Etelä-Afrikan ja Rhodesian puskasodat
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Nikhris
- Aloitus PVM
Samovarius
Ylipäällikkö
Ketjussa viitattuun väri-ilmiöön viitaten
http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9258558
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Näemme myös värit eri tavoin. Voit kokeilla kirjoittamalla Googlen kuvahakuunvenäjän sanan голубой(siirryt toiseen palveluun). Minkävärisiä kuvia sait eteesi?
Suurin osa suomenkielisistä varmaankin sanoisi, että sinisiä. Venäläiset kuitenkin tekevät tarkan eron värien синий(siirryt toiseen palveluun) (sinij) ja голубой (goluboj) välillä. Toinen on tummempi sininen, toinen vaaleampi. Kyseessä ei kuitenkaan ole vaaleansininen. Tämän voit testata helposti: jos kirjoitat kuvahakuun suomeksi vaaleansininen(siirryt toiseen palveluun), saat tulokseksi vaaleampia sävyä kuin голубой:lla. Tutkimuksissa onkin havaittu, että venäläiset näkevät ja kokevat sinisen sävyt yksityiskohtaisemmin kuin me, joiden kielessä sekä синий- että голубой-väriä kutsutaan siniseksi.
Namibialaisen himbaheimon kielessä taas ei ole sanaa siniselle. Kun himboille näytettiin 12:ta ruutua, joista yksi oli sininen ja loput vihreitä, suurin osa heistä ei pystynyt osoittamaan, mikä ruuduista oli erilainen. Toisaalta himboilla on sanoja sellaisille vihreän sävyille, joille suomessa tai englannissa ei ole ilmaisuja. Kun englanninpuhujille näytettiin 12:ta ruutua, joista yksi oli himbojen mielestä ilmiselvästi erisävyistä vihreää kuin muut, eivät britit pystyneet näkemään mitään eroa."
http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9258558
"
Näemme myös värit eri tavoin. Voit kokeilla kirjoittamalla Googlen kuvahakuunvenäjän sanan голубой(siirryt toiseen palveluun). Minkävärisiä kuvia sait eteesi?
Suurin osa suomenkielisistä varmaankin sanoisi, että sinisiä. Venäläiset kuitenkin tekevät tarkan eron värien синий(siirryt toiseen palveluun) (sinij) ja голубой (goluboj) välillä. Toinen on tummempi sininen, toinen vaaleampi. Kyseessä ei kuitenkaan ole vaaleansininen. Tämän voit testata helposti: jos kirjoitat kuvahakuun suomeksi vaaleansininen(siirryt toiseen palveluun), saat tulokseksi vaaleampia sävyä kuin голубой:lla. Tutkimuksissa onkin havaittu, että venäläiset näkevät ja kokevat sinisen sävyt yksityiskohtaisemmin kuin me, joiden kielessä sekä синий- että голубой-väriä kutsutaan siniseksi.
Namibialaisen himbaheimon kielessä taas ei ole sanaa siniselle. Kun himboille näytettiin 12:ta ruutua, joista yksi oli sininen ja loput vihreitä, suurin osa heistä ei pystynyt osoittamaan, mikä ruuduista oli erilainen. Toisaalta himboilla on sanoja sellaisille vihreän sävyille, joille suomessa tai englannissa ei ole ilmaisuja. Kun englanninpuhujille näytettiin 12:ta ruutua, joista yksi oli himbojen mielestä ilmiselvästi erisävyistä vihreää kuin muut, eivät britit pystyneet näkemään mitään eroa."
tulikomento
Supreme Leader
Osaako kukaan sanoa tästä videosta mitään tarkempaa ?
Afrikaansia tässä puhutaan ja veikkaan ajankohdaksi 80-lukua. Onko kyseessä ryhmänjohtajatason vaiko joukkueenjohtajatason koulutus ? Section leader training course mainitaan videossa.
Afrikaansia tässä puhutaan ja veikkaan ajankohdaksi 80-lukua. Onko kyseessä ryhmänjohtajatason vaiko joukkueenjohtajatason koulutus ? Section leader training course mainitaan videossa.
Falangi
Kenraali
Taitaa olla ryhmänjohtajakurssista kyse. Brittiarmeijassa "section" on ryhmä ja "platoon" on joukkue, joten luultavasti Etelä-Afrikan armeijassa on/oli samat nimitykset, koska E-A on Britannian entinen alusmaa. Ranskan armeijassa "section" meinaa joukkuetta ja Yhdysvaltojen armeijassa ryhmä on "squad" ja tuota "sectionia" käytetään sielläkin joissakin yhteyksissä, joten en ihmettele että nuo nimitykset voivat mennä sekaisin.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_(military_unit)
Hyvä pumppu.
miheikki
Greatest Leader
LESSONS FROM RHODESIA: SELF DEFENSE TOOLS FOR YOUR PROPERTY
https://southfront.org/lessons-rhodesia-self-defense-tools-property/
Translated from VVSM blog
If you want something done, you’ve got to do it yourself. When Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe) was engulfed in a war for independence, civilians had to invent self defense tools to protect their cars and homes. The more dire the reason, the more ingenious the solutions.
It all started with a Rhodesian named Ken Goosen building a DIY four-barrel single use shotgun to defend his homestead in Claremont (near Bulawayo). It was named Kill Quick.
Click to see the full-size image
The device had four short 12 bore shotgun barrels lined up as a fan. While unarmed they were in a vertical position, and did not pose a threat to people farming. If unwanted intruders entered the premises, the owner would pull a rope connecting the device to somewhere inside the house, pulling out the safety pin. The Kill Quick would move to a horizontal position, striking a fixed anvil in the process, and firing out of all four barrels at the same time. While it fired at the bushes, the defenders had some time to hide, run away or call for reinforcements.
Soon enough this device with various modifications (using an actuator for striking the anvil, bumping up the number of barrels up to five and more, using longer and wider barrels and so on) was used at every remote homestead across Rhodesia
Farmers even equipped their cars with this “fan of barrels”. This did not help much with the mines, but it sure did surprise some road ambushers. Mounted on the front — and later on the sides — Kill Quick allowed the driver to clear out the nearby bushes in order to make a quick getaway. A device called Spider was on a whole new level — it fired simultaneously out of 24-36 barrels, covering the space around the car from 270 to 360 degrees. And you thought spiders in Australia were scary.
Click to see the full-size image
One would think the military wouldn’t require such DIY solutions, as they were already armed to the teeth. That was not the case. Getting into firing position with a Fn-FAL took time. Quickly responding to an ambush with it was out of the question. In the end military engineers started mounting “sawed-off” assault rifles and machine guns on special turrets, installed in the driver’s door.
Click to see the full-size image
Besides that, two Kalashnikov assault rifles were often installed in pickups behind the driver seat’s, firmly fixed in the body of the car. In case of ambush, the driver would speed up and trigger the guns using an actuator by pressing a button on the deck. Yes, it was single-use, but having 30 shots fire and clearing 150 ft of road was quite sufficient. Rhodesian special forces, the Selous Scouts, even used two RPD machine guns with 90 bullet snail drums instead of AKs.
Click to see the full-size image
The civil war in Rhodesia was raging for 15 years without stop. These and other DIY weapons were sometimes the only chance to make it through and survive. Well, until the next ambush at least.
chigeen'a
Kapteeni
Tästä miheikin postauksesta tuli taas mieleen yksi tarina tuolta Zimbabawesta tämän vuosituhannen alkupuolelta.
Oltiin siirtymässä jatkettu koppisella Land Roverilla pohjois-Zimbabwesta keskiselle Karoin alueelle. Viisi ukkoa ahtautuneena varusteineen maasturiin. Ajomatkan kesto oli ainakin kymmenen tuntia murhaavassa helteessä tupakan savussa liemipullon kiertäessä. Harvakseltaan aika ajoin tiellä tuli vastaan viimeisiä urhoollisia valkoisia farmareita. Kusina toiminut ex-farmari puskasodan veteraani joka nyt toimi ammattimetsästäjänä pysäytti aina auton ja kysyi näiltä loppuun palaneen näköisiltä miekkosilta; "Have you seen politicans?" Tätä hämmästeltiin ja viimein kysyttiin mitä nämä politicans oikein on. Tämä oli valkoisten maanomistajien antama nimitys ZANU-PF puolueen virkamiehistä jotka kiersivät ympäri maata ryöstäen ja tappaen valkoisia maanomistajia, anastaen lopulta heidän farminsa. Kolmannen ja ilmoituksen mukaan viimeisen valkoisen tupakanviljelijän suusta tuli sitten varoitus. There is a patrol on the road some where here. Tunnin ajon päästä kuskimme karjaisi police ahead. Open windows take of your sunglasses and show them your rifles. Remember to stare at them straight to their eyes when we pass them. Everybody ready. Ok here go. Tiellä oli poikittain poliisiauto joka oli mersun c-malli ja neljä pistoolein ja pilottilasein varustautunutta poliisia. Yksi nosti kättä pystyyn mutta meidän kuski survoi kaasun pohjaan ja koukkasi penka puolelta ohi autosta niin että pari poliisia hyppäsi sivuun. Tämän jälkeen hän kohtalaisen huolestuneen näköisenä seurasi taustapeiliä pidemmän aikaa. Oltiin hiljaa eikä kyselty mitään vaan mentiin niin perkeleesti että kaikki keskittyminen meni penkillä pysymiseen. Tunnelma laukesi vasta kun päästiin muurien sisään ammattimetsästäjän kotiin Karoihin. Sielläkään ei kuskimme halunnut keskustella juurikaan siitä että mitä ihmettä oli oikein tapahtunut.
Ylli
Majuri
Paikallinen AUK. Hihoissa SL eli seksie leier- ryhmän johtaja ja loppupuhuttelussa puhutaan uusista "korporaaleista" eli alikersanteista.
Ylli
Majuri
Myös sanaa "soutpiel" käytetään. se tarkoittaa suolamulkkua ja kuvaa henkilöä, jonka toinen jalka on Afrikassa, toinen Euroopassa ja pallit roikkuvat meressä.
Ylli
Majuri
Luin kerran erään valkoisen rhodesialaisen näkökulman asiaan. Hänen mukaansa valkoiset eivät luulleet missään vaiheessa voivansa pitää loputtomiin vähemmistövaltaa. Yksipuoliseen itsenäisyysjulistukseen ajauduttiin koska brittihallinto halusi heti 60-luvun alussa ottaa itsenäistymisneuvotteluihin mukaan vasemmistolaiset itsenäisyysliikkeet ZANUn ja ZAPUn. Valkoisten mielestä tämä olisi johtanut maassa saman tien siihen tilanteeseen, jossa maassa tänään ollaan. Ja se haluttiin estää tuolla itsenäisyysjulistuksella. Syy tapahtumakulkuun siis oli tämän näkemyksen brittihallinnossa.
Nämä oivalliset liikkeet edustivat sitä raakaa kiväärilinjaa ja valkoisilla ei ollut halua joutua ammutuksi ja syödyksi ja nyljetyksi...missä järjestyksessä tahansa. Ei kannata olettaa, että kaikki mustaihoiset olisivat olleet innosta pinkeänä -itsenäisyyden- puolesta, ei sinne päinkään. Melkoinen osa tajusi kyllä, että raakalaisten valta on raakalaisten valtaa, vaikka se olisikin samanväristen valtaa. Siihen sitten monimutkaiset heimo-klaani-ym. seikat päälle. Eurooppalainen rasismi on kuin mahon lehmän hönkäys verrattuna afrikkalaiseen rasismiin, ihan oikeesti.
Tuolla yllä chigeena kertoo poliittisista rahanlainaajista. Nehän ovat vain hyvinpuettuja maantierosvoja, joilla on jonkinlainen lupa terrorisoida alueita...saalis jaetaan niinkuin hyeenat tekevät.
Yllättävän vähän länttä on kiinnostanut se etninen puhdistus, joka tuolla on tehty ja kohteena valkopeffat.....olisi ehkä ollut syytä olla hitusen jämerämpi. Ihme on se, että edes siteeksi alueille on jäänyt valkoisia afrikkalaisia. Ne ihmiset, joita minä olen sieltä tuntenut, ovat muuttaneet pois ja yksi tuntemani -katosi- kuusi vuotta sitten. On epäilty, että hänellä leikittiin afrikkalaista pyörää eli pantiin autonrenkaita ympärille ja tuikattiin tuleen. Hänen omistamansa bisnes on ainakin putsattu ja luonnollisesti bisnes on kuollut totaalisesti.
Valkoiset afrikkalaiset ovat kyllä sitkeää väkeä. Moni zimbabwesta häipynyt virittelee elämäänsä Sambiassa. Mulla ei oikein ole tietoa millainen tuo Sambia on.
chigeen'a
Kapteeni
Sambialaiset ovat tarkkaan seuranneet miten asiat meni etelä naapurissa Zimbabwessa ja ovat antaneet valkoisten jatkaa liiketoiminnan harjoittamista ja maanviljelystä. Jopa niin fiksusti että tuossa hetki sitten Sambiassa oli peräti valkoinen mies presidenttinä. Itse en ole kuin pistäytynyt Sambiassa mutta ilmapiiri ja katukuva Lusakassa oli varsin leppoisa jos nyt vaikka verrataan Harareen. Vähän kuin Keniassa muuta ilman islamin läsnäoloa.
Ja jos jonain mittapuuna voidaan valkoisen maanomistuksen lisäksi pitää valkoisten pyörittämää Safari matkailua niin sekin nousee koko aika pienin askelin. Pahan takapakin tosin otti tämä Sambian yksi harvoista paikallisia työllistävistä vientituotteista maailmanlaajuisen leijonan metsästys bannin vuoksi(aka Cecil the lion). Pitkäjänteinen työ johon nimenomaan Sambiassa oltiin satsattu jo parikymmentä vuotta ja pikku hiljaa oltiin saavutettu kestävä kanta kaatolisenssien myöntämiselle. Sambiassa on silti vielä laajoja alueita joilta on salametsästetty ja myrkytetty lähes kaikki eläväinen ja nykyisessä mielipideilmastossa on vaikea enää löytää safariyrittäjää joka ottaisi sen taloudellisen riskin että alkaisi eläimiä noille alueille siirto istuttamaan kuten on tehty leijonan kanssa. On hyvä muistaa että yksi leijona jahti tuolla tuottaa 40-70 tuhannen euron liikevaihdon. Sambiassa siis leijonat ovat vapaita eivätkä tarhafarmeilla kuten Etelä-Afrikassa jossa tuo toiminta nyt sitten on käytännössä loppu.
Sambia on muuten hyvällä tiellä mutta neljä kirjainta jotka on lähellä tuhota lupaavan kehityksen. Ja se on siis AIDS. Sambian keskimääräinen elinikä ennusten on tuon vitsauksen takia romahtanut jo alle 40 ikävuoteen ja huononee koko aika. Ennuste on että ennen pitkää joka toisella Sambialaisella on tuo tauti.
Laitetaanpas puskasotien jatkoksi puskarauhan tekoa; tuolla kun oli Soomi-poikakin mukana, Ahtisaarta myoten.
Ensin YK:n virallinen historiankirjoitus (pitka) ja sitten, miten se oikeasti meni (lyhyt) lopussa, eri fontilla:
The three enlarged infantry battalions approved for initial deployment were provided by Finland, Kenya and Malaysia. Four additional battalions were held in reserve, on seven days' notice to move to Namibia, by Bangladesh, Togo, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. In the event, the reserve battalions were not called to Namibia. The delays already [ainainen "long on morals" vs. "short on money" YK:n puitteissa] referred to had made it clear that it was not going to be possible to deploy the infantry battalions to Namibia by D-Day, 1 April, as originally envisaged in the Settlement Plan. Under the revised plan, they were due to be deployed in late April/early May. The events of early April, however, led to an acceleration of this deployment by approximately two weeks. The Finnish battalion was deployed in the north-eastern part of the Territory by 17 April; the Malaysian battalion in the north-west by 1 May; and the Kenyan battalion in the centre and south, also by 1 May. All three battalions remained in Namibia until after independence, with the Finnish and Malaysian battalions leaving in early April 1990. The incoming Government asked Kenya to retain its battalion in Namibia after independence, under bilateral arrangements, for an initial period of three months, in order to fulfil various tasks, including helping with the training of a Namibian army.
As already noted, the logistics elements in UNTAG's military component worked closely with the civilian logistics elements to provide an integrated logistics support system for the whole operation. The military units consisted of: a signals unit (United Kingdom); an engineer squadron (Australia); an administrative company, including movement control and postal elements (Denmark); supply, transport and maintenance units (Canada and Poland, plus civilian personnel provided by the Federal Republic of Germany); a helicopter squadron (Italy); and a squadron of light transport aircraft (Spain). The military component also included a civilian medical unit contributed by Switzerland. In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States provided air transport for the initial deployment of UNTAG.
For the same reason that applied to the infantry battalions, the deployment of the logistics units was not completed before D-Day. Indeed most of them had little more than advance parties in Namibia at that time and most became fully operational only in late April or early May.
D-DAY AND ITS AFTERMATH
When the Special Representative arrived in Windhoek on 31 March 1989 to assume his duties in Namibia, hopes were high. What had seemed an interminable process of negotiation was at last to bear fruit and Namibia's independence seemed in sight. There was concern, of course, that - for the reasons already mentioned, which were beyond the Secretary-General's control - UNTAG would be far from fully deployed on D-Day and would become completely operational only a month or more later. It was recognized that this made it even more essential that all concerned should honour the commitments which they had entered into regarding all aspects of the Settlement Plan. But an informal ceasefire had been in effect, and largely respected, for over seven months and the parties had just reaffirmed in writing their acceptance of a formal ceasefire with effect from 0600 local time on the morning of 1 April.
The previous evening, however, the newly arrived Special Representative was told by the South African Administrator-General that heavily armed SWAPO forces, in combat uniform, had begun moving forward and crossing from Angola into Namibia, many others being poised to follow.
The following morning, while demonstrations and processions of welcome for UNTAG were occurring throughout the Territory, the Administrator-General told the Special Representative that further armed SWAPO personnel had crossed the border overnight and incidents were occurring on a broad front throughout the Ovambo area of northern Namibia. A series of similar reports came in during the day, indicating military action and casualties on a scale not seen for many years in the Namibian conflict. The Special Representative sent a team of senior UNTAG officials north to investigate. As already noted, UNTAG was not yet effectively deployed in the Territory. Apart from the military observers and monitors, few personnel, military or civilian, had arrived and their operational capability was severely hampered by the lack of vehicles and communications.
Later on 1 April, the South African Foreign Minister told the Secretary-General that if UNTAG was unable to contain the new situation, it would be necessary for his Government again to deploy its military forces which had, earlier that day, been confined to base under UNTAG monitoring in accordance with the Settlement Proposal; the South West Africa Police were unable to deal with the incursion by heavily armed SWAPO groups. The Secretary-General immediately requested SWAPO representatives to do whatever they could to affect the situation positively.
Given all these circumstances, the Special Representative and the Force Commander sent to the Secretary-General an urgent joint recommendation that they be authorized to accept a strictly limited and temporary suspension of the SADF confinement to base. This recommendation was accepted. The arrangement under which this was to occur was in the following terms: "Certain specified units, to be agreed, will be released from restriction to base to provide such support as may be needed by the existing police forces, in case they cannot handle the situation by themselves. The situation will be kept under constant review and the movement out of existing bases will throughout be monitored by UNTAG military observers.
The team of UNTAG officials sent to the north held discussions on 2 April with the South African security forces and interviewed two SWAPO prisoners captured the previous day. The latter said that they had been instructed by their commanders in Angola to enter Namibia, avoiding the South African security forces if possible, in order to establish bases in Namibia under United Nations supervision. Their units were to bring with them all their arms, including rockets and anti-aircraft devices.
In the light of the wide difference between the stated objectives of the captives, who had impressed the UNTAG team with their credibility, and those attributed to them by the South African security forces, who saw their intention as aggressive and hostile, the team immediately requested to see all the general staff of the South African security forces who were then present at Oshakati, together with a senior representative of the South African Foreign Ministry. The team emphasized the immense gravity of the situation and the serious disparity between the two versions of events. They stressed, in unambiguous language, the imperative need for maximum restraint by the security forces, while immediate efforts were made in all quarters to resolve the situation. In Windhoek, the Special Representative and Force Commander impressed the same message on the Administrator-General and his senior police and military personnel.
On 2 April, SWAPO emphatically denied that it had violated the ceasefire and stated that it was committed to honouring it in spirit and letter. On the contrary, SWAPO said, South African security forces had attacked its members who had been peacefully celebrating the beginning of the implementation of resolution 435 in northern Namibia and some of whom had been trying to come forward to hand over their weapons to UNTAG. South Africa, for its part, asserted that the incursion of heavily armed and uniformed SWAPO forces was continuing.
The Secretary-General reported on these grave developments to the Security Council in informal consultations on 3 April. He concluded his report as follows:
"The mounting toll of Namibian and South African casualties, at the very moment when the long-delayed independence process has at last commenced, is especially tragic. On the basis of information so far available to it, UNTAG is of the view that SWAPO had infiltrated armed personnel and material into Namibia around the time of the ceasefire. UNTAG, however, feels that this infiltration may not have offensive intent, but instead may be aimed at the establishment of SWAPO camps inside the Territory, which SWAPO would then request UNTAG to monitor. SWAPO, for its part, has emphatically denied any infiltration and has stated that its supporters inside Namibia have been attacked. If the integrity of the Settlement Proposal, which took many years of difficult negotiation to conclude, is not respected by any party, then the people of Namibia will again be the principal sufferers. It is therefore most necessary for all concerned to exercise the maximum restraint at this time, and to advance and reinforce practical arrangements to implement each and every aspect of the Settlement Plan. This is a matter of the greatest political and humanitarian urgency, in view of the grave situation now existing along parts of the northern border of Namibia".
On 4 April, the South African Foreign Minister wrote to the Secretary-General stating, inter alia, that more than 1,000 SWAPO armed forces had now infiltrated Namibia, and that major mechanized, tank and infantry elements of SWAPO had been deployed just north of the Namibian/Angolan border. Unless, he said, active and effective measures were taken to stem the rapid deterioration of the situation, the whole peace process in Namibia was in danger of collapse. On 5 April, he informed the Secretary-General that the South African authorities were appealing by radio to SWAPO forces to return to Angola, and offering them safe conduct to locations north of the 16th parallel where, he said, it had been agreed, in the context of the Joint Commission agreements, that they would be confined.
On 5 April, the Secretary-General put proposals to South Africa and SWAPO for a ceasefire and the establishment of temporary assembly points under UNTAG supervision to which SWAPO armed personnel could report. They could then choose between being escorted across the border and to the north of the 16th parallel, with their arms, or handing over their weapons to UNTAG and returning as unarmed civilians to their homes in Namibia. If these proposals were accepted, South African security units would be required, 48 hours after the restoration of the ceasefire, to return to their bases under United Nations monitoring.
The Secretary-General communicated his proposals also to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Chairman of the front-line States. Following an emergency summit of the front-line States in Luanda on 6 April, President Kaunda informed the Secretary-General that the summit had accepted his proposals, but wished that the SWAPO forces, having handed over their arms to UNTAG, should remain at the assembly points until the SWAPO leadership returned to Namibia.
On 7 April, the Secretary-General again reported to the Security Council. Fighting was continuing, he said, and well over 200 persons had already been killed. Every effort was being made to expedite the arrival and deployment of UNTAG personnel throughout the Territory; members of the Council had offered fresh transport and logistics support to help to bring UNTAG rapidly up to operational strength. The Secretary-General went on to describe the ceasefire proposals which he had put forward.
On 8 April, South Africa rejected the Secretary-General's proposals, which, it said, would be incompatible with the existing agreements. South Africa stated that it would respect all related agreements and that it would be impossible to complete the peace process unless all other parties did the same.
Also on 8 April, Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, announced that the SWAPO leadership had decided to order its forces within Namibia to stop fighting, regroup and report to Angola within 72 hours under the escort of UNTAG.
Meanwhile, the Joint Commission established by the Brazzaville Protocol met in extraordinary session at Mount Etjo, in central Namibia, on 8 and 9 April. Angola, Cuba and South Africa attended, as did the United States and the Soviet Union, as observers. The Special Representative and the Administrator-General attended by invitation on 9 April. At the conclusion of the meeting, the parties adopted a Declaration of re-commitment to all aspects of the peace process, and urged the Secretary-General urgently to take all necessary measures for the most rapid and complete deployment of UNTAG so that it could fully and effectively carry out its mandate. In an annex to the Declaration, detailed agreement between the parties was recorded on Principles for a withdrawal procedure, and on a sequence of events for the implementation of the Declaration and Principles. These also were signed by the three Governments, having been agreed upon by all others in attendance at the meeting.
The withdrawal procedure was to be conducted under UNTAG supervision. SWAPO forces in Namibia were to present themselves at assembly points for safe passage to locations in Angola north of the 16th parallel. There they were to turn their arms over to UNTAG. They were to be informed of this process in local radio broadcasts in which a joint appeal by the Special Representative and the Administrator-General would be made. At the end of the process, and after information provided by SWAPO and joint verification by the Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the exit of all SWAPO forces from Namibian territory, the status quo ante 1 April would be deemed to have been reinstated. The parties, in agreeing to these provisions, further stated that they had taken note of the SWAPO announcement of 8 April.
On 9 April, the Secretary-General expressed his welcome for Mr. Nujoma's statement and the Mount Etjo Declaration; he believed that, in the light of these developments, the restoration of the ceasefire in Namibia would be facilitated, together with the process of implementing resolution 435. The next day, the Secretary-General again briefed the Security Council, expressing the hope that there would shortly be an end to the intense suffering and casualties that had scarred the start of UNTAG's work.
The Mount Etjo Declaration was an important step forward but it was not implemented in the manner envisaged. UNTAG found it impossible to persuade the South African security forces to keep their distance from the temporary assembly points. Perhaps as a result of this factor, among others, the SWAPO forces in Namibia chose to avoid them and only a handful, mostly sick or wounded, presented themselves for safe passage back to Angola. The vast majority preferred to make their own way across the border, without UNTAG protection. Unfortunately, a number of clashes occurred during this process. In a further meeting in northern Namibia on 20 April, the Joint Commission decided that in order to facilitate the return of SWAPO forces to Angola, all South African security forces would return to base for a period of 60 hours from 1800 hours local time on 26 April.
There was a further meeting of the Joint Commission in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April, about which the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 4 May. He said that he had asked the members of the Commission to ensure that the views of the United Nations were fully heard before the Commission adopted any decisions which would require action by UNTAG or otherwise affect the implementation of resolution 435. However, when the United Nations representatives were invited to join the Commission meetings, it was announced that certain agreements had already been arrived at, the main point being that for a two-week period, ending at 0600 hours local time on 13 May, the South African security forces would again be released from restriction in order to verify that SWAPO armed personnel had returned to Angola and to locate and lift arms caches. The Secretary-General told the Security Council that he would have preferred the outcome to have been a decision requiring that the restriction of South African security forces to their bases should continue without interruption. Regrettably, that had not been the case. He urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint, underlining the imperative need for SWAPO personnel to be given safe passage to the Angolan border.
In a further meeting of the Joint Commission at Cahama, Angola, on 19 May, the members noted the "positive steps" each had taken to fulfil its duties under the Mount Etjo agreement, as well as information provided by UNTAG that SWAPO forces were now confined to base under UNTAG monitoring north of the 16th parallel. The Special Representative and the Administrator-General confirmed that South African forces also had again been confined to base under UNTAG monitoring, with effect from 13 May, and that a de facto cessation of hostilities had been re-established in northern Namibia.
Meanwhile, the returning SWAPO forces and any others present on Angolan territory south of the 16th parallel had concentrated at Chibemba, south of Lubango, where their confinement to base by the Angolan armed forces was monitored by military officers of UNTAG (Angola). The SWAPO forces were later moved to bases closer to Lubango. These arrangements continued until the personnel concerned returned to Namibia as civilians under the repatriation programme described below.
Implementation of parts of the Settlement Proposal, which allowed a period of only seven months between D-Day and the elections, was now six weeks behind schedule. The intensity of the fighting revived the mistrust and division which had begun to be assuaged during the seven months of de facto ceasefire. UNTAG had been criticized in many quarters and its task of establishing its moral and political authority had been made more difficult. Between 300 and 400 combatants, mostly on the SWAPO side, had been killed. The counter-insurgency police, Koevoet, had been remobilized, and there would be much pain and tribulation before they were once again neutralized. It had been a nightmare beginning to an operation which had been launched with so much hope.
Tosiasihan on, etta YK myohastyi, SWAPO yritti marssia maahan (tuon alussa mainitun infiltraation jalkeen), E. Afrikka varautui tahan mobilisoimalla joukkonsa, mutta lahettivatkin eteen ilmavoimat ja jattivat maajoukot reserviin. Rynnakkokoneita tukemassa sorakentilla oli vain tankkaajia ja rakettien lataajat, koska Plan B oli lahtea akkia haneen (Puma kuljetuskopterit valmiina vieressa ) ja antaa homma armeijalle (jota myoten 7 kk:n rauha olsi ollut sirpaleina). Swapolaisia meni kuitenkin 1400 paivan aikana, ja invaasioporukat peraantyivat. YK joukot paikalle ("kaikki hyvin tanaan, sir?"), homma tarjoiltiin heille kuin lautasella, vaalit pidettiin ja nuo samaiset ukot (miinus se 1400 ja pari sataa paalle, mita hajanaisissa kahakoissa meni; tarkoitushan oli valttaa vastapuolta ja asettaa se, vasta myohemmin, tapahtuneiden tosiasioiden eteen) tulivat maahan sivilisteina, niinkuin tuo virallinen versio kertoo.
Todelliset tapahtumat on siloiteltu ja siis haudattu tuon yhden "unfortunately"-lauseen taakse
Unfortunately, a number of clashes occurred during this process. In a further meeting in northern Namibia on 20 April, the Joint Commission decided that in order to facilitate the return of SWAPO forces to Angola, all South African security forces would return to base for a period of 60 hours from 1800 hours local time on 26 April.
ja isot pojat kokoontuivat viela siivoamaan jalkia, kun ensimmaiset YK-joukot pari paivaa aiemmin olivat ehtineet pelipaikoilleen (eivat toki kaikki).
Ensin YK:n virallinen historiankirjoitus (pitka) ja sitten, miten se oikeasti meni (lyhyt) lopussa, eri fontilla:
The three enlarged infantry battalions approved for initial deployment were provided by Finland, Kenya and Malaysia. Four additional battalions were held in reserve, on seven days' notice to move to Namibia, by Bangladesh, Togo, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. In the event, the reserve battalions were not called to Namibia. The delays already [ainainen "long on morals" vs. "short on money" YK:n puitteissa] referred to had made it clear that it was not going to be possible to deploy the infantry battalions to Namibia by D-Day, 1 April, as originally envisaged in the Settlement Plan. Under the revised plan, they were due to be deployed in late April/early May. The events of early April, however, led to an acceleration of this deployment by approximately two weeks. The Finnish battalion was deployed in the north-eastern part of the Territory by 17 April; the Malaysian battalion in the north-west by 1 May; and the Kenyan battalion in the centre and south, also by 1 May. All three battalions remained in Namibia until after independence, with the Finnish and Malaysian battalions leaving in early April 1990. The incoming Government asked Kenya to retain its battalion in Namibia after independence, under bilateral arrangements, for an initial period of three months, in order to fulfil various tasks, including helping with the training of a Namibian army.
As already noted, the logistics elements in UNTAG's military component worked closely with the civilian logistics elements to provide an integrated logistics support system for the whole operation. The military units consisted of: a signals unit (United Kingdom); an engineer squadron (Australia); an administrative company, including movement control and postal elements (Denmark); supply, transport and maintenance units (Canada and Poland, plus civilian personnel provided by the Federal Republic of Germany); a helicopter squadron (Italy); and a squadron of light transport aircraft (Spain). The military component also included a civilian medical unit contributed by Switzerland. In addition, the Soviet Union and the United States provided air transport for the initial deployment of UNTAG.
For the same reason that applied to the infantry battalions, the deployment of the logistics units was not completed before D-Day. Indeed most of them had little more than advance parties in Namibia at that time and most became fully operational only in late April or early May.
D-DAY AND ITS AFTERMATH
When the Special Representative arrived in Windhoek on 31 March 1989 to assume his duties in Namibia, hopes were high. What had seemed an interminable process of negotiation was at last to bear fruit and Namibia's independence seemed in sight. There was concern, of course, that - for the reasons already mentioned, which were beyond the Secretary-General's control - UNTAG would be far from fully deployed on D-Day and would become completely operational only a month or more later. It was recognized that this made it even more essential that all concerned should honour the commitments which they had entered into regarding all aspects of the Settlement Plan. But an informal ceasefire had been in effect, and largely respected, for over seven months and the parties had just reaffirmed in writing their acceptance of a formal ceasefire with effect from 0600 local time on the morning of 1 April.
The previous evening, however, the newly arrived Special Representative was told by the South African Administrator-General that heavily armed SWAPO forces, in combat uniform, had begun moving forward and crossing from Angola into Namibia, many others being poised to follow.
The following morning, while demonstrations and processions of welcome for UNTAG were occurring throughout the Territory, the Administrator-General told the Special Representative that further armed SWAPO personnel had crossed the border overnight and incidents were occurring on a broad front throughout the Ovambo area of northern Namibia. A series of similar reports came in during the day, indicating military action and casualties on a scale not seen for many years in the Namibian conflict. The Special Representative sent a team of senior UNTAG officials north to investigate. As already noted, UNTAG was not yet effectively deployed in the Territory. Apart from the military observers and monitors, few personnel, military or civilian, had arrived and their operational capability was severely hampered by the lack of vehicles and communications.
Later on 1 April, the South African Foreign Minister told the Secretary-General that if UNTAG was unable to contain the new situation, it would be necessary for his Government again to deploy its military forces which had, earlier that day, been confined to base under UNTAG monitoring in accordance with the Settlement Proposal; the South West Africa Police were unable to deal with the incursion by heavily armed SWAPO groups. The Secretary-General immediately requested SWAPO representatives to do whatever they could to affect the situation positively.
Given all these circumstances, the Special Representative and the Force Commander sent to the Secretary-General an urgent joint recommendation that they be authorized to accept a strictly limited and temporary suspension of the SADF confinement to base. This recommendation was accepted. The arrangement under which this was to occur was in the following terms: "Certain specified units, to be agreed, will be released from restriction to base to provide such support as may be needed by the existing police forces, in case they cannot handle the situation by themselves. The situation will be kept under constant review and the movement out of existing bases will throughout be monitored by UNTAG military observers.
The team of UNTAG officials sent to the north held discussions on 2 April with the South African security forces and interviewed two SWAPO prisoners captured the previous day. The latter said that they had been instructed by their commanders in Angola to enter Namibia, avoiding the South African security forces if possible, in order to establish bases in Namibia under United Nations supervision. Their units were to bring with them all their arms, including rockets and anti-aircraft devices.
In the light of the wide difference between the stated objectives of the captives, who had impressed the UNTAG team with their credibility, and those attributed to them by the South African security forces, who saw their intention as aggressive and hostile, the team immediately requested to see all the general staff of the South African security forces who were then present at Oshakati, together with a senior representative of the South African Foreign Ministry. The team emphasized the immense gravity of the situation and the serious disparity between the two versions of events. They stressed, in unambiguous language, the imperative need for maximum restraint by the security forces, while immediate efforts were made in all quarters to resolve the situation. In Windhoek, the Special Representative and Force Commander impressed the same message on the Administrator-General and his senior police and military personnel.
On 2 April, SWAPO emphatically denied that it had violated the ceasefire and stated that it was committed to honouring it in spirit and letter. On the contrary, SWAPO said, South African security forces had attacked its members who had been peacefully celebrating the beginning of the implementation of resolution 435 in northern Namibia and some of whom had been trying to come forward to hand over their weapons to UNTAG. South Africa, for its part, asserted that the incursion of heavily armed and uniformed SWAPO forces was continuing.
The Secretary-General reported on these grave developments to the Security Council in informal consultations on 3 April. He concluded his report as follows:
"The mounting toll of Namibian and South African casualties, at the very moment when the long-delayed independence process has at last commenced, is especially tragic. On the basis of information so far available to it, UNTAG is of the view that SWAPO had infiltrated armed personnel and material into Namibia around the time of the ceasefire. UNTAG, however, feels that this infiltration may not have offensive intent, but instead may be aimed at the establishment of SWAPO camps inside the Territory, which SWAPO would then request UNTAG to monitor. SWAPO, for its part, has emphatically denied any infiltration and has stated that its supporters inside Namibia have been attacked. If the integrity of the Settlement Proposal, which took many years of difficult negotiation to conclude, is not respected by any party, then the people of Namibia will again be the principal sufferers. It is therefore most necessary for all concerned to exercise the maximum restraint at this time, and to advance and reinforce practical arrangements to implement each and every aspect of the Settlement Plan. This is a matter of the greatest political and humanitarian urgency, in view of the grave situation now existing along parts of the northern border of Namibia".
On 4 April, the South African Foreign Minister wrote to the Secretary-General stating, inter alia, that more than 1,000 SWAPO armed forces had now infiltrated Namibia, and that major mechanized, tank and infantry elements of SWAPO had been deployed just north of the Namibian/Angolan border. Unless, he said, active and effective measures were taken to stem the rapid deterioration of the situation, the whole peace process in Namibia was in danger of collapse. On 5 April, he informed the Secretary-General that the South African authorities were appealing by radio to SWAPO forces to return to Angola, and offering them safe conduct to locations north of the 16th parallel where, he said, it had been agreed, in the context of the Joint Commission agreements, that they would be confined.
On 5 April, the Secretary-General put proposals to South Africa and SWAPO for a ceasefire and the establishment of temporary assembly points under UNTAG supervision to which SWAPO armed personnel could report. They could then choose between being escorted across the border and to the north of the 16th parallel, with their arms, or handing over their weapons to UNTAG and returning as unarmed civilians to their homes in Namibia. If these proposals were accepted, South African security units would be required, 48 hours after the restoration of the ceasefire, to return to their bases under United Nations monitoring.
The Secretary-General communicated his proposals also to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Chairman of the front-line States. Following an emergency summit of the front-line States in Luanda on 6 April, President Kaunda informed the Secretary-General that the summit had accepted his proposals, but wished that the SWAPO forces, having handed over their arms to UNTAG, should remain at the assembly points until the SWAPO leadership returned to Namibia.
On 7 April, the Secretary-General again reported to the Security Council. Fighting was continuing, he said, and well over 200 persons had already been killed. Every effort was being made to expedite the arrival and deployment of UNTAG personnel throughout the Territory; members of the Council had offered fresh transport and logistics support to help to bring UNTAG rapidly up to operational strength. The Secretary-General went on to describe the ceasefire proposals which he had put forward.
On 8 April, South Africa rejected the Secretary-General's proposals, which, it said, would be incompatible with the existing agreements. South Africa stated that it would respect all related agreements and that it would be impossible to complete the peace process unless all other parties did the same.
Also on 8 April, Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO, announced that the SWAPO leadership had decided to order its forces within Namibia to stop fighting, regroup and report to Angola within 72 hours under the escort of UNTAG.
Meanwhile, the Joint Commission established by the Brazzaville Protocol met in extraordinary session at Mount Etjo, in central Namibia, on 8 and 9 April. Angola, Cuba and South Africa attended, as did the United States and the Soviet Union, as observers. The Special Representative and the Administrator-General attended by invitation on 9 April. At the conclusion of the meeting, the parties adopted a Declaration of re-commitment to all aspects of the peace process, and urged the Secretary-General urgently to take all necessary measures for the most rapid and complete deployment of UNTAG so that it could fully and effectively carry out its mandate. In an annex to the Declaration, detailed agreement between the parties was recorded on Principles for a withdrawal procedure, and on a sequence of events for the implementation of the Declaration and Principles. These also were signed by the three Governments, having been agreed upon by all others in attendance at the meeting.
The withdrawal procedure was to be conducted under UNTAG supervision. SWAPO forces in Namibia were to present themselves at assembly points for safe passage to locations in Angola north of the 16th parallel. There they were to turn their arms over to UNTAG. They were to be informed of this process in local radio broadcasts in which a joint appeal by the Special Representative and the Administrator-General would be made. At the end of the process, and after information provided by SWAPO and joint verification by the Administrator-General and the Special Representative of the exit of all SWAPO forces from Namibian territory, the status quo ante 1 April would be deemed to have been reinstated. The parties, in agreeing to these provisions, further stated that they had taken note of the SWAPO announcement of 8 April.
On 9 April, the Secretary-General expressed his welcome for Mr. Nujoma's statement and the Mount Etjo Declaration; he believed that, in the light of these developments, the restoration of the ceasefire in Namibia would be facilitated, together with the process of implementing resolution 435. The next day, the Secretary-General again briefed the Security Council, expressing the hope that there would shortly be an end to the intense suffering and casualties that had scarred the start of UNTAG's work.
The Mount Etjo Declaration was an important step forward but it was not implemented in the manner envisaged. UNTAG found it impossible to persuade the South African security forces to keep their distance from the temporary assembly points. Perhaps as a result of this factor, among others, the SWAPO forces in Namibia chose to avoid them and only a handful, mostly sick or wounded, presented themselves for safe passage back to Angola. The vast majority preferred to make their own way across the border, without UNTAG protection. Unfortunately, a number of clashes occurred during this process. In a further meeting in northern Namibia on 20 April, the Joint Commission decided that in order to facilitate the return of SWAPO forces to Angola, all South African security forces would return to base for a period of 60 hours from 1800 hours local time on 26 April.
There was a further meeting of the Joint Commission in Cape Town, South Africa, from 27 to 29 April, about which the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 4 May. He said that he had asked the members of the Commission to ensure that the views of the United Nations were fully heard before the Commission adopted any decisions which would require action by UNTAG or otherwise affect the implementation of resolution 435. However, when the United Nations representatives were invited to join the Commission meetings, it was announced that certain agreements had already been arrived at, the main point being that for a two-week period, ending at 0600 hours local time on 13 May, the South African security forces would again be released from restriction in order to verify that SWAPO armed personnel had returned to Angola and to locate and lift arms caches. The Secretary-General told the Security Council that he would have preferred the outcome to have been a decision requiring that the restriction of South African security forces to their bases should continue without interruption. Regrettably, that had not been the case. He urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint, underlining the imperative need for SWAPO personnel to be given safe passage to the Angolan border.
In a further meeting of the Joint Commission at Cahama, Angola, on 19 May, the members noted the "positive steps" each had taken to fulfil its duties under the Mount Etjo agreement, as well as information provided by UNTAG that SWAPO forces were now confined to base under UNTAG monitoring north of the 16th parallel. The Special Representative and the Administrator-General confirmed that South African forces also had again been confined to base under UNTAG monitoring, with effect from 13 May, and that a de facto cessation of hostilities had been re-established in northern Namibia.
Meanwhile, the returning SWAPO forces and any others present on Angolan territory south of the 16th parallel had concentrated at Chibemba, south of Lubango, where their confinement to base by the Angolan armed forces was monitored by military officers of UNTAG (Angola). The SWAPO forces were later moved to bases closer to Lubango. These arrangements continued until the personnel concerned returned to Namibia as civilians under the repatriation programme described below.
Implementation of parts of the Settlement Proposal, which allowed a period of only seven months between D-Day and the elections, was now six weeks behind schedule. The intensity of the fighting revived the mistrust and division which had begun to be assuaged during the seven months of de facto ceasefire. UNTAG had been criticized in many quarters and its task of establishing its moral and political authority had been made more difficult. Between 300 and 400 combatants, mostly on the SWAPO side, had been killed. The counter-insurgency police, Koevoet, had been remobilized, and there would be much pain and tribulation before they were once again neutralized. It had been a nightmare beginning to an operation which had been launched with so much hope.
Tosiasihan on, etta YK myohastyi, SWAPO yritti marssia maahan (tuon alussa mainitun infiltraation jalkeen), E. Afrikka varautui tahan mobilisoimalla joukkonsa, mutta lahettivatkin eteen ilmavoimat ja jattivat maajoukot reserviin. Rynnakkokoneita tukemassa sorakentilla oli vain tankkaajia ja rakettien lataajat, koska Plan B oli lahtea akkia haneen (Puma kuljetuskopterit valmiina vieressa ) ja antaa homma armeijalle (jota myoten 7 kk:n rauha olsi ollut sirpaleina). Swapolaisia meni kuitenkin 1400 paivan aikana, ja invaasioporukat peraantyivat. YK joukot paikalle ("kaikki hyvin tanaan, sir?"), homma tarjoiltiin heille kuin lautasella, vaalit pidettiin ja nuo samaiset ukot (miinus se 1400 ja pari sataa paalle, mita hajanaisissa kahakoissa meni; tarkoitushan oli valttaa vastapuolta ja asettaa se, vasta myohemmin, tapahtuneiden tosiasioiden eteen) tulivat maahan sivilisteina, niinkuin tuo virallinen versio kertoo.
Todelliset tapahtumat on siloiteltu ja siis haudattu tuon yhden "unfortunately"-lauseen taakse
Unfortunately, a number of clashes occurred during this process. In a further meeting in northern Namibia on 20 April, the Joint Commission decided that in order to facilitate the return of SWAPO forces to Angola, all South African security forces would return to base for a period of 60 hours from 1800 hours local time on 26 April.
ja isot pojat kokoontuivat viela siivoamaan jalkia, kun ensimmaiset YK-joukot pari paivaa aiemmin olivat ehtineet pelipaikoilleen (eivat toki kaikki).
Viimeksi muokattu:
Kyllä Mahtisaari on taatusti muutaman kerran nyrpistellyt naamaansa, kun on tuota muistellut. Kyllähän tuossa rauhanteossa nähtiin tasan se, kuinka kyyninen meno tässä elämässä on mahdollista. Petoksia, kylmiä peliliikkeitä, kostoja, varoituksia, suoranaista kiristystä, lahjontaa, painostusta, teurastusta....tuo joukkojen likvidointi oli yksi asia, toinen oli salamurhat, joita tehtiin vajaan viikon aikana eri lähteiden mukaan vähintään runsaasti, eikä siinä säälitty kohteiden läheisiäkään. Tekijöistä ei mitään tietoa....tietenkään.
Mutta eiko ollut hauskaa silokielta YK:lta?
Peitetty runsaiden yksityiskohtien alle. Mistahan kaikesta muusta on vaiettu, vain jotta nayttaisi, etta YK:llakin on menestystarinoita? Tuossahan oli erikoista se, etta suurvaltojen ja niiden proxien intressit yhtenivat. Unitaa ei tietysti kutsuttu edes mukaan, koska se tuolla diililla jai eristyksiin.
Peitetty runsaiden yksityiskohtien alle. Mistahan kaikesta muusta on vaiettu, vain jotta nayttaisi, etta YK:llakin on menestystarinoita? Tuossahan oli erikoista se, etta suurvaltojen ja niiden proxien intressit yhtenivat. Unitaa ei tietysti kutsuttu edes mukaan, koska se tuolla diililla jai eristyksiin.
Falangi
Kenraali
Lyhyt dokumenttipätkä Rhodesian puskasodasta ja Rhodesian armeijan käyttämästä Fireforce taktiikasta.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fireforce
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fireforce
