Jenkkilässä on noita mielipiteitä moneksi, esimerkiksi yhdenkin ilmavoimien miekkosen mielestä noin 300 operatiivisessä käytössä olevaa ydinasetta olisi riittävät pelote. Kiinalaisilla on operatiivisessä käytössä noin 80 ydinasetta ja ne säilytetään rauhan aikana erillään ohjuksista.
Venäläiset puolestaan näkevät tarpeen uudelle nestemäistä polttoainetta käyttävälle "raskaalle mannertenväliselle"... jonkun pitäisi käydä kertomassa itänaapurille että nyt eletään vuotta 2013.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57378154/u.s-considers-sharp-cuts-to-nuclear-force/In 2010, three Air Force analysts wrote in Strategic Studies Quarterly, an Air Force publication, that the U.S. could get by with as few as 311 deployed nuclear weapons, and that it didn't matter whether Russia followed suit with its own cuts
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lawrence-wittner/how-many-nuclear-weapons-_b_773553.htmlNot surprisingly, then, even U.S. military planners agree there's a good deal of room for dramatic cutbacks in the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Earlier this year, Colonel B. Chance Saltzman, chief of the U.S. Air Force's Strategic Plans and Policy Division, argued that "the United States could address military utility concerns with only 311 nuclear weapons in its nuclear force structure while maintaining a stable deterrence."
Venäläiset puolestaan näkevät tarpeen uudelle nestemäistä polttoainetta käyttävälle "raskaalle mannertenväliselle"... jonkun pitäisi käydä kertomassa itänaapurille että nyt eletään vuotta 2013.
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5610/reciprocal-unilateral-measuresRussia has announced a new heavy ICBM that is to be liquid fueled and will carry as many as 10 warheads. Ten warheads in a silo is a pretty juicy target. If the Russians don’t use this weapon first, they won’t be using it at all. Now, I do not think Moscow intends the new heavy ICBM as part of some strategy to fight and win a nuclear war, but I do worry about the adverse incentives they are creating for themselves.
Why Russia thinks the solution to its strategic rot is a new, vulnerable ICBM armed with a disproportionate share of the country’s nuclear weapons is beyond me. There are probably many reasons Russia is building a new ICBM, most of which have to do with bureaucratic and political concerns. But Alexei Arbatov observes that the overt justification for the new heavy ICBM is that otherwise Moscow will struggle to maintain New START levels as the last generation of Soviet-era strategic systems begin to age out. We would do well to do something about this argument.