Ydinaseet

Jenkkilässä on noita mielipiteitä moneksi, esimerkiksi yhdenkin ilmavoimien miekkosen mielestä noin 300 operatiivisessä käytössä olevaa ydinasetta olisi riittävät pelote. Kiinalaisilla on operatiivisessä käytössä noin 80 ydinasetta ja ne säilytetään rauhan aikana erillään ohjuksista.

In 2010, three Air Force analysts wrote in Strategic Studies Quarterly, an Air Force publication, that the U.S. could get by with as few as 311 deployed nuclear weapons, and that it didn't matter whether Russia followed suit with its own cuts
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57378154/u.s-considers-sharp-cuts-to-nuclear-force/

Not surprisingly, then, even U.S. military planners agree there's a good deal of room for dramatic cutbacks in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Earlier this year, Colonel B. Chance Saltzman, chief of the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Plans and Policy Division, argued that "the United States could address military utility concerns with only 311 nuclear weapons in its nuclear force structure while maintaining a stable deterrence."
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/how-many-nuclear-weapons-_b_773553.html


Venäläiset puolestaan näkevät tarpeen uudelle nestemäistä polttoainetta käyttävälle "raskaalle mannertenväliselle"... jonkun pitäisi käydä kertomassa itänaapurille että nyt eletään vuotta 2013.
Russia has announced a new heavy ICBM that is to be liquid fueled and will carry as many as 10 warheads. Ten warheads in a silo is a pretty juicy target. If the Russians don’t use this weapon first, they won’t be using it at all. Now, I do not think Moscow intends the new heavy ICBM as part of some strategy to fight and win a nuclear war, but I do worry about the adverse incentives they are creating for themselves.

Why Russia thinks the solution to its strategic rot is a new, vulnerable ICBM armed with a disproportionate share of the country’s nuclear weapons is beyond me. There are probably many reasons Russia is building a new ICBM, most of which have to do with bureaucratic and political concerns. But Alexei Arbatov observes that the overt justification for the new heavy ICBM is that otherwise Moscow will struggle to maintain New START levels as the last generation of Soviet-era strategic systems begin to age out. We would do well to do something about this argument.
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5610/reciprocal-unilateral-measures
 
Raskas, nestemäistä polttoainetta käyttävä raketti lienee halvempi kehittää, koska siihen tarvittava teknologinen osaaminen on jo ennestään Venäjällä olemassa. Käytännössä vanhaa, olemassa jo olevaa konseptia kierrätetään, jolloin kehityskustannukset pysyvät minimissä ja se on periaatteessa varmempikin ratkaisu, vaikkakin kooltaan suurempi. Sen sijaan täysin uudenaikainen kantoraketti tarkoittaisi valtavia investointeja.

Nuo pienemmät kantoraketit lienevät sukellusveneestä laukaistavien kokoluokkaa, jolloin ohjuksen täytyy olla riittävän pieni ja kevyt, jotta se mahtuisi sukellusveneeseen, mutta soveltunee varmasti myös rajanaapurien uhitteluun maalta laukaistavana versiona. Tosin noissa Venäjän uusimmissa sukellusveneistä koelaukaistuista ohjuksista vissiin puolet on epäonnistuneet, joten sekin kertoo jo jotain uudenlaisen järjestelmän luotettavuudesta ja onnistuineisuudesta.
 
Muutama vanha artikkeli kiinalaisten ydinaseista.

China's Nuclear Testing
Beginning with its first test on 16 October 1964, China conducted a total of 45 nuclear weapon tests -- 23 atmospheric and 22 underground -- ranging in yield from about 1 kiloton to about 4 megatons. China first tested underground on 23 September 1969. China's largest atmospheric test was 4 MT, conducted on 17 November 1976; its largest underground test was 660 kT, conducted on 21 May 1992.

China has conducted all of its nuclear weapons testing at Lop Nur, typically in the late spring and early fall.

China frequently points out that, of the declared nuclear powers, it has conducted by far the smallest number of nuclear tests, stating that it has "all along exercised utmost restraint on nuclear testing." ["Statement Of The Spokesman Of The Foreign Ministry Of The People's Republic Of China," 17 August 1995.]

China has reportedly tested 15 different warhead types: 4 with yields less than 20 kT; 4 with yields of 20-150 kT; and 7 with yields of 150 kT-4 MT.

China's has traditionally been reluctant to participate in the international regimes restricting nuclear testing. It originally criticized the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), which bans atmospheric testing, as a "fraud" designed to preserve the superpowers' nuclear monopoly. However, although China has not signed the PTBT, it has been in de facto compliance with the treaty since its last atmospheric nuclear test on 16 October 1980. On 21 March 1986, China stated that it had not conducted atmospheric testing for years and announced a permanent end to its above-ground testing. China did not, however, indicate an intention to dismantle the technical capability to conduct such tests.

China says that its atmospheric testing did not cause any radioactive harm to the neighboring countries downwind of China, or to its regions of Beijing, Lanzhou, or Dunhuang, based on over 20 years of surveys.

China has also not signed or stated its adherence to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) (which restricts underground test yields to below 150 kt), but has been in de facto compliance with the treaty since its 660 kT explosion on 21 May 1992.

China was also originally reluctant to participate in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Initially China insisted that it would agree to a CTBT only in exchange for no-first-use pledges from the other nuclear powers, and only in the context of general nuclear disarmament. Later, China dropped these conditions, but objected to the CTBT's ban on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) and legitimization of the use of national technical means (NTM) for verification.

After conducting an underground nuclear test on 29 July 1996 (its 45th test), China began a self-imposed moratorium on testing, effective 30 July 1996. [Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 July 1996.] On 24 September 1996, China signed the CTBT, even though the treaty draft both banned PNEs and allowed NTM. China insisted that the PNE ban be reviewed after 10 years, that NTM not be abused to infringe on Chinese sovereignty, and that the CTBT be considered only a first step toward more general disarmament.

Some speculate that China wanted to delay a testing moratorium until in could complete its latest round of tests. Officially, China declared in 1994 that these tests were geared toward designing warheads with safety features, such as insensitive high explosives (IHE). Other Chinese sources indicate that these tests were also intended to modernize Chinese nuclear weapons in other areas as well, including the development of an MRV or MIRV capability and to develop new warheads for China's next-generation solid-fuel ICBMs.
http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_china/coxrep/testpos.htm

Kiinalaisten testit.
# TEST AND DATE YIELD TYPE METHOD COMMENTS

(#45) 29 July 1996 1-5 kT Underground -- China's 45th and most recent test

(#44) 8 June 1996 20-80 kT Underground -- Reported detonation of two warheads

(#43) 17 August 1995 60-80 kT Underground -- Prompted the Japanese Diet (legislativebody) to pass a resolution protesting China's testing; later that month, Japan froze government grants for the remainder of 1995

(#42) 15 May 1995 95 kT Underground -- Prompted Japan to suspend the grant portion of its foreign aid program to China

(#41) 7 October 1994 40-50 kT Underground -- --

(#40) 10 June1994 40-50 kT Underground -- --

(#39) 5 October 1993 40-80 kT Underground -- --

(#38) 25 September 1992 1-20 kT (About 8 kT) Underground -- --

(#37) 21 May 1992 660 kT-1 MT (650 kT) Underground -- China's largest underground test

(#36) 16 August 1990 50-200 kT (189 kT) Underground -- --

(#35) 26 May 1990 15-65 kT (11.5 kT) Underground -- --

(#34) 29 September 1988 1-20 kT (2.5 kT) Underground Reported to be a 1-5 kT enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb")test

(#33) 5 June 1987 Unknown yield (250 kT) Underground -- --

(#32) 19 December 1984 5-50 kT (1.3 kT) Underground -- --

(#31) 3 October 1984 15-70 kT (9.1 kT) Underground -- --

(#30) 6 October 1983 20-100 kT (14.9 kT) Underground -- --

(#29) 4 May 1983 Unknown yield (About 1 kT) Underground -- --

(#28) 5 October 1982 3-15 kT Underground -- --

(#27) 16 October 1980 200 kT-1 MT Atmospheric -- The last atmospheric nuclear explosion by China or any country

(#26) 13 September 1979 Unknown yield Underground -- --

(#25) 14 December 1978 Below 20 kT Atmospheric -- Fission

(#24) 14 October 1978 Below 20 kT (3.4 kT) Underground - Shaft method - China's first shaft explosion

(#23)15 March 1978 6-20 kT Atmospheric -- Fission

(#22) 17 September 1977 Below 20 kT Atmospheric -- Fission

(#21) 17 November 1976 About 4 MT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Thermonuclear; Largest Chinese test

(#20) 17 October 1976 10-20 kT (2.6 kT) Underground -- Fission

(#19) 26 September 1976 200 kT Atmospheric -- Fission; Partial failure of fusion; "special weapon"

(#18) 23 January 1976 Below 20 kT Atmospheric -- Fission

(#17) 27 October 1975 Below 10 kT (2.5 kT)Underground -- Fission

(#16) 17 June 1974 200 kT-1 MT Atmospheric -- Thermonuclear

(#15) 27 June 1973 2-3 MT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Thermonuclear

(#14) 18 March 1972 100-200 kT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Possibly trigger device, containing Pu, for thermonuclear warhead

(#13) 7 January 1972 8-20 kT Atmospheric Air (Q-5 bomber) Fission; Possibly containing Pu

(#12) 18 November 1971 15-20 kT Atmospheric Ground (tower-mounted) Fission; Possibly containing Pu

(#11) 14 October 1970 3-3.4 MT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Thermonuclear

(#10) 29 September 1969 About 3 MT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Thermonuclear

(#9) 23 September 1969 20-25 kT (19.2 kT) Underground Tunnel method Fission ; China's first underground test

(#8) 27 December 1968 3 MT tmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Thermonuclear device; China's first test using plutonium (U235, with some Pu)

(#7) 24 December 1967 15-25 kT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Fission (U235, U238, and Li-6)

(#6) 17 June 1967 3-3.3 MT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) China's first full-yield multi-stage thermonuclear test (U235)

(#5) 28 December 1966 122 kT/300-500 kT Atmospheric Ground (tower-mounted) Boosted fission (U235); Test used to confirm the design principles of a two-stage device

(#4) 27 October 1966 12-30 kT Atmospheric DF-2 (CSS-1) MRBM Fission (U235)

(#3) 9 May 1966 200-300 kT/ Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Boosted fission (U235); China's first test of a boosted fission device (using Lithium-6)

(#2) 14 May 1965 20-40 kT Atmospheric Air (H-6 bomber) Fission (U235); China's first air-drop explosion by aircraft

(#1) 16 October 1964 20-22 kT Atmospheric Ground (tower-mounted) Fission (U235); China's first nuclear explosion, named "Device 596," representing the year and month in which the Soviets refused to provide China with a prototype device (June 1959)
http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_china/coxrep/testlist.htm
 
Richard Garwin: Reduce nuclear dangers
http://gulftoday.ae/portal/40fd7dd0-7735-451e-957b-9547ce129a30.aspx
 
US nuclear forces, 2013
As of early 2013, the United States has continued to reduce its nuclear stockpile, and retirement alone has accounted for a dip of over 250 warheads since last year. Of the total stockpile of approximately 4,650 warheads, an estimated 2,150 warheads are deployed. The arsenal is composed of roughly 1,950 strategic warheads deployed with approximately 800 missiles and bombers, as well as nearly 200 nonstrategic warheads deployed in Europe. In this article, the authors scrutinize the US nuclear arsenal.

Loput artikkelista löytyy täältä.
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/77.full



 
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The Air Force wants to upgrade its aging nuclear missiles and the hundreds of underground silos that hold them. One idea it’s exploring: the construction of a sprawling network of underground subway tunnels to shuttle the missiles around like a mobile doomsday train. As one does.

As first reported by Inside Defense, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center will award several study contracts next month worth up to $3 million each to research the idea. A broad agency announcement from the Air Force describes the hair-raising concept, intended to keep the weapons secure through 2075, as a system of tunnels where nuclear missiles are shuttled around on rails or some undefined “trackless” system.

The advantage of the world’s deadliest subway: During an atomic holocaust, mobile missiles are harder for an adversary to target than a static silo. Missiles could be positioned at launch holes placed at “regular intervals” along the length of the tunnels.

“The tunnel concept mode operates similar to a subway system but with only a single transporter/launcher and missile dedicated to a given tunnel,” stated the notice. “The tunnel is long enough to improve survivability but leaving enough room to permit adequate ‘rattle space’ in the event of an enemy attack.”
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/nuclear-subway/
 
By Hans M. Kristensen

Although the U.S. Navy has yet to make a formal announcement that the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) has been retired, a new updated navy instruction shows that the weapon is gone.

Artikkeli kokonaisuudessaan täällä.
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2013/03/tomahawk.php
 
US Nuclear War Plan Updated Amidst Nuclear Policy Review
By Hans M. Kristensen

The formal reason for the new plan was probably the update of the Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (CJCSI 3110.04B) that was issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 2011. The document, known as JSCP-N (formerly Annex C), provides nuclear planning guidance to combatant commanders in accordance with the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense. This probably eliminates strike scenarios involving the recently retired nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N).

Over the same time period, the number of Russian ICBMs declined by approximately 80 missiles, most of them silo-based SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, a change that potentially would allow a reduction of at least 160 warheads from the U.S. war plan.
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/oplan8010-12/



New START Data: US Reductions Finally Picking Up; Russia Flatlining
By Hans M. Kristensen

After two years of stalling, the latest New START Treaty aggregate data released today by the State Department indicates that U.S. warhead reductions under the treaty are finally picking up.

Russia, which is already below the treaty limit, has been more or less flatlining over the past year.

Seen in perspective, however, the warhead reductions achieved under New START so far are not impressive: since the treaty entered into effect in February 2011, the world’s two largest nuclear weapons states – with combined stockpiles of nearly 10,000 warheads – have only reduced their deployed arsenals by a total of 203 warheads!
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/newstartdata13/
 
Kalliiksi tulee vanhojenkin ydinaseiden päivittäminen.

The U.S. Air Force plans to spend more than $1 billion on developing a guided tailkit to increase the accuracy of the B61 nuclear bomb.

The cost is detailed (to some extent) in the Air Force’s budget request for FY2014, which shows development and engineering through FY2014 and full-scaled production starting in FY2015.
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/b61-12tail/
 
Teräsmies kirjoitti:
Kalliiksi tulee vanhojenkin ydinaseiden päivittäminen.

The U.S. Air Force plans to spend more than $1 billion on developing a guided tailkit to increase the accuracy of the B61 nuclear bomb.

The cost is detailed (to some extent) in the Air Force’s budget request for FY2014, which shows development and engineering through FY2014 and full-scaled production starting in FY2015.
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/b61-12tail/

Luuletko teris että tuo miljardi menee suoraan peräsimeen kun jdam kitti on jo olemassa?
 
ctg kirjoitti:
Luuletko teris että tuo miljardi menee suoraan peräsimeen kun jdam kitti on jo olemassa?

Ilmeisesti pommi tarvitsee erillaisen (kokonana uuden) peräsimen kun tuo JDAM ei kelpaa, mutta aika suolainen hinta kuitenkin.
 
B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2011/06/b61-12/
 
Teräsmies kirjoitti:
B61 LEP: Increasing NATO Nuclear Capability and Precision Low-Yield Strikes
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2011/06/b61-12/

Niille, jotka eivät viitsineet lukea tuota, niin siellä ilmenee, että tarkoitus on tehdä joitakin muutoksia myös noiden pommien eri malleihin, eikä vain asentaa tuota pyrstöä. Kaipa siihen saa miljardin menemään.
 
Taipei, April 16 (CNA) Unidentified lights have been seen over the Bohai Sea at night, which could be a sign that China is testing new nuclear missiles, Duowei News, a Chinese-language media based in New York, cited Chinese websites as reporting Tuesday.

The Bohai Sea is the innermost gulf of the Yellow Sea on China’s northeastern coast.

The Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper, reported a day earlier that China must have developed new multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and has the ability to overwhelm U.S. missile defense systems and launch counter nuclear attacks.

The Wall Street Journal, meanwhile, reported that the U.S. now has 806 ICBMs deployed, while Russia has a total of 491 and China has only between 50 and 75.

Some experts have said that China plans to increase its deployed ICBMs to 500.

In addition
http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aall/201304160034.aspx
 
The U.S. Air Force plans to arm the B-2A stealth bomber with a new nuclear cruise missile that is in the early stages of development, according to Air Force officials and budget documents.

The B-2A bomber, which is designed to slip through air defenses undetected, does not currently have a capability to deliver nuclear cruise missiles, a role reserved exclusively for B-52H bombers.

Under the Air Force’s plans, however, the new nuclear cruise missile – known as the Long-Range Standoff Weapon – will arm three nuclear bombers: the B-2A, the B-52H, and the next-generation Long-Range Strike Bomber.
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/b-2bomber/
 
With over five decades of involvement in nuclear weapons technology, Richard Garwin has advised U.S. administrations - both Republican and Democrat - on a range of issues including the safety of nuclear weapons and arms control. Garwin has spent much of his career promoting nuclear disarmament and warning about the need to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
---
Garwin testified before the U.S. Senate in 1999, when the issue of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was discussed: "I agree with those U.S. military leaders who have reviewed the benefits and costs to U.S. security from a CTBT and strongly support the Treaty. Our national security will be improved by ratification and impaired by further delay."
---
 
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During 10 days in November 1983, the United States and the Soviet Union nearly started a nuclear war. Newly declassified documents from the CIA, NSA, KGB, and senior officials in both countries reveal just how close we came to mutually assured destruction — over a military exercise.

That exercise, Able Archer 83, simulated the transition by NATO from a conventional war to a nuclear war, culminating in the simulated release of warheads against the Soviet Union. NATO changed its readiness condition during Able Archer to DEFCON 1, the highest level. The Soviets interpreted the simulation as a ruse to conceal a first strike and readied their nukes. At this period in history, and especially during the exercise, a single false alarm or miscalculation could have brought Armageddon.

According to a diplomatic memo obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by National Security Archives researcher Nate Jones, Soviet General Secretary Yuri Adroprov warned U.S. ambassador Averell Harriman six months before the crisis that both countries “may be moving toward a red line” in which a miscalculation could spark a nuclear war. Harriman later wrote that he believed Andropov was concerned “over the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and his desire to see them at least ‘normalized,’ if not improved.”

The early 1980s was a “crisis period, a pre-wartime period,” said Gen. Varfolomei Korobushin, the former deputy chief of staff of the Soviet nuclear Strategic Rocket Forces, according to an interview conducted by the Pentagon in the early 1990s and obtained by Jones. The Kremlin’s Central Committee slept in shifts. There were fears the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles to Europe (also in November 1983) could tip the balance. If a conventional war erupted, Soviet planners worried their troops would come close to capturing the nuclear-tipped missiles, prompting the United States to fire them.

The Soviet Union, according to an unclassified article written for the CIA’s classified Studies in Intelligence journal and provided to Jones, notes that Soviet fears of a preemptive American nuclear attack “while exaggerated, were scarcely insane.” This stemmed from the Soviet experience during World War II, when the Third Reich launched Operation Barbarossa, the largest invasion in human history. Soviet officials worried history might be repeated by NATO.

Oleg Gordievsky, a CIA and MI6 source during the Cold War, was previously known to have warned the West about these fears, but the CIA article identifies a second source of this information: a Czech intelligence officer with ties to the KGB who “noted that his counterparts were obsessed with the historical parallel between 1941 and 1983. He believed this feeling was almost visceral, not intellectual, and deeply affected Soviet thinking.”

President Reagan wasn’t sure, and in March, 1984, asked Arthur Hartman, his ambassador to the Soviet Union, “Do you think Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?” We don’t know what Hartman said in response, but John McMahon, the CIA director at the time, believed the Soviets were simply “rattling their pots and pans” to stop further Pershing II deployments.

It’s unclear how much of the fear was just pots and pans. Jones writes that although “real-time analysts, retroactive re-inspectors, and the historical community may be at odds as to how dangerous the War Scare was, all agree that the dearth of available evidence has made conclusions harder to deduce.” Jones did not get all the information he asked for. (The complete list of unclassified documents are collected at the Archives’ website, with two more sets of documents to follow.) The NSA told him it had 81 more documents, but did not release them. However, it did “review, approve for release, stamp, and send a printout of a Wikipedia article,” he noted.

Still, we do have more evidence of serious Soviet preparations. Documents obtained by Jones detail a massive KGB intelligence-gathering mission called Operation RYaN. (The name is a Russian acronym for “nuclear missile attack.”) According to the CIA article, RYaN was “for real” and accelerated in the early 1980s during the scare. The goal was to find out if and when the United States and NATO would attack. According to KGB instructions sent to agents in London, Soviet spies were to monitor bomb shelters, blood banks, military bases and key financial and religious leaders for signs of war preparations. “Many of the assigned observations would have been very poor indicators of a nuclear attack,” Jones warns.

But in another sense, the scrambling for any scrap of intelligence — whether good or bad — reflected a feverish belief among some quarters that war was just around the corner. “[T]he Reagan administration marked the height of the Cold War,” notes one declassified history published by the National Security Agency. “The president referred to the Soviet Union as the Evil Empire, and was determined to spend it into the ground. The Politburo reciprocated, and the rhetoric on both sides, especially during the first Reagan administration, drove the hysteria. Some called it the Second Cold War. The period 1982-1984 marked the most dangerous Soviet-American confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis.”

Worse, there were “a lot of crazy people” in the Kremlin and Soviet military command, according to Vitalii Tsygichko, an analyst for the Soviet General Staff who was interviewed by the Pentagon. “I know many military people who look like normal people, but it was difficult to explain to them that waging nuclear war was not feasible. We had a lot of arguments in this respect. Unfortunately, as far as I know, there are a lot of stupid people both in NATO and our country.”

Considering the consequences of a war, and how close it came, those comments certainly ring true.
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/05/able-archer-scare/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+wired/index+%28Wired:+Top+Stories%29&utm_content=Google+Reader
 
Tietoa pommeista ja muusta vastaavasta. Videot eivät sisällä mitään uutta tietoa, mutta ihan mukavaa katsottavaa jos ei ole muuta tekemistä.
 
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[video=youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=GKrXk6Y0uPk[/video]
 
"Policy Responses to Nuclear Threats," a lecture by Hans Kristensen, director, Nuclear Information Project, Federation of American Scientists. Part of Global Threats, the UNM International Studies Institute's fall 2010 lecture series.
 
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