Amerikkalainen sotataito


Poole on kirjoittanut useamman kirjan siitä, että vastustaja pyrkii taistelutekniinkallaan ja taktiikallaan viemään tulivoiman ja teknologian tuoman edun.

Kirjoissa on paljon hyviä esimerkkejä historiasta ja muutenkin ovat ihan mielenkiintoista luettavaa.

Itse olen lukenut useamman kirjan ja niitä voi suositella lämpimästi.
Viimeksi muokattu:


Thompson was particularly pleased with a plan to ramp up General Dynamics’s production of M-1 tanks in Lima, Ohio, in a factory whose production line the Army had tried to put on hold just a few years ago because it was already drowning in tanks and had no conceivable use for more of them.

Thompson argues that the new tanks are needed to keep up with Russia’s production of armored vehicles, a dubious assertion with a decidedly Cold War flavor to it. His claim is backed up, of course, by the administration’s new National Security Strategy, which targets Russia and China as the most formidable threats to the United States.

Never mind that the likely challenges posed by these two powers — cyberattacks in the Russian case and economic expansion in the Chinese one — have nothing to do with how many tanks the U.S. Army possesses.

Trump wants to create jobs, jobs, jobs he can point to, and pumping up the military-industrial complex must seem like the path of least resistance to that end in present-day Washington. Under the circumstances, what does it matter that virtually any other form of spending would create more jobs and not saddle Americans with weaponry we don’t need?

If past performance offers any indication, none of the new money slated to pour into the Pentagon will make anyone safer. As Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has noted, there is a danger that the Pentagon will just get “fatter not stronger” as its worst spending habits are reinforced by a new gusher of dollars that relieves its planners of making any reasonably hard choices at all.

Pitkä artikkeli siitä miten pentagon hassaa rahaa ja mikään ei muuta. Tekisi varmaan hyvää heille jos joku uskaltaisi laittaa hyvin paljon pienemmän budjetin kuin haaskata 61 prosenttia vuotuisista rahoista armeijan lompakkoon.


A US government commission has asked the public for its thoughts on possible changes to the military's selective service rules to allow the conscription of technical talent, including those with computer-oriented skills, regardless of sex or age.

The National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service, in accordance with the Congress in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, has been directed to consider how to encourage more people to participate in military, national and public service, in order to assure national security.

At the behest of Congress, the commission has been directed to solicit public input on possible rule changes. The commission did so in February through a notice published to the Federal Register, the official record of US government actions.

Among the various aspects of the US Selective Service System being re-evaluated is whether it might make sense to change the process to ensure that individuals with technical skills needed for national defense – medical, language, cyber, and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills – are to be required to register for a possible draft "without regard to age or sex."

Hyvä asia. Jenkit ovat päättäneet että ikä diskriminointi on loputtava notta riviin saadaan cybersotilaita ja muita tekniikkaan perehtyneitä. Tämä on erityisen hyvä asia koska ikääntyneillä ei ole kiire minnekkään ja he ovat mahdollisesti jo suorittaneet biologiset suoritteensa. Jotkin näistä cyberasioista eivät avaudu kuin vasta myöhemmin kun kokemusta on karttunut ja ihminen ymmärtää enemmän miten tehdä hallaa taikka miten suojautua sitä vastaan verkotetussa ympäristössä.

In a phone interview, Katie Moussouris, the CEO of Luta Security, said the military faces a variety of cyber talent challenges related to both intake of personnel and retention.

"You can't simply enlist in the military and say I want to focus on cybersecurity," she said. "Where you end up is not based on willingness or aptitude."

And then once military personnel gain computer skills, the desire for family life, better pay, and not moving around makes the private sector more attractive, she said.

Moussouris suggests that simply lifting gender and age restrictions for the Selective Service won't work without cultural and organizational adaptation in the military. "The quarters, the accommodations, and the culture need a transition," she said, if the military is to achieve greater gender balance.

As for the age limits, Moussouris said it's an issue because many cyber operations happen in dangerous environments and the military does not want people with physical limitations endangering others team members.

"If there can be more remote advisory positions where you're given a task and can do it from a non-war zone, the age restrictions can be lifted," she said. "That would be a way to get the older folks like me who might want to serve involved.


At first glance, Dark Hammer [PDF] looks a lot like any other science fiction comic book: On the front cover, a drone flies over a river dividing a city with damaged and burning buildings. But this short story in graphic form comes from the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, in New York. The ACI was set up to research cyber challenges, and it acts as a bridge between different defense and intelligence agencies and academic and industry circles.

“Our mission is to prevent strategic surprise for the army…to really help the army see what’s coming next,” explains Lt. Col. Natalie Vanetta, the ACI’s deputy chief of research. Dark Hammer is the first of four recently released comic books set in the near future that depict some of the emerging threats identified by the ACI. The books are free and downloadable by all, but they are primarily intended for “junior soldiers and young officers to get them to think about—well, what if the next 10 years doesn’t look like the last 80?” says Vanetta. The choice of format is unusual but far from unprecedented, she adds. “The army really has a large history of using graphic novels or fiction to help our workforce understand somewhat intangible concepts.”

Dark Hammer Hammer_high-res.pdf?ver=2018-02-08-090134-073 << PK ja cybersota

Silent Ruin Ruin_high-res.pdf
<< Venäläiset ja elso

Engineering a Traitor a Traitor_high-res.pdf?ver=2018-03-14-092145-113 << Tekoäly ja infosota

11-25-2027 << Turkki ja autonomiset dronet
Viimeksi muokattu:


Useamman kerran katsonut ton videon ja jalla jalla version. Niin jätkät teki munauksen, kun eivät ajanut pois. kyytiin ja kaasupohjaan ja v****. Mutta päättivät jäädä tappelemaan ja sit tuli osumaa ja siinä se sit olikin.


Miksi Yhdysvallat ei enää voita sotia? Operaatioilla pitäisi olla selkeät poliittiset tavoitteet, huippuaseistus ei yksin riitä
Yhdysvaltain viimeisin, menestyksekäs sota käytiin Kuwaitissa 1991, kun Yhdysvallat liittolaisineen ajoi Irakin joukot pois Kuwaitista. Tämän jälkeen usko huipputekniseen sodankäyntiin on tuottanut vain kalliita osavoittoja ja pitkittynyttä kärsimystä.

10.4.2018 klo 17:15
Pirkko Pöntinen

Presidenttiehdokas Donald Trump raivosi kampanjapuheissaan 2016, kuinka Yhdysvallat ei enää voita sotia niin kuin ennen. Tahti tulee muuttamaan ja voitot tulevat olemaan näyttäviä, hän vakuutti.
Trump oli ainakin osittain oikeassa – komeat voitot ja kunniakkaat kotiinpaluut ovat olleet hakusessa Persianlahden ensimmäisen sodan eli Kuwaitin vapautuksen jälkeen.
– Yhdysvallat on hyvä poistamaan riveistä pahoja kavereita kuten terroristi Osama bin Ladenin vuonna 2011 tai Irakin johtajan Saddam Husseinin 2003. Tulokseen pääsy ja sotilasoperaatioiden lopettaminen on ollut sen sijaan tuskaista, sanoo sodankäynnin voittoihin ja tappioihin perehtynyt
Sodan voittaminen edellyttää, että vihollinen on tiedettävä ja tunnistettava. Selkeät viholliskuvat katosivat, kun kylmän sodan rajat alkoivat murtua vajaat 30 vuotta sitten.
Nykyisin maailman kriisipesäkkeissä vihollinen on entistä useammin tunnistamaton tai vaikeasti havaittavissa. Maastoissa ja kaupunkikortteleissa liikkellä ovat erilaiset kapinallisryhmät, joita yhdistää esimerkiksi uskonnollinen tai etninen tausta.
Kylmän sodan aikaan valtioiden rajat olivat selvät ja vihollisen tunnisti sotilaspuvusta ja kauluslaatoista. Nyt Yhdysvaltain vihollinen voi kulkea reppu selässä farkuissa ja T-paidassa tai peittää itsensä päästä varpaisiin kaavun alle.
Näissä oloissa voitokas sodankäynti edellyttää ulkopuolisilta suurta paikallisen kulttuurin ja kielten tuntemusta.

Yhdysvaltain kannalta kuvaava esimerkki paikallisolojen tuntemuksen tärkeydestä on Irakista vuodelta 2006, sanoo professori Dominic Tierney.
– Yhdysvalloilla oli suurlähetystössään Bagdadissa tuhat omaa työntekijää, mutta vain kuusi heistä oli arabian kielen taitoisia.
Kun Neuvostoliitto lakkasi olemasta 1991, Yhdysvallat jäi maailman ainoaksi sotilaalliseksi supervallaksi.
– Tästä alkoi Yhdysvaltain asevoimien usko huipputekniikan voimaan, sanoo yleisen sotataidon sotilasprofessori Jyri Raitasalo Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulusta.
90-luvulta lähtien Yhdysvallat on pudottanut armeijansa vahvuuden 2,5 miljoonasta sotilaasta 1,5 miljoonaan. Samaan aikaan tekninen kalusto on viritetty huippuunsa.
– Huipputekniikka on helpottanut nopeaa puuttumista maailman kriiseihin ilman, että Yhdysvallat on miettinyt loppuun saakka, mitä poliittisia tavoitteita sillä on tai mitä pitkän aikavälin vaikutuksia kriiseihin puuttumisella on, sanoo professori Raitasalo.
Hän muistuttaa useita kertoja, että paraskaan tekniikka ei yksin käytettynä ole ratkaisu poliittisiin kriiseihin.
– Vaikka Bosnian ja Kosovon pommituksissa 90-luvulla saatiin Jugoslavian presidentti Slobodan Milosevic pois vallasta, on poliiittinen ratkaisu yhä kesken.
Jo vuonna 2003 presidentti George W.Bush julisti lentotukialuksen kannella, että tehtävä on täytetty ja Irak vapautettu, kun Saddam Husseinin hallinto kaatui.

Julistus oli suuri väärinarviointi. Yhdysvaltalaisjoukot pääsivät pois Irakista vasta 2011, valtavien menetysten jälkeen.
Kun sota pitkittyy ja mutkistuu, budjetit pettävät ja omia sotilaita kaatuu, sieltä ei voi lähteä kesken pois. Paikalla on pysyttävä hinnalla millä hyvänsä, koska niin paljon aikaa ja voimia on taisteluihin investoitu. Jokin voitto olisi saatava, jotta kotikulmille ilkeäisi palata.
Irak on yhä hauras, sodasta toipuva valtio.

Turvallisuusstrategiassa Venäjä ja Kiina ovat suurimmat uhat. Yhdysvaltojen tehtävä on puolustaa itseään, eikä puuttua kaikenmaailman kiistoihin ja kansallisvaltioiden rakenteluun.
Vaikka Yhdysvaltain nykyinen puolustusbudjetti on huikeat 600 miljardia euroa vuodessa, on Trumpin tavoitteena lisätä varoja ja kalustoa pitkällä tähtäimellä niin, että Yhdysvaltain ylivoima selkeästi tunnistettavaa vihollista vastaan säilyy.
– Tämän voiman rakentamiseen kuluu hyvinkin parikymmentä vuotta. Siis saman verran, kuin mitä asevoimien määrän alasajo on jatkunut, sanoo sotilasprofessori Jyri Raitasalo.
Trumpin strategiassa on kuitenkin ainakin yksi merkittävä puute.
Trump ei arvosta ulkoasiainhallintoa eikä diplomaattista asiantuntemusta. Niin kuin professori Dominic Tierney jutun alussa sanoi, iskut ja taistelut ilman poliittista päämäärää eivät ole viisaita. Trump ajaa Yhdysvaltain ulkoministeriötä alas vauhdilla, jossa tietotaito katoaa hälyyttävää tahtia.


Miksi Yhdysvallat ei enää voita sotia? Operaatioilla pitäisi olla selkeät poliittiset tavoitteet, huippuaseistus ei yksin riitä.....blaablaa.

Tähän palataan ögen.:cool:




Miksi Yhdysvallat ei enää voita sotia? Operaatioilla pitäisi olla selkeät poliittiset tavoitteet, huippuaseistus ei yksin riitä.....blaablaa.

Tähän palataan ögen.:cool:
Vastaus on koska konkonaisia kaupunkeja ei enään palopommiteta kunnes jäljelle jääneeet antautuvat.


Marine Corps announces sweeping changes to ground-combat forces
Published: May 15, 2018

The Marine Corps is making sweeping changes to the structure and equipment of its ground-combat forces aimed at improving lethality and agility on the battlefield.

Officially announced last week, the modifications are the result of nearly two years of study and experimentation known as Marine Corps Force 2025 and Sea Dragon 2025. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Robert Neller spoke about them earlier this month at a gala for the service’s top officers and enlisted ground-combat leaders in Arlington, Va.

Changes will be felt at almost every level of Marine Corps life.

The number of Marines in a rifle squad will be decreased from 13 to 12. The service will also add more automatic weapons, drones and all-terrain vehicles, while improving night optics, grenade launchers and shoulder-fired rockets.

The Marines are fast-tracking some of the changes, but others will be phased in over the next three to five years.

“The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to dominate one,” Neller said in a Marine Corps statement. “And that is what we are going to do.”

The Marines sent an experimental unit to Okinawa in May 2017 to test various unit sizes, concepts and technologies as the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit’s ground-combat element. The systems were on full display during last summer’s Talisman Saber drills in Australia.

A ‘better’ Marine Corps
Some of the changes are being made to the fundamental makeup of the Marines’ smallest ground units.

A rifle squad — whose mission is to “locate, close with, and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy’s assault by fire and close combat,” a Marine Corps instruction said — has typically consisted of 13 Marines.

Each squad includes three fire teams of four Marines each, built around a single automatic weapon and led by a sergeant serving as squad leader. Fire teams include a corporal fire-team leader or grenadier, two lance corporals — one with an automatic rifle and another assisting — and a private or private first class serving as rifleman.

Under Neller’s changes, fire teams will now feature three Marines, Capt. Ryan Alvis wrote in a statement. All will be armed with an M27 Infantry Automatic Rifle with suppressors and improved optics.

Though fire teams are losing a Marine, they are gaining two automatic weapons, giving each squad a total of 12

Two new positions — assistant squad leader and squad systems operator — are also being created for each squad, Alvis’ statement said. Rifle squads will keep an additional slot open for one rifleman per fire team should they need to add depth, but the positions will remain unmanned.

Late last month, the Marines awarded a contract to Heckler & Koch for up to 15,000 M27s that will partially replace M4 carbine semiautomatic rifles, a Marine Corps statement said. The rifles cost about $1,300 each.

The new makeup of the squad will see a squad leader — who will remain a sergeant with five to seven years of experience and formal squad leader training — backed up by a corporal as an assistant, the statement said. The new squad-systems operator will be a lance corporal formally trained in a variety of technologies.

Fire teams will consist of corporals in the leadership role, backed by lance corporal grenadiers and automatic riflemen.

The changes will be implemented across all Marine infantry battalions over the next three to five years, the statement said. Neller said this will ensure Marine Corps infantry formations remain the most “lethal, agile, and adaptable in the world.”

“We are going to change,” he said in the statement. “Not that we aren’t good; we are. But we must continually strive to get better.”

21st century battlefield
The Marines will also immediately begin distributing quadcopter drones to every squad. Platoons will gain a drone operator, and rifle companies will get a counter-drone section of five Marines.

Marine squads will also receive improved binocular night-vision devices and improved optics that include thermal capability and improved M320 grenade launchers.

They will gain additional firepower and rocket range as the Multi-Role Anti-Armor Anti-Personnel Weapon System, known as MAAWS or the “Carl Gustav,” replaces the Mk-153 Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon, or SMAW.

Squads will also get handheld devices that provide a digital link to close-air support and adjacent units, and an M38 Squad Designated Marksmanship Rifle with a suppressor and variable 2.5-8 power optic, the statement said.

The M38 is not a sniper rifle, but provides improved identification and engagement of targets up to 600 meters away. Marines carrying it will be required to complete additional training on range estimation, scope theory and observation.

Beyond the squad level, Marine scout snipers are to receive the Mk13 Mod 7 Long Range Sniper Rifle, the statement said. That rifle is used by members of U.S. Special Operations Command.

Weapons companies will get four additional extended-range Javelin antiarmor missile systems, bringing their total to 12, to offset the loss of four wire-guided TOW missile systems, the statement said. Eventually, TOWs will be eliminated from Marine Corps battalions altogether.

The Marines also announced the elimination of two 81-mm mortar systems, bringing the total down to six; however, they will pack a bigger punch with extended ranges and ammunition improvements.

Marines should also see more Polaris MRZRs, an all-terrain vehicle that resembles a dune buggy.

Each rifle company will gain an operations/intelligence section, a logistics cell and small arms repair, the statement said. Marine battalions will add an information management officer and an information environment operations officer and chief to integrate “information warfare capabilities.”

Each infantry battalion will gain a forward air controller, which means each rifle company will have one assigned.

Plans also call for combat engineer squads to increase to 13 Marines and engineer platoons to be attached to each infantry battalion.

The Marines’ 2nd Tank Battalion will get an additional company while the service upgrades its M1A1 active protection systems and target acquisition and sensor suites, the statement said.

The service also plans to bring back 5th Battalion, 10th Marines as a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS, battalion in fiscal year 2023.

The Marines also plan to field upgraded light armored vehicles with anti-tank capabilities.


Iso ongelma Yhdysvalloilla on myös tällä hetkellä viime tapilleen asti viedyt helikopterit ja lentokoneet. Nuorimmat F-16:sta, F-15:sta, yms... alkavat jo olla vanhoja ja ovat viime puolitoista vuosikymmentä olleet kovassa rääkissä Irakissa ja Afghanistanissa sodissa. Ja nythän tämä rääkki näkyy, kun viime aikoina on tiheään useampi Yhdysvaltain asevoimien ilma-alus pudonnut. Kovasti uutta tilalle tulisi hankkia.


Last week, Jason Healey argued that “there is now a well-documented instance of cyber deterrence,” pointing to a report of conversations within the Obama administration. Some White House officials argued against a cyberattack, citing asymmetric vulnerabilities in tit for tat engagements within the cyber domain. Healey highlights a powerful example of cyber restraint within the Obama administration, but is it deterrence? The United States has also exercised restraint in the nuclear domain, but it is unclear even now whether that restraint is a result of adversary deterrence efforts or a normative nuclear taboo. So what is driving the cyber restraint Healey identified?

In order to understand the motivations behind cyber behaviors, I performed a longitudinal analysis of strategic war games conducted at the Naval War College from 2011-2016. These free-play games, which feature 150-200 U.S. government experts and senior leader players, situate players within crisis scenarios and then allow them to play all instruments of national power to resolve the crisis. Over the years that I analyzed, these war games varied the adversary, the intensity of the crisis, and the players. Like the evolution of cyber operations in real life, the way cyber capabilities were designed in the games evolved in complexity, representing the institutions and capabilities that developed from 2011 to 2016. Bottom line: a lot of things changed between the games.

However, what remained remarkably consistent across the games was how players utilized cyber operations. In five of the six games, players launched offensive cyber operations only after conventional weapons conducted destructive attacks. Additionally, players were more willing to place systems on nuclear alert than to launch cyberattacks or even cyber-enabled information operations. Over and over players cited concerns about escalation in their cyber restraint, articulating fears that cyberattacks could “lead to nuclear war.” Further, in all of the six games, despite large scale adversary cyberattacks (up to nuclear effects in allied countries), none of the “blue” teams chose to respond to cyberattacks. In one game, a player explained, “this is cyber—it’s different psychologically.” In all of these games, players were told who had attacked them in cyberspace, essentially priming them for retaliation. The lack of support for retaliation in these games is, therefore, especially compelling.

This research suggests two types of restraint: restraint in using cyber operations and an overall restraint in responding to cyber operations. What causes this restraint? Is it deterrence or is it a cyber taboo? These games couldn’t definitively answer this puzzle, but they do suggest a series of potential hypotheses about cyber restraint. First, restraint in utilizing cyber operations could be a uniquely U.S. phenomenon tied to a perception of asymmetric cyber vulnerabilities combined with overwhelming conventional superiority (what Healey’s article alludes to). In other words, why open the Pandora box of cyber operations when the United States has the option to respond to any significant problems with economic punishment or military might? A secondary hypothesis suggests that cyber restraint derives from a false cyber-nuclear equivalency in which the institutional legacy of Strategic Command and the narrative of “strategic” cyber weapons has led to an extension of the nuclear taboo to the cyber domain. These hypotheses are largely agnostic to the adversary—mainly because the games I analyzed featured different adversaries with different cyber, conventional, and nuclear capabilities. Restraint was consistent despite these threat differences, suggesting that cyber restraint was not a product of adversary-tailored deterrence but instead internally derived incentives.

Perhaps more puzzling is why these games also show restraint when responding to cyber operations—a phenomenon not found in the nuclear domain. Once again, this could be a strictly U.S. form of restraint, in which the United States—as the largest economic and military power—can withstand significant cyberattacks without retaliation because it relies on a greater conventional and nuclear superiority. However, there could be a more generalizable explanation which links cyber restraint to emotions and argues that the virtual and novel threat of cyber operations fail to generate the kind of fight or flight gut reaction created by more evolutionarily-primed threats. If this final hypothesis is true, then the restraint in cyber response may permeate beyond U.S. borders and suggest that cyber operations are highly unlikely to lead to escalation in other domains.

Finally, the one war game which did not display cyber use restraint has important implications for foreshadowing the long-term strength of the cyber taboo. In that game, the player leading the blue team executed an extraordinarily risk-acceptant “escalate to dominate” strategy that featured early first use of cyberattacks against a series of domestic and military targets followed by a large-scale conventional offensive. This game highlighted how important the risk proclivity and personality of leaders are to when and how cyber operations are used. Previous research highlighted the large role that risk aversion played in the Obama administration and restraint across a series of domains. The Trump administration is much more risk acceptant, which may lead to less incentives for self-restraint in cyberspace.
En jaksa uskoa että cyberoperaatiot pysyvät aina kurissa. Naapuri on käyttänyt valtavia vapauksia heidän operaatioissaan.


As part of the fiscal 2019 defense budget, the Senate Armed Services Committee wants the U.S. to launch offensive cyber attacks in retaliation against Russia or any other country that tries to "significantly disrupt the normal functioning of our democratic society or government."

The language appeared in the committee's newly released conference report of the "John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019" a week after lawmakers on both sides of the aisle criticized President Donald Trump for not taking a hard stance on Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki.

The NDAA "authorizes the National Command Authority to direct U.S. Cyber Command to take appropriate and proportional action through cyberspace to disrupt, defeat, and deter systematic and ongoing attacks by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran in cyberspace."

"Defense committees have long expressed concern with the lack of an effective strategy and policy for the information domain, including cyberspace and electronic warfare," the document states.

To assist the Defense Department in this challenge, the NDAA "establishes a policy that the United States should employ all instruments of national power, including the use of offensive cyber capabilities, to deter if possible, and respond when necessary, to cyber attacks that target U.S. interests with the intent to cause casualties, significantly disrupt the normal functioning of our democratic society or government, threaten the Armed Forces or the critical infrastructure they rely upon, achieve an effect comparable to an armed attack, or imperil a U.S. vital interest," the document states.

Lawmakers became increasing vocal in their concerns about Russian meddling in U.S. elections after Trump appeared to question his own intelligence agencies' findings on the issue and take Putin's word at the Helsinki summit that Russia had no part in interfering with the 2016 election.

"I have great confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today," Trump said, according to The Associated Press.

"He just said it's not Russia. I will say this: 'I don't see any reason why it would be,' " Trump said.

He later clarified his comments, saying he told Putin the U.S. won't tolerate any election interference in the future.

"I let him know we can't have this," Trump said, according to an AP report. "We're not going to have it, and that's the way it's going to be."

In addition to the new language, Senate lawmakers increased research and development spending on cyber, and other emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics and directed energy, by more than $600 million, the document states.

If signed by Trump, "the FY19 NDAA will help provide our men and women in uniform the resources and tools they need to face today's increasingly complex and dangerous world," according to a recent Senate Armed Services Committee press release.

Pirullinen miettii miten voisi simuiloida valtiollisen toimintaa ja saada toiselle syyt niskaan. Periaatteessa jos cyperoperaattori on kentällä hän voi toisintaa toisen toimintaa, koska IP ei suoraan osoita kuka teki, vaan missä se tapahtui, samoin kuin MAC osoitteella osoitetaan kenen kone IPn takana oli syylliinen. Kumpaakin voi spooffata, ja operaattorin toimiessa man-in-the-middle tyyliin peittää jälkensä toisen ottaessa syyt niskoille. Jälkihoito varmistus eliminoimalla vihollisen operaattori ja soppa on valmis jenkkien sotakoneiden kiitäessä kohdemaata rankaisemaan. Toivon että jenkeillä on varmistuksia tässä asiassa.


Iso ongelma Yhdysvalloilla on myös tällä hetkellä viime tapilleen asti viedyt helikopterit ja lentokoneet. Nuorimmat F-16:sta, F-15:sta, yms... alkavat jo olla vanhoja ja ovat viime puolitoista vuosikymmentä olleet kovassa rääkissä Irakissa ja Afghanistanissa sodissa. Ja nythän tämä rääkki näkyy, kun viime aikoina on tiheään useampi Yhdysvaltain asevoimien ilma-alus pudonnut. Kovasti uutta tilalle tulisi hankkia.
Syy kaluston vanhenemiseen ja loppuun kulumiseen Obaman hallinto joka vähensi ja lopetti kaluston kehittämis ja uusimis tahtia, syy on sama kuin Euroopassa sotien uskottiin loppuneen ja jos Clinton olisi voittanut pressanvaalit olisi tilanne hyvin pian sama kuin Euroopassa, käytössä olisi paraatiarmeija.
Vaikka Suomen armeija on vielä iskukyinen ja kalustoa on alettu monerdisoida niin seuraava punaavihreä hallitus lähtee purkamaan hyvin alkanutta modernisointi kehitystä.


Syy kaluston vanhenemiseen ja loppuun kulumiseen Obaman hallinto joka vähensi ja lopetti kaluston kehittämis ja uusimis tahtia, syy on sama kuin Euroopassa sotien uskottiin loppuneen ja jos Clinton olisi voittanut pressanvaalit olisi tilanne hyvin pian sama kuin Euroopassa, käytössä olisi paraatiarmeija.
Samalla myös Bushin hallinto on syyllinen. Rahat, joilla olisi kalustoa uusia, menivätkin Irakin sotaan, jossa sitten vanha kalusto saikin kunnon rääkkiä niin sanotusti.