along the East-West line. The idea was that in the event of a complete cessation of gas supplies (for domestic consumption + transit to the EU), the authorities in Ukraine will not be able to ensure the supply of gas from the main underground gas stores facilities located in the west of the country to the main industrial centers in the east, which would be left without heat. Thus, it was supposed to provoke, according to the plan of russian strategists, 'a social unrest in the east and south of Ukraine.' In 2009, the russian Foundation for Strategic Culture worked out the so-called 'semi-hard' scenario, which included an emergency intervention of russian military contingents with the "interim government" Ukraine, the dynamic deployment of local governments in the occupied territories based on the 'support forces' prepared in advance - marginal groups, critical of the authorities in Kyiv, the creation of 'independent quasi-state entities.' It is no coincidence that on...

"January 12, 2009, publications appeared in the russian media on the topic of 'reviewing borders' in the CIS and statements by russian politicians: 'Deputy of the State Duma of the russian federation Konstantin Zatulin does not exclude that russia' at the right time...

"will give a sign 'to the southeastern regions of Ukraine to join russia.' Probably, the results of the joint meeting of the Security Council and the State Council of the russian federation on December 25, 2008, where the emphasis was placed on the...

"special role of interregional relations within the CIS, the integration core of which is the CSTO and the EAEU, became the basis for such statements."

I recommend you read the report in full here:

https://geostrategy.org.ua/en/analy...i-viyn-novogo-pokolinnya/zavantazhiti-pdf-ros

Photo: members of the "Donetsk Republic," Aug. 2009
1685806318483.png

The russian plan was to destabilize Ukraine's political system sufficiently for the country to abandon its EU membership aspirations and join the Eurasian Economic Union, russia's tool for economic extortion and political influence.

Through instability and political machinations, a pro-russian dictator was supposed to take over in Ukraine effectively turning the country into another Belarus. Yanukovych was supposed to be that pro-russian dictator, who "won" the elections in 2010 with russia's assistance.

Despite having pro-russian Yanukovich as president of Ukraine, russia started preparing contingency plans to occupy parts or all of Ukraine as early as summer 2013. In September of 2013 russian and Belarus conducted joint military exercises in the Kaliningrad Oblast, western russia, and Belarus simulating an invasion into an unspecified neighboring country with the aim to "protect an oppressed russian-speaking population."

https://web.archive.org/web/20220718194339/https://www.dw.com/ru/гибридная-война-в-европе-пишут-историю-конфликта-на-украине/a-18365493

The same year russian far-right monarchist and businessman Konstantin Malofeyev drafted a plan carving up Ukraine that reached putin's desk (LÄHDE). But most importantly in 2016 Ukrainian Cyberalliance, a hacktivist group, gained access to Surkov's emails.

Vladislav Surkov, an éminence grise and one of the Kremlin's chief ideologists, was a key architect behind the occupation of Crimea and the War in Donbas. The email hack spans a period between September 2013 and November 2014. Recall that the War in Donbas started in April.
Surkov's pre-April email hacks include a 22-page document outlining a plan to destabilize Ukraine using ethnic russian nationalists and pro-russian figures financed by the Kremlin. The hacks also include a description of a "novorossiya" project.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/2...lot-to-destabilize-kiev-surkov-ukraine-leaks/


According to the "novorossiya" project, russia planned to create a landbridge between russia and Crimea, not yet occupied, and Transnistria in Moldova. The plan included the creation of a number of quasi-states in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. As we now know the plan failed.
The start of the Euromaidan protests in November 2013 lasting till February 23, 2014, signaled the russians that the puppet dictator plan they had for Ukraine was not going to work. The contingency plans and the assets russia planted in Ukraine since 2009 were activated.

Taking advantage of the confusion amidst the Revolution of Dignity, the russians enter Crimea and oust the legitimate Ukrainian authorities there. The "little green men" expression is born -- the russian troops use no identifying insignia but were clothed in russian camo.

It is likely that the Yanukovych-appointed SBU officers either assisted or at the very least did not interfere with the russian occupation of Crimea.

Source 1: https://news.liga.net/politics/news..._vernul_v_krym_fsb_i_naznachil_shpionov_v_sbu
Source 2: https://prm.ua/ru/komandirovki-agen...yie-faktyi-biografii-valentina-nalivaychenko/


Concurrently with the occupation of Crimea, the GRU started a massive disinformation campaign (LÄHDE). russian propaganda claimed that the revolution in Ukraine was a "coup" by Ukrainian "nationalists, fascists, and nazis" financed by the West.
Now Donbas.

Some sociological surveys first. The chart below shows that the percentage of the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts) population wishing to join russia was far from the majority. Note that ru propaganda was hard at work there for at least 5 years by that point.

1685807805293.png

The results above are corroborated by another survey conducted roughly in the same period.

Source 1: https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=236&page=1&y=2014&m=3
Source 2: https://dif.org.ua/article/chi-vlastivi-ukraintsyam-nastroi-separatizmu

1685807840461.png


The russians attempted to conduct a repeat of the Crimean scenario in the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. However, the plan there failed as there was no russian military presence there (yet). Recall, that the russians leased the Sevastopol Naval Base for their Black Sea fleet.
The attempts in the Donbas also failed due to an overwhelming pro-Ukrainian sentiment. Thousands of Ukrainians rallied in Donetsk throughout March and April of 2014 in opposition to the provocations conducted by the russian intelligence services. LÄHDE

A joint operation by the FSB and the GRU saw that russian "titushky" or provocateurs, frequently with criminal past, were brought into the Donbas and clashed with the Ukrainian patriots and turned the unity rallies into a bloody affair. Their aim was to scare people.
An active part in the "pro-russian protests" in the Donbas was taken by the members of the aforementioned russian asset organization, "Donetsk Republic," and members of the now-banned ethnic russian Bloc, who were trained in ru for this very purpose. LÄHDE

The simultaneous "pro-russian protests" in 11 Ukrainian cities were coordinated by moscow and utilized the local criminal element, hired or blackmailed into collaboration, and the russian "tourists," frequently of the ultra-rightwing kind.
N.B. Members of the russian Imperial Movement (RIM) took part in the occupation of Crimea and the events leading up to the War in Donbas. RIM is recognized as a terrorist organization by the US and Canada. More on them here:


Surkov's email hacks also reveal the financial trail and the command chain during the so-called "russian spring," an irredentist project the russians started implementing in earnest in 2014. Source: https://www.liga.net/politics/opini...kak-rossiyane-delali-russkuyu-vesnu-v-ukraine

"We must take under control all the administrative buildings... By tomorrow morning complete the task so that Oblast level authorities could face the facts," - wrote Glazyev, a russian citizen and an advisor to the russian president, to one of the russian agents in Ukraine.
In a daily press briefing on April 7, 2014, after the meeting between Lavrov and Kerry, Psaki stated: "...the Secretary noted the Ukrainian Government’s assertion that this appeared to be a carefully orchestrated campaign with russian support." LÄHDE

1685807601981.png

On April 12, 2014, the russian invasion of Ukraine begins. On that day the russian forces under the command of Strelkov-Girkin, an FSB colonel, cross the border into Ukraine from russia and capture Sloviansk.

https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/russian-spring-2020-possible/31203721.html

The legitimate authorities in Kyiv launched a counter-terrorism operation two days later. As the russian troops fought without a banner, the Ukrainian government labeled the russian forces as terrorists (a fitting label, IMHO).

I will not go over the chronology of the war. So far in this thread, you've seen the elaborate preparations by russians that took years. I will provide you direct evidence with links showing DIRECT russian involvement in the War in Donbas.

Perhaps the most extensive investigation was conducted by @InformNapalm. They have a full list of all the ru units that were identified to be fighting in Eastern Ukraine pre-02.24 along with the incidents they were involved in:

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet...PqZhXMpG764TD2n3dbj461331k/edit#gid=941406428

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/16mV_B2MwLVCVeR6M5PqZhXMpG764TD2n3dbj461331k/edit#gid=0

The list includes 83 russian military units engaged in 193 separate incidents. The list contains links with detailed explanations of how the identification was conducted. Here is a visual representation of the scale of russian involvement -- units came from all over russia:
1685807487588.png

ru troops were even captured as POWs by the Ukrainians as early as August 2014. Here is a video interview with captured VDV troops explaining their "journey" into Ukraine (spoiler alert: they were told they were going for military drills, not war):

In 2014 RBC, a russian outlet, conducted its own investigation following reports of russian troops ending up dead or in Ukrainian captivity: LÄHDE

The official response from the ru MOD was that the ru troops went to Ukraine as volunteers while on leave.

The russians also employed a large number of ultra-rightwing volunteers and organizations from russia to fight in the War in Donbas, including DShRG Rusich, russian Imperial Movement, russian National Unity, russian Cossacks, etc.


Some of those russian military organizations were forged in Ukraine. The infamous Wagner Group was organized in 2014 to allow for plausible deniability of the russian presence in Eastern Ukraine. Wagner was created as an amalgamation of GRU/VDV Spetsnaz and russian Neo-Nazis.

There are also numerous reports of ru military equipment extensively used in the War in Donbas, e.g. TOS-1 Buratino not in Ukrainian service (LÄHDE), MLRS systems used exclusively by russia (LÄHDE), T-72B3 exclusive to russia (LÄHDE)

The russians were also shelling Ukraine from russia before February 24, 2022 as confirmed by an investigation conducted by the International Partnership for Human Rights:
https://iphronline.org/wp-content/u...report-on-cross-border-shelling-June-2016.pdf
The evidence is seemingly endless, but for conciseness, it is best to end with the most recent ruling on the shoot-down of MH17. LÄHDE

MH17: Three guilty as court finds Russia-controlled group downed airliner
A Dutch trial finds a missile supplied by Russia killed 298 people on board MH17 over Ukraine in 2014.


On November 17, the court in Hague found Igor Girkin, an FSB colonel, Sergey Dubinsky, a senior GRU officer, and Leonid Kharchenko, a russian agent, guilty of killing 298 people aboard flight MH17. This inspires hope that justice will be served for all.

 
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