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Onkohan tätä vielä linkattu: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/eric-schlosser-command-control-excerpt-nuclear-weapons mainostaa kirjaa ydinaseonnettomuuksista, ja linkistä saa lukea Titan II -luvun.
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By Hans M. Kristensen
With every official statement about the B61 nuclear bomb life-extension program, the capabilities of the new version (B61-12) appear to be increasing.
Previously, officials from the DOD, STRATCOM, and NNSA said the program is a consolidation of the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10 gravity bombs that would provide no additional military capabilities beyond those weapons.
This pledge echoed the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which states: “Life Extension Programs (LEPs)…will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.”
Yet the addition of a guided tail kit will increase the accuracy of the B61-12 compared with the other weapons and provide new warfighting capabilities. The tail kit is necessary, officials say, for the 50-kilotons B61-12 (with a reused B61-4 warhead) to be able to hold at risk the same targets as the 360-kilotons B61-7 warhead.
Tuli sitten tilattua tuo kirja,toimitusta odotellessaOnkohan tätä vielä linkattu: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/08/eric-schlosser-command-control-excerpt-nuclear-weapons mainostaa kirjaa ydinaseonnettomuuksista, ja linkistä saa lukea Titan II -luvun.
Laitapa sitten helmiä ja kommentteja foorumille. Tai pahoja kysymyksiä. Etukäteen kiittäen...Tuli sitten tilattua tuo kirja,toimitusta odotellessa
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/11/ssbnreduction/By Hans M. Kristensen
A new Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report – Options For Reducing the Deficit: 2014-2023 – proposes reducing the Navy’s fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines from the 14 boats today to 8 in 2020. That would save $11 billion in 2015-2023, and another $30 billion during the 2030s from buying four fewer Ohio replacement submarines.
The Navy has already drawn its line in the sand, insisting that the current force level of 14 SSBNs is needed until 2026 and that the next-generation SSBN class must include 12 boats.
But the Navy can’t afford that, nor can the United States, and the Obama administration’s new nuclear weapons employment guidance – issued with STRATCOM’s blessing – indicates that the United States could, in fact, reduce the SSBN fleet to eight boats. Here is how...
http://www.todayifoundout.com/index...-code-minuteman-silos-united-states-00000000/Today I found out that during the height of the Cold War, the US military put such an emphasis on a rapid response to an attack on American soil, that to minimize any foreseeable delay in launching a nuclear missile, for nearly two decades they intentionally set the launch codes at every silo in the US to 8 zeroes.
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Oh, and in case you actually did forget the code, it was handily written down on a checklist handed out to the soldiers. As Dr. Bruce G. Blair, who was once a Minuteman launch officer, stated:
Our launch checklist in fact instructed us, the firing crew, to double-check the locking panel in our underground launch bunker to ensure that no digits other than zero had been inadvertently dialed into the panel.
Follow the link below to watch the full event:
http://www.cato.org/events/end-overki...
Featuring Benjamin Friedman, Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Policy, Cato Institute; Elbridge Colby, Center for Naval Analyses; Hans M. Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists; and Matt Fay, PhD Program, Temple University History Department; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
President Obama recently voiced his ambition to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal to as few as 1,000 deployed warheads. Yet while the United States has cut the arsenal's size greatly since the Cold War's end, its missions and composition have barely changed. Around 1,600 deployed nuclear weapons remain tied to a triad of systems — bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles — that are designed for preemptive strikes against enemy arsenals. Current plans call for modernizing all three systems, which could cost taxpayers over $100 billion. A new Cato White Paper — The End of Overkill? Reassessing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy — argues for getting rid of the triad by basing U.S. nuclear weapons exclusively on submarines. It explains how the triad came from bureaucratic compromises, not strategic necessity; punctures the myths that sustained it; and shows how its burden on taxpayers is increasingly unjustified.
These clips are from shot Grable, the Atomic Cannon test in 1953 showing the initial burst and shockwave. Identified also are the various vehicles on the desert floor which are very, very tiny compared to the fireball of the blast. There are cars, jeeps, buses and tanks under the blast area. I have put a title over a frozen frame to be able to see the vehicles.
http://rt.com/news/hypersonic-vehicle-missile-china-665/China confirmed conducting a test flight of a new hypersonic missile delivery vehicle capable of delivering nuclear warheads with record breaking speeds. The move is purely scientific and not targeted at any country, said the Defense Ministry.
"Our planned scientific research tests conducted in our territory are normal," said the Beijing Defense Ministry as cited by Reuters on Wednesday. "These tests are not targeted at any country and at any specific goals."
The ministry’s statement confirmed a report by the Washington Free Beacon on Monday. The newspaper cited US Pentagon officials saying that a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) was detected flying at ten times the speed of sound over China on January 9. (link)
The officials added that the ultra-high speed missile vehicle is aimed at "delivering warheads through US missile defenses."
The HGV dubbed the WU-14 was reportedly designed to be launched as the final stage of China’s intercontinental ballistic missile. Its hypersonic speed range reportedly lies between Mach 5 and Mach 10, or 3,840 to 7,680 miles per hour.
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2014/01/agni-4-missiles-lands-less-than-100.htmlAGNI-IV, the 4000 kms range Nuclear Capable ballistic missile was successfully launched today at 1052 hrs today, i.e. 20th January 2014, from the Wheeler Island off the coast of Odisha.missiles lands less than 100 metres away from target at 4000 kilometres
http://io9.com/freedom-drop-the-196...utm_source=io9_facebook&utm_medium=socialflowWhen North Korea captured a U.S. Navy electronic surveillance ship, the USS Pueblo, in international waters in 1968, it was perhaps the worst security breach in U.S. history. One of the potential responses to North Korean aggression, drafted and approved by top military officials, was nuclear war.
The USS Pueblo was positioned in international waters (this is disputed by North Korea, of course) in January of 1968, using electronic means to intercept North Korean signals and messages. On January 23rd, North Korean ships opened fire on the Pueblo, which tried and failed to flee. The captain surrendered, and both the crew and ship were captured.
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That the crew were held (and tortured) for a year was bad enough, but the ship held an enormous amount of U.S. intelligence data. Worst of all, it held several devices used to decode encrypted U.S. military messages. Much later, the Navy would learn that the loss of the devices was compounded by the fact that the infamous Walker Spy ring was at the time already selling codes and other information to the Soviets.
The result of all this was a tense period during which the U.S. tried to figure out what the North Koreans were up to, the extent to which the U.S.S.R. and China were involved, and whether North Korea was planning an invasion of South Korea. During this same period, North Korean commandos were crossing the DMZ to attack targets in the south, including an attempted attack on the South Korean president's house. It wasn't quite Cuban Missile Crisis tense, but there were some white knuckles in the war room to be sure.
Diplomacy won out, with the U.S. basically waiting out the crisis until the Koreans released the prisoners, with some diplomatic help from the Soviets. Military aid to South Korea was increased, and the practice of leaving spy ships unarmed and alone while monitoring potentially hostile targets was brought into question. Today the USS Pueblo is a floating museum in Pyongyang – they gave back the crew but not the ship.
Recently declassified documents reveal the U.S.'s contingency plans, both for dealing with the capture of the Pueblo and for responding to a hypothetical North Korean invasion. The military's view of the situation was somewhat less diplomatic (which is their job, after all). They wanted to send a bunch of ships to Wŏnsan to flex their muscles and intimidate the North Koreans, but U.S. forces were a bit preoccupied in 1968, what with the Vietnam War and all. No ships were sent.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then considered invading North Korea, bombing the living hell out of them with B-52s until their air force was simply nonexistent. Then the land troops would move in. Analysis showed that China and the U.S.S.R. were very likely to intervene in some way. The plan accounted for this. However, this plan would have required the U.S. to pull out of Vietnam almost entirely (it required 12 divisions of troops and 40 tactical bomber squadrons). In all they developed five military plans to deal with the situation, varying in timing and specific troop disposition. These plans were called Fresh Storm.
Then there was the nuclear plan, called Freedom Drop. It was developed by CINCPAC, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, who at the time was Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp (Sharp was succeeded later in 1968 by Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., father of Senator John McCain). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan, so the potential responses included all-out nuclear war against tactical military targets – the Joint Chiefs delayed informing Sharp of the approval, however.
The warheads in such a situation would be delivered by Honest John rockets and Sergeant missiles, each with a maximum yield of 70 kilotons (very roughly five times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb). It would not have been a happy ending for anyone on the Korean peninsula.
You can see the documents themselves at the National Security Archive, hosted by George Washington University. Tip of the hat to Mark Strauss of Smithsonian Magazine, whose tweet this morning pointed me to the documents. The documents were uncovered by Jack Cheevers in researching his book Act of War.
Lyhyt ja paksu muoto viittaa kieltämättä laivalle sijoitettavaan ohjukseen. Onko Intialla sukellusveneitä?
Ja voiko hindu riisua sen turbaaninsa edes siellä?
As the United States struggles to deal with budget problems, as the U.S. Air Force deals with boredom, poor morale, drug use, and cheating on certification exams by their personnel entrusted with control of nuclear missiles, we have a solution that will save money as well as make the world a much safer place – get rid of most of our nuclear weapons immediately. A recent New York Times editorial pointed out that it would cost $10,000,000,000 just to update one small portion of the U.S. arsenal, gravity bombs. The U.S. government has no data on the overall cost of maintaining its nuclear arsenal, but various sources estimate the cost over the next decade between $150 billion and $640 billion, depending largely on which nuclear related tasks are included in the budget.