Informaatiosodankäynti, propaganda ja kulttuurivaikuttaminen - Turvallisuuden ulottuvuus

Intimidation as a propaganda tool in the Nordic countries


According to a poll shared by Radio Free Europe, Russia enjoys significantly less popularity in the Nordic countries than in the majority of European countries. This may be why official Russian outlet Sputnik closed its Danish, Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian language services last year: In an environment where Russia’s policies and actions are fundamentally unpopular, it is difficult to build an audience using very openly pro-Kremlin messaging – even if it is communicated in the local language.

In the recent analysis of the methods applied by the pro-Kremlin disinformation campaign, the East StratCom Task Force has pointed out that “targeting the Russian speaking minority seems the most important tool in the Baltic states, whereas in Central Europe it seems to be the use of dozens of “alternative“ websites, while trolling seems most prevalent in Scandinavia”. Why is it that trolling becomes the preferred propaganda method in an environment where pro-Kremlin views enjoy little popularity? If the target audience shows strong resilience to the political message, provoking fear, discomfort and confusion among journalists and other communicators could be a way of promoting self-censorship and perhaps even the kind of collective caution, which during the Cold War became known as “Finlandisation”.

Examples of trolling and intimidation abound in Nordic countries: Finland knows of a sad, but well-documented example of how the phenomenon of trolling has been be taken to a new level as openly Russia-affiliated activists are accused of intimidating journalists that cover Russian affairs, or journalists that decide to investigate the phenomenon of trolling. Recently, Johan Bäckman, a Finnish national who faces court proceedings for such intimidation, has also been denied the right to buy a broadcasting radio station in Tampere, Finland; Finland’s authorities found that the takeover would represent a threat to national security, as Finland’s public broadcaster YLE reports.

Similarly, Sweden has seen a verdict handed down against a “troll” spreading defamatory disinformation against a Swedish expert commentator who is known for having Russia-sceptical views. Last autumn, we reported about an individual who, using several aliases, trolled the Swedish internet from his workplace in the Swedish Parliament until he was discovered and forced to leave.

More recently, Norway’s security and intelligence service published its annual report, highlighting among other threats intimidation and blackmail targeting individual Norwegians from the side of Russian authorities. The primary group of victims has been Norwegians who travel to Russia and residents of Norway with a dual Norwegian-Russian citizenship or with family in Russia.

We see a picture emerging in which intimidation of individuals is a preferred practice and an alternative to communicating directly to target audiences as groups. This can also be seen in the light of the high level of interpersonal trust prevalent in Nordic societies. Individual intimidation is by definition a violation of interpersonal trust, and Nordic societies can therefore be seen as less prepared for personal intimidation than societies with a lower level of interpersonal trust.
Linkki: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/intimidation-as-a-propaganda-tool-in-the-nordic-countries/
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Google has partnered with Jigsaw, an Alphabet incubator, to tackle online trolling with the launch of Perspective, new software that uses machine learning to highlight “toxic comments.”

A recent report by the US Center for Innovative Public Health Research found that 72 per cent of Americans over the age of 15 had witnessed online harassment, and 47 per cent had directly experienced it. It’s a big problem, affecting 140 million people in the US and many others across the globe. And Google thinks it can tackle it.

Perspective is aimed at publishers. It can be tedious for journalists and social media interns, er, managers to moderate comments (present company excepted, Reg commentards). But the new software reviews comments and rates them based on how harmful the language is.

Type in something like “You’re a stupid idiot!” and the system will flash “98% similar to comments people said were ‘toxic’.”

Working together with The New York Times, Google and Jigsaw sifted through “hundreds of thousands” of comments to train the system to correlate negative words to a scoring system of how unpleasant the comment was.

The API is publicly available on Google’s machine learning TensorFlow library for developers and the Cloud Machine Learning platform.

Jared Cohen, Jigsaw’s president, said he’s hoping to extend the software to spot comments that are irrelevant to an article, such as spam ads.

“Our first model is designed to spot toxic language, but over the next year we’re keen to partner and deliver new models that work in languages other than English as well as models that can identify other perspectives, such as when comments are unsubstantial or off-topic,” he wrote in a Google blog post.

Interest in using machine learning and AI to help news publishers has risen. People were quick to point the finger at Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook’s CEO, for the spread of fake news. Zuckerberg reckons his network isn't to blame, but did say in his recent 6,000 word rant that his team is working on the problem and hoped to use AI to identify terrorist propaganda. Top tip, Mark, you need to invest more in machine learning.

Hundreds of developers from the AI community have also signed up to the Fake News Challenge, an open project that aims to award cash to the team able to write the best software for judging an article’s accuracy. ®
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/02/24/google_and_jigsaw_tackle_online_trolling/
 
Why Is Finland Able to Fend Off Putin’s Information War?

With elections coming up this year in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and perhaps Italy, European intelligence services across the Continent have been sounding the alarm about Russian attempts to influence the outcome though targeted disinformation and propaganda, as they appeared to do in the U.S. presidential election.

That brand of information war can range from pushing fake news stories and conspiracy theories to fanning the flames of existing problems — all serving to undermine public confidence in governments and institutions. Elsewhere in the Baltics and former Soviet Union, Russian-linked disinformation has worked to stoke panic and force local governments into knee-jerk, counterproductive responses that have boosted Kremlin goals across the region.

But in the face of this mounting pressure, one of Russia’s neighbors has emerged unusually resistant to the wider information war waged by Moscow across Europe: Finland.

Like other countries along the Baltic Sea or in Eastern Europe, Finland has seen a notable increase in fake news stories and propaganda targeted against it that can be linked back to Russia since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. These attacks have sought to undermine the government and often coincided with military shows of force along the Russian border.

But unlike its neighbors, Helsinki reckons it has the tools to effectively resist any information attack from its eastern neighbor. Finnish officials believe their country’s strong public education system, long history of balancing Russia, and a comprehensive government strategy allow it to deflect coordinated propaganda and disinformation.

“The best way to respond is less by correcting the information, and more about having your own positive narrative and sticking to it,” Jed Willard, director of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Center for Global Engagement at Harvard, told Foreign Policy. Willard, who is currently working for the Swedish government, was hired by Finnish officials to help them develop a public diplomacy program to understand and identify why false information goes viral and how to counter propaganda.

That initiative started at the top. In October 2015, Finnish President Sauli Niinisto took the first step, when he acknowledged that information warfare is real for Finland, and said that it was the duty of every citizen to combat it. In January 2016, the prime minister’s office enrolled 100 officials in a program across several levels of the Finnish government to identify and understand the spread of disinformation based on Willard’s advice.

Lots of governments in the West don’t have the same kind of narrative to respond with as does Helsinki.

A homogeneous country of 5.4 million people, Finland routinely ranks at the top of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s quality of life metrics and, in addition to strong social welfare programs, the country’s education system is the best in the world, according to the World Economic Forum.

Willard says this combination of widespread critical thinking skills among the Finnish population and a coherent government response makes a strong defense against concerted outside efforts to skew reality and undermine faith in institutions.

“This stuff is real. It is as real as war,” said Willard. “But the Finns very quickly realized this and got out in front of the problem.”

René Nyberg, a former Finnish ambassador to Moscow, says Finland has a couple of key advantages when it comes to parrying Russian disinformation. Helsinki is painfully well-versed in dealing with Russia, as it has had to do through war and annexation, and most recently the decades-long staring match of the Cold War. That left Finland with a sober understanding of the Kremlin’s real motives. Plus, it helps that Finland is not Russia’s main target when it comes to undermining European unity.

“The real intensity is Germany … Merkel is the main course,” Nyberg told FP. “We’re just a side dish.”

The case of the false “Lisa story” in Germany from January 2016 is often cited as a textbook example of Moscow’s modern information capabilities. Russian-language media reported allegations that a 13-yearold Russian-German girl had been raped by migrants in Berlin before local authorities had time to verify the information; those Russian reports were then picked up by mainstream news media in Germany and elsewhere. When the story was finally debunked, subsequent accusations of a cover-up by Berlin were reported by Channel One, Russia’s prime state TV station, and were even hinted at by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who said the incident “was hushed up for a long time for some reason” during a press conference. The spread of the false story also prompted protests across the country by anti-immigrant groups and Russian Germans.

Experts say it’s nearly impossible to track the extent to which these pro-Russian positions are directly shaped by the Kremlin. Indeed, to be most effective, Moscow does not invent issues out of whole cloth, they say. Instead, disinformation attacks seek to inflame existing tensions by putting out viral web stories that would then be republished by local news outlets and on social media to distort political debates about wedge issues like the European Union, immigration, and NATO.

Weaponizing information has a long history in Russia, and the Kremlin ran an extensive operation to subvert the West in Soviet times. In an age of social media where news can quickly spread around the globe, Russia deployed its arsenal of trolls, propaganda, and false information to a new level that has allowed Moscow to perfect its techniques over the last decade. These techniques have even become enshrined in official Kremlin doctrine.

But responding to such tactics can often backfire and risks replicating the Kremlin-backed narrative. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — as well as other former Soviet countries like Ukraine and Georgia — have been less successful in pushing back against Russian disinformation.

Pro-Russian media, including the state-owned Channel One, already reach huge numbers of homes across the former Soviet Union. In the Baltic states, which have large Russian-speaking minorities, attempts to restrict or ban Russian broadcasters, websites, or journalists have often polarized relations with the local Russian community and given more material for Kremlin-backed propaganda and disinformation. In Ukraine and Georgia, Russian propaganda often amplifies and distorts the very real problem of state corruption, seeking to destroy confidence in pro-Western political parties.

In contrast, Finland, which ranks as the world’s third-least corrupt country according to Transparency International, and which has only a tiny Russian-speaking population, has fewer obvious targets to be exploited. In March 2016, the Finnish-language bureau for Sputnik, the state-funded Russian media outlet, closed after it failed to attract enough readers.

“Nothing has been very harmful for the public so far,” Markku Mantila, director general for government communications at the Finnish prime minister’s office, told FP. “Finns are well-educated and because of that, we are very resilient to such attempts.”

But Finland does have one thing that drives the Kremlin to distraction: an 830-mile border with Russia. Fears over NATO’s eastward expansion — including, potentially, to Finland — are behind much of Russia’s aggressive posture toward the West.

Finnish officials claim to have documented 20 disinformation campaigns against their country that have come directly from the Kremlin. Those attempts tend to focus on a narrow but sensitive topic: Helsinki’s carefully balanced relations with Moscow.

After two wars with Russia in two years in the 1940s, Finland during the Cold War followed a carefully crafted policy of neutrality, allowing it to balance integration with Europe while maintaining good relations with the Soviet giant next door. The country refrained from joining NATO and often bowed to Moscow’s wishes to preserve its independence, a stance that some Western detractors condemned as too accommodating to the Soviets. Cold Warriors even dubbed it, derisively, “Finlandization.”

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Helsinki quickly distanced itself from its Cold War legacy, but the country’s policymakers still walk a tightrope with Russia.

Public opinion on NATO membership is strongly divided, making Finland an important target for Russia as it seeks to influence the public discourse of its neighbors and sow divisions in Europe.

Russian disinformation campaigns have spun a narrative of the Finnish government discriminating against ethnic Russians. In February, reports of dual Russian-Finnish citizens being rejected from military and foreign service jobs became a talking point in pro-Kremlin media in Russia. A measure discussed in Finnish parliament to prevent Russian citizens from owning land near military sites also rallied the pro-Kremlin propaganda machine. A similar line of attack, which has involved doctored photos, saw Kremlin outlets accuse Finnish authorities of child abduction in disputes arising over child welfare and custody battles for Finnish-Russian marriages. The accusations, which Finnish officials deny, first materialized in 2012, but continue to flare up — giving Russian lawmakers more opportunity to make inflammatory statements about their neighbor.

“It’s not just about Finland’s relationship with Russia,” Saara Jantunen, the author of Info-War, a book about Russian disinformation in Finland, told FP. “It’s about showing what kind of rhetoric in Finnish society and the media is acceptable.”

One noticeable aspect of the Kremlin’s approach in other parts of Europe is to support anti-establishment forces, which often parrot pro-Russian positions. A similar dynamic is at play in the case of Jessikka Aro, an investigative journalist for the social media division of Finland’s state broadcaster,Yle Kioski.

In 2014, Aro followed up on reports of a Russian “troll factory” in St. Petersburg that was seeking to influence public opinion in the West about Kremlin maneuvers abroad. After she published her initial investigation, which documented how pro-Russian voices were attempted to shape the public discourse on Ukraine, her name appeared on Russian nationalist websites where she was derided as a Western intelligence agent, bombarded with anonymous abusive messages on social media, and labeled a drug dealer.

The man who became the main voice targeting Aro was Johan Backman. An outspoken supporter of the Kremlin who is fluent in Russian, Backman — a Finn — was responsible for the bulk of the derisive commentary that appeared about Aro. Backman serves as the representative in Northern Europe for the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, a state-funded research group known for its Kremlin connections during the Cold War and currently led by a Soviet-era intelligence officer. Backman has defended his commentary as free speech.

MV-lehti — a Finnish-language news site hosted abroad that is known for its right-wing, anti-immigrant, and anti-EU views — also produced some of the false information about Aro. Ilja Janitskin, the news site’s founder and head who lives in Spain, told the New York Times in 2016 that he had no connections to Moscow. Still, both men are currently being investigated by Finnish police for harassment and hate speech for targeting Aro.

Finnish authorities have been trying to extradite Janitskin from Spain, but he is currently on the run.

Adding another layer to the case, the Helsinki police department announced in October 2016 that an employee from Yle, the Finnish broadcaster for whom Aro works, is suspected of providing the information that was later used to defame her. The case is awaiting a date in court.

Aro told FP that she became a target because her reporting brought into question Helsinki’s traditionally measured line with Moscow.

“NATO is at the core of everything,” Aro said. “The goal of these campaigns is to discredit the voices in Finland that are critical of Russia.”
Linkki: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/why-is-finland-able-to-fend-off-putins-information-war/
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Some Twitter users are voluntarily handing control of their accounts to the UK’s Russian Embassy, which uses them to retweet the “most important” tweets of the Russian ambassador on a weekly basis.

The programme, described by the embassy as the “Russian diplomatic online club”, is sold to its members as “a way for everybody interested in international policy and all things Russian to gain knowledge, get insights from top diplomats and be part of fascinating networking, both online and off”.

But its existence also adds to the weight of evidence that the nation engages in online “astroturfing”, using co-ordinated semi-automated accounts to create the appearance of widespread support for Russia and its allies.

Technology magazine Motherboard first reported on the “club”, signing up for it with a new Twitter account. Shortly after, the account retweeted a tweet from the ambassador, Alexander Yakovenko, announcing his presence at the London Book Fair.
https://www.theguardian.com/technol...russias-latest-weapon-in-the-information-wars
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö

If efforts by foreign powers to influence American society via disinformation — like the “fake news” that spread during last year’s presidential election — are rising as a national-security concern, then we need to know why such antics work. How does an adversarial government go about persuading an entire population that something is true, or that one truth is more important or relevant than another?

Recent research into the roots of persuasion in the brain yields some important clues about how people are convinced to propagate news that is not true or poorly sourced. Bottom line: fake news appeals directly to the portions of the brain associated with social acceptance. Activity from those regions has a bigger effect on decision-making than logical argument — like some snobby East Coast news outlet trying to tell you “true” things.

If you haven’t heard of the social brain or the role that it may play in deciding what to news to believe, you’re not alone. We associate most high-level decision making with the very front of the brain, the prefrontal cortex. You could be forgiven for thinking that prefrontal cortex would be the part of the brain we would use to evaluate the authenticity or accuracy of a big national news story.

But UCLA neuroscientist Matthew D. Lieberman has discovered a new neural network for social thinking that has an on-and-off relationship with the prefrontal cortex in decision-making.
http://www.defenseone.com/technolog...rological-explanation/136417/?oref=d-topstory
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Voi helvetti tämä ei saisi koskaan mennä läpi. No ehkä me opitaan siten kantapään kautta virheistä.

The European Commission will in June push for backdoor access to encryption used by apps, according to EU Justice Commissioner Věra Jourová.

Speaking publicly, and claiming that she has been pushed by politicians across Europe, Jourová said that she will outline "three or four options" that range from voluntary agreements by business to strict legislation.

The EC's goal is to provide the police with a "swift and reliable" way to discover what users of encrypted apps have been communicating with others.

"At the moment, prosecutors, judges, also police and law enforcement authorities, are dependent on whether or not providers will voluntarily provide the access and the evidence. This is not the way we can facilitate and ensure the security of Europeans, being dependent on some voluntary action," Jourová said, according to EU policy site Euractiv.

Typically governments will use the threat of legislation to push companies into agreeing to offer what they want voluntarily. But Jourová clearly expects some significant pushback from the tech industry – particularly US corporations such as Facebook and Apple – and so argued that the voluntary, non-legislative approaches would only be provisional in order to get to "a quick solution," with laws coming later.

The intended message is that the EC is not bluffing and although it will take a few years to pass such legislation, it is prepared to do so, and may do so regardless of what app-makers offer.

The announcement comes close on the heels of a number of aggressive pushes by European governments against social media companies.

Earlier this month, the German government proposed a €50m fine if companies like Facebook and Twitter do not remove "obvious" criminal content within 24 hours. A few days later, the EC said it was going to insist that social media companies change their terms and conditions to remove various efforts to insulate them legally from content issues – such as the requirement for anyone to sue them in a California court rather than in their home country.

And one day after the March 22 murderous attack in the heart of London, the UK government was publicly critical of the failure of companies like Google and Facebook to remove extremist content on the internet, arguing that they "can and must do more."

That was followed shortly after by UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd specifically highlighting Facebook-owned chat app WhatsApp and arguing that the authorities must be given access to messages sent by the Westminster attacker over the service.

The debate over encryption has been going on for well over a year and until recently was dominated by fights in the United States, most notably between the FBI and Apple over access to an iPhone used by a shooter in San Bernardino, California.

At the heart of the matter though, nothing has changed: tech companies and security experts say that if crypto backdoors are created, it will be impossible to ensure that only the "good guys" can use this special access, and thus will undermine end-to-end encrypted systems and encrypted storage. Meanwhile politicians and law enforcement insist they don't care how it's done, they want to be able to access people's private communications and stored data, particularly if they have a warrant regarding suspected criminal behavior. ®
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/30/ec_push_encryption_backdoors/
 

hansai

Ylipäällikkö
"Jos merkittävät suomalaiset poliitikot ja mediat ovat näin alttiita todistamattomille, väkijoukossa levinneille huhuille, niin miten käy siinä vaiheessa kun "vieras valtiollinen toimija" alkaa hybridivaikuttamaan kaikilla voimavaroillaan pakolaistilannetta hyväksikäyttäen? Tämä on tietenkin vain ajatusleikkiä, mutta eilisen soveltaminen tähän ajatusleikkiin ei anna kovin hyvää kuvaa esim. siitä peräänkuulutetusta hybridisodan kestokyvystä. "

Tähän kuulisin #turpo rintamalta kommentteja nyt kun eniten tarvitaan luotettavaa mediaa ja vastuuntuntoisia poliitikkoja...
 
Voi helvetti tämä ei saisi koskaan mennä läpi. No ehkä me opitaan siten kantapään kautta virheistä.

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/30/ec_push_encryption_backdoors/
Pitäähän EUrostoliitolla olla toimivat työkalut hallintoalamaistensa hallitsemiseen ja opposition tukahduttamiseen. Ei se muuten toimisi. Näistä nykyajan ja lähitulevaisuuden tietotekniikan EUrostoliitolle suomista mahdollisuuksista jopa 1930-luvun Neuvostoliiton NKVD muuttuisi punavihreäksi silkasta kateudesta.
 

baikal

Ylipäällikkö
Mod
Lahjoittaja
tietotekniikan EUrostoliitolle suomista mahdollisuuksista jopa 1930-luvun Neuvostoliiton NKVD muuttuisi punavihreäksi silkasta kateudesta.
Ennennäkemättömät ja -kokemattomat keinot ovat olemassa ja ne kehittyvät taatusti koko ajan. Mikä estää ajan oloon tämän tekniikan käyttämisen kansalaisvalvontaan? Silkka hyvä tahto vai kansalaisten nostama älämölö asian vuoksi?

Taajana ryppäänä räjähtelevät pommisarjat yleisön seassa takaavat AIVAN TAKUULLA sen, että kansalaisvalvonta lisääntyy ja siinä käytetään TAKUULLA alati kehittyvää tekniikkaa. Koska terroristit. Kuka ilkeää edes kritisoida, kun perustelu on terroristit?

Silkka hyvä tahto on fantastinen asia, mutta missään tapauksessa se ei tule estämään hyvin ikäviäkin ilmiöitä suhteessa kansalaisvapauksiin.

Onneksi esim. suomalaiset zournalistit ja dokumentoijat seuraavat nyt tippa napon päästä tippuen, miten Pietarin mötkäykset vaikuttavat venäläisiin kansalaisvapauksiin. Nauraisin rötväkkää everstitason huutonaurua, jos jaksaisin. Varmasti olisi syytä nimittäin pitää fokus ihan näissä kotoisemmissa ympyröissä, tarvetta sille on ja lisää tulee.
 

ctg

Ylipäällikkö
Sir Bernars-Lee puhuu asiaa.

Sir Tim Berners-Lee has criticised plans to weaken encryption or extend surveillance in the wake of recent terrorist attacks.

Days after the attack on Westminster that claimed the lives of three pedestrians and a police officer, Home Secretary Amber Rudd said there should be no safe space for terrorists to communicate online. The comments came after it emerged that attacker Khalid Masood had checked WhatsApp – which offers end-to-end encryption – two minutes before ploughing an SUV through pedestrians on Westminster Bridge then leaping out and fatally stabbing an unarmed policeman standing guard at the gates of the Houses of Parliament.

Weakening encryption would be a mistake, according to Sir Tim. "If you're trying to catch terrorists, it's really tempting to demand to be able to break all that encryption but if you break that encryption then guess what – so could other people, and guess what – they may end up getting better at it than you are."
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/04/04/web_inventor_opposes_crypto_backdoors/

The terrorist attack in Westminster has renewed the debate about the use of end-to-end encryption by messaging services such as WhatsApp. Rudd has appealed to tech companies to provide a way for government to inspect the communications of those suspected of criminal activity, for example terrorists. Other politicians have even called for a blanket ban on end-to-end-encryption.

Both of these approaches are flawed, according to Emm.

"The requirement for application vendors who use encryption to provide a way for government or law enforcement agencies to 'see through' encryption, poses some real dangers," Emm said. "Creating a 'backdoor' to decipher encrypted traffic is akin to leaving a key to your front door under the mat outside. Your intention is for it to be used only by those you have told about it. But if someone else discovers it, you'd be in trouble.

"Similarly, if a government backdoor were to fall into the wrong hands, cybercriminals, foreign governments or anyone else might also be able to inspect encrypted traffic – thereby undermining not only personal privacy, but corporate or national security. It would effectively create a zero-day (i.e. unpatched) vulnerability in the application."
 
@Laamanator
Niin tosiaan, annat ymmärtää, että Suomi joutuisi vieraiden sotiin. Viittaat tässä varmastikin NATO:n.
No, kuten joku viisas täällä kirjoitti, NATO ei ole simuloinut hyökkäyksiä Venäjän pääkaupunkiin tai strategisiin saariin, ei ole vallannut suvereenilta valtiolta maa-alueita, ei ole loukannut toistuvasti tusinoittain kertoja Venäjän ilmatilaa tai uhannut ydinaseilla ketään.
Mikäs muu taho näin onkaan toiminut, mietitäänpä hmm, Uganda?

Tässä täytyy olla virhe. Sinun täytyy tarkoittaa, että Suomi joutuu Venäjän sotaan, Venäjän toimesta.
Luen tässä vanhaa ketjua... Uganda on tehnyt suunnitelmat valmiiksi itäisen Kongon, eteläisen Etelä-Sudanin ja varmaan Darfurinkin haltuunotosta. Tai oikeastaan minkä tahansa naapurivaltionsa alueella sijaitsevan, luonnonrikkauksia sisältävän alueen varalta. Näitä skenaarioita varten Uganda on järjestänyt asiansa niin, että tarpeen vaatiessa heidän venäläisten lentäjien ja kenttähenkilökunnan operoimat pitkän matkan Sukhoit takaavat heille alueella ehdottoman ilmaherruuden. Uganda pystyy tarvittaessa iskemään ilmasta Khartoumiin, Khartoum ei ylety Kampalaan.
 

JR49

Ylipäällikkö
Lahjoittaja
Latviassa levitettiin väitettä aseet ladattuina kulkevista Nato-sotilaista
5.4.2017 klo 14:25 (päivitetty 5.4.2017 klo 17:27)
Latvian puolustusministeriö varoittaa maassa olevista Naton sotilaista leviävistä vääristä tiedoista.

Latvian puolustusministeriön mukaan maassa on levitetty ”tietoisesti tai tahattomasti” väitteitä, joiden mukaan ulkomaiset sotilaat kulkisivat jatkossa rutiininomaisesti ladattujen aseiden kanssa liikkuessaan Latvian rajojen sisällä.
Asiasta uutisoi Latvian yleisradio.
Puolustusministeriön varoitus harhaanjohtavista tiedoista tuli samana päivänä, kun Latvian parlamentissa käsiteltiin maassa toimivia ulkomaisia joukkoja koskevaan lakiin tehtyjä muutoksia.

Ministeriö korostaa, että leviävät tiedot ovat vääriä. Sen mukaan Naton sotilaat eivät liiku maassa ladattujen aseiden kanssa omasta aloitteestaan, ja että lakimuutoksen ainoana tarkoituksena on varmistaa, että Nato-liittolaiset voivat antaa maalle apua niin nopeasti kuin mahdollista ilman, että niiden on käytävä ensin läpi pitkiä hallintomenettelyjä.
– Näissä muutoksissa todetaan, että Naton ja EU:n jäsenvaltioiden asevoimat ja kalusto voivat liikkua aseet ladattuna Latviassa vain puolustusministeriön suostumuksella, ministeriöstä todetaan.

http://www.verkkouutiset.fi/ulkomaat/naton_joukot_latviassa-63834
 

Samses

Ylipäällikkö
Mod
Lahjoittaja
Halonen & Tuomioja vaikutukset myös tietustelussa... eli kun sopivalla vaikuttamisella on saatu muutaman henkilön ajattelumaailma korruptoitua ja he päätyvät valtakunnallisesti merkittäviin tehtäviin, niin jälki on karua.
http://www.iltalehti.fi/uutiset/201704182200104640_uu.shtml
Puolustusvoimien mukaan Suomen sotilastiedustelun työkalut ovat ruostumassa.

- Muut maat ovat pidemmällä. Me olemme noin 15 vuotta myöhässä tässä asiassa. Se on totuus, apulaistiedustelupäällikkö Kari sanoi Jyväskylässä tammikuussa.

Miten on mahdollista, että sodissa kyntensä näyttänyt signaalitiedustelu repsahti? Tämä tapahtui vieläpä Suomessa, joka on ylpeillyt tietoliikennetekniikan mallimaana.

Takamatkaan on kaksi syytä. Tarja Halonen ja Erkki Tuomioja.

Halonen presidentti-ylipäällikkönä ja Tuomioja ulkoministerinä estivät tiedustelun uudistamisen; siinä samalla suomalaisten viranomaisten soluttautumisen Venäjän asevoimien käyttämiin kaapeleihin ja kuituihin. Jos kauniisti sanotaan, presidentti ja ulkoministeri eivät nähneet tarvetta edistää tällaisen tiedustelutoiminnan sallivaa lainsäädäntöä.

Tarvitseeko enää muistuttaa kaksikon huippukaudella Suomen tekemistä muista sankariteoista kuten jalkaväkimiinojen kieltämisestä ja panssarivaunujen sulattamisesta.
...
 

hansai

Ylipäällikkö
Mitäs sitä enää millään tiedustelulakien muutoksella tekee...ostaa vaan palveluna Facebookilta ja muilta toimijoilta..:confused:

Facebook alkaa puuttua valtioiden tekemiin ”informaatio-operaatioihin”
Tulevaisuudessa Facebookin turvallisuusryhmä puuttuu ”informaatio-operaatioihin”, joiden tarkoituksena on vääristää poliittista keskustelua.

YHTEISÖPALVELU Facebook parantaa palvelunsa turvallisuutta, jotta voisi vastustaa valtioiden ja muiden tahojen levittämää harhaanjohtavaa tietoa tai poliittisista syistä tehtyä keskustelun ohjailua, yhtiö tiedotti torstaina.

Aiemmin Facebook on puuttunut hakkerointiin ja taloudellisiin huijausyrityksiin. Nyt yhtiö kertoo aikovansa puuttua myös hienovaraisempiin palvelun väärinkäytöksiin kuten yrityksiin vääristää kansalaiskeskustelua ja johtaa ihmisiä harhaan.

Aloitteessa on uutta se, että se kohdistuu yritysten ja yhteisöjen lisäksi myös suoraan valtioiden sosiaalisen median käyttöön. Facebook tekee selväksi, ettei se suo valtioiden vääristellä yleistä mielipidettä palvelullaan.

Tulevaisuudessa Facebookin turvallisuusryhmä puuttuu ”informaatio-operaatioihin”, joiden tarkoituksena on vääristää poliittisia käsityksiä.

FACEBOOKIN mukaan yhtiön turvallisuusryhmä keskittyy erityisesti valeuutisiin, aatteiden ohjelmoituun pönkittämiseen ja sellaiseen hallitusten tiedonkeruuseen, jonka tarkoituksena on löytää ja vastustaa toisinajattelijoita.

Yhteisöpalvelua kritisoitiin ankarasti harhaanjohtavien tietojen levittämisestä vuoden 2016 presidentinvaalien aikana. Facebook on aiemmin todennut, ettei palvelun rooli äänestäjiin vaikuttamisessa ole ollut merkittävä.

Nyt yhtiöllä on toinen ääni kellossa. Torstaina Facebook totesi tiedonannossaan, että palvelu on ollut altis tilanteille, joiden se arvioi muistuttavan informaatio-operaatioita.

”Meillä ei ole todisteita siitä, että yksikään Facebook-tili olisi vaarantunut osana tätä toimintaa, mutta oli miten oli, havaitsimme ja tarkkailimme tällaisia pyrkimyksiä, jotta voisimme suojella todellisia yhteyksiä, jotka määrittelevät palveluamme”, tiedonannossa todetaan.

Facebook kertoo, ettei tiedä, kuka rahoittaa info-operaatioita. Silti yhtiö muotoilee, etteivät palvelun keräämät tiedot ole ristiriidassa Yhdysvaltojen tiedustelun tammikuisten johtopäätösten kanssa.

Tiedustelupalvelut kertoivat tulleensa siihen tulokseen, että Venäjä pyrki vaikuttamaan Yhdysvaltojen presidentinvaalin tulokseen.
http://www.hs.fi/talous/art-2000005189024.html?share=4539e52af0476ed7d1d8feb89bc2ef31
 

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Ylipäällikkö
Iltalehden juttu siitä, että osa eduskunnasta ja presidentti Sauli Niinistö ovat eri linjoilla puolustuspolitiikasta ja erityisesti mahdollisesta Viron auttamisesta, on huomioitu myös Viron tiedotusvälineissä. Artikkelin mukaan vasemmisto ja osa keskustaa haluaisi kieltää mahdollisuudenkin sotilaallisen avun antamisesta Virolle.

...
– Suomi ei kuulu Natoon, mutta rauhoitan suomalaisia ystäviä sanomalla, ettei ole syytä huoleen, Viro tulee varmasti apuun jos Suomea uhataan, kirjoittaa Tsahkna Twitterissä.

Kansanedustaja Mihkelsonin mukaan asiassa ei ole mitään uutta. Hän muistuttaa, että ruotsalaisiin verrattuna suomalaiset poliitikot ovat aina olleet Baltian maiden sotilaallisesta auttamisesta hyvin niukkasanaisia.
http://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9599471

Herra ainola käy Informaatiosotaa jostain syytä, kirjoittelemalla valheellista tietoa taikka yrittämällä saada aikaan jonkinlaisen reaktion ja tiedon ulostamisen näitä valheellisia artikkeleitaan tekemällä. On melkein kuin hän ajattelee olevansa valtionherra ja hommat toimii kuten hän niitä kirjoittaa. Hemmetin riidankylväjä.

Ei ole Suomi jättänyt Viroa pulaan sitten itsenäistymisen.
 
Venäjän informaatiosodankäynnin ymmärtämistä haittaa osittain kulttuurierot.

Venäläisten informaatiosodankäyntiin liittyy erottamasti venäläinen käsitys totuuudesta. Tärkeää ei ole absoluuttinen totuus sellaisena kuin tapahtumat oikeasti tapahtuivat, vaan se miltä asiat näyttävät. Länsimaissakin tunnetaan sanonta "Älä anna tosiasioiden pilata hyvää tarinaa".

Venäläisessä kulttuurissa asia vaan on viety paljon pidemmälle. Venäjän kielessä on kaksi totuuta kuvaavaa sanaa, istina tarkoittaa totuutta länsimaisessa mielessä, sitä miten asiat ovat tai miten ne ovat tapahtuneet. Sen sijaan sana pravda tarkoittaa sitä miten asiat pitää ymmärtää tai kuinka niiden pitäisi olla.

Kun Putin tai oikeastaan useimmat Venäjän federaation kansalaiset puhuvat vaikka Ukrainasta, on kyse nimenomaan pravdasta. Venäläisessä kulttuurissa vallitsee jatkuva jännite pravdan ja istinan välillä. Ja eräät kirjoittajat ovatkin sitä mieltä, että Neuvostoliiton romahdutti se, että 1980-luvulla ristiriita istinan ja pravdan välillä kasvoi liian suureksi. Tarina menetti uskottavuutensa.

Suomalaiset ovat tässä informaatiopelissä altavastaajina, koska meidän kulttuurimme tuntee vain istinan kaltaisen totuuskäsityksen. Sen sijaan jokainen venäläinen osaa hämätä. Venäläinen on huomattavasti monisyisempi ja viekkaampi, kuin totuusrajoitteinen suomalainen ja pesee jopa välimeren humpuukkikansat mennen tullen. Viholliselle valehtelu ei ole kiellettyä ja se suorastaan on hyve. Länsimaissa kuten Suomessa tuollaista käytöstä ei ymmärretä. Sen sijaan venäjällä valehtelu, juonittelu ja pettäminen koetaan täysin hyväksytyksi keinoksi ulkoisia tai sisäisiä vastustajia kohtaan.

Kun Putin puhuu venäläisille Ukrainan kriisistä tärkeintä ei ole se, että faktat ovat kohdillaan, vaan se, että johtaja luo uskottavan tarinan ja liittää sen osaksi Venäjän ideaa. Novorossija ei ole mikään kansallisen itsemäärimisoikeuden loukkaus, vaan alueen venäläiset integroidaan osaksi euraasialaista yhteisöä.

Ylipäätänsä kannattaa muistaa, että ihminen on ennenkaikkea tunneolento, joka haluaa merkitystä ja järjestystä elämäänsä.