arcanine98
Kersantti
I stand corrected.
"[...] kone muistuttaa
Ilmavoimien tulevaisuus
- Viestiketjun aloittaja Museo
- Aloitus PVM
-
- Tagit
- ilmavoimat tulevaisuus
I stand corrected.
"[...] kone muistuttaa
Huhta
Greatest Leader
Kysyn nyt kertauksen vuoksi, kun asia on päässyt unohtumaan mielestä...
Miksi Venäjä tuottaa niin monia toisiaan vastaavia konetyyppejä? Olen ymmärtänyt, että asia liittyy osittain teollisuuspolitiikkaan, mutta kaipa sitä vähemmälläkin tyyppikirjavuudella pärjäisi, jos useampi kone tulee kuitenkin samalta valmistajalta?
Otetaan nyt esimerkeiksi vaikkapa Su-27:n pohjalta rakennetut konetyypit. On uustuotantona valmistettu "retro" Su-27SM3. Sitten on Su-30 (kahdessa eri versiossa, toisessa vielä työnnönsuuntaus), Su-34 ja vielä Su-35S.
Ymmärrän sen, että koneiden suunnittelussa on tehty tiettyjä painotuksia. Mutta miksi tilata noin samankaltaisia koneita? Miksi tarvitaan sekä Su-30 että Su-34? Entä mitä järkeä on tilata uustuotantona vanhaa sotaratsua päivitettynä (Su-27SM3)?
Mielestäni venäläisten pitäisi pärjätä ihan muutamalla raskaalla konetyypillä. Yksi pääasiallisesti ilmaherruushävittäjä (Su-35) ja toinen monitoimisempi, pääasiallisesti rynnäköintiin roolitettu.
Sitten venäläiset pelleilevät vielä MiG-29:n kehitysversioiden ja "too little too late" MiG-35:n kanssa. Vaikuttaa käsittämättömän tehottomalta jakaa resursseja näin moneen eri suuntaan sen sijaan, että keskityttäisiin vain muutamaan konetyyppiin kunnolla.
Miksi Venäjä tuottaa niin monia toisiaan vastaavia konetyyppejä? Olen ymmärtänyt, että asia liittyy osittain teollisuuspolitiikkaan, mutta kaipa sitä vähemmälläkin tyyppikirjavuudella pärjäisi, jos useampi kone tulee kuitenkin samalta valmistajalta?
Otetaan nyt esimerkeiksi vaikkapa Su-27:n pohjalta rakennetut konetyypit. On uustuotantona valmistettu "retro" Su-27SM3. Sitten on Su-30 (kahdessa eri versiossa, toisessa vielä työnnönsuuntaus), Su-34 ja vielä Su-35S.
Ymmärrän sen, että koneiden suunnittelussa on tehty tiettyjä painotuksia. Mutta miksi tilata noin samankaltaisia koneita? Miksi tarvitaan sekä Su-30 että Su-34? Entä mitä järkeä on tilata uustuotantona vanhaa sotaratsua päivitettynä (Su-27SM3)?
Mielestäni venäläisten pitäisi pärjätä ihan muutamalla raskaalla konetyypillä. Yksi pääasiallisesti ilmaherruushävittäjä (Su-35) ja toinen monitoimisempi, pääasiallisesti rynnäköintiin roolitettu.
Sitten venäläiset pelleilevät vielä MiG-29:n kehitysversioiden ja "too little too late" MiG-35:n kanssa. Vaikuttaa käsittämättömän tehottomalta jakaa resursseja näin moneen eri suuntaan sen sijaan, että keskityttäisiin vain muutamaan konetyyppiin kunnolla.
arcanine98
Kersantti
Kiitos, juuri näin.
Sitä olen joskus miettinyt, että vaikuttaako koneen oma nopeus IRST:n toimintaan. Noita moderneja QWIP-sensoreita pitää käsittääkseni jäähdyttää jonnekin -200 asteen paikkeille ja nokan näppyläksi sijoitetut sensorit ovat melkomoisen lämpökuorman alla kun nopeus nousee äänenopeuden tuolle puolelle. Mahtaakohan tällä olla merkitystä?
arcanine98
Kersantti
Hyvä kysymys, samaa hommaa joskus pohtinut, Olisiko tuossa jotain tekemistä sillä, että eri tehtaat valmistavat koneet? Tai onko asiakaspuolella useampia tilaajia, jotka sitten haluavat juuri prikulleen tietynlaisen koneen tai täydentävät kalustoa esim. juuri noilla retroflankereiden uustuotannolla?
Huhta
Greatest Leader
Mutta nuo ovat kuitenkin saman katto-organisaation alla (United Aircraft Corporation)? Luulisi, että firmoja voisi sulauttaa toisiinsa tai jotakin vastaavaa. Tosin oligarkit eivät ehkä tykkäisi, en tiedä.
fulcrum
Greatest Leader
Se onko se paljon vai vähän riippuu tietysti skannausnopeudesta.
"Mehupilli" -vertausta on yleensä käytetty rynnäköintiin tarkoitettujen IP-säiliöiden kuvamoodeista, jotka saattavat olla 4x4 tai jopa vain 1x1 astetta. Skywardin kapein katselukulma näyttää siis kerralla 3-50 kertaa enemmän taivasta.
fulcrum
Greatest Leader
Se voi hyvin olla yksi syy, jo vanhassa NL:ssä oli usein paralleeliprojekteja (Su-17 <-> MiG-27) jotta eri alueet ja mahtihenkilöt pysyisivät votkissa ja kaviaareissa. Tilanne on verrattavissa amerikkalaisten "pork barrel" -järjestelmään. Myös Kiinassa on paljon sotilaskonevalmistajia.
UAC on KnAAPOssa muuten vain vähemmistöomistaja.
Toisaalta varianttien paljoudessa on myös tiettyä logiikkaakin:
-Su-30:stä on kaksi pääversiota, KnAAPOssa tehty karvalakkimalli ja Irkutskissa tehty hifiversio. Ensinmainitun rahoittivat kiinalaiset ja jälkimmäisen intialaiset. KnAAPO-versiota tehtiin lähinnä vientiin ja sen valmistus on loppunut vastikään. Venäjän ilmavoimat on tilannut pääasiassa Irkutskin versiota mutta jostain syystä parikymmentä kappaletta myös halpisversiota. Näissä on aika paljon eroja ja Irkutskin versio käyttää paljon ulkomaisia avioniikkoja jotka nykyisenä halvan ruplan aikana tekevät koneesta melko kalliin.
-Su-27SM3:t ovat tiettävästi jonkin vientitilauksen peruuntumisesta ylijääneitä koneita. Ne lunastettiin kotimaan ilmavoimille ja varusteltiin suoraan SM-standardiin.
-MiG-29SMT on vanhat MiG-29:t päivitettynä MiG-29M/K -avioniikkoihin. MiG-35:ssä on uusi avioniikkapaketti.
Eikös nuo länsimaiset sotateollisuuden komponentit ole vientikiellossa Venäjälle? Ainakin mulla sellainen käsitys. Johtuen tietysti Krimistä ja Ukrainasta muutenkin. Voi olla aika nihkeää kehittää mitään missä tarvitsevat länkkäriosia. Eikös aika monet kriittiset osat tosiaankin ole länsimaista alkuperää? Esim tankkien pimeänäkölaitteet ym?
John Hilly
Ylipäällikkö
Yhdysvaltojen ilmavoimissa ristivetoa uudesta rynnäkkökonehankkeesta? Pohdintaa asiasta:
https://warisboring.com/is-the-u-s-air-force-ready-for-a-new-light-attack-aircraft-79562bf64882
Is the U.S. Air Force Ready for a New Light Attack Aircraft?
Flying branch begins search for its next close air support plane
by DAVE MAJUMDAR
The U.S. Air Force is expected to hold demonstrations this summer to show off the capabilities of a new light attack aircraft the service might eventually purchase under a new OA-X program.
The Air Force had attempted to buy a light attack aircraft in 2008 under a previous iteration of the OA-X program, but ultimately that effort came to naught. The previous OA-X effort came at a time when the Air Force was fighting two counter-insurgency wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan, but political forces and bureaucratic inertia within the service carried the day.
How this latest iteration of the OA-X will fare is an open question — but undoubtedly there are those within the Air Force who will vigorously fight the purchase of any new tactical aircraft that isn’t the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Nonetheless, the Air Force is proceeding with its planned demonstration effort. The hope is that an operational OA-X would eventually free up more expensive fighter aircraft such as the Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle or F-35 Lightning II for missions against more challenging foes.
“We want to see if there’s a business case there,” acting Air Force Secretary Lisa Disbrow said during a speech at the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium.
“This concept could free up higher-cost, higher-performance platforms from doing low-threat missions, which would allow us time to prepare for more complex threats with those assets. It could also help us absorb new pilots and be useful as we work with allies and partners.”
But at its core, the Air Force faces a dilemma between investing in expensive high-end multi-role combat aircraft or cheaper counter-insurgency — or COIN — machines that might not be useful outside of certain specific situations.
Afghan A-29 Super Tucanos. U.S. Air Force photo
“The Air Force is torn,” Richard Aboulafia, vice president of the Teal Group aerospace consultancy told The National Interest.
“On the one hand, it wants to be seen as helpful in the current Afghanistan and anti-ISIS conflicts, but on the other hand it doesn’t want to make a big investment in a fleet of planes that would have absolutely no relevance outside the current Afghanistan and anti-ISIS conflicts. COIN proponents tend to emphasize tactics over strategy; this is kind of the aeronautical equivalent of that tendency.”
Former Air Force B-52 pilot and air power analyst Mark Gunzinger at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments said that this time around, the Air Force is likely serious about the OA-X.
The service desperately needs more aircraft to provide more flying hours for its pilots and a low-cost OA-X could be just the answer the Air Force is looking for.
“The Air Force has been clear it is pursuing a light attack aircraft — perhaps more than a single variant over time — that could support counter-insurgency operations in permissive environments as well as increase the number of cockpits available to season pilots at an affordable cost per flying hour,” Gunzinger told The National Interest.
“I think the latter point is too quickly dismissed by some critics of this initiative. The Air Force has a pilot shortfall that is projected to grow to over 700 in the next couple of years,” Gunzinger added. “Moreover, while the Air Force’s Combat Air Force has shrunk to 55 fighter squadrons and a handful of bomber squadrons, there are other critical positions that require pilots such as joint staffs, operational planning staffs, etc.”
“The Air Force is going to produce more pilots, but they will need cockpits for them — and a light attack aircraft with a two-pilot cockpit and a cost per flying hour of $4–5,000 could be a cost-effective alternative. Add to that the availability of several off-the-shelf (or nearly so) aircraft; this becomes an option the Congress could fund that would have a near-immediate impact on the Air Force’s readiness. There is also the potential for foreign military sales to allies and partners. So, this said, I think the initiative has a good chance of succeeding.”
Col. Michael Pietrucha — one of the originators of the 2008 OA-X concept — wrote in War on the Rocks that the demand for aircraft fighting counter-insurgency wars shows no sign of abating.
“We can no longer pretend that the demand for combat air power in irregular conflicts will end soon,” Pietrucha wrote.
“The re-emergence of great power competition does not automatically translate into a reduction of irregular threats. Faced with a problem set that will not go away and a fighter/attack fleet that has been ridden hard and put away wet, it makes perfect sense to add combat capability quickly, and it is entirely reasonable that that air power be designed for the conflicts we face today.”
“OA-X is intended to be an additive capability — not to replace any other element of the fighter/attack fleet,” Pietrucha added. “The Air Force is not trading away its ability to fight a peer adversary, but it is making sure that the forces necessary for a modern theater war are ready for that fight by not frittering the lifespans of our advanced legacy fighters away on tasks that could be done as well for far less cost.”
“The Air Force has done this before, and it has good reason to try again.”
Gunzinger agreed that the Air Force needs the OA-X. However — like Pietrucha — he noted that a light attack aircraft is not a substitute for a high-end warplane that can take on the most capable threats coming from Russia and China.
“Of course, I do not see a light attack aircraft as a weapon system that should take the place of current and planned 5th gen and eventually 6th gen combat aircraft,” Gunzinger said.
Ultimately, only time will tell if the Air Force ends up buying the OA-X.
Institutional forces within the service are strong, and only determined leadership from the chief of staff, Gen. David Goldfein — and whomever the next secretary is — can push the OA-X through to fruition.
https://warisboring.com/is-the-u-s-air-force-ready-for-a-new-light-attack-aircraft-79562bf64882
Salakuljetusta tapahtuu, mutta IP ja VV -kalustoa naapuri osaa valmistaa myös itse.
Nhhk
Kenraali
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/ar...eed-50-maintenance-hours-per-flight-hour.html
En tiedä kuinka luotettavana lähteenä tätä pidetään, ainakin jutussa oli lähteet kohdallaan.
jos tuleva hävittäjä vaatii 40-50tuntia huoltoa per lentotunti niin voidaan unohtaa kyseinen hävittäjä.
En tiedä kuinka luotettavana lähteenä tätä pidetään, ainakin jutussa oli lähteet kohdallaan.
jos tuleva hävittäjä vaatii 40-50tuntia huoltoa per lentotunti niin voidaan unohtaa kyseinen hävittäjä.
Oikeastaan tämä selviää kun laskevat vertailuekelpoiset lentotuntien hinnat. Ei tarvitse pohtia käytettyä aikaa sellaisenaan.
Sehän ei voi poiketa kovin merkittävästi muista tai tavoitetta "noin F-16:ta vastaavasta hinnasta" samana ajankohtana ei saavutettaisi.
Epäilyttävältä näyttää Brigantin laskelma kun vertailtava luku 17 miljoonaa tuntia sisältää runsaasti kertaluontoisia toimenpiteitä. Vasta mature-kypsyysasteen saavuttanut ohjelma ei ole enää painottunut kustannuksissa kohtuuttomasti non-recurring suuntaan.
"'The material and non-recurring sustainment activities include: Training Material and Infrastructure, Initial Spares, Support Equipment, Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) Material and Infrastructure, Site Surveys and Site Activation Activity, Depot Activation, Reliability, Maintainability and Health Maturation, and the Structural Integrity Program.'"
Netistä löytyy kaikenlaista kuten "Drakenin 50 tuntia vs. Typhoonin 8". Ero kuulostaa liian isolta ollakseen lähtökohtaisesti uskottava.
Tässä on RAND:ilta kokonainen julkaisu, jonka perusteella voisi lähteä vertailemaan:
Metrics to Compare Aircraft Operating and Support Costs in the Department of Defense
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1178/RAND_RR1178.pdf
Viimeksi muokattu:
fulcrum
Greatest Leader
Voivat pitää hyvinkin paikkaansa jos verrataan vain laivuetason huoltoa. Nykykoneissa trendi tuppaa olemaan että huoltoja tehdään enemmän varikko- tai jopa tehdastasolla. Tämä tietysti auttaa pitämään suorittavan pään organisaation kevyenä mutta vähentääkö se kokonaiskustannuksia samassa suhteessa?? Vrt. NH90 jonka piti olla halpa huollettava.
Gyllis1
Respected Leader
Lisää asiaa suunnitellusta F-15:n eläkkeestä. Kopsattuna koko artikkeli muutamalla vahvennuksella:
http://aviationweek.com/defense/center-fuselage-rebuild-could-be-f-15cd-achilles-heel
Center Fuselage Rebuild Could Be F-15C/D Achilles’ Heel
U.S. Air Force considers major F-15C life-extension too costly
Mar 31, 2017
James Drew
The F-15C may still have an undefeated aerial combat record, but the 38-year-old aircraft could be slated for retirement if the U.S. Air Force decides not to fund a major structural life-extension program. Air Combat Command (ACC) chief Gen. Mike Holmes says it could cost $30-40 million per aircraft to keep the Eagle soaring beyond the late 2020s, including rebuilding the center fuselage section, among other refurbishments. “We’re probably not going to do that,” he tells Aviation Week. The better answer, he says, is to rapidly begin buying more fighter aircraft, at least 100 per year. That includes ramping up Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II output once the low-observable fifth-generation aircraft matures, but also successive purchases of air superiority jets under the service’s new Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) program. The F-15C is operated primarily by the Air National Guard (ANG) in support of the homeland defense mission, capable of intercepting and shooting down adversary fighters, bombers and cruise missiles. ANG Director Lt. Gen. Scott Rice sent shockwaves through the F-15 community on March 22 when he admitted to Congress that plans are being hatched to retire the 235-aircraft single-seat F-15C fleet and the twin-seat D-model trainers in favor of Lockheed Martin F-16s upgraded with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars.
In December, the Air Force put Raytheon on contract to replace the mission computers in its F-16 fleet, providing “near-fifth-generation aircraft computing power” with twice the processing output and 40 times more memory. This upgrade is the bedrock on which future Fighting Falcon improvements will be based, including the radar upgrade. The Northrop Grumman APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar and Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar could compete for that work. The ANG has an urgent operational need to install AESA radars on 72 of its F-16s, delivered in batches of 24 and 48 units depending on acquisition authority and funding beginning in fiscal 2018. That plan has been talked about for some time, but Rice’s comments before Congress suggest these upgraded F-16s could, without serious capability gaps, fulfill the role now performed by the Eagle. But the F-15C carries eight Raytheon AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles compared to the F-16’s six, along with two heat-seeking AIM-9Xs as backup. The Eagle’s wider radar aperture offers longer-range target detection, tracking and engagement of threats. It flies at twice the speed of sound and is more maneuverable than the F-16. The service says the F-15 retirement proposal is just one of many being considered as part of its “planning choices” process for fiscal 2019 that began last fall. Holmes says the F-15 remains capable, but the cost of rebuilding the center fuselage section will likely be too great.
The F-15 program office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, which supports the F-15C/D and F-15E Strike Eagle fleets, has been working to keep the type flying through 2045 via capability and structural upgrades, including a wing replacement effort in 2022-28. Last August, Boeing received a five-year contract valued at up to $254.2 million for fatigue testing of the F-15C and F-15E models. Two test articles—FTA7 (F-15C) and FTA7 (F-15C)—are undergoing accelerated structural life testing at Boeing’s fighter facility in St. Louis to figure out how long the F-15s can fly and which components fail first. Then the Air Force will know the true life-extension cost. Raytheon began upgrading the Eagle’s radar to the APG-63(V)3 AESA configuration in 2010. Last November, BAE Systems began full-scale development of a next-generation electronic-warfare suite for the Eagle and Strike Eagle under contract to Boeing. That F-15 Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System replaces the obsolete Tactical Electronic Warfare System, which has been the aircraft’s primary self-defense suite since delivery in the 1970s. The prospect of retiring the Eagle puts all these upgrades, collectively worth billions of dollars, at risk. It also dashes Boeing’s hopes for the “F-15 2040C.” Some of the capabilities being considered are fourth-to-fifth-generation communications, conformal fuel tanks, an infrared search-and-track sensor and quad-pack air-to-air missile racks.
Boeing points out that no formal decision has been taken, and it continues to promote “cost-effective” capability upgrades to the service, but there are capacity concerns, since too few F-22s were purchased before the line was shut down in 2012. “The F-15C was specifically designed for the air superiority mission,” Boeing says. “It has an undefeated, combat-proven record and has enough service life to continue flying for years to come.” ACC says it is developing a 30-year aviation plan that extends into the mid-2030s, and these types of force structure proposals are being considered as part of that road map. Holmes says since Operation Desert Storm 25 years ago, the Air Force has been buying too few aircraft, approximately 20 per year, mainly the Lockheed Martin F-22 and F-35, which took painfully long to deliver and cost too much. The average age of the fighter force is now 27-28 years. The F-22 buy was truncated at 187, compared to the original Cold War request of 750, and the F-35 still is not mature. Holmes says a minimum of 100 new fighters are needed per year to reverse this situation and begin rejuvenating the force. He wants to expand the F-35A build rate to 60 per year, but only after it completes development, to avoid upgrade costs. Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Stayce D. Harris tells Congress that the service cannot afford to drop below the minimum operational requirement of 55 fighter squadrons, and would rather grow to 60, about 2,100 aircraft. But it would prefer a healthy force of 55 fighter squadrons with enough pilots and maintainers to support operations than a stressed and undermanned force of 60 units.
ACC says it must retire some fleets to unlock money and personnel to transition to the F-35 and future PCA platform, while still modernizing the F-16 and F-22 fleets. The F-16 and F-15E Strike Eagle are relatively young, with plenty of service life left. The Air Force tried and failed to retire the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog, so the F-15C is the next obvious cut. “We’re trying to work out that mix,” Holmes says. “One of those options is, what year does the F-15C go away?” He says money being spent on F-22 upgrades will maintain its advantage over its Russia and China adversaries. “If the F-15s go away, eventually those F-22s will move into that role, so we need to get to Penetrating Counter-Air [for the high end],” he says. PCA was born of the Air Force’s one-year Air Superiority 2030 study, which wrapped up last year. A follow-on 18-month analysis of alternatives will deliver its recommendations to ACC in 2018. Holmes says the Air Force is discussing various acquisition strategies and authorities with Congress to shorten or avoid the typically lengthy engineering and manufacturing development phase if the proposed aircraft is mature enough. After the PCA study, the service hopes to move quickly into the prototyping and fly off phase. The OA-X light-attack aircraft program is seen as a trailblazer for the next fighter buy.
Holmes wants to take advantage of the three-stream adaptive cycle engines being developed by General Electric and Pratt & Whitney under the Air Force Research Laboratory. However, the service could decide to field an initial batch of fighters sooner, powered by an existing engine, perhaps the F-22’s Pratt & Whitney F119 super cruise propulsion system, he says. He compared this type of acquisition plan to the Century Series during the Cold War, in which six distinct aircraft models were fielded in rapid succession—a mix of fighter-bombers and interceptors—each bringing improved capabilities. John Venable, a former airman and defense policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation, does not believe the F-16 is a viable alternative to the F-15C, and it will take many years to complete the F-16 AESA radar upgrade anyway. He says radar size matters due to physics, and the F-15’s dish is significantly larger. There are not enough F-22As to fully assume the F-15’s role right away, and there is little hope of Lockheed restarting the production line, due to cost and dated technology. He doubts the Air Force can develop and field another aircraft in the time line needed before critical F-15C life-extension and force structure decisions must be made. “The F-15C is still a great airplane,” Venable says. “It doesn’t have the maneuverability of the latest Russian aircraft or French Dassault Rafale, but the biggest thing it has going for it is tactics.
What happens with those squadrons?” The proposed retirement is a serious issue for the ANG, which is run by the states. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), whose state is home to the 104th Fighter Wing, an F-15C unit, raised the issue with Air Force leaders during a congressional hearing. They stressed it was pre-decisional, and the ANG’s adjutant generals are being consulted as studies continue. John Goheen, a spokesman for the National Guard Association of the U.S., says the ANG would prefer to see these aircraft modernized, not retired. He acknowledges that the F-15C fleet presents a large bill at a time of constrained budgets and competing priorities, but the units in question are highly skilled in the air superiority mission, an Air Force core competency. “They provide the bulk of the defense of the nation’s air sovereignty and also deploy overseas,” he says. “These are busy aircraft and our preference would be for them to be modernized.” The service says it is still studying the proposal, and cannot say how much it would save by retiring the fleet. The total operating cost of the F-15C/D fleet was $1.3 billion in fiscal 2016.
http://aviationweek.com/defense/center-fuselage-rebuild-could-be-f-15cd-achilles-heel
Center Fuselage Rebuild Could Be F-15C/D Achilles’ Heel
U.S. Air Force considers major F-15C life-extension too costly
Mar 31, 2017
James Drew
The F-15C may still have an undefeated aerial combat record, but the 38-year-old aircraft could be slated for retirement if the U.S. Air Force decides not to fund a major structural life-extension program. Air Combat Command (ACC) chief Gen. Mike Holmes says it could cost $30-40 million per aircraft to keep the Eagle soaring beyond the late 2020s, including rebuilding the center fuselage section, among other refurbishments. “We’re probably not going to do that,” he tells Aviation Week. The better answer, he says, is to rapidly begin buying more fighter aircraft, at least 100 per year. That includes ramping up Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II output once the low-observable fifth-generation aircraft matures, but also successive purchases of air superiority jets under the service’s new Penetrating Counter-Air (PCA) program. The F-15C is operated primarily by the Air National Guard (ANG) in support of the homeland defense mission, capable of intercepting and shooting down adversary fighters, bombers and cruise missiles. ANG Director Lt. Gen. Scott Rice sent shockwaves through the F-15 community on March 22 when he admitted to Congress that plans are being hatched to retire the 235-aircraft single-seat F-15C fleet and the twin-seat D-model trainers in favor of Lockheed Martin F-16s upgraded with active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radars.
In December, the Air Force put Raytheon on contract to replace the mission computers in its F-16 fleet, providing “near-fifth-generation aircraft computing power” with twice the processing output and 40 times more memory. This upgrade is the bedrock on which future Fighting Falcon improvements will be based, including the radar upgrade. The Northrop Grumman APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar and Raytheon Advanced Combat Radar could compete for that work. The ANG has an urgent operational need to install AESA radars on 72 of its F-16s, delivered in batches of 24 and 48 units depending on acquisition authority and funding beginning in fiscal 2018. That plan has been talked about for some time, but Rice’s comments before Congress suggest these upgraded F-16s could, without serious capability gaps, fulfill the role now performed by the Eagle. But the F-15C carries eight Raytheon AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles compared to the F-16’s six, along with two heat-seeking AIM-9Xs as backup. The Eagle’s wider radar aperture offers longer-range target detection, tracking and engagement of threats. It flies at twice the speed of sound and is more maneuverable than the F-16. The service says the F-15 retirement proposal is just one of many being considered as part of its “planning choices” process for fiscal 2019 that began last fall. Holmes says the F-15 remains capable, but the cost of rebuilding the center fuselage section will likely be too great.
The F-15 program office at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, which supports the F-15C/D and F-15E Strike Eagle fleets, has been working to keep the type flying through 2045 via capability and structural upgrades, including a wing replacement effort in 2022-28. Last August, Boeing received a five-year contract valued at up to $254.2 million for fatigue testing of the F-15C and F-15E models. Two test articles—FTA7 (F-15C) and FTA7 (F-15C)—are undergoing accelerated structural life testing at Boeing’s fighter facility in St. Louis to figure out how long the F-15s can fly and which components fail first. Then the Air Force will know the true life-extension cost. Raytheon began upgrading the Eagle’s radar to the APG-63(V)3 AESA configuration in 2010. Last November, BAE Systems began full-scale development of a next-generation electronic-warfare suite for the Eagle and Strike Eagle under contract to Boeing. That F-15 Eagle Passive/Active Warning and Survivability System replaces the obsolete Tactical Electronic Warfare System, which has been the aircraft’s primary self-defense suite since delivery in the 1970s. The prospect of retiring the Eagle puts all these upgrades, collectively worth billions of dollars, at risk. It also dashes Boeing’s hopes for the “F-15 2040C.” Some of the capabilities being considered are fourth-to-fifth-generation communications, conformal fuel tanks, an infrared search-and-track sensor and quad-pack air-to-air missile racks.
Boeing points out that no formal decision has been taken, and it continues to promote “cost-effective” capability upgrades to the service, but there are capacity concerns, since too few F-22s were purchased before the line was shut down in 2012. “The F-15C was specifically designed for the air superiority mission,” Boeing says. “It has an undefeated, combat-proven record and has enough service life to continue flying for years to come.” ACC says it is developing a 30-year aviation plan that extends into the mid-2030s, and these types of force structure proposals are being considered as part of that road map. Holmes says since Operation Desert Storm 25 years ago, the Air Force has been buying too few aircraft, approximately 20 per year, mainly the Lockheed Martin F-22 and F-35, which took painfully long to deliver and cost too much. The average age of the fighter force is now 27-28 years. The F-22 buy was truncated at 187, compared to the original Cold War request of 750, and the F-35 still is not mature. Holmes says a minimum of 100 new fighters are needed per year to reverse this situation and begin rejuvenating the force. He wants to expand the F-35A build rate to 60 per year, but only after it completes development, to avoid upgrade costs. Air Force Assistant Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Stayce D. Harris tells Congress that the service cannot afford to drop below the minimum operational requirement of 55 fighter squadrons, and would rather grow to 60, about 2,100 aircraft. But it would prefer a healthy force of 55 fighter squadrons with enough pilots and maintainers to support operations than a stressed and undermanned force of 60 units.
ACC says it must retire some fleets to unlock money and personnel to transition to the F-35 and future PCA platform, while still modernizing the F-16 and F-22 fleets. The F-16 and F-15E Strike Eagle are relatively young, with plenty of service life left. The Air Force tried and failed to retire the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog, so the F-15C is the next obvious cut. “We’re trying to work out that mix,” Holmes says. “One of those options is, what year does the F-15C go away?” He says money being spent on F-22 upgrades will maintain its advantage over its Russia and China adversaries. “If the F-15s go away, eventually those F-22s will move into that role, so we need to get to Penetrating Counter-Air [for the high end],” he says. PCA was born of the Air Force’s one-year Air Superiority 2030 study, which wrapped up last year. A follow-on 18-month analysis of alternatives will deliver its recommendations to ACC in 2018. Holmes says the Air Force is discussing various acquisition strategies and authorities with Congress to shorten or avoid the typically lengthy engineering and manufacturing development phase if the proposed aircraft is mature enough. After the PCA study, the service hopes to move quickly into the prototyping and fly off phase. The OA-X light-attack aircraft program is seen as a trailblazer for the next fighter buy.
Holmes wants to take advantage of the three-stream adaptive cycle engines being developed by General Electric and Pratt & Whitney under the Air Force Research Laboratory. However, the service could decide to field an initial batch of fighters sooner, powered by an existing engine, perhaps the F-22’s Pratt & Whitney F119 super cruise propulsion system, he says. He compared this type of acquisition plan to the Century Series during the Cold War, in which six distinct aircraft models were fielded in rapid succession—a mix of fighter-bombers and interceptors—each bringing improved capabilities. John Venable, a former airman and defense policy analyst at The Heritage Foundation, does not believe the F-16 is a viable alternative to the F-15C, and it will take many years to complete the F-16 AESA radar upgrade anyway. He says radar size matters due to physics, and the F-15’s dish is significantly larger. There are not enough F-22As to fully assume the F-15’s role right away, and there is little hope of Lockheed restarting the production line, due to cost and dated technology. He doubts the Air Force can develop and field another aircraft in the time line needed before critical F-15C life-extension and force structure decisions must be made. “The F-15C is still a great airplane,” Venable says. “It doesn’t have the maneuverability of the latest Russian aircraft or French Dassault Rafale, but the biggest thing it has going for it is tactics.
What happens with those squadrons?” The proposed retirement is a serious issue for the ANG, which is run by the states. Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), whose state is home to the 104th Fighter Wing, an F-15C unit, raised the issue with Air Force leaders during a congressional hearing. They stressed it was pre-decisional, and the ANG’s adjutant generals are being consulted as studies continue. John Goheen, a spokesman for the National Guard Association of the U.S., says the ANG would prefer to see these aircraft modernized, not retired. He acknowledges that the F-15C fleet presents a large bill at a time of constrained budgets and competing priorities, but the units in question are highly skilled in the air superiority mission, an Air Force core competency. “They provide the bulk of the defense of the nation’s air sovereignty and also deploy overseas,” he says. “These are busy aircraft and our preference would be for them to be modernized.” The service says it is still studying the proposal, and cannot say how much it would save by retiring the fleet. The total operating cost of the F-15C/D fleet was $1.3 billion in fiscal 2016.
USMC kiirehtii moniongelmaisten Hornetiensa tilalle F-35:ia jopa siinä määrin, että aiempi ajatus F-18 ja Harrierien yhtäaikaisesta korvaamisesta on peruttu.
https://www.stripes.com/news/marines-troubled-f-a-18-hornet-jet-fleet-has-got-to-go-1.462173
Mahtaakohan nostaa kotimaisten Hornettien ylläpitokustannuksia kun kymmeniä poistuu rivistä aikaiseen rapakon takana?
https://www.stripes.com/news/marines-troubled-f-a-18-hornet-jet-fleet-has-got-to-go-1.462173
Mahtaakohan nostaa kotimaisten Hornettien ylläpitokustannuksia kun kymmeniä poistuu rivistä aikaiseen rapakon takana?
kimmo.j
Respected Leader
Salakuljetus on määrällisesti tod.näk pientä.
Naapurin oma tuotanto on taas laadullisesti potaskaa ja häviää ominenäläiseen ole välttämättä nopea ja halpa temppu.
Hävittäjien risteilyohjuksista ja toisaalta Venäjän uhasta: Trump ammutti 59 Tomahawkia yhteen Syyrian ilmavoimien tukikohtaan. Muutama kymmenen JASSM muodostaa toisaalta hyökkääjälle vahvan pidäkkeen. Ristiriitaisuuksia? Huomioitavaa, jälleen kerran suosittiin pinnasta laukaistavia risteilyohjuksia joilla saa aikaiseksi massoitettua tulenkäyttöä, toisin kuin ilmasta laukaistavilla (ainakaan ilman massiivista ilmavoimien käyttöä).