Informaatiosodankäynti, propaganda ja kulttuurivaikuttaminen - Turvallisuuden ulottuvuus

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U.S. Cyber Command is conducting operations against Russian operatives suspected of interfering in U.S. elections. The goal according to the New York Times is “to deter them from spreading disinformation” and “[tell] them that American operatives have identified them and are tracking their work.” Direct messages were apparently sent to these individuals to erase doubt about who attacked them and why.

This episode breaks the mold of what is typically understood as traditional cyberspace behavior. Operations in this domain are rarely coupled with intentional and clear acknowledgement by the perpetrator. Instead, they usually look like Russia’s 2016 election interference where communication is nonexistent and responsibility vehemently denied. Cyber Command’s operation is different and may portend an evolution in how states utilize cyber weapons and what goals they may try to achieve.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/20...ow-governments-use-cyber/152455/?oref=d-river
 
U.S. Begins First Cyberoperation Against Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections
WASHINGTON — The United States Cyber Command is targeting individual Russian operatives to try to deter them from spreading disinformation to interfere in elections, telling them that American operatives have identified them and are tracking their work, according to officials briefed on the operation.

The campaign, which includes missions undertaken in recent days, is the first known overseas cyberoperation to protect American elections, including the November midterms.

The operations come as the Justice Department outlined on Friday a campaign of “information warfare” by Russians aimed at influencing the midterm elections, highlighting the broad threat the American government sees from Moscow’s influence campaign.

Defense officials would not say how many individuals they were targeting, and they would not describe the methods that Cyber Command has used to send the direct messages to the operatives behind the influence campaigns. It is not clear if the information was delivered in an email, a chat or some other electronic intervention.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html

Video of "Williams" from the Internet Research Agency claiming he's leaving the Russian social media interference group, and has obtained documents showing Russia's 2018 interference talking points.
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https://archive.org/details/Httpswww.youtube.comwatchvrL4ROq_6RC4
 

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Tekoäly vauhdittaa Venäjän infosotaa länttä vastaan
HEIKKI HAKALA | 19.11.2018 | 07:10- päivitetty 18.11.2018 | 20:50
Tutkija varoittaa lännen tulevan yllätetyksi, ellei uuden uhan vakavuuteen reagoida ajoissa.
Venäjän vaikuttamisoperaatiot läntisten demokratioiden horjuttamiseksi eivät osoita laantumisen merkkejä. On olemassa vahvoja viitteitä siitä, että tekoälystä on jo lähiaikoina muodostumassa Kremlin ohjaaman informaatiosodankäynnin uusi ja tärkeä väline, amerikkalaisen Brookings Institution -tutkimuslaitoksen tutkija, tohtori Alina Polyakova arvioi.
– Taloudellisten ja inhimillisten resurssiensa asettamien rajoitteiden vuoksi Venäjä ei tule olemaan näiden uusien teknologioiden edelläkävijä tai innovaattori. Se on kuitenkin jo toteuttanut hyökkäyksiään länttä vastaan ja tulee myös jatkossa hyödyntämään olemassa olevia, kaupallisesti saatavilla olevia teknologioita epäsymmetrisen sodankäyntinsä välineinä, Polyakova toteaa tutkimuslaitoksensa julkaisemassa raportissa.
Kremlin suurin informaatiovaikuttamista koskeva oivallus ei hänen mukaansa ole liittynyt teknologiaan. Olennaisempaa on ollut havaita, että olemassa olevia kaupallisia työkaluja ja digitaalisia alustoja on mahdollista helposti käyttää aseina länttä vastaan. Venäjän kaltaiselle, taloudellisilta ja teknisiltä voimavaroiltaan suhteellisen heikolle valtiolle digitaalinen infosodankäynti on kustannustehokasta, mutta vaikuttaa tehokkaasti.
– Kyky tekoälyyn perustuvaan epäsymmetriseen sodankäyntiin saattaisi tarjota Venäjälle lisää suhteellista etua, Polyakova arvioi.
Tekoälyn pauloihin langetaan helposti
Edistysaskeleet tunnetiloja tulkitsevaan affektiiviseen laskentaan ja luonnollisen kielen käsittelyyn liittyvässä teknologiassa tekevät tohtori Polyakovan mukaan inhimillisten tunteiden manipuloinnin ja luottamuksellisen tiedon hankkimisen aiempaa helpommaksi.
– Kun tekoäly pääsee nykyistä laajemmin käsiksi henkilökohtaiseen dataan, se kykenee vetoamaan yhä räätälöidymmin ja personoidummin yksittäisiin käyttäjiin ja manipuloimaan heitä, hän sanoo.
Yhdistettynä muun muassa entistä edistyksellisempään puheentunnistukseen affektiiviset järjestelmät saavuttavat hänen Polyakovan mukaan kyvyn ennustaa ja jäljitellä kirjallisesti, puheessa tai ilmeillä ilmaistuja inhimillisiä tunteita ja myös vastaamaan niihin.
Hän kertoo tutkimusnäytöstä, jonka mukaan ihmiset vaikuttavat olevan melko valmiita luomaan henkilökohtaisen suhteen tietynlaisiin tekoälypohjaisiin sovelluksiin, kommunikoimaan niiden kanssa pitkäkestoisesti ja myös luovuttamaan niille hyvinkin henkilökohtaisia tietoja.
– Näitä järjestelmiä voitaisiin käyttää informaation keräämiseen tiedustelu-upseerien ja poliittisten toimijoiden kaltaisilta arvokkaiksi luokitelluilta kohteilta käyttäen hyväksi heidän heikkouksiaan ja käyttäytymistottumuksiaan.
– Myös propagandan kohdistaminen paikallisesti ja jopa yksilötasolla tulee tekoälyn sekä tiedonkeruun, mainosalustojen ja hakukoneoptimoinnin muodostaman ekosysteemin yhdistelmän myötä mahdolliseksi sellaisessa mittakaavassa, josta Yhdysvaltain vuoden 2016 presidentinvaalien yhteydessä saatiin vasta kalpea aavistus, Polyakova ennustaa.
Venäjä voi vetää pitemmän korren
Jotta länsi kykenisi vastaamaan tekoälypohjaisen informaatiosodankäynnin muodostamaan uhkaan, tarvitaan Polyakovan mukaan uusi, epäkonventionaaliseen sodankäyntiin keskittyvä strategia.
– Ensimmäinen askel kohti sellaista strategiaa on ensin tunnistaa ja sitten pyrkiä korjaamaan poliitikkojen ja teknologiateollisuuden välinen informaation epäsymmetria, hän toteaa.
Seuraavassa vaiheessa tulisi hänen mukaansa varoittaa Venäjää ja muita vihamielisiä toimijoita niistä seurauksista, joihin tekoälyyn perustuvat informaatiohyökkäykset tulevat johtamaan.
– Viestinnän olisi tapahduttava julkisesti hallinnon korkean tason viranomaisten toimesta sekä yhteydenpidossa tiedusteluelinten välillä. Pelote voi olla tehokas vain silloin, kun molemmat osapuolet ovat selvillä tekojensa seurauksista, Polyakova sanoo.
Hän pitää huolestuttavana sitä, kuinka vähän teknologian ja geopolitiikan risteyskohtaan kiinnitetään huomiota ja panostetaan resursseja siitä huolimatta, että Venäjän muodostama vakava uhka on esimerkiksi Yhdysvaltain tuoreimmassa kansallisessa turvallisuusstrategiassa kirkkaasti tunnistettu.
– Yhdysvallat on edelleen kilpailijoitaan – varsinkin Venäjää – selvästi edellä. Jo rajallisillakin kyvyillä Kreml voi silti nopeasti saavuttaa suhteellisen edun tekoälyyn perustuvassa informaatiosodankäynnissä, jolloin länsi tulisi jälleen kerran yllätetyksi housut kintuissa, varoittaa Polyakova.
https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/tekoaly-vauhdittaa-venajan-infosotaa-lantta-vastaan/
 
Pätkä Global Taiwan Instituten julkaisusta: http://globaltaiwan.org/2018/11/vol-3-issue-22/#RachaelBurton11142018

Disinformation in Taiwan and Cognitive Warfare
By: Rachael Burton

Rachael Burton is the Deputy Director at the Project 2049 Institute where she manages the Institute’s research and program development.

On November 24, Taiwanese citizens will cast their ballots in an election that will be viewed as a litmus test for President Tsai Ing-wen and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). After two years of contentious legislative reforms to labor and pension laws, along with a grim outlook on the growing restrictions to Taiwan’s international space, the lead up to the midterm elections offers the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) an opportunity to capitalize on political discontent and potentially make gains in some of the 22 counties, cities, and special municipality districts on the ballots. Yet, the DPP and the KMT are not the only players appealing to public opinion in Taiwan, the authorities in Beijing appear to be taking an active role as well.

The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, which is Taiwan’s equivalent to the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, established a big-data and public opinion task force and found “unequivocal evidence” that Beijing was responsible for spreading fake news articles in an effort to manipulate public opinion in Taiwan. Examples include the Chinese state-run media entity, China Central Television (CCTV), airing old footage of the People’s Liberation Army exercises to exaggerate the implications of a live-fire exercise, and online “content farms” being used to spread disinformation about the status of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. In May of this year, when Burkina Faso announced that it was severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, a post on the PTT Bulletin Board System stirred controversy when it claimed that Honduras was also in talks with Beijing. It was reported that the post was later traced to a “Chinese disinformation mill” that was sponsored by the Chinese government.

In a display of even-keeled leadership, on Taiwan National Day President Tsai appealed to the populace to be alert in the face of widespread disinformation. The President noted that Taiwan’s national security is not only under threat by military coercion, but also through diplomatic pressure, social infiltration, and predatory economic policies. President Tsai emphasized her government’s steadfast determination to prevent “foreign powers from infiltrating and subverting [Taiwan] society […] and create chaos.” Notably, President Tsai did not implicate the Chinese government by name. Rather, it is widely accepted that the source of disinformation can be attributed to actors in China, but it remains unclear if the strategy is a coordinated government-sponsored effort. However, what is clear is that the confusion and distrust cultivated by disinformation campaigns could have consequential implications for Taiwan’s vibrant democratic processes. While the debate within Taiwan on how to combat disinformation and mitigate its damages continues, who stands to gain from these disruptive strategies?

President Tsai’s appeal for further awareness, citizenry, and cooperation with like-minded countries, like the United States, on media literacy are just a few of the tools to support a more resilient Taiwanese public amidst the onslaught on its democratic freedoms and institutions. In addition, civil society will play an important role in maintaining a clean media/cyber environment. Non-profit organizations such as The Taiwan FactCheck Center, established by Media Watch, aims to provide a long-term, non-governmental solution to fake news by enhancing media literacy and fact-checking major news stories and rumors.

Presently, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using forms of perception management through co-option, corruption, censorship, and disinformation to target political and economic elites, the media, civil society, and academia to shape policies and perceptions that are in line with Beijing’s domestic and foreign policy objectives. In Taiwan’s case, Beijing’s goal would be the subjugation of Taiwan’s society, government, history, and people to unify under the CCP’s leadership in a “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement.

To win the “hearts and minds” of the Taiwanese people, Beijing and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conduct psychological, public opinion, and legal warfare against Taiwan, commonly referred to as the “three warfares,” to wear down the sovereignty and will of the people. Interestingly, a year ago an article was published on PLA Daily highlighting a new type of warfare, “cognitive warfare” (制腦作戰), which is to “influence and lead the cognition, emotion, and consciousness of the public and national elites, and ultimately influence a country’s values, national spirit, ideology, cultural traditions, and historical beliefs […] to achieve the strategic goal of winning without war.”

While a limited amount of information is available to decipher how Chinese military strategist views the use of cognitive warfare, the US military has identified the need to address the role of information and how information can change or maintain the drivers of behavior. In a public study released in July of this year, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) published the “Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE).” The report highlighted challenges facing US joint forces in an information environmentwhere an adversary could leverage the information domain to “paralyze the US Government with policy and legal issues” and thus gain freedom of action. The report addresses building the US Joint Forces’ capability to understand the perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive behaviors that affect Joint Forces Commands’ objectives. Ultimately, the US military is actively working to address how information, or disinformation, may adversely affect its war-fighting capabilities. When shifting this concept to a civilian, peace-time environment, the disinformation campaigns being waged on Taiwan not only targets the people’s decision-making process, but also that of Taiwan’s elected leaders.

The possible application of “cognitive warfare” to a peacetime environment raises important questions. Is disinformation being used as a tactic of “cognitive warfare” that aims to influence Taiwan’s population to only consider a specific set of options favorably to the CCP’s interests? If Beijing, or Chinese actors are indeed behind Taiwan’s disruptive disinformation campaigns, what would be their goals? Proof that democracy is unstable and unviable? To paralyze Taiwan’s government and its decision-making ability? To win the war of unification on Beijing’s terms without fighting? If “cognitive warfare” is being waged on the Taiwanese people, how can they be defended?

Disinformation must have the intent to deceive. Undoubtedly, the single most effective disinformation campaign wielded against Taiwan is Beijing’s “One-China Principle,” where the People’s Republic of China (PRC) aims to dictate and lecture to sovereign countries around the world on how they should conduct their relations with the government in Taiwan. The PRC, under the leadership of the CCP, has maneuvered all sources of state power—economic, education, military, civil society, media, and politics—to influence foreign governments and populations to adopt Beijing’s successor state theory that the Republic of China (Taiwan), and the government seated in Taipei, had cease to exist following 1949, 1972, and 1979. This of course does not accord with objective reality.

The main point: The PRC’s disinformation campaigns against Taiwan is a form of cognitive warfare that targets the people’s decision-making process, but also that of Taiwan’s elected leaders, and represent a national security threat for its ability to sow discontent, mistrust, and fear.
 
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