F-35 Lightning II

F-16 netissä joku oli lukenut vanhaa kirjaa The Revolt of the Majors: How the Air Force Changed After Vietnam ja tämä osuus tuntuu tutulta:

One of Creech's most immediate problems was increasing the amount of time TAC flew, because low flying time was not only a major reason so many young fighter pilots were leaving the Air Force but also, more important, it was cutting into combat readiness. The number of sorties and hours tactical fighters flew a month, had steadily declined and reached a historic low in February 1978 of 11.5 sorties/17 hours a month. Only 34 percent of TAC's F-15s were flyable at the end of any given day, and an inspection found the F-15 wing at Langley incapable of deploying to its forward base in Europe, even with three weeks notice.
The problems originated in the Air Force decision in the mid-to-late 1970s to spend its limited procurement budget on new aircraft and buy only the minimum number of spare parts, because spares also came out of the procurement budget. General Jack Chain, the director of Air Force Operations and Readiness, said in 1980, Our aircraft at the end of the Vietnam War were tired and were facing a new generation of Soviet equipment. We had a choice: we could have either a new airplane or we could have bought spares for the service. Shortly before Creech took over TAC, the command's fighter Utilization our old ones. We couldn't buy both. Additionally, as one general noted, spare parts were simply not sexy and lacked a constituency in the acquisition process when the question was two more F-15sî or ì5000 more extra tires and 10,000 more widgets for the radar.
While this decision was later lambasted by the Critics and some in Congress, more objective assessments suggest the Air Force choice to buy systems instead of spares at this time was not an unreasonable one. A 1994 analysis written by the Congressional Budget Office noted that during this period the underlying problem was an imbalance between defense resources and national security commitments that made it impossible for DoD to buy both readiness and modernization.


Näiden Majurien aikaansaannoksia on esim. Red Flag.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
'Revolt of the Majors' on kyllä hyvä opus. Se maalaa aika erilaisen kuvan USAFin kehityksestä Vietnamin sodan aikana ja sen jälkeen kuin mitä Boydin, Spreyn, Riccionen yms. 'reformistien' historioista saa. Vaikka kirjassa Boydin ansioiden vähättely lipsahtaa välistä jopa parjauksen puolelle, niin on selvää että tämän 'Light Fighter Mafian' merkitys oli paljon pienempi kuin mitä monet artikkelit ja historiakatsaukset väittävät.

Merkillepantavaa on miten paljon SAC dominoi varhaista USAFia. Häntä todellakin heilutti koiraa. Yhdessä välissä LeMay jopa esitti Tactical Air Forcen lakkauttamista.
 
Viimeksi muokattu:
Yet, ANG F-15C/D units have clamored for the F-35A.

Guard leaders in the five F-15 states initially expressed a preference for the Lockheed-built F-35A,” the National Guard Association of the United States said last August. “The concern is, the F-15EX will be a predominantly Guard aircraft and may not receive the same attention as systems also flown in the active component.”

Viidelle kuudesta F-15C/D ANG käyttäjästä ei tunnu kelpaavan F-15EX kun näkevät sen rupulikoneena :LOL: jos se tulee vain ANG käyttöön eikä aktiivi-USAF:lle.
 
'Revolt of the Majors' on kyllä hyvä opus. Se maalaa aika erilaisen kuvan USAFin kehityksestä Vietnamin sodan aikana ja sen jälkeen kuin mitä Boydin, Spreyn, Riccionen yms. 'reformistien' historioista saa. Vaikka kirjassa Boydin ansioiden vähättely lipsahtaa välistä jopa parjauksen puolelle, niin on selvää että tämän 'Light Fighter Mafian' merkitys oli paljon pienempi kuin mitä monet artikkelit ja historiakatsaukset väittävät.

Merkillepantavaa on miten paljon SAC dominoi varhaista USAFia. Häntä todellakin heilutti koiraa. Yhdessä välissä LeMay jopa esitti Tactical Air Forcen lakkauttamista.
Ehkä hyvä huomata, että yksi syy Light Fighter Mafian ajattelulle oli sinänsä järkevä oletus siitä, miten puolustusbudjetti tulisi kehittymään Vietnamis sodan jälkeen. Reaganin aikana alkanut budjetin valtaisa pumpaaminen ja piittaamattomuus velkaantumisesta muutti kuvaa täysin ja mahdollisti high-end kaluston kehityksen ja määrän kasvattamisen tavalla, joka ei olisi millään mahdollista normaaleissa budjettiraameissa.

Jos korona-aikakin unohdetaan, tasapainoinen budjetti USA:ssa tarkottaisi puolustusbudjetin leikkaamista noin 30% verran. Tuollainen leikkaus tarkoittaisi valtaisia supistuksia sekä uuden kehittämiseen että olemassa olevan fliitin kokoon. Tämä yyberteknohävittäjien kehittäminen ja lennättäminen isossa määrin on mahdollista vain nykyisessä tilanteessa jossa budjettialijäämillä ei ole mitään merkitystä.

Myös se ennuste, että kalliden järjestelmien suosiminen johtaisi systeemiseen korruptioon järjestelmässä, on osoittautunut todeksi.
 
Se on totta ettei varmaan monikaan 70-luvulla olisi uskonut Reaganin ajan budjetteihin jotka mahdollistivat mm. Strike Eaglen (vrt. HX ja 10 miljardin erillisrahoitus jota pidin vielä 3 vuotta sitten aivan utopiana). Osa siitä rahasta meni kuitenkin aika kyseenalaisiin projekteihin kuten B-1B. Lisäksi 'Light Fighter Mafian' vaikutus alkoi hiipua jo 70-luvulla, kun F-16 'pilattiin' kaikella 'turhalla' kuten tutka, elso, polttoaine yms.
'Reformistit' olivat oikeassa kritisoidessaan 50/60-luvun 'teknologiset ratkaisut edellä' filosofiaa, mutta monessa asiassa he olivat yksinkertaisesti väärässä, kuten vaikka Enhanced Tactical Fighter, josta myöhemmin tuli F-15E. Sen sijasta he olisivat halunneet rakentaa pieniä yksinkertaisia 'Blitzfightereita' joilla ei kyllä vaikka Desert Stormissa olisi tehnyt muuta kuin tapattanut ison liudan lentäjiä.
 
Se on totta ettei varmaan monikaan 70-luvulla olisi uskonut Reaganin ajan budjetteihin jotka mahdollistivat mm. Strike Eaglen (vrt. HX ja 10 miljardin erillisrahoitus jota pidin vielä 3 vuotta sitten aivan utopiana). Osa siitä rahasta meni kuitenkin aika kyseenalaisiin projekteihin kuten B-1B. Lisäksi 'Light Fighter Mafian' vaikutus alkoi hiipua jo 70-luvulla, kun F-16 'pilattiin' kaikella 'turhalla' kuten tutka, elso, polttoaine yms.
'Reformistit' olivat oikeassa kritisoidessaan 50/60-luvun 'teknologiset ratkaisut edellä' filosofiaa, mutta monessa asiassa he olivat yksinkertaisesti väärässä, kuten vaikka Enhanced Tactical Fighter, josta myöhemmin tuli F-15E. Sen sijasta he olisivat halunneet rakentaa pieniä yksinkertaisia 'Blitzfightereita' joilla ei kyllä vaikka Desert Stormissa olisi tehnyt muuta kuin tapattanut ison liudan lentäjiä.
Tyypillisessä Keski-Euroopan talvisäässä ei tehnyt paljon mitään alkuperäisellä F-16A-mallilla.
 
Näin se monesti hitech asekaupoissa näkyy olevan että ensiksi valitaan minkä suurvallan leiriin halutaan kuulua ja sen jälkeen valitaan tuotteet tämän koalition tarjonnasta.
 

Norwegian authorities must be vigilant so that the Americans do not shy away from F-35 contracts​

Norwegian industry has secured F-35 contracts worth ten billion kroner (1 mrd €).

For several years, a recurring theme was how relatively little value creation the F-35 purchase had contributed to on Norwegian soil and how demanding it was for the Norwegian defense industry to gain a foothold within the enormous weapons program.

But the Norwegian industrial companies, which have been patient enough and skilled enough to position themselves, are succeeding well in the fierce competition.

Norwegian industry has now passed a large and round figure: They have so far fought for F-35 contracts worth about ten billion kroner.

Large contracts in the last two years​

In 2017, Teknisk Ukeblad was able to point out that there was little movement in Norwegian F-35 order books in the period from 2010 until then.

The accumulated level was $ 350 million in 2010, $ 358 million in 2013 and $ 380 million at the end of 2016.

But since then, as is well known, the production rate of fighter jets has increased, apart from a slight corona-related decline, and last summer Teknisk Ukeblad was able to state that the value of production contracts had almost doubled in just one year.

The value had then increased from approximately 4 to 7.5 billion kroner, and since then Norwegian industry has won new F-35 assignments at almost the same pace. The total value is now about ten billion kroner.

This was stated by Lieutenant Colonel Geir Engen in the Ministry of Defense at the Defense and Security Industry Association's (FSI) annual conference INFO / ERFA last week.

The largest new assignment ended up with Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace (KDA), which a month and a half ago entered into an agreement with Lockheed Martin for the production of tail rudders, leading edge of tail fin and fuselage panels for more than 500 aircraft in production batches 15-17 until 2025. The contract is worth 1.75 billion.

Matchmaker and watchdog​

For the F-35, the so-called "best value" principle applies, in contrast to traditional repurchase. This means that Norwegian industry must compete for the assignments, here there is nothing that is distributed outwardly.

Norway's participation as a partner in development and further development in the F-35 program gives Norwegian industry the opportunity to compete for parts production and maintenance work for aircraft and engines.

At INFO / ERFA, the management of three Norwegian companies that supply components for the F-35 also participated, namely Kitron, Berget and T&G Elektro.

If these are representative, Engen and his colleagues in the Ministry of Defense do a very good and significant job as a matchmaker and watchdog.

Matchmaker in the sense of helping to make contacts and find relevant Norwegian companies they can promote and record for Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney.

The watchdog function is about continuously making sure that all assignments that are to be advertised actually become so, so that Norwegian industry has the opportunity to compete in this protected market.

Long way in​

In this area, the Norwegian authorities have to be vigilant, especially when restructuring is carried out in the US and actors come in without the same stringent attitude to call rules, it was stated at the conference.

The three Norwegian suppliers of the F-35 highlighted staying power as a key feature in this industry. The road in has been quite long, starting with the resource- and time-consuming AS9000 / 9100 certification.

For example, it took 17 years from T&G having its first meeting with Lockheed Martin in 1999 to the first delivery. Five years ago, Kitron still had no real value creation associated with the F-35, while today it accounts for 10-15 percent of their activity.

For Berget, the F-35 is so far not a great financial success, but things look promising in the future, including related to deliveries to the Joint Strike Missile (JSM).

For all the companies, it is also a slightly more difficult value to estimate, namely the reputation that follows from having an F-35 on the CV and what kind of competitiveness this contributes to when they cut contracts in completely different areas than within this program.

Improved sharing access​

Brigadier Sigurd Fongen from the Defense Staff attended the FSI conference to provide a status report for the F-35 program.

The fund confirmed what we already knew , namely that the pandemic has led to delays in F-35 production which also affects Norwegian aircraft, but that all ordered six new aircraft will be delivered to the Air Force during 2021.

He explained that the program is in the middle of a transition where the focus is shifted from production to global support solutions. That is, maintenance, logistics, spare parts - everything you need to operate the aircraft.

According to the Fund, Norway is still struggling a bit with spare parts access, even though it is improving and that in 2020 they noted a positive trend in terms of accessibility.

So far, approximately 650 F-35s have been delivered, and as it looks now, at least five times as many aircraft will be produced as will be in operation by the 2070s. In other words, there are long-term opportunities for Norwegian industry.

The brigadier pointed out that in addition to parts production and maintenance, Norwegian industry also has two other potentially valuable export cards up its sleeve, namely the cannon ammunition Apex from Nammo and JSM from KDA. Both have status as at the end of the development with ongoing integration.

JSM​

In connection with the integration work, JSM was released from an F-35 for the first time earlier this year.

So far, Norway and Japan have ordered JSM, and according to KDA, they notice that international interest is increasing for the missile, which is the only adapted weapon room on the F-35 and which is intended for well-defended naval vessels and land targets.

JSM is integrated into the F-35 block 4 which will be ready for the Air Force declares full operational capability (FOC) with its 52 fighter aircraft from 2025.

The aircraft will of course also be upgraded after block 4, and for further development in the period 2025-2030, NOK 6.3 billion has been set aside for Norway.

What kind of capacities will be added here, and which according to the plan will be in place by 2035, depends on what is adopted as a priority by the multinational program office JPO.

In the autumn, a new partnership agreement will enter into force for the eight remaining nations after Turkey was kicked out of the program two years ago because they had decided to buy Russian air defense, specifically the S-400 (SA-21 Growler). .
 
Viimeksi muokattu:

edit: itse transkripti
...I'm very, very excited about the advancement of the F-35. It's -- it's performance in the air domain has been
magnificent, where it contributes in the main salvos of success, indications and warnings, command and control, mission command, the F-35
contributions on all three salvos are -- are splendid. And with each passing day, we're finding better ways to unite nations that possess F-35s to improve
our speed and posture in the air domain, and we want to continue on the right path that we're on.

And I -- I'm firmly convinced with the strategic transparency and alignment that is taking place with the next generation air
defense system and with future combat aviation systems, and with the advances that we're making in F-35, fifth generation activity and the alignment
and transparency that nations are giving to each other, to -- to share ideas and thoughts about how to better employ the F-35, we're -- we're traversing in the right direction. I'm very pleased.
 
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Täydellisestä amatööripositiosta käsin, tullut tämän hankinnan prosessia kohtuullisen tiiviisti seurattua. Mielenkiinnosta.

Tällä tietämyksellä, F-35 on ajassaan kehittynein sekä suurimman potentiaalin jatkokehitykseen omaava järjestelmä. Mukaaanlukien poliittinen aspekti hankinnan sekä jo olemassaolevien, kahdenkeskisten sopimusten suhteen.

Luojalle sekä tasapuolisuuden vuoksi myös Allahille kiitokset siitä, ettei tälläisiä vitaalihankintoja tehdä Suomessa amatöörien tai vaihtelevan poliittisen ilmaston vaikutuksen toimesta. Jo vakiintuneen prosessin tapaan, PV:n esityksen vastaisesti toimiminen herättäisi isoja otsikoita. Tämä suitsee poliittisesta pisteidenkeruusta tulevaa riskiä osaltaan.

Oma uskoni prosessin toimivuteen on kohtuullisen vahva. Tätä uskoa voidaan tarkastella vaikkapa vasemmiston reagoinneilla hankintaan. Yksittäisiä kansanedustajia lukuunottamatta, itse HX-hankinnan tarvetta ei olla juurikaan kyseenalaistettu.

Todennäköisesti edellämainittuun vahvasti vaikuttaa poliittisen vaikutusvallan (hallituksessa olo) sekä siihen liittyvän tiedollisen sekä tosiasiallisen päätöksenteon mukanaan tuoma vastuu. Sekä toki näihin vaikuttavat tiedot geopoliittisesta ilmastosta, joita ei julkisuuteen, pl. tarkoitushakuiset toimenpiteet, juurikaan jaeta.

Kyllä tästä hyvä tulee.
 
Tyypillisessä Keski-Euroopan talvisäässä ei tehnyt paljon mitään alkuperäisellä F-16A-mallilla.

No miksi ihmeessä Hollanti, Tanska ja Belgia lähtivät mukaan kelkkaan? Varmaan myös Norjassa talvisäätä...
 
No miksi ihmeessä Hollanti, Tanska ja Belgia lähtivät mukaan kelkkaan? Varmaan myös Norjassa talvisäätä...
Sillä edellisellä sukupolvella ei tainnut tehdä mitään vastaavissa olosuhteissa?
Ei siis nähty tarpeelliseksi/rahan arvoiseksi ominaisuudeksi.
(tämä siis omaa pohdintaa)
 
No miksi ihmeessä Hollanti, Tanska ja Belgia lähtivät mukaan kelkkaan? Varmaan myös Norjassa talvisäätä...
Niiden mukaantulon myötä nimenomaan siitä tuli monitoimihävittäjä.
Increased interest turned the LWF into a serious acquisition program. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway were seeking to replace their F-104G Starfighter fighter-bombers. In early 1974, they reached an agreement with the U.S. that if the USAF ordered the LWF winner, they would consider ordering it as well. The USAF also needed to replace its F-105 Thunderchief and F-4 Phantom II fighter-bombers. The U.S. Congress sought greater commonality in fighter procurements by the Air Force and Navy, and in August 1974 redirected Navy funds to a new Navy Air Combat Fighter program that would be a navalized fighter-bomber variant of the LWF. The four NATO allies had formed the Multinational Fighter Program Group (MFPG) and pressed for a U.S. decision by December 1974; thus, the USAF accelerated testing.
To reflect this serious intent to procure a new fighter-bomber, the LWF program was rolled into a new Air Combat Fighter (ACF) competition in an announcement by U.S. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in April 1974. The ACF would not be a pure fighter, but multi-role, and Schlesinger made it clear that any ACF order would be in addition to the F-15, which extinguished opposition to the LWF. ACF also raised the stakes for GD and Northrop because it brought in competitors intent on securing what was touted at the time as "the arms deal of the century". These were Dassault-Breguet's proposed Mirage F1M-53, the Anglo-French SEPECAT Jaguar, and the proposed Saab 37E "Eurofighter". Northrop offered the P-530 Cobra, which was similar to the YF-17. The Jaguar and Cobra were dropped by the MFPG early on, leaving two European and the two U.S. candidates. On 11 September 1974, the U.S. Air Force confirmed plans to order the winning ACF design to equip five tactical fighter wings. Though computer modeling predicted a close contest, the YF-16 proved significantly quicker going from one maneuver to the next and was the unanimous choice of those pilots that flew both aircraft.
On 13 January 1975, Secretary of the Air Force John L. McLucas announced the YF-16 as the winner of the ACF competition. The chief reasons given by the secretary were the YF-16's lower operating costs, greater range, and maneuver performance that was "significantly better" than that of the YF-17, especially at supersonic speeds. Another advantage of the YF-16 – unlike the YF-17 – was its use of the Pratt & Whitney F100 turbofan engine, the same powerplant used by the F-15; such commonality would lower the cost of engines for both programs. Secretary McLucas announced that the USAF planned to order at least 650, possibly up to 1,400 production F-16s. In the Navy Air Combat Fighter competition, on 2 May 1975 the Navy selected the YF-17 as the basis for what would become the McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet.

Eli Hornet saatiin noiden kiinnostuksen myötä lohdutuspalkintona. Ilman LWF:ää ei olisi ollut sitäkään.
 
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