Ukrainan sodan tappioiden vaikutukset Venäjän uhkaan?

Pekka Toveri tekee laajan yhteen vetävän esityksen materiaalitilanteesta. Sanoo että aikaisintaan 2025 Ukraina saavuttaisi (länsituen jatkuessa voimakkaana) materiaalista ylivoimaa kun kunnostettava alkaa varastoista pikku hiljaa hiipua. Siksi Venäjän on nyt yritettävä epätoivon vimmalla jos meinaavat tavoitteitaan saavuttaa.

Pekka Toveri: Tällaiset ovat nyt Ukrainan ja Venäjän joukot, varastot ja sotatuotanto​


 
Pekka Toveri tekee laajan yhteen vetävän esityksen materiaalitilanteesta. Sanoo että aikaisintaan 2025 Ukraina saavuttaisi (länsituen jatkuessa voimakkaana) materiaalista ylivoimaa kun kunnostettava alkaa varastoista pikku hiljaa hiipua. Siksi Venäjän on nyt yritettävä epätoivon vimmalla jos meinaavat tavoitteitaan saavuttaa.

Kuitenkin tällä hetkellä monenlaisessa kalustossa Venäjällä edelleen selvä ylivoima ja varastoissa vanhempaa kalustoa riittää. Toivottavasti tämän vuoden Ukraina pystyy sinnittelemään ja kuluttamaan voimasuhteita tasaisempaan suuntaan.
 
Onkohan Iskander-prikaatin perustamisen syynä Karjalankannakselle pelko siitä, että Atacmsien mahdollinen tulo Ukrainaan tuhoaa Iskanderit lähtötelineisiin?
Vähän samankaltainen ilmiö kuin ohjusveneiden siirto Itämereltä Laatokalle?
 
Onkohan Iskander-prikaatin perustamisen syynä Karjalankannakselle pelko siitä, että Atacmsien mahdollinen tulo Ukrainaan tuhoaa Iskanderit lähtötelineisiin?
Vähän samankaltainen ilmiö kuin ohjusveneiden siirto Itämereltä Laatokalle?
Ironista jos näin olisi. Ryzzä tuo ohjuksensa Naton kylkeen suojaan. Naton, jota vastaan se omasta mielestä käy sotaa.
 
Osaisiko @Antares tai joku muu arvioida tai linkata luotettavaa ulkopuolista arviota ryssän it:n tilasta?

Ilmapuolustus tuntuu vuotavan kuin seula ja nyt on jo jonkin aikaa nähty ja kuultu ainakin kerrottavan lähes päivittäisistä s-300/400 tappioista, on tehty iskuja tutka-asemiin ja päälle Pantsirit ym. lyhyemmän kantaman systeemit.

Päätelleen Ukrainan dronejen kyvystä penetroitua syvälle emäryssälään, ilmapuolustusta on keskitetty Ukrainan lähialueille. Huomattavaa on myös ilmavoimien kyvyttömyys torjua (ei havaita?) droneja satojen km lentomatkoista huolimatta. Koska ollaan tilanteessa, että tappiot johtavat tilanteeseen, jossa rintaman ja krimin ilmapuolustus alkaa käytännössä lepäämään ilmavoimien harteilla ja silloinkin huonolla tilannekuvalla tutkien puuttuessa?

Tämä antaisi sauman Ukrainalle lentää korkealla ja pakottaa ryssän ilmavoimat tekemään saman, jolloin tulisivat Patriotin ym. vaikutuspiiriin.

Jos naapurin ilmapuolustus oikeasti murenee, voitaneen olla aika huoletta Itämeren turvallisuuden osalta myös.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Osaisiko @Antares tai joku muu arvioida tai linkata luotettavaa ulkopuolista arviota ryssän it:n tilasta?

Ilmapuolustus tuntuu vuotavan kuin seula ja nyt on jo jonkin aikaa nähty ja kuultu ainakin kerrottavan lähes päivittäisistä s-300/400 tappioista, on tehty iskuja tutka-asemiin ja päälle Pantsirit ym. lyhyemmän kantaman systeemit.

Päätelleen Ukrainan dronejen kyvystä penetroitua syvälle emäryssälään, ilmapuolustusta on keskitetty Ukrainan lähialueille. Huomattavaa on myös ilmavoimien kyvyttömyys torjua (ei havaita?) droneja satojen km lentomatkoista huolimatta. Koska ollaan tilanteessa, että tappiot johtavat tilanteeseen, jossa rintaman ja krimin ilmapuolustus alkaa käytännössä lepäämään ilmavoimien harteilla ja silloinkin huonolla tilannekuvalla tutkien puuttuessa?

Tämä antaisi sauman Ukrainalle lentää korkealla ja pakottaa ryssän ilmavoimat tekemään saman, jolloin tulisivat Patriotin ym. vaikutuspiiriin.

Jos naapurin ilmapuolustus oikeasti murenee, voitaneen olla aika huoletta Itämeren turvallisuuden osalta myös.

Ukrainalainen vishun_military niminen OSINT-ryhmä julkaisi artikkelin tästä aiheesta 26.5.2024 eli melko tasan kaksi viikkoa sitten.

Tässä saatesanat heidän telegram-kanavaltaan: LÄHDE

Study of the state of air defense of Russia

Our readers have repeatedly asked to study the air defense of the Russian Federation. We will fulfill your request. Since there is a lot of material for work, we divided the study into two parts:

- Army air defense;
- Air Defense Air Force of the Russian Federation.

The first part of the army's anti-aircraft defense includes units of the ground forces of the Russian Federation, whose task is to directly cover the troops on the battlefield.

⭕ In this study,
we focused on the estimated number of anti-aircraft missile systems in the Russian army and marines at the beginning of the invasion to estimate the scale of losses, because without understanding the estimated number of SAMs in service, it is impossible to estimate the scale of losses.

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Lainaan artikkelin tekstin käännöksen kokonaisuudessaan spoilerin taakse mutta minun oli pakko poistaa muutama kuvituskuva:

https://www.vishchun.com/post/doslidzhennia-armiiskoi-ppo-rf

    • May 26

    • Read 8 min

Research of the army air defense of the Russian Federation​


Recently, the readers of "Military Fortune Teller" have repeatedly asked to do a study of air defense of the Russian Federation. We will fulfill your request. Since there is a lot of material to work with, we divided the study into two parts - army air defense and air defense of the Russian Air Force . To begin with, a short reference.

To the army air defense includes include units of the ground forces of the Russian Federation, the task of which is to directly cover the troops on the battlefield. We are talking about anti-aircraft missile regiments and brigades, anti-aircraft missile divisions as part of brigades and air defense units of motorized rifle and tank regiments.

Air defense of the military and space forces is a separate type of strategic-level troops whose task is to cover important military and civil infrastructure. VKS units are armed with S-300/400 complexes, which are on duty at permanent deployment points. More details - in the next study.


A few words about the structure of the army air defense​


  • Let's start with the smallest - motorized rifle regiment . Each motorized rifle regiment has in its structure three motorized rifle battalions, a tank company or battalion, and an anti-aircraft missile artillery division (abbreviated as ZRADN). ZRADN of the regimental level are armed with 8 units of air defense systems. As a rule, these are 4 units of the Strela-10 air defense system and 4 units of the Tunguska or Shilka air defense system. Tank regiments also have an identical structure in terms of air defense.

  • Next come the anti-aircraft missile (ZRDN) and anti-aircraft missile and artillery (ZRADN) in the brigades. As a rule, brigades have one ZRDN and one ZRADN . ZRDNs in brigades have up to 12 units of "Tor" or "Osa-AKM" air defense systems , ZRADN - 6 units of "Strila-10" and 6 units of "Tunguska" air defense systems . Some brigades may be armed with anti-aircraft missiles on the "Buk" air defense system, which includes 6 self-propelled fire installations .

  • Anti-aircraft missile regiments (ZRP) are armed mainly with Tors, some units are still armed with Osa or Buks and may have a different number of vehicles in their composition. As a rule, anti-aircraft missile regiments as part of motorized rifle divisions are armed with up to 16 combat vehicles (4 batteries on "Torah" or "Osakh"). The ZRP as part of the Airborne Divisions has 12 units of the Strela-10 air defense system and 6 units of the BTR-3D "Skezhet" with the ZU-32-2, which were not included in the study, as well as other anti-aircraft artillery weapons.

  • Anti-aircraft missile brigades (ZRBR) are armed with "Buk" and "S-300B/B4" and can have up to 4 anti-aircraft missiles. ZRDN on "Buk" has up to 6 self-propelled fire installations (IEDs) . S-300B/B4 brigades consist of two divisions, each of which has up to 36 launchers (PU) and launchers (ROM).

How the research was conducted and what it includes​


In this study, we focused on the estimated number of anti-aircraft missile systems in the Russian land forces and marines at the beginning of the invasion to estimate the scale of losses, because without understanding the estimated number of SAMs in service, it is impossible to estimate losses. The "inspiration" for the study was the figures of The Military Balance, which it was impossible to agree with.

For the assessment, we used such OSINT sources as historical data, publications in the mass media, photos from the social networks of servicemen, satellite images, the pace of production of new complexes, etc. The study includes an estimate of the number of anti-aircraft missile systems "Tor", "Buk", "Osa-AKM", "Strela-10", "Tunguska" and a few words about modifications of the S-300 (S-300B/B4) in ground forces units and Marines, training centers, foreign military bases and partially at storage bases. Anti-aircraft artillery weapons were not included in the calculation.

The task turned out to be difficult, because the Russians were actively preparing for the invasion, rearming and deploying new units with unknown armaments. The assessment was carried out by two methods:
  • a table with existing subdivisions, in which information from open sources was entered (media publications, photo in /h). If the state and availability of air defense systems in service are unknown, standard states were taken for assessment (in the vast majority of cases we are talking about motorized rifle regiments);
  • historical data on the number of air defense systems in Russia + information on contracted new complexes during 2010-2022.

The numbers are indicative for a strategic assessment of Russian air defense capabilities and losses and do not claim to be the most accurate figure of the year.

How many air defense systems did Russia have at the beginning of the invasion?​


As a result of the research, we received the following figures:


Type of air defense systemEstimated quantity for 2022
Buk260-300
Tor340-350
Osa-AKM160-170
Strela-10450-500
Tunguska260-320
C-300B/B4 *4 ZRBR, 1 ZRP, 1 DZN *
Together1470-1640

But there are details in these figures that need to be clarified, so we recommend reading the article.


Buk air defense system​


0c450b_6032945c80924a4296f68a364a2db7e8~mv2.png


Let's start with the fact that the Buk air defense system is a complex and cannot be considered as separate machines. To estimate losses, we focused on self-propelled fire installations . The traditional "Bukiv" division includes 3 batteries, each of which has 2 units of self-propelled fire installations (6 IEDs) .

This air defense system is mainly used by individual anti-aircraft missile brigades, each of which has 3-4 divisions - up to 24 IEDs. In the period 2009-2016, the troops were supplied with "Buk-M2" complexes to replace outdated Soviet versions, in 2016-2022 - "Buk-M3". In the course of rearmament, outdated complexes were transferred to some motorized rifle brigades or taken out for storage.

During the research, we estimated the number of IEDs in the range of 260-300 units. A somewhat large range is caused by an arbitrary number of IEDs in divisions, which can be up to 6 units (emphasis on the word "to"). This is especially true of the newest Buk-M3, whose ROM and IED have increased ammunition (6 rockets for the Buk-M3 IED versus 4 for the Buk-M2). Accordingly, the staff number of IEDs is reduced to 4 (as stated), but we must also take into account the maximum possible staff - 6 units.

The Military Balance 2022 gives a figure of 350 units , excluding the units of the Navy (Marine Corps). What exactly is meant by the number 350 is unknown (IED, ROM?), but this number has not changed for many years.

Some of the decommissioned Buk air defense systems can be found at storage bases. Basically, the machines remain at the bases and are used as donors . The exact number of divisions in storage is unknown, since the vast majority of equipment is stored in hangars (at least 75 arsenals).



0c450b_1ef6b24f12e846e9ba57920154dcc40f~mv2.gif



SAM "Tor"​


0c450b_cbf3555e18cb48c9b86e3fa9ce73a1e7~mv2.png


The combat vehicle of the Tor air defense system is equipped with all the necessary means for detecting and destroying air targets, so it is much easier to estimate the losses of this complex.

The Russian army had about 110-120 units of "Tors" of old modifications ("Tor", "Tor-M1"). The MIlitary Balance guide has been giving the same estimate of the number of all mods since at least 2009, and it has somehow not changed since then, but...

In 2011-2016, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation purchased the new Tor-M2U modification, from 2016 - the newest Tor-M2 (including kits of the Artic version of the Tor-M2DT ). Practically all these purchases were ignored by the directory.

In total, according to our estimate, at the beginning of the invasion, the Russians had at their disposal 340-350 combat vehicles. This figure includes old complexes that may have been sent for storage and those that are in training centers. The production of machines continued all the time before and after the beginning of the invasion,

Air defense system "Strela-10"​


0c450b_b686b532ae4d45fa974b6d35d9d99843~mv2.png


For years, the Russians methodically prepared for the invasion and deployed new divisions. In addition to the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, this complex was handed over to the LPR/DPR. Taking into account the number of available units, the probable full-time number of Strela-10 air defense systems can reach 500 units. We have not been able to confirm the presence of the Strela-10 air defense system in a number of units, but taking into account the 2023 pictures of 75 arsenals, on the basis of which the air defense systems repair company operates, work on the restoration of this air defense system was/is going on very actively.

In the picture, you can see about 80 MT-LB, based on which the Strela-10 air defense system was developed (some of the machines were in storage). Note that we may be mistaken in the identification of these machines.

0c450b_299fb9fc72de477d8a79c5f79b6f4cf5~mv2.png


The Military Balance gives a figure of 480 units + some number in the units of the DPR/LPR , which roughly coincides with our estimate. In contrast to the full-scale production of the Buk and Tor complexes, the Russian defense industry worked mainly on the modernization of the Strela-10 air defense system and the launch of a new missile for it. So there have been no significant changes in the number of SAMs over the years, and the directory has great inaccuracies exactly when this happens.

SAM "Osa-AKM"​


0c450b_123c1f5e9585412987f0a4701329961f~mv2.png


It was this complex that the Russians tried to completely replace with new "Toriv" modifications. The air defense system is outdated and has a number of related shortcomings, and serial production was stopped in the late 80s.

In total, up to 1,800 complexes were manufactured, including export samples for other countries. According to The Military Balance 2012, the Russian army had 420+ complexes in service and this figure did not change until 2022. As already mentioned above, this is not true.

According to our estimate, about 160 units of "Osa-AKM" remained in the armament of land units and marine units . The rearmament of the "Tora" took place dynamically, and the "Wasps" were taken out for storage. We counted about 250 Osa-AKM combat vehicles in storage bases, but in reality there may be more, as some may be in hangars.

0c450b_f29f36c1927045ee9f533e450a730e74~mv2.png


As of mid-2023 (according to the available images), there has not been any unusual activity around the "Os" in storage, the machines are rather spot cannibalized or removed from storage in small quantities. In general, the study of air defense systems in storage is a separate topic, which may appear in the future on "Military Vishchun".

ZRPK "Tunguska"​


0c450b_e196d09ce98a4c7ebda59634c92c2b5e~mv2.png


As in the case of the Strela-10, the presence of the Tungusok in service was not confirmed in a number of regiments, which could instead have the Shilki or ZU-32-2 in service. According to the historical data of The Military Balance 2012, 250+ "Tungusok" were in service at that time .

Before the "great deployment of new divisions" and preparation for the invasion, the staff of the land units in 2009-2016 numbered about 200 vehicles. We counted another 60+ machines in the 75 arsenal. More cars can be stored in hangars.

0c450b_0ff6a8bfeb5747eb8b9bb9974351fb9d~mv2.png


Thus, at the beginning of the invasion, the Russians could have from 260 to 320 units of "Tunguska". The upper "ceiling" of the range may seem (and be) a bit high, but we were starting from the states of the units.



A few words about S-300B and S-300B4 *​


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The air defense brigades of the ground forces are also armed with long-range S-300B and S-300B4 complexes, which can cover troops in a radius of up to 100 km. They are armed with 28, 38, 77, 202 anti-aircraft missile brigades (one brigade per military district), the 988th anti-aircraft missile regiment, a division in the 39th motorized rifle brigade. Brigades consist of 2 divisions, each of which usually has 4 batteries. The basis of each battery consists of a multi-channel guidance station (RALS) and up to 9 PU/ROM.

The material and technical base of the divisions may differ, have a different structure and number of PU/ROM, in connection with which it is difficult to estimate losses. The destroyed PU of such complexes does not mean the destruction/incapacitation of the entire division.

According to Oryx, the Armed Forces have destroyed/damaged 3 multi-channel guidance stations and 7 PU/ROMs. At least one division can be considered disabled.


Assessment of losses​


According to visually confirmed data, the Russians have lost 11-13% of their combat vehicles and self-propelled anti-aircraft fire systems.

Type of air defense systemEstimated quantity for 2022Losses (24.05.2024)Loss percentage
Buk260-3005518-21%
Tor340-3505415-16%
Osa-AKM160-1702112-13%
Strela-10450-500459-10%
Tunguska260-320144-5%
Together1470-164018911-13%

It is obvious that not all losses are recorded visually. Some of the lesions were applied without external filming (AGM-88) or with non-public means of lesions, some remained in the archives.


Production rates​



Since 2016, 6 brigades have been re-armed with Buk-M3 air defense systems (one brigade per year on average). As a rule, a brigade consists of 3-4 divisions, but in the case of "Buk-M3" it is quite likely that the declared "brigade sets" were not always complete and could consist of 2 divisions . The same number of ordered Buk-M3 divisions was announced in 2023 in one of Shoigu's videos:

"According to the terms of the current year's state defense order, we have to ship two divisions, the first division was shipped ahead of schedule in September, the second is under final assembly and adjustment."

On average, annual production rates were 2-4 divisions. This allows you to partially cover losses. In the case of the production of 2-4 divisions per year with 4 IEDs in each, in two years the Russians could compensate for 16-32 lost IEDs out of 55 visually confirmed. The machines in storage will be used rather to extend the resource of the complexes of old modifications available in service.

According to the mass media, at the moment JSC "Ulyanovsky Mechanical Plant" (manufacturer of the "Buk" air defense system) needs to close more than 150 vacancies. The vast majority of vacancies require more than 3 years of experience in working with radio electronics, which makes the search for personnel not so easy. A significant increase in the number of manufactured products is still in the future.

"Kupol" Izhevsk Electromechanical Plant" in the pre-war period could supply 24-36 Tor-M2 air defense systems per year . At the moment, the contract signed with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2019 for the production of the Tor-M2 air defense system for 100 billion rubles until 2027 is in effect. It is impossible to determine the exact number of machines under the contract, as it is not known exactly what it includes.

As a speculation, we will cite a contract for a set of 12 Tor-M1 combat vehicles in 2013, which cost ~178 million dollars. That is, we can talk about about 8-10 divisions during 2019-2027. Given the jumps in the ruble exchange rate and other factors, conditions could change.

One way or another, the plant could supply up to 3 ZRDN (36 cars) per year. During the two years of the war, the Russians could compensate for the loss of 4-6 ZRDN (48-72 vehicles), i.e., the production approximately covers the visually confirmed losses.

As for "Osa", "Strela-10" and "Tunguska", serial production of these complexes as such has not been carried out for many years. If the "Wasps" were to be completely replaced by the "Tor-M2" air defense system, then there are no ready-made serial products for other complexes yet. A small part of the machines underwent modernization, but the vast majority of air defense systems were outdated and needed replacement even before the start of the war. The problem of the regimental-ZRDN brigade level complexes has not been solved and with active use sooner or later they will require modernization.

It is known that in 2014-2015, the Russian Armed Forces received more than 30 Strela-10MN air defense systems with thermal imagers from Airborne Forces units. The pace of modernization was more than 15 machines per year , in total, 72 units of modernized air defense systems were received by the Air Force units, which continue to be supplied even now. We are talking about the modernization of existing complexes.

Sporadic modernization of the Tunguska-M1 air defense system also took place, but the approximate numbers are unknown.

The further development of "Arrows-10" should become the "Sosna" air defense system, "Tungusok" should replace the "Derivation-Air Defense" air defense system. This has not happened yet, the projects are in the development/"finishing" stage.

It is worth noting that the Russian Federation has a solid number of obsolete air defense systems, namely "Osa-AKM". As the mass media and officials stated in 2022-2023, the Kupol plant , which was the manufacturer of Osa-AKM, is modernizing these systems to the level of Osa-AKM1 , which is an interesting signal . "Kupol" is the manufacturer of the Tor-M2 air defense system, which was supposed to replace the "Osy". But, obviously, the losses are hitting the capabilities of the Russian troops, which requires faster and cheaper solutions to this problem. For now, we are talking about a small number of vehicles (mostly those that are in service), since there is little activity at the storage bases around these SAMs.


Conclusion​


Air defense losses add significant problems to the Russian military, but they are not critical. In addition to serial production of new complexes, the Russians have the potential to recover 300+ air defense systems from storage bases and partially compensate for losses to maintain the combat capability of army air defense units.

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HUOM: tämä käsittelee pelkästään ryssän maavoimien ilmatorjuntakalustoa, jättäen varsinaisten ilmavoimien (Aerospace forces) ilmatorjuntakaluston tämän tarkastelun ulkopuolelle. He kirjoittavat, että heidän tarkoituksenaan on julkaista jossain vaiheessa myös varsinaisten ilmavoimien ilmatorjuntakaluston tarkastelu, mutta sitä ei ole toistaiseksi julkaistu.

Lisäksi, tässä lainaamassani artikkelissa arvioidaan pelkästään aktiivijoukkojen käytössä olleen kaluston määrää eikä varastotukikohdissa olevan kaluston määrää.

Silti, en muista nähneeni aikaisemmin vastaavaa yritystä arvioida ilmatorjuntakaluston määrää - toki poislukien ne numerot jotka on nähtävissä Military Balance julkaisuista. Vishun_military artikkeli vertailee heidän arviotaan Military Balance julkaisujen arvioon - ja numerot eivät täsmää. Täten jää lukijan vastuulle miettiä, kumman numeroita pitää luotettavampana.
 
Jatkoa edelliseen viestiin, sitä tukeva twitter-ketju joka lähestyy ryssän maavoimien ilmatorjuntakaluston määriä yhden, tosin merkittävimmän varastotukikohdan kaluston näkökulmasta (tämä on julkaistu 1.6.2024):

75th Arsenal JSC

A Thread about what this facility hold has equipment.

Imagery is from June, 14th 2023.


1718030277355.png

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First, this facility has been a GRAU (Ministry of Defence Artillery and Missile Directorate) Arsenal.

Sometime after USSR breakup, the facility become a private company known as "75 Arsenal JSC".

This facility has been dealing mainly with Ground Forces Air Defences.


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That means you won't find any Aerospace Forces equipment here.

This facility is known to be doing extensive repair and maintenance, similar to what can be done in BTRZ for armored vehicles.

Compared to other Arsenals, the facility stores more than half of AD equipment.


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60% of Ground Forces Air Defence reserve is stored here (574 out of 950).

Almost 200 S-300V vehicles are present at that facility, in fact, more vehicle are actually in reserve than in active service (visible in Red Polygons).


(katso kuvat twitter-ketjusta)

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That means that a third of equipment stored here is Long Range Air Defence.

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Moving to medium Range,

There is a noticeable number (77) of Buk-Mx vehicles around, unfortunately, it is not possible to identify precisely which variant is present, few export vehicle could be noticed (in blue below).


(katso kuvat twitter-ketjusta)

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SHORAD, there are a lot of various SHORAD platforms:
Tunguska (light green), Pantsir (dark green), OSA(pink), Strela(blue green), TOR(yellow), even a few Shilkas (black).

This make up about another third (224) of the stored active systems.


(katso kuvat twitter-ketjusta)

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Also, Several surveillance radars (purple) to support SHORAD are present : P-40, PRV-16, P-19, PPRU-1. Most of them except modern PPRU-1 variants are obsolete. 74 Radars were identified.

(katso kuvat twitter-ketjusta)

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To support all of this complex hardware, the base is full of more than 683 various support vehicles (white) and trailers that make possible Air Defence operations.

Command posts, maintenance, testing, smaller radars, etc...


(katso kuvat twitter-ketjusta)

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This work took me a while compared to what I've been doing for Tank counting for CBRT's because most of those Systems are complex with various support vehicles to conduct operations.

Here is the detailed breakdown of vehicles in this facility.


1718030528743.png
1718030545268.png

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In the very near future, I'm going to deal with Ground Forces Air Defence equipment in other facilities, namely :

- 8th GRAU Arsenal
- 80th GRAU Arsenal
- 94th GRAU Arsenal
- Arsenal of MU 59313-46.



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Poiminta viestiketjun kommenteista: 216th and 7021st are the first to look at after the 8th arsenal.

Johon Athene Noctua vastasi näin: Thanks for the head-up about the 216th. For the 7021st, it's actual name is Arsenal of Artillery and Missile for Eastern Military District, military unit 59313-46, I already going to cover it.

Alkuperäinen kommentoija vastasi näin: And this one as well - 48.35307668324673, 135.04039164452178

Johon Athene Noctua vastasi näin: Nice catch !

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Eli jos hänen arvionsa / tietonsa pitää paikkansa, tämä 75th Arsenal JSC varastoi noin 60% maavoimien varastoiduista ilmatorjuntalaitteista. Tietysti tähän laskelmaan pätee sama kuin muihin vastaaviin eli on laskettu se mitä nähdään optisten satelliittien kuvista. Täten ei nähdä varastohallien ja peltikatosten sisälle ja alle. JOS niissä on varastoitu jonkin verran kalustoa, se määrä puuttuu tästä laskelmasta.

HUOM: varsinaisten ilmavoimien eli Aerospace forces ilmatorjuntakalusto on varastoituna muualle ja niiden aktiivijoukkojen kalusto on myös asia erikseen.

Athene Noctua kirjoittaa että aikoo tehdä vastaavanlaisen tarkastelun / twitter-ketjun myös muiden ilmatorjuntakalustoa varastoivien tukikohtien osalta. Kuten tekstistä nähdään, 75th Arsenal JSC satelliittikuvat on otettu 14.6.2023 eli melko tasan vuosi sitten. Olisi hyödyllistä, jos meillä olisi tämän datapisteen lisäksi samanlainen laskelma hyökkäyksen alkamista edeltävältä ajalta JA miksei toki myös tuoreempien satelliittikuvien laskelma, jotta olisi parempi käsitys nykytilanteesta sekä karkea arvaus suunnasta / trendistä.

Tietysti tämä yksi ketju on parempi kuin ei mitään ja antaa meille yhden datapisteen.

Jäämme odottamaan vastaavia ketjuja muiden varastotukikohtien osalta.
 
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