ELSO (elektroninen sodankäynti) radiotaajuuksilla: radiotiedustelu, taajuushäirintä, EMP etc

vlad

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Laitetaan jakoon Roger N McDermott'in:

"Russia’s Evolving Electronic Warfare Capability: Unlocking Asymmetric Potential

Since first initiating the reforms of the Russian Armed Forces in the fall of 2008, Moscow has developed a number of complimentary niche capabilities..."

https://www.icds.ee/blog/article/russias-evolving-electronic-warfare-capability-unlocking-asymmetric-potential/

Johon Verkkouutiset tarttui lyhyelti:

"Venäjän asevoimissa on toteutettu syksyllä 2008 käydyn Georgian sodan kokemusten pohjalta mittavia uudistuksia. Runsaasti huomiota on kiinnitetty muun muassa tiedustelu-, valvonta ja johtamisjärjestelmien kehittämiseen ja yhteensovittamiseen.

Lännessä ei ole jäänyt havaitsematta, että merkittävään rooliin niiden rinnalla on noussut myös elektronisen sodankäynnin (ELSO) valmiuksien kehittäminen
...".

https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/venaja-satsaa-yha-enemman-elektroniseen-sodankayntiin/
 

Talvela

Ylipäällikkö
Laitetaan jakoon Roger N McDermott'in:

"Russia’s Evolving Electronic Warfare Capability: Unlocking Asymmetric Potential

Since first initiating the reforms of the Russian Armed Forces in the fall of 2008, Moscow has developed a number of complimentary niche capabilities..."

https://www.icds.ee/blog/article/russias-evolving-electronic-warfare-capability-unlocking-asymmetric-potential/

Johon Verkkouutiset tarttui lyhyelti:

"Venäjän asevoimissa on toteutettu syksyllä 2008 käydyn Georgian sodan kokemusten pohjalta mittavia uudistuksia. Runsaasti huomiota on kiinnitetty muun muassa tiedustelu-, valvonta ja johtamisjärjestelmien kehittämiseen ja yhteensovittamiseen.

Lännessä ei ole jäänyt havaitsematta, että merkittävään rooliin niiden rinnalla on noussut myös elektronisen sodankäynnin (ELSO) valmiuksien kehittäminen...".

https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/venaja-satsaa-yha-enemman-elektroniseen-sodankayntiin/
Tuo voimakas uuden puolustushaaran perustamisen ajaminen ja roolin kasvattaminen kertoo siitä strategisesta ja operatiivisesta roolista mikä nykyisellä aselajilla nähdään.
Venäläisen sotatieteen teoreetikoissa on kyllä historiallisesti ollut ihan suuriakin ajattelijoita ja eivät ne nytkään ainakaan teorian tasolla taida olla ELSO:ssa jäljessä.
Kiinasta on myös mahdollista hankkia komponentteja ja tehdä muuta materiaalista yhteistyötä.
 
Swedut härnäämässä Venäläisiä:
Ruotsi ottaa roolia Syyrian lähialueella – Nuuskinut Välimerellä venäläisten signaaleita tiedustelukoneellaan jo viisi päivää
https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10192890
 
Sardaukar- kirjoitti Harvinaisia ja erikoisia sotakuvia -viestiketjussa näin:
Tuo japanilainen on Hiroshii Ito (muistaakseni). Tiedustelumies (ja niin nuo pääesikunnan heput). Koordinoi Suomen radiotiedustelun ja Japanin yhteistoimintaa.


Mieleeni tuli, että onkohan nyky Suomella ja Japanilla yhteistä tiedustelutietojen vaihtoa? Kummankin naapurina kun on Venäjä. Saattaisi olla etenkin Venäjän meri- ja ilmavoimiin liittyvää tiedustelutietoa jota voisi vaihdella puolin ja toisin.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
The U.S. Army’s new electronic warfare capability, developed by the service’s Rapid Capabilities Office, was challenged in a recent Eastern European exercise.

The 2nd Cavalry Regiment conducted an active electronic attack — or jamming — within a European country for the first time since the Cold War this month during Saber Strike in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. The event shows the Army is making headway on refining a rapid electronic warfare capability it put into the field in Europe just one year ago.

The Army’s RCO — which was officially created in August 2016 — is designed to hone in on the service’s largest requirements with the intent to deliver capabilities within a one- to five-year horizon.

At its launch, the RCO prioritized electronic warfare; position, navigation and timing; and cyber that were neglected in the counterinsurgency operations of the past 15 years. Now that the Army anticipates battling more near-peer adversaries in contested environments, it is refocusing on ensuring its capability overmatch against those possible enemies.

The RCO developed an electronic warfare prototype and sent it to Europe to help soldiers view the EW picture in the spring of 2017, which was then tested out in the Army’s major exercise Saber Guardian in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary in July. Subsequent versions were sent over in in the summer and fall of last year.

The EW system was also extensively tested at Fort Bliss, Texas, last summer.
https://www.c4isrnet.com/land/2018/06/29/electronic-warfare-capabilities-challenged-in-eastern-european-exercise/
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö


Soldiers from the Army's 1st Infantry Division recently got the chance to attack another unit with the service's first electronic warfare (EW) prototype equipment during a force-on-force exercise at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.

The 1st ID's 1st Brigade Combat Team at Fort Riley, Kansas, is the first stateside unit to receive the same EW prototypes that went to forward-based units in Europe in February.

After receiving the assortment of electronic sensing and jamming equipment in March, the unit's electronic warfare officers put it into action as part of the opposing force at NTC, "locating the 'blue' or friendly forces on the battlefield, passing that information to the OPFOR commander and even applying some jamming effects against the friendly forces," according to a recent Army press release.

"This was our initial test of the equipment away from home station in a realistic operational environment," Sgt. 1st Class Gregory Robinson, electronic warfare non-commissioned officer in charge with the 1st BCT, said in the release. "When our brigade goes to the NTC later this year, we'll be able to integrate the equipment within our organic brigade, using the equipment in the same environment, but this time against the OPFOR."
https://www.military.com/defensetech/2018/07/06/big-red-one-attacks-foes-training-new-electronic-warfare-kit.html

"Recognizing this is a prototype system, it is still a step in the right direction," Warrant Officer 1 Christopher Mizer, an electronic warfare technician with the 1st BCT at Riley, said in the release.

"We haven't had a system within the electronic warfare community that looks at the electromagnetic spectrum and forces soldiers to think through what they are seeing, how that affects their commander's mission, and how they can affect the spectrum to enable the commander," he added.

The EW systems are helping the soldiers at Riley and in Europe learn how to fight with this type of technology on the battlefield, the release states.

"If we did nothing electronic warfare-wise until we actually field a program of record EW system, we would be significantly farther behind," Mizer said in the release. "We wouldn't know how to integrate them, operate them, maintain them or fight those systems when we get them.

"This is really informing that process. It's forcing our EW soldiers to look at the intellectual problem of determining how you fight an EW system. That's something the Army hasn't really done in almost three decades," he added.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö

Academics say they've mounted a successful GPS spoofing attack against road navigation systems that can trick humans into driving to incorrect locations.

The research is of note because previous GPS spoofing attacks have been unable to trick humans, who, in past experiments, often received malicious driving instructions that didn't make sense or were not in sync with the road infrastructure —for example taking a left on a straight highway.

But a research team formed from academics from Virginia Tech and the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, along with experts from Microsoft Research, have come with an improved method of carrying out GPS spoofing attacks that take into account the road layout.

To perform the attack researchers developed an algorithm that works in near real-time, along with a portable GPS-spoofing device that costs about $223, which can be easily attached to a car or put on a vehicle tailing the target's car at distances of up to 50 meters.
https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/researchers-mount-successful-gps-spoofing-attack-against-road-navigation-systems/

"38 out of 40 participants (95%) follow the navigation to all the wrong destinations," researchers explained in a paper titled "All Your GPS Are Belong To Us: Towards Stealthy Manipulation of Road Navigation Systems."

The research team says their attacks are possible against any GPS-enabled road navigation system, such as those deployed normal cars, users' phones, couriers, or taxi sharing platforms. The attack is also successful against self-driving cars, for which the risk is even higher, as users are often more trustworthy in these types of vehicles than normal cars.

In fact, this was one of the reasons behind the research, to warn users and vendors that GPS spoofing should be taken seriously for road-based navigational systems.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Sen. Ron Wyden has sent a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice concerning disruptions to 911 emergency services caused by law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators (CSS, also known as IMSI catchers or Stingrays). In the letter, Sen. Wyden states that:

Senior officials from the Harris Corporation—the manufacturer of the cell-site simulators used most frequently by U.S. law enforcement agencies—have confirmed to my office that Harris’ cell-site simulators completely disrupt the communications of targeted phones for as long as the surveillance is ongoing. According to Harris, targeted phones cannot make or receive calls, send or receive text messages, or send or receive any data over the Internet. Moreover, while the company claims its cell-site simulators include a feature that detects and permits the delivery of emergency calls to 9-1-1, its officials admitted to my office that this feature has not been independently tested as part of the Federal Communication Commission’s certification process, nor were they able to confirm this feature is capable of detecting and passing-through 9-1-1 emergency communications made by people who are deaf, hard of hearing, or speech disabled using Real-Time Text technology.​
https://eff.org/files/2018/08/27/wyden-stingray-jamming-letter-to-doj.pdf

Researchers of CSS technology have long suspected that using such technologies, even professionally designed and marketed CSS’s, would have a detrimental effect on emergency services, and now—for the first time—we have confirmation.

It is striking, but unfortunately not surprising, that law enforcement has been allowed to use these technologies and has continued to use them despite the significant and undisclosed risk to public safety posed by disabling 911 service, not to mention the myriad privacy concerns related to CSS use. What’s more, a cell-site simulator wouldn’t just disrupt service for the specific person or persons being tracked but would likely disrupt service for every mobile device in the area as it tricks every phone in the area into connecting to the fake base station in search of the target phone. This could be especially dangerous during a natural disaster when IMSI catchers are being used to locate missing persons in damaged buildings or other infrastructure, cutting off 911 service at a time like that could be a grave danger to others trapped in dangerous situations.
 

PekkaSavo

Ylipäällikkö
Millähän tavoin nämä tekniikat kehittyvät? Kuinka kaukaa esim. 5 vuoden kuluttua kyetään paikantamaan "tietyt päätelaitteet" ilman ilmassa liikkuvia apuvälineitäkin?

https://www.auto.tuwien.ac.at/bib/pdf_TR/TR0186.pdf
The first attempt to detect mobile phone users did not meet the initial expectations.
However, applying a few modifications to the software it should be possible to, at least,
detect MSs in dedicated mode. When a mobile enters dedicated mode by making or
receiving a call, it becomes highly active.

Over time new possibilities to detect mobile phone emissions emerged as these devices
were progressively making use of more telecommunication standards. However, using
GSM signals for human detection is not really common, as other technologies such as...

********************

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/10/russian-robots-fear-jammers-not-terminators/
.. but in the Donbass, the Russians shut Ukrainian military communications down so thoroughly that troops often resorted to their personal cellphones to communicate. Even in the advanced US military, troops routinely bring their personal phones into the field, unwittingly creating a way for a savvy adversary to track them and send them disinformation: The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday that Russian hackers attacked NATO soldiers’ cellphones, using drones to eavesdrop on insecure wireless devices. What’s more, Bendett argues, as the Russians buy more and longer-ranged drones, they could dramatically expand the reach of their jamming.

2016, Turn Off That iPhone, Commandant Tells Marines
https://breakingdefense.com/2016/08/turn-off-that-iphone-commandant-tells-marines/
Marines, turn off your iPhone and dig yourself a foxhole. That’s the Commandant’s message to young troops, based on embarrassing experiences in recent exercises. As cheap drones and other surveillance technologies spread worldwide, said Gen. Robert Neller, US forces must re-learn how to hide — both physically and electronically — from increasingly tech-savvy adversaries.

“We’ve got to change the way we’re thinking….An adversary can see us just as we see them,” said Gen. Neller. “If you can be seen, you will be attacked.”
 
Viimeksi muokattu:

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Capsizing a ship with a cyberattack is a relatively low-skill enterprise, according to an analysis from Pen Test Partners.

Maritime transport still contributes in an important way to the world’s economy, with on-time shipments influencing everything from commodities availability and spot pricing to the stability of small countries. Unfortunately, capsizing a ship with a cyberattack is a relatively low-skill enterprise, according to an analysis from Pen Test Partners.

With so many previously outlined ways to infiltrate networks on-board shipping vessels (think satcom hacking, phishing, USB attacks, insecure crew Wi-Fi, etc.), the question becomes, what could an adversary do with that access?

“If one was suitably motivated, perhaps by a nation-state or a crime syndicate, one could bring about the sinking of a ship,” said Pen Test Partners researcher Ken Munro, in a stark assessment of maritime cyber-danger this week.
https://threatpost.com/hacker-capsize-ship-sea/142077/


At issue is the fact that critical ship control systems, including IP-to-serial converters, GPS receivers or the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR), tend to be easily compromised; some on-board devices for instance still run Windows XP and Windows NT, and converters rarely have their admin passwords changed.

Those that do have non-default credentials will likely have such out of date firmware that they’re easily exploited anyway: Munro pointed out that many of the Moxa device servers commonly found aboard vessels were recently found to be vulnerable to a firmware downgrade attack that allowed trivial compromise.

“It’s a low-skill attack,” Munro told Threatpost. “Password security and patch management are so poor at sea that compromise does not require significant expertise. There’s a documented case of a kid finding a mobile drilling platform control system using Shodan and clicking buttons to see what happened. I believe they unintentionally took the dynamic positioning system offline.”

These easily hacked devices communicate with a raft of control systems via a standardized messaging system, called NMEA 0183 messaging (it’s a superset of the messaging format that GPS devices use). These include autopilot systems, propulsion control, dynamic positioning, engine control, ballast control and digital compasses – everything that’s needed to steer a ship off-course or cause catastrophe.

“The messages are usually exchanged using RS485 serial datacomms, either directly or encapsulated over IP networks,” Munro said in a posting. “In some cases, CAN is used as a bridge between IP and serial. Any point where serial meets IP is a point where the hacker can potentially access the messaging system.”

Once the hacker is able to reach the control systems, it would for instance be possible to replay the Hoegh Osaka incident, where a car carrier’s ballast tanks weren’t properly filled, which resulted in the ship developing a heavy list during a tight turn out of the port. It narrowly avoided capsize, thanks only to a favorable wind blowing.

“Modern ballast control systems provide remote monitoring and operation from the bridge, usually running on a PC,” Munro explained. “So, the attacker would simply send the appropriate serial data to the ballast pump controllers, causing them all to pump from port to starboard ballast tanks. That change in trim alone could cause a capsize.”

He added, “If the change in ballast wasn’t enough to sink the vessel by itself, when a list had started to develop, send a NMEA message to the autopilot, commanding a turn to starboard. Or, send a helm message commanding the same turn direction. The list, combined with the change in stability when turning, is likely to cause a capsize.”

Access to the control systems could be remote or local, depending on the attacker. PTT has done prior research on remote attacks over satcoms; and serial network attacks can be carried out remotely via the satcom connection, or by physically locating the convertors.

“Any half-decent attacker can happily abuse these operating systems all day long and still cover their tracks effectively,” Munro said.

Previous research has shown that other concerning attacks are possible as well, such as forcing a ship off-course or causing collisions. The issue with remediating the dismal state of maritime security is a lack of clearly defined responsibility for security, according to the researcher.

“It’s a lack of awareness,” he told Threatpost. “Ship owners are rarely the ship operator, charter parties are rarely interested in security. When responsibility and liability for security incidents is unclear, it’s hard to determine who should take control of patching and cyber-risk management. Clarity is urgently required; several organizations such as the [International Maritime Organization] are taking action, though it will take time for processes to change.”
 

1806thu82

Alokas
Millähän tavoin nämä tekniikat kehittyvät? Kuinka kaukaa esim. 5 vuoden kuluttua kyetään paikantamaan "tietyt päätelaitteet" ilman ilmassa liikkuvia apuvälineitäkin?
Olisikohan iso investointi alkaa PV:n jakamaan harjoituksissa jotain Silent Pocket tyyppistä faraday-pussia osallistujille, jossa voivat pitää puhelimensa. Venäjällä tekevät asian oikein ja kielsivät kokonaan puhelimet, mutta tuskin tulee täällä tapahtumaan. Tollanen pussi vähän keventäisi signaalijälkiä ainankin ja toisi varusveijareidenkin mieleen paremmin tämän tietoturvallisuus-/ELSO-/kyberkulman.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Olisikohan iso investointi alkaa PV:n jakamaan harjoituksissa jotain Silent Pocket tyyppistä faraday-pussia osallistujille, jossa voivat pitää puhelimensa. Venäjällä tekevät asian oikein ja kielsivät kokonaan puhelimet, mutta tuskin tulee täällä tapahtumaan. Tollanen pussi vähän keventäisi signaalijälkiä ainankin ja toisi varusveijareidenkin mieleen paremmin tämän tietoturvallisuus-/ELSO-/kyberkulman.
Eikö olisi parempi että akut kerätään pois? Puhelimet voi jäädä käyttäjälle. Akun saa sitten takaisin lomille lähtiessä. Jos jäät kiinni sala-akusta niin poistumiskieltoa jne.
 

Sardaukar

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Olisikohan iso investointi alkaa PV:n jakamaan harjoituksissa jotain Silent Pocket tyyppistä faraday-pussia osallistujille, jossa voivat pitää puhelimensa. Venäjällä tekevät asian oikein ja kielsivät kokonaan puhelimet, mutta tuskin tulee täällä tapahtumaan. Tollanen pussi vähän keventäisi signaalijälkiä ainankin ja toisi varusveijareidenkin mieleen paremmin tämän tietoturvallisuus-/ELSO-/kyberkulman.
Noita saa halvimmillaan n. $9 kipale Amazonista. PV:lle ei suuri kustannus koituisi jos noita jakovarusteena olisi vaikka 20 000 kpl. Varmaan saisivat paljousalennustakin.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Russian-linked electronic warfare equipment which creates false GPS signals has been used thousands of times – including outside of the country's own territories. Using data collected by the International Space Station (ISS), researchers found GPS spoofing technology being used in Russian controlled areas of Syria.

The tech works by manipulating Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) into believing they are located elsewhere. GNSS is a catch-all term for satellite-based navigation systems, including: GPS, the Russian GLONASS, Europe's Galileo and China's Beidou.

A new report from C4ADS, a non-profit organisation focussing on conflict and security, found 9,883 cases of GNSS spoofing. Because of the widespread use of GPS-style technologies – in navigation, mobile phone networks, and stock markets – false signals have the potential to cause widespread disruption.

C4ADS says spoofing has affected 1,311 commercial ships in and around Russian waters since February 2016. "C4ADS detected at least 7,910 instances where victim vessels located outside of Russian territorial waters fell victim to GNSS spoofing activity, potentially posing a risk to maritime navigational safety," the group says in its report.
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/russia-gps-spoofing

By monitoring the publicly disclosed location of Putin the researchers were able to say that GPS signals were seemingly spoofed to obfuscate his movements. "In almost all cases where brief GNSS spoofing events occurred in remote locations in Russia and Crimea, such as in Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok, and Kerch, we found that spoofing events directly coincided with visits by Russian president Vladimir Putin," the report says.

On both May 15 and September 15 last year, Putin visited the area around the Kerch Bridge (also known as the Crimean Bridge). The construction of the bridge, between Ukraine and Russia, has been condemned by Nato, while Russian naval operations have also taken place in the area. C4ADS says it found GPS spoofing on both occasions that Putin visited the area.

"We were able to uncover evidence that systems used to spoof GNSS signals are also being deployed on the ground in Syria," the report says. Working with researchers from the University of Texas, the group analysed data from the ISS to locate a GPS spoofing transmitter at the Khmeimim Airbase, located south-east of the city of Latakia. On three separate days last summer, C4ADS found "clear evidence" of the GPS signals being deliberately disrupted.


All of the incidents highlighted in the report have happened around Russia and have links to its interests. Within Russia there have previously been reports of taxi drivers and Pokémon Go players getting caught up by apparent GPS spoofing attacks.

It also highlighted a potential counter-drone system around the Kremlin. C4ADS says antennas on all of the buildings, two of which are known to be publicly owned by the Russian government, point towards the Kremlin and are identical. It says "individuals with electronic warfare experience" highlight antennas that could operate on ultra-high frequency bands. The group suggests that the antennas are in place for countering drones. They "could be used to direct GNSS spoofing signals in a desired direction".

And the low cost of the technology means it isn't necesserially just nation states who are using GPS spoofing. "The technology used to conduct this activity over the past decade, has become cheaper and easier to procure," the researcher says, adding it was possible to buy the technology for as little as $300.

"These technologies are not just available to state actors," the researcher adds. “I think more and more we're seeing that these capabilities are being used to project strategic interests and promote power abroad”.
 

MeriTJ

Eversti
Lahjoittaja
Noita saa halvimmillaan n. $9 kipale Amazonista. PV:lle ei suuri kustannus koituisi jos noita jakovarusteena olisi vaikka 20 000 kpl. Varmaan saisivat paljousalennustakin.
Lisäksi tuollainen konkretisoisi kummasti asiaa ja muistuttaisi sähkömagneettisen spektrin hallinnan/huomioinnin tärkeydestä osana 2020-luvun taistelukenttää ihan siellä "yksittäisen poteron räkääsyövällä tasollakin".
 
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