Kyllä georgiallakin ilmatorjuntaa oli... Auttoiko? Ei...
Auttoi. Kaiken voi tietysti aina kääntää niin, että mikään ei auta mitään jos häviää lopulta, mutta häviön tasojakin on paljon ja tässäkin tapauksessa syynä häviöön oli jokin aivan muu kuin IT:n riittämättömyys. Ja kyllä, tiedän että ratkaiseva rooli tässä asiassa oli nimenomaan ohjustorjunnalla. Sellaisella joka pitäisi tornarin mukaan pystyä kääntämään pois päältä painamalla pientä punaista nappia Moskovassa.
http://www.cast.ru/eng/?id=328
"
Air farce
The Russian Air Force didn't perform well during the conflict in South Ossetia
Russia & CIS Observer, №4 (23) November 2008
Konstantin Makienko"
Otteita:
"Ideally. Russian aviation should have suppressed the Georgian artillery and multiple-launch rocket system positions before the end of August 8. .Another urgent task was to deliver air strikes on the Georgian 4th Infantry Brigade, which was storming Tskhinvali. Russian aviation attempted to accomplish these objectives, but
immediately lost three Sukhoi Su-25 ground-attack aircraft to Georgian anti-air fire. After that, according to eyewitness accounts, there were
no Russian aircraft over Tskhinvali on August 8 or the following day — that is. during the most critical period of the conflict. In effect, the Russian military command was forced to bring motor-rifle units into battle from the march, without first gaining superiority in numbers and firepower."
"
One other deficiency of the Russian Air Force demonstrated during the South Ossetian operation was its inability to gain and sustain air superiority over the battlefield. Russian military convoys advancing along narrow mountainous roads were
totally exposed to air raids by Georgian ground-attack aviation. There is no evidence that Russian fighters provided air protection for the ground troops. Numerous reports assert that Georgian Su-25 attacks were countered with the help of tactical air defense assets, i.e. self-propelled AA guns and man-portable air defense systems. The low efficiency of the Georgian air raids can be put down exclusively to inadequate pilot training. That said,
Georgian Su-25s continued attempted attacks on the Russian troops even on August 11, the last day of combat actions. It is totally unbelievable that the Russian Air Force was unable to establish air superiority almost to the end of the five-day war, despite the fact that the enemy had no fighter aviation."
"In the course of the conflict, the Russian Air Force demonstrated a
complete inability to suppress enemy air defenses. To be fair, Russian aviation had never before faced such a task. The Georgian troops had at least one battalion (according to some sources, two battalions) of relatively modern Buk-Ml (SA-11) self-propelled SAM systems, at least two battalions (a total of eight units) of Osa-AK (SA-8B) self-propelled SAM systems, and six to 10 of the upgraded Osa-AKM version. They managed to deploy dense air defenses right in the conflict zone, as well as near the Georgian cities of Gori and Tbilisi. On the very first day of combat action, Georgian air defense units inflicted heavy losses on Russian aviation.
They shot down up to four war-planes — one Tupolev Tu-22M3 strategic bomber and three Su-25 ground-attack aircraft. By the end of the conflict Russia, had lost at least seven warplanes; the figure could exceed 10 if we count the aircraft that returned to base but were damaged beyond repair."
Toisilla on vain toiveita ja unelmia... Niissäkään sinänsä mitään väärää ole...